



House of Commons  
Foreign Affairs Committee

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# **A climate for ambition: Diplomatic preparations for COP26**

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**Seventh Report of Session 2019–21**

*Report, together with formal minutes relating  
to the report*

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## Summary

COP26 is a key moment in our response to global climate change. Previous conferences have too often been momentary waypoints that have not secured the change needed. The UK's Presidency will not be a success unless it sets a path to net zero made real by changes to our economy that recognise the real cost of carbon output and are secured by ambitious green financing. Only real change will build global resilience and count the cost of climate change.

Current global commitments and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are a long way off what will be needed to keep global temperature rises under 1.5°C. The half-measures and partial promises of previous rounds risk repetition unless the UK can bring partners together to encourage more ambitious climate pledges. The FCDO and their Italian colleagues, who share the Presidency, have the diplomatic networks needed to build coalitions able to meet this increased ambition. However, they will need to make climate their key priority if we are to go beyond the 7 percent drop in carbon output we saw during the covid lockdown and towards the levels required to limit temperature rises.

The UK has the chance to lead and set ambitious domestic climate policies, alongside credible plans to deliver them. With Britain's Presidency of the G7, Italy's Chair of the G20 and the election of a new US President committed to combatting climate change, now is the moment to engage in transformational diplomacy. By offering technological leadership through investment and financial innovation, the UK can be a leader in low-carbon industry. HM Treasury's role, from enabling crypto-contracts to insurance, could facilitate virtual carbon capture by eliminating the savings to consumers from manufacturing jurisdictions where carbon costs least, so that the polluter always pays.

This year will only be successful for British diplomacy if the G7 and COP are seen as part of a joint engagement. Both presidencies can be used to show that environmental agendas are not in competition with, but complement, economic growth, health, development and security policies, and can become an integrated part of a national strategy. The FCDO's plan should include parliaments and people, along with the technological transformation called for in the Integrated Review, to deliver a more prosperous and stable world for the British people.

With covid overshadowing and disrupting international progress on climate change, there is also a chance for more radical thinking. The way we trade, travel and interact is so different from only 18 months ago that we must rethink the traditional diplomatic jamboree. The lessons of the pandemic offer a way of turning away from airmiles and onto airwaves, especially when discussing the climate emergency. Alongside the networked diplomacy this Committee has called for in the past, Britain has a chance to embed partners into the hosting of regional events and connect them all through technology, making this a truly global, truly green event.

# 1 Introduction

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1. In November this year, the UK and Italy will co-host the 26th United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP26). The summit will be held in Glasgow and is the most significant UN climate summit since Paris in 2015.<sup>1</sup> It will be the first test of a key principle in the Paris Agreement: that all countries will ‘ratchet up’ their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) climate pledges every five years. Since Paris, the UN’s climate science body, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), has adjusted its guidance, reducing what they deem as a ‘safe’ level of warming from 2°C to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.<sup>2</sup> Existing national commitments made under the Paris Agreement would result in a 3°C increase in average global temperatures by 2100.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, countries will have to commit to significant action and improvements to their NDCs if they are to keep global temperature increases to ‘safe’ levels. We were told that “time is definitely running out”<sup>4</sup> and that if COP26 fails it may become impossible to limit the average rise in temperatures to below 2°C, let alone to 1.5°C.<sup>5</sup>

2. The role of host and President is critical in the lead up to a COP summit.<sup>6</sup> The host must effectively lead informal diplomatic negotiations in advance of the meeting, and broker agreements during the conference itself. The Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, a non-profit organisation, explained the importance of the UK’s actions in advance of the conference:

The UK has an opportunity to take a number of international actions—on diplomacy, trade and investments—which could increase the likelihood of a successful outcome at COP26. Thoughtful UK decisions can strengthen other countries’ ability to deliver climate action; but short-sighted decisions can undermine international action and hinder countries’ achievement, for example, of their own NDCs. Scrutiny of the UK actions in the run up to COP26 will be intense, with many complex and sometimes conflicting agendas potentially challenging the diplomatic effort.<sup>7</sup>

3. Securing as ambitious a set of NDCs as possible will be the key diplomatic goal for the UK in its role as President. It will be the key metric against which success is measured, not just of the COP event, but of the UK’s diplomatic capability.<sup>8</sup> The UK Government faces a formidable challenge over the next few months to persuade nations to commit to more ambitious climate pledges, while also seeking to broker agreements on rules for a global carbon market and on the financing issues that were left unresolved at previous summits.<sup>9</sup> The French Government had three years to prepare for COP21 and devoted the resources of its foreign ministry. The UK has had a much shorter lead time to prepare for

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1 Q2

2 IPCC, [IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C](#), 8 October 2018

3 Climate Action Tracker, [Warming Projections Global Update](#), December 2018, p 1

4 Q67

5 [Laurence Tubiana, Emmanuel Guérin and Joss Garman, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, COP26: A Roadmap for Success](#), accessed 14 April 2021

6 *Estimates Day Debate: COP26 Climate Conference*, Debate Pack [2021-0033](#), House of Commons Library, March 2021

7 Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit, [UK diplomacy and influence ahead of COP26](#), accessed 4th April 2021

8 See, for example, Bond Development and Environment Group (CLI0023); E3G (CLI0015)

9 [Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations](#), dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021

COP26: it was only awarded the presidency in September 2019, and the global focus on covid-19 and the vaccine competition that has followed, have severely disrupted plans and even delayed the Summit by a year.

4. As part of our current inquiry we received over 30 written evidence submissions and held two evidence sessions specifically focused on the Government's diplomatic strategy for COP26. We explored the aims and ambitions of COP26, the successes and failures of previous COP hosts and the complexities of diplomatic negotiations. On 23 March we wrote to the Foreign Secretary asking about the Government's progress on COP26 preparations, focussing on key areas including the Government's priorities, diplomatic strategy and covid-19 preparedness.<sup>10</sup> This short report follows up on this work: it sets out our vision of what the Government should be seeking to achieve at COP26 and measures its progress to date.

