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Energy Security and Net Zero Committee

UK climate leadership at a crossroad

Fifth Report of Session 2026–27

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Energy Security and Net Zero Committee

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Summary

Climate change was first accepted as a global problem that needed a collective solution at the 1992 Earth Summit. The 2015 Paris Agreement set the ambition to hold the increase in the global average temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and seek to limit this increase to 1.5°C. Restoring the UK's climate leadership is a key tenet of the Labour Party's Manifesto, proposing a two-pronged strategy pledging to "reset at home" and "reconnect abroad".

Our inquiry scrutinised the status of the UK's international climate leadership. We explored the importance of domestic delivery on both climate mitigation and adaptation for international credibility, the evolving UK's contribution to international climate finance, scopes for strengthened collaborations in a fragmented world characterised by entangled climate actions and geopolitics and avenues to strengthen the formulation and delivery of joined-up policies involving two or more departments.

Further actions are needed to demonstrate credible domestic delivery on both mitigation and adaptation. Upholding the integrity of the Climate Change Act and independent oversight by the Climate Change Committee is paramount to maintain the robustness of the science-policy interface but, on its own, is not enough. We recommend the establishment of a National Framework for Climate Services as an immediate step to improve delivery of domestic climate adaptation measures. We also recommend the government provides a plan, measures and legislation to deliver on lagging performance and emerging priorities with regard to the UK's domestic action on climate change adaptation. We also urge the government to use UK climate risk assessments to rate how climate-related policies across sectors impact those risks, using a quarterly-updated traffic light system. We recommend DESNZ to immediately publish a clear electrification strategy to close the 2030 NDC implementation gap and strengthen credibility for the domestic delivery of international commitments to reduce emissions at home.

The delivery of the UK share of international climate finance requires focusing on impactful implementation of Paris-aligned mitigation and adaptation considering context-specific needs and vulnerabilities. We recommend the government publishes, within six months, a single cross-government delivery plan for international climate finance, to detail clear multi-year finance commitments and a dedicated adaptation target. We

also recommend the government provides, within the annual statement on the State of Climate and Nature, an update on the UK's international climate commitments, including delivery plans and milestones for each initiative.

Energy security and climate security concerns are only likely to grow rather than shrink. We urge the government to develop and publish a UK roadmap on phasing out fossil fuels before the 2nd International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in the Pacific in July 2027 and to take the lead in reframing the scope and remit of the Global Clean Power Alliance (GCPA). It could begin by making the integrated consideration of energy security and climate security challenges central to its G20 Presidency in 2027.

Despite promises that a mission-driven approach would enable more joined-up policies, challenges in cross-departmental delivery on cross-cutting issues call for a new approach for government-led interventions to address climate change. The persistent opacity of the original mission boards and their delivery-focused forums successors prevent the necessary level of transparency as a very basic enabler of the accountability owed by the executive to the House, through its select committees.

Introduction

1. Climate change was first accepted as a global problem that needed a collective solution at the 1992 Earth Summit. Rooted in multilateralism, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) Conferences of Parties (COPs) have since provided a platform for consensus-based decision-making providing a framework for countries to set ambitions, negotiate and coordinate their actions. The 2015 Paris Agreement[1] represented a significant moment of international coordination to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions and adapt to climate impacts. It set an overarching goal to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit this increase to 1.5°C. To achieve this, 195 member states agreed to the complementary goal of balancing anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions by sources with their removal by sinks in the second half of this century. This goal, often expressed as 'net zero[2] by 2050', aims to deliver mitigation pathways that are scientifically-compatible with the 1.5°C limit in the context of sustainable development.[3]

2. In passing the Climate Change Act 2008,[4] the UK was the first country to set out a legal framework of national carbon budgets and legally-binding mitigation targets and to introduce mandatory five-yearly national climate risk assessments and national adaptation programmes. It was also the first major economy to put the net zero target into law[5] and to halve its greenhouse-gas emissions.[6]

3. The Climate Change Act also established the Climate Change Committee (CCC) as an independent body to provide scientific advice to the UK and devolved governments, promoting evidence-based policy-making on climate action. The science-policy interface and the architecture set up

1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris Agreement, last accessed 20 August 2026

2 House of Commons Library, "Net zero emissions: A new UK climate change target?", 19 October 2018

3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Mitigation Pathways Compatible with 1.5°C in the Context of Sustainable Development, in IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C, 8 October 2018

4 Climate Change Act 2008, last accessed 30 July 2026

5 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, "UK becomes first major economy to pass net zero emissions law", 27 June 2019

6 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, "UK first major economy to halve emissions", 6 February 2024

via the Climate Change Act and the CCC have formed the key pillar of the UK's leadership and international influence,[7] providing a model for other countries to emulate. Around 60 other countries have adopted their own climate legislation[8] and 31 national expert bodies officially mandated to advise their governments on climate policy are currently part of the International Climate Councils Network.[9] Glasgow-hosted COP26[10] also provided the opportunity for the UK to build on its track-record of championing climate science in international negotiations[11] and to leverage its convening role and diplomatic influence,[12] setting high ambitions and encouraging progress towards commitments on mitigation, adaptation, and climate finance.[13] Today, 138 countries have national-level net zero targets, covering 74% of global emissions and 77% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which rises to over 80% when counting commitments by sub-national governments.[14]

4. The country's reputation as a global climate leader suffered damage during the 2022–2024 Sunak Conservative Government after the CCC confirmed that weakening of key policies put at risk both its domestic and international goals.[15] Legal challenges by civil society also led to two High Court rulings against the Sunak government's net zero strategies and climate plans.[16] Restoring the UK's climate leadership is a key tenet of the Labour Party's Manifesto, recognising that addressing the climate and nature crisis requires co-ordinated action, and proposes a two-pronged strategy pledging to "reset at home" and "reconnect abroad".[17] Rt Hon Ed Miliband MP, previously Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, championed Labour's Clean Energy Superpower mission seeking to accelerate the UK's energy transition and strengthen energy security though homegrown resources. He previously emphasised that the UK's domestic

7 For example, Q17 [Dr Neil Grant]; Dr Liyun Zhang et al., University of Birmingham(ICP0056), Dr Matilda Becker et al., University of Oxford (ICP0040); Met Office (ICP0069); Wellcome Trust (ICP0041)

8 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022), WWF UK (ICP0050), Climate Change Committee, "The Seventh Carbon Budget", 26 February 2025

9 International Climate Councils Network, last accessed 18 August 2026

10 Cabinet Office, "COP26 Presidency Outcomes", 30 November 2022

11 For example, Wellcome Trust (ICP0041), Prof Chrispas Nyombi and Dr Eghosa Ekhator, University of Derby (ICP0005)

12 For example, Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford (ICP0040), Dr Anandadeep Mandal, University of Birmingham (ICP0001), Dr Tariq Umar, University of the West of England (ICP0020)

13 Prof Chrispas Nyombi and Dr Eghosa Ekhator, University of Derby UK (ICP0005)

14 Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, Data-Driven EnviroLab, NewClimate Institute, Oxford Net Zero, Net Zero Tracker, last accessed 25 August 2026

15 Climate Change Committee, 2023 Progress Report to Parliament, 28 June 2023

16 Friends of the Earth. "High Court judgment on government's climate plan", 03 May 2024

17 Labour Party, "Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024", 13 June 2024

leadership continues to work on the international stage, reaffirming commitments to multilateral climate action, the Paris agreement and 1.5°C at last year's COP30 in Belém, Brazil.[18]

5. In November 2025, we launched our International Climate Policy inquiry to explore the status of the UK's international climate leadership amid pledges from the new government to reset at home and reconnect abroad.[19] We received more than 70 pieces of written evidence from a wide range of stakeholders, including academics, think-tanks, non-governmental organisations, charities, trade associations, businesses, local authorities as well as public sector bodies. We also held two oral evidence sessions in June and July 2026, in which we questioned 13 individual witnesses, concluding with Climate Minister Katie White OBE MP (DESNZ), the UK Special Representative for Climate Rachel Kyte (DESNZ/FCDO) and the Director for International Climate Finance and Strategy, Matt Toombs (DESNZ). We are very grateful to everyone who participated in this inquiry, especially those who provided formal written submissions and/or attended oral evidence hearings.

6. Geopolitical and climatic events during 2026 also informed and shaped our inquiry. Besides challenges posed by the withdrawal of the USA from several climate agreements,[20] the global oil crisis that resulted from the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz have heightened energy security concerns. Opening this year's London Climate Action Week, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned against the twin climate and energy crises driven by fossil fuel dependence and called for a rapid transition to clean energy, stronger adaptation measures and significantly higher climate finance.[21] In his new roles as secretary of Foreign Secretary and UK Governor to the World Bank, Rt Hon Ed Miliband MP has vowed to "reinvigorate climate diplomacy"[22] and lead on international development and climate finance.[23] The new Prime Minister, Rt Hon Andy Burnham MP, also promised that the Government would meet the climate challenge and has confirmed that he would attend this year's COP31 in Antalya, Turkey.[24]

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18 Q658 [Ed Miliband] Energy Security and Net Zero Committee, Work of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 11 February 2026

19 ESNZ Committee, ESNZ new inquiry: UK domestic and international climate policy, 6 November 2025

20 Dialogue Earth, "COP30 chief says climate implementation can't wait for consensus", 26 March 2026

21 United Nations Sustainable Development Group, 'A Tale of Two Crises' - UN Secretary-General at London Climate Action Week, 23 June 2026

22 Financial Times, How will UK foreign policy change under Ed Miliband?, 21 July 2026

23 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, UK strengthens commitment to global development as Foreign Secretary becomes UK Governor to the World Bank, 27 July 2026

24 Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, PM statement to the House of Commons, 1 September 2026

1 Credible domestic delivery

Climate mitigation

7. The Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ) told us that domestic leadership is essential to persuade others to act and protect future generations from climate breakdown.[25] In line with the Paris Agreement,[26] the UK's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), reflect the country's ambition to meet the collective goals of holding the increase in the global average temperature below 2°C, compared to pre-industrial levels, and limiting this increase to 1.5°C. The UK's first NDC targets sought to reduce economy-wide greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions by at least 68% below 1990 levels by 2030[27] while the second NDC ratcheted up ambitions to a reduction of 81% GHG emissions by 2035,[28] broadly aligning with the national carbon budgets.[29] DESNZ wrote that commitments in the NDCs represent the fastest pledged emission reduction rate of any major economy, asserting that they are an "ambitious, fair and credible contribution to global action on climate change".[30] According to Climate Action Tracker's independent assessment of modelled domestic pathways, the UK and Norway are the only two countries whose 2035 NDCs are consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C.[31]

