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4 December 2023

**Dame Meg Hillier MP**  
**Chair of the Public Accounts Committee**

*Sent electronically*

Dear Chair,

### **EQUIPMENT PLAN 2023-2033: UPDATE ON AFFORDABILITY**

In my letter to you of 21 July 2023, I explained that the department would not provide a full Equipment Plan report this year, as we need to work through the direction from the Defence Command Paper 2023 (DCP23) and further understand the impact of extraordinary inflation and how to mitigate it<sup>1</sup>. A pause also provides us with an opportunity to review whether the current arrangements are best suited to an explanation of our forward equipment investment and support plans. This letter provides an update on the department's current understanding of the cost of the defence Equipment Plan.

This year we have been able to increase the budget allocated to the Equipment Plan by £46.3 billion to £288.6 billion over the ten years from 2023 to 2033. This reflects 49% of the forecast Defence budget. Against our current central budget assumption we forecast the cost of the Equipment Plan to exceed budget by just under 6%. There are however other reasonable scenarios in which the department has a surplus over ten years. The position reported here and by the National Audit Office (NAO) does not, for example, yet reflect the Government's commitment to increase defence spending to 2.5% of GDP as soon as economic and fiscal conditions allow. As in previous years, we have also set out a range of costs, reflecting uncertainty and risk. Different scenarios are therefore set out below to reflect potential budgetary and cost outcomes.

While we are currently forecasting a pressure, I am confident from an Accounting Officer perspective that the department can live within its equipment budget, with only 25% of the Equipment Plan committed over the next decade, providing the headroom to adjust the programme as needed and ensuring we can remain responsive to emerging events and new technologies. We have also made significant changes to how we manage the nuclear

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<sup>1</sup> [MOD PUS to Chair of the PAC, 21 July 2023. Equipment Plan](#)

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enterprise which will support us to deliver programmes related to the nuclear deterrent on schedule.

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The enclosure provides continuity of financial reporting from previous years, including an update to the Project Performance Summary Table of major projects<sup>2</sup>.

The NAO have again worked alongside us to review our plans and have published their report today. I want to thank them for their continued support on this work, which continues to help us improve our management of the Equipment Plan.

### **Fiscal, economic and policy context**

You will be aware of the macroeconomic context in which we are working. For defence, this has meant managing inflationary cost increases and supply chain challenges. Inflation has added £10.9bn to the programme and foreign exchange movements a further £2.2bn, without which our financial position would be closer to that of previous years and our Equipment Plan pressure considerably smaller. Our commercial approach to seek nonindex linked firm price contracting prior to the high inflation environment limited the initial impact, as well as our use of forward purchase of foreign exchange and long-lead items. We are now making greater use of index-linked contracts to reduce the risk of firms either applying high risk premia on firm price bids or not bidding.

This year the Chancellor announced a further £5bn for Defence at the Spring Budget. This included £3bn for the nuclear programme and £1.95bn for wider priorities. This was in addition to the £560m announced at last year's Autumn Statement for the department to invest in munitions and stockpiles. These are reflected in the position we are reporting. We have also baselined spend where agreed with HM Treasury.

This year the Government also published its refresh of the Integrated Review and the department published DCP23. The world is increasingly dangerous and the transition into a multipolar, fragmented and contested world has happened more quickly and definitively than anticipated in the original Integrated Review. Of relevance to the Equipment Plan, we announced our intent to invest £2.5bn in stockpiles over the next decade, which will allow us to improve supply chain resilience for munitions based on lessons emerging from the Ukraine conflict. However, as the Equipment Plan for 2023-2033 is based upon the department's ten-year position at the close of FY22/23, it does not reflect the policy intent set out within the DCP23 published this July. The DCP23 signals the department's shift to focus more on Artificial Intelligence, autonomous and digital capabilities to modernise our Armed Forces, and reinforces the importance of assuring our supply chains. It emphasises the importance of increasing our resilience by prioritising critical enablers such as logistical support, infrastructure, and stockpiles for complex weapons, general munitions and operational spares to ensure we can better deliver defence capabilities and

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<sup>2</sup> 2 Data is based on spending plans for equipment procurement and support at end of Financial Year 22/23, which were developed through our annual financial planning exercise.

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credible deterrence across domains and meet the needs of sustained operation. While we recognise the affordability challenge of the 2023-2033 Equipment Plan, it is only right that the choices we make to address this challenge reflect the Government's priorities as set out in DCP23, including adapting to the lessons from the Ukraine conflict and ensuring that our equipment plan is relevant in a period of fast technological change. DCP23 was not aligned with a Spending Review, so while we can make some prioritisation choices now, we are also developing choices to reshape the plan under different scenarios for the next review. As I explained in my letter of 21 July 2023, this is part of our rationale for not publishing a full Equipment Plan report this year.

