



House of Commons
International Trade Committee

**CPTPP: opportunities
and challenges for the
UK**

Sixth Report of Session 2022–23

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to the Report*

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The International Trade Committee

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Summary

We launched our inquiry into the UK's accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in November 2021. We had intended to report our findings to the House later in 2023, following examination of the UK's terms of accession. However, reorganisation of the House's Select Committees to mirror changes to the machinery of Government has necessitated us making our incomplete findings available to the House.

The UK has free trade agreements (FTAs) with nine of the eleven parties to the CPTPP. A key line of enquiry has therefore been to determine what accession to the CPTPP offers over bilateral FTAs with the remaining two countries. We began to examine gains in goods and services, and how the agreement's rules help improve the baseline of the trading environment. We have been unable to complete this inquiry and it is therefore difficult for us to provide a full estimate of these benefits. However, we note that there are clearly important areas where the CPTPP goes further than some existing agreements, including generous rules of origin, and prohibition of the requirement to maintain a local presence to deliver services.

It was suggested that the CPTPP could play a role in helping to shape trading rules and norms. Although our evidence is incomplete, there are areas on digital trade and the environment where the CPTPP has contributed to progress in multilateral fora. There are clear advantages in the UK contributing to these efforts, particularly as like-minded partners are turning to plurilateral blocs, rather than the lignified World Trade Organization, for digital and environmental policy innovation.

There are also opportunities within the CPTPP for the UK to show leadership and expertise, particularly in digital trade and environmental policy, where the UK has proven to be a global leader. It also needs to ensure that the CPTPP's structures support the UK's agenda by calling for a permanent CPTPP secretariat that can support enlargement and modification of the agreement.

The UK's accession to the CPTPP also comes with a set of challenges. Witnesses raised issues with the agreement's provisions for investment protection, intellectual property requirements, and food standards and animal welfare. The parts of the CPTPP which affect these areas are seemingly small and technical, but misalignment of these provisions with current practices in the UK could jeopardise important public policy aims and damage business confidence.

The Government has stated that the benefits of UK accession to the CPTPP will be amplified as new members join. However, it is also true that the accession of new members could amplify some of the challenges for the UK. In particular, we looked at the impact China's accession could have on the CPTPP's high standards; a risk which, though significant, the UK will be well placed to address given that accession to the CPTPP comes with the power of veto over prospective new members. However, before it assesses the merits of new applicants, the Government needs to outline as part of a single, comprehensive trade strategy how it intends to use its trade policy to achieve its broader strategic goals.

1 Introduction

The CPTPP and the UK

1. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) is a free trade agreement (FTA) comprising: Australia; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; Japan; Malaysia; Mexico; Peru; New Zealand; Singapore; and Vietnam. The CPTPP emerged from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement—a free trade agreement signed in 2006, which came to be known as the P4 after its four Pacific signatories: Brunei Darussalam; Chile; New Zealand; and Singapore.¹ In March 2010, Australia, Peru, the United States, and Vietnam launched formal talks to join the P4. Other countries joined during discussions: Malaysia in 2010; Canada and Mexico in 2012; and Japan in 2013. Negotiations concluded in 2015, and the agreement was signed in February 2016 as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).²

2. President Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP on his third day in office, following opposition to the agreement in America across the political spectrum.³ Consequently, the other signatories re-entered negotiations and suspended a handful of the TPP's provisions, most notably in the chapters on Investment and Intellectual Property. This modified version of the TPP was signed by the 11 remaining parties as the CPTPP on 8 March 2018, entering into force on: 30 December 2018 for Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Singapore; 14 January 2019 for Vietnam; 19 September 2021 for Peru; 29 November 2022 for Malaysia; and 21 February 2023 for Chile. The agreement has not been ratified, and is therefore not in force, in Brunei Darussalam.⁴

Our inquiry

3. Ahead of the UK's exit from the European Union, a Government consultation sought views on FTAs with Australia, New Zealand and the US, and on accession to the CPTPP. The Government's response to the consultation was published in July 2019.⁵ In February 2021, the UK became the first country formally to apply to join the CPTPP and has estimated that accession will raise UK GDP by 0.08%.⁶ Applications have since been made by: Ecuador; China; Costa Rica; Taiwan; and Uruguay.⁷ The existing parties to the CPTPP agreed, in June 2021, that the UK's accession could begin.⁸ In November 2021, with the intention of informing the House's consideration of the terms of accession, we launched an inquiry into the opportunities and challenges of the agreement for the UK.

1 [The Origins and Evolution of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Negotiations](#), Deborah Elms, November/December 2016; [TPP: What is it and why does it matter?](#), BBC News, 23 January 2017

2 [The TPP, Origins and Outcomes](#), Jeffrey J. Schott, 10 October 2018

3 [Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement](#), 23 January 2017

4 [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\)](#), Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed 4 August 2022; CPTPP, [Annex](#)

5 [Public consultation on the UK potentially seeking accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\)](#), Department for International Trade, 18 July 2019, page 6

6 [Formal Request to Commence UK Accession Negotiations to CPTPP](#), Department for International Trade, 1 February 2021; [UK Accession to the CPTPP: the UK's Strategic Approach](#), Department for International Trade, June 2021, page 60

7 [Common questions](#), New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, accessed 3 April 2023

8 [UK welcomes CPTPP nations' invitation to begin accession](#), Department for International Trade, 2 June 2021

4. We received 21 pieces of written evidence and held three public evidence sessions to inform this inquiry. We are grateful to all the witnesses who formally gave written or oral evidence; their names can be found at the back of this report. We are also grateful to the staff of the British Missions in Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam who facilitated our visit to the region in October and November 2022 to meet Ministers, business leaders, non-governmental organisations, and academics to inform our work.
5. Over the course of the last 18 months, we also received a series of private briefings from senior officials at the Department for International Trade. These briefings provided a forum for frank discussions on the progress of the UK's accession. As such, they provided useful context to our work and helped us determine avenues of enquiry. We are very grateful to the Department for its assistance in this matter. We are also very grateful to Professor Christopher Dent, who served as Specialist Adviser to us during the early stages of this inquiry.⁹
6. The House's decision of 27 March 2023 that the International Trade Committee should be dissolved, and that the Department for Business and Trade should be scrutinised by the Business and Trade Committee to reflect changes to the Machinery of Government, has necessarily brought our work, including this inquiry, to a premature conclusion. While our findings are therefore incomplete, we hope they are nonetheless useful to Members as they examine the CPTPP over the coming months. The Government's response to this Report should be directed to the Business and Trade Committee.