8. As one of the largest historic polluters,[32] the UK's international credibility depends on its success in reducing emissions at home.[33] There was a consensus among written and oral evidence in this inquiry that the early

25 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
26 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris Agreement, last accessed 20 August 2026
27 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero and Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, "UK's 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) emissions reduction target under the Paris Agreement", last updated 23 September 2022
28 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution", 30 January 2025
29 E3G (ICP0068)
30 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
31 Climate Action Tracker, United Kingdom, last updated 28 October 2025
32 Our World in Data, Which countries have contributed the most to historical CO_2 emissions?, 17 March 2025
33 For example, Professor Rowan Sutton (Director at Met Office Hadley Centre) (ICP0070), E3G (ICP0068), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038)

submission of, and enhanced ambition in, the 2035 NDC strengthened the country's leadership in international commitments but that bold delivery is necessary to maintain credibility.[34] According to academics at the University of Oxford, the decline of the UK's relative geopolitical influence and economic weight implies that "soft power" credibility becomes the country's currency, which may be earned by being a leader on climate.[35] We have been told that leadership is no longer measured primarily by ambition or rhetoric[36] or who sets the target first[37] and that credible domestic delivery requires coherence and continuity as evidenced by demonstrable impacts.[38] Stakeholders agreed that upholding the integrity of the Climate Change Act,[39] legally-binding carbon budgets and independent oversight by the Climate Change Committee (CCC) is paramount in maintaining the UK's leadership credentials and in sustaining delivery across political cycles.[40] Domestic implementation of countries' NDCs is not legally enforceable under the Paris Agreement but, for the UK, those emission reduction targets broadly mirror the statutory national carbon budgets,[41] providing the foundations for continuity and credible domestic delivery grounded in climate science.[42] The Wellcome Trust told us:

> The UK's credibility in international climate policy rests not only on ambition, but on proof that commitments translate into outcomes and implementation, as our climate policy infrastructure supported us to become the first major economy to halve emissions in 2024.[43]

We heard that domestic results and consistency with emissions reductions so far have helped demonstrate internationally that climate action and economic growth can go hand-in-hand and reinforce each other.[44] For the energy sector specifically, emission reduction came with a complete phase-

34 For example, Q7 [Dr Neil Grant], Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford (ICP0040), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038), Green Alliance (ICP0067)
35 Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford (ICP0040),
36 Dr Tariq Umar, University of the West of England, (ICP0020)
37 Q3 [Dr Zhang]
38 For example, Q39 [Eliot Whittington], Wellcome Trust (ICP0041); Muslim Charities Forum (ICP0036); Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford (ICP0040); Dr Liyun Zhang et al., University of Birmingham (ICP0056); UKELA (UK Environmental Law Association) (ICP0030); Dr Lukas Slothuus and Prof. Peter Newell, University of Sussex (ICP0035)
39 Climate Change Act 2008, last accessed 30 July 2026
40 Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford (ICP0040)
41 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022), E3G (ICP0068)
42 For example, Q3 [Dr Zhang] ,Professor Sylvester Kaczmarek (ICP0012), Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford, (ICP0040), Dr Liyun Zhang et al. University of Birmingham (ICP0056); Dr Lukas Slothuus and Prof. Peter Newell, University of Sussex (ICP0035)
43 Wellcome Trust (ICP0041)
44 Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford (ICP0040), E3G (ICP0068), Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)

out of coal-fired electricity generation[45] and a profound transformation of the UK power system, providing a global example of how climate action can support modernisation, investment and a more resilient energy system.[46] The Clean Power Plan,[47] if delivered on time and with stable or level bills , would also be a huge statement to the rest of the world of what is possible with credible, consistent change.[48] DESNZ told us that the policies and proposals in the Carbon Budget and Growth Delivery Plan[49] to deliver carbon budgets 4–6 keep the UK on track to meet the 2030 and 2035 NDCs on the pathway to net zero by 2050.[50] However, witnesses emphasised persistent gaps between ambitious commitments and progress in implementation.[51] Despite progress over the last two years[52] and policies that are "finally fit for purpose",[53] the Climate Change Committee has called for strengthened delivery over the next year to keep the 2030 NDC's target in reach, with the pace of emissions reduction needing to almost double.[54] Recommendations include a more ambitious electrification plan, particularly for buildings, surface transport, and industry, including continued progress towards low-carbon electricity and an accelerated roll-out of electric vehicles, heat pumps, and industrial electrification. Dr Eoin Devane, Acting Director for Net Zero at the CCC recently told the Environmental Audit Committee:

> The UK has been seen as a sort of leader on climate action. That is both because we have been good at putting policy frameworks and targets in place, and because we have been good at delivery. […] Failing to deliver on the 2030 NDC—which, I remind you, is the first target that is set in line with the 2050 net zero commitment—would send a troubling message about our ability to deliver against those targets.[55]

45 Carbon Brief, "How the UK became the first G7 country to phase out coal power", 27 September 2024

46 E3G (ICP0068)

47 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Clean Power 2030 Action Plan, last updated 15 April 2025

48 Q20 [Dr Neil Grant]

49 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, "Carbon budget and growth delivery plan", last updated 23 June 2026

50 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)

51 For example, Q10 [Dr Liyun Zhang], Q22 [Dr Neil Grant], Mrs Anna Ruddy (Director at ACS Air Conditioning and C-Bon) (ICP0016)

52 Q2 [Dr Neil Grant]

53 Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) (ICP0066)

54 Climate Change Committee, Progress in reducing emissions 2026 report to Parliament, 24 June 2026

55 27 [Dr Eoin Devane], Environmental Audit Committee, Progress on climate change mitigation, 9 September 2026

Climate adaptation

9. Credible domestic delivery on climate actions means delivering on both mitigation and adaptation. Adaptation is not a substitute for mitigation, but the UK must, at a minimum, prepare for weather extremes of 2°C global temperature increase levels by 2050.[56] The Climate Change Act's pioneering framework of mandatory five-yearly national risk assessments and national adaptation programmes[57] positioned the UK as a leader in establishing the legislative framework, regulatory and knowledge infrastructure for national-level adaptation, underpinned by the CCC's independent advice on those risks.[58] The UK's NDCs do not include measures on how the country plans to prepare for climate impacts and support adaptation overseas, referring to separate Adaptation Communications submitted to the UNFCCC.[59] The last Adaptation Communication was produced in 2020 as a cross-departmental document involving DESNZ, DEFRA, the FCDO, the then DBEIS, as well as the devolved governments in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.[60] Our call for evidence asked how important domestic delivery on climate action and climate governance was to the UK's climate leadership on the global stage.[61] DESNZ did not consider domestic adaptation in its submission to our inquiry.[62]

10. We heard that the UK's international leadership and credibility on climate adaptation rests on commitments to lead by example both at home and in its support of vulnerable nations.[63] The CCC found that the Third National Adaptation Programme for the 2023–2028 period fell short of preparing this country for climate change impacts,[64] suggesting that adaptation was not yet a top priority across government. Despite the robustness of scientific evidence on climate risks informing policy,[65] Professor Rowan Sutton, Director of the Met Office Hadley Centre, told us that current UK infrastructure is not adapted to the current climate, let alone the climate

56 Climate Change Committee, A Well-Adapted UK: The Fourth Independent Assessment of UK Climate Risk, 20 May 2026
57 Climate Change Act 2008, last accessed 30 July 2026
58 University College London (UCL) (ICP0013)
59 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland's 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution", 30 January 2025
60 DESNZ/DEFRA /FCDO/DBEIS/ Northern Ireland Executive/The Scottish Government and Welsh Government, The UK's Adaptation Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2020, 12 December 2020
61 ESNZ Committee, ESNZ new inquiry: UK domestic and international climate policy, 6 November 2025
62 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
63 University College London (UCL) (ICP0013)
64 Climate Change Committee, "Progress in adapting to climate change: 2025 report to Parliament", 30 April 2025
65 Met Office (ICP0069)

that is to come.[66] Witnesses agreed that the failure to act on climate adaptation at domestic level and incorporate measures that have been recommended or required as part of the Climate Change Act undermine the UK's international leadership.[67] Prof. Lisa Vanhala from University College London told us:

> The UK's climate adaptation leadership is eroding with the slowing or stagnation of domestic progress […] planning for adaptation is piecemeal and siloed across government departments and across scales of governance with many local authorities ill-prepared for the range of expected UK climate risks such as flooding and extreme heat.[68]

11. Many submissions outlined that climate leadership requires broadening the scope beyond NDC commitments and reducing GHG emissions to consider climate change adaptation and interlinkages between climate, nature and biodiversity.[69] We also heard of cascading and systemic climate risks across sectors[70] and of a need for immediate action, while there is still the opportunity to address risks in a way that is inclusive, cost-effective and timely.[71] Prof. Sutton told us understanding adaptation requires assessments based on the most up-to-date and robust data and practices while tackling it necessitates a comprehensive suite of measures across many sectors.[72] The Climate Change Committee recently called for increased ambition from the government, setting out risks, actions, and enablers across 14 key systems including health, land, and the economy and providing clear recommendations and accountability.[73] The CCC found existing visions for adaptation lack meaningful objectives and measurable targets and recommended these to be in place for the next set of national adaptation plans due in 2028.

12. Challenges in the siloed departmental approach for climate change were also confirmed during our inquiry. Amid the third heatwave affecting the UK, Climate Minister Katie White OBE MP told us the UK was "not set up for this new normal",[74] outlining risks and security implications in citizens way of life and with fundamental risks to the country's food, water, and energy systems. Despite conceding that "adaptation has been a poor relation

66 Q26 [Prof. Rowan Sutton]
67 For example, Q25 Q30 [Dr Neil Grant], University College London (UCL) (ICP0013)
68 University College London (UCL) (ICP0013)
69 For example, WWF UK (ICP0050), Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) (ICP0066), Met Office (ICP0069), University College London (UCL) (ICP0013)
70 Q30 [Dr Neil Grant]
71 University College London (UCL) (ICP0013)
72 Q26 [Professor Rowan Sutton]
73 Climate Change Committee, "A Well-Adapted UK: The Fourth Independent Assessment of UK Climate Risk", 20 May 2026
74 Q115 [Katie White]

of mitigation"[75] and that " playing our full part means mitigation and adaptation",[76] she could not elaborate on the Government's approach to the CCC's recommendations because responsibilities for adaptation sit with DEFRA.[77]

13. **CONCLUSION**
We are very concerned by the lack of progress on delivering domestic climate adaptation actions. The current siloing of departmental responsibilities seems to be preventing delivery of the necessary actions for the UK to adapt to the domestic realities of climate impacts affecting this country and its people. Failures to act on the Climate Change Committee's recommendations and deliver on domestic adaptation challenge the UK's credibility and potentially contrast with the country's track record and future ambition to lead by example.

