

Defence Committee

Service Accommodation

First Report of Session 2024–25

HC 406

Defence Committee

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Summary

“Access to decent accommodation underpins the wellbeing of our Armed Forces community and is key to the operational effectiveness of serving personnel”¹

When the 2024 general election was called, the Defence Committee had completed taking evidence on service accommodation but had not yet produced a Report. We have decided to publish this Report now, to draw attention to the important issues uncovered by that evidence, before we begin our own scrutiny of the current Government’s emerging personnel policy.

Very low rates of satisfaction with service accommodation

Satisfaction with the standard of both Service Family Accommodation (SFA) and Single Living Accommodation (SLA) fell to their lowest levels yet in 2023. Although they recovered slightly in 2024, they remain very low, impacting recruitment, retention and morale.

Historic under-investment

The Ministry of Defence has under-invested in the Defence estate over decades. A third of Single Living Accommodation and two-thirds of Service Families Accommodation are in such poor condition that they are essentially no longer fit for purpose. It would require billions of pounds of investment to refurbish or rebuild all military housing to meet modern living standards.

Persistent problems with contract maintenance and repairs

The Defence Infrastructure Organisation’s contractual arrangements for the maintenance and repair of its accommodation have resulted in poor contractor performance, poor quality of maintenance and repair work, and a poor lived experience for many serving personnel and their families.

A botched roll-out of the new accommodation offer

The mismanaged communication and implementation of the MOD’s ‘new accommodation offer’—a policy which was designed to give service personnel more accommodation options—forced the MOD to pause its rollout with further consequences for morale, which the Government must now try to fix.

¹ Ministry of Defence, [Armed Forces Covenant and Veterans Annual Report 2023](#), gov.uk, 18 December 2023

Introduction

Purpose of the inquiry

1. The purpose of this inquiry was to consider service personnel and their families' experiences of service accommodation; the Ministry of Defence's improvement and investment plans for Single Living and Service Families' Accommodation; and proposals to alter the allocation criteria for some of this accommodation through the New Accommodation Offer (now called the Modernised Accommodation Offer).
2. The inquiry was launched during the 2019 Parliament in response to extensive reports of serious issues with service accommodation during the winter of 2022–23, confirmed by the results from the UK Regular Armed Forces Continuous Attitude survey (AFCAS), published in June 2023. These showed that satisfaction with the standard of both Service Family Accommodation (SFA) and Single Living Accommodation (SLA) had fallen to their lowest reported levels, with the most significant reductions in satisfaction relating to maintenance and repairs. 29% of service personnel cited accommodation as a factor influencing their intention to leave.² These trends were also reflected in the Tri-service families continuous attitude survey, published in July 2023.
3. The inquiry began in July 2023 under a Sub-Committee, chaired by Robert Courts, and was subsequently remitted to the main Defence Committee in November 2023, retaining the same terms of reference. The inquiry was interrupted by the 2024 general election. In November 2024, we agreed to complete the inquiry and publish its findings. As a result, this Report contains almost no evidence taken under the current Government and largely reflects the situation as it was in May 2024. The findings remain relevant and deserve to be brought to the attention of the House, the Government and the public.

² Ministry of Defence, [Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey: 2023](#), gov.uk, 1 June 2023

Oral and written evidence

4. The inquiry held three oral evidence sessions:
 - a. On 13 September 2023, with the Army, Naval and RAF Families Federations, as representatives of service personnel and their families.³
 - b. On 27 November 2023, with the service providers for Service Families Accommodation (SFA): Pinnacle Group, Amey and VIVO Defence Services.⁴
 - c. On 27 February 2024, with the MOD Minister with responsibility for the Defence Estate at the time, alongside senior military and civilian officials.⁵
5. The then Secretary of State for Defence also answered questions about service accommodation on 15 November 2023⁶ and we asked the incumbent Secretary of State for Defence questions of our own on 21 November 2024, in both cases as part of sessions covering broader ground.⁷
6. In the terms of reference, we asked for written evidence on the following points:
 - a. What measures have been put in place to resolve the housing maintenance issues, hold service providers to account and ease the cost of living for service families?
 - b. Do the new Future Defence Infrastructure Services (FDIS) contracts for Service Family Accommodation represent value for money and are they operating effectively?
 - c. What is the MOD doing and what more could they do to rebuild trust in service accommodation?
 - d. Are there examples of good practice in provision of service accommodation, which could be replicated across Defence? What are the lessons and what is the potential impact of the re-negotiation of the Annington Homes contract?

3 Oral evidence taken on [13 September 2023](#)

4 Oral evidence taken on [27 November 2023](#)

5 Oral evidence taken on [27 February 2024](#)

6 Oral evidence taken on 15 November 2023, [Qq58–63](#)

7 Oral evidence taken on 21 November 2024, [Qq34–36](#)

- e. Is enough money being invested to modernise and future proof military accommodation and how long will it take for all military accommodation to meet an acceptable standard of energy efficiency? Is the MOD being as forward thinking and innovative as it could be in its approach to new housing stock?
 - f. What are the benefits and drawbacks of the Future Accommodation Model? How successful was the Future Accommodation Model pilot and what should the MOD take forward to include in the new accommodation offer?
 - g. Is enough being done to help personnel leaving service transition to civilian housing?
 - h. Could the Service accommodation offer be more supportive to those experiencing relationship breakdown or domestic abuse?
7. The last two of these questions are not covered in this Report, given the limited written evidence received. We are nonetheless grateful to the Royal British Legion⁸ and the Service Families Federations⁹ for their insight into these issues.
8. The Committee received 72 written evidence submissions, including 40 from serving personnel, after the then Secretary of State granted them dispensation to contribute to the inquiry in a personal capacity, following a change of heart in October 2023. We would like to thank all those who contributed written evidence and shared their experiences of living in service accommodation.

Table 1: Submissions of written evidence by contributor

Contributor	Number of submissions
Army personnel/families	26
RAF personnel/families	19
Navy personnel/families	2
Joint HQ personnel/families	1
Organisation	14
Private tenant	1
Not known	9

Source: Defence Committee

8 The Royal British Legion ([SAC0012](#)), paras 3.3.1-3.4.7

9 [Qq46-50](#)

Scrutiny of Service Accommodation

9. Concerns about inadequate service accommodation have been raised repeatedly in Parliament over recent years.
10. In connection with a Westminster Hall debate on 19 December 2023, on Adequacy of Service Accommodation,¹⁰ the Petitions Committee invited signatories of relevant petitions to answer a survey about their experiences of service accommodation and put forward suggestions for how it could be improved. The results of the survey are published as written evidence,¹¹ and many of the key themes in it correlate with other evidence, such as the poor condition of some housing and quality of repair work, a perceived lack of accountability for this and the effect on morale (see Chapters 1 and 2).
11. The Committee published a Report on Defence and Climate Change in August 2023.¹² It included a recommendation to invest in the housing stock to increase energy efficiency and enhance Defence’s energy resilience, which in turn would improve retention. In its response to the report,¹³ the MOD pointed to a “significant accommodation strategy review which includes Net Zero and energy factors”, scheduled to conclude by the end of 2023. As of 3 December 2024, the MOD had not published any outcomes from this review.
12. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) produced reports on Improving Single Living Accommodation for Service Personnel in April 2021¹⁴ and on Service Family Accommodation in July 2017.¹⁵ The PAC concluded that “Service families have been badly let down for many years” and “the Department has neglected Single Living Accommodation for many years.”
13. At least two recent MOD-commissioned reviews have included recommendations on service accommodation:
 - a. The review of UK Armed Forces incentivisation by Rick Haythornthwaite,¹⁶ published in June 2023, includes recommendations to prioritise investment in single living and service family accommodation.

10 HC Deb, 19 December 2023, [cols 483-503WH](#)

11 Cat Smith MP (Chair of Petitions Committee) ([SAC0080](#))

12 Defence Committee, Eighth Report of Session 2022–23, [Defence and Climate Change](#), HC 179, paras 42-43

13 Defence Committee, First Special Report of Session 2023–24, [Defence and Climate Change: Government Response](#), HC 32, para 5

14 Committee of Public Accounts, Fifty-Fourth Report of Session 2019–21, [Improving single living accommodation for service personnel](#), HC 940

15 Committee of Public Accounts, Ninth Report of Session 2016–17, [Service Family Accommodation](#), HC 77

16 Ministry of Defence, [Agency and Agility: Incentivising people in a new era - a review of UK Armed Forces incentivisation](#), gov.uk, 19 June 2023, Recommendation 3

- b.** Living in our Shoes: Understanding the needs of UK Armed Forces Families by Andrew Selous MP,¹⁷ published in June 2020, includes a chapter on accommodation and a set of recommendations, including “urgent significant investment in poor quality SFA”.
- 14.** In April 2024, the Kerslake Commission on Armed Forces Housing published a review: ‘Homes unfit for Heroes. The poor condition of armed forces accommodation and what needs to change’,¹⁸ commissioned by Rt Hon John Healey MP as Shadow Defence Secretary. There are similarities between that review’s findings and our own.

