



House of Commons
Business and Trade Committee

UK accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

Second Report of Session 2023–24

*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

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Business and Trade Committee

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Summary

The UK applied to accede to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in 2021; and the UK and the CPTPP member states signed an Accession Protocol in July 2023.

We looked at the benefits of CPTPP accession, including access to fast-growing markets, potential increase in UK GDP, the impact on UK goods and services producers, and geostrategic benefits to the UK. We also considered the Trade and Agriculture Commission's advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the impact of CPTPP accession regarding statutory protections for UK agri-food standards, including the Commission's examination of concerns around growth promoters in beef and pork production, pesticide use and deforestation linked to palm oil. Lastly, we took evidence on the provisions in CPTPP on investor-state dispute settlement, including their possible impact on the UK Government's ability to regulate, or to take into public ownership, the English water industry.

We found that the terms of UK accession raise contentious issues. Accordingly, we recommend that, during the 21-day scrutiny period under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the Government facilitate a debate on the Floor of the House on a substantive motion on the ratification of UK accession.

It is difficult to estimate the potential benefits of CPTPP or its impact on economic growth, not least because the Secretary of State has resiled from the models used by her department to estimate benefits in the published impact assessment. Nor has the Government explained its own ambitions for the future of CPTPP or provided any sort of roadmap for its evolution to include a much bigger proportion of Indo-Pacific markets. This renders speculative much of the commentary about CPTPP's future advantages. We recommend that the Government provide a revised impact assessment, setting out its current expectations of the gains from CPTPP; and the Department for Business and Trade should explain what steps it is going to take to help ensure that UK business exploits the treaty to the full.

1 The purpose of our report

Scrutiny of signed free trade agreements

1. The negotiation, signing and ratification of international agreements, including free trade agreements (FTAs), is undertaken by His Majesty's Government under the Royal Prerogative. The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (CRaG) requires that, before a treaty can be ratified, the Government must lay it before Parliament for a prescribed scrutiny period of 21 sitting days. If, during that time, the House of Commons votes against ratification, the Government must lay a statement explaining why the treaty should nonetheless be ratified. If, during a further period of 21 sitting days, the House again objects to ratification, the Government must repeat the process before the treaty can be ratified.¹ In theory, that process could be repeated indefinitely if the House were to continue to vote against ratification. The House can only exercise its powers under CRaG if the process is facilitated by the Government, since the Act does not oblige the Government to find time for a debate on a treaty or to schedule a substantive motion in any such debate.

2. International agreements signed by the Government do not automatically become part of UK domestic law. Consequently, primary or secondary legislation is often required in order to implement international agreements. The practice of successive Governments has been to make sure that UK domestic law is in line with obligations under a new treaty before that treaty is ratified—although there is no statutory obligation to do so.²

3. Under the Agriculture Act 2020, before the Government can lay an FTA under CRaG, it must lay a “section 42 report” setting out the extent to which the agreement is consistent with maintaining UK levels of statutory protection in relation to: human, animal or plant life or health; animal welfare; and the environment.³ The Trade Act 2021 further requires the Government, in preparing such a report, to request advice from the statutory Trade and Agriculture Commission (TAC) on all these matters (“except insofar as they relate to human life or health”), and to lay TAC’s advice before Parliament.⁴ In addition, the Government’s practice has been to seek advice from the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and Food Standards Scotland (FSS) on the impact of FTAs on statutory protections relating to human life or health.⁵

4. The Government has also given several non-statutory commitments regarding the scrutiny of new FTAs. It has undertaken to lay a signed new FTA in Parliament, without triggering the CRaG process, alongside explanatory material and an independently-scrutinised impact assessment, as soon as is practical following signature. The Government has said it will seek to facilitate a debate on a signed FTA, subject to the availability of parliamentary time, should a relevant Select Committee “produce a report on a new FTA and as part of this request a debate”. The Government has also said that it does “not

1 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, [section 20](#)

2 *How Parliament treats treaties*, Briefing Paper [CBP-9247](#), House of Commons Library, 1 June 2021, pp 18, 38

3 Agriculture Act 2020, [section 42](#)

4 Trade Act 2021, [section 9](#). Pending commencement of the relevant provisions in the Trade Act, the functions of TAC are currently being replicated by an interim non-statutory body of the same name – Rt Hon Elizabeth Truss MP to Angus Brendan MacNeil MP, [30 July 2021](#).

5 Written evidence taken before the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, July 2023 – Food Standards Agency ([TFA0019](#))

envisage a new FTA proceeding to ratification without a debate first having taken place on it, should one have been requested in a timely fashion by [a relevant Select Committee], subject to available parliamentary time.”⁶

5. In February 2023, the Department for International Trade was merged with parts of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy to form the Department for Business and Trade (DBT). Subsequently, in April 2023, the International Trade Committee (ITC) was abolished. The new Business and Trade Committee became responsible for scrutinising all DBT’s functions, including those relating to international trade.

6. In July 2023, the Business and Trade Committee published a Report setting out our approach to the scrutiny of FTAs. We decided that we “would not normally expect to conduct detailed textual scrutiny of signed agreements” and would focus primarily on whether any concerns we had raised in a report on negotiating objectives had been met in a signed agreement. Where such concerns are not met, and are so severe as to warrant rejection of ratification, we agreed that “we would make that recommendation in a further report to the House and would ask the Government to make time for a debate on a substantive motion during the CRaG period”. We added that “There may be other circumstances in which we would press for a debate on an agreement during the CRaG period. In most such cases, we would expect a debate to take place on a neutral motion.”⁷

7. On 29 January 2024, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee published its report on Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century. This recommended that “as a matter of constitutional principle, all treaties should require the explicit approval of the democratically elected House of Commons before they enter into force”.⁸ The Government’s response to this report will be awaited with great interest.

