



House of Commons
Public Accounts Committee

COVID 19: the free school meals voucher scheme

Forty-First Report of Session 2019–21

*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

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The Committee of Public Accounts

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Summary

The Department for Education (the Department) and its contractor, Edenred UK Group Limited (Edenred), set up the national voucher scheme quickly, during March 2020, so that children eligible for free school meals could continue to receive support while schools were closed to most pupils. But there were serious problems in the early weeks of the scheme and the Department recognises that, even in the short time it had, it should have done more testing before the scheme went live. In those early weeks, Edenred's systems failed to cope with the demand for vouchers and the volume of telephone calls and emails. Schools and parents found it difficult to access Edenred's website and to get answers from Edenred to their queries. There were unacceptable delays in Edenred processing orders from schools and getting vouchers to families. Edenred took action to boost the capacity of its systems and we recognise that performance improved after April 2020. The Department and Edenred have now apologised to schools and families for the problems and inconvenience they encountered in the early stages of the scheme.

The Department focused on firefighting the problems with the voucher scheme and did not actively manage its contract with Edenred. The Department extended the contract twice, increasing its value fivefold, from £78 million to £425 million, but it failed to take the opportunities those extensions presented to renegotiate the terms and secure better value for money for the taxpayer. The Department did not make use of the open book arrangement in the contract until the scheme had finished, and only then established how much profit Edenred had made from the scheme. It declined to share with us details of Edenred's profit on the grounds of commercial confidentiality.

The extensions to the contract should have enabled the Department to consider how it could maintain the scheme as a standing resource and to tender with other suppliers. After our evidence session on 17 December schools were physically closed to most children again on 5 January with 24 hours' notice and the scheme was not activated again until later in January. We have not had the opportunity to probe why there was a delay in re-establishing the existing scheme at pace when schools and parents already being familiar with using the scheme.

Introduction

At January 2020, 1.44 million children in England were eligible for free school meals, representing 17.3% of all pupils. The Department funds free school meals with the aim of ensuring that disadvantaged pupils have a healthy lunch that will support their learning and development. State schools are legally responsible for providing free school meals to eligible pupils. Pupils may be eligible if their parent or carer is in receipt of specified income-related benefits, including Universal Credit.

On 18 March 2020, the Government announced that, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, schools in England would close on 20 March 2020 for all pupils except vulnerable children and children of key workers. On 31 March 2020, the Department announced a national free school meals voucher scheme, as a temporary substitute for the normal arrangements. The vouchers were worth £15 per week, for each eligible child.

The Department awarded a contract to run the voucher scheme to a private contractor, Edenred without tender under the emergency procurement rules. Schools participating in the scheme ordered electronic codes (eCodes) online that could be converted into shopping vouchers for families to use at nominated supermarkets. The number of supermarket chains taking part in the scheme rose from six at the start to 10 by 29 June 2020. The scheme ran until the end of the school summer holiday and over 90% of state schools registered to use the scheme. The Department spent £384 million on the scheme.

Conclusions and recommendations

1. **The Department's failure to understand how schools and parents would use the scheme contributed to delays in getting vouchers to families.** The Department underestimated the extent to which people would want to call to talk to a human being when they were struggling to use the scheme, assuming that they would seek help by email rather telephone. Calls to Edenred's telephone helpline increased rapidly, from 727 on 1 April 2020 to 3,940 on 14 April 2020. At the start of the scheme, Edenred had failed to put in place enough capacity to handle the number of calls from schools and families. It brought in an outsourced contact centre to help, but did not have this in place until 11 May 2020. The Department also recognises that it should have done more user-testing of the scheme and that its guidance was not clear enough. The Department and Edenred did not become aware until May 2020 that 40,000 eCodes for conversion into vouchers had not been delivered to families.