17 Ministry of Defence, [Living in our shoes: understanding the needs of UK Armed Forces families](#), gov.uk, 30 June 2020, Chapter 3

18 The Kerslake Commission on Armed Forces Housing, [Homes unfit for heroes: the poor condition of armed forces accommodation and what needs to change](#), April 2024

1 Service Family Accommodation (SFA)

15. In March 2023¹⁹ there were 47,800 properties in the UK intended for Service Family Accommodation (SFA). The MOD leases the majority, 37,100 homes, from Annington Property Limited (see paras 26-29); the rest are owned by the MOD or leased from other providers or Private Finance Initiatives.²⁰ The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) keeps a ‘management margin’ of 10% of properties vacant, which allows for maintenance and rotation of service personnel.²¹ In May 2023 9,100—19% of such homes—were unoccupied,²² almost double the MOD’s management margin. The DIO has refurbished 1,000 empty properties in anticipation of an increase in demand for SFA²³ (this was expected after the introduction of the new accommodation offer - see Chapter 3). In addition, 500 homes (1% of the total SFA housing stock) were made available to Afghan families as part of the Afghan Relocation and Resettlement policy (ARAP).²⁴
16. The DIO accepts that it must modernise the Defence estate, as half of its buildings are over 50 years old, including efficiency improvements which would help achieve the Government sustainability and climate commitments.²⁵ Michael Green, Chief Executive at DIO, described the state of the estate as “shocking” and estimated that two-thirds of SFA “needs rebuilding,” to meet modern standards.²⁶ The DIO says it is “constrained by the lack of investment in the Defence estate over decades and current funding levels, over which it exercises no control.”²⁷ Between 2010 and 2022, the MOD adopted a “fix on fail” approach to maintenance,²⁸ which led to

19 To maintain comparability, we have used statistics from 2023. Updated statistics for 2024 are available at Ministry of Defence, [Service Family Accommodation Statistics: 2010 to 2024](#), gov.uk, 30 May 2024. These show only a marginal change from the previous year.

20 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)), para 4

21 Data on 31 March 2023, taken from Ministry of Defence, [Service Family Accommodation Statistics: 2010 to 2023](#), gov.uk, 23 May 2023

22 Ministry of Defence, [Service Family Accommodation Statistics: 2010 to 2023](#), gov.uk, 23 May 2023

23 [Qq261-266](#)

24 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)), para 85 (December 2023)

25 Ministry of Defence, [Strategy for Defence Infrastructure](#), gov.uk, 27 January 2022

26 [Qq218-222](#)

27 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)), para 3

28 The fix on fail approach refers to the MOD suspending proactive/preventative maintenance in response to budget cuts.

further deterioration in the condition of its housing.²⁹ It was estimated in the Haythornthwaite review that SFA needs £2 billion additional investment over the next 10 years.³⁰ Michael Green agreed it would take between £2 billion to £2.4 billion to make the estate “decent” and “somewhere people would be happy to live.”³¹

17. In April 2024, the former Government announced plans to invest over £4 billion to upgrade existing accommodation and build new service accommodation over the next decade. However, no detail on this commitment was available at the time the general election was called.³²

18. In the May 2024 issue of the DIO’s newsletter, newly appointed Head of Accommodation, Air Commodore Leah Griffiths stated,

“The current financial position is more challenging than ever which is resulting in some difficult choices being made. This means that to ensure the safety and compliance of the estate, DIO is currently prioritising emergency and urgent repairs which means that requests for non-urgent repairs and home improvements are not currently affordable and, unfortunately, will need to be deferred. This position will be reassessed once the budget for 24/25 has been finalised.”³³

19. The new Minister for Defence People and Veterans told Parliament in October 2024 that he had been “utterly shocked by the state of parts of the housing estate”, describing the situation as “unacceptable”. In answers to written questions, Ministers reported that different, apparently conflicting amounts were to be spent in the current financial year (2024–25) on maintaining and improving Service Families Accommodation, ranging from £439 million to £619 million.³⁴ No figures appear yet to be available for future years.³⁵

20. In evidence to us in November 2024, the Secretary of State confirmed that infrastructure, including service accommodation, fell within the terms of reference for the Strategic Defence Review as key enablers for Defence, and that there would be “big and difficult decisions about where the best direction for investment will lie.”³⁶

29 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)) para 11; [Q216](#)

30 Ministry of Defence, [Agency and Agility: Incentivising people in a new era - a review of UK Armed Forces incentivisation](#), gov.uk, 19 June 2023, para 1.15, p28

31 [Q267](#)

32 HC Deb, 24 April 2024, [col 940](#)

33 Ministry of Defence, Service Family Accommodation, [Families First - Issue 16](#), gov.uk, 1 May 2024

34 Armed Forces: Housing: [HL964](#), 26 September 2024; [8912](#), 22 October 2024; [179](#), 25 July 2024

35 HC Deb, 14 October 2024, [col 581](#)

36 Oral evidence taken on 21 November 2024, [Q34](#)

21. RECOMMENDATION

As part of its response to this Report, the Government should set out in detail its investment plans for both Service Families Accommodation and Single Living Accommodation, how far it expects these plans to address the condition of the Estate, and how it intends meanwhile to manage the human and resourcing consequences of continuing to expect personnel and their families to occupy ageing properties, often in poor condition, that do not meet their expectations.

- 22.** The DIO's evidence makes clear the high level of spend required simply to carry out running repairs on the existing, increasingly dated estate. We would expect any investment plans to detail the allocation towards new build and complete refurbishment as opposed to more tactical maintenance, so that we and others can judge if this is likely to produce the kind of uplift that service personnel are likely to demand as part of their long-term retention package.

Who lives in SFA?

- 23.** Despite widespread issues with the condition and maintenance of SFA, uptake for SFA across the Services remains relatively high. Just under three-fifths of families live in SFA although this differs by Service and rank.³⁷
- 24.** To apply for SFA under existing rules, a service person must be married, in a civil partnership or have permanent custody of children. Those in an established long-term relationship are eligible (rather than entitled) to apply for surplus SFA homes (SSFA) if there is availability. The type of home to which a service person is entitled currently depends on rank for officers, and family size for other ranks.³⁸
- 25.** The MOD announced forthcoming changes to its entitlement policies for SFA in the Defence Accommodation Strategy (DAS)³⁹ launched in October 2022, and had planned to roll the changes out in March 2024 as part of a new accommodation offer; but this was subsequently suspended, pending a review (see Chapter 3 below). As of 3 December 2024, no information was available on the new Government's approach to entitlement for SFA.

37 Army = 69%, RAF = 52%, Royal Navy/Royal Marines = 38%; 63% = Other Ranks families, 48% Officer families: taken from Ministry of Defence, [UK Tri-Service Families Continuous Attitude Survey Results 2024](#), 18 July 2024

38 Ministry of Defence, [Service Family Accommodation](#), last updated 28 November 2024

39 Ministry of Defence, [Defence Accommodation Strategy](#), gov.uk, 20 October 2022

Annington Homes

26. In November 1996, the MOD sold most of its housing stock (57,400 properties) in England and Wales to a private company, Annington Property Limited (APL), for £1.7 billion. The homes required for Service families were then leased back on a 200-year lease, with the condition that the MOD would hand surplus properties back to APL.⁴⁰ This deal left the government trapped, paying for both the maintenance and the rent (albeit at a discounted rate), but unable to benefit from the increase in the properties' value or to demolish and rebuild or pursue potential development opportunities.
27. The MOD is contractually obliged to hand back possession of a certain number of homes per year to APL and must return them in the required condition or pay dilapidation fees, diverting resources away from investment in homes occupied by service families. The National Audit Office estimated in 2018 that over the first 21 years of the contract the MOD was £2.2 billion to £4.2 billion worse off than if it had kept the properties, and the Public Accounts Committee concluded that the deal was “disastrous” during its Military Homes inquiry in 2019.⁴¹
28. While one of the objectives of the sale was to release funds to invest in upgrading SFA, in fact only £100 million (6.25% of the proceeds of the sale—£200 million at present day values) was invested in SFA, with the rest being returned to the Treasury. This amount is less than the DIO planned to spend on SFA improvements in 2023–24 alone. From 2010 to 2022 the MOD made no provision for proactive or preventative maintenance work to Service families' homes.⁴²
29. The MOD is currently pursuing a test case to try to take back freehold ownership of some properties from APL. The High Court ruled on 15 May 2023 that the MOD had acted lawfully in issuing enfranchisement notices.⁴³ APL has appealed, and the hearing is currently scheduled to take place in May 2025.⁴⁴

40 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)) paras 79-81

41 See House of Commons Library, [Armed forces family housing and Annington Homes](#), Research Briefing, 8 June 2023

42 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)), para 11

43 Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, [Annington final judgement](#), 15 May 2023

44 Justice Case Tracker for Civil Appeals, [Annington Property Limited v The Secretary of State for Defence](#), gov.uk, 15 May 2023

Performance of maintenance contracts for SFA

30. The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) contracts out the maintenance and repair of its accommodation to service providers. This has been historically problematic. A PAC report in 2016 concluded that “service families have been badly let down for many years and are not getting the accommodation service that they have a right to expect,” under the former National Housing Prime (NHP) contract.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, these problems were not resolved by the new £640 million Future Defence Infrastructure Services (FDIS) contracts, which were awarded to Pinnacle Group, Amey Community Ltd and Vivo Defence in April 2022.
31. Michael Green, Chief Executive of DIO, told the Committee, “it is fair to say we lost control for a number of months in the first year of FDIS.”⁴⁶ Families were left feeling helpless and frustrated by slow response times, missed appointments and lengthy delays to resolve severe maintenance issues over the winter months, such as loss of heating, hot water and cooking facilities, as well as damp and mould. This resulted in the DIO issuing a formal notice to the contractors to produce rectification plans to address their poor performance.
32. The MOD blamed an IT failure between the three contractors and insufficient staff operating the national call centre and tradesmen to deliver the maintenance work.⁴⁷ The contractors claimed they had inherited an unexpectedly large backlog of work and had faced higher demand than they had been led to expect—and as a result, had put in place insufficient manpower. Pinnacle admitted in hindsight that the eight-month mobilisation period had been too “ambitious”.⁴⁸
33. The Families Federations said that the backlog of legacy work was something that they had raised as a concern prior to the implementation of the new contracts.⁴⁹
34. Pinnacle also pointed to contractual issues. The structure of the FDIS contracts differed from the previous NHP contract, which made the transition more challenging. There was no contractual interface between the National Accommodation Management Services (NAMS) contract,

45 Committee of Public Accounts, Ninth Report of Session 2016–17, [Service Family Accommodation](#), HC 77

46 [Q216](#)

47 HC Deb, 20 December 2022, [cols 146-147](#)

48 Amey ([SAC0015](#)); VIVO Defence Services ([SAC0008](#)); [Q61](#)

49 [Q25](#)

run by Pinnacle, and the Regional Accommodation Maintenance Services (RAMS) contracts run by Amey and VIVO, meaning “no one contractor had responsibility for the mobilisation and transition of service.”⁵⁰

35. CONCLUSION

There have understandably been serious concerns about the Defence Infrastructure Organisation’s contract oversight of the implementation of the FDIS contracts for the maintenance and repair of Service Family Accommodation. DIO is accountable for the fact that there was no contractual relationship between the suppliers and no lead prime to take overall responsibility: this contributed substantially to the problems with the rollout of the new accommodation service.