### **Defence Nuclear Enterprise**

The Government has set up a new ringfenced budget for the Defence Nuclear Enterprise, which brings together for the first time the key programmes required across defence to ensure continued delivery of the nuclear deterrent. This new funding arrangement gives the department greater flexibility to move funding between years. This is a significant step forward which we expect to improve value for money in line with your committee's previous reports<sup>3</sup>. For example, we can now choose to bring capital funding forward to take advantage of an opportunity to purchase long-lead items in advance at a lower overall cost. This same funding flexibility also ensures that the rest of the defence programme is insulated from changes in the profile of nuclear spending, which includes many of our largest, most complex, and novel programmes. I have appointed the new Chief of Defence Nuclear as an additional Accounting Officer to support this.

We have also improved our understanding of the investment required to redress underinvestment over the past 20 years. We also need to accelerate delivery which will allow us to seize the benefits of the AUKUS partnership. This means we are reporting a higher cost for the nuclear enterprise, with investments now to support future capacity. The new nuclear funding settlement has largely funded these costs, reflecting the Government's commitment to delivering the nuclear deterrent.

There is a notional gap between the ten-year budget and the estimated costs for defence nuclear – some £7.9bn. This is some 7% of the budget over a ten-year period. The Department is not complacent and will act in successive planning rounds to ensure that costs are realistic, and projects are deliverable. Our experience of this financial year, as we start to accelerate projects within the nuclear ringfence, is that the uplift has proved sufficient to cover the increased scale of the programme. At the mid-year point in 23/24 we expect to deliver our nuclear projects and programmes within the allocated and ringfenced funding. No project has been delayed because of a shortage of funds and we are working hard to accelerate delivery. We are currently considering how we exercise the flexibility to bring forward or push back funding between 23/24 and 24/25.

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<sup>3</sup> [PAC, 2020, Defence Nuclear Infrastructure](#): 'Given its impact on the overall defence budget, the Department should make a case to the Treasury for ring-fencing the nuclear budget in the course of the discussions in 2020 for the current Integrated Review and the Spending Review'

## Affordability of the Equipment Plan – Risk and Uncertainty

We have assessed the cost of the Equipment Plan on a comparable basis to last year. As ever, the figures outlined below are based on the position at the end of Financial Year 22/23. These forecasts include adjustments for expected future savings, efficiencies, and delivery constraints.

	Planned Pressure	Impact of inflation	Impact of Cost forex	Cost	spend
<i>Nuclear EP</i>	117.8	109.8	7.9 (7%)	+7.3	+0.4
<i>Conventional EP</i>	187.8	178.8	9.0 (5%)	+3.5	+1.8
<b>Overall</b>	<b>305.5</b>	<b>288.6</b>	<b>16.9 (6%)</b>	<b>+10.9</b>	<b>+2.2</b>

Figure 1: Headline financial position in the defence equipment plan

The total pressure in the Equipment Plan is £16.9bn, or just under 6% of the Equipment Plan, of which £10.9bn is due to inflation. The new nuclear ringfence arrangements mean that the remainder of the Equipment Plan is insulated from the impact of changes in the profile of nuclear spending. The non-nuclear element of the Equipment Plan has a pressure of £9bn or 5%.

We are forecasting increased costs for delivering the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and the Navy's shipbuilding programme. FCAS costs increases reflect the tri-nation Global Combat Air Programme agreement between the UK, Japan and Italy which is based on an estimated cost share between the partner nations. We have included further risk provision in the middle of the decade to reflect higher levels of uncertainty in these costs.

In considering the affordability of the Equipment Plan over a ten-year period, the department must consider a range of budget scenarios beyond the end of the current Spending Review period. The baseline defence planning assumption set by HMT is 0.5% real annual growth in the core budget. The Government has said it will aim to increase Defence spending to 2.5% of GDP as soon as economic and fiscal conditions allow<sup>4</sup>, however, the timetable for this commitment is uncertain. The higher scenario assumes we reach 2.5% by 32/33, starting from the expected post-SR period. Given the range of potential future scenarios, we have assumed a core scenario which includes additional funding for the nuclear enterprise but does not assume a path to 2.5%. This does not constitute an agreed long-term budget but is the scenario used for our affordability assessment. Figure 2 below shows the impact of these assumptions on the defence budget, Equipment Plan and overall pressure. In the best-case scenarios, the Equipment Plan is affordable over ten years, but would require spending plans to be reprofiled. In worst-case scenarios, the department will need to make significant savings across the period.

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


Figure 2: ranges of outcomes for cost and budget assumptions. Bold line reflects MOD core scenario. £m

<sup>4</sup> [Chancellor of the Exchequer, March 2023. Spring Budget Speech](#)

Inflation will continue to be a significant risk and we have been taking action to reduce our exposure. For example, we have used bring-forwards where these de-risked the programme, we continue to forward purchase foreign currency, and we are maximising use of our contractual mechanisms. On the latter, we have adapted at pace by implementing a change to commercial policy to make greater use of index-linked fixed price contracts because in the current environment, firms may be unwilling to bid on a firm-priced (non-indexed-linked) basis or charge MOD a very high premium for doing so. These measures have and will mitigate some of the impact of inflation.