9 Professor Christopher Dent's declaration of interests can be found in the [Formal Minutes of the International Trade Committee 2022–23](#).

2 Areas of focus for the UK

Delivering for UK businesses and consumers

7. The UK already has FTAs with nine of the 11 CPTPP countries: Australia; Canada; Chile; Japan; Mexico; New Zealand; Peru; Singapore; and Vietnam. The UK's agreements with Australia and New Zealand were its first newly negotiated FTAs following exit from the EU, although neither is yet in force. The remainder are continuity agreements replicating FTAs to which the UK was party as a member of the EU.¹⁰ Notably, the UK's accession to the CPTPP would put the UK on FTA terms immediately with Malaysia, and eventually with Brunei Darussalam, assuming the latter ratifies and implements the agreement. We have sought to examine where else the CPTPP offers opportunities for the UK above and beyond those in its bilateral agreements.

Trade in goods

8. In its Strategic Approach document, the Department for International Trade noted that “based upon recent patterns of trade and CPTPP tariff schedules, UK accession to CPTPP could increase the proportion of UK exports eligible for tariff-free access”.¹¹ The Department also suggested that accession could potentially improve “access to some additional tariff rate quotas”.¹² However, the UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) suggested that “tariff elimination for goods under the CPTPP [does] not seem to provide new opportunities to the UK” and also noted that even if the terms of the tariff rate quotas (TRQs) under the CPTPP were more generous than those of the UK's bilateral agreements

[...] this would only concern a handful of products, which do not amount to very significant values of trade [as] the tariff elimination commitments in the UK's bilateral FTAs with the CPTPP countries are not dissimilar to those currently in place for the contracting parties to the CPTPP.¹³

Rules of origin

9. Products are eligible for trade under the preferential rate specified in the tariff schedule if they originate from within the CPTPP, a qualification which is determined by compliance with the agreement's rules of origin. Generally speaking, these rules require a product to: be wholly produced in the CPTPP; contain non-originating materials that constitute less than 10% of its value; be processed within the CPTPP to the extent that it has become a new product; or contain originating, or non-originating, components which meet a pre-determined percentage of the product's value.¹⁴ The TPP specifies which method, or methods, may be used for each type of product (see Figure 1) and allows for accumulation: goods originating in one party can be treated as goods of the other parties.

10 Several of these deviated slightly from the original EU agreements, for example, the UK's agreement with Japan contained notable new provisions on digital and data and financial services (See: International Trade Committee, Second Report of Session 2019-21, [UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement](#), HC 914, para 8); Negotiations to expand on the provisions of the UK's rollover agreements with Canada and Mexico are underway.

11 [UK Accession to the CPTPP: the UK's Strategic Approach](#), Department for International Trade, June 2021, page 35

12 Department for International Trade ([TPP0003](#)), para 13

13 UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#)), para 19

14 TPP, [Chapter 3](#)

We also heard from Eduardo Pedrosa, Secretary General, Pacific Economic Co-operation Council, that the CPTPP's arrangements for certification of goods as originating was significant:

[...] under most FTAs, you would need a chamber of commerce or someone else to certify that you are compliant with the rule of origin. Under the CPTPP rules, you can actually self-certify that you have complied. Who checks that afterwards? It will take a better man than me. It is about 200 pages of product-specific rules of origin. They are fairly generous, and it was really designed and built to encourage trade amongst the various CPTPP members.¹⁵

Figure 1: How do CPTPP Rules of Origin work?




Figure 1: Simplified flow chart adapted from [Guide to obtaining preferential tariff treatment when exporting and importing goods using CPTPP](#), Australian Government, 15 September 2021, and [Chapter 3](#) of, and [Annex 3-D](#) to, the TPP.

10. Whether the agreement's rules of origin are sufficiently generous to encourage UK trade within the CPTPP is a different matter, on which witnesses were conflicted. The National Farmers' Union (NFU) and the Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) each felt that the agreement's provisions for accumulation of origin were of little benefit to UK agriculture due to the perishability of goods, and the expense of

transporting them out of the region.¹⁶ However, it is possible that the agreement's rules of origin prove more beneficial to other sectors. Dr Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, Assistant Professor and Head of the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, told us that they could enable the UK to be a preferred location for investment, and Amanda Tickel, Partner, Head of Tax & Trade Policy, Deloitte LLP, told us in written evidence that the agreement's rules of origin could prove administratively and financially advantageous for UK manufacturers "given the typically complex and lengthy supply chains often utilised".¹⁷

Trade in services

11. In its Strategic Approach document, the Department for International Trade noted that

CPTPP contains modern rules governing trade in services, including key UK exports such as professional and business services and financial services. These modern rules remove barriers to market access and ensure UK services and service suppliers will be treated no less favourably than local services and service suppliers as well as those from any other CPTPP member or third country.¹⁸

12. In its written evidence, the UKTPO noted that the text of the CPTPP, compared with the UK's continuity agreements with CPTPP parties, has wider and deeper provisions, which are likely to provide more opportunities for businesses and establish a greater degree of legal certainty.¹⁹ It highlighted Article 10.6 of the TPP, which prohibits parties from requiring service suppliers to establish or maintain a local presence to conduct business. The UKTPO notes that this helps British service providers trade across borders and is an improvement on the UK-Japan CEPA, which does not contain such a provision.²⁰ However, the UKTPO notes that, generally speaking, the added value of UK membership of the CPTPP is minimal in relation to the emerging markets of Chile, Mexico, Peru and Vietnam, because