36. RECOMMENDATION

The DIO must prove it has learned lessons from the failures in the delivery of these contracts.

37. Since mobilisation of the contracts, DIO has been withholding profit where the contractors have failed to achieve the minimum Acceptable Level of Performance (ALP). Contractors funded £2.15 million in compensation payments to Service Personnel between April 2022 and October 2023 for missed appointments, failed move-in to SFA, subsistence costs for temporary accommodation, incorrect tradesperson, total loss of heating and total loss of cooking facilities.⁵¹

38. According to the MOD there have since been significant improvements with all three contractors having recruited more staff⁵² and performing well against their key performance targets in February 2024, highlighted by improved response times and fewer complaints and compensation claims.⁵³

39. This is reflected to some extent in the Armed Forces Continuous Attitudes Survey 2024, which shows a recovery in satisfaction rates relating to maintenance and repair work of Service Family Accommodation (SFA) from 19% in 2023 to 27-28%—clearly still unsatisfactory, but back in line with 2022 levels.⁵⁴

50 Pinnacle Group ([SAC0013](#)); [Q61](#)

51 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)), para 33

52 The contractors have provided statistics on staffing levels at the beginning of the contract and as of December 2023: Amey Limited ([SAC0076](#)); Pinnacle Group ([SAC0072](#)); VIVO Defence Services ([SAC0077](#))

53 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)) paras 37-38; [Q280](#)

54 Ministry of Defence, [Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey: 2024](#), 23 May 2024. The recovery is also reflected in Ministry of Defence, [Tri-service families continuous attitude survey: 2024](#), 18 July 2024

40. The Service Families Federations have said that there is still “much work to be done” in areas such as communication with families, particularly relating to follow-on repair work and to address a “frustrating and complex” complaints system.⁵⁵
41. The MOD maintains that the FDIS contracts have a “Family First” approach built into them with “clear customer satisfaction targets for contractors to meet”, “backed by incentives to go beyond the minimum standards and financial consequences for falling short.”⁵⁶ However not all serving personnel agree:

Box 1: Written evidence on FDIS contracts for SFA

“It strikes me that the model for SFA maintenance and repair seems to be skewed; with payment for visits and work done, which is not related to successful outcomes for customers.”⁵⁷

“There is little ability to hold service providers to account. The contract has been written in a way whereby only the Key Performance Indicators are monitored, and they have been written in a way which doesn’t demonstrate the true experience of the SFA occupier.”⁵⁸

“I recall something was mentioned with the new contracts re performance measuring and holding the companies to account when performance was poor, but at ground level we don’t see this.”⁵⁹

42. While some personnel and their families have a positive experience of living in service accommodation,⁶⁰ many more have criticised the continuing poor customer service and standard of workmanship of repairs. They listed a series of bodged jobs and temporary fixes, waiting months for work to be done and a lack of contractual oversight of the work when it is completed—and they could not see how this represents value for money.⁶¹

55 Ministry of Defence, [The Armed Forces Covenant and Veterans Annual Report 2023](#), gov. uk, 18 December 2023

56 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)), para 23

57 Mr Paul Smith ([SAC0038](#))

58 Anonymous ([SAC0062](#))

59 Anonymous ([SAC0016](#))

60 See for example Mrs Katie Singleton ([SAC0047](#))

61 See for example Anonymous ([SAC0004](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0007](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0011](#)); The Royal British Legion ([SAC0012](#)) para 3.1.8; Anonymous ([SAC0016](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0020](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0023](#)); Anonymous; Mr Paul Officer ([SAC0025](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0031](#)); Mrs Carlee Towl ([SAC0033](#)); Mr Paul Smith ([SAC0038](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0041](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0054](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0060](#));

43. The Royal British Legion has emphasised “the ongoing importance of monitoring work to improve maintenance and conditions of Service accommodation, to ensure improvements are delivered and sustained.”⁶²

44. **RECOMMENDATION**

The DIO and its contractors should outline the assurance processes they have in place to ensure maintenance and repairs meet the needs of service families. The DIO should also review the performance measures in the RAMS and NAMS contracts to assess how they could more effectively take account of service families’ satisfaction. For example, the contractors might meet a target of 85% for first-time fixes, but they also need to measure whether those fixes are satisfactory.

45. **CONCLUSION**

The MOD’s claims of a recovery in performance need to be borne out in a demonstrable improvement in the customer experience and markedly increased customer satisfaction. Service families’ trust has been affected and the DIO and service providers need to demonstrate a genuine “family first” approach to earn that trust back.

46. However, we also acknowledge that the poor state of the housing stock means that the service providers will struggle to keep pace with the volume of outstanding maintenance and remedial work; and even if they do, some accommodation may not be able to meet service personnel’s reasonable expectations.

47. The MOD admits as much in their written evidence:

“Achievement of steady state delivery in FDIS Accommodation will not alone address the issues in SFA. Whilst the NAMS/RAMS contracts will provide maintenance services, the main blocker to the delivery of appropriate accommodation services to families now remains the poor condition of the SFA estate.”⁶³

Engagement with service families and the complaints process

48. The Families Federations and serving personnel have highlighted continuing issues with communication between the service providers and service families. Sarah Clewes from the Naval Families Federation said, “communication sounds fairly basic, but actually, just telling people what

62 The Royal British Legion ([SAC0012](#)), para 2.2

63 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)) para 48

is going on is key.”⁶⁴ Often issues with the level of customer service are compounded by an information system which does not hold sufficient information and poor coordination between the different parties:

Box 2: Written evidence on communication issues

“A particular highlight was receiving a letter to say our electricity would be turned off for a day, at 11am on the day it had been turned off.”⁶⁵

“This lack of communication on the job should be relatively easy to fix with an information system that ensures the passage of information for each job number.”⁶⁶

49. Sarah Clewes acknowledged that communication in general has improved since the contracts began, with, for example, the introduction of the Families First newsletter in 2023 as a positive step forward in communicating with families.⁶⁷ Pinnacle also began to hold community engagement events (known as Housing Surgeries or High Impact Days) along with VIVO or Amey and local DIO representatives. The MOD claimed that these surgeries have proved to be very successful and are well attended by families, as well as SFA stakeholders such as Unit Welfare teams.⁶⁸
50. The contractors have said they are trying to make better use of data to improve the management and communication of follow-on work.⁶⁹ Amey claimed that they were resolving 40% of heating and hot water issues with the help of an AI system through which families could send video and images of heating issues to be assessed remotely.⁷⁰
51. However, the Committee heard that other services that families were promised as part of the FDIS contracts, such as the Home Hub and one-hour appointment slots, had not yet materialised. The Home Hub is an online portal which will enable families to track jobs and book their own appointments. The DIO told the Committee in February 2024, that the Home Hub was in development but still a year off, because the DIO had had to focus on other issues during the first year of the contracts.⁷¹

64 [Q20](#)

65 Anonymous ([SAC0016](#))

66 Richard Crawford ([SAC0059](#))

67 [Q20](#)

68 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0071](#)), para 54

69 VIVO Defence Services ([SAC0008](#)); Amey ([SAC0015](#))

70 Amey ([SAC0015](#))

71 [Qq230-233](#)

52. CONCLUSION

There needs to be better communication with service families about maintenance work. Part of the solution lies in the introduction of the promised Home Hub portal, to give families access to information about maintenance work and the ability to book their own appointments online.

53. RECOMMENDATION

The DIO must prioritise the development of the Home Hub portal and roll this out to families as soon as possible.

- 54.** Some serving personnel told us they would like the MOD to bring housing officers or “patch managers”⁷² back in-house to act as a point of contact and address local housing concerns, which the MOD has told us is not under consideration. The Army has 11 regional military housing liaison officers throughout the UK, whereas the Navy has base warrant officers, and the RAF has station community support officers who cover housing. Major General Clements, Director of Army Basing and Infrastructure at the Ministry of Defence, explained that these roles “monitor and support. They are not there to run the estate.”⁷³
- 55.** Pinnacle has 150 housing officers across the country, who provide the first point of contact for families and carry out patch management. They are also responsible for the move-in, move-out and occupancy check appointments with families.⁷⁴ Amey has customer and community engagement officers on each estate who assess local needs and VIVO has a Customer Care Team and local customer liaison officers to manage complex complaints.
- 56.** Collette Musgrave from the Army Families Federation noted that Amey had successfully reintroduced a patch manager-type role in some areas.⁷⁵ Jerry Maloney from VIVO described the situation as one of choice for families but acknowledged that there could be better clarity on roles and responsibilities.⁷⁶
- 57.** Pinnacle has proposed the creation of new joint case management teams between the suppliers, to manage the most difficult service requests and ensure families’ issues are resolved.⁷⁷ Pinnacle manages a 3-stage complaints process on behalf of all the suppliers and DIO. If personnel are not satisfied with the response at stage 1, they can escalate it to the DIO

72 Housing officers or “patch managers” were DIO employees, based regionally, who provided a housing service to military families prior to it being outsourced to contractors.

