

## Government Response to the House of Lords International Relations and Defence Committee's Report

### 'Ukraine: a wake-up call'

1. The Government are grateful to the International Relations and Defence Committee for their report *Ukraine: a wake-up call* published on 26 September 2024.
2. The Government wishes the Committee to know that the responses to this report predate the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) being completed. The SDR is an externally led review that will determine the roles, capabilities and reforms required by UK Defence to meet the challenges, threats and opportunities of the twenty-first century, deliverable and affordable within the resources available to Defence within the trajectory to spending 2.5% of GDP.
3. The Government has learned lessons from Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine; where there are recommendations that we agree with, they will be acted upon. The Government will continue to fully engage with Parliament on the situation in Ukraine and the lessons we continue to learn.

#### Introduction:

**Conclusion 1: This report, as usual, provides conclusions and recommendations for the Government to respond to within two months. We are additionally submitting this report to the Strategic Defence Review for consideration by the external reviewers. We welcome that the new Government has moved swiftly to launch its Strategic Defence Review.**  
(Paragraph 5)

***Recommendation 2: Given the deteriorating global threat environment, the Government cannot afford to delay setting defence priorities and articulating how much money will be available to UK Defence. The Government should ensure that the Review is completed to schedule, and implement its findings promptly. We call on the Government to keep the Committee updated on the Review's progress and subsequent implementation. (Paragraph 6)***

***Recommendation 3: As highlighted in our 2023 report, 'UK defence policy: from aspiration to reality?', Government policy documents often fail to clearly articulate the Government's priorities and the hard choices that need to be made in the face of competing pressures on limited resources. We call on the new Government to ensure that its response to the Strategic Defence Review provides a clear sense of the Government's priorities for UK Defence and how it plans to turn aspirations into practice. (Paragraph 7)***

4. The Government is grateful for the Committee's interest in the SDR. Led by three external reviewers – Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, General Sir Richard Barrons, and Dr Fiona Hill – the MOD will support the Reviewers with full

transparency and candour; the SDR will be the department's top priority after operations.

5. The Reviewers will report regularly on progress to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for Defence and will make their final report to the Prime Minister, the Chancellor and the Defence Secretary – with recommendations – in the first half of 2025.

6. The Secretary of State for Defence will subsequently report the SDR to Parliament

**Conclusion 4: The new Government has yet to set the levels of future defence spending, pending the outcome of the review. It remains to be seen if 2.5% of GDP represents a suitable increase in defence spending, and we note that any increase should be seen in the context of decades-long defence cuts and recent inflationary pressures on the defence budget. Unless significant efficiencies are found, laser-sharp priorities are set and hard trade-offs are made, an increase to 2.5% of GDP may not be enough to meet the UK's growing defence needs. (Paragraph 8)**

7. The Prime Minister has set a firm commitment to increasing defence spending to reach 2.5% of GDP. This will help to secure our country's future, while getting the best value for money for British taxpayers. The pathway to reaching 2.5% will be set at a future fiscal event.

8. In addition to setting out the pathway to reaching 2.5% at a future fiscal event, the Secretary of State for Defence announced to Parliament that six outdated military capabilities will be taken out of service, including a number of Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships, Army drones and Royal Air Force helicopters. Taking these capabilities out of service are set to save the MOD £150 million over the next two years and up to £500 million over the next five years.

9. The SDR will ensure that Defence is central both to the security, and to the economic growth and prosperity, of the UK. The Autumn Budget finalised the MOD's budget for the current financial year and the next. Future financial years' figures are subject to the outcome of the second phase of the Spending Review.

***Recommendation 5: We also acknowledge that some of the recommendations in this report will have cost implications. While there will be other pressing demands on the UK Budget, the new Government should nonetheless give careful and swift consideration to our recommendations. (Paragraph 9)***

10. The Government is greatly appreciative of the Committee's conclusions and recommendations, and will carefully consider these recommendations alongside the recommendations made by the SDR.

### **The underlying importance of deterrence:**

**Conclusion 6: Deterrence is key to avoiding future conflict. In light of the ongoing threat from Russia, and the deteriorating global security environment, there is a need to re-establish credible deterrence in the UK and across Europe. This includes both nuclear and conventional deterrence.** (Paragraph 18)

11. The UK nuclear deterrent does deter the most extreme threats to the UK and our NATO allies. While there have been conflicts since the Second World War there has since been no use of nuclear weapons or major conflict between states with nuclear weapons.

12. Nonetheless, the Committee rightly identifies the deterrence credibility challenges brought about by today's security environment, and the need for coherence between nuclear and conventional deterrence as key to avoiding future conflict and denying our adversaries perceived deterrence gaps in which they may operate. Russia has demonstrated her willingness to use military and non-military levers to further their objectives in Ukraine, including irresponsible nuclear signalling designed to deter and distract NATO intervention and support to Ukraine.

13. The UK is committed to deeper integration of the UK's conventional deterrence posture, bringing together all levers of state power; political, diplomatic, economic, and military, to deliver effect. Critically, the Government has committed to a triple lock on renewal and modernisation of our nuclear forces to underpin this.

14. Furthermore, the MOD will continue to engage and develop relationships with and within NATO to achieve a unified and fully integrated deterrence approach for the UK and its allies.

***Recommendation 7: We need to re-learn some of the Cold War lessons around deterrence and escalation management and apply them to a new context.***  
(Paragraph 19)

15. The Committee rightly highlights the ongoing deterioration in the security environment. The UK faces a new nuclear age with diverse actors and increased complexity compared to the Cold War. This demands the development of new deterrence thinking alongside re-learning Cold War lessons. This challenge is amplified by a longstanding focus on disarmament within the nuclear community since the Cold War that has narrowed deterrence expertise. The manifestation of this new security environment in events such as Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine have

refocused the public mindset on the importance of maintaining a capable and credible nuclear deterrent.

16. The MOD is deeply aware of these security challenges and is committing new resources to upskill and adapt to this new environment. We have several programmes of investment to modernise our capabilities and secure a sustainable Enterprise with people and infrastructure at the centre. This will strengthen the nuclear skills and expertise across Government, industry, and academia needed to deliver our nuclear deterrent. The UK also continues to raise the collective awareness of NATO and allies on topics including deterrence and escalation management.