We have also seen increased uncertainty around deliverability. Supply chain constraints and the supply of skilled labour in both MOD and its suppliers have meant that delivery timetables are more uncertain than in previous years. The department has adjusted its forecasts by £18bn (6%) to account for these risks, but we think there is further risk, particularly in the nuclear enterprise, as discussed above.

The department's Cost Analysis and Assurance Service have again produced independent cost estimates covering approximately half of the equipment programmes in delivery. This year these independent estimates are in aggregate £1.5bn lower than our delivery team's assessments, principally because of expected delays to major programmes.

Foreign exchange continues to be a major source of uncertainty. Although the department continues to forward purchase USD and EUR to mitigate this risk, a scenario where GBP weakened by 20% would result in an additional £7.9bn cost to the 10-year programme. We have used a wider range of forex outcomes in our affordability analysis this year to capture this risk (up from +/- 10% range last year).

Finally, we have updated our reporting on our savings and efficiencies assumptions. These adjustments reduce costs by £4.9bn or 1.5%, lower than the £7.1bn or 2.7% assumed in last year's report. This year we have improved our reporting by more clearly distinguishing lower and higher maturity savings plans, addressing a key concern from previous reports. The value of less mature plans has reduced from £1.6bn to £1.2bn. We therefore assess the risk associated with these embedded savings and efficiencies to be lower than in previous reports.

## Managing affordability

To ensure affordability, work is already underway to develop proposals to deliver the intent of DCP23 within our current budget. The additional funding from the Autumn Statement and Spring Budget is already allowing us to make new investments in stockpiles and munitions. In the Army, we are developing proposals which will allow us to modernise our forces by increasing investment in long-range fires, air defence, electronic warfare, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and logistics within current budget settlements. Funding constraints mean that to do this we will have to deprioritise or defer some existing programmes.

The department needs to prepare choices for different budget and cost scenarios, but it would be precipitous to cancel programmes now for decision in future Spending Reviews. To reduce the risk to value for money, the department is monitoring levels of contractually committed spend carefully and continues to operate a robust approvals framework to ensure new commitments do not constrain our ability to reduce costs in the future or to choose to fund different capabilities. We ensure that we maintain substantial uncommitted headroom over the period of the plan; on average 25% is currently committed.




Figure 3: costs by commitment status in the Equipment Plan against budget, £m


We are also progressing with our ambitious acquisition reform agenda, which will build greater agility into our processes for prioritising and allocating resources. This means building in the financial headroom to respond to changing needs so we can iteratively develop capabilities and declaring ceiling costs to industry for new capabilities. We are also progressing the Sheldon Report's recommendations on amending the confidence levels used to assess milestone approvals dates; this will also have an impact on project costings within the Equipment Plan.

I would welcome the committee's views on how we best update on the department's equipment affordability position in the future. The format we introduced and have adapted since 2012 may no longer be suitable for the future given the significant changes to the funding mechanisms for the Defence Nuclear Enterprise; the difficulty of reporting a single, timely long-term position for a plan with volatile assumptions; and our ongoing work to reform Defence acquisition and reset our relationship with industry.

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This letter and its enclosures will be published on GOV.UK. Copies will be placed in the library of the House of Commons and sent to the Chair of the Defence Select Committee and Comptroller and Auditor General.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D Williams', with a horizontal line underneath.

**DAVID WILLIAMS**

## Equipment Plan 2023 supplementary data tables

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Note that figures may not sum due to rounding

**ASSESSMENT OF AFFORDABILITY**

Table 1 presents the Department's assessment of the affordability of the Equipment Plan at April 2023. This is based on the central estimate of costs (detail in Table 2) and indicative variations from this cost forecast if risks or opportunities materialise. The central estimate of costs is presented in more detail in Table 2, with assumptions on foreign currency demand and efficiency savings shown in Tables 3 and 4. The potential sources of variations in costs are presented in Table 5. The available spending for the EP is shown in Table 6.

Comparisons are provided with equivalent figures from Equipment Plan 2022.