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10 [Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations](#), dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021

## 2 Ambitions

5. Greater ambition is essential ahead of COP26; if the conference is to succeed, countries arriving in Glasgow will need detailed climate road maps which deliver on the Paris Agreement targets set five years ago.<sup>11</sup> COP26 needs to dramatically speed up global emissions reductions, build resilience to the impacts of climate change, turn economic incentives towards a green outcome and support the most vulnerable.<sup>12</sup> We believe that, in order to achieve this, the UK Presidency must go beyond just encouraging ambitious target-setting and ensure that countries' implementation strategies also stand up to scrutiny.<sup>13</sup> COP26 will have the additional challenge of encouraging finance ministers to drive forward the transition of their economies and financial systems to net zero, whilst also successfully mobilising US\$100 billion in public and private funding to support developing countries.<sup>14</sup>

6. As so many actors are involved in COP negotiations, “designing a plan and sharing it far ahead of the COP is the best way to increase convergence and shape expectations”.<sup>15</sup> Many of those who contributed to our inquiry agreed that the UK Presidency needed to set out clear and ambitious targets, outlining what they expect from state parties attending COP26.<sup>16</sup> Laurence Tubiana, France's former Climate Change Ambassador and Special Representative for COP21, told us that by the beginning of the summer the COP President should have set out what he wants to achieve at the conference “almost drafting the press communiqué that he wants to get out of Glasgow”.<sup>17</sup> Alongside colleagues from the European Climate Foundation she argued that:

Situating COP26 as a key moment for climate action, the presidency will have to set a highly ambitious goal and go, not one, but many steps beyond what has been done so far.<sup>18</sup>

Witnesses emphasised that the Government should seek input and buy in from other UNFCCC Parties well in advance of COP26 so that all countries feel invested and included in the UK's vision for the conference.<sup>19</sup> All governments, particularly in democracies, will need public support for ambitious climate targets and for many that will require parliamentary engagement. So far, there is little public evidence of the FCDO promoting and encouraging open participation in a national, never mind an international, debate about the objectives for COP26, nor the level of engagement with legislative bodies required to ensure enduring support.<sup>20</sup>

11 See, for example, Bond Development and Environment Group (CLI0023); [Laurence Tubiana, Emmanuel Guérin and Joss Garman, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, COP26: A Roadmap for Success](#), accessed 14 April 2021; Qq65, Q67, Q80

12 [Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations](#), dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021

13 Qq65, Q12

14 Qq72, Q77

15 Laurence Tubiana, Emmanuel Guérin and Joss Garman, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, COP26: A Roadmap for Success, accessed 14 April 2021; See also, Qq65, Q67, Q80

16 See, for example, Q98; COP26 Coalition (CLI0030); Laurence Tubiana, Emmanuel Guérin and Joss Garman, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, COP26: A Roadmap for Success, accessed 14 April 2021

17 Q98; See also, COP26 Coalition (CLI0030); Laurence Tubiana, Emmanuel Guérin and Joss Garman, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, COP26: A Roadmap for Success, accessed 14 April 2021

18 Laurence Tubiana, Emmanuel Guérin and Joss Garman, Hoffmann Centre for Sustainable Resource Economy, COP26: A Roadmap for Success, accessed 14 April 2021

19 See, for example, Q74; International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033); WaterAid (CLI0021)

20 See, for example, BioDiplomacy (BLI0027)

7. In March, the Government set out four headline objectives for its COP26 Presidency: to encourage countries to submit more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions, to protect and help adapt our communities, to meet the US\$100 billion goal for climate finance, and to close off the outstanding elements of the Paris Agreement.<sup>21</sup> Beyond this there has been little information on the level of ambition the UK Government hopes to secure in Glasgow or how it intends to measure success. The Business Energy and Industrial Skills (BEIS) Committee's recent report recommended that the Government's headline ambitions "be expanded to a clear list of measures, with a set of criteria attached to each in terms of how success will be measured".<sup>22</sup>

8. The UK's responsibility as COP President does not end when COP26 concludes.<sup>23</sup> The UK's Presidency will run until November 2022, when COP27 will be hosted by an African nation, and the UK will need to continue to champion climate change in multilateral and bilateral forums to help ensure a successful legacy for Glasgow.<sup>24</sup> This commitment cannot be distinct from British foreign policy, but as the Integrated Review makes clear, is integral to the success of our global engagement. The UK has committed to continuing to make climate change and biodiversity loss the first international priority and the FCDO have said that they are in the process of integrating climate and biodiversity as a priority throughout their work.<sup>25</sup> We agree with witnesses who argued that climate objectives will need to be successfully integrated into future foreign policy if we are to secure a successful legacy for Glasgow.<sup>26</sup> The event in November will be the first indication of the Foreign Secretary's commitment to the Prime Minister's stated objective.

**9. COP26 will be a key moment for global climate action. We have been encouraged by the number of countries that have expressed the importance of the climate agenda in international fora; COP26 must now translate these words into actions. The UK Presidency will need to mobilise public engagement so that as countries come forward with ambitious climate targets, those promises are backed by people around the world. COP26 will not be considered a success unless the UK Presidency sets the world on a path to net zero, secures an ambitious green finance package, and helps to build resilience to the impacts of climate change.**

**10. We welcome the Government's announcement of four headline 'objectives' for its COP26 Presidency. However, beyond this announcement there has been little detail on what the UK Government wants to achieve. Setting ambitious expectations will be crucial to securing the success of the conference and the Government will need to do more than just set out broad ambitions. *We recommend that the Government ensures that the process for setting objectives for COP26 is inclusive and incorporates the views of the Least Developed Countries and the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. We recommend that before the beginning of the G7 conference in June, the Government expands its headline objectives into a clear list of targets that the UK Presidency wants to achieve in Glasgow. Using the two events together to mobilise support will give a greater opportunity for success. Only by working with networks of***

21 HC Deb, March 18 2021, [Column 14WS](#)

22 Business Energy and Industrial Skills Committee, [Third Report of Session 2019–21 Net Zero and UN Climate Summits: Scrutiny of Preparations for COP26—interim report](#), HC1265, para 5

23 See, for example, COP26 Coalition (CLI0030)

24 E3G (CLI0015)

25 [Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations](#), dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021

26 See, for example, CAFOD (CLI0013); E3G (CLI0015); International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033); ODI (CLI0032); Q87

*partners will the FCDO ensure that more ambitious NDCs are put forward, and only by making plans early and engaging others will the Government secure buy in from other UNFCCC Parties.*

11. We welcome the Government's commitment to make climate change its number one international priority this year, but the responsibility of the UK does not end when COP26 concludes. The UK must continue its efforts as the torchbearer for the next COP, and beyond, to continue to ratchet up ambition on climate change. The FCDO and the UK's diplomatic network will have a key role to play in this process. *In order to ensure a successful legacy for the UK's COP Presidency, we recommend that the FCDO publishes an environmental diplomacy strategy, defining the Department's foreign policy aims for the UK's COP26 Presidency and beyond, and that it establishes a unit that can support future presidencies. The UK must commit to working closely with the African COP27 Presidency, including with the loan of staff and expertise, to sustain momentum on global climate action; particularly on adaptation, resilience, finance and loss and damage. Without a future commitment Glasgow risks being a one-off jamboree of voice and worry, changing nothing but airmiles.*