Recommendation: *The Department should take on board lessons from the scheme and ensure, in designing services intended to be used by schools and parents, that:*

- *it properly user-tests new systems and engages with front line school leaders and representatives to better identify likely problems before they are launched; and*
- *there is sufficient call centre capacity to meet maximum expected demand at the start, which can be stood down or increased further as needed.*

2. **The Department was surprisingly unconcerned about whether Edenred was profiting from the voucher scheme at taxpayers' expense, and missed potential opportunities to reduce the cost or share in the profits.** The Department's policy team worked with commercial colleagues and the Crown Commercial Service in managing the contract with Edenred. Despite extending the contract twice, and increasing its value from £78 million to £425 million, the Department did not seek to renegotiate any of the terms or introduce any profit-sharing element. The Department considered it achieved good value for money because it did not pay Edenred anything more than the face value of the vouchers issued to families. However, Edenred bought the vouchers from supermarkets at a discount, and the Department could have chosen to try and renegotiate how much it paid Edenred per voucher and so reduce the cost to the taxpayer. Although the contract included an open book arrangement, the Department did not use this to check on Edenred's income and costs until after the end of the scheme. The Department now says that it is "very comfortable" with the level of profit Edenred made from the scheme, but has provided no figures or explanation of any kind to back up that judgement.

Recommendation: *The Department should strengthen its commercial skills, taking advice from the Crown Commercial Service, and take opportunities to renegotiate terms when it changes or extends contracts, in order to secure better value for the taxpayer.*

3. **The Department did not have the information it needed to manage Edenred's performance and understand whether the scheme was meeting the needs of**

families. At the start of the scheme, the Department received data from Edenred only on activity, such as the volume of orders for eCodes received from schools and processed. It did not receive data on performance – for example, how long Edenred was taking to process orders, or how long schools and families were waiting to access Edenred’s website to convert eCodes into vouchers. The Department did not monitor Edenred’s performance against a requirement in the contract that Edenred should answer 90% of calls within 30 seconds. Edenred itself did not start collecting data on the number of calls answered until 11 May 2020, by which point the volume of calls from schools and families was much lower than in the first weeks of the scheme.

Recommendation: *The Department should collect complete management information specified in contracts from the outset, monitor performance as well as activity, and use this information to manage contracts effectively.*

4. **The Department did not do enough to assess how far families had to travel to supermarkets in the scheme and whether coverage was adequate to meet needs.** The Department worked with the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs to check there was at least one participating retailer in each local authority area. However, given the size of many local authorities, this offered limited assurance about coverage in practice for many families, particularly in rural areas. The Department did not analyse how far parents would need to travel to stores, or how long it would take. At the start of the scheme when six supermarket chains were taking part, almost 2,500 schools (11.2% of all schools) were more than five kilometres from their nearest participating store. This would have meant a long journey for families, and been especially difficult and costly for those reliant on public transport and given the movement restrictions during the early months of the pandemic.

Recommendation: *In implementing future policies, the Department should ensure it robustly evaluates geographic coverage and likely travelling time for people to access services.*

5. **Limitations in the data shared between the Department and the Department for Work & Pensions meant that support for vulnerable families with children eligible for free school meals could not be routed through the benefits system.** In March 2020, the Department’s preferred option for support was an uplift to benefits for families with children eligible for free school meals. However, not all families in receipt of Universal Credit are eligible for free school meals and the Department does not share data with the Department for Work & Pensions that would allow benefit payments to be targeted in this way. The Department therefore concluded that it would not be possible, in the time available, to implement a support scheme through the benefits system by distinguishing families eligible for free school meals from other benefit recipients.

Recommendation: *The Department should work with the Department for Work & Pensions to explore how data sharing could be improved to allow government to support families with children eligible for free school meals more flexibly and responsively.*

1 Setting up the voucher scheme

1. On the basis of a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took evidence from the Department for Education (the Department) and Edenred (UK Group) Ltd (Edenred) about the free school meals voucher scheme, which ran from 1 April 2020 to the end of the school summer holiday.¹
2. The Department funds free school meals with the aim of ensuring that disadvantaged children have a healthy lunch that will support their learning and development. State schools are legally responsible for providing free school meals to eligible pupils. Pupils may be eligible if their parent or carer is in receipt of specified income-related benefits, including Universal Credit.²
3. The latest published figures show that, at January 2020, 1.44 million children in England, from reception classes to sixth forms, were eligible for free school meals. Nationally, this figure represented 17.3% of all pupils. There is wide agreement that the number of eligible children has risen during the COVID-19 pandemic.³
4. On 18 March 2020, the Government announced that, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, schools in England would close on 20 March 2020 for all pupils except vulnerable children and children of key workers. The Department said that it expected schools to support pupils eligible for benefits-related free school meals who were not attending school. On 31 March 2020, the Department announced a national free school meals voucher scheme, as a temporary substitute for the normal arrangements.⁴
5. The vouchers were worth £15 per week for each eligible child. The Department explained that this was not a precisely calculated amount, but the value needed to be higher than the £11.50 usually provided to schools because families would not benefit from the economies of scale available to school caterers.⁵ In written evidence, the Department said that it also took into account the typical £3 cost of supermarket meal deals.⁶

