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Committee of Public Accounts

Government compensation schemes

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Committee of Public Accounts

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Summary

Government compensation schemes should provide redress to people harmed, either directly or indirectly, by the actions or inaction of public bodies. The costs associated with such schemes are large, with an estimated cost for seven of the most prominent schemes of nearly £15 billion.

The various schemes have experienced significant issues after being launched, with many victims waiting an unacceptable time to receive compensation or financial redress, and only able to do so via a claim process that they fundamentally distrust and often find retraumatising. The vast majority of people who responded to our survey also said that the schemes felt unfair, and 76% of people reported finding the claim process itself to be distressing or retraumatising.

Some schemes have made changes to try and improve the claim process for victims, including lowering the required evidence threshold and adopting a single caseworker approach. But over half of people who responded to our survey felt that the evidence they were asked to provide was unreasonable or too difficult to obtain. Most victims are still not told how long the process is expected to take or provided with updates while their claims are being processed. More than half of the respondents to our survey felt the timescales and next steps were not regularly communicated to them.

Government has historically underestimated the complexity and scale of its compensation schemes. Several schemes have had to extend the time whereby they are open to new claims, recognising that many eligible claimants had not applied within original timescales, and have received many more claims than expected. Victims across different schemes have called for independent, mutually respected and properly funded advice and support. Support should not always have to mean legal advice, but too many victims have had to seek expensive and time-consuming legal advice to navigate complex schemes with burdensome evidential requirements.

Victims deserve an independent body they can trust to design and administer schemes that can deliver redress quickly without being overly adversarial or litigious. In the absence of an independent body with central oversight, government compensation schemes are often designed or administered by the bodies responsible for the original wrong,

undermining trust and compounding harm. Trust is further damaged by schemes often being designed without sufficient input from the communities who have suffered the harm.

Although some compensation schemes have learned from the mistakes in design and administration of earlier schemes, there is no central repository to preserve lessons learned across government. Without such oversight, the government risks repeating the same mistakes, rather than ensuring that future schemes are timely, efficient and effective.

Conclusions and recommendations

CONCLUSION
Victims have lost trust in the bodies administering government compensation schemes. Bodies which they view as responsible for the initial harm caused.

> "For me it felt clear that once we were no longer being served by people invested in our story we got lost in the government "machine" and it has felt like we are then dealing with an unknown faction whose main aim is to protect the status quo, limit damage to the system and at all costs limit what gets paid out in compensation."
> – Survey respondent

> "Compensation schemes should not be run by the perpetrators of crime but by impartial panels who should be suitably qualified for the task in hand."– Survey respondent

Trust collapses when people have to rely on the same body that caused them harm to manage the compensation process. Lack of trust from victims in government compensation schemes, and the bodies administering the schemes, has negatively impacted their administration, engagement from victims and the wider claim experience. For example, the Home Office received far fewer claims than expected soon after launching the Windrush Compensation Scheme, partly due to a lack of trust amongst victims, and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) identified that a low level of trust amongst veterans made engaging eligible claimants on the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme more difficult. The vast majority of people who responded to our survey also said that the schemes felt unfair, and 76% of people reported finding the claim process distressing or retraumatising. Groups representing victims have been critical that the assessment processes in some schemes are not sufficiently independent and many feel that schemes should not be administered by the government bodies responsible for the original harm. Currently, only the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme, of the schemes examined by the NAO, is run independently of the department or organisation responsible for the original harm. The Department of Business & Trade (DBT) is chairing a ministerial group to consider options for improving future delivery of redress and explore the feasibility of an independent body. The government previously announced its plan to make a substantive statement on the matter by summer 2026, but this has not materialisd.

RECOMMENDATION

The Cabinet Office should:

a. provide a comprehensive update on the establishment of an independent body responsible for designing and administering government compensation schemes in order to end the practice of the body responsible for the harm designing and administering the redress; and

b. outline how it plans to design and resource an independent body to ensure it can effectively build claimant trust and provide redress efficiently.

CONCLUSION

There is no central oversight or coordination of government compensation schemes, and there is the risk that lessons learned from earlier schemes are lost.

> "There seems to be so many lessons learned to improve things, but it still seems to be the same." – Survey respondent

> "Before governments and reviews announce all-singing all-dancing promises and processes and how sorry they are [...], they would do better to plan, problem solve and have IT systems and staff in place to deliver." – Survey respondent

Responsibility for the design and delivery of compensation schemes currently sits with the bodies administering them, and there is no permanent central body providing oversight or coordination of schemes across government, or that stands ready to support and advise those who might need to set up a new scheme. Government officials designing and running schemes have set up a cross-Whitehall working group to share learning and identify good practice; but this approach relies on informal coordination and does not provide sufficient assurance that knowledge and expertise will be retained over time. In the absence of formal structures, learning may not be consistently recorded or shared across government and the risk that mistakes made in earlier schemes are repeated by future schemes increases. The NAO report and Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry have both recommended the establishment of a standing body to ensure lessons are systematically captured and applied. The Cabinet Office has asserted its determination to learn lessons from previous schemes and act as a central repository for learning but, without central oversight or coordination, government risks repeating the same design and delivery failures of the past on future schemes.

RECOMMENDATION
Government should set out how it plans to create a formal structure to ensure lessons learned from existing and past government compensation schemes are centrally recorded for future schemes, with consideration given to a standing body to undertake such a task.

CONCLUSION
A failure to properly consult with the impacted communities has led to too many schemes being launched without fully understanding the issues faced by victims.

> "The scheme is a disaster. It was setup by the Government without any input from the community. [...] This resulted in a scheme entirely unfit for purpose [...] This would have all be avoided if they consulted with the community." – Survey respondent

DBT acknowledges that it and Post Office Limited misunderstood the scale of the Horizon IT scandal, and it was only in the months and years after launching the Horizon Shortfall Scheme that it realised how many people were affected. Post Office Limited initially expected a few hundred people would apply to the Horizon Shortfall Scheme, but 2,417 people had applied by its initial claim deadline. The Windrush Compensation Scheme also faced issues after being launched without fully understanding the needs and challenges facing victims. Consequently, in December 2020, following criticism about the scheme's performance from Parliament and groups representing victims, and feedback from caseworkers, the Home Office announced changes to the scheme, including launching a £500,000 Windrush Community Fund. Schemes could have avoided these challenges by consulting impacted communities and conducting effective co-design with victims before schemes launched. Both government departments and representatives of victims agree that effective co-design is essential for building trust with victims and is a key determinant of success for a scheme.

RECOMMENDATION
Before future compensation schemes launch, government should commit to:

a. working with groups and key individuals representing victims to effectively co-design the scheme from the outset; and

b. agreeing with groups and key individuals representing victims how long a scheme will be open to claims, what funded support and payment options will be available and what restorative justice activity will be provided to victims.

CONCLUSION

Several government compensation schemes have failed to deliver compensation or financial redress to victims in a reasonable time.