73 [Qq223-227](#)

74 [Qq163-165](#)

75 [Q37](#)

76 [Q162](#)

77 Pinnacle Group ([SAC0013](#))

Customer Services Team, and if after stage 2, they are still not satisfied, they can escalate to the Accommodation Complaints Review Panel.⁷⁸ Maria Lyle of the RAF Families Federations described the complaints system as “cumbersome and lengthy.”⁷⁹

58. Pinnacle says that 95% of complaints relate to repairs issues and that the rate of new complaints peaked at 1,100 a month, compared to 550 a month under the previous contract.⁸⁰ In response, Pinnacle doubled the size of the complaints handling team and introduced locally-based Customer Solutions Managers.⁸¹ In October 2023, the number of open complaints stood at 885, 78% lower than the previous year.⁸²

Box 3: Written evidence on the complaints process

“To get a level one complaint elevated to a level two complaint is near impossible—I still don’t know how you actually get it done and I have tried.”⁸³

“To escalate a claim to DIO, Pinnacle have to close the complaint at Stage 1. If they have not closed the complaint, it cannot be escalated. So families sit with issues, stuck with the very body who the complaint is about. Families cannot force Pinnacle to close a complaint. This needs to be addressed. In my own experience, Pinnacle did close a stage 1 complaint and it was escalated to Stage 2. At this point DIO stated that it shouldn’t have been closed as Pinnacle hadn’t dealt with the Stage 1 correctly, so it was being passed back. After many weeks Pinnacle said they knew nothing about that happening and the whole process started again. It’s still not resolved.”⁸⁴

“I do not feel as though there are sufficiently accessible options for occupiers of service housing to feel heard by DIO as the system is designed to allow Pinnacle to mask the real failures behind transference of blame.”⁸⁵

78 Ministry of Defence, [Service Family Accommodation](#), gov.uk

79 [Q22](#)

80 Pinnacle Group ([SAC0013](#))

81 Pinnacle Group ([SAC0013](#))

82 Ministry of Defence, Service Family Accommodation, [Families First - issue 10](#), gov.uk, 31 October 2023

83 Anonymous ([SAC0062](#))

84 Anonymous ([SAC0054](#))

85 Anonymous ([SAC0041](#))

59.

CONCLUSION

If the housing officer role is to continue being undertaken by Pinnacle, then Pinnacle's representatives must be more effective at resolving outstanding issues and complaints, working collaboratively with their contract partners.

60.

RECOMMENDATION

We understand that MOD were conducting a review of the complaints policy and process, and of the quality of contractors' responses to complaints to improve the customer experience. We trust that work on this review is now complete and ask the Government to summarise its findings and outcomes in their response to this Report.

Allocation of housing and the move-in process

61. The Pinnacle Home Services Team is also responsible for the allocation of houses, in accordance with DIO policy. Personnel must apply for SFA online using a system which allows them to view available homes that match their entitlement, register their top three preferences and book move-in and move-out appointments. We received written evidence criticising the poor choice of properties, lack of information on Pinnacle's system, last-minute changes to housing allocations, and in one worst-case scenario, no SFA to move into on arrival from overseas.⁸⁶

86 Rana-Hume ([SAC0028](#))

Box 4: Written evidence on allocation of SFA housing

“The process of moving house is painful. The archaic system in use is not fit for purpose. There is an expectation that when we move house, we are presented a handful of poor resolution photos of three homes. We are expected to accept one of these homes within a short deadline, with scant detail of the house and not being allowed to physically view them. There is always an underlying ‘threat’ that if we don’t accept one, a house ‘may be chosen for us,’ and this could be below entitlement, i.e., ‘choose one of these houses without understanding what you are getting, or we’ll give you a smaller house.’ Often, when we make a selection, we are told that it is no longer available anyway and the process starts all over again.”⁸⁷

“Overall, the feeling I have around SFA is powerlessness. It feels like such a lottery—whether you’ll see any photos or plans of the house you’re next offered; whether you’ll be offered one close to your serving person’s work or not; whether your next move will not only place you far away from family and friends but also amenities and community.”⁸⁸

“The search function is next to useless. Giving only 20 houses in an area without the ability to search, either by type of property, current status of property, means you cannot actually see what might be available. Properties are online as available that are not—at least they are but local arrangements mean you are rejected. If they are tied (to appointment or position) they should not be on the system as it gives a false impression of availability.”⁸⁹

“To offer houses to people, only to find out that they are uninhabitable just days before move in is not acceptable. I have been traumatised by this experience to such an extent that, with all sincerity, I would rather end my service than be forced to move again. I simply cannot stomach the risk or thought of putting my wife and children through such a painful experience again.”⁹⁰

62. Clare Kober from Pinnacle explained that there are photographs (of varying age and quality) online for 90% of properties and floor plans for 60%—however properties in Northern Ireland have neither photographs nor floor plans.⁹¹ One contributor of written evidence told us that “Service families

87 Anonymous ([SAC0031](#))

88 Anonymous ([SAC0016](#))

89 Richard Crawford ([SAC0059](#))

90 Mr Peter Cornish ([SAC0024](#))

91 [Q133](#)

have come up with their own inventive ways of supporting each other in this—using social media to create picture repositories of houses they have just moved out of.”⁹²

63. CONCLUSION

The process for allocating housing is a source of great frustration to many service families due to the limited choice of properties and very little information available about them prior to moving in.

64. RECOMMENDATION

The Government should ensure that there are good quality photos and floorplans accessible to service families for every available SFA property, as promised.

65. Over 12,500 Move Ins happen each year, accompanied by work to prepare the home for the next family. Changes to housing allocations can result from homes not meeting the required standard to move into and this falls to the RAMS contractors, Amey and VIVO, who carry out the maintenance work. It is Pinnacle’s responsibility to assess the properties and the work delivered, against whether they meet DIO’s required standard for occupation. Some serving personnel told us that work was still being carried out in the days before or on the actual day they moved in⁹³ and others berated the low level of cleanliness of the properties they moved into.⁹⁴ In October 2023, 83% of properties passed their move-in inspection; in other words, 17% of families expecting to move into SFA were unable to. One submitter commented, “if you have a system where work is programmed within 5 days of a move in, then the system is set to fail more than set to succeed.”⁹⁵

66. CONCLUSION

The MOD has highlighted the preparation of homes for move-in as an area in which VIVO and Amey need to show improvement to meet their contractual Acceptable Level of Performance (ALP) requirements.

67. RECOMMENDATION

The DIO should clarify what improvements have been and are being made to the move-in process, to guarantee homes consistently meet an acceptable standard of decoration, maintenance and cleanliness in good time.

92 Anonymous ([SAC0016](#))

93 See for example, Richard Crawford ([SAC0059](#))

94 See for example, Anonymous ([SAC0004](#))

95 Richard Crawford ([SAC0059](#))

Winter planning, damp and mould

68. As part of the Defence Command Paper Refresh in July 2023, the DIO received an additional £400 million on top of its annual maintenance budget⁹⁶ to spend over 2023–24 and 2024–25, intended to tackle damp and mould in 4,000 properties and to carry out refurbishment works to 1,000 unoccupied (void) homes - effectively doubling the maintenance budget for two years.
69. To avoid a repeat of the maintenance crisis over the winter of 2022–23, the DIO and its contractors put in place contingency plans to improve their resilience, such as increasing call handling capacity by 55%, recruiting additional out of hours staff and ensuring better availability of parts. They also produced guidance for families to help them prepare for the winter. As part of this work, DIO spent £220 million allocated for refurbishments for financial year 2023–24 (with £180 million allocated for 2024–25) on boiler and heating upgrades, new bathrooms, kitchens and insulation and damp and mould mitigation packages in over 3,000 properties; and said they were on track to complete the work in 2024.⁹⁷ The MOD reported good performance in February 2024, despite some severe weather.⁹⁸

70. CONCLUSION

The MOD successfully delivered in winter 2023–24 on its preparedness planning and carried out the remediation work that it promised. However, this was only achieved through additional resources. Service families need reassurance that DIO and its contractors can continue to provide the same level of service in the future, when substantial emergency uplifts to funding may not be available.

71. In the Families First newsletter, dated 28 March 2024, the DIO apologised for a “truly appalling case of damp and mould” which appeared on social media.⁹⁹ The MOD has claimed that it no longer allocates housing with damp and mould to families,¹⁰⁰ but all the evidence suggests that this is still happening.¹⁰¹ Simply sending in a task force to periodically remove mould and cover up damp does not solve the underlying problems that are causing it.

96 DIO has committed to spend £219 million in financial year 2023–24 on standard maintenance, repairs and improvement works for SFA.

97 [Q217](#), [Q238–257](#)

98 [Q200](#); [Qq235–238](#); [Q282](#)

99 Ministry of Defence, Service Family Accommodation, [Families First - Issue 15](#), gov.uk, 28 March 2024

100 [Q217](#)

101 See Royal British Legion ([SAC0012](#)), para 3.1.8

Box 5: Written evidence on remediation work for damp

“Our damp has been surveyed (multiple times) and our SFA graded level 4. We were given a standard package to ‘fix’ our issues which was largely reported as being unfit for purpose–this one size fits all methodology wastes money and does not get to the root of the problem.”¹⁰²

72. DIO says it “has seen positive results in response to the packages of works delivered to address Damp and Mould which have prevented reoccurrence in over 80% of cases.”¹⁰³

73. **CONCLUSION**

It is shocking that, until a policy change in 2022, it was considered acceptable to house families in properties known to have damp and mould. However, issues with damp and mould still exist.