17. In addition to our wide ranging work, the committee may be interested in the Nuclear Deterrence Fund (NDF), which is a £3.3 million pilot programme launched by the MOD which will run between FY24-27 to stimulate wider UK expertise in the field of nuclear deterrence and to cultivate a greater skills and research base to support UK nuclear deterrence thinking and policymaking.

***Recommendation 8: Equally important is understanding the human aspects of war. There was clearly a failed assessment of Putin's will to fight in the run-up to the invasion of Ukraine. The UK and NATO should focus on developing a better understanding of Putin's strategy and intentions—including what influence others (like China) may have on his decision-making—while strengthening de-escalation mechanisms. This would provide for more robust deterrence, helping decision-makers distinguish between posturing and the actual risk of nuclear weapons being used, while mitigating against escalation by accident.*** (Paragraph 20)

18. The Government disagrees with the Committee's statement that intelligence assessments of Putin's will to fight failed to effectively highlight the level of will he possessed; the intelligence community clearly signalled its concern over Putin's willingness to use force in Ukraine, citing the numerous precedents prior to 2022 including Georgia, Syria, Crimea and Salisbury. However, we do agree with the Committee's recommendation that it is important for the UK and NATO to focus on understanding Putin's strategy and intentions.

**Conclusion 9: The 'will-to-fight' applies not only to Putin and other political leaders, but to their armed forces and their civilian populations as well. There are also other human aspects that determine the outcome of wars including, motivation, determination, memory of past victories and defeats, culture, and stamina, and all are essential elements for any consideration of deterrence, defence, and de-escalation.** (Paragraph 21)

19. The Government agrees with this conclusion by the Committee; there are numerous factors that affect the outcome of wars and conflicts, including those

identified by the Committee, that need to be addressed when considering how best to deter and de-escalate.

### **Building Mass:**

**Conclusion 10: All in all, the evidence we heard points to the current size of the British Army being inadequate. While size is not the only measure of capability, we are concerned that the Army cannot, as currently constituted, make the expected troop contribution to NATO. We therefore question whether the British Army is prepared to meet the growing threat posed by Russia to European security. (Paragraph 34)**

20. The Government agrees that the Army, and UK forces more widely, are not in the state that the country would wish, but we believe we meet our expected contributions to NATO. The British Army will continue to support the UK's commitment to NATO, as set out in the NATO Force Model. Exercise STEADFAST DEFENDER in the summer of this year demonstrated our ability to deploy, under NATO, as part of a UK joint force.

21. The UK's strength lies fundamentally in our position in NATO, rather than in the provision of sovereign capability alone. Our defence plan aligns with NATO's plan and our Army's structure is NATO first and allied by design. Our ability to integrate and fight alongside allies and partners is paramount.

22. Our priority is to tackle the recruitment and retention crisis and stop the long-term decline in the numbers of our Armed Forces. That's why we have brought in recruitment reforms to scrap outdated policies and speed up recruitment and delivered the largest pay rise for our armed forces in over 20 years. We know there is more to do and the SDR will ensure our people are at the heart of Defence's plans, supporting the security and the economic growth and prosperity of the UK.

***Recommendation 11: The Armed Forces continue to face recruitment and retention challenges, which must be addressed urgently. We call on the new Government to set out what plans it has to address these, whether it will implement the recommendations of the Haythornthwaite Review and, if so, what the timetable would be. (Paragraph 39)***

23. The Government agrees that recruitment and retention must be addressed urgently and have made this a department priority.

24. The MOD's work in improving retention and recruitment is part of a larger package of measures aimed to renew the contract between the nation and those who serve. The Armed Forces need to continue to attract a range of diversity, talent, skills and experience which is fully reflective of the society it serves, all whilst faced with the context of a challenging labour market. We are modernising and refining our policies and processes in order to be fully attractive to a diverse range of potential

candidates, highlighting that Defence is a modern, forward-facing employer which offers a valuable and rewarding career. Our aim is to attract and recruit more and maximise those applications that successfully enter and remain in Armed Forces employment.

25. To facilitate this the MOD are ambitious in our work to revisit and where appropriate challenge previous regulations for Armed Forces recruiting as well as identifying new initiatives, working at pace to develop and deliver them.

26. The Government is prioritising its response to the recruitment and retention challenge and will set out its plans in the context of the SDR. The recommendations of the HRAFI report have been incorporated into this work, and the MOD has announced a new £8,000 retention payment for eligible regular Privates and Lance Corporals who have served four years in the Army.

27. Examples of this Government focusing upon and taking steps to improving Armed Forces retention and recruitment include the delivery of a 35% pay increase for new recruits, setting a new ambition for the Armed Forces to make a conditional offer of employment to candidates within ten days, and to give people a provisional training start date within 30 days. We have also announced the extension of Wrap Around Childcare to Overseas families, potentially saving up to £3,400 annually for Service families from Jan 2025, and we have committed to delivering a £30,000 financial incentive to a cohort of tri-Service Air Engineers in return for three years' service from Apr 2025, protecting a critical enabler of Defence capability. In addition, for a cohort of Army personnel, an £8000 Retention Payment will also be implemented in Jan 2025 for those reaching their four-year point. Finally, Defence is creating a new military direct-entry cyber pathway. This will help boost our cyber resilience and support the UK's ability to conduct operations in cyberspace.

**Conclusion 12: The Defence Recruitment System (DRS) is burdened by excessive bureaucracy, particularly in its medical evaluation process, which has become overly cautious and risk averse. This has led to unnecessary rejections and delays, discouraging many potential recruits. (Paragraph 40)**

28. The MOD is working with the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) to improve the process for the medical assessment of candidates applying to the Armed Forces. This has confirmed electronic signatures for patient consent are legal and the Army is looking to introduce a digital consent technical solution from December 2024.

29. A pilot project with the Army's recruitment partner, Capita, on medical data sharing has had impressive results, with the time it takes for medical files to be reviewed greatly reduced. This will be rolled out throughout England, Scotland and Wales from January 2025. The MOD is keen to progress this collaboration further to

ensure all three services are able to benefit from digital ways of working in recruitment.