Harnessing stakeholders in domestic delivery

14. A coherent policy framework can help harness the contribution of various stakeholders[78] in domestic delivery of climate mitigation and adaptation. Written and oral evidence outlined how local authorities, cities, regions, businesses, investors, civil society, communities, households and individuals are increasingly involved in climate action. Initiatives launched around the UK-hosted COP26, such as the Race to Zero campaign[79] and the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero[80] have helped to aggregate and make visible various commitments[81] and a rapidly growing number of regions, cities, local governments and businesses have adopted emission reduction targets.[82] These commitments do not replace the UK government-led NDCs but can contribute to their delivery. We heard that ambitious NDCs can drive investment and innovation but clear rules, consistent policies, a stable regulatory environment and robust mandates are needed to enrol other parts of society and the economy in national-level decarbonisation efforts.[83]

75 Q134 [Katie White]
76 Q137 [Katie White]
77 Qq134–135 [Katie White]
78 UNFCCC - Global Climate Action (NAZCA), United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 22 September 2026
79 Climate High-Level Champions, Net Zero Activation Group, last accessed 22 September 2026
80 Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, last accessed 22 September 2026
81 Dr Anandadeep Mandal, University of Birmingham (ICP0001)
82 Net Zero Tracker, Net Zero Stocktake 2025, 23 September 2025
83 UK Corporate Leaders Group (ICP0052), Ecologi (ICP0009), WWF UK (ICP0050)

Eliot Whittington, Director of the UK Corporate Leaders Group told us credible NDCs are important for businesses and investment and help send a signal of continuity and certainty:

> The key thing is about the delivery and the policies that underpin it, which is where I think there is more focus and emphasis. […] Ultimately, governments are setting the rules and will set the direction of travel, but the private sector has a huge amount to offer.[84]

15. We heard that local delivery is essential to both national and international climate credibility.[85] Evidence we received outlines several proposals to enable local authorities to decarbonise and build resilience to climate impacts.[86] Our previous report "Get connected: How community energy can turbocharge the transition" identified the important role of local authorities and community energy organisations in driving place-based climate actions.[87] Several stakeholders called for more inclusive policy processes at both national and local level to ensure equality, diversity and participation to legitimise effective policies and programmes.[88] The MET Office told us that stakeholder activities can amplify actions signalled by government through policy, especially for adaptation where action happens locally.[89] It suggested a National Framework for Climate Services[90] (NFCS) would strengthen UK leadership in climate action, including with the myriad of stakeholders involved. Prof. Sutton told us an NFCS would establish clear standards for everybody to work within and provide a very powerful mechanism to accelerate adaptation and UK economic leadership.[91] The Centre for Climate Engagement has proposed a "Locally Determined Contributions Framework" to enable local authorities to decarbonise and build resilience to climate impacts. The Minister said this was under consideration.

84 Q39 Q45[Eliot Whittington]
85 Medway Council (ICP0024)
86 Centre for Climate Engagement, Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge (ICP0061)
87 ESNZ Committee, "Get connected: How community energy can turbocharge the transition", 17 June 2026
88 University College London (UCL) (ICP0013) Dr. Pedi Obani (Associate Professor at University of Bradford) (ICP0057)
89 Met Office (ICP0069)
90 UK Climate Resilience Programme, "Recommendations for the UK National Framework for Climate Services", August 2022
91 Q26 [Professor Rowan Sutton], Professor Rowan Sutton (Director at Met Office Hadley Centre) (ICP0072)

16. **CONCLUSION**

The government's ambition to restore the UK's climate leadership on the global stage and the progress made to this end over the last two years are laudable. However, further actions are needed to demonstrate credible domestic delivery on both mitigation and adaptation. Upholding the integrity of the Climate Change Act and independent oversight by the Climate Change Committee is paramount to maintain the robustness of the science-policy interface but, on its own, is not enough. Leading by example on climate mitigation, means matching heightened emission reduction commitments in the 2035 NDC and the Seventh Carbon Budget with the shorter-term delivery of the 2030 NDC pledges.

17. **CONCLUSION**

Piecemeal planning for adaptation starkly contrasts with the net zero push and increased commitments to greenhouse gas emission reduction. Being a climate leader requires delivering on both mitigation and adaptation. Failures in delivering on climate adaptation not only undermine the credentials of science-based policy-making under the Climate Change Act but affects people's welfare. The Climate Change Committee has provided clear recommendations to address the challenges preventing adaptation action at sufficient scale and speed, including meaningful adaptation objectives, supported by targets, and assigned ownership. In the meantime, creating a National Framework for Climate Services could be a way of engaging with the public to help policy and delivery of adaptation measures.

18. **RECOMMENDATION**

Acting on the Climate Change Committee's recommendations will not only uphold the integrity of the UK's science-policy interface but also provide the credibility for enrolling the private sector in national adaptation and decarbonisation efforts.

19. **RECOMMENDATION**
We recommend the establishment of a National Framework for Climate Services as an immediate step to improve delivery of domestic climate adaptation measures. The government must, in this Parliament, also provide a plan, measures and legislation to deliver on lagging performance and emerging priorities with regard to the UK's domestic action on climate change adaptation. The Climate Change Committee has called for delivery plans, backed with the necessary resources to deliver on climate adaptation objectives. Its proposed set of objectives and targets provide the government with a starting point to adapt to a 2°C global warming level by 2050 and must inform the next sets of national plans due in 2028.

20. **RECOMMENDATION**
We urge the Government to use UK climate risk assessments to rate how climate-related policies across sectors impact those risks, using a traffic light system. Given rapidly evolving climate impacts, these ratings should be updated quarterly. This would complement the Climate Change Committee's recommendation for the relevance and adequacy of adaptation objectives to be reviewed regularly, which the five-yearly assessment of the latest evidence of impacts required under the Climate Change Act allow for.

21. **RECOMMENDATION**
We recommend DESNZ to immediately publish a clear electrification strategy to close the 2030 NDC implementation gap and strengthen credibility for the domestic delivery of international commitments to reduce emissions at home.

22. **RECOMMENDATION**
We recommend that the department report back to this Committee on the conclusions of their consideration of proposals for a "Locally Determined Contributions Framework" and their reasons for those conclusions.

2 International Climate Finance

The UK's International Climate Finance (ICF)

23. International climate finance (ICF) is the cornerstone of the global climate governance architecture. ICF is founded upon the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) which underpin the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement and relevant international law[92] and reflect different national circumstances and historical emissions. In short, industrialised countries have broadly accepted they bear greater responsibility in leading on climate mitigation, including the provision of finance and other support to lower-income countries for the pursuit of low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways.[93] The UK has previously championed increased funding to support climate actions in developing countries, demonstrating leadership in the allocation of ICF as an important part of Official Development Assistance (ODA).[94] The UK also supported the recently-adopted UN resolution[95] backing the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) landmark advisory opinion on the obligations of states in respect of climate change.[96] The joint DESNZ/DEFRA/FCDO third international climate finance strategy documented the planned delivery of the UK's £11.6 billion ICF commitment from 2021–22 to 2025–26.[97] According to the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI), the third ICF funding

92 Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh and Sarah Mead, "The Cambridge Handbook on Climate Litigation", 3 June 2025

93 For example, Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038), Population Matters (ICP0054), UKELA (UK Environmental Law Association) (ICP0030), Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)

94 Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059)

95 UN, "General Assembly Strengthens Fight against Climate Change, Adopting Contentious, Yet Broadly Supported Draft among Several Texts on Myriad topics", 20 May 2026

96 Carbon Brief, "ICJ: What the world court's landmark opinion means for climate change", 25 July 2025

97 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs and Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "UK International Climate Finance Strategy", 30 March 2023

allocation performed relatively well overall for effectiveness and value for money.[98] However, successive cuts under both Conservative and Labour governments have seen the UK's ODA spending fall from its domestic statutory target of 0.7% of gross national income to 0.5% (during the covid pandemic), and to 0.3% planned for 2027–28 (to pay for increased defence spending commitments). DESNZ told us that the UK remains committed to meeting its international obligations, outlining that reducing emissions, building climate resilience and supporting communities to adapt to climate impacts is "crucial to deliver energy security today and climate security for future generations".[99]

24. We heard that cuts to ODA, failure to provide climate finance that is new and additional, decreasing provision of vital grant finance and accounting changes have all undermined the country's leadership in recent years.[100] Many written submissions called for an increase in ICF funding, supporting both mitigation and adaptation, to sustain the UK's credibility.[101] Citing the ICJ's ruling, Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) reminded us that climate finance "is not discretionary aid but an obligation rooted in international law".[102]

25. Calls for the UK's ICF contributions to be stepped up further, stem from the country's responsibility as one of the largest historical emitters. Contrasting with DESNZ's assertion that commitments in the UK's 2030 and 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) represent a "fair and credible contribution to global action on climate change",[103] many stakeholders referred to Climate Action Tracker's independent assessment of the NDCs as a "highly insufficient" fair share in global terms.[104] Witnesses emphasised that debates about what is an appropriate fair share relate to equity,[105] considering cumulative historical emissions and existing capacities. Dr Neil Grant,[106] senior expert on mitigation pathways at Climate Action Tracker, told us that cuts in climate finance, combined with inflation and changes in accounting, means that the UK's climate finance contributions, will be down

98 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)
99 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
100 Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059), Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031), International Development Committee, "UK International Climate Finance: Sustaining Commitments and Impact Amid a Shrinking Aid Budget", 17 September 2026
101 See for example, Greenpeace UK (ICP0038), Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059), ActionAid UK (ICP0043), UK Corporate Leaders Group (ICP0052), Ecologi (ICP0009)
102 Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059)
103 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
104 Climate Action Tracker, United Kingdom, last updated 28 October 2025
105 For example, Q5 [Professor Sutton], Q7 [Dr Neil Grant], Q39 [Catherine Pettengell], Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038)
106 Q7 [Dr Neil Grant]

about 50% in the next few years. He argued that strengthened NDC pledges need to be backed up by delivery on both domestic emission reduction targets and support overseas:

> It is impossible to talk about the UK's leadership without bringing those two things together. It is the balance of what we are doing at home and what we are doing elsewhere that really matters.