Our scrutiny of CPTPP accession

8. In July 2022, ITC launched an inquiry into UK accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This is one of the largest FTAs in the world, encompassing 11 countries with a combined GDP of £9 trillion.⁹ UK accession potentially raises a number of contentious issues. ITC’s inquiry was cut short by the Committee’s abolition. In April 2023, the then ITC published a Report summarising the findings of its incomplete inquiry on CPTPP accession.¹⁰ In May 2023, we received a confidential private briefing from DBT’s chief negotiator on CPTPP accession, for which we thank the Department. In June 2023, we published the Government’s response to ITC’s Report on CPTPP accession.¹¹

6 Exchange of letters between Lord Grimstone and Baroness Hayter, [19 May 2022](#); Rt Hon Kemi Badenoch MP to Rt Hon Liam Byrne MP, [1 November 2023](#)

7 Business and Trade Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2022–23, [Scrutiny of free trade agreements](#), HC 1719, para 19

8 Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Second Report of Session 2023–24, [Parliamentary Scrutiny of International Agreements in the 21st century](#), HC 204, para 32

9 Department for International Trade, [“UK applies to join huge Pacific free trade area CPTPP”](#), 30 January 2021

10 International Trade Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2022–23, [CPTPP: opportunities and challenges for the UK](#), HC 13

11 Business and Trade Committee, Ninth Special Report of Session 2022–23, [CPTPP: opportunities and challenges for the UK: Government response to the International Trade Committee’s Sixth Report](#), HC 1614

9. To discharge our scrutiny function on CPTPP accession, we held a one-off evidence session on 23 January 2024, when we were joined by the Chair of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee, Sir Robert Goodwill MP. At that session, we took evidence from the Chair of TAC, experts and stakeholders, and the Secretary of State for Business and Trade, Rt Hon Kemi Badenoch MP, along with one of her senior officials. We are grateful to all our witnesses.

10. When we took evidence from the Secretary of State, we asked her whether there would be a debate during the CRaG period, held in Government time, regarding UK accession to CPTPP. She indicated her support for a general debate (as opposed to a debate on a substantive motion) but told us that that was a matter not for her but for the Leader of the House.¹²

11. The terms of UK accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership raise contentious issues. We recommend that during the 21-day scrutiny period under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the Government facilitate a debate on the Floor of the House on a substantive motion on the ratification of UK accession to the Agreement. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade should write to the Leader of the House, setting out the case for holding such a debate in Government time.

12. In order to facilitate scrutiny by the House, we have set out in this report those aspects of CPTPP accession which were shown by our evidence to be contentious.

13. It is difficult to estimate the potential benefits of CPTPP or its impact on economic growth, not least because the Secretary of State has resiled from the models used by her department to estimate benefits in the published impact assessment. It is, therefore, hard to debate what investment in trade promotion and export support would be appropriate to unlock the full potential of the Agreement. Nor has the Government explained its own ambitions for the future of CPTPP or provided any sort of roadmap for its evolution to include a much bigger proportion of Indo-Pacific markets. This renders speculative much of the commentary about CPTPP's future advantages. We note that the Secretary of State wants to see the development of better ways to measure the impact of trade agreements but has not yet found a way to achieve this. We recommend that the Government provide a revised impact assessment, setting out its current expectations of the gains from CPTPP; and the Department for Business and Trade should explain what steps it is going to take to help ensure that UK business exploits the treaty to the full. The Government must also say what it will do to develop better ways of measuring the impact of future trade agreements—including the involvement of an independent body, to avoid the Department “marking [its] own homework”, as the Secretary of State put it.

2 UK accession to CPTPP

14. The 11 founding members of CPTPP were Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.¹³ In February 2021, the UK became the first country to apply to accede to the Agreement.¹⁴ The UK Government published its strategic approach to CPTPP accession (including its response to a public consultation, its negotiating objectives and a scoping impact assessment) in June 2021.¹⁵

15. As a precondition of accession, the UK had to demonstrate compliance with the terms of the agreement, which it began doing in September 2021.¹⁶ The UK then had to agree a set of market access schedules. That potentially entailed granting market access concessions to the 11 member states (in addition to any given under the existing UK FTAs with nine of the member states). Bilateral negotiations between the UK and the CPTPP member states began in February 2022.¹⁷ Following the conclusion of substantive negotiations on accession in March 2023, the Accession Protocol was signed by the UK and the CPTPP member states in July 2023.¹⁸ At the same time, the UK signed several side letters with individual member states, securing mutual opt-outs from certain CPTPP provisions. The text of the Accession Protocol, along with associated documents, was laid before Parliament (without triggering the CRAg scrutiny period) immediately after signature.¹⁹

16. The domestic legislation to implement CPTPP accession, the Trade (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) Bill, was introduced in the House of Lords on 8 November 2023 and completed its passage of the Upper House on 23 January 2024.²⁰ It is currently before the House of Commons.

17. TAC's advice on CPTPP accession was laid before Parliament on 7 December 2023.²¹ The Secretary of State's section 42 report (which included advice from FSA and FSS) was laid on 11 January 2024.²² The 21-day CRAg scrutiny period has yet to be commenced by the Government.