74. **RECOMMENDATION**

The DIO must resolve outstanding problems with damp and mould across the estate. In its response to this report, the Government should detail the ongoing work to eliminate damp and mould in SFA, including a timeline for remediation of the Estate as a whole. Detailed statistics should be published by June 2025 on the number of properties affected by damp and mould across the whole of the Defence Estate, and its severity, and these should be updated and published annually thereafter.

Gas and electrical safety inspections

75. In June 2023, it came to light that hundreds of occupied military homes had not had up-to-date gas and electrical safety inspections, as required by law, thereby putting personnel and their families at greater risk.¹⁰⁴
76. The Minister for Defence Procurement attributed the lapsed inspections to various factors including tradesmen being unable to gain access to properties, contractors missing appointments, supply chain resource problems, including sourcing suitably qualified gas and electrical

102 Anonymous ([SAC0062](#))

103 Ministry of Defence, Service Family Accommodation, [Families First - Issue 20](#), gov.uk, 31 October 2024

104 [Qq207–208](#)

tradespersons, and a backlog of work inherited from the previous contract. In addition, a change in legislation reduced the validity of existing electrical safety certificates from ten to five years.¹⁰⁵

77. VIVO says it took months to review the asset information transferred to them at the start of their contract and this, coupled with difficulties accessing some properties, led to 2,769 or 10% of Landlord Gas Safety Inspections being overdue in May 2023 out of 28,000 SFA properties in their regions. To rectify this, they have implemented a “red card” process since September 2023.¹⁰⁶ Amey and VIVO are not permitted as part of their contract with DIO to force entry or cap off the gas to gain entry, but now, if they cannot gain access to a property after two attempts, the chain of command mandates that the service personnel living in the property must work from home on the day of the appointment to ensure access - and this has enabled them to clear the backlog.¹⁰⁷
78. In the last MOD data provided to the Committee, from April 2024, 252 occupied homes had an outstanding valid gas safety certificate. The MOD claims that at least two appointments had been made to carry out inspections for all of these properties.¹⁰⁸
79. This is an account from a serving person who had a Gas Safety Inspection in October 2023:

Box 6: Written evidence on gas safety inspections

“I am grateful that this situation was fixed but the stress and time it took to reach a resolution was just unacceptable. It seemed to me that there was no coordination between the maintenance and repair parts of the Pinnacle / Vivo organisations. So, whilst gas safety inspections were being carried out at pace there did not appear to be any matching effort to deal with the inevitable repairs arising from unsafe boiler situations.”¹⁰⁹

105 HC Deb, 20 June 2023, [Col 2WS](#)

106 VIVO Defence Services ([SAC0008](#))

107 [Q121](#)

108 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0081](#))

109 Mr Paul Smith ([SAC0038](#))

80. RECOMMENDATION

In a situation in which the contractor has no way of gaining entry to service accommodation without the occupier’s consent to carry out safety checks, and no option to cut supply, a very small number of properties are likely to have overdue gas safety certificates. However, the situation in 2023 with overdue certificates had clearly got out of control. The DIO must put in place measures to ensure that a similar situation cannot happen again.

- 81.** The DIO says it is putting in place a “lessons learned” process for the medium and long term on what it can learn from these failures that it can apply to future contracts to avoid similar mistakes.

82. RECOMMENDATION

We welcome the offer from DIO to share its key lessons learned on gas and electrical safety inspections.

Accommodation standards and their application

- 83.** The MOD uses comparisons with the social housing benchmark (Decent Homes Standard (DH)) to evaluate the condition of SFA. The MOD claims that the proportion of SFA that meets or exceeds the DH standard is 97%—higher than in civilian housing. However, there is a disparity between this evidence and service personnel’s low levels of satisfaction with SFA.¹¹⁰ In the Covenant and Veterans Annual Report 2023, the MOD reaches the conclusion that the problem is with the standard, stating “it is clear from the Tri service continuous attitude survey 2023’s satisfaction rates that the Decent Home and Decent Home Plus standards do not meet the expectations of Service personnel”.
- 84.** MOD, together with the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, are developing a new Enhanced Target Standard (ETS) for SFA, which will focus on improving thermal efficiency to achieve a minimum Energy Performance Certificate of C. The new standard will also change the method for how a home is assessed and break the link between age and condition—currently a home can only fail the DH or DH+ standard if one or more key components are both past a defined age threshold *and* in poor condition.¹¹¹

110 Measured by the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey and the Tri-Service Continuous Attitude Survey

111 [Q268](#)

85. We agree that service personnel and their families deserve accommodation of a higher quality than the minimum standards set for social housing. However, the natural conclusion to draw from decreasing satisfaction rates is that the main problem is with the implementation of these standards, rather than the standards themselves. Service personnel and their families do not have unreasonably high expectations of their accommodation. It is far more likely that the assessment process is the problem than that the Decent Homes Standard is fundamentally flawed. The evidence also suggests this. The Service Families Federations have noted the increased costs of living for service families resulting from basic issues relating to maintenance and insulation. And individual serving personnel have reported that housing that nominally meets the existing standards in fact fails to do so:

Box 7: Written evidence on application of Decent Homes Standard

“It is disingenuous for DIO to present glossy brochures about being ‘decent homes plus’ when they are anything but. They claim to reflect the Local Housing regulations but reading through the source regulation, it is clear that the DIO’s property frequently does not meet the standards. Moreover, there is no local authority to hold them to account as would be the case for private and other local landlords. DIO’s public face always shows their ‘new’ properties and ‘good news’ stories but neglects to show the disgusting conditions that many others have to suffer.”¹¹²

“Redo all CAAS banding bespoke to each house to ensure it is correct. This is especially pertinent to ‘Decent Home Standard.’ It is impossible to challenge the ‘Decent Homes Standard’ without paying for a survey yourself. It is widely accepted that each house has not been checked but either guessed or it is assumed that the standard of one house is the same as all in one area.”¹¹³

86. Favourable comparisons with the standard of properties in the private/ social rented sector are irrelevant in this context. If service personnel are effectively fobbed off by being told that their accommodation meets an acceptable standard when clearly it does not, it is understandable that this would impact on satisfaction levels and retention.

112 Anonymous ([SAC0007](#))

113 Anonymous ([SAC0062](#))

87.

RECOMMENDATION

While we welcome the MOD's work in parallel with DLUHC to develop a new Enhanced Target Standard (ETS) for SFA, the MOD needs to review not only the standards it uses to assess the adequacy of accommodation, but also critically the assessment process itself. It needs to have justified confidence in both.

2 Single Living Accommodation (SLA)

- 88.** Single Living Accommodation refers to accommodation blocks inside military bases. It is available to single personnel or personnel who are married/in a civil partnership but unaccompanied, including those in the Full Time Reserve Service (Full Commitment). Some personnel stay in SLA as their main residence, whilst others use it on an ad hoc basis if they have another place of residence, such as their own home.
- 89.** There are 3 types of SLA:
- a.** Permanent: Accommodation on units/bases to which personnel are allocated for an assigned tour of duty.
 - b.** Temporary (transit): Accommodation for visitors, or those on training courses.
 - c.** Training estate: Where units and individuals deploy to exercise, there are no accommodation charges levied for this component of the estate, neither is there a grading system.¹¹⁴
- 90.** There are approximately 133,000 permanent and temporary bedspaces in the UK; 17,000 bedspaces overseas; and 21,000 bedspaces across the UK training estate. 81,000 Service personnel across all Services, 56% of the total, live in permanent SLA.¹¹⁵
- 91.** Since 2018, responsibility for infrastructure has been delegated to the Front Line Commands (FLCs). According to the MOD, “all FLCs have prioritised SLA condition, reinforced by proactive senior leadership engagement, and have plans to eliminate their worst accommodation.”¹¹⁶
- 92.** The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) awarded four 7-year contracts in June 2021, worth £1.6 billion, for facilities management of the UK defence estate, as part of the Future Defence Infrastructure Services (FDIS) programme. These include:
- a.** Mitie: £160 million for facilities across Scotland and Northern Ireland.

114 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)), para 4

115 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)), para 5

116 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)), para 2

- b. Vivo: £558 million for the central region of the UK including Wales, the Midlands, and the North of England and £336 million for the South-West of England.
- c. Vinci: £423 million for the South-East of England.¹¹⁷

93. In May 2023, the DIO awarded a contract to Landmarc Support Services (a joint venture between Mitie and Amentum) for facilities management, rural estate management and operational services for the UK Defence training estate, worth £560 million.¹¹⁸

Condition of SLA

94. According to the Single Living Accommodation Lived Experience Survey: May 2024,¹¹⁹ (published on 5 September 2024), there has been a marginal increase in satisfaction with the overall quality of SLA amongst Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel since 2022; however amongst Army personnel, it had fallen by 4%.¹²⁰ Service personnel were least satisfied with current snack preparation facilities (59%), the response to requests for maintenance/repair (56%) and WIFI provision (51%). Compared to 2022, more Service personnel wanted or expected future SLA to have an ensuite bathroom, enhanced cooking facilities, a double bed and better quality WIFI.
95. These preferences are also backed by written evidence. However, aging accommodation blocks often cannot meet modern living requirements and standards and 40% of serving personnel across all three services said that their experience of SLA increased their intention to leave the Armed Forces, up from 34% in 2022. One contributor commented:

117 Ministry of Defence, [£1.6 billion investment to upgrade UK Defence estate](#), gov.uk, 14 June 2021

118 Ministry of Defence, [UK military training estate to benefit from new £560 million contract sustaining 1,300 UK jobs](#), gov.uk, 10 May 2023

119 Ministry of Defence, [Single Living Accommodation Lived Experience Survey: May 2024](#), gov.uk, 5 September 2024

120 RN/RM 46%; RAF 35%; Army 39%

Box 8: Written evidence on condition of SLA

*“Broken ceiling panels, outdated bathrooms and washing facilities, furniture and fittings that are over forty years old does not represent a modern fighting force ... Faced with the prospect of at least 3 years in this kind of SLA, this has undoubtedly caused a few to question their career choice, especially when they are coming from homes and universities with better living conditions.”*¹²¹

96. The MOD has proposed that the next policy area to be addressed using data from the SLA survey is a review of need and entitlement.¹²²
97. The MOD stated in December 2023 that a third of people in SLA were then living in sub-standard accommodation, due to legacy issues with the condition and state of repair. However, all SLA infrastructure services contracts were performing to the required Key Performance Indicators (KPI) standards.¹²³
98. Maria Lyle from the RAF Families Federation told the Committee that the poor quality of single living accommodation is “driven by underinvestment over a long period of time, but it is also driven by the poor quality of service that people sometimes receive”.¹²⁴

Box 9: Written evidence on maintenance of SLA

*“Overall, the main issue is not because of the block itself, but the poor maintenance from the contractors, with them taking far too long to get anything done, or when it is done it is not to a satisfactory standard. Personally, I think that the contractor needs to up their standards and be held to account for unacceptable job standards.”*¹²⁵

*“I had an issue with effluent fluids coming through my ceiling, I had to push for anyone to look at it let alone fix the issue, it took months to fix it.”*¹²⁶

99. Maria Lyle went on to say,

I can think of some really big main operating bases where there are significant concerns over the quality of the junior ranks’ accommodation, and it will be a factor in recruitment and retention.