A new strategy for UK climate finance

26. The fourth ICF funding allocation,[107] disclosed earlier this year, signals a change for the UK's approach to international climate finance. It allocates £6 billion of ODA as ICF for the next three financial years, promising to balance support between mitigation and adaptation and to maintain a strong focus on nature. Ambitions to "continue to lead internationally", come with a shift in the UK's role from traditional donor to investor.[108] An additional £6.7 billion is pledged with the aim of mobilising private sector participation, including by leveraging the City of London's position as the world's green finance capital. The joint FCDO/DESNZ/DEFRA ICF4 strategy presents climate finance as an essential investment in the UK's long-term national security and prosperity, focusing on four priority areas.[109] Matt Toombs, Director for International Climate Finance and Strategy at DESNZ, told us the government would look not only at ODA spending but also other public levers, including UK Export Finance, British International Investment, and guarantees to ensure multilateral development banks support the delivery of the UK's international climate finance commitments.[110]

27. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) wrote that repeated changes to climate finance accounting and domestic net zero policy shifts have eroded international trust in the UK's climate leadership.[111] ICAI also found persistent challenges in the management of the third ICF spending targets and cross-departmental coordination, including blurred responsibilities between the FCDO and DESNZ, the two main delivery departments, which have led to institutional tension, uncertainty and fragmented implementation.[112] Rt Hon Yvette Cooper MP, then Foreign

107 FCDO, DESNZ, DEFRA/DSIT, "International Climate Finance", last updated 24 June 2026
108 FCDO/DESNZ/DEFRA "International Climate Finance Strategy 2026", 22 June 2026
109 The four priority areas in the ICF4 strategy are: 1) Mobilise public and private finance at scale for climate and nature outcomes, 2) Transform the global energy system to deliver clean and affordable energy for all, 3) Accelerate a transition to climate-resilient communities, economies and ecosystems, 4) Safeguard and sustain nature, including forests, oceans and coastal, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems
110 Q114 [Matt Toombs]
111 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)
112 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031), Independent Commission for Aid Impact, "UK aid for energy transition", 5 November 2025

Secretary, identified building UK energy security through the green transition and developing worldwide climate security as top priorities.[113] But Dr Matt Webb, Associate Director for Global Clean Power Diplomacy at E3G, told us that international climate actions need to see a doubling down and trebling of pace over the next two years and called for concrete actions to enable the swift delivery of the £6.7 billion non-ODA finance:

> Practically, how will that be structured with the support of the City of London and institutions to drive delivery within the next two or three years? We do not have the time to sit around doing reviews and reports. Public finance takes at best four or five years from inception through to delivery. We have to get on with it now.[114]

28. It is also unclear how the new strategy will deliver on the UK's adaptation commitments and pledges to support the most vulnerable countries which are experiencing the worst climate impacts. DESNZ told us that the government is committed to the global goal of $300 billion climate finance and to tripling adaptation finance for global south countries by 2035.[115] UK Climate Representative, Rachel Kyte told us:

> Between now and Antalya [COP 31], we need to have a much better offer, together with all other developed countries, on how to finance the costs of adaptation. This is a flashpoint, and we are doing work on that within FCDO with DESNZ and DEFRA.[116]

29. Despite the government's commitments to triple its own adaptation finance contribution from £500m in 2019 to £1.5 billion by 2025, as part of the £11.6 billion ICF3,[117] many witnesses identified discrepancies between the financing of adaptation and mitigation interventions.[118] ICAI has warned that the government pledge to boost adaptation finance with an informal benchmark of a 40/60 split share between adaptation and mitigation within the total ICF pot, risked falling short of the UK's commitments. In practice, the delivery of ICF funding has favoured mitigation, which has led to a focus on supporting higher emitting middle-income countries via mitigation-oriented concessional loans while adaptation goals were not systematically pursued beyond the energy sector.[119] Climate Action Network UK told us:

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113 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, "Britain's place in the new world order: Foreign Secretary's Chatham House essay", 6 July 2026

114 Q91, Q88 [Dr Matt Webb]

115 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)

116 Q112 [Rachel Kyte]

117 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)

118 See for example, ActionAid UK (ICP0043), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038), University College London (UCL) (ICP0013), Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059)

119 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)

Given the considerable gap that remains between adaptation and mitigation finance - and political attention - this leadership must not waver, and the UK must redouble efforts to significantly increase adaptation finance, while also providing additional finance for loss and damage.[120]

Mobilising the private sector

30. The lack of clarity on expectations for the private sector to fill the international climate finance gaps is of concern. Historically, the ICF has supported sizeable portfolios in several areas, including clean energy and the energy transition, and helped mobilise additional public and private finance via development finance institutions and blended finance arrangements.[121] UK Climate Representative, Rachel Kyte, told us that the industry-led Emerging Markets and Developing Economies Investor Taskforce[122] co-sponsored by the Treasury and the FCDO is currently working out how to translate the private finance objective into deliverables and encourage British asset owners and insurers to invest in developing countries' infrastructure.[123] Several stakeholders agreed that businesses and financial institutions could contribute to the delivery of UK international climate finance but outlined that political certainty, backed by government spending, is necessary to incentivise meaningful private sector engagement.[124] We heard of a "long wish list" of what needs to happen to mobilise private finance and engage it in supporting the transition.[125] Several witnesses acknowledged the potential role of financial institutions but called for clearer signals, rules and incentives to ensure financial flows are aligned with Paris Agreement objectives rather than reward more lucrative short-termism supporting fossil fuels.[126] Richard Folland, Head of Capital Markets Policy at Carbon Tracker Initiative, told us that Ed Milliband, in his then position as the Energy Secretary, was sending a very strong signal to investors around clean power but financial institutions also needed signals that the Treasury and the Bank of England are buying in:

120 Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059)
121 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)
122 The Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change, "UK Government and Financial Leaders Launch Taskforce to Support Global Economic Growth and Tackle Climate Change", 16 May 2025
123 Q112 [Rachel Kyte]
124 For example,Q55 Q58 [Rogier van den Berg], Ecologi (ICP0009), WWF UK (ICP0050) , UK Corporate Leaders Group (ICP0052)
125 Q54 [Eliot Whittington]
126 Q33 Q36 [Dr Neil Grant], Qq85–86 Q90[Richard Folland], Q87[Ana Yang], Q88 [Dr Matt Webb], Carbon Tracker Initiative (ICP0048), Dr Lukas Slothuus and Prof. Peter Newell, University of Sussex) (ICP0035)

> I will single out here the importance of asset owners, pension funds. This is where the deep pools of capital lie if you are talking about shifting financial flows. […] They need stronger and more consistent policy signals but also messaging, with a whole-of-government approach.[127]

31. Mobilising private finance to address climate change, while laudable amid budget cuts, is not a panacea for all needs in all contexts. We heard that careful considerations are needed when considering blended or commercial instruments.[128] Large volumes of private capital successfully mobilised by the British International Investment and the Private Infrastructure Development Group are generally more effective for mitigation interventions and large-scale energy transitions, especially in middle-income countries,[129] than for adaptation. While accepting that DESNZ recognises the application of financial instruments is not a one-size-fits-all approach,[130] many stakeholders warned against over-reliance on the private sector to support climate adaptation and ensure sufficient support for low-income, highly vulnerable countries.[131] Grants and concessional public finance are better suited for adaptation, particularly in Least Developed Countries, Small Island Developing States and highly vulnerable communities because of their limited debt-carrying capacity and weak revenue generation.[132] While an increasing share of the UK ICF is channelled as loans,[133] many stakeholders warned that these increase the debt burden of recipients and are not well suited to the needs of the poorest and most climate-vulnerable countries, calling for reforms to raise funding through fair "polluter pays" taxation.[134] Catherine Pettengell, Chief Executive of Climate Action Network UK , told us:

127 Q85 [Richard Folland]
128 For example, Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031), Mercy Corps (ICP0039), ActionAid UK (ICP0043), techUK (ICP0049), Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (ICP0053)
129 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)
130 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
131 Q58 [Catherine Pettengell], Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031), Independent Commission for Aid Impact, "UK aid for energy transition", November 2025,
132 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)
133 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031), Independent Commission for Aid Impact, "UK aid for energy transition", November 2025
134 See for example, Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK) (ICP0059), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038), UKELA (UK Environmental Law Association) (ICP0030), Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund (ICP0053), Stamp Out Poverty (ICP0060)

> The grant finance provision that developed countries need to provide to developing countries is the cornerstone of how we make this happen for the majority of the world. [...] Tens of billions of pounds could be raised each year in the UK with fair polluter pays taxes that do not unfairly cost UK households.[135]

32. ICAI has recommended a more comprehensive strategic approach across government, particularly as budgets are squeezed.[136] Despite longstanding political commitment and substantial ICF allocations to work on energy transitions in the global south, ICAI found that the portfolio has evolved through a learning-by-doing approach, rather than a shared cross-government strategy, with a lack of a comprehensive operational plan.[137] Rt Hon Sir Keir Starmer KCB KC MP, then Prime Minister, claimed that the UK-led Global Clean Power Alliance (GCPA) was a flagship to restore the country's climate leadership on the global stage, which would boost the world's clean energy transition.[138] However, academics at the University of Sussex argued that there is a lack of clarity on how the GCPA can function as a tool for international climate finance.[139] They suggested that the GCPA should challenge the idea that derisking private capital is the only route to decarbonisation and focus instead on public finance and public ownership in the energy system. Matt Webb attributed the lack of pace in the delivery of the GCPA finance and supply chain missions to insufficient political backing at leader- and Foreign Secretary-level to drive the initiative through:

> There simply has not been the urgency and the seniority of delivery at the top political level since Labour came in.[140]

33. **CONCLUSION**

International Climate Finance has become the Achilles' heel of UK climate leadership on the global stage. Challenges in the cross-departmental delivery of ICF3 funding and successive budget cuts that have led the UK's ODA contribution to collapse to 0.3% of GNI by 2027 are a far cry from the UK meeting its "fair share" of responsibility in addressing climate change. The new ICF4 strategy leaves too many blank spaces on how the new strategic focus of collaboration with the private sector will be delivered on the scale required.