**Table 1 Summary of forecast cost, available spending and affordability**

£billions	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22
<b>Total Equipment Plan</b>													
Forecast cost (central estimate)	24.7	27.8	29.2	31.1	31.9	33.0	32.6	32.4	31.6	31.4	305.5	239.8	65.8
Total available spending (indicative budget)	23.7	24.8	25.3	26.5	28.2	29.5	30.7	32.5	34.7	32.7	288.6	242.3	46.3
<b>Implied variance to budget</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>4.6</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>(0.1)</b>	<b>(3.2)</b>	<b>(1.3)</b>	<b>16.9</b>	<b>(2.6)</b>	<b>19.5</b>
<i>as % budget</i>	<i>4.04%</i>	<i>11.99%</i>	<i>15.30%</i>	<i>17.31%</i>	<i>13.26%</i>	<i>11.64%</i>	<i>6.14%</i>	<i>-0.27%</i>	<i>-9.16%</i>	<i>-3.83%</i>	<i>5.86%</i>	<i>-1.06%</i>	
Additional cost if all risks materialise	1.8	1.7	1.8	2.0	1.5	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.2	12.9	9.9	2.9
Revised variance if all risks materialise	2.7	4.7	5.7	6.6	5.3	4.5	3.0	0.8	(2.4)	(1.1)	29.8	7.3	22.4
<i>as % budget</i>	<i>11.56%</i>	<i>18.80%</i>	<i>22.34%</i>	<i>24.75%</i>	<i>18.67%</i>	<i>15.37%</i>	<i>9.69%</i>	<i>2.56%</i>	<i>-6.80%</i>	<i>-3.30%</i>	<i>10.32%</i>	<i>3.03%</i>	
Reduction in costs if all opportunities materialise	(0.7)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)	(1.0)	(1.2)	(1.5)	(1.8)	(2.0)	(9.3)	(4.4)	(4.9)
Revised variance if all opportunities materialise	0.3	2.6	3.6	4.4	3.5	2.5	0.7	(1.6)	(5.0)	(3.2)	7.6	(7.0)	14.6
<i>as % budget</i>	<i>1.06%</i>	<i>10.44%</i>	<i>14.09%</i>	<i>16.58%</i>	<i>12.36%</i>	<i>8.42%</i>	<i>2.16%</i>	<i>-4.83%</i>	<i>-14.38%</i>	<i>-9.90%</i>	<i>2.64%</i>	<i>-2.89%</i>	
<b>Nuclear Equipment Plan</b>													
Forecast cost (central estimate)	8.6	9.9	11.6	12.3	12.6	12.8	12.5	12.6	12.2	12.7	117.8	n/a	
Total available spending (indicative budget)	8.6	9.1	9.5	10.0	11.0	11.9	11.7	12.0	12.5	13.6	109.8	n/a	
<b>Implied variance to budget</b>	<b>(0.1)</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>2.1</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>(0.9)</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>n/a</b>	
<b>Conventional Equipment Plan</b>													
Forecast cost (central estimate)	16.1	17.9	17.6	18.7	19.3	20.1	20.1	19.8	19.4	18.8	187.8	n/a	
Total available spending (indicative budget)	15.1	15.7	15.8	16.5	17.1	17.6	19.0	20.5	22.3	19.1	178.8	n/a	
<b>Implied variance to budget</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>(0.7)</b>	<b>(2.9)</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>n/a</b>	



**Table 2 Forecast cost (central estimate)**

£billions	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22
<b>Project cost estimates assured by delivery agents</b>	<b>27.4</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>30.6</b>	<b>30.4</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>28.8</b>	<b>27.9</b>	<b>27.2</b>	<b>293.8</b>	<b>226.7</b>	<b>67.1</b>
<i>of which cost estimates before in-delivery efficiencies</i>	29.3	32.2	32.3	32.1	31.7	32.0	30.5	29.8	28.9	28.0	306.8	236.8	70.0
<i>of which in-delivery efficiency benefits</i>	(1.8)	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(13.0)	(10.1)	(2.9)
Project cost estimates not yet delegated to delivery agents (inc corrections and transfers)	0.9	0.7	1.2	2.7	3.5	4.1	5.1	5.5	5.2	5.7	34.6	33.3	1.3
Adjustment for delivery realism	(3.2)	(3.0)	(2.2)	(1.7)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.3)	(1.3)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(18.0)	(13.2)	(4.8)
Planned cost reductions (with plans)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	0.0	(0.5)	(2.1)	1.6
Planned cost reductions (without plans)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(1.2)	(1.6)	0.4
Further efficiencies	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(3.2)	(3.4)	0.2
<b>Forecast cost (central estimate)</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>27.8</b>	<b>29.2</b>	<b>31.1</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>32.6</b>	<b>32.4</b>	<b>31.6</b>	<b>31.4</b>	<b>305.5</b>	<b>239.8</b>	<b>65.8</b>

Notes: TLBs are responsible for providing 10-year cost forecasts to Head Office for the Plan. These forecasts have three components: 1) Forecasts generated and assured by delivery organisations, for projects delegated by TLBs; 2) Forecasts generated and assured by TLBs for elements of the Plan not delegated to delivery organisations and 3) central technical adjustments. Both TLBs and delivery organisations adjust forecasts to reflect likely delivery across their portfolios of projects based on experience from previous years - these adjustments are referred to as management adjustments for delivery realism.