[...] the UK is already enjoying policy and regulatory reforms in the emerging markets triggered by the CPTPP and other FTAs. This is because developing countries generally use FTAs as a political leverage for economic policy reforms while they try to maximise benefits of preferential market access to developed countries. These include the EU's FTAs (to which the UK used to be a member) and current UK bilateral FTAs with these countries.²¹

16 National Farmers' Union ([TPP0023](#)), para 34; Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) ([TPP0005](#)), para 9

17 [Q18](#); Amanda Tickel (Partner, Head of Tax & Trade Policy at Deloitte LLP) ([TPP0024](#)), para 8

18 [UK Accession to the CPTPP: the UK's Strategic Approach](#), Department for International Trade, June 2021, page 11

19 UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#)), para 19

20 UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#)), para 19

21 UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#)), para 15

Maturity of the trading environment

13. The importance of the CPTPP as a builder of business confidence was highlighted to us by Paul Baker, CEO, International Economics Consulting, who said that

Businesses in general that are operating in foreign markets want to have some sort of predictability in the legal framework of the country in which they are operating, as well as guaranteed mechanisms for protecting investors' interests.²²

14. Mr Baker assessed that the commitments to transparency throughout the Environment Chapter had gone “virtually as far as any agreement [...] has gone to try to promote more confidence in the region”.²³ Mr Baker also noted that the Environment Chapter's encouragement of corporate social responsibility was comparable to other FTAs, but that it played a “small part in the equation” that affects the intrinsic risks of investments.²⁴

15. In its Strategic Approach document, the Department for International Trade noted that the CPTPP “sets coherent and consistent IP standards and rules across the region, benefitting businesses and consumers”.²⁵ We put this to Professor Kimberlee Weatherall, Professor of Law, University of Sydney, who assessed that the chapter:

[...] does not create or require members to create a common set of IP laws or rules. It sets a common baseline, but, beyond that, countries can have more extensive protection; they can vary in all kinds of different ways. From the perspective of promoting economic integration or reducing costs for business, it is very different to set a baseline versus setting a common set of rules. Businesses will continue to face different rules in every CPTPP country.

[...] Frankly, this 75-page chapter is a bit of a nightmare of legalese. There is a lot of ambiguity in a lot of the provisions. Some of the provisions simply defy sensible interpretation, like the trade secrets provision. In some cases, footnotes completely change the meaning of text so it is hard to understand.

Finally, the IP chapter adds to, rather than replaces, existing international obligations. [...]

Working out what any given country's obligations are depends on looking at a whole lot of different agreements. It is even true that in some cases the text is qualified in side letters [...] so you cannot even look at the text and know what the obligations are between two countries.²⁶

However, the more muted assessment from Dr Bobby Mukherjee, Chair, IP Federation Trade Working Group, was that while “conflicting obligations are unhelpful to business”, the variation between the CPTPP and the UK's agreements with Australia and New Zealand creates a “manageable” burden on businesses.²⁷

22 [Q107](#)

23 [Q108](#)

24 [Q110](#)

25 [UK Accession to CPTPP: The UK's Strategic Approach](#), Department for International Trade, April 2021, page 13

26 [Q64](#)

27 [Q66](#)

Developing trading rules and norms

16. In February, we took evidence on the future of the rules-based trading system: the set of norms, focused around the WTO, which seek to promote confidence and prosperity through equal and predictable treatment. Peter Ungphakorn told us that two of the WTO's core functions, the facilitation of consensus through negotiation, and the settlement of disputes, were “working pretty badly and are facing problems”.²⁸ He additionally noted that trade blocs, by addressing policy challenges, could pave the way for more widely-adopted provisions at the WTO, and could therefore play a confidence-building role, although he and Sam Lowe noted that this was not a panacea for the wider structural problems within the WTO.²⁹

17. We explored the influence of the CPTPP and heard that its imprint is noticeable on the texts of other trade agreements: it was the source for 30% of the text of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)³⁰; and a mapping exercise conducted for us by Professor Christopher Dent, International Political Economist, Edge Hill University, noted its similarity with the UK's new FTAs with Australia and New Zealand.³¹ While propagating the text of the CPTPP into other agreements might be one way for the UK to champion particular norms, Professor Dent, noting the United States' influence in the drafting of the agreement, questioned whether the UK is

[...] leaving one set of trade regulatory norms, or a regional group, as in the EU, simply to join, if we align most of our trade agreements and interests in the future around the Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific, another set that is dominated by the United States.³²

18. Professor Dent was sceptical that the UK is sufficiently influential to develop its own regulatory model across core chapters of trade agreements, such as intellectual property, investment, finance, and telecommunication. However, he noted that the UK could become a policy innovator in new areas alongside fellow innovative middle-power parties to the CPTPP, such as Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.³³ Indeed, the UK signed a Digital Economy Agreement with Singapore in 2022 which built upon the provisions of the CPTPP and was welcomed by Julian David, the CEO of techUK, as setting “a global benchmark for high-standard digital trade rules” and strengthening “the UK's leadership in digital trade policy”.³⁴ However, Professor Dent noted what he saw generally as the “relative lack of trade strategy in the UK Government in terms of setting down norms that they want to achieve and regularising practice”.³⁵ Before our work had to be curtailed, we considered two such areas where the UK might be able to leverage its expertise to regularise practice: digital trade; and the environment.