### 3 Diplomacy

12. Many countries have yet to increase ambition under the Paris ratchet mechanism: only 45 (44 countries and the EU) out of the 197 UNFCCC Parties met a UN deadline to submit updated NDCs by the end of 2020. At the time of writing, in April 2021, only 52 parties representing around 30% of global emissions have submitted updated NDCs, and the NDCs of several countries such as Australia, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, and Russia are no more ambitious than their first-round submissions.<sup>27</sup> Some countries such as New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea have now committed to revise and increase the targets they submitted last year ahead of COP26, but more countries will need to follow suit if we are to keep the 1.5°C target within reach.<sup>28</sup> The UN’s Initial NDC Synthesis Report shows that current NDCs put us on a path to achieve a less than 1 percent reduction in emissions by 2030 compared to 2010 levels.<sup>29</sup> The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, by contrast, has indicated that emission reduction ranges need to be around 45 percent lower in order to meet the 1.5°C temperature goal.<sup>30</sup> The FCDO acknowledge that the Synthesis Report shows that “we are a long way off what is collectively required” and argue that it will serve “as a call to action to all countries ahead of COP26”.<sup>31</sup>

13. Some of the largest emitters, such as China and the US, have yet to submit their second-round NDCs.<sup>32</sup> Securing ambitious NDCs from these two major economies will be vital to the success of COP26.<sup>33</sup> If the UK’s diplomatic efforts can help secure a significant increase in the NDCs of the US and China, it may encourage other, more hesitant countries to also come forward with enhanced climate pledges. Some positive signs have emerged: China announced a net-zero by 2060 target, whilst the US has recommitted to the Paris Agreement, appointed a Special Presidential Envoy for Climate and is likely to announce an increase in its ambition at its ‘Earth Day Summit’ on climate change on 22 April. However, the UK will need to continue to push for increased ambition if it is to ensure that these NDCs are in line with the principles expressed in the Paris Agreement.<sup>34</sup>

#### Mainstreaming COP Objectives

14. The UK Presidency will need to use all the tools they have at their disposal to create an atmosphere of collective purpose in the lead up to COP26.<sup>35</sup> This includes mainstreaming COP objectives into the FCDO’s foreign policy and development strategies and putting climate at the centre of all diplomatic activities that take place prior to the event itself.<sup>36</sup>

27 CAT Climate Target Update Tracker, [List of non-updating countries](#), accessed 7 April 2021

28 UNFCCC, [Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement Synthesis report by the Secretariat, February 2021](#); [Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations](#), dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021

29 UN Climate Press Release, [Greater Climate Ambition Urged as Initial NDC Synthesis Report Is Published](#), February 2021

30 UN Climate Press Release, [Greater Climate Ambition Urged as Initial NDC Synthesis Report Is Published](#), February 2021

31 [Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations](#), dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021

32 CAT Climate Target Update Tracker, [List of non-updating countries](#), accessed 7 April 2021

33 ODI (CLI0032), para 37; Qq8, 12, 32, 67

34 CAT Climate Target Update Tracker, [China](#), accessed 7 April 2021

35 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2019–21, [COP26: Principles and priorities—a POST survey of expert views, HC1000, P 16](#)

36 See, for example, E3G (CLI0015); CAFOD (CLI0013); International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033); WWF (CLI0026); Q8

Contributors emphasised that every foreign engagement the UK undertakes can be an opportunity to exercise environmental diplomacy.<sup>37</sup> We were told that decisions on overseas aid, international security, and trade all needed to be aligned with COP objectives.<sup>38</sup>

15. Adapting to climate change comes with considerable economic costs for many vulnerable countries. Delivering the finance package that these countries need to build resilience to threats such as climate change and covid-19 will be fundamental if the UK is to build relationships and trust with these countries in the run up to COP26.<sup>39</sup> At COP15, developed countries agreed to provide developing countries with “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding”.<sup>40</sup> To date, the UK has performed well against this target, providing US\$6.1 billion of additional finance in 2018 against 2009 levels.<sup>41</sup> The Integrated Review also promised that the UK would continue to lead in this field, aligning ODA spend to the Paris Agreement principles and making ‘climate and biodiversity’ a strategic priority for ODA in 2021–22.<sup>42</sup> However, the Government’s recent decision to reduce the 0.7 percent of gross national income the UK spends on overseas aid to 0.5 percent raises questions. Although the UK remains among the most generous aid donors, its credibility as a leader in climate finance is reliant on direction, not just quantum. Contributors told us that these aid cuts may undermine the UK’s ability to ask other countries to step up, as well as damaging the trust that climate-vulnerable countries have in the UK’s COP26 Presidency.<sup>43</sup>

16. Covid-19 has dominated international politics for the past year. Governments worldwide have devoted significant amounts of time and money to recovery from the pandemic, which may influence their ongoing capacity and willingness to tackle environmental issues.<sup>44</sup> We were told that “the geopolitics could hardly be worse”<sup>45</sup> and that:

Covid-19 has disrupted the geopolitical landscape. Global cooperation and multilateralism are being tested, as evidenced by rising diplomatic tensions between the US, China, the EU and beyond... Before covid-19, diplomacy towards COP26 was taking place in a geopolitical landscape with rising headwinds with potential for climate objectives to form the basis for political and economic influencing of other countries. Now, however, covid-19 will dominate international politics for at least the next year.<sup>46</sup>

With a global context not favourable for swift action on climate, the need for UK leadership to deliver global cooperation on environmental issues is more critical than ever.<sup>47</sup> The

37 See, for example, E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism) (CLI0015); WWF (CLI0026)

38 See, for example, Bond Development and Environment Group (CLI0023); CAFOD (CLI0013); E3G (CLI0015); Global Justice Now (CLI0029); International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033); ODI (CLI0032); Tearfund (CLI0018); Q87

39 See, for example, Bond Development and Environment Group (DEG) (CLI0023)

40 UNFCCC, [Draft Decision CP.15](#), 18 December 2009

41 International Institute for Environment and Development, [UK aid cuts threaten climate leadership role of COP26 president](#), accessed 9 April 2021

42 Cabinet Office, [Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy](#), 16th March

43 See, for example, International Institute for Environment and Development, [UK aid cuts threaten climate leadership role of COP26 president](#), accessed 9 April 2021; Q87

44 E3G (CLI0015)

45 Q6

46 E3G (CLI0015), para 27

47 WWF (CLI0026)

UK will need to do a lot of heavy lifting and actively lobby to put environmental issues back on the global agenda.<sup>48</sup> Witnesses emphasised that, as we begin the recovery from covid-19, the UK Presidency will need to demonstrate that environmental agendas are not in competition but are highly complementary with health, development and security issues.<sup>49</sup> The UK will need to show that climate change itself poses risks to global security through its potential to exacerbate existing conflicts and create new ones. It will similarly need to show that climate change has the potential to negatively impact global health and exacerbate health inequalities.<sup>50</sup>