**Table 3 Expected cost of foreign currency in the Plan and sensitivity to changes in exchange rates**

£ billions	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22
Expected cost at most likely rates (April 23)	4.8	4.7	4.4	4.0	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.3	36.8	31.2	5.6
20% weakening	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	7.9	2.8	5.2
20% strengthening	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(5.3)	(2.3)	(3.0)

**Table 4 Efficiency savings targets and expected delivery over the 10 years of the plan**

£ billions	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22
Total forecast benefits	(2.2)	(1.9)	(1.9)	(1.8)	(1.7)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.2)	(1.0)	(16.2)	(13.5)	(2.7)
<i>of which high confidence initiatives included in forecast costs</i>	(1.8)	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.5)	(1.4)	(1.2)	(1.1)	(1.0)	(0.9)	(0.8)	(13.0)	(10.1)	(2.9)
<i>of which lower confidence initiatives included in forecast costs</i>	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(3.2)	(3.4)	0.2

**Table 5 Risks and opportunities detail**

£billions	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22
<u>Plausible potential increases in cost</u>													
Project cost estimates assured by delivery agents *	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.0	0.0	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.5)	2.8	5.2	(2.3)
Adjustment for delivery realism	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.6	1.5	0.2
Further efficiencies (not yet included in project cost estimates)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.5	(0.1)
Unfavourable changes in exchange rates for foreign currencies (up to 20%)	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	7.9	2.8	5.2
<b>Total plausible increase in costs</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>12.9</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>2.9</b>
<u>Further potential increases and adjustments</u>													
Project cost estimates not yet delegated to delivery agents (inc corrections and transfers)	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.9	1.2	1.5	0.7	0.6	0.7	7.1	2.7	4.5
Planned cost reductions (not yet included in project cost estimates)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	(0.3)
Dreadnought contingency arrangement **	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.4)	(0.0)	(0.0)	0.0	0.0	0.5	(2.8)	(1.5)	(1.3)
<u>Plausible potential reductions in cost</u>													
Project cost estimates assured by delivery agents	0.0	0.4	0.6	0.7	0.6	(0.1)	(0.4)	(0.7)	(1.2)	(1.4)	(1.5)	-	(1.5)
Adjustment for delivery realism	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(0.2)	(2.2)	(1.5)	(0.7)
Further efficiencies (not yet included in project cost estimates)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.3)	(0.7)	0.4
Favourable changes in exchange rates for foreign currencies (up to 10%)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.6)	(0.7)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(5.3)	(2.3)	(3.0)
<b>Total plausible decrease in costs</b>	<b>(0.7)</b>	<b>(0.4)</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>(0.2)</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>	<b>(1.0)</b>	<b>(1.2)</b>	<b>(1.5)</b>	<b>(1.8)</b>	<b>(2.0)</b>	<b>(9.3)</b>	<b>(4.4)</b>	<b>(4.9)</b>
<u>Further potential reductions</u>													
Project cost estimates not yet delegated to delivery agents (inc corrections and transfers)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(0.8)	(0.7)	(0.8)	(4.9)	(3.0)	(1.9)
Planned cost reductions (not yet included in project cost estimates)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.5)	0.4

**Table 6 Available spending for the Equipment Plan**

£billions	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22
Equipment Procurement Planning	10.7	10.6	11.5	12.5	13.5	13.9	12.8	12.3	10.2	11.5	119.6	117.2	2.3
Equipment Support Plan	11.5	11.5	11.4	11.2	10.9	11.3	11.8	12.5	16.3	11.3	119.8	119.3	0.5
Head office funding	1.5	2.7	2.5	2.7	3.7	4.3	6.0	7.7	8.3	9.8	49.3	5.8	43.5
<b>Total planned spending</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>28.2</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>30.7</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>34.7</b>	<b>32.7</b>	<b>288.6</b>	<b>242.3</b>	<b>46.3</b>

**SECTOR ANALYSIS  
OF PLANNED  
SPENDING**

Top Level Budgets (TLB) in MOD allocate their equipment budget to the individual delivery organisation teams responsible for delivering equipment and support projects. In DE&S these project teams are grouped into 'Operating Centres' based on the type of equipment delivered. Table 7 shows the breakdown of TLB planned spending for the Plan by TLB, while Table 8 presents their planned spending by the seven main DE&S operating centres, Defence Digital and the SDA. Table 9 shows spending on the Equipment Plan since 2015/16 and presents this in the context of 10-year spending plans over time.