121 Pickard ([SAC0026](#))

122 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)), para 14

123 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)), para 10

124 [Q4](#)

125 Mr Seth Clowes ([SAC0036](#))

126 Anonymous ([SAC0030](#))

I am thinking of places like Brize Norton, Waddington, Odiham, Marham, High Wycombe and Digby. At somewhere like Odiham, the newest of the junior ranks' blocks are over 25 years old.¹²⁷

- 100.** Service personnel in SLA have described issues such as a lack of hot water for months in winter, heating failure, flooding, damp, rat infestations, and inadequate facilities for washing and cooking: the Committee heard one example at RAF Odiham of three toilets and showers being shared by twenty-three occupants.¹²⁸
- 101.** Most focus in the media and in Parliament has related to poor-quality family accommodation, but those living in poor-quality SLA also deserve to have their voices heard and their concerns addressed. Often junior ranks do not feel they can raise a complaint with their chain of command and there is a general view that no-one is held accountable to fix the problems with their accommodation.

Box 10: Written evidence on accountability for the standard of SLA

“The most uncomfortable thing about the blocks is that I feel everyone has accepted the standard we have because it feels nothing is done in reasonable time to fix issues with infrastructure and the overall hygiene.”¹²⁹

- 102. CONCLUSION**
Single Living Accommodation (SLA) does not always meet the needs and expectations of today's recruits, and this is having an adverse effect on recruitment and retention.
- 103.** The MOD has committed to spending £5.3 billion over 10 years to improve SLA. The MOD established a change programme called the Defence Estate Optimisation Portfolio (DEOP) in 2016,¹³⁰ which works with construction partners as part of a framework alliance contract on infrastructure projects to modernise the Defence estate and create efficiencies through site disposal and by using modular, energy-efficient construction techniques.
- 104.** A large proportion of DEOP project work is for the Army. The Army has recently used modular designs for new-build SLA at Imjin Barracks in Gloucestershire, which include modern design features such as

127 [Q55](#)

128 For examples, see Pickard ([SAC0026](#)); Glenn Allison ([SAC0027](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0030](#)); Mr Alexander John Anderson ([SAC0035](#)); Mr Seth Clowes ([SAC0036](#)); Mr Mohammed Adil Mulla ([SAC0039](#)) and Jack Wilkins ([SAC0043](#))

129 Jack Wilkins ([SAC0043](#))

130 Ministry of Defence, [Defence Estate Optimisation \(DEO\) Portfolio](#), gov.uk, 15 October 2020

soundproofing, full-height windows and individual thermostats with Smart monitors.¹³¹ According to the MOD, “the use of standard, modular and repeatable designs exploits the MOD’s permitted development rights, minimises bureaucratic drag and can be mobilised at short notice to exploit departmental underspend.”¹³²

- 105.** The DIO announced in August 2024, that it had appointed six construction companies to build 16,000 bedspaces for Single Living Accommodation over the next six years, with the intention to build or refurbish 40,000 SLA bedspaces over ten years.¹³³ This suggests that the work will need to ramp up considerably to build or refurbish the remaining 24,000 over four years.

Table 2: Breakdown across the services of £5.3 billion investment in SLA

FLC	Plans	Funding over 10 years
Navy	Replacement or refurbishment of SLA blocks at 8 sites, starting Autumn 23	£1Bn
Army	8,500 bedspaces	£1.2Bn
DEOP (Army)	8,696 new bedspaces 1,540 refurbed bedspaces	£0.533Bn
Air	7,000 new bedspaces 6,000 refurbed bedspaces	£1.5Bn
UK StratCom	An SLA Programme to upgrade worst condition SLA first	£0.810Bn
DEOP (Air and UK StratCom)	3,404 new bedspaces 556 refurbed bedspaces	£0.257Bn
Totals	~40,000 bedspaces	£5.3Bn

Source: Ministry of Defence written evidence (SAC0070)¹³⁴

- 106.** Colette Musgrave from the Army Families Federation noted the advantage of modular build in allowing investment to take place in locations at risk of disposal, as it could be moved if and when required.¹³⁵

131 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)) para 19

132 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)) para 20

133 Ministry of Defence, [MOD’s new approach to Single Living Accommodation pipeline](#), gov.uk, 20 August 2024

134 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)) para 31

135 [Q56](#)

- 107.** DIO is working on development of data capture and analytical tools, which will identify and prioritise investment requirements across the SLA estate. The SLA Management Information System (SLAMIS) will draw together all SLA data (both DIO and non-DIO managed), providing oversight of the availability and condition of SLA through a global bedspace index, a booking tool, and a 4-tier grading tool (to assess the Condition for Charge). SLAMIS includes a central booking system, which went live on 23 October 2023 across the UK and part of the overseas estate, with over 127,000 bedspaces now bookable.¹³⁶
- 108.** The MOD says the SLAMIS project has taken longer than intended to deliver, due to its complexity, range of stakeholders and the challenges of maintaining and reporting accurate data.¹³⁷

109. CONCLUSION

We support plans to create much needed new-build SLA, using modular construction techniques.

110. RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that the Government provide an update on the funding and completion status of new-build SLA projects in their response to this Report.

Defence Minimum Standards (DMS) for SLA

- 111.** The Defence Accommodation Strategy (DAS) implements one of the Public Accounts Committee’s report recommendations from 2021, to set a new minimum standard for Single Living Accommodation (SLA). SLA “must offer individuals private, quiet, secure, dry, appropriately ventilated and heated space with access to hot water.”¹³⁸
- 112.** The DMS for SLA went live on 1 April 2024, with variable impact across the Estate. Front-Line Commands need to ensure they have enough bedspaces that meet the standard to accommodate their personnel, and this will have required considerable planning.
- 113.** The MOD has assessed each bedspace across the estate, using data on SLAMIS and a physical survey, completed by single Service representatives. The data is collated and analysed to identify work which will need to be

136 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)) para 11

137 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)) para 23

138 RAF Families Federation, [Defence Minimum Standard Update – SLA](#), 5 April 2024

undertaken to ensure that bedspaces meet the new standard.¹³⁹ Serving personnel have been told if their SLA fails any aspect of the DMS, the rental element of their SLA charge will be waived until the problem is fixed.¹⁴⁰

114. CONCLUSION

The introduction of a new Defence Minimum Standard (DMS) for SLA is a long-awaited and very welcome step forward, if it ensures that personnel are no longer living in unacceptable conditions and does not simply result in sub-standard accommodation being recognised but not rectified.

115. RECOMMENDATION

The Government should provide us with an update following the implementation of the new DMS, clarifying how they are measuring improvements to the condition of SLA and to what extent the new standards are making a difference to morale and meeting their expectations.

139 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0070](#)), para 15

140 RAF Families Federation, [Defence Minimum Standard Update – SLA](#), 5 April 2024

3 Allocation of housing

- 116.** Following the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), the MOD committed to developing a new accommodation offer to help more personnel live in private accommodation and buy their own homes, called the Future Accommodation Model (FAM).
- 117.** In October 2022, the MOD published its Defence Accommodation Strategy (DAS),¹⁴¹ which outlined three main objectives:
- a.** Ensure Service personnel in long-term relationships are able to access the same accommodation support as their married or civil partnered colleagues.
 - b.** Ensure that subsidised accommodation is allocated based primarily on the needs of Service personnel and their families, ending the use of accommodation as reward for rank.
 - c.** Support Service personnel to buy their own homes.
- 118.** The MOD launched a FAM pilot at HM Naval Base Clyde, Aldershot Garrison and RAF Wittering, which concluded on 31 March 2023. Under the FAM pilot, the MOD tested the following options:
- a.** Allocation based on need as opposed to rank.
 - b.** Allowances for home ownership.
 - c.** Entitlement for those in long Term established relationships.
 - d.** Entitlement for those Service personnel who look after children for over 80 nights a year.
 - e.** The option for Service personnel and families to choose the private rental sector rather than Service Family Accommodation and receive an allowance towards the rental costs.
- 119.** The FAM pilot was considered a success, and the New Accommodation Offer (subsequently renamed the Modernised Accommodation Offer (MAO)) was announced as going live on 31 October 2023, with more details to follow—although this date was later pushed back to 11 March 2024.