28 Evidence taken before the International Trade Committee, 1 February 2023, [Q2](#)

29 Evidence taken before the International Trade Committee, 1 February 2023, [Qq20–21](#)

30 [Q25](#) [Eduardo Pedrosa]

31 International Trade Committee, [UK Trade Negotiations: Agreement with Australia](#), Second Report of Session 2022–23, HC 117, Appendix 1; International Trade Committee, [UK Trade Negotiations: Agreement with New Zealand](#), Third Report of Session 2022–23, HC 78, Appendix 1

32 [Q23](#)

33 [Q24](#)

34 [Q39](#) [Sabina Ciofu]; [UK-Singapore Digital Economy Agreement comes into force](#), techUK, 14 June 2022

35 [Q23](#)

Digital trade

19. Dr Kati Suominen, CEO, Nextrade Group, noted that the CPTPP's e-commerce provisions "have been proliferating in other agreements and have been exported by the current members" which have contributed to "a set of global norms around digital trade".³⁶ We also heard in written evidence from the UKTPO that Australia, Japan and Singapore are "promoting core e-commerce rules derived from the CPTPP" at the WTO's Joint initiative on e-commerce, and that the UK, as a like-minded partner, would be expected to work to promote free trade and enhance the CPTPP "to become a major contributor of establishing global trade rules".³⁷

20. We also heard that there was a lot of scope for, and benefit to, the UK in contributing to digital rules within the CPTPP itself.³⁸ Dr Cosmina Dorobantu, Co-Director, Public Policy Programme, The Alan Turing Institute, told us that the UK's innovative academic work and regulatory practices were a "winning combination" that would allow the UK to "easily lead" on AI and other technologies and commented that "Regulation and governance are the low-hanging fruit. That is where I believe the UK should put its power and influence towards".³⁹ The UK might also be able to strengthen implementation of the chapter's provisions, which has so far been found to be incomplete.⁴⁰ Dr Kati Suominen told us that it would be important for the Government to carefully consider: the provisions the CPTPP could encompass; and how existing provisions could be implemented and monitored. In particular, Dr Suominen noted that the business community in the region could play an important and useful role in providing insights on how the agreement works in practice and on areas ripe for improvement.⁴¹

21. Sabina Ciofu, Associate Director, techUK, considered that the UK had developed a "pretty successful digital trade policy in just a few years" and that it had a lot of expertise to share, but that it was important to ensure that digital front-runners did not advance further without helping more nascent players close the gap.⁴² Both Sabina Ciofu and Dr Suominen considered that the alignment of the UK's trade policy with its development agenda was crucial in addressing this issue.⁴³ However, Sabina Ciofu also cautioned that the UK needed to be diplomatic in its approach by working to understand the differing perspectives of parties across the region, rather than take the position of an "arrogant lecturer", which could be counterproductive.⁴⁴

Environment

22. The CPTPP's Environment Chapter has also proved its relevance to the establishment of trading norms beyond the Indo-Pacific. Professor Stephanie Rickard, Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics, discussed the WTO's June 2022 multilateral agreement on fisheries subsidies:

36 [Q40](#)

37 UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#)), para 25

38 [Q60](#)

39 [Q58](#)

40 [Monitoring the Implementation of the CPTPP's E-commerce Chapter](#), Kati Suominen, October 2022, page 12

41 [Q56](#)

42 [Q57](#)

43 [Qq56–57](#)

44 [Q60](#)

The debates were intense. They could not even agree on the definition of a fish. [...] They got an agreement after 20 years and, in part, the CPTPP played a role in that. The CPTPP was able to bring agreed text to the table and say, “Look, here are the prohibitions that we have agreed. We already have a coalition of the willing”. All the CPTPP states went into those negotiations at the WTO and said, “We have agreed to these restrictions. Get on board”. I believe that the CPTPP played a critical role in getting that agreement at the WTO.⁴⁵

23. We also heard that the UK could leverage its influence to set rules and norms within the CPTPP itself. Witnesses told us that the CPTPP’s Environment Chapter contained a record (137) number of provisions and “provides a very good basis for tackling environmental questions”.⁴⁶ The chapter requires parties to the agreement to cooperate on: ozone-depleting substances; protection of the marine environment from ship pollution; trade and biodiversity; transition to a low emissions and resilient economy; marine capture fisheries; and conservation and trade.⁴⁷ However, the parties are not generally *required* to work towards a defined set of outcomes, or *bound* to a specific course of action, except on marine capture fisheries.⁴⁸ Consequently, we were initially sceptical that such loosely phrased provisions could facilitate meaningful environmental protections. However, witnesses told us that, far from being a hinderance, non-binding language could be a strength of the agreement. Professor Clara Brandi, Head of Research Programme, German Institute of Development and Sustainability, told us that

While, at first sight, these provisions seem less strong and less stringent than the binding ones, it can [...] be very valuable to have ongoing co-operation on issues such as energy efficiency, ship pollution and deforestation. It might not be possible at this point to agree on binding provisions, but having dialogue and co-operation channels can really make a difference [...]⁴⁹

24. Upon accession, the UK will be permitted to outline to the other parties its priorities for environmental cooperation.⁵⁰ Witnesses discussed two areas the UK could choose to focus its efforts:

- Professor Stephanie Rickard told us that the CPTPP contains language in ‘best efforts’ terms to prevent subsidies which create overcapacity. She suggested that the UK could work towards this goal and champion it as a new member of the CPTPP⁵¹; and
- Professor Brandi told us that the UK could “focus on environmental goods and services more extensively”, with a particular focus on expanding the existing provisions to address climate-related goods and services, which are absent from Article 20.18.⁵²

45 [Q129](#)

46 [Q94](#); [Q96](#)

47 TPP, [Articles 20.5, 20.6, 20.13, 20.15, and 20.17](#)

48 TPP, [Article 20.16](#)

49 [Q116](#)

50 TPP, [Article 20.12](#)

51 [Q124](#) [Professor Stephanie Rickard]

52 [Q124](#) [Professor Clara Brandi]; TPP, [Article 20.18](#)

25. However, Paul Baker noted that technical cooperation between developed and developing parties in the CPTPP, although potentially quite useful, was also quite a sensitive topic.⁵³ He also cautioned that the UK would need political support from the other parties for environmental initiatives, so would likely have to demonstrate that any cooperation under, or change to, the agreement was economically beneficial. Mr Baker's is an important reminder that an initiative, simply by virtue of being proposed by the UK, should not be considered a "done deal".⁵⁴

53 [Q114](#)

54 [Q115](#)