**Table 7 Planned spending split by Commands**

Commands £billions	Plan	Committed/Uncommitted	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22	
<b>Air Command</b>	<b>EPP</b>	Committed	1.0	0.7	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	3.0	5.5	(0.5)	
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.1	6.8	6.1	(0.6)	
	<b>ESP</b>	Committed	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.3	14.7	16.8	(1.2)
		Uncommitted	0.2	0.4	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.2	10.0	7.8	1.7
<b>Army Command</b>	<b>EPP</b>	Committed	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	6.7	5.8	(1.0)	
		Uncommitted	0.9	1.0	1.4	2.3	2.8	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	23.0	22.9	2.1	
	<b>ESP</b>	Committed	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	2.7	2.8	(0.2)	
		Uncommitted	0.5	0.4	0.6	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	10.2	9.7	1.0	
<b>DNO</b>	<b>EPP</b>	Committed	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.0	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	0.0	0.7	3.0	(1.5)	
		Uncommitted	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.7	4.0	35.1	28.3	4.2	
	<b>ESP</b>	Committed	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.2	2.1	24.1	16.3	5.7	
		Uncommitted	(0.2)	(0.2)	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	2.9	10.5	(5.2)	
<b>Navy Command</b>	<b>EPP</b>	Committed	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.2	9.7	4.1	6.3	
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.6	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	(0.2)	7.0	10.9	(6.0)	
	<b>ESP</b>	Committed	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	5.5	5.3	(0.9)	
		Uncommitted	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.1	2.4	4.1	1.7	19.4	17.8	1.0	
<b>Strategic Command</b>	<b>EPP</b>	Committed	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.9	0.0	
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.1	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	7.1	9.5	(2.8)	
	<b>ESP</b>	Committed	1.2	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	4.8	4.2	(0.4)	
		Uncommitted	1.4	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.9	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.2	1.9	19.1	20.4	(1.0)	
<b>Strategic Programmes</b>	<b>EPP</b>	Committed	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	3.3	3.5	0.2	
		Uncommitted	0.6	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.5	2.6	2.4	2.9	0.8	2.8	16.3	13.8	2.1	
	<b>ESP</b>	Committed	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.3	(0.1)	
		Uncommitted	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	2.6	0.6	5.8	3.9	0.0	
<b>Grand Total</b>			<b>22.2</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>22.9</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>22.9</b>	<b>239.4</b>	<b>236.5</b>	<b>2.8</b>	

Table 8 Planned spending split by Operating Centres

OFFICIAL

OC £billions	Plan	Commitment level	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33	EP23 10 year total	EP22 10 year total	Change from EP22
Air Support	EPP	Committed	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	1.7	(0.3)
		Uncommitted	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.4
	ESP	Committed	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	9.9	9.1	0.7
		Uncommitted	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.6	(1.0)	2.4	4.6	(2.1)
Combat Air	EPP	Committed	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	2.3	3.5	(0.3)
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.8	(0.1)	4.9	1.4	(0.7)
	ESP	Committed	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	4.2	5.3	(0.4)
		Uncommitted	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	1.0	(0.2)	5.8	6.2	(0.9)
Defence Digital	EPP	Committed	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.7	0.1
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	10.2	9.6	0.4
	ESP	Committed	0.8	0.5	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	(0.0)	(0.0)	1.9	2.4	0.3
		Uncommitted	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	1.7	15.9	14.2	(0.3)
Helicopters	EPP	Committed	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	-	-	1.7	0.8	(0.0)
		Uncommitted	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	1.4	1.8	(0.2)
	ESP	Committed	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	0.1
		Uncommitted	0.1	0.1	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	5.8	6.0	0.1
Integrated Battlespace	EPP	Committed	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.0
		Uncommitted	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	2.5	2.5
	ESP	Committed	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.9	0.8	0.1
		Uncommitted	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.1	3.0	2.9	0.1
Land Equipment	EPP	Committed	0.8	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	4.9	5.0	(1.1)
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.1	6.7	5.6
	ESP	Committed	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.5	(0.3)
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	5.2	5.7
Nuclear Enterprise	EPP	Committed	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.0	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.0)	0.0	0.8	3.0	(1.5)
		Uncommitted	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.7	4.0	35.0	28.3	4.1
	ESP	Committed	3.1	3.2	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.2	26.0	16.9	6.0
		Uncommitted	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.4	9.7	14.6	(4.8)
Ships	EPP	Committed	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.2	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.4	0.2	9.7	4.0	6.2
		Uncommitted	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	2.9	5.6	(4.3)
	ESP	Committed	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	2.3	1.4	0.1
		Uncommitted	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.2	9.9	9.9	0.5
Weapons	EPP	Committed	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.1	0.1	-	-	3.1	3.8	(0.3)
		Uncommitted	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.6	0.6	1.3	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	6.4	6.8	(0.3)
	ESP	Committed	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.0	0.2
		Uncommitted	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	3.4	5.9	(2.6)
Other	EPP	Committed	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.4
		Uncommitted	0.4	(0.0)	0.9	1.8	2.8	3.3	3.5	3.9	2.1	4.8	23.5	28.7	(2.1)
	ESP	Committed	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	2.9	6.6	(3.9)
		Uncommitted	(0.7)	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.2)	0.5	1.1	4.4	2.3	6.4	(1.0)	7.4
<b>Grand Total</b>			<b>22.2</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>22.9</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>24.4</b>	<b>25.2</b>	<b>24.7</b>	<b>24.8</b>	<b>26.4</b>	<b>22.9</b>	<b>239.4</b>	<b>236.5</b>	<b>2.8</b>