***Recommendation 13: To increase recruitment numbers and enhance the efficiency of the process, the DRS should take a more balanced and risk-tolerant approach to its medical examinations and accelerate the process of resolving marginal cases. (Paragraph 41)***

30. The MOD recognises the Committee's concerns regarding the medical evaluation process and the need to encourage a more balanced and risk-tolerant approach to its medical examinations. The medical entry standards for the Armed Forces were updated in August 2024 following an intensive period of review by clinical experts, Defence personnel staff and the recruiting agencies. More than 700 applications have been reconsidered following the removal of 100 outdated medical policies such as those blocking some sufferers of hay fever, eczema and acne.

31. The content has been revised to ensure it is unambiguous in the freedoms that are offered, and the MOD is engaged with recruitment partners to operationalise the revised policy and to exploit any additional permissions it offers.

**Conclusion 14: The Reserves provide a cost-effective model for building mass. By investing in the Reserves—both ex-regular and volunteer—the UK can enhance its capability and war readiness, contributing to deterrence and sustaining its armed forces in warfighting scenarios. (Paragraph 47)**

***Recommendation 15: The new Government should prioritise reinvigorating the Reserves. It should respond to General Sir Nick Carter's review, clearly articulating what role(s) it expects the Reserves to undertake and how they should be organised to effectively supplement and support our Armed Forces. (Paragraph 48)***

***Recommendation 16: A reduction in Reserve workforce numbers confirms that the capability of the Reserves has declined over the last few years. To reverse this, a co-ordinated response is needed that includes incentives for joining and provides clarity of purpose for all units. The new Government should also re-assess its funding for the Reserves to ensure it delivers on demanding training, appropriate scales of equipment, and sufficient logistical and administrative support. (Paragraph 49)***

32. The Government's priority will always be to ensure that our country is well defended, and the vital importance of our Reserve Forces cannot be understated.

33. The Minister for Veterans and People will be reviewing our Reserves Forces to better determine how Defence can utilise their expertise and experience whilst also increasing social mobility and a higher return on investment.

34. Since the invasion of Ukraine, we have taken steps to improve our readiness and re-organise to better meet our NATO Force Model commitments. Our Agile Stance Campaign Plan (ASCP) and work under the Cabinet Office's Home Defence Programme (HDP) are developing the reserve contribution to both warfighting and homeland protection.

35. We are improving the administration and management of our Strategic Reserve and actively exploring how it and the Active Reserve are better able to deliver the range of capabilities that they could be called upon to provide.

36. Overall, we aim to extract maximum advantage from the scale, skills and agility our reservists offer.

**Conclusion 17: A resilient industrial base underpins Defence's credibility as a fighting force. Our evidence consistently showed that the UK's defence industry is unprepared for high-intensity, prolonged conflict due to decades of budget cuts and reduced industrial capacity since the end of the Cold War. Our witnesses strongly emphasised the role that the Government should play in reversing this process. (Paragraph 75)**

***Recommendation 18: There is a significant trust deficit between the defence industry and the Government. The defence industry has expressed the need for clear, long-term commitments to effectively increase production and meet wartime demands. The MoD needs to transition from a traditional customer-supplier relationship to one that ensures sustained collaboration, consistent follow-through on commitments, and which fosters early and transparent engagement. (Paragraph 76)***

37. The Government recognises the vital role defence plays in both our national security and economic growth, and as noted in the Invest 2035 Industrial Strategy is committed to bringing forward a Defence Industrial Strategy which aligns defence, security and economic priorities.

38. The Defence Industrial Strategy will develop a modern defence industrial base able to better support our, and allies', security while also helping to drive economic growth. It will strengthen Britain's security through establishing long-term partnerships with our domestic defence industry, alongside examining our approach to critical elements of the supply chain and supporting the development of advanced technologies, skills and capabilities. Alongside traditional defence industry partners we will also engage with the tech sector, small and medium sized enterprises, universities and trade unions as vital partners in our overall endeavour.



***Recommendation 19: The procurement process needs to be more agile and willing to take risks, as successfully demonstrated by the Ukrainian forces' rapid innovation and collaboration with the private sector during the war. There needs to be a culture change around risk. The Government will have to transform how it buys weapons to keep up with the need for much faster development cycles. (Paragraph 77)***

39. The Government recognises the need for increased pace and agility in the acquisition system. We are reforming our approach to procurement to deliver capabilities at greater pace, secure the best possible value for money and leverage rapidly changing technology.

40. The MOD's experience of rapid procurement for Ukraine has shown that greater strategic alignment, clear prioritisation, and a shared and agreed understanding of risk tolerance can drive increased pace in delivery. These factors are reflected in the department's acquisition reform agenda. A key focus is on setting programmes up for success from the outset, drawing on expert advice early in the process to identify and address strategic risks and challenges.

41. Programmes can use a range of mechanisms to understand the risk and complexity of their programme and balance the strategic factors affecting it, enabling proportionate approaches and decision making based on appropriate risk.

***Recommendation 20: Non-traditional defence suppliers, such as start-ups, SMEs and tech companies, are key for accelerating the pace of delivery, but they face a unique set of barriers in accessing the defence market. The new UK Government needs to facilitate a 'broad church' of industry engagement, beyond the defence sector and into relatively new sectors of the economy. (Paragraph 78)***

***Recommendation 21: There are risks attached to increasing collaboration with commercial partners who, traditionally, have not been involved in defence. The new Government will need to be alert to these risks and work to mitigate them. In particular, the Government should conduct careful risk assessments when deciding whether to allow private companies access to certain systems, such as sensitive communication and targeting systems. However, a proportionate approach should be taken in less sensitive areas, fostering collaboration with non-traditional partners by ensuring that bureaucratic burdens are kept as low as possible. (Paragraph 79)***

42. The MOD recognises that smaller businesses face unique challenges, and the department is committed to working collaboratively with industry to address them and to make defence a more attractive proposition for all businesses.

43. Industry partners, of all sizes, are at the heart of our One Defence approach. We recognise the value that all suppliers bring to the defence enterprise, particularly

the agility and customer-focus that smaller businesses provide. In uncertain times it is important that we attract the very best suppliers to help develop a robust, resilient and innovative defence supply chain that contributes to national security and wider UK prosperity.