> "I have been promised at least 6 different deadlines for a decision, all of which have passed." – Survey respondent

> "People are and have been suffering for years and there doesn't seem to be an end in sight"– Survey respondent

Three schemes examined by the NAO have already had to extend how long they were open to new claims, to ensure victims receive the compensation or financial redress to which they are entitled, and there is also a high risk that the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme will close with some eligible claimants having missed the claim deadline. Some groups representing victims are concerned that government does not do enough to advertise and promote schemes effectively throughout their lifetime, limiting the number of victims that apply for the compensation to which they are entitled. The time taken to conclude claims also varies substantially between and within schemes, with some victims waiting over a year or more for an offer. For example, in January 2026 there were 27 claims to the Windrush Compensation Scheme that had been in progress for 12 to 18 months, and a further 15 claims which had been in progress for longer than 18 months. On the Horizon Shortfall Scheme, the longest time taken to settle a claim was 1,395 working days.

RECOMMENDATION

Government must ensure for future compensation schemes that there is:

a. an outreach plan, including a commitment to identifying and contacting affected people whose details are already held by the relevant authorities, and associated budget to maximise take-up of the scheme to all those impacted by the associated harm;

b. performance metrics in place to ensure timely processing and payment of claims; and

c. a contingency plan to manage the risk of victims not being able to receive compensation or financial redress within the scheme's timeframe.

CONCLUSION
Too many victims require expensive and time-consuming legal support because of schemes' complexity and burdensome evidential requirements.

> "You have to be academic, legally savvy, dogmatic and super resilient to begin, continue and complete this process. It's compensation for wrongs done, not proving our innocence." – Survey respondent

> "I, in my 70s, had to dredge up very painful memories [...] staff wouldn't or couldn't just use what I had already submitted, they wanted me to re-remember what for years I have been trying to forget. Not only did I have to remember again the nightmare [...] I had to hold those details in my mind indefinitely just in case they required follow-up information. They were not quick in processing the applications, months went by. I have undergone medical interventions to suppress the nightmares [...] . During the waiting time [...] to look at my application the night terrors returned. Years of work undone." – Survey respondent

The evidential requirements of government compensation schemes have often been set at a level that is difficult for claimants to meet without additional support. Evidence requested from victims is often excessive, outdated or not readily accessible, and may already be held by the body administering the scheme; it creates a complex and legalistic claim process that presents significant barriers to making a successful claim and can be retraumatising for victims. Over half of people (53%) that responded to our survey reported that the evidence they were asked to provide felt unreasonable or too difficult to provide. As a result, many victims have resorted to legal advice to navigate the claim process. However, access to legal support varies between schemes, and claims that do receive legal support are typically more expensive and subject to more delays. For example, claimants to the Windrush Compensation Scheme are not eligible for funded legal support, despite the complexity of the scheme, while claimants to some of the Horizon schemes are but the legalistic nature of the claim process has increased the cost of administering the scheme and the time taken to settle claims. The Cabinet Office agrees that funded legal support should be available by design on schemes that have complex and legalistic claim processes, to avoid victims incurring costs. Departments also stated that some schemes such as the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme, were not designed to require legal support, but the Committee is concerned many claimants rely on and require legal assistance nonetheless.

RECOMMENDATION

Ahead of launching future schemes, government should:

a. work with groups and key individuals representing claimants to determine what would be an appropriate evidence threshold for claimants to meet;

b. ensure fraud and error implications are considered and fully understood when setting a scheme's evidence threshold; and

c. where the evidential requirements are likely to require support, ensure that the cost of any support is not incurred by the victims.

CONCLUSION

Most victims do not receive progress updates during the claim process and are not told how long their claim can be expected to take.

> "We have waited for years for the closure and compensation we are entitled to […]. My claim is straightforward and I have all the evidence required but we still have no idea on when we will receive payment or even have contact […]. We are just a reference number. The current process is inflexible, complex and lacks common sense, empathy and compassion." – Survey respondent

> "There is no indication of timeline […] which I feel would greatly reduce potential claimants' anxiety. Even if it were to say something along the lines of 'at the current rate of processing we would anticipate having invited everyone in your cohort by X date'. At least that would give people a bit of reassurance."– Survey respondent

Government bodies administering compensation schemes have not consistently provided claimants with clear information about the progress of their claims during the process or provided victims with an indication of how much time may be required to reach an outcome. For example, LGBT veterans were promised regular updates about claims which were not provided, and the MoD accepts that it could have better managed victims' expectations about how long it would take for claims to be processed. Meanwhile, the Home Office acknowledges that Windrush claimants initially received little information about progress or timescales, and claimants to the Horizon IT schemes reported stress and anxiety because of a lack of communication during the claim process. Of respondents to our survey, 53% felt the timescale to claim and next steps in the process were not regularly communicated to them during the process, and a further 13% reported seldom receiving regular communication. The effect of a lack of transparency has often been anger at the bodies administering schemes and disillusionment with the claim process. Government is considering ways to improve the transparency of government compensation schemes, and how best to communicate with victims during the claim process, including through a range of communication channels.

RECOMMENDATION

Government should work with groups and key individuals representing victims to establish:

a. a framework outlining communication and victim engagement principles that are to be adhered to by future government compensation schemes; and

b. how it plans to ensure future schemes are more transparent and effective at providing updates to victims throughout the claim process, with consideration at the design phase given to using an app.

1 Administration and oversight of government compensation schemes

Introduction

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took oral evidence from several public bodies administering compensation schemes – the Cabinet Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Department of Business & Trade (DBT) and from the Infected Blood Compensation Authority.[1] We also took oral evidence from Sir Alan Bates, founder of the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance; Kate Burt, Chief Executive at The Haemophilia Society; Rev Clive Foster MBE, Windrush Commissioner at Office of the Windrush Commissioner; and Peter Gibson, Chief Executive at Fighting with Pride and experts with specialist knowledge relating to government compensation schemes. We also surveyed individuals across all government compensation schemes to increase our understanding of the common problems that people experience. More details of the survey are included in Annex: Summary of survey results.

2. Government compensation schemes are expected to provide people who have experienced harm, either directly or indirectly, from the actions or inaction of public bodies with the compensation or financial redress they are rightly entitled to. The NAO's report examined the operational phase of a selection of seven government compensation and financial recognition schemes, including Windrush, Post Office Horizon IT (looking at four separate schemes within it), LGBT Financial Recognition, and Infected Blood. Our report concentrates predominantly on the schemes examined by the NAO and their operations.[2]

1 C&AG's Report, Government's compensation and financial recognition schemes, HC 1817, 17 April 2026

2 C&AG's Report

Table 1

Scheme overview

Scheme	People eligible for compensation	Lead government department
Windrush Compensation Scheme	Members of the Windrush generation and their families who incurred losses due to difficulties proving their legal immigration status in the UK. This was extended to any eligible person who arrived in the UK before the end of 1988 from any country and who is lawfully in the UK.	Home Office
Horizon Shortfall Scheme	Current and former subpostmasters with Post Office contracts who were wrongly held liable by Post Office Limited for shortfalls in branch accounts and who were neither convicted nor litigants in the group litigation.	Department for Business & Trade (DBT)
Horizon Group Litigation Order Scheme	492 of the 555 subpostmasters involved in the group litigation that resulted in a 2019 High Court settlement, following a judgement which ruled that the Horizon IT system was faulty	DBT
Horizon Overturned Convictions Scheme	Current and former subpostmasters whose criminal convictions were overturned by the courts, or who were prosecuted but not convicted nor received a caution.	DBT