141 Ministry of Defence, [UK Armed Forces Defence Accommodation Strategy](#), October 2022

- 120.** The MOD promised transitional protection for three years for personnel who would otherwise experience a reduction in their entitlement as a result of the new offer.
- 121.** From October 2023 onwards, the MOD held a series of Roadshows at bases in different locations to explain the new accommodation policy. At this point, some serving personnel and their families began to raise concerns about the move to needs-based allocation instead of rank-based allocation of SFA.
- 122.** A third of the Committee’s written evidence submissions raised concerns about the new accommodation offer. Service personnel and their families—mainly in the Army—reported that the offer had been poorly communicated to them, and they were worried that it would negatively impact officers with smaller families and those who need to mobilise more. Some officers thought it was an erosion of their “offer” and have said that a reduction in their accommodation entitlement would make them more likely to leave the Armed Forces.¹⁴²
- 123.** The intention to move from rank-based to needs-based allocation for SFA had been in the public domain since at least October 2022, when the DAS was published. However, this element of the policy was clearly not widely known by serving personnel and their families, outside of those who participated in the pilot.
- 124.** The Army Families Federation told families their understanding was that because a major change in the allocation policy was being considered, HMRC had instructed that any changes must fit with the current legislation and therefore, allocation by rank would now be considered a taxable benefit in kind. They also said that they understood the tax would be calculated based on the local market cost of the property and so likely to be higher.

142 See, for example Major Andrew Meeke ([SAC0018](#)); Tanner ([SAC0029](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0044](#)); Anonymous ([SAC0046](#)); Mrs Stevenson ([SAC0048](#)); Mrs Laura Ross ([SAC0053](#)); Major Tom Wythe ([SAC0057](#)); Mrs Rosie Bucknall ([SAC0061](#)) - these are a sample, there are other submissions which also reflect these views.

Box 11: Written evidence on communication about the new accommodation offer

“The NAO has been announced before the policy has even been completed and published. This has resulted in stress, fear and frustration as we have no access to the full detail concerning an implementation that will have a huge impact on our lives.”¹⁴³

“It has been confirmed that following the Future Accommodation Model (“FAM”) pilot, the NAM is going to be introduced in less than six months. There is no finalised policy explaining how the NAM is going to work (other than a very broad-brush overview) and DIO do not have answers to even the basic of questions.”¹⁴⁴

- 125.** Even in January 2024, just weeks before the new accommodation offer was due to be implemented, the MOD had not provided any detailed information about how the allocation process would work in practice.
- 126.** In mid-February 2024, a petition asking the Government to review the new accommodation offer, had received over 20,000 signatures.¹⁴⁵
- 127.** The MOD announced on 26 February 2024, that it would be pausing the rollout of the elements of the Modernised Accommodation Offer (MAO) relating to SFA. This included pausing the move to needs-based allocation and also a pause to extending entitlement to those in long-term relationships and those with non-resident children.
- 128.** Other aspects of the offer have proceeded, including the extension of the waiver for SLA charges for all personnel who own or rent their own home, the refunding of up to £1,500 of legal expenses as part of the Forces Help to Buy scheme from 11 March 2024, and the introduction of the minimum standard for SLA from 1 April 2024.
- 129.** The then Minister for Defence Procurement told the Committee on 27 February: “the issue here is ultimately about retention and recruitment. Losing the valuable resource of some of our most experienced and important personnel would have a significant cost to it in many ways and we must take that into account.”¹⁴⁶

143 Anonymous ([SAC0044](#))

144 Mrs Stevenson ([SAC0048](#))

145 [Review the MOD’s New Accommodation Offer for armed forces personnel](#), e-petition

146 [Q196](#)

130. He explained, “we are using this review to ask whether we can still extend that entitlement, on which there is wide consensus and support ... and ameliorate the wider negative impacts on personnel”¹⁴⁷ but he also caveated, “we have to recognise there is a finite supply of property. There is a finite available budget for investing in the estate.”¹⁴⁸

131. We asked the MOD why they had not anticipated the negative reaction. The Chief of Defence People told the Committee that a survey and qualitative engagement had shown that because “middle and senior ranking officers were less positive,” the MOD had devised the policy to provide three years of transitional protection and the option for personnel to apply for an additional bedroom above their entitlement.¹⁴⁹

132. Nevertheless, the MOD did not anticipate the level of dissatisfaction from some personnel in the new offer, illustrated by the MOD having to pause the scheme.

133. CONCLUSION

The MoD’s communication of its new accommodation offer for SFA was inadequate for those adversely affected by the policy change, including those with rank-based benefits, to understand and respond to its impact on them.

134. CONCLUSION

We support the MOD’s decision to pause and conduct a review of the accommodation offer for SFA because of concerns around retention of personnel. However, we recognise that this decision has caused potential disappointment for the 45,000 personnel in long-term relationships and/or with non-resident children, who might have hoped to become entitled to SFA in March 2024, and personnel who had expected to benefit from the new needs-based allocation.

135. RECOMMENDATION

The Government should provide an update to us, and more importantly to Service personnel, on its approach to allocation of SFA, with timescales and metrics for implementation. This should take into account the different needs of the three Services and include a full impact assessment of any potential revisions to the accommodation policy for SFA.

147 [Q197](#)

148 [Q196](#)

149 [Q199](#)

136. CONCLUSION

By mishandling the implementation of the Modernised Accommodation Offer (MAO), the MOD has created a situation in which groups of service personnel are now more likely to feel aggrieved, whatever form the scheme takes. With a limited supply of housing, some personnel will inevitably lose out. It is vital that the Government manages the morale and retention consequences.

137. CONCLUSION

The MOD sent out a Modernised Accommodation Offer survey on 18 March 2024 to all Regular and Full Time Reserve Service-Full Commitment personnel, with a deadline of 4 April 2024.¹⁵⁰ The former Minister of State said that the Secretary of State would report the findings from the review in the Summer; however, following the change in Government, there has as of 3 December 2024 been no announcement of a new accommodation offer for service families.¹⁵¹

150 Ministry of Defence ([SAC0081](#))

151 HL Deb, 15 May 2024, [col 601](#)

Conclusion

- 138.** There has been a steady decline in satisfaction in service accommodation standards since 2015, with satisfaction in both Service Family Accommodation (SFA) and Single Living Accommodation (SLA) falling to their lowest recorded levels in 2023. AFCAS survey statistics show that this is impacting retention and recruitment of personnel within the Armed Forces.
- 139.** The MOD admits to a historic lack of investment in ageing accommodation, with half of SFA built over 50 years ago and half of SLA over 25 years ago—and much of it of poor original build quality. Additionally, the MOD sold and leased back the majority of SFA housing stock in a deal with Annington Property Limited in 1996 and then implemented a ‘fix on fail’ approach to maintenance between 2010 and 2022. The outcome of the Annington contract and the FDIS maintenance contracts is that the MOD has been left “firefighting”—expending money and resources to manage both situations.
- 140.** As a result of this poor decision-making and inadequate maintenance of service accommodation over several decades, a third of people in SLA are currently living in sub-standard accommodation and two thirds of UK SFA need extensive refurbishment or rebuilding. In the words of Lieutenant General Sir Rob Magowan, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, “what has been happening across the estate within the last 10 to 15 years has now come home to roost.”¹⁵²
- 141.** The Defence Infrastructure Organisation (DIO) and the Front-Line Commands (FLCs) are beginning to prioritise investment in service accommodation and have committed to spend £5.3 billion on SLA and £1.8 billion on SFA over 10 years. This seems disproportionately low for SFA.

142.

CONCLUSION

The MOD has acknowledged that current levels of funding are insufficient to bring all service accommodation up to decent, modern standards and that “it is investment that ultimately will lead to the change.”

In the current economic climate, and with so many competing pressures on public funds, we are not confident that the sustained investment required will be forthcoming in future Defence budgets. Both the MOD and the Treasury must make substantial and ongoing funding commitments to improve the Defence estate before it deteriorates beyond repair—and before greater numbers of personnel decide to leave the military because of poor accommodation.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. As part of its response to this Report, the Government should set out in detail its investment plans for both Service Families Accommodation and Single Living Accommodation, how far it expects these plans to address the condition of the Estate, and how it intends meanwhile to manage the human and resourcing consequences of continuing to expect personnel and their families to occupy ageing properties, often in poor condition, that do not meet their expectations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 21)

Service Family Accommodation (SFA)

2. There have understandably been serious concerns about the Defence Infrastructure Organisation's contract oversight of the implementation of the FDIS contracts for the maintenance and repair of Service Family Accommodation. DIO is accountable for the fact that there was no contractual relationship between the suppliers and no lead prime to take overall responsibility: this contributed substantially to the problems with the rollout of the new accommodation service. (Conclusion, Paragraph 35)
3. The DIO must prove it has learned lessons from the failures in the delivery of these contracts. (Recommendation, Paragraph 36)
4. The DIO and its contractors should outline the assurance processes they have in place to ensure maintenance and repairs meet the needs of service families. The DIO should also review the performance measures in the RAMS and NAMS contracts to assess how they could more effectively take account of service families' satisfaction. (Recommendation, Paragraph 44)
5. The MOD's claims of a recovery in performance need to be borne out in a demonstrable improvement in the customer experience and markedly increased customer satisfaction. Service families' trust has been affected and the DIO and service providers need to demonstrate a genuine "family first" approach to earn that trust back. (Conclusion, Paragraph 45)