13 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 15

14 Department for International Trade, ["UK applies to join huge Pacific free trade area CPTPP"](#), 30 January 2021

15 Department for International Trade, [UK Accession to CPTPP: The UK's Strategic Approach](#), June 2021

16 Department for International Trade, ["UK kickstarts talks to join £9 trillion global trade bloc"](#), 28 September 2021

17 Department for International Trade, ["Trade Secretary secures major trade bloc milestone ahead of Asia visit"](#), 18 February 2022

18 Department for Business and Trade, ["UK strikes biggest trade deal since Brexit to join major free trade bloc in Indo-Pacific"](#), 31 March 2023; Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, [Joint Ministerial Statement on the Occasion of the Seventh Commission Meeting](#), 16 July 2023

19 Department for Business and Trade, ["The text of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\) and associated documents"](#), 17 July 2023

20 [Trade \(Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership\) Bill \[Lords\] \[Bill 153 \(2023–24\)\]](#)

21 Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK's Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023

22 Department for Business and Trade, [Report pursuant to Section 42 of the Agriculture Act 2020: Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), January 2024

3 The benefits of CPTPP accession

Access to fast-growing markets

18. The Secretary of State told us that UK trade policy is predicated on the recognition that “We are facing limited growth across the world and in the mature European economies.” Consequently, the Government is “looking to where the growth in the world is coming from”, which is “mostly in the Indo-Pacific.” The Government is looking to strengthen ties with countries in that region and “CPTPP [accession] is a classic example of that.”²³ Dr Minako Morita-Jaeger, Senior Research Fellow in International Trade at the University of Sussex, told us that, in focusing on the Indo-Pacific region, the UK is orientating itself towards “the engine of the growth of the world economy”.²⁴

19. The Government’s impact assessment for the agreed terms of UK accession to CPTPP states that

CPTPP membership acts as a gateway to the wider Indo-Pacific region which is expected to account for the majority (54%) of global growth between 2021 and 2050. By 2035, around half of the world’s 2.7 billion middle class consumers are expected to be in the Indo-Pacific.²⁵

20. CPTPP, however, at present covers only a small proportion of the Indo-Pacific region. DBT’s *Global Trade Outlook*, from which these figures derive, defines the Indo-Pacific region as “three DBT HM Trade Commissioner regions: South Asia [including India], Asia Pacific and China & Hong Kong”—meaning that it encompasses some very significant economies outside the current CPTPP membership.²⁶ It should also be noted that CPTPP includes countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America regions, as well as in the Asia-Pacific region.²⁷

21. The Government is also unclear about how—or if—it would like CPTPP to develop to encompass a bigger proportion of the Indo-Pacific marketplace. Although China has formally applied to accede to CPTPP, the Secretary of State was non-committal on whether the UK would endorse China’s application. She said that CPTPP had a “country-agnostic” approach to the accession process, that member states worked “as a bloc” and that all accession applicants must meet the same high standards as the UK had. She added that “I cannot freelance what we would do outside the CPTPP meetings.”²⁸

Potential increase in UK GDP

22. The Government’s impact assessment stated that, according to econometric modelling by DBT, CPTPP accession “could boost UK GDP by around £2.0 billion a year

23 [Q39](#)

24 [Q19](#)

25 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 17

26 Department for Business and Trade, [Global Trade Outlook](#), February 2023, p 10

27 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 15

28 [Q49](#)

when compared to projected GDP in 2040.”²⁹ This is equivalent to 0.09% of UK GDP in 2021.³⁰ The Secretary of State for Business and Trade, however, distanced herself from that figure. She said that “I am very sceptical of a lot of modelling” and “I personally do not really like talking about the model”, which she referred to as a “statutory requirement.”³¹ She emphasised that the modelling on CPTPP accession had been done before she became Secretary of State and “I would have put many more caveats around it”.³² She criticised what she regarded as the unwarranted assumptions on which such models rest: “Many of the things that are assumed do not necessarily happen.”³³

23. The Secretary of State also said that the modelling “does not take into account CPTPP growing”.³⁴ DBT has, though, published illustrative modelling on the potential marginal impact for the UK of certain countries joining CPTPP.³⁵ A DBT study on the strategic potential of CPTPP accession, published in July 2023, considered the possible further expansion of CPTPP and the economic benefits this could bring the UK (according to illustrative modelling by DBT and separate academic work).³⁶ Matt Davies OBE, Director of Trans-Pacific Negotiations and Policy at DBT, told us that “we joined CPTPP because we want it to be a growing agreement. With the UK joining, we know it is more attractive and others will want to join. Thinking about that and how that fits into our broader objectives, we are trying to understand some of the impacts.”³⁷

24. The Secretary of State was also critical of the modelling on the grounds that it is based on “very old data” (from 2017).³⁸ DBT’s impact assessment stated that “The modelling uses the latest available Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset - 2017 - at the time of the analysis, as the benchmark dataset and therefore does not account for several trends or changes in trends that have appeared in subsequent years which could influence the impact of UK accession to CPTPP”.³⁹ The Secretary of State for Business and Trade said that the modelling “does not model dynamic effects”.⁴⁰ DBT’s impact assessment stated that the (“comparative static”) modelling approach used, while it is a standard way of assessing the impact of an FTA, “may not capture the full range of dynamic impacts that result from the agreement”.⁴¹

29 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 41. This figure is based on the assumption that CPTPP membership remains as it is currently.