Horizon Convictions Redress Scheme	Current and former subpostmasters whose criminal convictions were deemed to have been malicious and were quashed by legislation.	DBT
LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme	LGBT veterans of the UK Armed Forces who were dismissed or discharged because of the pre-2000 ban on homosexuality (Dismissed or Discharged Payment) and those negatively affected by the ban (Impact Payment).	Ministry of Defence (MoD)
Infected Blood Compensation Scheme	NHS patients who became infected through receiving contaminated blood transfusions or products, and those affected such as family members and carers.	Cabinet Office

Source: C&AG's report, Figure 1

3. We also received written submissions from a range of different sources including voluntary sector organisations, academic and researchers as well as wider government stakeholders. A list of the written evidence is available on the inquiry page of the Committee's website.[3] In particular, the evidence we received has drawn to our attention the importance of:

- clear, proactive communication throughout the claim process, by bodies administering schemes;
- outlining clear assessment criteria for claimants;
- simplifying compensation schemes where possible, and adopting a proportionate approach to assessing claims based on evidence provided;
- adopting a more coherent approach to designing and delivering government compensation schemes that is user-centred;

3 Committee of Public Accounts, Government compensation schemes: update written evidence

- the independent design and delivery of schemes, separate from the body responsible for causing the original harm to victims; and
- schemes providing more comprehensive support for victims during the claim process, including legal support.

4. By February 2026, the government had paid around £3.5 billion in total across the seven schemes examined by the NAO, with up to another £11.4 billion potentially yet to be paid. The Infected Blood Compensation Scheme alone is estimated to pay out £12.8 billion. Schemes differ in fundamental ways that affect their complexity and progress to date, including expected cohort size. Some Horizon schemes expect to receive hundreds of claims, for example, while the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme anticipates potentially tens of thousands.[4]

5. Some compensation schemes, such as the Windrush and some of the Horizon IT schemes, experienced significant issues in their early stages.[5] For example, schemes' initial assumptions about likely claim volumes and processing capacity were often wrong, contributing to backlogs and lengthened processing times.[6] These schemes needed to make changes in how they operated as a result, such as introducing fixed sum awards and providing better support to victims, to improve the claim process for victims.[7]

6. There remains substantial variation across schemes in how long claims take to conclude, capacity for greater transparency and clarity during the claim process and scope for more structured and consistent cross-government learning.[8] The independence of schemes, and their design and operation, is also still a concern for victims, as only the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme is run independently of the department or organisation responsible for the original harm.[9]

Victim trust and the independence of compensation schemes

7. Most respondents to our survey reported feeling the scheme they had experience of felt unfair, and 76% of people said the claim process was distressing or retraumatising. Over the first year of the Windrush compensation scheme, the Home Office received far fewer claims than

4 C&AG's Report, para 5
5 C&AG's Report, para 16
6 C&AG's Report, para 7
7 C&AG's Report, paras 10 and 16
8 C&AG's Report, paras 8, 14 and 17
9 C&AG's Report, para 12

expected, partly due to a lack of trust amongst victims. Some victims feared that engagement with the Home Office, as administrator of the scheme, may lead to immigration enforcement action. Many victims suffered harm due to the Home Office's 'hostile environment' policies, which required them to demonstrate their lawful immigration status to access public services, housing and jobs.[10] The Ministry of Defence (MoD), likewise, identified a low level of trust amongst victims of its discriminatory ban on LGBT service personnel, which has made it hard to engage with those veterans who may be eligible for financial recognition.[11] The Windrush Commissioner, Reverend Clive Foster MBE, told us that having the department that caused the original harm as the administrator of a compensation scheme does not help build victim trust in a scheme, and that a level of independence is essential to build trust.[12] Similarly, written evidence we received from Age UK, University of Leicester's Legal Advice Clinic and Hackney Council all noted that compensation schemes should be independently administered rather than be administered by the bodies responsible for the original harm caused to victims.[13]

8. We asked the departments whether they agreed that having the body that caused the original harm administering the subsequent compensation scheme was a poor way to establish trust. The Home Office said that it understood why there is deep scepticism and lack of trust, as victims perceive that government departments are not trustworthy so would want an independent organisation to deliver redress. However, on balance, it was of the opinion that the body that has caused the harm should also be responsible for providing redress. In contrast, DBT said that, on the Horizon Shortfall Scheme, claimants low level of trust in Post Office Limited became apparent and it was a mistake in retrospect for them to administer the scheme.[14] The Cabinet Office also stated that it established the Infected Blood Compensation Authority to administer the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme after reflecting on how you build trust and establish structures independent of the organisation that caused original harm.[15]

9. The Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry led by Sir Wyn Williams recommended that the government should establish a standing public body to "devise, administer and deliver schemes for providing financial redress" to persons harmed by the action or inaction of public bodies. The NAO made a similar recommendation, for a new standing public body to act as a compensating

10 C&AG's Report, para 1.9
11 C&AG's Report, para 3.20
12 Q5
13 GTS0008; GTS0011; GTS0014
14 Q 50
15 Q 72

authority to administer future time-limited compensation schemes.[16] Professor Sir Jonathan Montgomery, professor of healthcare law at University College London and former chair of the expert group on the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme, spoke to us about establishing a redress commissioner or standing body that works with affected communities to set up schemes. He said that creating such structures could be beneficial in ensuring that future schemes could be created more quickly.[17]

10. We asked the Cabinet Office why there is still no permanent central body to oversee and advise how compensation schemes are administered. The Cabinet Office acknowledged the merits of a single body independently administering schemes in a consistent way but expressed concern that such an organisation could not build multiple bespoke or tailored schemes that are appropriate for victims. It asserted that it would need to be persuaded that the benefits of an independent body outweighed those of having bespoke and tailored schemes.[18] We later asked the Cabinet Office for its assurance that it is open minded, however, about establishing an independent body to help design and deliver schemes, which it confirmed it is and that it is advising Ministers of the merits and challenges.[19] The Departments also confirmed to us that DBT is chairing a ministerial group to consider options for improving future delivery of redress and explore the feasibility of an independent body.[20] DBT previously announced that government plans to make a substantive statement on the matter by summer 2026, however, this has not materialised.[21]

Central oversight of compensation schemes and learning within government

11. Officials from compensation schemes across government attend eight-weekly meetings of a cross-Whitehall network to share updates on schemes, learning and best practice. The NAO's report found that these meetings are helpful opportunities for Departments to raise questions on operational issues and policy design, which have led to improvements in earlier schemes and benefitted later ones.[22] However, that there remains