6. There needs to be better communication with service families about maintenance work. Part of the solution lies in the introduction of the promised Home Hub portal, to give families access to information about maintenance work and the ability to book their own appointments online. (Conclusion, Paragraph 52)
7. The DIO must prioritise the development of the Home Hub portal and roll this out to families as soon as possible. (Recommendation, Paragraph 53)
8. If the housing officer role is to continue being undertaken by Pinnacle, then Pinnacle's representatives must be more effective at resolving outstanding issues and complaints, working collaboratively with their contract partners. (Conclusion, Paragraph 59)
9. We understand that MOD were conducting a review of the complaints policy and process, and of the quality of contractors' responses to complaints to improve the customer experience. We trust that work on this review is now complete and ask the Government to summarise its findings and outcomes in their response to this Report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 60)
10. The process for allocating housing is a source of great frustration to many service families due to the limited choice of properties and very little information available about them prior to moving in. (Conclusion, Paragraph 63)
11. The Government should ensure that there are good quality photos and floorplans accessible to service families for every available SFA property, as promised. (Recommendation, Paragraph 64)
12. The MOD has highlighted the preparation of homes for move-in as an area in which VIVO and Amey need to show improvement to meet their contractual Acceptable Level of Performance (ALP) requirements. (Conclusion, Paragraph 66)
13. The DIO should clarify what improvements have been and are being made to the move-in process, to guarantee homes consistently meet an acceptable standard of decoration, maintenance and cleanliness in good time. (Recommendation, Paragraph 67)
14. The MOD successfully delivered in winter 2023–24 on its preparedness planning and carried out the remediation work that it promised. However, this was only achieved through additional resources. Service families need reassurance that DIO and its contractors can continue to provide the same level of service in the future, when substantial emergency uplifts to funding may not be available. (Conclusion, Paragraph 70)

15. It is shocking that, until a policy change in 2022, it was considered acceptable to house families in properties known to have damp and mould. However, issues with damp and mould still exist. (Conclusion, Paragraph 73)
16. The DIO must resolve outstanding problems with damp and mould across the estate. In its response to this report, the Government should detail the ongoing work to eliminate damp and mould in SFA, including a timeline for remediation of the Estate as a whole. Detailed statistics should be published by June 2025 on the number of properties affected by damp and mould across the whole of the Defence Estate, and its severity, and these should be updated and published annually thereafter. (Recommendation, Paragraph 74)
17. In a situation in which the contractor has no way of gaining entry to service accommodation without the occupier's consent to carry out safety checks, and no option to cut supply, a very small number of properties are likely to have overdue gas safety certificates. However, the situation in 2023 with overdue certificates had clearly got out of control. The DIO must put in place measures to ensure that a similar situation cannot happen again. (Recommendation, Paragraph 80)
18. We welcome the offer from DIO to share its key lessons learned on gas and electrical safety inspections. (Recommendation, Paragraph 82)
19. While we welcome the MOD's work in parallel with DLUHC to develop a new Enhanced Target Standard (ETS) for SFA, the MOD needs to review not only the standards it uses to assess the adequacy of accommodation, but also critically the assessment process itself. It needs to have justified confidence in both. (Recommendation, Paragraph 87)

Single Living Accommodation (SLA)

20. Single Living Accommodation (SLA) does not always meet the needs and expectations of today's recruits, and this is having an adverse effect on recruitment and retention. (Conclusion, Paragraph 102)
21. We support plans to create much needed new-build SLA, using modular construction techniques. (Conclusion, Paragraph 109)
22. We recommend that the Government provide an update on the funding and completion status of new-build SLA projects in their response to this Report. (Recommendation, Paragraph 110)

- 23.** The introduction of a new Defence Minimum Standard (DMS) for SLA is a long-awaited and very welcome step forward, if it ensures that personnel are no longer living in unacceptable conditions and does not simply result in sub-standard accommodation being recognised but not rectified. (Conclusion, Paragraph 114)
- 24.** The Government should provide us with an update following the implementation of the new DMS, clarifying how they are measuring improvements to the condition of SLA and to what extent the new standards are making a difference to morale and meeting their expectations. (Recommendation, Paragraph 115)

Allocation of Housing

- 25.** The MoD's communication of its new accommodation offer for SFA was inadequate for those adversely affected by the policy change, including those with rank-based benefits, to understand and respond to its impact on them. (Conclusion, Paragraph 133)
- 26.** We support the MOD's decision to pause and conduct a review of the accommodation offer for SFA because of concerns around retention of personnel. However, we recognise that this decision has caused potential disappointment for the 45,000 personnel in long-term relationships and/or with non-resident children, who might have hoped to become entitled to SFA in March 2024, and personnel who had expected to benefit from the new needs-based allocation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 134)
- 27.** The Government should provide an update to us, and more importantly to Service personnel, on its approach to allocation of SFA, with timescales and metrics for implementation. This should take into account the different needs of the three Services and include a full impact assessment of any potential revisions to the accommodation policy for SFA. (Recommendation, Paragraph 135)
- 28.** By mishandling the implementation of the Modernised Accommodation Offer (MAO), the MOD has created a situation in which groups of service personnel are now more likely to feel aggrieved, whatever form the scheme takes. With a limited supply of housing, some personnel will inevitably lose out. It is vital that the Government manages the morale and retention consequences. (Conclusion, Paragraph 136)
- 29.** The former Minister of State said that the Secretary of State would report the findings from the review in the Summer; however, following the change in Government, there has as of 3 December 2024 been no announcement of a new accommodation offer for service families. (Conclusion, Paragraph 137)

Conclusion

30. The MOD has acknowledged that current levels of funding are insufficient to bring all service accommodation up to decent, modern standards and that “it is investment that ultimately will lead to the change.” In the current economic climate, and with so many competing pressures on public funds, we are not confident that the sustained investment required will be forthcoming in future Defence budgets. Both the MOD and the Treasury must make substantial and ongoing funding commitments to improve the Defence estate before it deteriorates beyond repair—and before greater numbers of personnel decide to leave the military because of poor accommodation. (Conclusion, Paragraph 142)

Formal minutes

Tuesday 3 December 2024

Members present

Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, in the Chair

Mr Calvin Bailey

Alex Baker

Lincoln Jopp

Mrs Emma Lewell-Buck

Mike Martin

Jesse Norman

Ian Roome

Michelle Scrogam

Fred Thomas

Derek Twigg

Service Accommodation

Draft Report (*Service Accommodation*), proposed by Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 142 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134)

Adjournment

Adjourned till Tuesday 10 December 2024 at 10.00am.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Wednesday 13 September 2023

Collette Musgrave, Chief Executive, Army Families Federation; **Sarah Clewes**, Chief Executive, Naval Families Federation; **Maria Lyle**, Director, RAF Families Federation [Q1-57](#)

Monday 27 November 2023

Craig McGilvray, Managing Director for Complex Facilities, Amey; **Jerry Moloney**, Managing Director, VIVO Defence Services; **Claire Kober OBE**, Managing Director of Homes, Pinnacle Group [Q58-182](#)

Tuesday 27 February 2024

James Cartlidge MP, Minister for Defence Procurement, Ministry of Defence; **Vice Admiral Philip Hally**, Chief of Defence People, Ministry of Defence; **Major General Richard Clements**, Director Army Basing and Infrastructure, Ministry of Defence; **Mike Green**, Chief Executive, Defence Infrastructure Organisation [Q183-313](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

SAC numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

1	Allison, Glenn	SAC0027
2	Amey	SAC0015
3	Amey	SAC0076
4	Anderson, Mr Alexander John	SAC0035
5	Anderson, Mrs Jennie	SAC0055
6	Anonymised	SAC0075
7	Anonymised	SAC0073
8	Anonymised	SAC0051
9	Anonymised	SAC0060
10	Anonymised	SAC0065
11	Anonymised	SAC0062
12	Anonymised	SAC0054
13	Anonymised	SAC0046
14	Anonymised	SAC0045
15	Anonymised	SAC0044
16	Anonymised	SAC0041
17	Anonymised	SAC0040
18	Anonymised	SAC0037
19	Anonymised	SAC0031
20	Anonymised	SAC0030
21	Anonymised	SAC0023
22	Anonymised	SAC0020
23	Anonymised	SAC0016
24	Anonymised	SAC0011

25	Anonymised	SAC0007
26	Anonymised	SAC0004
27	Army Families Federation	SAC0079
28	Bucknall, Mrs Rosie	SAC0061
29	Clouth, Mrs Julie	SAC0019
30	Clowes, Mr Seth	SAC0036
31	Cornish, Mr Peter	SAC0024
32	Crawford, Richard	SAC0059
33	Dandelion Military Families	SAC0074
34	AS1(T) Harper	SAC0021
35	MacDonald, Dr Susannah	SAC0078
36	Meeke, Major Andrew	SAC0018
37	Ministry of Defence	SAC0081
38	Ministry of Defence	SAC0071
39	Ministry of Defence	SAC0070
40	Mulla, Mr Mohammed Adil	SAC0039
41	Naval Families Federation	SAC0066
42	Nicholas, Lieutenant Colonel	SAC0063
43	Nokes, Caroline (MP for Romsey and Southampton North)	SAC0034
44	Officer, Mr Paul	SAC0025
45	Pearson, Capt Stuart	SAC0017
46	Petitions Committee, House of Commons	SAC0080
47	Pickard	SAC0026
48	Pinnacle Group	SAC0072
49	Pinnacle Group	SAC0013
50	RAF Families Federation	SAC0067
51	Rana-Hume, Mrs	SAC0028
52	Relf, Sqn Ldr Brian	SAC0001
53	Ross, Mrs Laura	SAC0053
54	The Royal British Legion	SAC0012
55	Singleton, Mrs Katie	SAC0047
56	Smith, Mr Paul	SAC0038

57	Stevenson, Mrs	<u>SAC0048</u>
58	Tanner, Mrs	<u>SAC0029</u>
59	Tanner, Mr Daniel	<u>SAC0049</u>
60	Towl, Mrs Carlee	<u>SAC0033</u>
61	VIVO Defence Services	<u>SAC0077</u>
62	VIVO Defence Services	<u>SAC0008</u>
63	Wilkins, Jack	<u>SAC0043</u>
64	Wythe, Major Tom	<u>SAC0057</u>