Options the Department considered

6. The Department awarded a contract to administer the voucher scheme to a private contractor, Edenred.⁷ We asked the Department why it had gone down this route, and what alternative options it had considered to support pupils eligible for free school meals who were not attending school. The Department told us that it had looked at four main options. Its initial preferred option was a cash transfer to parents through the benefits system. The Department explained, however, that this approach would not have been quick enough for what it was trying to achieve. It would have taken at least six weeks to put in place the mechanisms for payments through the benefits system, and would have required

1 C&AG's Report, *Investigation into the free school meals voucher scheme*, Session 2019–20, HC 1036, 2 December 2020

2 C&AG's Report, para 1.1

3 Q 128; C&AG's Report, paras 1.2, 1.3

4 C&AG's Report, paras 2, 2.1

5 Qq 44–45

6 Supplementary written evidence from the Department for Education

7 C&AG's Report, para 3

legislation. This was because the Department does not share with the Department for Work & Pensions data identifying which families in receipt of Universal Credit also have children eligible for free school meals.⁸

7. The other options the Department had considered, but ruled out, were: to make cash transfers to the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government or directly to local authorities to fund local arrangements for supporting vulnerable families; and to provide cash for schools to distribute directly to families of eligible pupils.⁹ The Department told us that it had been reluctant to make schools responsible for handling cash, and that there was no alternative scheme, such as a prepaid debit card, available that it could stand up in the time available.¹⁰

8. The Department noted that an advantage of a voucher scheme was that it made it more likely that the money would be spent on food, which was the aim.¹¹ We asked why the Department, having settled on a voucher scheme, had chosen Edenred to run it. The Department explained that there were a number of alternative voucher providers it could have chosen and that its commercial and legal advice confirmed that, in light of the exceptional circumstances, it could make a direct contract award. It asked the Crown Commercial Service whether it had any suppliers on a framework that had already been through a competitive process with due diligence checks and that could provide a voucher service. Edenred was the only company that met this requirement.¹²

9. Schools had a choice whether to use the national voucher scheme or to make local arrangements.¹³ The Department emphasised that all the options it had considered would have run alongside any arrangements that schools had made for themselves. It explained that, during the summer term, typically around 10% of schools continued to use their own catering supplier, and around 12% of schools used arrangements with a different catering supplier, to provide food parcels to eligible children at home. Some of these schools may have also used the voucher scheme at times.¹⁴

10. In written evidence, the National Association of Head Teachers told us that many school leaders took immediate action to support pupils eligible for free school meals following the school closures. The responses included creating local schemes, using their existing catering contracts, and purchasing supermarket vouchers from their own reserves. The National Association of Head Teachers also said that a large number of schools felt they had no alternative other than to use the national voucher scheme, or risk not being fully reimbursed for the additional costs involved in making local arrangements.¹⁵ We also received written evidence from Elsley Primary School that there was a huge incentive for schools to use the national scheme rather than a local alternative, as the Department had placed limitations on the maximum amount of money that schools could claim for operating local schemes.¹⁶

8 Qq 38–40

9 Qq 38

10 Qq 42–43

11 Q 39

12 Q 47

13 C&AG's Report, para 3

14 Q 38; Supplementary written evidence from the Department for Education

15 National Association of Head Teachers submission, paras 6, 21

16 Elsley Primary School submission, para 15

Supermarket coverage

11. Schools taking part in the scheme ordered electronic codes (eCodes) online that could be converted into shopping vouchers for families to use at nominated supermarkets.¹⁷ The Department told us that a reason for selecting Edenred to run the scheme was that Edenred already had established relationships with some supermarket chains, and it had wanted to pick an existing scheme that could start as quickly as possible. The number of supermarket chains participating in the scheme rose from six at the start to 10 by 29 June 2020. The Department told us that the six supermarket chains involved at the start accounted for a good share of the United Kingdom supermarket market and had good geographical coverage.¹⁸ However, we note that almost 2,500 schools (11.2% of all schools) were more than five kilometres from their nearest participating store at the start of the scheme. There was a limited choice for a further 6.0% of schools, that had only one participating supermarket store within five kilometres.¹⁹