30 UK GDP in 2021 was worth £2,176 billion – Office for National Statistics, [Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted £m](#), 22 December 2023

31 [Qq67, 72](#)

32 [Q68](#)

33 [Q67](#)

34 [Q68](#)

35 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 56

36 Department for Business and Trade, [The strategic potential of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, pp 4–5

37 [Q95](#)

38 [Qq68, 69](#)

39 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 9

40 [Q69](#)

41 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 34

25. The Secretary of State said that a model was “just something that gives an indicator of direction rather than quantum.”⁴² She thought modelling was most helpful in showing “whether this is a negative or a positive” and that it had shown CPTPP accession to be “a positive”.⁴³ The Secretary of State stressed that econometric “Models are not even forecasts”.⁴⁴ She said that the actual impact of accession to CPTPP would be down to businesses: “It is business that creates economic growth. It is not Government. Government need to create the right environment for it.” She added that DBT would help businesses through its FTA utilisation programme.⁴⁵

26. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade indicated that she would like to see the development of better ways to measure the impact of trade agreements. She told us that “We need to find a way to use models and forecasts rather than just picking things off the shelf that do not necessarily work for certain scenarios.” She thought that it might not be appropriate for that work to come from within DBT, because “That is effectively us marking our own homework.” She had spoken to the Regulatory Policy Committee and been told that “we do not necessarily need to do some of the things that we are doing because they are not applicable”. She thought there was a need “to find something that is a bit better, that uses the right assumptions and that has the right caveats”, rather than “plucking figures, making different assumptions and not necessarily talking about the same thing, which is making it very hard for people to get a clear picture of what we can expect to see in the future.”⁴⁶

Impact on UK goods producers

Rules of origin and cumulation of origin

27. Rules of origin provisions in FTAs set out the criteria that products must meet regarding their country of origin in order to access preferential tariffs under the agreement. Cumulation of origin provisions in an FTA allow products from one country to count as originating in another for the purposes of meeting a rule of origin. Under CPTPP, all member countries are covered by a single set of rules of origin and form part of a single cumulation zone.⁴⁷

28. William Bain, Head of Trade at the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), told us that those aspects of the agreement would be beneficial to UK goods producers. He explained that 75% of UK manufacturing exports “involve both the importing and exporting in part of the process”. CPTPP “allows you to include components, ingredients or textiles from any of the other CPTPP countries, make them into finished goods in the UK and export them to another CPTPP country, while maintaining the tariff-free principle for the vast majority of the goods.”⁴⁸ He argued that that would provide “great opportunities” for the UK food products, clothing and textiles, and chemicals sectors.⁴⁹

42 [Q69](#)

43 [Q67](#)

44 [Q67](#)

45 [Q71](#)

46 [Q97](#)

47 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 26

48 [Q33](#)

49 [Q35](#)

29. Mr Bain thought it likely that exports would increase due to CPTPP accession, but “The question is simply exactly how much.”⁵⁰ To take advantage of the opportunities presented would require “a trade promotion strategy that is firing on all cylinders”, Mr Bain said.⁵¹ He thought that issues identified by chambers of commerce indicated that “we perhaps need more rocket boosters” under trade promotion efforts. Other countries did this well, and the BCC had called for “a refresh of the export strategy and the creation of an exports council as well.”⁵²

30. The Secretary of State cited the rules of origin and cumulation provisions under CPTPP as a particular benefit for UK exporters,⁵³ describing them as “quite game-changing” for the UK automotive sector in particular. She thought that the possibility of integration with supply chains involving Japan and Mexico, “where auto is absolutely huge”, would be “quite significant”.⁵⁴ She was unable to quantify the potential economic benefit, but said that the auto sector was “very happy” and that “The gains will be dependent on what they choose to do.”⁵⁵ She thought that other manufacturing sectors would also benefit.⁵⁶

Additional market access for goods

31. Mr Davies of DBT told us that through CPTPP accession the UK would gain additional market access in some of the nine countries with which the UK already has FTAs. This related partly to situations where tariffs on some UK goods will be eliminated more quickly under CPTPP than they would have been under existing bilateral FTAs which provide for phased liberalisation (as in the case of UK chocolate exports to Mexico, for instance). In addition, CPTPP accession would give the UK access to member countries’ tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on some agri-food products. (TRQs allow specific products to be imported, up to an annual maximum amount, at a lower tariff than would otherwise apply.) This would benefit, for instance, UK beef exports to Peru.⁵⁷ It would also benefit UK cheese exports to Canada, which have recently faced a steep increase in tariffs following the expiry of temporary TRQ arrangements.⁵⁸

Goods sectors that will lose

32. DBT’s impact assessment on CPTPP accession notes that three UK goods sectors are expected to contract relative to the baseline (a modelled scenario where the UK does not join CPTPP) in the event of accession, because of increased international competition. These are two manufacturing sectors (electronic equipment and transport equipment) and one agri-food sector (semi-processed food).⁵⁹ Dr Morita-Jaeger told us that the UK sectors

50 [Q37](#)

51 [Q34](#)

52 [Q38](#)

53 [Q73](#)

54 [Q74](#)

55 [Q76](#)

56 [Q77](#)

57 [Q73](#)

58 [Q92](#)

59 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 48

which would lose under CPTPP accession were the agricultural and semi-processed food sectors, since these were “much less competitive” than other sectors and would be exposed to increased imports from “very competitive agricultural countries”.⁶⁰

33. We asked the Secretary of State about Government modelling from 2021, obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request, which showed that UK semi-processed food producers would be adversely affected if South Korea or Thailand were to accede to CPTPP. She warned against assuming “that trading with other countries is always going to take something from the UK”, as that would lead to “a zero-sum world”. Although “trade increases economic growth”, there needed to be “a level playing field” and countries acceding to CPTPP would have to meet its high standards.⁶¹