16 Post Office Horizon IT Inquiry Final Report Volume 1, Recommendation 17, HC 1119, July 2025; C&AG Report, Lessons learned: Government compensation schemes, Session 2024–25, HC 121
17 Q 15-16
18 Q 106
19 Q 112
20 Q 109
21 C&AG's Report, para 2.24
22 C&AG's Report, para 2.27

no dedicated team within government that has central oversight of, or offers support to, bodies setting up or administering government compensation schemes. Without such oversight, the government risks losing its expertise in ensuring schemes operate in a timely, efficient and effective manner.[23] Written evidence we received from Hackney Council also warned that without government making efforts to learn lessons from earlier compensation schemes, there is a risk that mistakes from earlier compensation schemes and injustices are repeated.[24]

12. We asked the Departments how they had learned lessons from what went wrong with earlier compensation schemes. DBT told us that it learnt lessons as it continued to administer the Horizon IT compensation schemes and applied the learning from earlier schemes to its more recent ones.[25] For example, Sir Alan Bates criticised the Horizon Group Litigation Order Scheme, stating the scheme became very legalistic despite DBT's assurances during co-design that it would not be. DBT now accepts it over-complicated the scheme and has applied this learning to its Capture Scheme[26]. It also explained it had learned from the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme when designing the Capture Scheme and referenced, in particular, its more broad and holistic assessment of claims.[27] Similarly, the MoD said it engaged closely with earlier schemes, and learned a lot from the Windrush Scheme about case working and processing as well as the importance of considering the implications of financial recognition payments on benefit payments. The MoD also referenced the Cross-Whitehall Working Group and described it as bringing together expertise in government.[28]

13. Sir Alan Bates told us of the importance of establishing an organisation that learns lessons from those involved with compensation schemes, including for example victims and lawyers.[29] Shaila Pal, Director of the King's Legal Clinic at King's College London and author of a comparative analysis of the Windrush Compensation Scheme, said that an advisory group with significant learning and knowledge of compensation schemes, that includes victims of other schemes, should be part of an independent body that devises future schemes.[30]

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23 C&AG's Report, para 17

24 GTS0014

25 Q50

26 The Capture Redress Scheme launched in October 2025. People may be able to apply for the Capture Redress Scheme if they suffered a financial shortfall as a result of the Capture software, which was installed in some Post Office branches between 1992 and 2000.

27 Qq 72

28 Q 101

29 Q 23

30 Q 19

14. We asked the Cabinet Office whether there should be a permanent body within government that is learning lessons from what went wrong with earlier schemes. Cabinet Office told us that it is the natural place for such learning, considering it is the cross-cutting and co-ordinating centre of government. It also said its wider work is trying to change the culture in government, preventing the need for future compensation schemes, but it acknowledged that learning lessons to change how government operates is very difficult.[31] We also questioned the Cabinet Office on whether an independent body responsible for compensation schemes would be an effective repository of institutional memory. The Cabinet Office asserted that it is the responsibility of the departments of State to ensure government is retaining and sharing corporate knowledge. It also told us it is determined to learn the lessons of previous schemes and that it will be ready for any further compensation schemes that government decide to establish.[32]

31 Q 107

32 Qq 110, 111

2 Claimant experience on government compensation schemes

Failure to consult impacted communities

15. The departments have not always launched schemes before gaining a clear understanding of issues facing affected communities. On the Horizon Shortfall Scheme, Post Office Limited initially expected only a few hundred applicants but by the initial claim deadline of November 2020 it had received 2,417 applications.[33] Post Office Limited could not afford the total amount of compensation due at this point, which led it to pause the processing of claims.[34] The scheme then reopened after this deadline and subsequently received over 10,000 more applications.[35] On the Windrush Compensation Scheme, the Home Office announced changes to the scheme design in December 2020, following criticism about the scheme's performance from Parliament and representatives of victims, and feedback from caseworkers. Changes included launching a £500,000 Windrush Community Fund to raise awareness of the Windrush schemes and address a widespread lack of trust in the Home Office that was deterring some people from claiming.[36]

16. Kate Burt, Chief Executive of the Haemophilia Society, told us that Government could have avoided problems experienced by the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme if it had early engagement with affected communities – before the scheme launched.[37] She said that the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme was designed without victim involvement and stressed that co-design with victims is critical.[38] Reverend Clive Foster also told us it is critical that impacted groups are involved in designing schemes from the outset, and that design is aligned with trauma-informed principles that consider how the claim process can be retraumatising for people.

33 C&AG's report, Paras 2.7 & 2.8
34 C&AG's report, Para 2.9 and 2.13
35 C&AG's report, Para 1.19
36 Q81
37 Q9
38 Q16

Sir Alan Bates similarly stressed the importance of engaging victims and their representatives in designing schemes and processes and told us of his experience of co-design with DBT on the Horizon Group Litigation Order Scheme. Sir Alan said DBT had seemed to consider victims' perspectives during co-design sessions, but despite this, the scheme then ended up looking very different to what was discussed.[39] Shaila Pal went further by telling us that, not only should affected communities be involved in the design of schemes, but they should also receive funded legal advice to support them to engage in co-design.[40]

17. We asked the departments whether they agree that there needs to be more co-design with victims on future schemes as early as possible. The Cabinet Office told us that co-design is essential for compensation schemes, because it believes it is the only way schemes can build trust with victims and affected communities. It acknowledged that it is a core lesson and principle in building trust going forward. DBT and the MoD told us that they conducted co-design on the Horizon Group Litigation Order Scheme and the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme respectively. The MoD gave the example of co-design resulting in it establishing the separate impact payment and the identification of priority cases. The MoD also echoed the Cabinet Office's argument that co-design can build victim trust and confidence in a scheme. The Infected Blood Compensation Authority also told us it operates a community-driven design, where it engages with and consults affected communities before deciding on any significant design features of its scheme.[41]

Failure to deliver compensation to victims in a timely manner

18. The NAO's report found that three schemes extended the time periods over which they are open to new claims after the schemes were launched, recognising that many eligible claimants had not applied within original timescales.[42] It also found substantial variation across and within schemes in the time taken to resolve claims. There were 27 claims to the Windrush Compensation Scheme, as of January 2026, that had been in progress for between 12 and 18 months, and a further 15 claims which had been in progress for longer than 18 months, out of 528 claims in

39 Q5
40 Q 13
41 Q72
42 C&AG's Report, para 9.

progress at the time.[43] On the Horizon Shortfall Scheme, 2,049 claims were paid over a year after a claim was received—a fifth of all claims paid—and the longest claim settled took 1,395 working days.[44]

19. Peter Gibson, Chief Executive Officer of Fighting With Pride, expressed serious concern that government has not sufficiently resourced publicity and outreach on the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme, or proactively identified and engaged eligible claimants. He told us that government should be doing all it can to identify eligible claimants before the scheme closes in December 2026, including contacting all eligible veterans, and that he felt its current efforts are insufficient.[45] We also received written evidence from Hackney Council informing us that it is running drop-in sessions and outreach with potential Windrush Compensation Scheme claimants, in lieu of an effective national campaign. It said misinformation was allowed to spread in the community, which has led to confusion amongst victims as to the remit of the scheme, in the absence of a successful government campaign.[46]