**Conclusion 22: Engaging the whole of society in defence is crucial for building a resilient and prepared nation. This involves the integration of civilian capabilities, community engagement, and the emotional aspects of national defence.** (Paragraph 85)

44. We agree that a whole of society approach is crucial to build a resilient nation. To that end, work has already commenced with critical sectors to ensure planning for catastrophic scenarios is in place and resilient, and will build on this to bring together and exercise a comprehensive Home Defence Programme (HDP) for our security, preparedness and resilience as a nation, led by the Cabinet Office. This will be based on the latest assessment of threats and risks – including tabletop mobilisation exercises such as those happening at the Defence Academy in Shrivenham – whilst bringing together our defence and civilian planning to reflect the increasingly interconnected and interdependent world that we live in. In addition, the SDR will be looking at resilience in detail.

***Recommendation 23: As a first step, the UK Government should build public understanding around the role the general population can play in building national resilience and contributing to national security and defence, moving beyond the notion that defence is the sole responsibility of the military. Plans must be developed in consultation with the general public, so that communities have ownership over plans and are motivated to participate in them. The UK Government should learn from the experiences of other nations, such as the Scandinavian concept of ‘total defence’.*** (Paragraph 86)

45. By implementing the Home Defence Programme, the Government will take a whole of society approach to the resilience and security of the UK. This will include work to familiarise the public with their role in national security and resilience. A clear timeline for this engagement and the activities that will be conducted is under development, and will be communicated in due course. We are committed to learning from international best practice both bilaterally and through existing forums, such as NATO's Resilience Committee.

46. The Government's website<sup>1</sup> for resilience and emergency planning is designed to help people plan for potential hazards and equip themselves with the necessary knowledge and resources to respond effectively.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://prepare.campaign.gov.uk/>

47. Part of the Government's wider work to build resilience across the whole of society, it offers accessible and actionable advice for individuals, households and communities, both to improve their resilience to a range of risks and help them support their communities when emergencies arise.

***Recommendation 24: The Government should continue to invest in high-end technologies while ensuring that it rebuilds and maintains adequate stockpiles of conventional munitions. This dual investment strategy will provide UK Defence with the flexibility to respond to various types of threats. (Paragraph 93)***

48. Peer-on-peer conflict does involve high levels of attrition and the Government's approach to such conflicts will be shaped by our ability to replace equipment and replenish munitions. The department is developing an affordable munitions strategy which will address stockpile shortages, create an industrial base able to replenish stockpiles at the rates required, build supply chain resilience, and do so in conjunction with our allies and partners.

***Recommendation 25: We call on the Government to conduct an assessment of the balance the UK should strike between high-end and conventional weapons to enhance effectiveness and sustain operations. This assessment should also consider the mix of capabilities among NATO's European members and take account of the potential for burden-sharing across the Alliance. (Paragraph 94)***

49. The MOD recognises that it needs innovative technology ready for contemporary capabilities across a range of complex and intelligent munitions operations and applications such as integrated air and missile defence, precision strike at range, and non-kinetic and novel munitions balancing mass against exquisite capability. As part of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the MOD will conduct a root and branch assessment across all of its capabilities including whether or not it has the right balance between high-end and conventional weapons. As for areas of potential burden-sharing, 'NATO First' is a central theme within the SDR and will identify areas where the MOD can better align itself across a range of current and future capabilities with our European allies and partners. This is consistent with the work of NATO's Defence Production Action Plan (DPAP).

50. The NATO DPAP agreed at the summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, signalled a step-change in the relationship between NATO Allies and the defence industry. The DPAP aims to strengthen NATO's deterrence and defence by greatly increasing allies' ability to deliver new capabilities and sustain existing equipment. The plan commits allied nations to accelerating joint procurement, boosting production capacity, and increasing interoperability, interchangeability and standardisation of equipment. It will foster more transparent relationships with industry, open up greater multinational cooperation and lead to more agile procurement.

51. A UK contribution to DPAP, has seen the launch of UK-led NATO initiatives on missiles and munitions alongside a total of 14 European NATO allies. The first of these UK-led cooperative procurement opportunities promoted the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) and the AIM-132 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile (ASRAAM). We continue to work with partners and allies to promote and participate in initiatives across a range of capabilities, complementing NATO initiatives to ensure coherence and also that of our Allies. Germany, for example is spearheading the European Sky Shield Initiative, which is based on the procurement of alternative missile systems to the initiatives helping to ensure a blend of capabilities among NATO's European Allies.

***Recommendation 26: The Government should urgently reconsider its policy for disposing of old weapons stocks and consider 'mothballing' them instead, ensuring that the accounting and IT infrastructure is updated to support this move. While there may be costs attached to this, as well as to maintenance, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the ongoing effectiveness of retired capabilities. (Paragraph 100)***

52. The MOD maintains policy options to both dispose of and/or mothball Defence capabilities and decisions to do so are taken at the highest levels and accounted for appropriately. The MOD continues to support Ukraine through the granting in kind of capabilities including those legacy capabilities which have been slated for disposal should they provide a capability requested/needed by Ukraine.

***Conclusion 27: Our evidence showed that while there has been some progress in increasing joint procurement and harmonising defence systems among NATO allies, more needs to be done. Fragmentation hinders interoperability and cohesive defence efforts, as evidenced by Ukraine's current logistical struggles with maintaining capabilities. (Paragraph 111)***

53. The Government agrees with this conclusion; it is essential that allies continue to work together to ramp up our collective defence production, signalling to our collective industrial base, and to our adversaries, that we are serious about winning the war of production – both for Ukraine and our own defence and deterrence.

54. The UK continues to play a leading role on this agenda in NATO, seeking to improve cooperation across allies including the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion (NICE) Pledge, agreed at the 2024 Washington Summit.

***Recommendation 28: The UK should reinvigorate existing NATO mechanisms, such as the national armaments directors' forum and the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, to enhance cooperation and standardisation efforts among member states. (Paragraph 112)***

55. The Government notes that the UK already chairs the NATO Army Armaments Group (NAAG) and the NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG). Moreover, the UK takes a leading role in NATO's Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD), the Defence Industrial Production Board (the NATO body set up to deliver the Defence Production Action Plan), NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), and NATO's numerous industrial and armament working groups.

56. We work closely with allies and NATO's International Staff to ensure these structures deliver for the UK and the Alliance as a whole, seeking to improve cooperation across the board, including on standardisation, but also on other common industrial challenges, such as supply chain security.