12. The Department told us that the vast majority of families had easy access to participating retailers but acknowledged that, at the outset of the scheme, there were some families further from stores than it wanted. It said that it sought to have as many people as close as possible to branches of participating supermarkets. It carried out analysis with the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs to make sure there was at least one participating retailer in each local authority area. However, it acknowledged that local authorities varied hugely in size.²⁰ The Department did not analyse the distances parents would have needed to travel to stores or how long it would have taken using available means of transport.²¹ It told us that it sought, with Edenred, to add more supermarket chains during the course of the scheme, and to make sure schools had other choices if the nearest participating store was a long way away.²²

13. The Catholic Education Service wrote to tell us that families in remote, isolated communities struggled to find an appropriate shop from which to purchase food, due to the limited number of supermarket chains taking part in the scheme.²³ In its written evidence, the National Association of Head Teachers said that parents had difficulty using participating supermarkets that were most suited to their needs, saying that some had to use public transport to reach supermarkets and that this did not offer the best value for money.²⁴ We also received written evidence from Truro and Penrith Academy Trust, saying that in their rural part of Cornwall there were no nearby supermarkets, that many families did not have their own transport, and that there was a very limited bus service. The vouchers could only be used in large supermarket chains and not in the local, accessible shops in that part of the country.²⁵

14. Edenred told us that setting up the voucher scheme in two weeks meant that it had to start with those supermarket chains with which it had an existing relationship. It then held discussions with other chains aiming, by increasing the number of participating

17 C&AG's Report, para 3

18 Q 120; C&AG's Report, para 13

19 C&AG's Report, para 3.29

20 Qq 120–122

21 C&AG's Report, para 3.29

22 Qq 120–121

23 Catholic Education Service, para 6

24 National Association of Head Teachers, para 28

25 Truro and Penrith Academy Trust, para 5

supermarkets, to reduce travelling time and increase choice for families. It told us that, at the end, the scheme covered 82% of the United Kingdom grocery market. Edenred acknowledged that coverage was not 100%, so could have been better, but observed that this was a good achievement in the time available. It explained that it had had two key requirements for bringing further supermarket chains into the scheme. The first was that supermarket chains had to be able to accept vouchers in every branch, to ensure a consistent experience. The second was that the vouchers had to be distributed digitally, so they could be processed quickly, simply and securely.²⁶ The Department acknowledged, however, that it could have set out more clearly and transparently the steps required for supermarkets to join the scheme.²⁷

26 Q 50

27 Q 37

2 Operation of the voucher scheme and costs to the taxpayer

Understanding how schools and parents would use the scheme

15. Over 11,000 school administrators registered immediately after the voucher scheme opened. By August 2020, 20,717 schools had registered for the scheme (94% of state schools in England).²⁸

16. The Department acknowledged that there was a period early in the scheme when parents and schools experienced quite a lot of difficulty and disruption in getting access to the vouchers. It said that it had underestimated the extent to which parents and schools would want to talk to a human being about how to use the scheme. Many more people had wanted to telephone than it had expected. The Department said that it could have pushed Edenred to provide more contact centre support earlier, but the assumption had been that schools and parents would make first contact by email.²⁹

17. The number of calls each day to Edenred’s telephone helpline increased rapidly, from 727 on 1 April 2020 to 3,940 on 14 April 2020. In the early weeks of the scheme, in April 2020, Edenred called on staff from other parts of its business to help handle the volume of calls it was receiving, and it did not bring in an outsourced contact centre until 11 May 2020.³⁰ Edenred told us that, if it were to go back to the start of the scheme, it would have put more resources into handling incoming calls and enquiries.³¹

18. In terms of things it could have done better, the Department said that, if it were to do the same thing again, it would try to find a way to do more user testing before the scheme started. The Department said that a lack of user-testing before the scheme was launched accounted for much of what led to the delays and difficulties that schools and parents experienced. It explained that it had been unable to complete as much testing as would normally have been done, ahead of the scheme opening. It told us that it would have carried out months of proper testing in normal times, but had only 18 days to get the scheme up and running. The Department said that it had considered what it could have done differently, even in the short time available, and felt that it could have carried out some sort of “guerrilla user testing” earlier, such as getting all departmental staff to try using the system for two hours to see how well it worked.³²