Impact on UK services producers

34. Dr Morita-Jaeger told us that the UK’s services sector would gain from CPTPP accession. Compared with services provisions in the UK’s existing FTAs with nine CPTPP members, CPTPP’s services trade rules were comprehensive, especially the digital trade chapter and provisions on financial services. Further, the agreement entailed a “ratchet mechanism”, requiring that liberalisation of services markets will not be reversed and thereby giving “certainty and the predictability for the services sector as a whole”. Dr Morita-Jaeger noted that “the UK’s service sector is very competitive and the UK market is already open”, so the UK had “nothing to lose” by signing up to the levels of market access entailed by CPTPP membership.⁶²

35. The Secretary of State told us that CPTPP is “more heavily services-focused than we have seen before. I would say probably even more than what we were doing with the EU.” She welcomed the presence of “a ratchet mechanism for the first time”. She noted that the UK would acquire “new transport [services] commitments from Singapore and Peru”. There would also be “new data localisation commitments from Canada, Peru, Vietnam, Mexico and others”, preventing them from requiring service providers to use or locate computing facilities in their territory as a condition of conducting business there.⁶³

Geostrategic benefits to the UK

36. Dr Morita-Jaeger told us that “the significance of the UK joining the CPTPP can be seen in the more political strategic gains rather than the economic gains”. She noted that the trade policy landscape had become “very volatile”, with many Governments around the world “shifting to managed trade”. In this context, CPTPP was important as a means of “trying to preserve or promote open and rules-based liberal trade”. Economic diplomacy was now an important part of geopolitical strategy, alongside “security, defence and development”. The UK could use CPTPP as a policy forum to enhance economic diplomatic ties, as well as economic security and other issues alongside like-minded countries such as Japan, Australia and Canada; and CPTPP members were expecting the UK to play a role in enhancing the norms of the liberal order within CPTPP. Dr Morita-Jaeger also noted that the UK accession process was expanding the scope of CPTPP

60 [Q26](#)

61 [Q96](#)

62 [Q26](#)

63 [Qq73, 88](#)

beyond the Asia-Pacific region, with Ukraine now having also applied to accede.⁶⁴ She described CPTPP as a “middle-power club” that was trying “to promote the liberal order in the world of global diplomacy”.⁶⁵

37. Dr Morita-Jaeger also referred to the UK’s “Indo-Pacific tilt”.⁶⁶ DBT’s impact assessment on CPTPP accession stated: “Acceding to CPTPP supports a core objective of the Government’s March 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, which committed to pursuing deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific, in support of shared prosperity, security and stability.”⁶⁷ The Secretary of State referred several times to the importance of the Integrated Review as the foundation for UK trade policy.⁶⁸

38. Both Mr Davies of DBT and the Secretary of State noted that, once the UK is a member of CPTPP, it will be able to participate in the general review of the Agreement, which will consider the process for further countries to accede, as well how CPTPP’s provisions might develop.⁶⁹

64 [Q22](#)

65 [Q23](#)

66 [Q19](#)

67 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 17

68 [Qq39, 56, 72](#)

69 [Q95](#)

4 The Trade and Agriculture Commission's advice

Overall impact on protections for UK agri-food production standards

39. The Chair of TAC, Professor Lorand Bartels MBE, explained to us that the Commission had been asked by the Secretary of State to answer three questions regarding the effect of CPTPP accession. TAC's response to those questions had effectively been that there was "on the whole, good news" about the impact of CPTPP accession.⁷⁰ As with the Commission's analysis of previous FTAs, TAC had not "made any huge criticisms that the Government were under a huge amount of pressure to respond to", and this was reflected in the Secretary of State's section 42 report.⁷¹

40. The first question was whether CPTPP required the UK to change its levels of statutory protection in relation to animal or plant health, animal welfare or environmental protection. TAC found that this was not the case and that, in some areas, CPTPP enhanced the UK's right to regulate compared with World Trade Organization (WTO) law.

41. The second question was whether CPTPP reinforced the UK's levels of statutory protection in the three areas mentioned. TAC's answer was that CPTPP does do so, by requiring the UK to maintain its levels of environmental protection and allowing the UK to ensure that other countries maintain their levels of environmental protection.

42. The third question was whether CPTPP otherwise affected the ability of the UK to adopt statutory protections in the three areas mentioned. TAC found that CPTPP does not do so. The Commission noted that decisions that can be taken under the Agreement might affect this in future and that this "is something that Parliament needs to keep an eye on". It found that increased imports under CPTPP would not necessarily cause any problems for UK border controls (FSA and the FSS also reached that conclusion). TAC also examined concerns about potentially increased imports of particular agri-food products under CPTPP.⁷² We asked Professor Bartels about those concerns.