**Conclusion 29: Joint procurement initiatives and strengthened industrial collaboration with key allies, including non-European states, are essential for enhancing the cost-effectiveness, scalability, and interoperability of defence capabilities.** (Paragraph 113)

57. The Government is committed to expanding and enhancing the UK's industrial collaboration with key allies, creating new partnerships and promoting defence exports. The UK recently signed an agreement with Germany (the Trinity House Agreement) to enhance defence cooperation including nurturing and promoting our defence industrial bases, fostering joint procurement initiatives and advancing joint research and development to enhance capability production and technological innovation. This completes the triangle of E3 (UK, France & Germany) Agreements, enabling closer cooperation between our three nations.

58. Multilaterally, the UK is leading with our NATO Multinational Procurement Initiatives and DIAMOND, both of which aim to increase industrial collaboration and interoperability in support of NATO deterrence. The UK is also seeking to participate in the part-EU funded HYDIS project, through which we hope to cooperate with European partners, including France, Germany and Italy, and their industries, on scoping a new counter-hypersonics capability.

59. The trilateral AUKUS Defence Ministers meeting in London in September 2024 highlighted the range and scale of joint initiatives and defence industrial collaboration being undertaken between the US, Australia and the UK – including UK-delivered training courses for defence and civilian personnel to develop the skills necessary to own, operate, maintain, sustain and regulate nuclear-powered submarines.

***Recommendation 30: Interoperability is not an end in itself. While pursuing interoperable solutions, the Government should be mindful of maintaining a diversity of capabilities and promote innovation. For example, the Government***

***should review with industry how faster feedback loops could be developed that would support agile innovation. (Paragraph 114)***

60. The Government agrees with this recommendation.

61. There are real benefits to being interoperable with our allies and it is one of the key drivers behind the NATO DPAP and AUKUS treaty. Suites of standards regarding interoperability and integration can increase both innovation, pace and certainty for capability development by providing consistency for industry and defence adaptation and preventing stovepipe development. The Integration Design Authority is supporting the department to make decisions on the balance of benefits and risks on how integrated and interoperable we are across the services and with our allies. In addition, the department is working closely with Industry to ensure they are more integrated into our force and capability development cycles to enable spiral development as part of a reformed approach to acquisition.

#### **Nurturing partnerships:**

**Conclusion 31: The war in Ukraine has thrown the role of alliances at a time of war into the spotlight. Following the invasion, Russia is attempting to offset its decline in relations with the West by developing closer ties with China, Iran, North Korea and key Global South countries, including India. This has allowed Russia to undermine the effectiveness of Western sanctions and avoid international isolation, while also increasing its strategic depth. (Paragraph 143)**

**Conclusion 32: Russia's collaboration with China, Iran and North Korea, in particular, is of concern. It could lead to a substantial deterioration of the threat environment we face and pose a significant strategic challenge to the West. (Paragraph 144)**

***Recommendation 33: We recognise that there are limited options for the UK Government to respond to this challenge, but it should aim to maintain the broadest possible coalition of countries to counter Russian narratives and send clear signals about unacceptable behaviour. (Paragraph 145)***

62. We agree with the Committee's conclusion that Russia's increasing cooperation with China, Iran and North Korea is of growing concern.

63. The UK is working closely with allies to ensure a shared assessment of how these deepening relationships increase the threat to our security in the context of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine, and to be ready to coordinate on necessary responses to any unacceptable behaviour that poses a threat to our collective security.

***Recommendation 34: As the UK Government is facing a world where the Global South is becoming more assertive, with some countries leaning towards China or Russia, it is vital for the UK to be more proactive and have a strategy on how to engage with the Global South. Specifically, the UK should build relationships by seeking a consistent role where it has credibility and expertise. In particular, the UK Government should leverage diplomacy and reinvigorate its role as an international development actor to offer an alternative value proposition to those countries in the Global South particularly exposed to Russian and Chinese influence. (Paragraph 146)***

64. The Government has committed to resetting relations with the Global South and Middle Powers, in what is an increasingly competitive world. Our defence and security engagement aims to strengthen our partners' resilience against destabilising Russian activity and help them strengthen their domestic and regional security, including through our humanitarian, development and stabilisation programmes, our significant contributions to multilateral peacekeeping and conflict prevention and our bilateral defence diplomacy.

65. The MOD is currently undertaking work to ensure that our defence diplomacy is fit for purpose in an increasingly competitive world, and to ensure that it can strengthen our position with both allies and partners alike.

***Recommendation 35: To counter the neo-colonial narrative deployed by Moscow in the Global South, diplomatic efforts of the UK and its Western allies should keep the focus on Putin's violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and portray Russian actions in Ukraine as imperialistic. (Paragraph 147)***

66. Russia has stepped up efforts to build support and rehabilitate its reputation across the Global South. It is using disinformation and other malign tactics to advance its influence, sow discord and undermine global rules and norms worldwide. We are continuing to call out these malign tactics, and to emphasise to our partners and the Global South that Putin's invasion of Ukraine is a serious violation of the UN Charter and the international order on which global prosperity and security depends – something that should matter to all countries, wherever they are in the world.

***Conclusion 36: We welcome the communiqué agreed by NATO members at the Washington Summit labelling China a "decisive enabler" of Russia's war against Ukraine. This reinforces the evidence we heard that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a window of opportunity for the deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship. (Paragraph 148)***

67. The Government agrees with the Committee's conclusion; any support for Russia's illegal war against Ukraine is deplorable.

***Recommendation 37: It is imperative that the UK Government continues to pay close attention to the development of the Sino-Russian relationship, both in the context of the Ukraine war and beyond. In addition to developing distinct strategies for Russia and China, the Government should develop a comprehensive strategy that takes account of the potential for a deepening Sino-Russian relationship, particularly in critical areas for UK security, such as the Arctic. (Paragraph 149)***

68. The Government welcomes the Committee's recommendation.

69. The implications of a deepening Sino-Russian relationship are of great importance to the security of the UK and will be considered during a series of strategic reviews announced by the Government.

**Conclusion 38: The UK has shown leadership in providing military support for Ukraine and has developed a good level of cooperation and co-ordination with European partners. We welcome the new Government's commitment to negotiate an ambitious security pact with the EU. This could represent an important step towards rebuilding credible conventional deterrence. (Paragraph 150)**

70. Following their meeting in Brussels on 2 October 2024, the President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister have agreed to strengthen the relationship between the EU and UK, putting it on a more solid, stable footing.