3 Possible obstacles for the UK

Compatibility with UK regulations and practices

Investment protection

26. The Investment Chapter outlines the rules governing Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) which may be invoked if an investor feels that a party to the agreement has: reneged on one of its investment obligations; and caused that investor loss or damage.⁵⁵ These provisions are controversial. While TheCityUK, in written evidence, stated that the protections ensured that UK service industries operating overseas have the same protections as local businesses,⁵⁶ others were highly critical. The Trade Justice Movement stated that “ISDS can have disastrous effects on the environment and a ‘chilling’ effect on regulation designed to combat climate change”.⁵⁷ The Business & Human Rights Resource Centre additionally criticised the provision for its opacity, stating that it allows “corporations to sue states through a secretive parallel legal system if government policies threaten their future profits—even if those policies are aimed at protecting human rights and the environment”.⁵⁸

27. The UK could seek to exclude the ISDS provisions through side letters with each party. However, the UK has bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with Singapore (since 1975), Malaysia (since 1988), Peru (since 1994), Chile (since 1997), Vietnam (since 2002), and Mexico (since 2007), each of which contains an ISDS clause.⁵⁹ These agreements belong to a group of ‘old generation’ international investment agreements which do not contain clauses on: health and environment; the right to regulate; or corporate social responsibility.⁶⁰ In contrast, the CPTPP contains ‘new generation’ investment provisions which seek to safeguard the parties’ “environmental, health or other regulatory objectives” and promote corporate social responsibility, although the latter is presented as a voluntary measure.⁶¹ Dr Joshua Paine, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol Law School, told us during our one-off evidence session on ISDS in January that

It is important that the UK considers the interaction of those pre-existing BITs with any application of the CPTPP chapter between the UK and those parties. Otherwise, even if you achieve a side letter excluding ISDS on the CPTPP—say, with Singapore—you will be left with ISDS under a much older, more dated and frankly less satisfactory investment treaty than is currently in place.⁶²

55 TPP, [Article 9.19](#)

56 TheCityUK ([TPP0018](#)), para 16

57 Trade Justice Movement ([TPP0019](#)), para 24

58 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre ([TPP0009](#)), para 16

59 [UK International Investment Agreements](#), Investment Policy Hub accessed 6 March 2023

60 UK Bilateral Investment Treaties with: [Singapore](#); [Malaysia](#); [Peru](#); [Chile](#); [Vietnam](#); and [Mexico](#). Accessed 6 March 2022

61 TPP, [Article 9.16](#) and [Article 9.17](#)

62 [Q25](#), evidence taken by the International Trade Committee, 18 January 2023

28. The inclusion of ISDS in the CPTPP proved especially controversial in New Zealand, which opted out of the mechanism by means of side-letters exchanged with five other member states.⁶³ Perhaps unsurprisingly, the New Zealand government has stated that, by mutual agreement, “ISDS will not apply between New Zealand and the UK should the UK accede to CPTPP”.⁶⁴ We are also aware of local news reports that Chile is attempting to negotiate a side-letter with the UK, excluding the ISDS clause between the two countries; and terminate its BIT with the UK.⁶⁵

Intellectual property

29. Under the terms of the CPTPP, parties must make patents available for new, inventive products or processes which have an industrial application. When determining whether such a product is new or innovative, the parties must disregard information in public disclosures made within a year of the patent application by, or directly via, the applicant.⁶⁶ This is known as the “grace period” and differs from practice in the UK where inventors can acquire patent protection in one of two ways (through a UK patent application; or through a European patent application) but not if the product has been publicly declared.⁶⁷ The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (CIPA) outlined to us its concern that this variation in practice could render UK membership of the CPTPP incompatible with continued UK membership of the European Patent Office and the European Patent Convention, which could cost the industry £740 million.⁶⁸ Lee Davies, Chief Executive, Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys, and Dr Bobby Mukherjee also noted that *prima facie* non-compliance with the EPC could put businesses in a position of uncertainty and could “undermine the UK’s global aspirations to be a technology and science superpower and to attract industry”.⁶⁹ CIPA and the IP Federation have each called for an exemption from the grace period for the UK for this reason, and have stated that there are good reasons for CPTPP members to want to keep the UK’s EPC commitments intact, given the

[...] tremendous value of the UK’s influence within the non-EU European Patent Convention on the development of European patent law and policy, including in patent law harmonisation initiatives, which is beneficial for existing CPTPP member states. The UK’s role is particularly valuable for countries with a common law tradition, such as Australia and Canada, for which the UK is often the sole advocate in Europe.⁷⁰

30. Despite the possible conflict, the IP Federation told us in written evidence that the principle of an internationally harmonised grace period with “suitable safeguards against

63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand), [“Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific: Partnership text and resources”](#); Side-letters exchanged with Peru and Australia fully exclude the use of ISDS, while those exchanged with Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Vietnam provide for dispute resolution, to avoid ISDS proceedings being initiated. See House of Lords International Agreements Committee, [UK accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership \(CPTPP\): Scrutiny of the Government’s Negotiating Objectives](#), HL (2021–22) 94, para 136

64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand), [“New Zealand-United Kingdom FTA Key Outcomes”](#), p 6

65 [\[Confidencial\] La sigilosa “side letter” que Ahumada negocia con el Reino Unido para permitir el acceso británico al CPTPP](#), Ex Ante, Eduardo Olivares C., 7 March 2023

66 [TPP, Articles 18.37, 18.38](#)

67 [Will the UK introduce a 12 Month Grace period for filing patent Applications?](#), Meissner Bolte, Samuel Giles, accessed 3 April 2023

68 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys ([TPP0013](#)), para 2

69 [Q85](#)

70 [Q90](#)

misuse and to preserve legal certainty” was to be welcomed and Dr Bobby Mukherjee commented that he was optimistic that this could be achieved through existing multilateral processes.⁷¹ However, Professor Kimberlee Weatherall was more sceptical, commenting that “patent system harmonisation has been an ongoing goal for decades and decades, so I will not be holding my breath for immediate changes”.⁷²