Growth promoters in beef and pork production

43. The UK has a ban on imports of beef produced from cattle that have been treated with hormonal growth promoters and pork from pigs that have been treated with ractopamine hydrochloride (another kind of growth promoter). These prohibitions, which the UK inherited from the EU, rest on an approach to sanitary and phytosanitary protections known as the "precautionary principle", whereby protective measures are adopted in the face of scientific uncertainty about the risk involved. Professor Bartels told us that the EU's ban on hormone-treated beef had been found to be illegal under WTO law in the 1990s, although the ban had been kept in place after the EU "essentially bought off the complainants" with TRQ concessions on other beef imports.⁷³ TAC's advice noted that

70 [Q3](#)
 71 [Q5](#)
 72 [Q3](#)
 73 [Q10](#)

“An EU challenge to this ruling in 2008, in part on a different basis, was inconclusive, with the result that the original findings remain operative. The UK’s own import prohibition has not been challenged.”⁷⁴

44. Professor Bartels told us that TAC had not investigated whether UK import bans based on the precautionary principle could be challenged successfully under the provisions of CPTPP. Nor could he give a view on this in a personal capacity, “because it depends on the science and I do not know what the science is”.⁷⁵ However, TAC had concluded that accession to CPTPP did not make the bans any more susceptible to challenge than they already were under WTO law.⁷⁶

Pesticide use

45. TAC examined whether tariff reductions under CPTPP might lead to increased imports of agri-food goods produced using pesticides that are banned in the UK. The Commission found that such products were likely to be imported at increased rates due to CPTPP accession and that the producers of such imports were likely to have a cost advantage over UK producers.⁷⁷

46. TAC further found that, under CPTPP, the UK would retain the same right to regulate in respect of such imports as it has under WTO law. That right allowed the UK to set maximum residue levels for pesticides in imported products.⁷⁸ (The FSA and FSS reached the same conclusion in looking at the impact of CPTPP accession on agri-food protections in respect of human health.)⁷⁹ In addition, TAC noted, WTO law permitted import restrictions to protect plants, animals or the environment in relation to “shared resources”, such as highly migratory animals or the high seas, and this right, too, is unaffected by CPTPP accession.⁸⁰ As regards import restrictions that are solely focused on the health of plants or animals, or the environment, in the territory where goods are produced, TAC noted that such restrictions are prohibited by WTO law and CPTPP alike.⁸¹ Professor Bartels told us that “under international law, you do not get to protect other countries’ environments. If they want to pollute their rivers and there is no matter of international concern that might give you some right to regulate, you simply cannot do it.”⁸²

74 Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, p 53

75 [Q10](#)

76 [Qq10–12](#)

77 Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, pp 63–66, 67

78 Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, p 66, 67

79 Department for Business and Trade, [Report pursuant to Section 42 of the Agriculture Act 2020: Protocol on the Accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), January 2024, p 50

80 [Q7](#); Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, p 66

81 Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, pp 66, 67

82 [Q7](#)

Deforestation linked to palm oil

47. Civil society groups have raised concerns that reducing UK tariffs on palm oil (which range up to 12%) under CPTPP will lead to increased imports of this product from deforested land in Malaysia.⁸³ Given that “Palm oil demand in the UK is stable, and even falling slightly as consumers move away from products containing palm oil due to concerns about its environmental impact”, TAC concluded “we do not expect the UK’s total imports of palm oil to increase”.⁸⁴ The Commission anticipated that there would be some shift in the source of UK palm oil imports from Indonesia to Malaysia (since Indonesia has no FTA with the UK and so its exports do not benefit from tariff preference).⁸⁵

48. Professor Bartels told us that, although the situation regarding deforestation from palm oil production in Malaysia was not perfect, it was “a work in progress”, with the Malaysian Government planning to introduce an improved certification standard. He emphasised that the important point for TAC was whether UK accession to CPTPP would make matters worse. The Commission concluded that the expected shift in the supply of palm oil exports from Indonesia to Malaysia would not “pose any greater risk of deforestation at a global level, contribution to climate change or loss of biodiversity and all the rest of it”. This was because “the Malaysian certification scheme and standards for production of palm oil are [...] certainly not worse than those in Indonesia”.⁸⁶ Professor Bartels noted that a high proportion of current UK imports of palm oil from Malaysia meet a voluntary standard which is higher than the Malaysian national standard.⁸⁷ He suggested this may have come about due to the EU’s Deforestation Regulation, which is “much tougher than the UK’s certification requirements”.⁸⁸

49. Leo Verity, Senior Political Adviser at the Trade Justice Movement (TJM), told us it was “not clear” how the equivalent UK rules, under the Environment Act 2021, would “interact with the provisions of CPTPP”.⁸⁹ These rules (which are not yet in force) prohibit the use of “Forest Risk Commodities” in commercial activity unless due diligence has been undertaken regarding whether they have been produced in compliance with “relevant local law”. TAC indicated that CPTPP would not prevent the UK from implementing this provision in relation to palm oil imports, citing the Malaysian production standard as “for these purposes a ‘relevant local law’”.⁹⁰

50. TAC also observed that “As under WTO law, CPTPP does not ordinarily give the UK a right to protect *Malaysian* resources, including its forests.” However, any net deforestation contributing to climate change or harming biodiversity was potentially a different matter.

83 [Qq14, 27](#); Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, p 48, 49

84 [Q14](#); Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, pp 49, 50

85 Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, p 50

86 [Q14](#)

87 [Q15](#); Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, pp 48–49

88 [Q15](#). Under the EU Regulation, from 30 December 2024, in-scope products can only be placed on the EU market where due diligence has been undertaken to ascertain that the products are legal in the country of production and not linked to deforestation and forest degradation after 31 December 2020 – [Regulation \(EU\) 2023/1115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023](#).