17. Due to covid-19, the UK and Italian Presidency now coincides with the UK's Chair of the G7 and Italy's Chair of the G20. This gives the UK and Italy a unique opportunity to build a partnership that will shape the global agenda on climate diplomacy throughout 2021. Thematically connecting the two events would ensure greater preparation for compromise and commitment between the major democracies and the industrialised nations. Witnesses told us that the UK and Italy must weave a "golden thread" of climate action through these major moments of international cooperation, using their presidency of the G7 to leverage political support for both climate and biodiversity actions.<sup>51</sup> E3G argued that:

HMG could strengthen this by embedding environmental diplomats into internal G7/G20 teams. The UK must shift the conversation about environmental issues from environment and energy ministers, to mainstreaming it across ministries and at the highest levels (Heads of State and Finance Ministers).<sup>52</sup>

**18. Environmental diplomacy can enhance the UK's global leadership in line with the UK's vision for 'Global Britain' set out in the Integrated Review. Covid-19 has delayed international progress on climate action but has provided more time for the UK to prepare the ground for a successful COP26. Every foreign engagement the UK undertakes in the lead up to COP26 can be an opportunity for environmental diplomacy. Environmental negotiations will need to take place within UN frameworks, in bilateral talks with countries, during trade negotiations, at the G7 and the G20, and in the UK's engagement with NGO's and the private sector. The UK will also need to ensure that climate objectives are effectively integrated into other foreign policy decisions, including decisions on international security, global health, and overseas aid.**

**19. *The Government should ensure its objectives for COP26 are brought into all of the FCDO's foreign policy activity, including trade deals, decisions on overseas aid and bilateral and multilateral conversations with other UNFCCC parties. The Government's international development strategy should be published before COP26 and prioritise climate and biodiversity, listing the commitments that the UK will make along with pledges secured by partners. The recovery from covid-19 will require a Marshall Plan-scale commitment from many and the UK should ensure that this aligns with***

48 WWF ([COV0099](#))

49 See, for example, E3G (CLI0015), para 31; International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033)

50 See, for example, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CLI0013); United Nations World Food Programme (CLI0028);

51 E3G (CLI0015) para 35; see also, Born Free Foundation (CLI0008); Royal Society of the Protection of Birds (RSPB) (CLI0016); Q28

52 E3G (CLI0015), para 35.

*environmental ambitions, embedding a green outlook into a new economy. The FCDO should communicate to its partners that environmental agendas are not in competition but integral to health, development, and security policies. For COP26 to be successful, the Government should ensure alignment with G7, G20 and COP15 processes and decisions. As both the COP26, G7 and G20 Presidents, the UK and Italian Governments are well placed to ensure this alignment.*

## Networks of like-minded nations

20. Encouraging all 197 UNFCCC parties to submit new, ambitious and comprehensive NDCs will be a huge diplomatic task for the UK Government and the FCDO in particular. In order to reach all UNFCCC parties, the UK Government will need to organise parties into various blocs to make the negotiation process more efficient.<sup>53</sup> The French COP Presidency followed this approach, inviting ministers or heads of delegation from around 35–40 countries to multiple informal meetings in the lead up to COP21.<sup>54</sup> Laurence Tubiana told us that this gave “a pretty fair representation of all the interests...of the countries” and helped to “bring people along”, creating a “group of friends” that could prove vital in the final negotiations.<sup>55</sup>

21. Our Integrated Review inquiry recommended that “the UK should use its convening power and thought leadership to bring together nimble networks of like-minded nations by agreeing a baseline for cooperation between them”.<sup>56</sup> These sentiments were echoed during the course of this inquiry. Many contributors argued that, in order for COP26 to be successful, the UK Presidency must build ‘coalitions of the willing’, getting groups of like-minded countries to rally behind certain climate proposals.<sup>57</sup> These coalitions of like-minded nations can be used to increase the pressure on all global actors, including major polluters, to commit to strong climate action. We were told that:

The UK has a strong record for building coalitions for climate action, such as the High Ambition Coalition at UN climate negotiations, and the Powering Past Coal Alliance. The UK should redouble efforts to create coalitions of the willing for progressive negotiated outcomes at UNFCCC negotiations.<sup>58</sup>

Robert Falkner, Research Director of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, argued that ‘this is something that no presidency can do on its own’ and told us that it would require a long-term process of engaging with other countries and high-ranking individuals who could help the UK build coalitions of countries to push for action on certain issues.<sup>59</sup> Events like the US Earth Day Summit, Petersberg Climate Dialogue, COP15 and the G7 Leaders’ Summit will provide critical opportunities for the UK to progress negotiations and push for increased ambition.<sup>60</sup> We heard that the UK must play a leading role in the preparations for these events and ensure that they are aligned with COP26 objectives.

53 Q73

54 Qq82, 91

55 Q82

56 Foreign Affairs Committee, *A brave new Britain? The future of the UK’s international policy*, [Fourth Report of Session 2019–21](#), HC380, See also, Samantha Power (Qq1 and 6); Lord Hague of Richmond (Qq22 and 28); Alexander Downer (Q40); Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (Q58); and Koji Tsuruoka (Q119)

57 See for example Robert Falkner (Q73); Laurence Tubiana (Q89); CAFOD (CLI0013); Christian Aid (CLI0004); International Fund for Animal welfare (CLI0017); Royal Society of the Protection of Birds (CLI0016)

58 E3G (CLI0015) para 15

59 Q17

60 Chatham House, [2021: A ‘super year’ for climate and environment action](#), Accessed 9th April 2021

22. We have seen some evidence of ‘coalition building’ from the UK COP Presidency. As part of its diplomatic efforts, the COP Presidency has initiated a series of multilateral campaigns and summits to build momentum for net zero, including the Race to Zero Campaign, the online Climate Ambition Summit, and the Climate and Development Ministerial, aimed at supporting countries most vulnerable to climate change. However, we were told that the Government would need to place more emphasis on coalition building and engaging with very vulnerable developing countries if it is to secure a successful outcome at Glasgow.<sup>61</sup>

23. Bilateral conversations will also be an important part of the FCDO’s diplomatic strategy. It is in these bilateral negotiations that the Government can discover the red lines of other parties and explore areas where there is negotiating flexibility.<sup>62</sup> The FCDO can play an important role in this process, gathering intelligence from countries around the world to “help give the presidency a better sense of the overall ‘art of the possible’ and what landing zones there may be for COP outcomes”.<sup>63</sup> Laurence Tubiana told us that you need bilateral conversations:

To understand where the big players are. In a way, it is easier in a bilateral conversation than in a club one. I have experienced that again and again.<sup>64</sup>

The COP26 President said that the diplomatic networks of the FCDO were being put to use, and Peter Hill, CEO of COP26, told the BEIS Committee that “the Permanent Secretary of the FCDO and the Foreign and Development Secretary have both, in recent weeks and months, written to the [diplomatic] network to ensure that they understand the priority that [COP26] needs to be given”.<sup>65</sup>

**24. All countries share a common interest in preserving the planet—the global impacts of the climate crisis mean that COP26 will provide an opportunity for the UK to exercise soft power and rebuild relationships with key countries where differences remain on other issues. *The UK Government should use its COP26 Presidency as an opportunity to open dialogues with countries and people around the world on common climate issues. The UK should capitalise on opportunities for collaboration, with like-minded partners on intellectual property sharing for green technology. The FCDO can play a key role in collecting information for the COP Unit, engaging in discussions with countries around the world to discover ‘red lines’ and areas where there is negotiating flexibility. If our diplomatic network is to be effective, posts will need to be set clear negotiating objectives. It will also be essential to secure public support for climate polices. We recommend that the FCDO sets out an engagement strategy that goes beyond governments, using international media and public engagement to promote behavioural change and popular commitment to climate polices.***

**25. The US Climate Summit and COP15 (the biodiversity COP) will be two key moments where the UK will need to take stock of progress and push for increased ambition. *As the COP26 President, the UK should play a leading role in both the preparations for the US conference and during the conference itself. We recommend that***

61 See, for example, COP26 Coalition (CLI0030), Global Justice Now (CLI0029); WaterAid (CLI0021)

62 Christian Aid (CLI0004); Laurence Tubiana (Q89)

63 Christian Aid (CLI0004),

64 Q89

65 Oral evidence taken before the Business Energy and Industrial Skills Committee on 19 January 2021, [HC 144](#), Q193

*the UK works closely with the US administration to align the objectives of the US climate summit on 22 April with the objectives of COP26. The United States' unquestioned importance in the pledging of climate commitments should not replace the UK's diplomatic role in bringing together other partners. It will be important for the FCDO to find ways to build bridges between both processes as well as pushing for ambitious commitments from the USA and China at COP26.*

26. The UK has a strong record for building coalitions for climate action, such as the High Ambition Coalition at UN climate negotiations, and it could build upon this during its COP Presidency. Summits such as the global summit on climate and development provide an important opportunity to influence those countries most affected by the impacts of climate change. *The UK Government should look to build overlapping circles of interest to build support for change and to drive forward global ambition. Building on partnerships that may be temporary, the UK should enable with staff support, though not always lead, groups of low-lying states, island nations, developing economies, high ambition states, and vulnerable country groups, amongst others, building on the work of the Small Island Developing States. We recommend that the FCDO make use of their relationships with the previous Chilean hosts, the Italian co-presidents, and other regional partners to build a network of sectoral leaders to help secure a worldwide push for increased climate ambition. The UK's Presidency should be viewed as organisational and enabling.*

27. *In order to map the whole picture, it is important that the Government organise inclusive pre-meetings and do not simply hold pre-meetings on a regional basis. The Government should publish the agenda of these meetings to ensure inclusivity and to allow other countries to monitor the status of discussions.*

## Domestic Policy

28. In order to have credibility in discussions with international partners, the UK should lead by example, with strong domestic policies on environmental issues. Contributors emphasised the importance of the UK announcing ambitious climate policies, we were told that "If the UK is unable to 'walk the talk' on environmental policy the [FCDO] ... will have no authority to influence international partners".<sup>66</sup> We have not explored the opportunities presented by exciting green innovations such as direct air capture plants, vertical farming, recycling technology, carbon capture gardens and smart villages, but the COP26 Presidency provides a key opportunity for the UK to position itself as a driver of innovation in these areas. The recently announced Net Zero Innovation Portfolio will provide a welcome source of funding for new low-carbon technologies and systems.<sup>67</sup> By investing in and promoting the use of new green technologies the UK can position itself as a worldwide leader in low-carbon economies and influence other countries to follow our example.<sup>68</sup>

29. **It is essential that domestic policy decisions support rather than undermine diplomatic efforts. We recommend that the UK leads by example and sets ambitious domestic climate policies. We welcome the introduction of the Net Zero Innovation**

66 E3G (CLI0015); See also, COP 26 COALITION (CLI0030); Global Witness (CLI0002); Christian Aid (CLI0004); Katie White (Q11); ODI (CLI0032); UK Youth Climate (CLI0012); WWF (CLI0026); Q22

67 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, [Net Zero Innovation Portfolio](#), 3 March 2021

68 Dr Mara Oliva (CLI0005)

*Portfolio and recommend that the Government continue to explore and promote opportunities presented by new green technologies. HM Treasury is a key partner to the FCDO. Financial instruments that ensure enduring responsibility for environmental impact will be essential to demonstrate the UK's enduring commitment to a green agenda and key to ensuring that the City's leadership is used to embed change.*

*30. COP26 must aim to secure a form of realistic pricing of carbon output that prevents carbon offshoring and fully prices in the cost of the production of goods and transport. Building on the G7 and G20 to ensure the burden is carried by the commissioning country, and to incentivise change in producing nations, will change a simple equation based on the cost of energy to one based on the cost to the planet. The UK's financial services sector, and particularly its insurance industry, is well placed to understand these costs. Using new forms of finance to look at cost-sharing based on innovative ledgers would provide an opportunity to realise the impact and share the reward of growth, while encouraging cross-industry and jurisdictional cooperation on climate targets.*

## 4 Covid-19

31. The covid-19 pandemic has brought unprecedented challenges for the UK's Presidency of COP26 and dramatically changed the way that countries engage internationally.<sup>69</sup> The Government will now need to conduct effective, time-sensitive negotiations through a combination of digital and in-person diplomacy.<sup>70</sup> We were told that this will be an extremely difficult task, as in-person trust-building has often played an extremely important role in COP negotiations.<sup>71</sup> We heard that the ability of negotiators to spontaneously approach each other and to organise side meetings to explore compromise solutions is often crucial to securing agreements.<sup>72</sup> Dr Rietig, Senior Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, told us that:

Frequently, deals are struck after nights of negotiations when the presidency and group pressure make clear to negotiators that they will not be able to leave until an agreement is found.<sup>73</sup>

...This is something that is very difficult to reconstruct on Zoom and other online platforms.<sup>74</sup>