20. We asked MoD why it has not written to all potentially eligible veterans through the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme. MoD told us it was doing all it could to promote the scheme, but it could not contact all eligible veterans as service records were so fragmented.[47] We also expressed concern that the deadline for applications of December 2026 may mean claimants miss out on financial recognition. MoD said in response it will continue to promote awareness of the scheme and referenced additional investment in a specialist to deliver outreach but did not address the cut-off date for applications. When asked whether the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme could be extended if claims are submitted after December 2026, MoD said its focus was on maximising the number of claims submitted before the deadline and that it did not have a contingency in place. It also said that any extension to the scheme would require ministers to enact the necessary legislation.[48]

21. Representatives of victims told us that prolonged delays in settling claims were unacceptable and had serious consequences for victims. Reverend Clive Foster informed us that Windrush victims were waiting 14 months to get a result on a claim in 2020, and it was totally unacceptable

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43 C&AG's report para 7
44 C&AG's Report, para 2.19
45 Qq 4, 22
46 Written evidence - GTS0008
47 Q 70
48 Qq 91, 92

how long people were waiting to get justice. Peter Gibson from Fighting With Pride also said that the delays at the start of the LGBT Financial Recognition Scheme led to a great deal of distrust.[49]

22. We asked the Departments why there is such substantial variation in the time taken to settle claims. DBT responded that it is waiting for people to submit full claims on the Horizon Compensation Schemes and it is keen to pay victims.[50] The Home Office said that, on the Windrush Compensation Scheme, launching without case-working capacity was a serious issue that resulted in backlogs and completely unacceptable processing times, that needed improvement.[51] The Home Office also told us it investigated why claims longer than 12 months were unresolved, which it attributed mainly to complex cases and claims with probate considerations.[52] The Home Office agreed that claims should be resolved within a reasonable timeframe, stating that claims taking longer than 12 months to resolve were not acceptable.[53] We asked both DBT and the Home Office how processing times had improved, with DBT attributing this to the introduction of fixed-sum offer payments and the Home Office crediting better resourcing and a single case worker approach.[54] Finally, we asked the departments whether they agree that claims taking over 1,000 working days were unacceptable. The Home Office and DBT agreed, but both also stated that a lot of the longest claims are delayed because claimants want to pause or slow the process, because they are finding it distressing and retraumatising, and departments only progress claims at the pace victims want.[55]

Complex evidential requirements and legal support for claimants

23. Compensation schemes often require claimants to provide extensive evidence to demonstrate their eligibility for the scheme.[56] However, the evidence we heard suggested that the evidential requirements on too many schemes have become overly burdensome and onerous for the claimants, and that in some instances they relate to records that no longer exist.[57] The Windrush Commissioner told us that the level of evidence required

49 Q52
50 Q 80
51 Q 81
52 Q 81
53 Q81
54 Q 83
55 Q84
56 Q10
57 Q20

means claimants often need additional support to complete their applications, and that the absence of funded legal support creates barriers to accessing compensation.[58] 63% of respondents to our survey reflected that the overall process had felt “extremely difficult”, a further 23% found it “somewhat difficult”[59]. Respondents felt it was particularly unfair that the burden of gathering evidence fell on them when that evidence was already held by the body administering the scheme and responsible for their harm.

24. Sir Alan Bates told us that the Horizon schemes had become complex and legalistic in nature, increasing both the time taken to resolve cases and the cost of administering schemes[60]. He acknowledged that the Horizon schemes were intended to be nonlegalistic but had “got bogged down in lawyers”, which he said added complexity and increased costs.[61] He told us that claimants have had to rely on legal representation to engage effectively with the process.[62] The Horizon schemes place significant emphasis on formal evidence and structured assessment processes, meaning claimants often rely on legal representation to support their applications.[63] Shaila Pal also told us that, without legal support, claimants may recover significantly less compensation; she cited evidence that awards of around £11,000 without legal representation can increase to around £80,000 where claimants have legal support.[64]

25. We also asked about differences between schemes in access to legal support. The Home Office told us that it was struck by the contrast between Windrush and the Horizon schemes in access to funded legal advice, explaining that Windrush was designed without funded legal support to avoid confrontational and retraumatising processes.[65] MoD told us that it does not provide legal support on the LGBT Financial Recognition scheme because it was designed to operate without the need for legal representation.[66] It explained that it provides funding to organisations such as Fighting With Pride and the Royal British Legion to support applicants.[67] However, Peter Gibson from Fighting With Pride told us that applicants had struggled to engage with the scheme and that expectations had not been effectively managed, despite the support provided.[68] We asked the Cabinet Office about the wider availability of legal advice for claimants,

58 Q5
59 Survey Q
60 Q6
61 Q5
62 Q6
63 C&AG’s report, Paras 2.35 & 2.5
64 Q10
65 Q87
66 Q88
67 Q70
68 Q22

and it told us that where schemes are highly complex and legalistic it can be appropriate for the state to provide funded legal support as part of scheme design.[69]

Scheme transparency and progress updates

26. Representatives of victims have expressed a need for greater transparency and clarity about how long the claims process is expected to take, and have been critical about the lack of information provided to victims about how long they might wait for an offer or how their claims were progressing.[70] Despite the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme and the Windrush Compensation Scheme providing claimants with a single point of contact to support them and provide continuity during the claims process, representatives of victims still reported needing more clarity about how long a claimant can expect to wait and better communications during the process.[71] Representatives of claimants to the Horizon Compensation Schemes also told the NAO that a lack of communication about how individuals' claims are progressing causes significant stress and anxiety for people during the process.[72]

27. Peter Gibson from Fighting With Pride told us that the MoD initially promised victims regular updates during the claim process, but this did not come to fruition, and it also said the MoD launched the scheme without delivering its online case management system, that allows claimants to view the status of their claim and which generates automatic updates.[73] The MoD told us it should have done more to manage expectations about the readiness of the scheme at launch and how long it would take claims to be processed. The MoD also explained that it launched the scheme without its online case management system being ready, so it could provide financial recognition payments to high-priority groups as quickly as possible.[74] The Home Office also told us that Windrush claimants initially received little information about progress or timescales when the scheme launched, describing the scheme as a 'black box'.[75]

28. Our survey of individuals with experience of government compensation schemes found that two-thirds of people had irregular or no communication during the claim process. Of total respondents to our survey, 53% felt

69 Q89
70 C&AG's Report, para 14
71 C&AG's Report, para 14
72 C&AG's report, para 2.11
73 Q 15
74 Q 67
75 Q 93

the timescale to claim and next steps in the process were not regularly communicated to them during the process, and a further 13% reported seldom receiving regular communication.[76] Written evidence we received from the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman highlighted the importance of clear communication and engagement with claimants throughout the process, acknowledging in particular the potential trauma and lengthy time that an individual may have suffered for before being able to seek redress.[77]

29. We asked the Departments what feedback they had received from victims about transparency during the claim process and what it was doing to address feedback it received. DBT told us it amended the claim guidance on the Horizon Compensation Schemes, in response to feedback from claimants about wanting more information, and has considered an online tracker so claimants could view their progress. The Home Office similarly confirmed it is reflecting on whether it should make an online system for tracking claims that is easily accessible and transparent, rather than relying on an individual caseworker to update a claimant.[78] We also pressed the Departments on whether an app would be useful so every claimant to a scheme could track the status and progress of their claim. The Cabinet Office agreed that an app would work in certain circumstances, but it advised that there are others where it would not – particularly when a claimant is very ill. It also acknowledged that it is its job to make sure that there are appropriate and transparent channels available that match the diversity of people claiming through schemes. DBT then echoed this point, asserting that claimants to the Capture Scheme, for example, prefer paper-based communication such as letters.[79]

76 See Annex: Summary of survey results
77 GTS0003
78 Qq 93, 94
79 Q 96

Annex: Summary of survey results

Introduction

572 people responded to our survey, which sought to understand people's experiences of applying for government compensation and financial recognition schemes. The survey was disseminated through organisations representing or supporting people with experience of relevant schemes. Organisations shared the survey with members and service users through their existing communication channels. Given the sensitive and potentially retraumatising nature of the subject matter, respondents were not asked to describe the circumstances that had led to their compensation claim or application.