135 Q58 [Catherine Pettengell]
136 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)
137 Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICP0031)
138 Labour Party, "Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024", 13 June 2024, Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, "Prime Minister launches Global Clean Power Alliance as UK leads the global energy transition", 19 November 2024
139 Dr Lukas Slothuus and Professor Peter Newell, University of Sussex (ICP0035)
140 Q91 [Dr Matt Webb]

34. **CONCLUSION**

The delivery of the UK share of international climate finance requires focusing on impactful implementation of Paris-aligned mitigation and adaptation considering context-specific needs and vulnerabilities. While leveraging the private sector and involving the City of London is laudable amid budget cuts, neither blended finance nor loans are suitable instruments to address the important adaptation needs of vulnerable countries and people. ICF is a key differentiator in terms of the UK's global role. A strategic approach to delivery means explicitly stating how ICF4 will be delivered and by whom.

35. **RECOMMENDATION**

We urge the Government to publish, within six months, a single cross-government delivery plan for international climate finance. This should go beyond a single figure in the ICF4 strategy to detail clear multi-year finance commitments and a dedicated adaptation target.

36. **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend the Government provides, within the annual statement on the State of Climate and Nature, an update on the UK's international climate commitments, including delivery plans and milestones for each initiative.

3 Leadership in a fragmented world

Climate multilateralism at a crossroad: from negotiation to implementation

37. Multilateralism is the foundation of international climate policy processes underpinning the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP). The Paris Agreement's[141] ratchet mechanism sets the framework for countries to update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and strengthen collective ambitions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and adapt to climate impacts. The political momentum generated by the first Global Stocktake (GST)[142] outlining bold actions for governments and stakeholders to keep 1.5 °C within reach, led to the COP28 landmark global agreement to "transition away from fossil fuels".[143] However, the global climate consensus has faced unprecedented pressures over recent years. Besides the US' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the Environmental Investigation Agency told us that coordinated attacks on climate science, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) process, and the COP negotiations, particularly around mitigation and the GST, have damaged confidence in multilateral climate action.[144] Last year's COP30, branded the "COP of implementation" by the Brazilian Presidency,[145] aimed to strengthen multilateralism and move climate actions from pledges to real-world impacts.[146] Informed by a five-year vision outlining clear timelines for real-world delivery during the 2025–30 period,[147] the resulting stronger and better-formulated,[148] Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA), was aimed at providing a renewed framework

141 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The Paris Agreement, last accessed 20 August 2026
142 Q83[Prof. Joeri Rogelj] Q80 [Dr Matt Webb]
143 House of Commons Library, "What was agreed at COP28?", 17 January 2024
144 Environmental Investigation Agency (ICP0045)
145 Dialogue Earth, "COP30 chief says climate implementation can't wait for consensus", 26 March 2026
146 House of Commons Library, "What was agreed at COP30?", 3 December 2025
147 UNFCCC, "Global Climate Action Agenda 2026–2030: A five-year vision for accelerating implementation", 9 November 2025
148 Q77 [Dr Matt Webb]

to accelerate action and mobilise a whole-of-society *mutirão* (collective endeavour for the common good), aligning everyone around shared goals.[149] However, ambitions to include roadmaps on *tackling* deforestation and *phasing out* fossil fuels in COP30's final text, did not materialise as no consensus was found. Ana Yang, Director for the Environment and Society Centre at Chatham House, emphasised to us that the future of COP and the UNFCCC has become completely entangled with increased geopolitical rivalry, tensions and conflicts:

> We also see with the Strait of Hormuz and all the different hot wars almost a bifurcation of the petrostates and the electrostates. […] The biggest question is about what implementation looks like. Implementation needs to link to national interests, prosperity and jobs. It also needs to link to the security issue.[150]

38. The evolving international architecture for climate actions and governance creates an opportunity for the UK to contribute from its experience but there is a need to review the country's approach to leadership. DESNZ told us that the Government would continue to support and encourage other countries to come forward with ambitious 1.5°C aligned NDCs, particularly actively engaging with major and emerging heavy emitters.[151] Written and oral evidence pointed towards a consensus on the need to uphold science-based decision-making, protect the Paris Agreement's framework and maintain multilateral and inclusive negotiation processes at annual COPs.[152] However, UK climate diplomacy needs to step up beyond renewed commitments to play a central role in delivering climate actions.[153] We heard that implementation also helps sustaining momentum when political divisions disrupt international cooperation.[154] Dr Matt Webb, Associate Director for Global Clean Power Diplomacy at E3G told us that the Global Climate Action Agenda allows countries to demonstrate that they are going forward faster than their NDCs would indicate:

149 UNFCCC, "Global Climate Action Agenda COP30: outcomes report", 21 November 2025
150 Q76 [Ana Yang]
151 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
152 For example, Q78 [Richard Folland], Q79 [Professor Joeri Rogelj], Environmental Investigation Agency (ICP0045), E3G (ICP0068), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038), Environmental Investigation Agency (ICP0045), Greenpeace UK (ICP0038)
153 For example, Q3 [Dr Liyun Zhang], Q76 [Ana Yang], Q77 [Dr Matt Webb]
154 Dialogue Earth, "COP30 chief says climate implementation can't wait for consensus", 26 March 2026

> [The] delivery phase requires the UK and others to work with a set of new coalitions and actors to get the job done. That is domestic policy delivery, international finance delivery and moving from setting really important commitments through to actually delivering the finance on the ground to build the infrastructure to make the transition happen.[155]

39. The clearer separation between implementation and negotiation that came from COP30 allows smaller coalitions of nations, business and cities with similar interests to move forward together on issues like the energy transition or deforestation.[156] We heard that these "coalitions of the willing" have a catalytic role to play in elevating energy transition-related issues on the international scene, securing additional and stronger commitments over time and supporting the implementation of all member countries.[157] Historically, the UK has demonstrated leadership in agenda-setting through several initiatives, including the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA) and the Global Clean Power Alliance (GCPA). We heard that the growing number of coalitions of the willing, such as the PPCA and the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, over the recent years counteract the weakening state of climate multilateralism[158] but concrete actions and positive outcomes are needed to demonstrate their credibility and value as effective complements to the formal UNFCCC process.[159]

Reframing the global energy transition

40. A greater focus on the implementation of the transition away from fossil fuels at international climate change proceedings has been given impetus by geopolitical conflicts and instability and rising concerns over energy security. Witnesses told us that the Santa Marta process on phasing out fossil fuels,[160] initiated by Columbia and supported by the Netherlands, complements rather than replaces, the contested climate negotiation process.[161] It, however, provided a critical platform for, what Prof. Joeri Rogelj, Director of Research at Grantham Institute, Imperial College, described as "if not political then at least coalitions of practitioners and practice, where we learn from each other to achieve the transition away from fossil fuels".[162] Witnesses agreed that continuity in the Santa Marta

155 Q77 [Dr Matt Webb]
156 Dialogue Earth, "COP30 chief says climate implementation can't wait for consensus", 26 March 2026
157 Environmental Investigation Agency (ICP0045)
158 78 [Richard Folland]
159 Greenpeace UK (ICP0038)
160 1st International Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, last accessed 1 October 2026
161 Q79 [Richard Folland], Q79[Professor Joeri Rogelj], Q84 [Dr Matt Webb]
162 Q79 [Professor Joeri Rogelj]

process should inform the second Global Stocktake (GST2) due to be finalised in 2028 with countries' roadmaps as examples of how things can be done. They emphasised that both the political phase of GST2 and achieving a strong outcome will be difficult, given current political challenges, not only within the UNFCCC but any consensus-based multilateral forum.[163] To maintain political momentum and ensure continuity in the process, the next summit on phasing out fossil fuels will take place in July 2027 in the Pacific island nation of Tuvalu, with support from Ireland.[164]

41. Growing momentum on coalitions of interests towards phasing out fossil fuels provide the opportunity to revive and renew the UK's ambition to lead on the global energy transition. The Global Clean Power Alliance (GCPA) [Chapter2] focuses on incentivising new coalitions towards the delivery of COP28 commitments of tripling renewable energy and doubling energy efficiency. Supporting the global energy transition is also a core priority of the fourth International Climate Finance (ICF4) strategy, which Matt Toombs, Director of International Climate Finance and Strategy at DESNZ illustrated with the example of the UK's offshore wind support to Brazil. However, the GCPA does not mention COP28's objective of transitioning away from fossil fuels in a "just, orderly and equitable manner". Witnesses agreed that the UK needs to play a central role in continuing the political momentum in phasing out fossil fuels created by Brazil and Colombia.[165] The solution-focused process from Santa Marta provides practical solutions from the UK to convene and lead, building on insights from its domestic energy transition, our track-record in becoming the first economy to phase-out coal and our landmark commitments not to issue new oil and gas licences.[166] Richard Folland, Head of Capital Markets Policy at Carbon Tracker, told us that, as an oil and gas producer, the UK can play a constructive role in the processes started in Colombia and be actively involved within this initiative, helping to shape it:

> It is not an alternative—a new way of addressing what is such a major issue for climate. We should focus on the building of a new energy system, but for the transition to be managed and effective, a managed phase out of the old fossil-based system will be required.[167]

163 Q83 Q84 [Professor Joeri Rogelj], Q84 [Dr Matt Webb]
164 Tuvalu and Ireland set out vision for 2027 conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels, 24 September 2026
165 Q77 [Dr Matt Webb]
166 See for example, Dr Lukas Slothuus and Professor Peter Newell, University of Sussex) (ICP0035); Greenpeace UK (ICP0038), Environmental Investigation Agency (ICP0045)
167 Q78 [Richard Folland]

Climate as a diplomatic priority

42. Increased focus on delivery amid geopolitical volatility would mean doing climate diplomacy differently.[168] Several stakeholders outlined how science diplomacy can strengthen partnerships, including with high-emitters, ensuring continuity in collective efforts.[169] For example, active partnerships with a range of countries on climate science have focused on climate risks, climate resilience and early warning systems.[170] We heard that targeting the development of collaborations between the scientific community in the UK and key scientific institutions in high emitting countries such as China and India would not only open channels for conversation but develop joint solutions typically in the energy transition sphere and, food security and energy security areas.[171] In the case of China, for example, common ground on science and shared interests relate not only to climate risks but also drivers of the low carbon economy.[172] Prof. Rowan Sutton, Director, Met Office Hadley Centre, told us that leading collaborative work between the MET Office and the National Energy System Operator on how to build a resilient grid has also sparked interests from other countries.[173]