19. The Department recognised that the instructions for schools were not clear enough at the start of the scheme, and it also attributed this to its lack of user-testing.³³ Edenred told us that it had not been able to engage with schools before the scheme was launched. It felt this would have been an opportunity to explain to schools how to register for the scheme and how to place orders.³⁴ The Department said that, because the guidance was

28 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.3–3.4

29 Q 37

30 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.7, 3.15

31 Q 135

32 Q 37

33 Q 95

34 Q 135

not clear enough, many schools submitted a large number of individual orders, rather than uploading a single spreadsheet with a bulk order for their pupils, which took up much more system capacity.³⁵

20. Edenred told us that it discovered, after implementing an improvement to its platform at the beginning of May 2020, that 40,000 eCodes it had emailed to parents had not been delivered because of incorrect email addresses. It said that it had built a new process to alert schools to the problem and help them identify incorrect email addresses.³⁶ In written evidence, the Department told us that Edenred issued weekly communications to school administrators who had attempted to send an eCode to an incorrect parent address resulting in a ‘bounced’ email. This communication contained details of how the schools should resolve the issue to ensure that families received their vouchers.³⁷

21. The Department accepted that there were many things about the scheme that could have been better. Both the Department and Edenred apologised to schools and parents who experienced difficulty and disruption. Edenred said that it was very sorry to families and schools who had a bad experience at the beginning of the scheme.³⁸

Monitoring scheme performance

22. The Department told us that, at the start of the scheme, it started collecting management information from Edenred twice daily. Initially it collected data only on the number of orders from schools and the number of vouchers ordered by parents.³⁹

23. The Department did not systematically collect data on Edenred’s processing times, or how long it took people to access Edenred’s website to order eCodes or convert them into vouchers.⁴⁰ It also did not monitor performance against the service-level indicator in Edenred’s framework contract that it should answer 90% of telephone calls within 30 seconds. Calls to Edenred’s helpline peaked during the early weeks of the scheme in April 2020.⁴¹ The Department told us that it discussed performance in its meetings with Edenred, but that it did not ask Edenred for regular reports on how quickly it answered calls.⁴² Edenred and the Department started collecting data on the number of calls answered from 11 May 2020 when Edenred brought in the outsourced contact centre.⁴³

24. In April 2020, schools had to wait over 42 minutes on average to access Edenred’s website.⁴⁴ In written evidence, Truro and Penrith Academy Trust told us that its school business manager had to try uploading the school’s orders to Edenred’s website in the middle of the night, for several nights in a row, and that website traffic was better in the

35 Q 95

36 Q 90

37 Supplementary written evidence from the Department for Education

38 Qq 37, 136

39 Qq 82, 84

40 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.11, 3.19

41 C&AG’s Report, para 3.18, Figure 5

42 Q 87

43 C&AG’s Report, paras 3.15, 3.18

44 C&AG’s Report, para 3.19

early hours of the morning.⁴⁵ The Association of School and College Leaders told us that performance improved over the duration of the voucher scheme and that, at the end of the period, the scheme was working for schools.⁴⁶

Costs to the taxpayer

25. The Department told us that it spent £384 million on the voucher scheme, in addition to the £1.2 billion funding for free school meals in schools every year.⁴⁷ The Department signed an initial contract with Edenred on 28 March 2020, which ran to 26 April 2020 and had a value of £78 million. The Department subsequently extended the contract: firstly to 24 June 2020, with a new total value of £234 million, and secondly to 31 August 2020, with a new total value of £425 million.⁴⁸

26. The Department told us that it was used to managing contracts, and that its policy team worked with commercial colleagues and the Crown Commercial Service in managing the contract with Edenred.⁴⁹ In written evidence, the Department confirmed that it was not advised to seek to negotiate the contract terms at any point during the scheme.⁵⁰ The Department said that its focus had been on trying to get the scheme running as well as possible. It did, nonetheless, accept that it could have looked at renegotiating terms before agreeing contract extensions.⁵¹