Food standards and animal welfare

31. One of the features of UK risk regulation is that “conclusive scientific proof of the existence of a hazard and of the pathway by which a risk will materialise is not required for regulators to act”.⁷³ Several witnesses raised concerns that this “precautionary principle” is contravened by provisions in the CPTPP. Article 7.9 requires Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures to either: “conform to the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations”; or be “based on documented and objective scientific evidence that is rationally related to the measures”.⁷⁴ And Article 7.8 requires the parties to recognise an SPS measure as equivalent if it “achieves the same level of protection as the importing Party’s measure; or has the same effect in achieving the objective as the importing Party’s measure”.⁷⁵ Dr Giulia Claudia Leonelli, Lecturer in Law at Birkbeck College, University of London, told us in written evidence that this

[...] sanctions a Party that fails to recognise the equivalence of (non-precautionary) measures. It is in this context that the science-based obligations of the SPS Agreement and of Article 7.9 of the SPS Chapter could have a very important role to play. In the absence of ‘sound’ conclusive proof of the existence of specific hazards and risks, an exporting Party would be able to objectively demonstrate that its own measure achieves the same level of protection as the importing Party’s protective measure. In accordance with the dispute settlement organs’ interpretation of the SPS Agreement, measures based on a ‘sound’ risk assessment should also be regarded as equivalent to measures based on prudential risk assessments [...]

A failure to recognise the equivalence of such measures would trigger recourse to dispute settlement. [...] This would create incentives for the UK to recognise the equivalence of (non-equivalent) SPS measures of exporting countries [which] may trigger a race to the bottom and create incentives for deregulation.⁷⁶

In particular, witnesses told us in written evidence that the CPTPP’s scientific, rather than precautionary, approach could: see imports “contain pesticide residues that are not currently allowed to appear in UK food because they pose a risk to human health”;⁷⁷ require changes to animal health legislation and therefore cause divergence from EU regulations and make UK-EU trade more difficult;⁷⁸ and could lead to the import of chlorine washed

71 IP Federation ([TPP0017](#)), para 21; [Q91](#)

72 [Q92](#)

73 Dr Giulia Claudia Leonelli (Lecturer in Law at Birkbeck College, University of London) ([TPP0014](#)), para 5

74 TPP, [Article 7.9](#)

75 TPP, [Article 7.8](#)

76 Dr Giulia Claudia Leonelli (Lecturer in Law at Birkbeck College, University of London) ([TPP0014](#)), para 36–37

77 PAN UK ([TPP0010](#)), para 4

78 RSPCA ([TPP0008](#)), paras 4–5

chicken.⁷⁹ However, it is worth noting that any lowering of the UK's SPS standards would require changes to primary or secondary legislation; something which is highly unlikely given the significant opposition across the House of Commons and House of Lords.

32. Witnesses also raised concerns that tariff elimination could cause agri-food goods produced to lower standards to enter the UK market, which could undercut domestic producers bound by higher standards and fall short of the welfare standards expected by the British public.⁸⁰ Similar concerns were raised with us over liberalisation of tariff lines for products of environmental concern, such as tropical timber and palm oil, and witnesses repeatedly outlined the importance of an environmental impact assessment accompanying the terms of accession.⁸¹ Without access to the UK's tariff schedule at the point we prematurely ended our inquiry, we were unable to assess the impact further.

China's accession

33. In its Strategic Approach document, the Department for International Trade noted that, following accession, “the more CPTPP expands, the greater the benefits to the UK”.⁸² However, there is no guarantee that every new applicant will share the UK's aspirations for the development of the agreement, or complement its ambitions in the region. In particular, China's 2021 application to join the CPTPP was met with speculation that it would be unable to attain many of the standards set by the CPTPP, despite domestic reforms across multiple sectors. While Professor Kimberlee Weatherall told us she was “more sceptical than you might think that the IP chapter is going to be the problem”,⁸³ other witnesses discussing the e-commerce provisions of the agreement were far less optimistic. Sabina Ciofu told us that she felt China was “very serious about trying to join the CPTPP” but expressed scepticism that its consequent domestic reforms were good-faith efforts to meet the agreement's standards.⁸⁴ Dr Dorobantu agreed and considered it more likely that “China considers that it can live to some extent with some versions of the CPTPP rules [on e-commerce]” and witnesses noted that the language of the agreement was loose enough in places to allow some wiggle room.

- Article 14.10 (Principles on Access to and Use of the Internet for Electronic Commerce) states that the parties recognise the benefits to consumers of access to the internet services of their choice. However, this clause is subject to a party's “applicable policies, laws and regulations”.⁸⁵ Dr Dorobantu noted that China could seek to justify exemption from this provision as its internet regulation is a matter of national security.⁸⁶

79 Greener UK (TPP0016), para 18

80 Greener UK (TPP0016), paras 15–16; National Farmers' Union (TPP0023), para 3; RSPCA (TPP0008); paras 11 and 13; and UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) (TPP0021), para 28

81 Q113; Greener UK (TPP0016), para 3; Trade Justice Movement (TPP0019), para 5

82 UK Accession to the CPTPP: the UK's Strategic Approach, Department for International Trade, June 2021, page 4

83 Q79

84 Qq42–43 [Sabina Ciofu]

85 TPP, Article 14.10

86 Q43 [Dr Cosmina Dorobantu]

- Article 14.11 (Cross-Border Transfer of Information by Electronic Means) requires the parties to the CPTPP to allow the electronic transfer of information across borders when it relates to the “conduct of the business of a covered person” although contains an exemption for public policy objectives.⁸⁷ Dr Dorobantu noted that the exemption is likely to give China sufficient scope to put “the activities it does not want covered by the article outside of the scope of the article”.⁸⁸
- Article 14.13 (Location of Computing Facilities) prohibits parties from requiring a covered person to use computing facilities located in-country as a condition of conducting business there.⁸⁹ Dr Suominen felt that “China does not meet those rules at all”⁹⁰, although the text includes room for an exemption from this provision on the grounds of security.⁹¹

34. Although these concerns frequently focus on China, an aspirant member, full compliance with the e-Commerce Chapter is not yet universal amongst existing members. Dr Suominen discussed with us the issue of Vietnam’s non-compliance and noted that it could be used by China as justification for not meeting all the agreement’s obligations.⁹² Other witnesses noted that the UK finds itself in a similarly difficult position: if the UK is able to negotiate exemptions from areas of the agreement, China could argue that it need not meet all the agreement’s standards.⁹³