43. The twin energy and climate crises have also heightened interest in the UK's technical capacities and assistance. We heard that focusing on trade relationships with high-emitters could provide scope to align national interests and the UK should focus on engagement as the "best and more pragmatic way of approaching it".[174] Embedding climate objectives into trade policy would signal to international partners that the UK's transition is an economic reality rather than a purely diplomatic posture.[175] UK Climate Representative, Rachael Kyte, told us that the insecurity around gas and the negative impact of the Strait of Hormuz is reshaping diplomatic relationship beyond diplomacy and free-trade agreements towards technical assistance to support various countries' energy transitions, including shifts to wind power, coal decommissioning and shifts to electricity supply/generation to solar, wind and nuclear:

> We have a conversation going on with Pakistan, as it has gone hard into solar but it was hit by the Strait of Hormuz and it is indebted to China for its coal plants. I could go around the country, but the

168 E3G, "The Road to Antalya", March 2026
169 For example, Q83 [Professor Joeri Rogelj], Q15 Q18 [Professor Sutton], Met Office (ICP0069), Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford) (ICP0040)
170 Q15 [Prof. Rowan Sutton], Met Office (ICP0069)
171 Q83 [Professor Joeri Rogelj
172 Q92 [Richard Folland]
173 Q23 [Professor Rowan Sutton]
174 Q92 [Ana Yang]
175 Dr Liyun Zhang (Research Fellow in Economics at University of Birmingham) (ICP0071)

request is for help from Ofgem and NESO as well as from officials. […] People want what we have, they want to know what has worked and what has not worked as we have developed our transition.[176]

44. Reshaping climate actions around common interests expands leadership and countries' interactions beyond the scope of the UNFCCC negotiation processes. Several stakeholders argued for UK international climate action to become a major diplomatic priority and responsibility for government representatives across portfolios. They outlined that the UK should strengthen its commitment to the UNFCCC process by engaging at all stages of the process, including intercessional and bilateral meetings throughout the year and not just COP summits. Greenpeace told us there should be strong cross-departmental work to align strategy and objectives across different multilateral settings with close communication across delegates representing the UK in different forums.[177] The 2026 King's Speech outlined how the G20 Summit should focus on driving global growth and reinforcing global stability, which is essential for the prosperity of working people across the country.[178] Building on the UK's widely acknowledge convening power,[179] the upcoming 2027 G20 Presidency also provides an opportunity to bridge domestic and international leadership in addressing intertwined climate and energy security challenges. We heard this could be the opportunity to demonstrate and galvanise support among most of the world's biggest emitters, even if consensus may not be possible within the G20.[180]

45. **CONCLUSION**

Shifts of the international climate agenda from negotiation to implementation, combined with energy security pressures created by geopolitical tensions and conflicts, have seen a growing convergence of interests in the margins of UNFCCC consensus-based decision-making. Since implementation of climate actions does not require unanimity, aligning the UK's national interests with others means a focus on delivery that cuts across trade, finance and international development which, albeit interlinked, have been less strategically aligned in the past.

176 Q114 [Rachel Kyte]
177 Greenpeace UK (ICP0038)
178 Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street and His Majesty King Charles III, "The King's Speech 2026", 13 May 2026
179 For r example, Dr Lukas Slothuus and Professor Peter Newell, University of Sussex (ICP0035), Dr Matilda Becker and Dr Anupama Sen, University of Oxford (ICP0040), Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (ICP0022)
180 E3G (ICP0068)

46. **CONCLUSION**
Energy security and climate security concerns are only likely to grow rather than shrink. As such, the government must step up the ambitions of the Global Clean Power Alliance to integrate Santa Marta processes and roadmaps towards phasing out fossil fuels and deliver on context-specific energy transitions. Strengthened ambitions and roadmaps must also enrol stakeholders, including the private sector, in the delivery of the COP28 twinned objectives of increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency capacity and transitioning away from fossil fuels in a "just, orderly and equitable manner".

47. **RECOMMENDATION**
We recommend that the government builds on its experience and learning of energy transitions at home and abroad to provide a clear framework on how it intends to lead and deliver on the global energy transition. To achieve this, we urge the government to develop and publish a UK roadmap on phasing out fossil fuels, as France, Germany and the Netherlands have already done. This roadmap should be completed and published as soon as possible and before the 2nd International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in the Pacific in July 2027.

48. **RECOMMENDATION**
The publication of the UK roadmap should be accompanied by the UK taking the lead in seeking to reframe the scope and remit of the Global Clean Power Alliance (GCPA). We believe the GCPA's ambitions to achieve global transition away from fossil fuel-powered electricity generation need to be accelerated in response to the heightened energy, and climate, security challenges that all countries face. We recommend the government works with like-minded countries on reframing the GCPA and includes pathways to phasing-out fossil fuels in rallying support for context-specific energy transitions.

49. **RECOMMENDATION**
We recommend the government makes the integrated consideration of energy security and climate security challenges central to its G20 Presidency in 2027.

4 Whole of government approach

50. The Labour Party's Manifesto promised a mission-driven approach that would offer "a new way of doing government that is more joined up".[181] The original mission boards were, however, even more opaque than the traditional cabinet committees and the government refused[182] to publish minutes, or even memberships, of the mission boards even after their removal from the formal Cabinet committee system in November 2025 and reformulation as "delivery-focused forums … led by the relevant Secretary of State".[183] In July 2026, DESNZ Minister for Climate, Katie White OBE MP, was adamant that the department was working across government, outlining close collaborations with the FCDO and DEFRA.[184] However, Whitehall's famously siloed policy-making architecture may find it difficult to deliver on the multiple cross-cutting challenges that the links between climate, nature/biodiversity,[185] financial resilience,[186] health,[187] international development[188] and trade[189] require. Gaps and challenges in the delivery of domestic mitigation and adaptation actions (Chapter 1) and International Climate Finance (Chapter 2) reflect shortcomings in several cross-departmental collaborations. Beyond stronger coordination and integration, several stakeholders told us a whole-of-government approach to climate change is needed to deliver joined-up policies aligned with the Paris Agreement's objectives.[190]

181 Labour Party, "Change: Labour Party Manifesto 2024", 13 June 2024

182 Qq626–629, ESNZ Committee, Work of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, 21 July 2025

183 UK Parliament, Mission Boards: question for Cabinet Office, UIN 94199, tabled on 25 November 2025, 3 December 2025

184 Q140 [Katie White]

185 For example, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) (ICP0066), WWF UK (ICP0050)

186 For example, Carbon Tracker Initiative (ICP0048); Richard Ridyard, Liverpool John Moores University (ICP0065); Dr Lukas Slothuus and Professor Peter Newell, University of Sussex (ICP0035)

187 See for example, University College London (UCL) (ICP0013), Wellcome Trust (ICP0041)

188 ActionAid UK (ICP0043); WaterAid (ICP0014)

189 Q57, Q68 [Catherine Pettengell]; Dr Liyun Zhang (Research Fellow in Economics at University of Birmingham) (ICP0071)

190 For example, Qq85–86, Q90 [Richard Folland], Dr Liyun Zhang (Research Fellow in Economics at University of Birmingham) (ICP0071), Dr Alice Venn et al., University of Bristol (ICP0015), Carbon Tracker Initiative (ICP0048), E3G (ICP0068)

51. Calls for a whole-of-government approach to deliver both at home and abroad come at a time when climate is increasingly being reframed by concerns around energy security and economic security.[191] Observers have commented that the socio-economic impacts of energy shocks resulting from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the disruption to the Strait of Hormuz on the UK and its citizens require a rethink of what security means and how the UK can be made more resilient.[192] Climate Minister, Katie White OBE MP, told us that the new cabinet-hosted climate security taskforce,[193] that she jointly-leads with Cabinet Office Parliamentary Under Secretary, Baroness Twycross,[194] will "work across Whitehall" to address challenges that climate change and nature loss pose for many of the UK's fundamental needs, including energy, water and food.[195] The objective was to improve UK resilience by assessing where there might be further risks and where there might be gaps in the analysis. We were unable, however, to gain any insight into how the taskforce's weak remit and powers and its time-limited three meetings over the next year[196] will address the scale and urgency of current challenges. The Climate Change Committee has said that further analysis can help understanding of the potential for avoiding cascading risks but emphasised that the priority is action now to address known risks.[197] The CCC emphasised that adaptation cannot wait and need the same level of focus and commitment as geopolitical and other security threats.[198]

52. The UK's climate leadership and credible delivery at home and abroad cuts across many sectors and involves different departments but there are persistent discrepancies between commitments, strategies and delivery, whether local, national or international. The CCC has outlined how several cross-sectoral solutions can address climate risks across often overlapping systems such as health, land, energy and the economy.[199] The government's Seventh Carbon Budget strengthened ambitions to cut emissions by 87% against 1990 levels during the 2038–2042 period and

191 Q90 [Richard Folland]
192 E3G/King's College London, "The Home Front: A strategic security review of British homes", 26 June 2026
193 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, "UK launches first ever taskforce to strengthen climate security", 26 June 2026
194 The Climate Security Taskforce was first announced as jointly-headed by Climate Minister Katie White and the then Security Minister Rt Hon Dame Angela Eagle DBE MP. The Taskforce is now jointly-headed by Minister White and Cabinet Office Parliamentary Under Secretary, Baroness Twycross.
195 Qq133–134 [Katie White]
196 Qq133–134 [Katie White]
197 Climate Change Committee, "A Well-Adapted UK: The Fourth Independent Assessment of UK Climate Risk", 20 May 2026
198 Climate Change Committee, "A Well-Adapted UK: The Fourth Independent Assessment of UK Climate Risk", 20 May 2026
199 Climate Change Committee, "A Well-Adapted UK: The Fourth Independent Assessment of UK Climate Risk", 20 May 2026

outlined co-benefits of the energy transition as a route to "lower bills, warmer homes, energy security, cleaner air, good jobs" and tackling the climate crisis.[200] We also heard compelling evidence on the need for the financial sector to be aligned with the Paris Agreement's objectives and address the dominant short-termism driving investment decisions that favour fossil fuels.[201] We heard that the Santa Marta process had seen the emergence of whole of government economic planning approaches around the transition, energy, economic security and climate.[202] In our report "Zero sum game: How the UK can reframe the energy transition", we called for a reframing of the UK's energy transition as energy security.[203] The need to mitigate systemic threats through electrification and decentralising energy also requires embedding climate resilience into decision-making across government.[204] Extreme heat, for example, not only affects all types of electricity generation, including nuclear, gas, wind and solar but also drives up electricity demand as people turn on air conditioning and fridges work harder.[205]