The following is an analysis of the free text responses to the question:

> *If you could change one thing about the process to make it better for people like you, what would it be?*

People took the opportunity to describe the difficulties they had experienced, as well as giving suggestions for change. While people who had applied to the Infected Blood Compensation Scheme formed the majority of respondents, similar concerns appear across all schemes including, the Horizon, Windrush, and LGBT veterans schemes.

Although respondents represented different schemes and circumstances, common themes emerged. These related to delays, poor communication, lack of transparency, evidential requirements, fairness of compensation arrangements, the emotional impact of the process, and confidence in scheme administration and independence. Example quotes:

> "The process […] appeared less like a fair attempt to compensate victims and more like an opaque and adversarial exercise in which claimants were expected to educate themselves, prepare their own cases, and then be challenged on technicalities."

> "After decades of fighting for recognition, we believed we were finally at the finish line – and instead we are being treated with suspicion, as though we are trying to defraud a system rather than seeking acknowledgement of a wrong done to us by the state."

> "It should be remembered that this was an act that none of the applicants are responsible for, we should be treated as such."

> "The interim scheme was so traumatic that I had to seek counselling. The whole scheme is a disgrace that only serves to re-traumatise."

> "Go back to the drawing board with the whole scheme and have another try at removing all the unfairness and disparity. This was not an accident! This is not even close to bringing justice, it's an absolute joke of a scheme!"

> "We have waited for years for the closure and compensation we are entitled to [...]. My claim is straightforward and I have all the evidence required but we still have no idea on when we will receive payment or even have contact from [compensation scheme]. We are just a reference number. The current process is inflexible, complex and lacks common sense, empathy and compassion."

Victim trust and the independence of compensation schemes

Mistrust affects people's reflections of every part of the process. The independence and motivation of assessors is repeatedly questioned. Many see the delays, administrative or communication failures they have experienced as a design feature intended to stall payment or limit the liability of the body that harmed them. Across schemes, there are repeated calls for not only for independent administration, but independent panels, more transparent evidence standards and removal of perceived conflicts of interest. Example quotes:

> "For me it felt clear that once we were no longer being served by people invested in our story we got lost in the government "machine" and it has felt like we are then dealing with an unknown faction whose main aim is to protect the status quo, limit damage to the system and at all costs limit what gets paid out in compensation."

> "The whole scheme is designed to be difficult because the government does not want to pay compensation."

> "Almost appears to be deliberate in the hope that more people waiting to be compensated will die."

> “Compensation schemes should not be run by the perpetrators of crime but by impartial panels who should be suitably qualified for the task in hand.”

> “Stop allowing the people who caused the trauma being the ones to also decide the compensation.”

> “[It] should not be handling its own compensation scheme. It is not independent and they are too politically connected to the subject matter. They are not compensators, do not understand the compensation process, place onerous burdens on victims for information, they shift the goal posts and deliberately have policy of grinding you down.”

Central oversight of compensation schemes and learning within government

Respondents describe a “testing and learning” approach being used as an excuse for failure and describe frustration over a perceived lack of planning and accountability. Example quotes:

> “There seems to be so many lessons learned to improve things, but it still seems to be the same.”

> “The ‘test and learn’ excuse wore thin years ago – Yes, years ago”.

> “The constant refrain of we are testing and learning has been infuriating.”

> “It seems to lack planning and Cabinet Office appear to make it up as they go along.”

> “Before governments and reviews announce all-singing all-dancing promises and processes and how sorry they are […], they would do better to plan, problem solve and have IT systems and staff in place to deliver.”

> “I can only assume that the problem stems from a mismatch in the aims and objectives of different departments within the government and civil service and legal advisers, those who are trying to dispense justly and those who see it as their role to control expenditure, guard against legal presidents etc.”

> “I strongly recommend you never involve the guilty parties in trying to remedy resolve and compensate the victims. Setup a government department that takes over immediately this will give reassurance and appear to be independent to the victims. When involving specialist

bodies in gathering evidence, allow them to work fully independently and not bind them to guidelines that have been in place years earlier that were put in place for different reasons and don't have bearings on the current schemes, have faith in the specialist and let them do their work fairly and independently rather than your guidelines appearing to be adversarial."

Failure to consult impacted communities

People who responded to our survey repeatedly criticised the practice of designing schemes without meaningful engagement with impacted communities. People describe distress and delays that could have been avoided with better consultation prior to setting up schemes – for example, eligibility criteria that overlook loved ones or carers; compensation criteria that create divisions between groups; digital processes unsuitable for many claimants; and evidence requirements that ignore the age, illness or bereavement status of applicants or their ability to access records.

Respondents argue that community experience should shape the fundamentals of scheme design: what evidence is reasonable, how impact is measured, how deceased and affected people are treated, how claims are prioritised, how communication is handled and how staff should be trained to interact with traumatised claimants. Example quotes:

> "The victims must be part of the setting up of these schemes. Input from real life sufferers should be paramount."

> "The scheme is a disaster. It was setup by the Government without any input from the community. […] This resulted in a scheme entirely unfit for purpose […] This would have all be avoided if they consulted with the community."

> "The infected blood compensation scheme was constructed by bureaucrats, civil servants with no experience of infected blood. A compensation scheme developed without any user involvement from victims, presented as a "fait de complete"."

> "Listen to the groups, the community is suffering you still don't listen"

> "Cabinet Office officials dictate to victims, there is no meaningful engagement and reasonable and carefully thought-out arguments and change proposals are listened to and just as swiftly disregarded and ignored."

Failure to deliver compensation to victims in a timely manner

The most frequently raised issue was the length of time taken to progress claims and make payments. Delay is also one of the most emotionally charged themes. Respondents describe waiting years or decades for compensation, feeling forced to relive trauma in order to progress a claim, with many saying they fear they or their relatives will die before receiving redress. This is particularly acute for infected blood respondents, many of whom refer to their decades of waiting for acknowledgment of harm. Respondents describe elderly and traumatised family members unable to cope with continuing applications.