Table 9 Outturn for the Equipment Plan since 2015/16

£ billions	15/16	16/17	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	22/23	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	32/33
Outturn	14.7	14.7	15.3	16.2	16.3	18.1	19.9	21.7										
EP16		14.6	15.9	16.5	17.3	18.5	19.1	18.9	19.1	19.0	18.9							
EP17			15.3	16.0	17.2	18.4	18.8	18.6	19.1	18.8	18.7	19.0						
EP18				15.9	17.2	18.7	19.2	18.8	19.5	19.1	18.9	19.1	20.1					
EP19					16.2	18.6	19.8	19.4	19.5	19.6	19.1	19.0	18.9	18.4				
EP20						17.1	18.3	18.8	19.4	20.0	19.6	19.6	19.4	19.0	19.1			
EP21							21.3	22.3	22.1	22.4	22.4	23.5	24.8	25.3	26.7	27.1		
EP22								22.0	21.7	22.3	22.4	23.5	24.4	25.4	26.2	26.8	27.7	
EP23									23.7	24.8	25.3	26.5	28.2	29.5	30.7	32.5	34.7	32.7

# Project Performance Summary Table 2021

Portfolio	Project	Description	Cost							Time						Key User Requirements (KURs)						
			Expected cost to completion at approval (£m)	Current forecast cost to completion (£m)	Total cost variation to completion (£m)	In-year variations attributed to FOREIGN EXCHANGE (FOREX) (£m)	In-year variations not attributed to 'Delivery Organisations' (exc: FOREX) (£m)	In-year variations attributed to 'Delivery Organisations' (exc: FOREX) (£m)	In-year change on costs to completion (£m)	Expected In-Service Date at approval	Current forecast In-Service Date	Total time variation against approval (months)	In-year variations not attributed to 'Delivery Organisations' (months)	In-year variations attributed to 'Delivery Organisations' (months)	Total In-year change to In-Service Date (months)	Number of Key User Reqs	To be met	To be met, with risks	Total number of Key User Reqs to be met	Not to be met	In-year change, to be met, with risks	In-year change - not to be met
<b>DEFENCE EQUIPMENT &amp; SUPPORT (DE&amp;S)</b>																						
-	<b>AAV (Specialist Vehicles)</b>	Armoured Fighting Vehicle	5,480	5,418	-61	0	2	37	40	Jul-20	Dec-25	65	31	14	45	11	0	11	11	0	0	0
-	<b>Apache Capability Sustainment Programme</b>	Sustainment of Attack Helicopter	1,778	1,776	-2	55	24	17	96	Apr-22	May-23	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
-	<b>Challenger Life Extension Programme</b>	Main Battle Tank	1,422	1,453	30	2	35	8	45	Nov-27	Nov-27	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	10	0	0	0
-	<b>E7 Wedgetail</b>	Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft	2,156	1,943	-212	29	0	24	53	Dec-23	Dec-24	12	0	9	9	8	8	0	8	0	0	0
-	<b>Brimstone 3B</b>	Sustainment Programme of Air to Ground Missile	521	592	72	0	24	50	73	Oct-22	Jun-26	44	0	16	16	8	8	0	8	0	0	0
-	<b>Brimstone 3B</b>	Sustainment Programme of Air to Ground Missile	347	334	-13	0	38	-20	17	ISD not set at Main Gate						11	8	1	9	2	0	0
-	<b>Spear Capability 3</b>	Fighter Air to Ground Missile	1,401	1,432	30	1	0	46	48	Jun-27	Jun-27	0	0	0	0	8	8	0	8	0	0	0
-	<b>ASRAM Sustainment (MS1)</b>	Sustainment Programme of Air to Air Missile	415	406	-9	0	-5	0	-5	Nov-18	Apr-22	41	0	0	0	8	8	0	8	0	0	0
-	<b>Chinook Capability Sustainment Programme</b>	<b>Chinook CSP</b>	1,478	1,629	151	50	0	-3	47	Mar-26	Jun-29	39	0	0	0	12	12	0	12	0	0	0
-	<b>Mechanised Infantry Vehicle (MIV)</b>	<b>Mechanised Infantry Vehicle</b>	4,076	3,876	-200	-20	-16	-7	-43	Oct-25	Oct-25	0	0	0	0	13	13	0	13	0	0	0
-	<b>Protector</b>	Unmanned Aircraft	704	1,132	428	35	29	10	74	Jul-21	Nov-23	28	0	0	0	14	14	0	14	0	0	0
-	<b>Fleet Solid Support</b>	Fleet Solid Support	1,600	1,600	0	0	0	0	0	Apr-31	Apr-31	0	0	0	0	10	10	0	10	0	0	0
-	<b>Type 26 Frigates</b>	Global Combat Ship	10,866	11,742	877	0	644	0	644	Oct-27	Oct-28	12	0	0	0	10	1	9	10	0	0	0
-	<b>Type 31 Frigates</b>	General Purpose Frigate	2,161	2,340	180	0	128	52	181	May-27	May-27	0	0	0	0	11	11	0	11	0	0	0
<b>DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPORT (DE&amp;S) TOTAL</b>			<b>34,404</b>	<b>35,674</b>	<b>1,270</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>903</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>1,268</b>	-	-	<b>254</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>SUBMARINE DELIVERY AGENCY (SDA)</b>																						
-	<b>Core Production Capability</b>	<b>Core Manufacturing Facility</b>	1,385	2,020	634	0	0	197	197	Jun-26	Oct-25	-8	0	0	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	0
-	<b>Dreadnought</b>	<b>Balistic Submarine</b>	21,938	23,630	1,692	17	0	1,674	1,691	ISD not set at Main Gate						2	2	0	2	0	0	0
<b>SUBMARINE DELIVERY AGENCY (SDA) TOTAL</b>			<b>23,323</b>	<b>25,650</b>	<b>2,326</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,871</b>	<b>1,888</b>	ISD not set at Main Gate						<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>INFORMATION SYSTEMS &amp; SERVICES (ISS)</b>																						
-	<b>SKYNET GA</b>	UK Military Satellite Communication Capability	844	764	-80	0	0	-44	-44	Aug-26	Aug-26	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	6	0	0	0
<b>DEFENCE DIGITAL TOTAL</b>			<b>844</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>-80</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-44</b>	<b>-44</b>	ISD not set at Main Gate						<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>TOTAL S</b>			<b>58,572</b>	<b>62,088</b>	<b>3,516</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>903</b>	<b>2,042</b>		ISD not set at Main Gate						<b>142</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>OVERALL TOTAL</b>									<b>3,112</b>	ISD not set at Main Gate						<b>99%</b>						