32. Continuing uncertainties around covid-19 restrictions will present further logistical challenges given that roughly 30,000 delegates would usually be expected to attend a COP.<sup>75</sup> This substantial number of UK and international delegates could present health risks to those attending the conference as well as the wider populations in Glasgow and the UK. The COP26 President has expressed that the Government's "clear intent is that we have a main conference that is in person" and highlighted that this is also the preference of many of the most vulnerable countries.<sup>76</sup> However, it is now only six months until the conference is due to take place and the Government has yet to outline any plans for what may happen if numbers of attendees are limited. Dr Jennifer Allan, Lecturer in International Relations, Cardiff University, told the BEIS Committee that "what we need is clarity on how the meetings will be scaled back, who will be invited and how to ensure that inclusivity, given that fewer people will be coming to Glasgow than originally anticipated."<sup>77</sup>

33. Many of those who submitted evidence to our inquiry emphasised that, for COP26 to be successful, all countries needed to feel invested and included in negotiations and the UK's preparations for the conference.<sup>78</sup> We were told that it would not be possible to guarantee that a virtual forum was inclusive unless people from the world's poorest countries had access to it.<sup>79</sup> However, moving negotiations online can create accessibility

69 International Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033)

70 Dr Katharina Rietig and Christine Peringer (CLI0031)

71 See, for example, Q76; Dr Katharina Rietig and Christine Peringer (CLI0031)

72 Q76

73 Dr Katharina Rietig and Christine Peringer (CLI0031)

74 Q76

75 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Fourth Special Report of Session 2019–21, [COP26: Principles and priorities—a POST survey of expert views, HC1000](#)

76 Oral evidence taken before the Business Energy and Industrial Skills Committee on 19 January 2021, [HC 144](#); Q214; Dr Katharina Rietig and Christine Peringer, LLB (CLI0031)

77 Oral evidence taken before the Business Energy and Industrial Skills Committee on 1 December 2021, [HC 144](#), Q129

78 Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033)

79 Dr Katharina Rietig and Christine Peringer, LLB (CLI0031); Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033)

issues for those with poor internet access, lack of access to simultaneous translation services or unstable connectivity.<sup>80</sup> Robert Falkner, Professor in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science, noted that:

There is huge concern, especially among poorer developing countries, which may struggle on the infrastructure side and not have stable and powerful connections, that they will therefore be disadvantaged.<sup>81</sup>

Recent research by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) echoes these concerns, 90% of the LDCs they surveyed agreed that poor internet accessibility affected their ability to participate in virtual meetings relevant to climate diplomacy.<sup>82</sup> Accessibility meant, for example, no internet or signal where they are located. The same number also agreed that poor internet quality affected their ability to participate in virtual proceedings. The FCDO says that it is:

Considering how we can build on new ways of working and advances in technology to enhance participation and inclusivity. The world of virtual events is moving fast and we need to be open to learning and adapting plans as lessons are learnt. We will work closely with all our partners to consider what the right virtual offer could be for COP26 to maximise participation. While this presents opportunities, we recognise the very strong view among parties of the imperative of in-person negotiations and that remains our focus.<sup>83</sup>

**34. For COP26 to be successful, the Government will need to ensure that negotiations are inclusive and take into account the viewpoints of the Least Developed Countries and the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. It will not be possible to guarantee that negotiations are inclusive unless the Government ensures that people from the world's Least Developed Countries have effective access to them. Poor internet access and connectivity could prove a real barrier to hosting an inclusive conference. Diplomatic efforts during the pandemic and recovery must recognise these challenges, participants should be supported with accessing negotiations and the Government must recognise situations where in-person diplomacy is needed. The event should be viewed as an opportunity to look at new ways of connecting communities, not just an obstacle.**

**35. The UK Government must recognise that it may not be possible for 30,000 delegates to attend a conference in November. There is a distinct possibility that large parts of the summit will have to be moved online or downscaled because of risks from covid-19. Those participating need more certainty on how covid may affect the logistics of the conference. In response to our report the UK Government should set out the criteria it will use to determine whether COP26 can go ahead as an in-person conference. We recommend that the Government set out what will happen if COP26 cannot have an in-person 'green zone' or if the main conference cannot go ahead with the expected number of attendees. The Government should also set out priorities for in-person attendees and contingency plans for virtual or hybrid events.**

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80 Dr Katharina Rietig and Christine Peringer (CLI0031); Institute for Environment and Development (CLI0033); Q76  
81 Q76  
82 Dr Katharina Rietig and Christine Peringer (CLI0031)  
83 [Correspondence with the Foreign Secretary on COP26 preparations](#), dated 6 April 2021 and 23 March 2021

***36. Given the commitment of the global environmental community to a green agenda, a downscaled COP26 could become the first expression of a new approach to international climate diplomacy, rejecting airmiles for airwaves and living the message of carbon neutrality.***

# Conclusions and recommendations

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## Ambitions

1. COP26 will be a key moment for global climate action. We have been encouraged by the number of countries that have expressed the importance of the climate agenda in international fora; COP26 must now translate these words into actions. The UK Presidency will need to mobilise public engagement so that as countries come forward with ambitious climate targets, those promises are backed by people around the world. COP26 will not be considered a success unless the UK Presidency sets the world on a path to net zero, secures an ambitious green finance package, and helps to build resilience to the impacts of climate change. (Paragraph 9)
2. We welcome the Government's announcement of four headline 'objectives' for its COP26 Presidency. However, beyond this announcement there has been little detail on what the UK Government wants to achieve. Setting ambitious expectations will be crucial to securing the success of the conference and the Government will need to do more than just set out broad ambitions. *We recommend that the Government ensures that the process for setting objectives for COP26 is inclusive and incorporates the views of the Least Developed Countries and the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. We recommend that before the beginning of the G7 conference in June, the Government expands its headline objectives into a clear list of targets that the UK Presidency wants to achieve in Glasgow. Using the two events together to mobilise support will give a greater opportunity for success. Only by working with networks of partners will the FCDO ensure that more ambitious NDCs are put forward, and only by making plans early and engaging others will the Government secure buy in from other UNFCCC Parties.* (Paragraph 10)
3. We welcome the Government's commitment to make climate change its number one international priority this year, but the responsibility of the UK does not end when COP26 concludes. The UK must continue its efforts as the torchbearer for the next COP, and beyond, to continue to ratchet up ambition on climate change. The FCDO and the UK's diplomatic network will have a key role to play in this process. *In order to ensure a successful legacy for the UK's COP Presidency, we recommend that the FCDO publishes an environmental diplomacy strategy, defining the Department's foreign policy aims for the UK's COP26 Presidency and beyond, and that it establishes a unit that can support future presidencies. The UK must commit to working closely with the African COP27 Presidency, including with the loan of staff and expertise, to sustain momentum on global climate action; particularly on adaptation, resilience, finance and loss and damage. Without a future commitment Glasgow risks being a one-off jamboree of voice and worry, changing nothing but airmiles.* (Paragraph 11)