Delay is not only about how long people have to wait but the uncertainty. People repeatedly say they do not know when they will be invited to claim, when a decision will be made, or when payment will follow. The absence of reliable timelines creates anxiety, prevents closure and leaves people feeling ignored.

Proposed solutions include moving the burden of finding evidence on to the bodies that caused the harm, increasing staff capacity, creating specialist teams, simplifying scheme design, strengthening accountability for performance, processing straightforward claims first, publishing realistic timelines, processing family or otherwise connected groups as one claim, making interim payments where appropriate, adding interest to delayed payments, and prioritising elderly, end-of-life, and bereaved-family cases. Example quotes:

> "Mine was a clear-cut case but I have waited 41 years and still the process has not been finalised"

> "I have been promised at least 6 different deadlines for a decision, all of which have passed."

> "People are and have been suffering for years and there doesn't seem to be an end in sight"

> "We were promised compensation would be paid quickly, most of us are still waiting over two years down the line"

> "It has become a lumbering, slow bureaucracy. It is failing in its duty to get payments to people quickly. The length of time taken to "pilot" payments to the affected is ridiculous."

Complex evidential requirements and legal support for claimants

People feel they are being asked to prove harms that government or public bodies should already understand or have evidence of. Evidence requirements are described as excessive, repetitive and often impossible to meet. Respondents repeatedly point out that relevant records are held by public bodies that are responsible for the harm rather than individuals. Older records have been destroyed under retention rules, and information may never have been properly recorded or may be decades old. In addition people describe opaque internal rules about what evidence is acceptable.

A persistent theme is that schemes appear designed around administrative caution and avoiding fraud rather than what it is reasonable or fair to expect of claimants. Many respondents say that schemes claim to apply a claimant-friendly standard, such as balance of probabilities, but their experience suggests a culture of disbelieving claimants. Example quotes:

> "The single most important change would be to lower and humanise the evidential burden placed on families like ours."

> "I, in my 70s, had to dredge up very painful memories […] staff wouldn't or couldn't just use what I had already submitted, they wanted me to re-remember what for years I have been trying to forget. Not only did I have to remember again the nightmare […] I had to hold those details in my mind indefinitely just in case they required follow-up information. They were not quick in processing the applications, months went by. I have undergone medical interventions to suppress the nightmares […] . During the waiting time […] to look at my application the night terrors returned. Years of work undone."

> "Stop requiring parents as affected claimants to jump through hoops… how am I going to find evidence from almost 40 years ago it's retraumatising and impossible!"

> "as all the evidence required is primarily [held by] other government bodies, they could have asked for explicit consent from the applicant and written legislation or agreements to share information rather than everyone having to request SARs etc for the documents, it would reduce the continued trauma and emotional upset families are continuing to experience due to the shocking delays."

> "It is very difficult to provide the required documentation when the event happened a long time ago"

> “Stop treating the claimants as fraudsters out to defraud the scheme. Do not treat destroyed medical notes as nothing medical having happened.”

> “I have directly asked IBCA on numerous occasions what identification the affected will need to prove a relationship to the Infected person. Every time I asked, I’m either ignored or I get a reply that bears no relevance to my question. It is examples such as this that hold everything up when it comes to speeding up the process. People could have documentation ready instead of searching for it when they start their claim, but no, that involves too much common sense!”

> “We cannot see the rules we are being judged against, we cannot speak directly with the evidence advisory board, and we cannot meaningfully challenge decisions when the framework behind them is hidden.”

The need for support is substantial. Many respondents required help from professionals, family, friends, scheme staff, solicitors or charities. The need for significant support principally relates to navigating adversarial or court-like processes, which require an understanding of complex paperwork, evidence standards and legal concepts. Support is also needed to deal with the processes behind obtaining the evidence to make the claim and managing digital systems.

Some respondents say they could not navigate the scheme without professional legal help, while others feel that the legal and adversarial processes, which requires such support, made claims slower and more costly. Example quotes:

> “I need professional help to understand the legal wording.”

> “You have to be academic, legally savvy, dogmatic and super resilient to begin, continue and complete this process. It’s compensation for wrongs done, not proving our innocence.”

> “I have spent hours and hours of my time trying to access necessary evidence from financial and medical institutions that other schemes have professional help with. I am stressed I will get the info wrong and this will affect my case”

> “there is nowhere for victims to receive help, indeed if you have no money then basically you are “up the creek without a paddle”

Scheme transparency and progress updates

Across all schemes, only a minority of people said that timescales and next steps were regularly and clearly communicated. Respondents want communication that is specific, regular and honest. They ask for clear timelines, progress updates, realistic estimates, plain-language guidance, and consistent responses from caseworkers. Many people say that even an update saying there is no change would be better than silence, because it would reassure claimants that they have not been forgotten.

A recurring complaint is that communication is unclear, contradictory or evasive. Some respondents say they are told a scheme is "working at pace" while their own experience suggests little progress or "testing and learning" while their experience suggests no change.

Respondents link unclear communication to lack of accountability, lack of independence and lack of trust. Without transparent progress data and clear decision-making criteria, delays are interpreted as deliberate stalling, cost control or institutional self-protection. Example quotes:

> "My family are still waiting for any contact […] We are just a reference number."

> "I'm almost 71. I don't have time on my side. There's been nothing since I applied as an affected person (mother) it's a travesty and scandalous!"

> "The speed which claims are being processed and the lack of clear communication. There have been no clear timescales communicated"

> "Communication is awful! Things change ALL the time and we have to chase our tails."

> "The wait to be called to start your claim is an anxiety inducing process with no indication of when you might be contacted. There is no indication of timeline […] which I feel would greatly reduce potential claimants' anxiety. Even if it were to say something along the lines of 'at the current rate of processing we would anticipate to have invited everyone in your cohort by X date'. At least that would give people a bit of reassurance."

> "The only thing I can think of [to improve schemes] is more information even if there is nothing new to add! I know this sounds odd but it stops a feeling that one has been forgotten."

Additional cross-cutting themes

Fairness, tariffs and perceived discrimination

A major theme is perceived unfairness between groups. Respondents raise concerns about differences on how different groups are treated – people who contracted different illnesses, people who have been physically, psychologically or financially harmed; estates and individuals; parents, spouses and children; and differences between people in different roles when the harm occurred. Fairness concerns are also raised with regard to the differing ability to navigate the complexity of different schemes and how people are treated when experiencing delays outside of their control.

One of the strongest sub-themes in responses from people who identified themselves as victims of the infected blood scandal is the treatment of deceased victims and their families. Many respondents say deceased victims have been deprioritised and feel they are valued less than living victims. Families, widows, affected children and elderly parents describe being left waiting, having to gather evidence again, or fearing they will die before seeing any redress. Respondents argue that deceased people should not be treated as lower priority.

Emotional harm and re-traumatisation

The emotional impact is striking: the overwhelming majority of entries describe the process as distressing, re-traumatising or stressful. Respondents often say they were required to repeatedly relive traumatic events as part of the application process. Respondents repeatedly ask for trauma-informed staff, compassion, dignity and empathy.

Respondents often describe schemes as if they should be public accountability mechanisms, rather than simple payment systems. Respondents want schemes to acknowledge harm quickly enough for elderly, ill or bereaved claimants to receive some closure in their lifetimes.