71. This broad geopolitical partnership with the EU will drive closer coordination and complement our unshakable NATO First commitment which will remain the foremost vehicle for European security. While NATO is the bedrock of Europe's collective defence, we recognise the important role the EU plays in the peace and prosperity of Europe.

72. As part of strengthening our relationship we will seek an ambitious, broad-based UK-EU security pact to protect the UK and EU and enhance cooperation on the threats we collectively face.

***Recommendation 39: There are, however, challenges within EU rules and practice to third-country participation. We therefore recommend that the new Government starts to discuss third-country involvement rules early on in any negotiations to understand the EU's willingness to adjust them, which would provide clarity on the parameters for the negotiations. (Paragraph 151)***

73. The Government has enduring concerns regarding the terms of participation for third countries in many of the EU's defence industrial and capability development initiatives, specifically the terms and conditions relating to export controls, and Intellectual Property Rights. Whilst intended to provide resilience to EU supply



chains and procurement, we assess that these terms make it unattractive, or in some instances impossible, for third countries and their industry to be involved, even on a self-funded basis.

74. Whilst we welcome efforts to enhance the EU's defence production, it is important that these initiatives enable cooperation with the UK as a key strategic partner to develop the capabilities Europe needs. We have engaged with the EU and European partners to outline the UK's intrinsic place within the European industrial base and encourage the EU to consider fairer terms to permit third country participation in its defence initiatives.

75. The UK regularly engages EU partners to highlight our concerns regarding the conditions placed on third country participation in EU defence initiatives. In line with our messaging on the European Defence Industrial Strategy, we launched a comprehensive engagement plan calling for EU defence industrial initiatives to take a more collaborative approach with non-EU partners. This message has been a central feature of senior engagement with the EU and Member States for many months and we hope to find new avenues of cooperation through a UK-EU security pact.

***Recommendation 40: The Government should ensure that pragmatism underpins a security deal with the EU. The purpose of any UK–EU cooperation should first and foremost be to deliver additional value for European security as it faces its biggest crisis since the Second World War. Negotiations should prioritise pragmatic areas for cooperation, rather than institutional landmarks. (Paragraph 152)***

76. Europe faces a generational threat to our shared security.

77. We are seeking a mutually reinforcing, delivery-focused relationship with the EU that strengthens European security under NATO.

**Conclusion 41: We have received persuasive evidence about the value of the JEF and its potential as a testbed for other formats of defence cooperation with European partners. (Paragraph 153)**

***Recommendation 42: The Government should maintain the UK's leadership role within the JEF and set ambitious objectives for the initiative, such as closer industrial integration among the member countries. There are lessons learnt from the JEF that can be applied to the broader European context. We urge the Government to explore how a similar format could be applied with a different set of countries to tackle a different mission. (Paragraph 154)***

78. The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) has come of age in recent years and enjoyed various successes which have bolstered the value the framework brings to the UK and its allies and partners.

79. One of the JEF's greatest assets is its role as a political forum and platform for greater discussion and collaboration with a group of close-knit allies.

80. Continuing to make use of the JEF as a forum of discussion, alongside rehearsing and developing JEF Response Options is where we will see the framework adding the most value with our European partners.

81. The JEF's signature exercise, JOINT PROTECTOR, deploying in November 2024, will prove an excellent example of JEF cooperation in action. Exercising together will further bolster the interoperability of ten like-minded European allies, and evidence the strength of this regional security grouping.

82. We are now in a position to explore new and ambitious opportunities for the JEF to ensure it continues to succeed over the next ten years, while sustaining our focus on those contributions which have made the JEF a success to date. The upcoming JEF Summit in December 2024 will provide greater clarity on the future vision and opportunities of the JEF.

83. Exporting the JEF format to other geographic regions is an option that we will keep under review when considering future options for the JEF and the role of the UK as the Framework Nation.

**Conclusion 43: The United States has long been a cornerstone of European security, but it is also reasonable to expect a gradual shifting of US priorities, regardless of the outcome of the forthcoming US election. The trajectory of a re-focus towards the Indo-Pacific region is clear. (Paragraph 155)**

84. The Government agrees that the USA is a cornerstone of European security and looks forward to working with this important ally.

***Recommendation 44: As we continue to rely on the vital yet evolving partnership with the US, the Government and its European allies must visibly increase their preparedness by committing more resources—both human and financial—towards our collective security. (Paragraph 156)***

85. The UK has spent at least 2% of GDP on defence every year since 2006. In 2024, 23 allies are expected to spend 2% of their GDP on defence and NATO European allies are expected to collectively spend 2% for the first time. But in light of the grave threats to our security, the UK recognises that we must go further.

86. This Government has committed to setting out a path to spending 2.5% on defence, while encouraging all allies to continue increasing their defence investment to at least 2% of GDP and beyond.

#### **Countering aerial threats:**

**Conclusion 45: The war in Ukraine has reaffirmed the importance of air superiority, with air defences critical to avoiding an attritional ground conflict. (Paragraph 178)**

**Recommendation 46: Under-investment has led to substantial vulnerabilities in the UK's (and Europe's) ability to defend itself from airborne threats. In the context of a worsening security environment, this is deeply concerning, and the new Government should pay greater attention to homeland defence. (Paragraph 179)**

***Recommendation 47: Increasing investment in integrated air and missile defence and a credible plan to deliver operational S/DEAD capabilities in close collaboration with our European NATO allies should therefore be high on the list of defence priorities for the new Government. (Paragraph 180)***

87. The Government agrees that air and missile defence has been critical in the survivability of Ukrainian Defence Forces and we are incorporating appropriate lessons into our future plans and operational design.

88. NATO expects all nations, as part of Article 3, to be able to appropriately defend themselves. Defence has recently undertaken a review of defence contribution to national defence and revised and updated plans are in development to meet the threats the UK faces.

89. The Government has launched the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) to ensure we have the military capabilities to protect the United Kingdom now and in the future. This will consider the priority for both IAMD and S/DEAD and make recommendations in the context of our other capability plans and international opportunities. In parallel, and given the importance to the UK and NATO, Defence continues to invest in its own current IAMD capabilities, including upgrading platforms such as Eurofighter Typhoon and the F-35 Lightning, and investing in new technologies such as the E-7 Wedgetail to address evolving threats.