35. When we visited the region, China’s political influence, partly the consequence of its trading footprint, was readily apparent and it was not obvious to us that such an environment allowed space for existing CPTPP members strongly to advocate the agreement’s standards. Discussing e-commerce, Dr Suominen told us that many of the CPTPP member states “are interested in having a third party, whether it is the US or the UK, play a very key role in the region”.⁹⁴ Such a dynamic could require the UK, once it has acceded, to play a key role in the bloc’s consideration of China’s membership. Article 27.3 of the agreement states that decisions within the CPTPP are made by consensus, including the admission of new members.⁹⁵ Once the UK joins, it will therefore effectively have the power of veto over applications from prospective new members, including China. While several parties to the CPTPP share the UK Government’s scepticism over China’s membership, they may look to the UK as a non-regional defender of the agreement’s standards.

36. Witnesses also raised concerns that China might not be able to comply with the CPTPP’s standards on: state-owned enterprises; labour; services; and the environment, which the UKTPO considered could “initiate a race to the bottom”.⁹⁶ We did not have sufficient time to examine the veracity of these concerns, nor whether, in the face of Chinese noncompliance, the UK would be sufficiently well placed to provide intra-CPTPP

87 TPP, [Article 14.11](#)

88 [Q43](#) [Dr Cosmina Dorobantu]

89 TPP, [Article 14.13](#)

90 [Q44](#) [Dr Kati Suominen]

91 TPP, [Article 14.13](#)

92 [Q44](#) [Dr Kati Suominen]

93 UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#)), para 26

94 [Q59](#)

95 TPP, [Article 27.3](#)

96 [Q6](#) [Dr Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit]; UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#)), para 26

leadership in each of these policy areas. However, it is clear that upholding the agreement's standards is viewed as crucial to maintaining the CPTPP's reputation as a "gold standard trade agreement".⁹⁷

Resourcing

37. Dr Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit highlighted a particular and significant deficiency in the CPTPP which would limit parties' abilities to adjust its provisions and therefore respond to new challenges:

[...] you need a CPTPP secretariat that has staff to look through the text. In order to amend the text, it needs a lot of dedication and expertise. For example, let us say if you want to edit article 15.1, you will probably have to move down and edit article 15.4 as well, because they are linked. Once you change these two places, they now contradict with some sentences in chapter 16, so you have to go there and fix that as well. As a result, we really need a dedicated group as, for example, the secretariat, to have staff who do that. We cannot just dump this text on the desk of trade officials from CPTPP economies because [...] they are overworked already.⁹⁸

38. The absence of a bureaucratic structure was also raised by Professor Rickard as a challenge to upholding the requirement for transparency in the Environment Chapter.⁹⁹ Witnesses indicated to us that the Electronic Commerce Committee, the principal organ through which deficiencies in digital trade can be discussed and addressed, possibly also enjoyed only modest resources, and we note that it has met only once since its September 2021 inception.¹⁰⁰

97 [Q44](#)

98 [Q15](#)

99 [Q112](#) [Professor Stephanie Rickard]

100 [CPTPP Committee on Electronic Commerce](#), Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore, accessed 13 March 2023; [Q50](#)

4 Judging accession

39. While we have been unable to complete our inquiry into the opportunities and challenges presented by the CPTPP to the UK, we have been able to identify several areas to which the House should give careful consideration when assessing the terms of the UK's accession.

On the face of the agreement

- (1.) **The agreement needs to deliver tangible opportunities for businesses which go above and beyond those which already exist through the UK's bilateral trade agreements with individual CPTPP members. Given the complexities of accession, it would be farcical for the headline benefit of accession to be agreement of preferential trading terms with Malaysia: something which could have been achieved through simpler bilateral negotiations.**
- (2.) **There is a risk that accession to the CPTPP places intellectual property obligations on the UK which are incompatible with membership of the European Patent Office and the European Patent Convention. *The Government should secure exemptions from these parts of the Intellectual Property Chapter or secure a guarantee that implementation of the agreement will not jeopardise UK membership of the EPO and EPC.***
- (3.) **Investment protection is an important facilitator of confidence and predictability in unfamiliar markets, but it can have the unintended effect of undermining environmental protections. *The UK's terms of accession should, if environmental concerns cannot be mitigated, include an exemption from the Investor-State Dispute Mechanism. The UK also has several such mechanisms in Bilateral Investment Treaties with CPTPP parties. These should be reviewed and disapplied as part of the accession process.***

Accompanying accession

- (4.) **In each of our reports on the UK's FTAs with Australia and New Zealand, we highlighted the importance of the Government including the cumulative impact of trade agreements on the UK economy. *It is essential that the assessment of the impact of CPTPP accession considers how further tariff liberalisation could affect those sectors of the UK economy which already feel aggrieved by the negotiations with Australia and New Zealand.***
- (5.) **There are many unanswered questions on the environmental impact of accession to the CPTPP. In particular, the consequence of tariff liberalisation on products of concern, and the welfare and production standards applied to products entering the UK market. *The Government should publish an environmental impact assessment to accompany the terms of the UK's accession.***

- (6.) The opportunities created by accession are only useful if businesses can take advantage of them. *In its response to this report, Government should outline exactly how it will ensure that businesses are best placed to make use of the agreement.*
- (7.) Accession to the CPTPP is a significant moment for the UK. We have explored several of the opportunities and challenges that the agreement presents, but it is only right that the House as a whole gets the chance to scrutinise the terms of the UK's accession. *The Government should ensure that the House is given time to debate the terms of the UK's accession to the CPTPP on a substantive motion within the 21-day CRaG period.*