Formal minutes

Thursday 3 September 2026

Members present

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, in the Chair

Mr Clive Betts

Anna Dixon

Chris Kane

Matt Turmaine

Government compensation schemes

Draft Report (*Government compensation schemes*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 29 read and agreed to.

Annex agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Twelfth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Adjourned till Monday 7 September at 3.00 p.m.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee's website.

Monday 1 June 2026

Sir Alan Bates, Founder, Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance; **Kate Burt**, Chief Executive, The Haemophilia Society; **Rev Clive Foster MBE**, Windrush Commissioner, Office of the Windrush Commissioner; **Peter Gibson**, Chief Executive, Fighting with Pride Q1-46

Professor Jonathan Montgomery, Professor of Health Care Law, University College London; **Shaila Pal**, Director, Kings College London, Legal Clinic Q1-19

Thursday 4 June 2026

Cat Little CB, Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office, Chief Operating Officer, Civil Service; **Gareth Davies CB**, Permanent Secretary, Home Office; **Jeremy Pocklington CB**, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence; **David Foley**, Chief Executive, Infected Blood Compensation Authority; **Carl Creswell**, Director, Post Office Policy, Department for Business and Trade Q47-112

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the inquiry publications page of the Committee's website.

GTS numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1	Age UK	GTS0011
2	Anonymised	GTS0002
3	Body, David	GTS0012
4	Hackney Council	GTS0008
5	Macleod, Dr Sonia	GTS0010
6	NHS Resolution	GTS0009
7	Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman	GTS0003
8	Smith, Miss Amelia	GTS0004
9	The Haemophilia Society	GTS0015
10	The Windrush Commissioner	GTS0013
11	University of Leicester's Legal Advice Clinic	GTS0014
12	Wilding, Dr Jo	GTS0006
13	Wilson, Mr	GTS0001

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee's website.

Session 2026–27

Number	Title	Reference
11th	Unlocking land for housing	HC 87
10th	Government shared services	HC 85
9th	Large business tax compliance	HC 86
8th	Northern Powerhouse Rail	HC 97
7th	Financial resilience of government-sponsored museums and galleries	HC 96
6th	The Access to Work scheme	HC 92
5th	MoD follow-up Spring 2026	HC 95
4th	Regulating for growth	HC 93
3rd	The MoD's tackling of economic crime and misconduct	HC 91
2nd	NAO financial audit insights 2024–25	HC 94
1st	An analysis of the asylum system	HC 89

Session 2024–26

Number	Title	Reference
79th	Supporting people with frailty outside hospitals	HC 1706
78th	The Bank of England's Real-Time Gross Settlement Renewal Programme	HC 1732
77th	Accountability in small government bodies	HC 887
76th	New Hospital Programme update	HC 1705
75th	Government use of data analytics on error and fraud	HC 891

Number	Title	Reference
74th	Environmental regulation	HC 1687
73rd	Financial sustainability of adult hospices in England	HC 1236
72nd	BBC World Service	HC 1299
71st	Government's use of external consultants	HC 1521
70th	Home-to-school transport	HC 1238
69th	Whole of Government Accounts 2023-24	HC 1243
68th	Excess Votes 2024-25	HC 1711
67th	NS&I's transformation programme	HC 1237
66th	Tackling fraud and error in benefit expenditure 2024-25	HC 1231
65th	Efficiency and resilience of the Probation Service	HC 1235
64th	Costs of clinical negligence	HC 1234
63rd	Increasing police productivity	HC 1239
62nd	Faulty energy efficiency installations	HC 1229
61st	Financial sustainability of children's care homes	HC 1233
60th	DWP follow-up: Autumn 2025	HC 1447
59th	Ministry of Justice follow-up: Autumn 2025	HC 1240
58th	Government services: Identifying costs	HC 1421
57th	Government services: Generating income	HC 890
56th	BBC Accounts and Trust Statement 2024–25	HC 1230
55th	Reducing NHS waiting times for elective care	HC 820
54th	Afghanistan Response Route	HC 1391
53rd	Cost of maintaining the FCDO's overseas estate	HC 884
52nd	Resilience to threats from animal disease	HC 885
51st	The UK's F-35 stealth fighter capability	HC 1232
50th	Local bus services in England	HC 892
49th	Administration of the Civil Service Pension Scheme	HC 888
48th	Smarter delivery of public services	HC 889
47th	First Annual Report of the Chair of the Committee of Public Accounts	HC 1300
46th	Improving local areas through developer funding	HC 886
45th	Improving family court services for children	HC 883
44th	Governance and decision-making on major projects	HC 642
43rd	MoD's oversight of Reserve Forces' and Cadets' Associations	HC 893
42nd	Water sector regulation	HC 824
41st	UK Research and Innovation	HC 826

Number	Title	Reference
40th	Collecting the right tax from wealthy individuals	HC 827
39th	Government’s use of private finance for infrastructure	HC 821
38th	Increasing teacher numbers: Secondary and further education	HC 825
37th	Immigration: Skilled worker visas	HC 819
36th	Jobcentres	HC 823
35th	Introducing T Levels	HC 822
34th	Department for Business and Trade Annual Report and Accounts 2023-24	HC 818
33rd	Supporting the UK’s priority industry sectors	HC 1070
32nd	The Future of the Equipment Plan	HC 716
31st	Local Government Financial Sustainability	HC 647
30th	Antimicrobial resistance: addressing the risks	HC 646
29th	Condition of Government property	HC 641
28th	Decommissioning Sellafield	HC 363
27th	Government’s relationship with digital technology suppliers	HC 640
26th	Tackling Violence against Women and Girls	HC 644
25th	DHSC Annual Report and Accounts 2023-24	HC 639
24th	Government cyber resilience	HC 643
23rd	The cost of the tax system	HC 645
22nd	Government’s support for biomass	HC 715
21st	Fixing NHS Dentistry	HC 648
20th	DCMS management of COVID-19 loans	HC 364
19th	Energy Bills Support	HC 511
18th	Use of AI in Government	HC 356
17th	The Remediation of Dangerous Cladding	HC 362
16th	Whole of Government Accounts 2022-23	HC 367
15th	Prison estate capacity	HC 366
14th	Public charge points for electric vehicles	HC 512
13th	Improving educational outcomes for disadvantaged children	HC 365
12th	Crown Court backlogs	HC 348
11th	Excess votes 2023-24	HC 719
10th	HS2: Update following the Northern leg cancellation	HC 357
9th	Tax evasion in the retail sector	HC 355
8th	Carbon Capture, Usage and Storage	HC 351

Number	Title	Reference
7th	Asylum accommodation: Home Office acquisition of former HMP Northeye	HC 361
6th	DWP Customer Service and Accounts 2023-24	HC 354
5th	NHS financial sustainability	HC 350
4th	Tackling homelessness	HC 352
3rd	HMRC Customer Service and Accounts	HC 347
2nd	Condition and maintenance of Local Roads in England	HC 349
1st	Support for children and young people with special educational needs	HC 353