53. This exemplifies the importance of considering how growing links between climate leadership and delivery, both domestic and international, relate to people directly affected by the twin energy and climate crises. The national security strategy recommended a "whole of society" approach to implementation, including wider societal participation, in achieving national resilience.[206] Witnesses, however, pointed to the disconnection between the complexities and scientific jargon animating high-level international climate negotiations at the United Framework Convention on Climate Change's Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and people's everyday experiences and realities.[207] We heard of "a very large bridge to be built between those two worlds,[208] which means translating how COP or Santa Marta outcomes translate into things that really matter and how they trickle down and affect everyone's daily life.[209] Crucially, there is a need to communicate back to

200 Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Energy security, jobs and investment boost through climate action, 2 June 2026
201 For example, Q33 Q36 [Dr Neil Grant], Qq85–86 Q90 [Richard Folland], Q87 [Ana Yang], Q88 [Dr Matt Webb], Carbon Tracker Initiative (ICP0048), Dr Lukas Slothuus and Prof. Peter Newell, University of Sussex) (ICP0035)
202 Q90 [Richard Folland]
203 ESNZ Committee, Zero sum game: How the UK can reframe the energy transition, 17 September 2026
204 E3G/King's College London, "The Home Front: A strategic security review of British homes", 26 June 2026
205 Carbon Brief, "How nuclear, gas, wind and solar power are affected during heatwaves", 4 August 2026
206 House of Commons Library, "What is a 'whole of society' approach to defence and security?", 02 September 2026
207 Q21 [Dr Neil Grant], Q83 [Prof. Joeri Rogelj]
208 Q83 [Prof. Joeri Rogelj]
209 Q81 Q82 [Ana Yang]

people how these COP processes and outcomes are solving the twin crises people are facing because "if it does not answer that question, it is not doing the right purpose".[210] Witnesses all agreed on the power of policy narratives and story-telling, with Ana Yang, Director of the Environment and Society Centre at Chatham House, suggesting further efforts in articulating linkages between the clean energy transition and domestic reindustrialisation:

> The UK was the inventor of the industrial revolution […] Can the UK reinvent itself and think about what are the next generation of green industrial policies that will transform this country and inspire people with more jobs in the most deprived regions? That is the story that is missing that connects climate to everybody's daily life, and then also goes wider for a specific government who have stories that mobilise people.

54. **CONCLUSION**

Despite promises that a mission-driven approach would enable more joined-up policies, challenges in cross-departmental delivery on cross-cutting issues call for a new approach for government-led interventions to address climate change. We identified recurrent discrepancies in delivery that leave us unconvinced that Whitehall's siloed policy-making architecture is fit for this purpose. The new climate security taskforce could contribute to a reframing of various climate-related issues buts its remit lacks ambition and clarity on how it relates to the CCC's assessment of climate risks and adaptation solutions.

55. **RECOMMENDATION**

We were hopeful that a mission-driven approach would deliver the necessary joined-up policies that mitigating and adapting to climate change require. Yet, we found numerous instances related to nature/biodiversity, financial resilience, health, international development and trade where this is not the case. We urge the Government to publish the membership of the Mission Board/delivery-focused forum for Clean Power along with the agendas and minutes of meeting discussions. This level of transparency seems to us to represent a very basic enabler of the accountability owed by the executive to the House, through its select committees, and we have not seen any argument, let alone a cogent one, for withholding this information (especially following the change of status of the boards).

210 Q84 [Dr Matt Webb]

Conclusions and recommendations

Credible domestic delivery

1. We are very concerned by the lack of progress on delivering domestic climate adaptation actions. The current siloing of departmental responsibilities seems to be preventing delivery of the necessary actions for the UK to adapt to the domestic realities of climate impacts affecting this country and its people. Failures to act on the Climate Change Committee's recommendations and deliver on domestic adaptation challenge the UK's credibility and potentially contrast with the country's track record and future ambition to lead by example. (Conclusion, Paragraph 13)

2. The government's ambition to restore the UK's climate leadership on the global stage and the progress made to this end over the last two years are laudable. However, further actions are needed to demonstrate credible domestic delivery on both mitigation and adaptation. Upholding the integrity of the Climate Change Act and independent oversight by the Climate Change Committee is paramount to maintain the robustness of the science-policy interface but, on its own, is not enough. Leading by example on climate mitigation, means matching heightened emission reduction commitments in the 2035 NDC and the Seventh Carbon Budget with the shorter-term delivery of the 2030 NDC pledges. (Conclusion, Paragraph 16)

3. Piecemeal planning for adaptation starkly contrasts with the net zero push and increased commitments to greenhouse gas emission reduction. Being a climate leader requires delivering on both mitigation and adaptation. Failures in delivering on climate adaptation not only undermine the credentials of science-based policy-making under the Climate Change Act but affects people's welfare. The Climate Change Committee has provided clear recommendations to address the challenges preventing adaptation action at sufficient scale and speed, including meaningful adaptation objectives, supported by targets, and assigned ownership. In the meantime, creating a National Framework for Climate Services could be a way of engaging with the public to help policy and delivery of adaptation measures. (Conclusion, Paragraph 17)

4. Acting on the Climate Change Committee's recommendations will not only uphold the integrity of the UK's science-policy interface but also provide the credibility for enrolling the private sector in national adaptation and decarbonisation efforts. (Recommendation, Paragraph 18)

5. We recommend the establishment of a National Framework for Climate Services as an immediate step to improve delivery of domestic climate adaptation measures. The government must, in this Parliament, also provide a plan, measures and legislation to deliver on lagging performance and emerging priorities with regard to the UK's domestic action on climate change adaptation. The Climate Change Committee has called for delivery plans, backed with the necessary resources to deliver on climate adaptation objectives. Its proposed set of objectives and targets provide the government with a starting point to adapt to a 2°C global warming level by 2050 and must inform the next sets of national plans due in 2028. (Recommendation, Paragraph 19)

6. We urge the Government to use UK climate risk assessments to rate how climate-related policies across sectors impact those risks, using a traffic light system. Given rapidly evolving climate impacts, these ratings should be updated quarterly. This would complement the Climate Change Committee's recommendation for the relevance and adequacy of adaptation objectives to be reviewed regularly, which the five-yearly assessment of the latest evidence of impacts required under the Climate Change Act allow for. (Recommendation, Paragraph 20)

7. We recommend DESNZ to immediately publish a clear electrification strategy to close the 2030 NDC implementation gap and strengthen credibility for the domestic delivery of international commitments to reduce emissions at home. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)

8. We recommend that the department report back to this Committee on the conclusions of their consideration of proposals for a "Locally Determined Contributions Framework" and their reasons for those conclusions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 22)

International Climate Finance

9. International Climate Finance has become the Achilles' heel of UK climate leadership on the global stage. Challenges in the cross-departmental delivery of ICF3 funding and successive budget cuts that have led the UK's ODA contribution to collapse to 0.3% of GNI by 2027 are a far cry from the UK meeting its "fair share" of responsibility in addressing climate change.

The new ICF4 strategy leaves too many blank spaces on how the new strategic focus of collaboration with the private sector will be delivered on the scale required. (Conclusion, Paragraph 33)

10. The delivery of the UK share of international climate finance requires focusing on impactful implementation of Paris-aligned mitigation and adaptation considering context-specific needs and vulnerabilities. While leveraging the private sector and involving the City of London is laudable amid budget cuts, neither blended finance nor loans are suitable instruments to address the important adaptation needs of vulnerable countries and people. ICF is a key differentiator in terms of the UK's global role. A strategic approach to delivery means explicitly stating how ICF4 will be delivered and by whom. (Conclusion, Paragraph 34)

11. We urge the Government to publish, within six months, a single cross-government delivery plan for international climate finance. This should go beyond a single figure in the ICF4 strategy to detail clear multi-year finance commitments and a dedicated adaptation target. (Recommendation, Paragraph 35)

12. We recommend the Government provides, within the annual statement on the State of Climate and Nature, an update on the UK's international climate commitments, including delivery plans and milestones for each initiative. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)

Leadership in a fragmented world

13. Shifts of the international climate agenda from negotiation to implementation, combined with energy security pressures created by geopolitical tensions and conflicts, have seen a growing convergence of interests in the margins of UNFCCC consensus-based decision-making. Since implementation of climate actions does not require unanimity, aligning the UK's national interests with others means a focus on delivery that cuts across trade, finance and international development which, albeit interlinked, have been less strategically aligned in the past. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

14. Energy security and climate security concerns are only likely to grow rather than shrink. As such, the government must step up the ambitions of the Global Clean Power Alliance to integrate Santa Marta processes and roadmaps towards phasing out fossil fuels and deliver on context-specific energy transitions. Strengthened ambitions and roadmaps must also enrol stakeholders, including the private sector, in the delivery of the COP28

twinned objectives of increasing renewable energy and energy efficiency capacity and transitioning away from fossil fuels in a "just, orderly and equitable manner". (Conclusion, Paragraph 46)

15. We recommend that the government builds on its experience and learning of energy transitions at home and abroad to provide a clear framework on how it intends to lead and deliver on the global energy transition. To achieve this, we urge the government to develop and publish a UK roadmap on phasing out fossil fuels, as France, Germany and the Netherlands have already done. This roadmap should be completed and published as soon as possible and before the 2nd International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in the Pacific in July 2027. (Recommendation, Paragraph 47)

16. The publication of the UK roadmap should be accompanied by the UK taking the lead in seeking to reframe the scope and remit of the Global Clean Power Alliance (GCPA). We believe the GCPA's ambitions to achieve global transition away from fossil fuel-powered electricity generation need to be accelerated in response to the heightened energy, and climate, security challenges that all countries face. We recommend the government works with like-minded countries on reframing the GCPA and includes pathways to phasing-out fossil fuels in rallying support for context-specific energy transitions. (Recommendation, Paragraph 48)

17. We recommend the government makes the integrated consideration of energy security and climate security challenges central to its G20 Presidency in 2027. (Recommendation, Paragraph 49)

Whole of government approach

18. Despite promises that a mission-driven approach would enable more joined-up policies, challenges in cross-departmental delivery on cross-cutting issues call for a new approach for government-led interventions to address climate change. We identified recurrent discrepancies in delivery that leave us unconvinced that Whitehall's siloed policy-making architecture is fit for this purpose. The new climate security taskforce could contribute to a reframing of various climate-related issues buts its remit lacks ambition and clarity on how it relates to the CCC's assessment of climate risks and adaptation solutions. (Conclusion, Paragraph 54)

19. We were hopeful that a mission-driven approach would deliver the necessary joined-up policies that mitigating and adapting to climate change require. Yet, we found numerous instances related to nature/biodiversity, financial resilience, health, international development and trade where this is not the case. We urge the Government to publish the membership of the Mission Board/delivery-focused forum for Clean

Power along with the agendas and minutes of meeting discussions. This level of transparency seems to us to represent a very basic enabler of the accountability owed by the executive to the House, through its select committees, and we have not seen any argument, let alone a cogent one, for withholding this information (especially following the change of status of the boards). (Recommendation, Paragraph 55)

Formal minutes

Tuesday 27 October 2026

Members present

Bill Esterson (Chair)

Wera Hobhouse

Graeme Downie

UK climate leadership at a crossroad

Draft Report (*UK climate leadership at a crossroad*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. Paragraphs 1 to 55 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Title agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House. Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order 134.