Publication notes:

Rounding: The values within each field in the cost table are rounded to the nearest £1m.

In-Service Date (ISD): is defined by each project within its Business Case and can be Initial Operating Capability (IOC) or Equipment Delivery Date (EDD).

Defence Equipment & Support

"Ajax: The forecasted ISD shown in the table reflects the approval of a redefined Initial Operating Capability (IOC) for the programme, that better reflects the operational demands of the Army."  
"

Brimstone 3B: As an outcome of the Defence Integrated 21 Review an ISD will no longer be set at Main Gate 2 due to the decision to Off-Ramp B3B from Apache.

Protector: The programme is currently being re-baselined and a Review Note will be submitted during 2023.

Type 26 Frigates: The information now reflects both Batch 1 and 2 approvals, and covers the complete order for eight vessels, Batch 1 for three of the ships and Batch 2 for the remaining five.

Type 31: Includes an £175m approval increase since PPST 22. The uplift reflects early buy of facilities and technical support essential to successfully integrate all aspects of the combat and communications systems into the T31 frigate.

Submarine Delivery Agency

Dreadnought: Information reflects the phased approval regime and the current Approved Budgetary Limit (up to and including Delivery Phase 3+) for the programme. The overall budget envelope for the Dreadnought programme was set at SDSR15 at £31Bn plus a £10Bn contingency.

Foreign Exchange Rate (FOREX) - To be updated

Eight projects within the PPST population have a separate foreign exchange rate (FOREX) risk provision held outside of their approvals to deal with potential FOREX volatility. Where there have been FOREX variations on projects since approval these have been included in the projects "Current forecast cost to completion" figures to provide an aggregate forecast cost to deliver the EP 22.

Apache: £253m FOREX variations incurred since approval. Apache has a separate FOREX risk provision held outside of approval of £221m.

Brimstone 3b: £1m FOREX variations incurred since approval. Brimstone 3b has a separate FOREX risk provision held outside of approval of £4m.

Chinook CSP: £22m FOREX variations incurred since approval: Chinook has a separate FOREX risk provision held outside of the approval of £95m.

E7 Wedgetail: £117m FOREX variations incurred since approval. E7 Wedgetail has a separate FOREX risk provision held outside of the approval of £133m.

Protector: £115m FOREX variations incurred since approval. Protector has a separate FOREX risk provision held outside of approval of £58m.

Three further projects that have a FOREX risk provision held outside their approval's limit but have not yet exceeded this risk provision are:

Challenger LEP: £35m

Spear Capability 3: £12m

Mechanised Inventory Vehicle: £91m

Chinook CSP: £95m