

Meta Response: Science, Innovation & Technology Committee Social Media, Misinformation & Harmful Algorithms Inquiry

Update (May 2026)

Meta welcomes the opportunity to provide further information on two matters as requested via email correspondence shared by the Committee Specialist on May 5th. We hope the information below will be helpful for Committee members.

I. Prevalence of misinformation

As described in our original April 2026 written submission, it is not possible to provide prevalence figures for misinformation in the same way as for content that violates our Community Standards, such as bullying and harassment.

However, there are areas of our enforcement data across our [Community Standards Enforcement Reports](#) and [Adversarial Threat Reports](#) which we hope will provide the Committee with meaningful insight into relevant trends. Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour (CIB) networks and fake accounts, for example, are widely recognised as potential vectors for the distribution of false claims. The disruption of these networks and removal of these accounts therefore likely has a direct bearing on the reach and spread of misleading content.

On fake accounts specifically, our most recent [Community Standards Enforcement Report](#) shows that in Q4 2025, we actioned approximately 1.1 billion fake accounts on Facebook alone, of which 99.9% were detected proactively by our automated systems before any user reported them. This proactive detection rate has remained consistently above 99% across reporting periods - while the total number of fake accounts removed has fluctuated between a recent high of 1.4 billion in Q4 2024 and a low of 687 million in Q2 2025. Further information and historical data points can be found in the relevant section of Meta's [Transparency Center](#).

Our most recent [Adversarial Threat](#) report details 6 CIB networks that were disrupted in H1 2026 - originating from Iran, Russia, China, and Pakistan - with a combined total of approximately 1,450 Facebook accounts, 199 Facebook pages, and 704 Instagram accounts removed. Russia, Iran and China continue to serve as the three leading sources of CIB globally, with increasing sophistication and tradecraft a defining trend. When we investigate and remove these operations, we focus on behaviour, not content - no matter who's behind them, what they post, or whether they're foreign or domestic.

II. Young People, Revenue & Age Restrictions

We do not have a figure we can share on the specific revenue impact of Australia's social media ban. However, given that under-18s represent less than 1% of Meta's revenue globally, the ban's impact on revenue would be negligible.

Meta shares the Australian Government's goal of creating safe, age-appropriate online experiences - but emerging evidence raises serious questions about the effectiveness of the

ban. We believe a better approach would be app store-level age verification, placing young people into age-appropriate experiences from the start.

May 2026