Adjournment

Adjourned till Wednesday 28 October at 8.45am.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee's website.

Tuesday 23 June 2026

Dr Neil Grant, Senior Expert – Mitigation pathways, Climate Action Tracker; **Dr Liyun Zhang**, Research Fellow in Economics, University of Birmingham; **Professor Rowan Sutton**, Director, Met Office Hadley Centre Q1–37

Catherine Pettengell, Executive Director, Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK); **Rogier van den Berg**, Global Director, WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities; **Eliot Whittington**, Director, Corporate Leaders Groups Q38–74

Wednesday 8 July 2026

Richard Folland, Head of Capital Markets Policy, Carbon Tracker; **Professor Joeri Rogelj**, Professor of Climate Science & Policy and Director of Research, the Grantham Institute at Imperial College London; **Dr Matt Webb**, Associate Director for Global Clean Power Diplomacy, E3G; **Ana Yang**, Director, Environment and Society Centre, Chatham House Q75–103

Katie White OBE MP, Minister for Climate, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; **Matt Toombs**, Director for International Climate Finance and Strategy, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero; **Rachel Kyte CMG**, Special Representative for Climate, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero Q104–151

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee's website.

ICP numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1	ActionAid UK	ICP0043
2	Addicott, Richard	ICP0019
3	Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board	ICP0025
4	Becker, Dr Matilda (Strategic Partnerships Manager, Oxford Net Zero, and Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford); and Dr Anupama Sen (Associate Director – Impact, Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford)	ICP0040
5	British Standards Institution	ICP0055
6	Buziuk, Hleb (Independent policy researcher and human-rights advocate, FairGo CIC)	ICP0002
7	CMG, Rachel Kyte (Special Representative for Climate, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero)	ICP0073
8	Carbon Tracker Initiative	ICP0048
9	Centre for Climate Engagement, Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge	ICP0061
10	Climate Action Network UK (CAN-UK)	ICP0059
11	Coal Action Network	ICP0027
12	Conservation International UK; Campaign for Nature; Fauna & Flora; The Nature Conservancy; WWF; and Zoological Society of London	ICP0058
13	Department for Energy Security and Net Zero	ICP0022
14	E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism)	ICP0068
15	Easton, Dr Christina (Assistant Professor in the Ethics of Non-Violence, University of Birmingham); and Dr Andrew Walton (Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy , Newcastle University)	ICP0023

16	Ecologi	ICP0009
17	Environmental Investigation Agency	ICP0045
18	Green Alliance	ICP0067
19	Greenpeace UK	ICP0038
20	Harris, Ms Laura	ICP0003
21	Independent Commission for Aid Impact	ICP0031
22	Kaczmarek, Professor Sylvester	ICP0012
23	Mandal, Dr Anandadeep (Associate Professor, University of Birmingham)	ICP0001
24	Medway Council	ICP0024
25	Mercy Corps	ICP0039
26	Met Office	ICP0069
27	Murphy, Dr Ash (Senior Lecturer, Manchester Law School, Manchester Metropolitan University)	ICP0010
28	Muslim Charities Forum	ICP0036
29	National Biofilms Innovation Centre	ICP0044
30	Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)	ICP0064
31	Nyombi, Professor Chrispas (Professor of International Commercial Law, University of Derby UK); and Dr Eghosa Ekhator (Associate Professor of International Environmental Law, University of Derby UK)	ICP0005
32	Obani, Dr Pedi (Associate Professor, University of Bradford)	ICP0057
33	Parsons, Dr Katie (Research Fellow, Loughborough University)	ICP0011
34	Plymouth Marine Laboratory	ICP0047
35	Population Matters	ICP0054
36	Renukappa, Professor Suresh (Professor of Sustainable Smart Innovation, University of Wolverhampton); Dr Elivelton da Silva Fonseca (Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Wolverhampton); Professor Subashini Suresh (Professor of Knowledge Management , University of Wolverhampton); Mr Chandrashekar Subbarao (Research Scholar, University of Wolverhampton); Dr Nayana Shabadi (Associate Professor, JSS Academy of Higher Education & Research, Mysuru, India.); Dr Rajeev Krishnadas (Assistant Professor, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, U.K.);	

	and Professor Tonny Veenith (Professor and Clinical Director of Research, Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, Wolverhampton, UK)	ICP0033
37	Renukappa, Professor Suresh (Professor of Sustainable Smart Innovation, University of Wolverhampton); Mr Alhaji Bangura (Research Scholar, University of Wolverhampton); Professor Subashini Suresh (Professor of Knowledge Management, University of Wolverhampton); Dr Meenu Netke (Consultant Anaesthetist, Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, Wolverhampton, U.K.); Mrs Janet Smith (Strategic and values-led transformation leader, Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, Wolverhampton, U.K.); Mrs Caroline Caroline Dixey (Research Scholar, University of Wolverhampton); Mr Chandrashekar Subbarao (Research Scholar, University of Wolverhampton); Dr Rajeev Krishnadas (Assistant Professor, University of Cambridge); and Professor Tonny Veenith (Clinical Director and Professor in Intensive Care Medicine, Perioperative Care and Anaesthetics, Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, Wolverhampton, U.K.)	ICP0018
38	Renukappa, Professor Suresh (Professor of Sustainable Smart Innovation, University of Wolverhampton); Mrs Caroline Dixey (Research Scholar, University of Wolverhampton); Professor Subashini Suresh (Professor of Knowledge Management, University of Wolverhampton); Mr Chandrashekar Subbarao (Research Scholar, University of Wolverhampton); Mr Alhaji Bangura (Research Scholar, University of Wolverhampton); Dr Rajeev Krishnadas (Assistant Professor, University of Cambridge); and Professor Tonny Veenith (Clinical Director of Research and Professor of Anaesthesia, Critical Care and Acute Care, Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust, Wolverhampton, U.K)	ICP0017
39	Ridyard, Richard (Senior Lecturer in Law, Liverpool John Moores University)	ICP0065
40	Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)	ICP0066
41	Ruddy, Mrs Anna (Director, ACS Air Conditioning and C-Bon)	ICP0016
42	Salas, Natacha Isabel Socias (PhD researcher in Business and Management, University of Manchester); and Natael Abel Simicich Erazo	ICP0029
43	SIDA – Scotland's International Development Alliance	ICP0026
44	Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund	ICP0053

45	Slothuus, Dr Lukas (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, University of Sussex); and Professor Peter Newell (Professor, University of Sussex)	ICP0035
46	Stamp Out Poverty	ICP0060
47	Startup Coalition	ICP0051
48	Sutton, Professor Rowan (Director, Met Office Hadley Centre)	ICP0072
49	Sutton, Professor Rowan (Director, Met Office Hadley Centre)	ICP0070
50	Sylvera	ICP0063
51	techUK	ICP0049
52	The Carbon Capture and Storage Association	ICP0034
53	The Climate Majority Project	ICP0032
54	The Royal Society of Biology	ICP0008
55	UK Corporate Leaders Group	ICP0052
56	UK Youth Climate Coalition (UKYCC)	ICP0062
57	UKELA (UK Environmental Law Assocation)	ICP0030
58	Umar, Dr Tariq (Senior Lecturer, University of the West of England, UK)	ICP0020
59	University College London (UCL)	ICP0013
60	Venn, Dr Alice (Senior Lecturer in Climate Law, University of Bristol); Dr Sarah Bell (Senior Lecturer in Health Geography, University of Exeter); and Mr Andrew Shipley (Researcher, University of Exeter)	ICP0015
61	Walton, Dr Andrew (Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy, Newcastle University); Prof Derek Bell (Professor of Environmental Political Theory, Newcastle University); Dr Meera Iona Inglis (Lifelong Learning Tutor, University of Glasgow); and Dr Johannes Kniess (Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy, Newcastle University)	ICP0042
62	Weatherburn, Ella (Student, Edge Hill University); and Matthew Wallace (Student, Edge Hill University)	ICP0028
63	WaterAid	ICP0014
64	Wellcome Trust	ICP0041
65	Williams, Dr Rebecca (Lecturer in Environmental Law, University of Glasgow)	ICP0021
66	World Nuclear Association	ICP0037
67	WWF UK	ICP0050

68	Zhang, Dr Dongna	ICP0007
69	Zhang, Dr Liyun (Research Fellow in Economics, University of Birmingham); Professor Robert J.R. Elliott (Professor, University of Birmingham); and Dr Qinqin Xiong	ICP0056
70	Zhang, Dr Liyun (Research Fellow in Economics, University of Birmingham)	ICP0071

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee's website.

Session 2026–27

Number	Title	Reference
4th	Planning for fusion	HC 571
3rd	The cost of energy	HC 416
2nd	Zero sum game: How the UK can reframe the energy transition	HC 230
1st	Get connected: How community energy can turbocharge the transition	HC 229
1st Special	Get connected: How community energy can turbocharge the transition: Government Response	HC 583

Session 2024–26

Number	Title	Reference
6th	Workforce planning to deliver clean, secure energy	HC 393
5th	Tackling the energy cost crisis	HC 736
4th	The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation	HC 1212
3rd	Pre-appointment hearing for the Chair of the Climate Change Committee	HC 1186
2nd	Gridlock or growth? Avoiding energy planning chaos	HC 868
1st	Retrofitting homes for net zero	HC 453
6th Special	Tackling the energy cost crisis: Ofgem Response	HC 1789

Number	Title	Reference
5th Special	Workforce planning to deliver clean, secure energy: Government Response	HC 1704
4th Special	Tackling the energy cost crisis: Government Response	HC 1624
3rd Special	The new National Policy Statement for nuclear energy generation: Government Response	HC 1508
2nd Special	Gridlock or Growth? Avoiding energy planning chaos: Government Response	HC 1507
1st Special	Retrofitting homes for net zero: Government Response	HC 1260