Looking to the future

- (8.) The CPTPP is a living agreement with the potential to adapt to challenges as they arise and accommodate expansion. However, the bureaucratic structure of the CPTPP needs proper resourcing to realise this potential. *Following accession, the UK should champion the creation of a permanent CPTPP secretariat.*
- (9.) Scrutiny of free trade agreements does not end with implementation: it is an ongoing process which needs to consider the continued utility and suitability of their provisions. *To aid the House in any future scrutiny it may wish to conduct, the Government should make an annual report to Parliament on the value of UK membership of the CPTPP. The first such report should be made a year after the CPTPP enters into force for the UK.*
- (10.) The CPTPP's capacity to change and expand adds an extra dimension to any assessment of its impact. The accession of new parties could amplify the benefits of the agreement to the UK but could also amplify its challenges. *Government must have a clear understanding of what it wants to achieve through the UK's membership of the agreement. While it should look for opportunities to further liberalise tariffs and align regulations, it also needs to consider where its policy leadership, exercised across multiple Government Departments, could strengthen the rules-based trading system to deliver for British businesses. The Government is not well placed to make any assessment on the accession applications of new parties to the agreement until it has considered these issues as part of a single, comprehensive trade strategy.*

Formal minutes

Wednesday 19 April 2023

Members present

Angus Brendan MacNeil (Chair)

Mark Garnier

Anthony Mangnall

Lloyd Russell-Moyle

Martin Vickers

Mick Whitley

Mark Garnier declared the following interest: he is the Prime Minister's Trade Envoy to Myanmar, Thailand and Brunei.

Draft Report (*CPTPP: opportunities and challenges for the UK*) proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 39 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available (Standing Order No. 134).

Adjournment

Committee adjourned.

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Wednesday 07 September 2022

Professor Christopher Dent, International Political Economist, Edge Hill University; **Eduardo Pedrosa**, Secretary General, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council; **Dr Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit**, Assistant Professor and Head of the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

[Q1–35](#)

Wednesday 25 January 2023

Dr Cosmina Dorobantu, Co-Director, Public Policy Programme, The Alan Turing Institute; **Dr Kati Suominen**, CEO, Nextrade Group; **Sabina Ciofu**, Associate Director, techUK

[Q36–62](#)

Professor Kimberlee Weatherall, Professor of Law, University of Sydney; **Lee Davies**, Chief Executive, Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys; **Dr Bobby Mukherjee**, Chair, IP Federation Trade Working Group

[Q63–92](#)

Wednesday 22 February 2023

Paul Baker, CEO, International Economics; **Professor Stephanie Rickard**, Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics; **Professor Clara Brandi**, Head of Research Programme, German Institute of Development and Sustainability

[Q93–139](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

TPP numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board (AHDB) ([TPP0005](#))
- 2 Alliance for Intellectual Property ([TPP0007](#))
- 3 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre ([TPP0009](#))
- 4 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys ([TPP0013](#))
- 5 Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys ([TPP0002](#))
- 6 Department for International Trade ([TPP0003](#))
- 7 Greener UK ([TPP0016](#))
- 8 IP Federation ([TPP0017](#))
- 9 International Economics Consulting Ltd ([TPP0022](#))
- 10 International Economics Consulting Ltd ([TPP0011](#))
- 11 Leonelli, Dr Giulia Claudia (Lecturer in Law, Birkbeck College, University of London) ([TPP0014](#))
- 12 Leoni, Dr. Zeno (Lecturer in War Studies , King's College London); and Neironi, Dr. Raimondo (Adjunct Professor in History of Contemporary Japan, University of Turin) ([TPP0004](#))
- 13 National Farmers' Union ([TPP0023](#))
- 14 Office of the City Remembrancer, City of London Corporation ([TPP0015](#))
- 15 PAN UK ([TPP0010](#))
- 16 RSPCA ([TPP0008](#))
- 17 Rickard, Professor Stephanie (Professor, London School of Economics) ([TPP0012](#))
- 18 TheCityUK ([TPP0018](#))
- 19 Tickel, Amanda (Partner, Head of Tax & Trade Policy, Deloitte LLP) ([TPP0024](#))
- 20 Trade Justice Movement ([TPP0019](#))
- 21 UK Trade Policy Observatory (UKTPO) ([TPP0021](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the publications page of the Committee's website.

Session 2022–23

Number	Title	Reference
1st Report	UK trade negotiations: Scrutiny of Agreement with Australia	HC 444
2nd Report	UK trade negotiations: Agreement with Australia	HC 117
1st Special Report	UK trade negotiations: Scrutiny of Agreement with Australia and Agreement with Australia: Government Response to the Committee's First and Second Reports	HC 704
1st Joint Report	Developments in UK Strategic Export Controls	HC 282
3rd Report	UK trade negotiations: Agreement with New Zealand	HC 78
2nd Special Report	UK trade negotiations: Agreement with New Zealand: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report	HC 1033
4th Report	UK trade negotiations: Parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements	HC 815
3rd Special Report	UK trade negotiations: Parliamentary scrutiny of free trade agreements: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report	HC 1034
5th Report	UK trade negotiations: Agreement with India	HC 77

Session 2021–22

Number	Title	Reference
1st Report	Digital trade and data	HC 123
2nd Report	UK Export Finance	HC 126
3rd Report	Inward Foreign Direct Investment	HC 124
1st Special Report	UK trade remedies policy: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2019–21	HC 269
2nd Special Report	UK Freeports: Government Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of Session 2019–21	HC 453
3rd Special Report	UK trade remedies policy: Trade Remedies Authority's Response to the Committee's Third Report of Session 2019–21	HC 707

Number	Title	Reference
4th Special Report	Digital trade and data: Government Response to the Committee's First Report	HC 831
5th Special Report	Inward Foreign Direct Investment: Government Response to the Committee's Third Report	HC 921
6th Special Report	UK Export Finance: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report	HC 965

Session 2019–21

Number	Title	Reference
1st Report	The COVID-19 pandemic and international trade	HC 286
2nd Report	UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement	HC 914
3rd Report	UK trade remedies policy	HC 701
4th Report	UK freeports	HC 258
1st Special Report	The COVID-19 pandemic and international trade: Government Response to the Committee's First Report of Session 2019–21	HC 815
2nd Special Report	UK-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement: Government Response to the Committee's Second Report of Session 2019–21	HC 1163