89 [Q27](#)

90 Department for Business and Trade, [Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK’s Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, p 50

In that case, “it is likely that the UK is entitled under WTO law, and CPTPP, to restrict trade in order to combat climate change or to address biodiversity loss, to the extent that either can be seen as conserving a UK ‘exhaustible natural resource’ or, perhaps, as part of the global commons.”⁹¹

91 [Department for Business and Trade, Trade and Agriculture Commission: Advice to the Secretary of State for Business and Trade on the UK's Accession Protocol to CPTPP](#), December 2023, p 51

5 Investor-state dispute settlement

51. DBT’s impact assessment on CPTPP accession emphasised the benefit to UK investors of the Agreement’s “modern and transparent” provisions on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). These, it said, would “ensure that UK investors can access an independent international tribunal” should a member state subject them to “unfair or arbitrary treatment”.⁹²

52. Mr Verity of the TJM was concerned about these provisions. He told us ISDS was “a system via which international investors can bring legal challenges against the Governments of member states if those Governments bring in policy and regulations that they perceive to have harmed their profits.” He said that such provisions had been used “to challenge lots of climate and environmental regulations internationally through other agreements”.⁹³

53. Mr Verity noted that the UK already had agreements with many CPTPP member states that included ISDS. In respect of two member states, Australia and New Zealand, the UK had signed bilateral side letters providing for mutual opt-outs from CPTPP’s ISDS provisions. In the case of the remaining CPTPP members, accession would create new ISDS arrangements between the UK and those countries.⁹⁴

54. Mr Verity was particularly concerned about the prospect of the UK entering into ISDS arrangements with Canada under CPTPP. He told us that “Canadian investors have been particularly litigious” in using ISDS provisions; they had brought 65 such cases, as far as was known—and there might be others, given that ISDS cases can be conducted in secrecy. Many of the cases brought by Canadian investors had involved “climate and environmental regulations”, in respect of “things like mining concessions and environmental practices around oil extraction”. Mr Verity noted that, in negotiating a new bilateral FTA with Canada, the UK had set as a specific objective the exclusion of ISDS from such an agreement, which he thought was the only case of the UK doing so in an FTA negotiation. He argued that the Government should also seek to opt out of ISDS arrangements with Canada in acceding to CPTPP. He emphasised that opposition to ISDS was not a “fringe position”. Australia and New Zealand had moved away from it; several countries were withdrawing from the Energy Charter Treaty as its ISDS provisions were “incompatible with their climate commitments”; and the current US administration did not look favourably on ISDS.⁹⁵

55. We asked the Secretary of State about the potential impact of ISDS arrangements with Canada on the UK Government’s ability to regulate, or to take into public ownership, the English water industry, given that Canadian pension funds are major investors in that sector. She responded that FTAs “do not interfere with any country’s sovereign rights to regulate” as “embedded in international law”. She said that the UK had ISDS arrangements with some 90 countries and had “never been successfully sued on the basis of that”. The Government was not worried about ISDS, because the UK had “very high legal standards”. People invested in the UK because of the rule of law, making the UK a “a safe place to

92 Department for Business and Trade, [Impact assessment of the accession of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership](#), July 2023, p 29

93 [Q27](#)

94 [Q32](#)

95 [Q32](#)

invest”, where investors knew their assets would not be expropriated. Regarding the water industry specifically, the Secretary of State for Business and Trade said that UK pension funds were not investing in UK companies and that, consequently, “We cannot complain if other countries then come in to invest. If they do not, a lot of those services would just fall apart.”⁹⁶ Problems with the water industry were for the regulators to solve and the Government was not worried that ISDS would “stop our right to regulate and stop our regulators from doing the right thing”.⁹⁷

96 [Q89](#)

97 [Q90](#)

Conclusions and recommendations

The purpose of our report

1. The terms of UK accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership raise contentious issues. *We recommend that during the 21-day scrutiny period under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the Government facilitate a debate on the Floor of the House on a substantive motion on the ratification of UK accession to the Agreement. The Secretary of State for Business and Trade should write to the Leader of the House, setting out the case for holding such a debate in Government time.* (Paragraph 11)
2. It is difficult to estimate the potential benefits of CPTPP or its impact on economic growth, not least because the Secretary of State has resiled from the models used by her department to estimate benefits in the published impact assessment. It is, therefore, hard to debate what investment in trade promotion and export support would be appropriate to unlock the full potential of the Agreement. Nor has the Government explained its own ambitions for the future of CPTPP or provided any sort of roadmap for its evolution to include a much bigger proportion of Indo-Pacific markets. This renders speculative much of the commentary about CPTPP's future advantages. We note that the Secretary of State wants to see the development of better ways to measure the impact of trade agreements but has not yet found a way to achieve this. *We recommend that the Government provide a revised impact assessment, setting out its current expectations of the gains from CPTPP; and the Department for Business and Trade should explain what steps it is going to take to help ensure that UK business exploits the treaty to the full. The Government must also say what it will do to develop better ways of measuring the impact of future trade agreements—including the involvement of an independent body, to avoid the Department “marking [its] own homework”, as the Secretary of State put it.* (Paragraph 13)

Formal minutes Formal Minutes

Tuesday 6 February 2024

Members present:

Liam Byrne, in the Chair

Antony Higginbotham

Ian Lavery

Anthony Mangnall

Mark Pawsey

Draft Report (*UK accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 55 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Second Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

Adjournment

[Adjourned till Tuesday 20 February at 9:45am]

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Tuesday 23 January 2024

Professor Lorand Bartels MBE, Chair, Trade and Agriculture Commission [Q1–16](#)

William Bain, Head of Trade, British Chambers of Commerce; **Dr Minako Morita-Jaeger**, Policy Research Fellow, UK Trade Policy Observatory, Senior Research Fellow in International Trade, University of Sussex Business School; **Leo Verity**, Senior Political Adviser, Trade Justice Movement [Q17–38](#)