## Diplomacy

4. Environmental diplomacy can enhance the UK's global leadership in line with the UK's vision for 'Global Britain' set out in the Integrated Review. Covid-19 has delayed international progress on climate action but has provided more time for the UK to prepare the ground for a successful COP26. Every foreign engagement the

UK undertakes in the lead up to COP26 can be an opportunity for environmental diplomacy. Environmental negotiations will need to take place within UN frameworks, in bilateral talks with countries, during trade negotiations, at the G7 and the G20, and in the UK's engagement with NGO's and the private sector. The UK will also need to ensure that climate objectives are effectively integrated into other foreign policy decisions, including decisions on international security, global health, and overseas aid. (Paragraph 18)

5. *The Government should ensure its objectives for COP26 are brought into all of the FCDO's foreign policy activity, including trade deals, decisions on overseas aid and bilateral and multilateral conversations with other UNFCCC parties. The Government's international development strategy should be published before COP26 and prioritise climate and biodiversity, listing the commitments that the UK will make along with pledges secured by partners. The recovery from covid-19 will require a Marshall Plan-scale commitment from many and the UK should ensure that this aligns with environmental ambitions, embedding a green outlook into a new economy. The FCDO should communicate to its partners that environmental agendas are not in competition but integral to health, development, and security policies. For COP26 to be successful, the Government should ensure alignment with G7, G20 and COP15 processes and decisions. As both the COP26, G7 and G20 Presidents, the UK and Italian Governments are well placed to ensure this alignment.* (Paragraph 19)
6. All countries share a common interest in preserving the planet—the global impacts of the climate crisis mean that COP26 will provide an opportunity for the UK to exercise soft power and rebuild relationships with key countries where differences remain on other issues. *The UK Government should use its COP26 Presidency as an opportunity to open dialogues with countries and people around the world on common climate issues. The UK should capitalise on opportunities for collaboration, with like-minded partners on intellectual property sharing for green technology. The FCDO can play a key role in collecting information for the COP Unit, engaging in discussions with countries around the world to discover 'red lines' and areas where there is negotiating flexibility. If our diplomatic network is to be effective, posts will need to be set clear negotiating objectives. It will also be essential to secure public support for climate policies. We recommend that the FCDO sets out an engagement strategy that goes beyond governments, using international media and public engagement to promote behavioural change and popular commitment to climate policies.* (Paragraph 24)
7. The US Climate Summit and COP15 (the biodiversity COP) will be two key moments where the UK will need to take stock of progress and push for increased ambition. *As the COP26 President, the UK should play a leading role in both the preparations for the US conference and during the conference itself. We recommend that the UK works closely with the US administration to align the objectives of the US climate summit on 22 April with the objectives of COP26. The United States' unquestioned importance in the pledging of climate commitments should not replace the UK's diplomatic role in bringing together other partners. It will be important for the FCDO to find ways to build bridges between both processes as well as pushing for ambitious commitments from the USA and China at COP26.* (Paragraph 25)
8. The UK has a strong record for building coalitions for climate action, such as the High Ambition Coalition at UN climate negotiations, and it could build upon this

during its COP Presidency. Summits such as the global summit on climate and development provide an important opportunity to influence those countries most affected by the impacts of climate change. *The UK Government should look to build overlapping circles of interest to build support for change and to drive forward global ambition. Building on partnerships that may be temporary, the UK should enable with staff support, though not always lead, groups of low-lying states, island nations, developing economies, high ambition states, and vulnerable country groups, amongst others, building on the work of the Small Island Developing States. We recommend that the FCDO make use of their relationships with the previous Chilean hosts, the Italian co-presidents, and other regional partners to build a network of sectoral leaders to help secure a worldwide push for increased climate ambition. The UK's Presidency should be viewed as organisational and enabling.* (Paragraph 26)

9. *In order to map the whole picture, it is important that the Government organise inclusive pre-meetings and do not simply hold pre-meetings on a regional basis. The Government should publish the agenda of these meetings to ensure inclusivity and to allow other countries to monitor the status of discussions.* (Paragraph 27)
10. *It is essential that domestic policy decisions support rather than undermine diplomatic efforts. We recommend that the UK leads by example and sets ambitious domestic climate policies. We welcome the introduction of the Net Zero Innovation Portfolio and recommend that the Government continue to explore and promote opportunities presented by new green technologies. HM Treasury is a key partner to the FCDO. Financial instruments that ensure enduring responsibility for environmental impact will be essential to demonstrate the UK's enduring commitment to a green agenda and key to ensuring that the City's leadership is used to embed change.* (Paragraph 29)
11. *COP26 must aim to secure a form of realistic pricing of carbon output that prevents carbon offshoring and fully prices in the cost of the production of goods and transport. Building on the G7 and G20 to ensure the burden is carried by the commissioning country, and to incentivise change in producing nations, will change a simple equation based on the cost of energy to one based on the cost to the planet. The UK's financial services sector, and particularly its insurance industry, is well placed to understand these costs. Using new forms of finance to look at cost-sharing based on innovative ledgers would provide an opportunity to realise the impact and share the reward of growth, while encouraging cross-industry and jurisdictional cooperation on climate targets.* (Paragraph 30)

## Covid-19

12. *For COP26 to be successful, the Government will need to ensure that negotiations are inclusive and take into account the viewpoints of the Least Developed Countries and the countries most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. It will not be possible to guarantee that negotiations are inclusive unless the Government ensures that people from the world's Least Developed Countries have effective access to them. Poor internet access and connectivity could prove a real barrier to hosting an inclusive conference. Diplomatic efforts during the pandemic and recovery must recognise these challenges, participants should be supported with accessing negotiations*

*and the Government must recognise situations where in-person diplomacy is needed. The event should be viewed as an opportunity to look at new ways of connecting communities, not just an obstacle. (Paragraph 34)*

13. The UK Government must recognise that it may not be possible for 30,000 delegates to attend a conference in November. There is a distinct possibility that large parts of the summit will have to be moved online or downscaled because of risks from covid-19. Those participating need more certainty on how covid may affect the logistics of the conference. *In response to our report the UK Government should set out the criteria it will use to determine whether COP26 can go ahead as an in-person conference. We recommend that the Government set out what will happen if COP26 cannot have an in-person 'green zone' or if the main conference cannot go ahead with the expected number of attendees. The Government should also set out priorities for in-person attendees and contingency plans for virtual or hybrid events. (Paragraph 35)*
14. *Given the commitment of the global environmental community to a green agenda, a downscaled COP26 could become the first expression of a new approach to international climate diplomacy, rejecting airmiles for airwaves and living the message of carbon neutrality. (Paragraph 36)*

# Formal minutes

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**Thursday 15 April 2021**

Members present:

Tom Tugendhat, in the Chair

Chris Bryant	Henry Smith
Stewart Malcolm McDonald	Royston Smith
Bob Seely	Graham Stringer

Draft Report (*A climate for ambition: Diplomatic preparations for COP26*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

*Ordered*, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 8 read and agreed to.