***Recommendation 48: European countries are coming together to deliver air defences collectively via the European Sky Shield Initiative, in which the previous Government had expressed an interest. We call on the new Government to provide an assessment of the merits of joining the initiative and update us on progress. (Paragraph 181)***

90. The Government is considering the value in a range of European initiatives, of which the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is one.

91. ESSI continues to progress with now 22 countries across Europe signing up to the initiative. Its focus is on procuring off the shelf capabilities in particular Arrow3, Patriot, IRIS-T and Skyranger Air Defence capabilities.

92. The DIAMOND ambition is to better connect the various Command and Control capabilities that are already part of each individual air defence system, be that the ones procured through ESSI or other capabilities based in Europe. While the requirements would need to be defined with allies, there are potential capabilities out there, such as UK GUARDIAN Air Command and Control capability, which could form the basis for an overarching IAMD C2 capability subject to further upgrades. We would also look to test interoperability of the various Air Defence systems through military exercises.

***Recommendation 49: Vulnerabilities extend to the maritime domain. While the UK does have a maritime missile capability in the Tomahawk land attack cruise missile, further investment is required to enable the Royal Navy to be deployed offensively and better project lethality. (Paragraph 182)***

93. The MOD welcomes the Committee's findings on maritime missile capabilities, and sees this as completely aligned with the Royal Navy's Strike vision to be able to "provide conventional deterrence through its ability to deliver credible, accurate and precise strike effects at the time and place of its choosing".

94. The Tomahawk programme is a 30-year UK/US bilateral success story not only through the provision of world beating integrated strike capability with the UK's closest strategic ally, but also through prosperity for UK manufacturing with cutting edge technology in every Tomahawk being produced in Scotland.

***Conclusion 50: The war in Ukraine has exposed the sheer variety of possible drone threats in a conflict scenario, ranging from disposable and commercially available drones to high-end, sophisticated ones. (Paragraph 196)***

95. The Government recognise and agree that the threat raised from the proliferation of drones has been considerable, shifting the character of warfare in Eastern Europe. We recently established a Joint Counter-UAS Office (JCO) and associated programmes to enhance development of Counter-UAS capabilities.

***Recommendation 51: The UK should invest in research and development to maintain a strategic edge in drone technology (including amphibious drones), and support the rapid development of new technologies that can compete in contested environments. Given the pace of technological adaptations on and off the battlefield, UK Defence should place greater emphasis on spiral***

***development and modularity to support continuous adaptation. (Paragraph 197)***

96. The MOD recognises the challenge of rapid drone adaptation and the effect on modern warfare in electromagnetically contested spaces. The department has also stood up an enhanced governance structure to ensure coherence of uncrewed systems.

97. Spiral adaption using off the shelf or proven components to rapidly upgrade in-use military capabilities has been a key lesson requiring a very close relationship with industry to deliver successfully.

98. We are committed to capitalising on our considerable knowledge gained from the £400 million a year (in 24/25) investment in drones to support Ukraine.

***Recommendation 52: Military training should be revised to incorporate learning on the use of drones in Ukraine across all domains. (Paragraph 198)***

99. The Government recognises the need for military training to reflect the current operating environment that personnel may encounter on operations. Defence continues to develop a range of initiatives to best suit our training to the environment and threats faced, including Uncrewed Systems (UxS).

**Space, cyber and the electromagnetic environment:**

**Conclusion 53: Space, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare (EW) are closely interlinked and have featured heavily in the Ukraine war. They will likely form an integral part of future warfare between technologically capable states. (Paragraph 242)**

***Recommendation 54: It is therefore imperative that the UK enhances its space, cyber and EW capabilities, focusing on developing resilient and adaptive systems that can operate in highly contested environments, like the one we are witnessing in Ukraine. (Paragraph 243)***

100. The Government agrees that relative military advantage in space, cyber and Electromagnetic Warfare (EW) compared to our adversary will continue to provide the 'military setting' for how future warfare will be conducted between technologically capable states.

101. The Government agrees that the ability to develop adaptive systems is key and the shifting environment demands rapid spirals across hundreds of hardware and thousands of software adaptations; the UK's considerable investment in capability in support of Ukraine has given Defence considerable lessons in how to navigate, communicate and target in the most contested environments.

***Recommendation 55: The ability to conduct cyber and electronic warfare, and deploy electronic countermeasures to avoid detection, should be seen as a core capability for the UK's Armed Forces. The Government should learn lessons from how the Ukrainians have deployed and responded to electronic warfare attacks, including through dispersal techniques, and innovative command and control structures. (Paragraph 244)***

102. The Government agrees that the ability to conduct cyber and electronic warfare and deploy electronic countermeasures to avoid detection should be a core capability of the UK's Armed Forces. Operational challenges observed in Ukraine have provided valuable insights into modern conflict.

103. The cyber activities and proliferation of electronic warfare seen in Ukraine demonstrates the importance of resilient communications systems and robust cyber defences. The MOD will continue to invest in cyber and electronic capabilities to operate in the current and future electromagnetic environment.

***Recommendation 56: Ukraine has shown that rapid technological innovation and adaptation are essential to stay ahead of adversaries. The Government should focus on building UK Defence's capacity to adapt and innovate quickly in or near the battlefield. (Paragraph 245)***

104. The Government agrees with the Committee's recommendation.

105. The conflict in Ukraine has become a very visible representation of a 'new way of war', one characterised by innovation, the proliferation of technology, digitisation of the battlefield and the need to rapidly develop capability fit for the tempo of operations – this requires changes in our processes, doctrine, culture and relationship with industry as demonstrated by our successful approach to uncrewed systems for the UK and Ukrainian armed forces.