Rt Hon Kemi Badenoch MP, Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade; **Matt Davies OBE**, Director, Trans-Pacific Negotiations and Policy, Department for Business and Trade [Q39–101](#)

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

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| 1st | Batteries for electric vehicle manufacturing | HC 196 |
| 1st Joint Special | Scrutiny of Strategic Export Controls | HC 436 |
| 2nd Special | Batteries for electric vehicle manufacturing: Government Response to the Committee's First Report | HC 547 |

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| 1st | Pre-appointment hearing with the Government's preferred candidate for Chair of the Competition and Markets Authority | HC 523 |
| 2nd | Draft Legislative Reform (Provision of Information etc. relating to disabilities) Order 2022 | HC 522 |
| 3rd | Energy pricing and the future of the Energy Market | HC 236 |
| 4th | Post-pandemic economic growth: state aid and post-Brexit competition policy | HC 759 |
| 5th | The semiconductor industry in the UK | HC 291 |
| 6th | The semiconductor industry in the UK: Government response | HC 1115 |
| 7th | Royal Mail | HC 1045 |
| 8th | Memorandum of Understanding on scrutiny of the Investment Security Unit | HC 1235 |
| 9th | UK plc | HC 1120 |
| 10th | Post-pandemic economic growth: UK labour markets | HC 306 |
| 11th | Decarbonisation of the power sector | HC 283 |
| 1st Special | Decarbonising heat in homes: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of 2021–22 | HC 208 |
| 2nd Special | Energy pricing and the future of the energy market: Responses to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2022–23 | HC 761 |
| 3rd Special | Post pandemic economic growth: State aid and post-Brexit competition policy: Responses to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2022–23 | HC 1078 |

| Number | Title | Reference |
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| 4th Special | Revised (Draft) National Policy Statement for Energy: Government response to the Committee's Ninth Report of Session 2021–22 | HC 1299 |
| 5th Special | State aid and post-Brexit competition policy: Office for the Internal Market response to the Committee's Fourth Report | HC 1302 |
| 6th Special | The semiconductor industry in the UK: Further Government response to the BEIS Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2022–23 | HC 1404 |
| 7th Special | Royal Mail: Responses to the BEIS Committee's Seventh Report of Session 2022–23 | HC 1391 |
| 8th Special | UK trade negotiations: Agreement with India: Government response to the International Trade Committee's Fifth Report | HC 1584 |
| 9th Special | CPTPP: opportunities and challenges for the UK: Government response to the International Trade Committee's Sixth Report | HC 1614 |
| 10th Special | Free Trade Agreement Negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council: Government response to the International Trade Committee's Seventh Report | HC 1626 |

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| 2nd | Climate Assembly UK: where are we now? | HC 546 |
| 3rd | Post-pandemic economic growth: Levelling up | HC 566 |
| 4th | Liberty Steel and the future of the UK steel Industry | HC 821 |
| 5th | Pre-legislative scrutiny: draft Downstream Oil Resilience Bill | HC 820 |
| 6th | Pre-appointment hearing of the Government's preferred candidate for Chair of the Financial Reporting Council | HC 1079 |
| 7th | Decarbonising heat in homes | HC 1038 |
| 8th | Post Office and Horizon - Compensation: interim report | HC 1129 |
| 9th | Revised (Draft) National Policy Statement for Energy | HC 1151 |
| 10th | Draft Legislative Reform (Renewal of National Radio Multiplex Licences) Order 2022 | HC 1199 |
| 1st Special | Decarbonising heat in homes: Government Response to the Committee's Seventh Report of 2021–22 | HC 208 |
| 2nd Special | Net Zero and UN Climate Summits: Scrutiny of Preparations for COP26—interim report: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2019–21 | HC 120 |
| 3rd Special | Uyghur forced labour in Xinjiang and UK value chains: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2019–21 | HC 241 |

| Number | Title | Reference |
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| 4th Special | Mineworkers' Pension Scheme: Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report of Session 2019–21 | HC 386 |
| 5th Special | Climate Assembly UK: where are we now?: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report | HC 680 |
| 6th Special | Post-pandemic economic growth: Industrial policy in the UK: Government Response to the Committee's First Report | HC 71 |
| 7th Special | Post-pandemic economic growth: Levelling up: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report | HC 924 |
| 8th Special | Liberty Steel and the Future of the UK Steel Industry: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report | HC 1123 |
| 9th Special | Pre-legislative scrutiny: draft Downstream Oil Resilience Bill. Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report | HC 1177 |
| 10th Special | Post Office and Horizon – Compensation: interim report. Government Response to the Committee's Eighth Report | HC 1267 |

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| 1st | My BEIS inquiry: proposals from the public | HC 612 |
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| 3rd | Net Zero and UN Climate Summits: Scrutiny of Preparations for COP26 – interim report | HC 1265 |
| 4th | Pre-appointment hearing with the Government's preferred candidate for the Chair of the Regulatory Policy Committee | HC 1271 |
| 5th | Uyghur forced labour in Xinjiang and UK value chains | HC 1272 |
| 6th | Mineworkers' Pension Scheme | HC 1346 |
| 1st Special | Automation and the future of work: Government Response to the Committee's Twenty-third Report of Session 2017–19 | HC 240 |
| 2nd Special | Future of the Post Office Network: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2019 | HC 382 |
| 3rd Special | Safety of Electrical Goods in the UK: follow-up: Government Response to the Committee's second report of Session 2019 | HC 494 |
| 4th Special | COP26: Principles and priorities—a POST survey of expert views | HC 1000 |