Motion made, to leave out paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 and insert the following new paragraph:

“The United Nations consulted 9.7m people from across the world who were asked to rank their priorities out of 16 options: Education came top, Action on Climate Change came 16th. It is therefore an absurd pretence for the Government to make Climate Change its number one priority. COP26 is taking place in the light of the failure of the United Nations’ framework convention on Climate Change to halt the increase in carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. In fact, at the present time there are 350 coal-fired power stations under construction in the world. More than half of these are in China (184). It is farcical for China to be considered a developing country in this process. If the United Nations and the major carbon dioxide emitters are serious about reducing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, then the top 10 emitters should negotiate a legally binding agreement on targets for reduction. The COP process is a contemptuous mockery of a serious objective. There is no reason for 30,000 political activists to fly in from around the globe, putting even more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere”—(*Graham Stringer*.)

Question put, That the new paragraph be read a second time.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 1	Noes, 4
Graham Stringer	Chris Bryant
	Stewart Malcolm McDonald
	Bob Seely
	Henry Smith

Paragraph accordingly disagreed to.

Paragraphs 9 to 36 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Question put, That the Report be the Seventh Report of the Committee to the House.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5

Chris Bryant

Stewart Malcolm McDonald

Bob Seely

Henry Smith

Royston Smith

Noes, 1

Graham Stringer

Question accordingly agreed to.

*Resolved*, That the Report be the Seventh Report of the Committee to the House.

*Ordered*, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

*Ordered*, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 20 April at 1.45pm

## Witnesses

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The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

### Tuesday 10 March 2020

**Pete Betts**, Visiting Professor in Practice, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment; **Shane Tomlinson**, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, E3G—Third Generation Environmentalism; **Katie White**, Executive Director Advocacy and Campaigns, WWF

[Q1–34](#)

### Tuesday 19 January 2021

**Professor Klaus Dodds**, Professor of Geopolitics, Royal Holloway University of London; **Dr Richard Powell**, Reader in Arctic Studies, Scott Polar Research Institute, University of Cambridge; **Heather Conley**, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

[Q35–64](#)

### Tuesday 16 March 2021

**Dr Katharine Rietig**, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Newcastle University; **Professor Robert Falkner**, Associate Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics, Research Director, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment

[Q65–78](#)

**Laurence Tubiana**, Former Climate Change Ambassador and Special Representative for the 2015 COP21 Climate Change Conference, Chief Executive Officer, European Climate Foundation

[Q79–99](#)

## Published written evidence

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The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

CLI numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Bond Development and Environment Group (DEG) ([CLI0023](#))
- 2 Born Free Foundation ([CLI0008](#))
- 3 British Antarctic Survey and NERC Arctic Office ([CLI0009](#))
- 4 Christian Aid ([CLI0004](#))
- 5 CAFOD (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development) ([CLI0013](#))
- 6 Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) ([CLI0007](#))
- 7 COP26 Coalition ([CLI0030](#))
- 8 E3G (Third Generation Environmentalism) ([CLI0015](#))
- 9 Foreign and Commonwealth Office ([CLI0010](#))
- 10 Global Justice Now ([CLI0029](#))
- 11 Global Witness ([CLI0002](#))
- 12 International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) ([CLI0017](#))
- 13 International Institute for Environment and Development ([CLI0033](#))
- 14 Met Office ([CLI0022](#))
- 15 Oliva, DR Mara ([CLI0005](#))
- 16 Orr, Iain ([CLI0027](#))
- 17 Overseas Development Institute ([CLI0032](#))
- 18 Peringer, Christine, (Member of Climate Change Project, Mediators Beyond Borders International); and Rietig, Dr. Katharina (Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in International Politics, Newcastle University, UK; School of Geography, Politics and Sociology) ([CLI0031](#))
- 19 Porter, Dr. Robin ([CLI0006](#))
- 20 Pouran, Dr Hamid ([CLI0011](#))
- 21 Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) ([CLI0016](#))
- 22 Tearfund ([CLI0018](#))
- 23 The Pew Trusts ([CLI0024](#))
- 24 UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum ([CLI0019](#))
- 25 UK Youth Climate Coalition ([CLI0012](#))
- 26 WaterAid ([CLI0021](#))
- 27 Westminster Foundation for Democracy ([CLI0014](#))
- 28 WFP UK Office ([CLI0028](#))
- 29 WWF-UK ([CLI0026](#))

# List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee's website.

## Session 2019–21

Number	Title	Reference
1st	Viral Immunity—The FCO's role in building a coalition against COVID-19	HC 239
2nd	Merging success: Bringing together the FCO and DFID	HC 525
3rd	Flying Home: The FCO's consular response to the COVID-19 pandemic	HC 643
4th	A brave new Britain? The future of the UK's international policy	HC 380
5th	No prosperity without justice: the UK's relationship with Iran	HC 415
6th	Striking the balance: Protecting national security through foreign investment legislation	HC 296
1st Special Report	A cautious embrace: defending democracy in an age of autocracies: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2019	HC 116
2nd Special Report	"Media freedom is under attack": The FCO's defence of an endangered liberty: Government Response to the Committee's Twenty First Report of Session 2017–19	HC 269
3rd Special Report	Viral Immunity—The FCO's role in building a coalition against COVID-19: Government Response to the Committee's First Report	HC 449
4th Special Report	Global Britain and South America: Government Response to Committee's Twentieth Report of Session 2017–19	HC 669
5th Special Report	Responding to irregular migration: A diplomatic route: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2019	HC 670
6th Special Report	Merging success: Bringing together the FCO and DFID: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report	HC 809
7th Special Report	Flying Home: The FCO's consular response to the COVID-19 pandemic: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report	HC 859
8th Special Report	A brave new Britain? The future of the UK's international policy: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report	HC 1088
9th Special Report	No prosperity without justice: the UK's relationship with Iran: Government Response to Committee's Fifth Report Ninth	HC 1253

Number	Title	Reference
10th Special Report	Striking the balance: Protecting national security through foreign investment legislation: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report	HC 1263