106. We are embedding a different relationship with industry and collaborating earlier to ensure they understand the threats and can input into our requirements. We are turning the concept of agile logistics into reality, working closely with industry and the Defence Catapult network to understand the changes to how we support capabilities and shaping how we operate in future. Through regular industry engagements we will incentivise industry to support the rapid manufacture and adaptation at a scale and capability able to deliver operational advantage for our Armed Forces

**Conclusion 57: Maximum strategic advantage can only be obtained if space, cyber and EW are integrated across domains. We note that under the previous Government, the MoD announced the creation of an Integration Design Authority to support integration. While this is a welcome development, it is**

**people and skills and industry—including the leveraging of commercial partnerships—that will determine the success of such integration. (Paragraph 246)**

107. The Integration Design Authority (IDA) uses an all-domain warfare approach and facilitates the force development ‘integration layer’ by gearing strategic direction into coherent force development activity across the Defence. By establishing an IDA, UK Strategic Command (UKStratCom), on behalf of Head Office, seeks to transform Defence’s ability to develop an integrated force, optimise and adapt in the face of threats, and seize digital age capability opportunities (including in the space, cyber and EW areas) within a NATO-first framework.

108. We recognise the role industry plays as a key contributor to, and part of, the Integrated Force. The IDA is already collaborating with DE&S (the systems integrator for most defence equipment) to establish a single coherent Defence-wide integration approach inclusive of capabilities, systems, and component-level design. This effort will maximise the use of ‘open architectures’ and aid spiral development. It will assist Defence in shaping and adhering to multi-national standards (e.g. NATO and industry) to ensure interoperability and optimise UK prosperity opportunities. To maximise the contribution by industry the IDA will promote early and enduring engagement from the conceptual phase to share perspectives, and work with DE&S and other Defence delivery agents.

***Recommendation 58: The new Government should work together with the private sector to formulate options for attracting high-tech talent to the defence sector and design flexible career paths that build skills and grow Defence’s expertise in cyber and electromagnetic warfare. (Paragraph 247)***

109. Work is ongoing in collaboration with industry to understand how we can take an enterprise approach to securing the talent we need. This includes how we enable personnel to move in and out of regular and reserve employment as they progress through skilled and rewarding careers – and as we move from a series of fixed employment models to a single, Spectrum of Service focused model. This approach will provide us with the capability and capacity required by our Armed Forces and further strengthen our UK defence industry.

110. Furthermore, ensuring the right mix of skills across the defence sector is critical to creating and sustaining the vibrant, innovative and competitive industrial base we need to have in the UK. The MOD is committed to working with industry to ensure that we have the right mix of skills, through taking a collaborative approach across the defence enterprise to address sector-wide issues, including recruiting and retention challenges. This includes working with industry to identify and address the skills gap within the UK defence sector around Science, Technology, Engineering and Maths related skills.

111. There is ongoing engagement between defence and academia to develop a sustained partnership based around a clear demand signal enabling higher and further education to deliver the skills needed. Solving skills shortage is a whole-economy task and we will be taking a cross-Government approach to grow our collective skills base as part of the Invest 2035 Industrial Strategy.

***Recommendation 59: This will require training and learning lessons directly from colleagues in the Ukrainian forces and working closely with industry. The Government should adopt a more flexible approach to bringing in commercial actors, while acknowledging some of the unique challenges these partnerships can entail around, for example, accountability or reliability. (Paragraph 248)***

112. The Government has been working closely with industry and learning from Ukrainian Forces to ensure that we approach drone procurement and development correctly.

113. By engaging directly with defence industry to spirally develop drone capabilities and introduce them to the theatre of operations at the speed and mass of relevance, Defence has demonstrated a flexible approach to bringing in commercial actors, while adapting to the unique challenges presented with utilising commercial actors in capabilities required during conflict.

***Recommendation 60: The Government should ensure that cyber, EW and emerging technologies are fully integrated into the next edition of the Defence and Security Industrial Strategy. In addition, it should give serious consideration to the creation of a warfare centre for the cyber and electromagnetic domain. (Paragraph 249)***

114. The Government's Defence Industrial Strategy will better support a sector which is driving the development and application of new technology areas such as AI, quantum and space capabilities.

115. The MOD's Land Cyber Electromagnetic Activity programme continues to integrate defence's people with cyber and electromagnetic technologies, to exploit opportunities and gain military advantage. This includes defensive and offensive cyber and electromagnetic activity, electronic countermeasures and electronic warfare plus signals intelligence capabilities.

***Conclusion 61: Developments in Ukraine are relevant to UK national security and, in particular, the protection of its critical national infrastructure (CNI). (Paragraph 250)***



***Recommendation 62: The reliance of modern economies on space-based technologies makes them a prime target for hybrid attacks. Cyber and electronic tactics deployed in Ukraine by Russia have been used elsewhere, including against the UK and its allies. It is therefore essential that the new Government focuses on building greater resilience into the UK's CNI. (Paragraph 251)***

116. The Government welcomes the Committee's focus on Ukraine, in particular its focus on Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).

117. The Cabinet Office's Home Defence Programme will take a holistic approach to national security and resilience, this includes ensuring that the UK is prepared for increased targeting of cyber infrastructure and CNI.

118. Through the National Cyber Strategy 2022, it was agreed that the Government would aim to strengthen the UK's position as a responsible and democratic cyber power, able to protect and promote our interests in and through cyberspace. This work is ongoing.

***Recommendation 63: The UK's fragmented police forces and limited military resources may struggle to handle the increased civil defence burden in the event of hostile actions, such as sabotage of CNI. The Government should thus consider the merits of establishing a centralised civil defence agency, akin to the US' Federal Emergency Management Agency. (Paragraph 252)***

119. The Cabinet Office's HDP, with support from Defence and guided by the outcome of the SDR, will consider the need for a new civil defence agency as well as what form this would take and what model would best fit the UK and current operational context. Any developments will take into consideration the existing structures of resilience in the UK, including the civil reserve, local government, emergency services and civil society organisations.

***Recommendation 64: The new Government should also invest in Space Situational Awareness and Space Domain Awareness capabilities, for which it heavily relies on the US. (Paragraph 253)***

120. The Government agree that continued investment in space is required, and we are therefore addressing a growing demand for sovereign Space Domain Awareness (SDA) and Space Situational Awareness (SSA) through several initiatives. These include the National Space Operations Centre (NSpOC) to monitor space activity and a leading role in the Combined Space Operations initiative aimed at providing freedom of action in space through multi-national collaboration.

121. Furthermore, the UK has invested in Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) - A tri-lateral agreement (US/UK/AUS) to provide global coverage to protect

space capabilities out to Geo-Stationary Orbit. This agreement sees multiple radar dishes planned for installation at Cawdor Barracks in Wales.