27. The Department paid Edenred the face value of eCodes issued to families, less any cancelled or expired codes, meaning that the final cost to the Department was the value of vouchers that families received.⁵² Under the terms of its framework contract, Edenred paid the Crown Commercial Service a management charge of 1% of the value of vouchers issued.⁵³ The Department argued that it was difficult to see how it could have achieved equivalent value through any other alternative arrangement.⁵⁴

28. Edenred generated revenue from the scheme by buying vouchers from supermarket chains at a discount on their face value.⁵⁵ It explained that it had individual arrangements with each supermarket participating in the scheme, but declined to share any details of its commercial arrangements on the grounds that the information was confidential.⁵⁶

29. The contract included an open book arrangement giving the Department access to information about Edenred's income and costs relating to the scheme. However, the Department did not make use of this arrangement during the course of the scheme.⁵⁷ The Department told us that Edenred had subsequently shared with it some information about costs and profitability. The Permanent Secretary said that she was "very comfortable" with the level of profitability in the contract, but that the Department could not disclose

45 Q 136

46 Association of School and College Leaders, para 17

47 Q 132

48 C&AG's Report, Figure 3

49 Qq 98, 100–101

50 Supplementary written evidence from the Department for Education

51 Qq 57, 61–62

52 C&AG's Report, para 4.2

53 Supplementary written evidence from the Department for Education; C&AG's Report, para 4.5

54 Q 108

55 C&AG's Report, para 16

56 Qq 52, 55

57 C&AG's Report, para 16

this information as there were commercial confidentiality concerns.⁵⁸ In supplementary written evidence after the oral evidence session, she restated that the Department had now been sighted on the level of profit made by Edenred, and considered it to be “reasonable”, but did not provide figures or explanation to support that judgement.⁵⁹

58 Qq 105, 109

59 Supplementary written evidence from the Department for Education

Formal minutes

Monday 1 February 2021

Virtual meeting

Members present:

Meg Hillier, in the Chair

Mr Gareth Bacon

Mr Richard Holden

Sir Geoffrey Clifton-Brown

James Wild

Peter Grant

Draft Report (*COVID 19: the free school meals voucher scheme*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 29 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Introduction agreed to.

Conclusions and recommendations agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Forty-first of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Thursday 4 February at 9:15am

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Thursday 17 December 2020

Susan Acland-Hood, Permanent Secretary, Department for Education; **Johann Vaucanson**, CEO, Edenred UK; **Sarah Lewis**, Director, Early Years and Schools Strategy, Department for Education

[Q1-152](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

FSM numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 ASCL ([FSM0008](#))
- 2 Ask Research ([FSM0003](#))
- 3 COVID-19 Review Observatory, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham ([FSM0010](#))
- 4 Catholic Education Service ([FSM0005](#))
- 5 Elsley Primary ([FSM0006](#))
- 6 Howard, Ms Andrea (School Business Manager, Truro & Penwith Academy Trust (at the time of using Edenred)) ([FSM0002](#))
- 7 Jolley, Mr Andrew ([FSM0009](#))
- 8 LACA – The School Food People ([FSM0004](#))
- 9 NAHT ([FSM0001](#))
- 10 The School and Nursery Milk Alliance ([FSM0011](#))
- 11 Understanding Society, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex ([FSM0007](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Session 2019–21

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2nd	Defence Nuclear Infrastructure	HC 86
3rd	High Speed 2: Spring 2020 Update	HC 84
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5th	University technical colleges	HC 87
6th	Excess votes 2018–19	HC 243
7th	Gambling regulation: problem gambling and protecting vulnerable people	HC 134
8th	NHS capital expenditure and financial management	HC 344
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26th	Department of Work and Pensions Accounts 2019–20	HC 681
27th	Covid-19: Supply of ventilators	HC 685

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30th	The production and distribution of cash	HC 654
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32nd	Specialist Skills in the civil service	HC 686
33rd	Covid-19: Bounce Back Loan Scheme	HC 687
34th	Covid-19: Support for jobs	HC 920
35th	Improving Broadband	HC 688
36th	HMRC performance 2019–20	HC 690
37th	Whole of Government Accounts 2018–19	HC 655
38th	Managing colleges' financial sustainability	HC 692
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40th	Achieving government's long-term environmental goals	HC 927