The UK and Sub-Saharan Africa: prosperity, peace and development co-operation
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See Appendix 1.

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Q in footnotes refers to a question in oral evidence.
SUMMARY

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region of 49 countries of immense complexity and diversity. In the next 30 years to 2050 it will see unprecedented social and economic changes, some of which present enormous economic and social opportunities. Others create challenges which could be overwhelming for some individual nations. The African Union (AU) has developed a long-term strategy to meet these challenges and to harness the opportunities. The UK should take a greater interest in, and seek a stronger partnership with, Sub-Saharan Africa to support the delivery of the AU’s long term strategy.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region with some of the fastest growing economies in the world.1 Africa’s population is expected to double to 2.1 billion by 2050; this growth is resulting in a rapidly expanding middle class, and a growing proportion of young people across the continent. Africa is the biggest bloc at the United Nations (UN) and the AU is growing in significance. Therefore, it is of strategic and geopolitical importance to the UK. It is a region where the UK really can make a difference. Successive governments have said that Africa should be given a higher priority across Whitehall, but have failed to make this a reality in the face of competing demands.

During her visit to Cape Town in September 2018, the then Prime Minister, Theresa May MP, announced a “fundamental strategic shift” in the UK’s engagement with the countries of Africa, known as the ‘strategic approach’. We welcome the ‘uplift’ of staff in the region that followed the announcement, but are disappointed to conclude that the Government’s ‘strategic approach’ to Africa falls short—it is not a strategy, but rather some broad ideas and themes. The Government should publish a clearly articulated list of its priorities for its engagement with Africa, and an action plan for meeting them. The context of the UK’s departure from the European Union (EU), and the Integrated Review of foreign policy, defence, security and international development, present a timely opportunity for a renewal of the UK’s engagement in Africa.

During the course of our inquiry, it became clear that aspects of the UK’s domestic policy have a direct impact on its reputation in Africa. We received overwhelming evidence that the UK’s visa policies are damaging its reputation, and we recommend that the Home Office should urgently review the UK’s approach to the issuing of visas for people from Africa. We also heard evidence of the lasting impact of the historical legacy of slavery and colonialism on perceptions of the UK in the region. It is necessary to address appropriately both the treatment of black people in the UK, and this historical legacy, including through fostering better knowledge among UK citizens.

We were struck by evidence that remittances from the UK to Sub-Saharan Africa exceed aid and charitable giving. Remittances are given too little profile in the narrative of the UK’s economic relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Government should work to lower the cost of remitting money to the region. We also urge the Government to embed consultation with diaspora communities into policy making.

It is already clear that the impact on Africa of COVID-19, both in health and economic terms, will be very damaging. This adds urgency and scale to the collective responses to the challenges we identify in this report, which

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1 Prior to the COVID-19 crisis.
focuses principally on Sub-Saharan Africa. Significant economic support from international partners will be needed to prevent economic gains over the last two decades being reversed. In particular, the Government should support the AU’s call for a two-year standstill for African countries’ public and private debt, and continue to work with international partners to ensure that any COVID-19 vaccine that is developed is made available to developing countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa.

We conclude that the UK’s future relationship with the countries of Africa and their regional institutions needs to be based, as has not always been the case in the past, on a genuine partnership. The UK should continue to support constructive reforms to the rules-based international order, including the UN Security Council, to provide African countries with a voice commensurate with their size and importance. We also welcome the Government’s support for the use of UN-assessed contributions to fund AU-led peacekeeping missions. The reboot of the UK-AU relationship through the Memorandum of Understanding, signed in 2019, provides further opportunities for co-operation. The cultural, educational, language and other soft power connections of the Commonwealth provide a substantial basis for a further strengthening of the UK’s ties. We believe the Government should work with the 19 African members of the Commonwealth to seek ways in which its work in the continent could be strengthened.

We conclude that working with international partners should remain an important part of the UK’s approach to Sub-Saharan Africa. We identify common interests between the UK and France, particularly in the Sahel, and the need for new methods of co-operation to be built up with the EU institutions and members states. Many African governments regard China as an important partner and source of investment, and the UK should seek to work constructively with China where appropriate, especially through multilateral institutions, on issues such as debt, health, climate change and trade, while defending UK national interests and values.

We welcome the range of effective UK official development assistance (ODA) projects across the region. These include Aid for Trade—particularly in relation to the African Continental Free Trade Area—support for agriculture and health, and work to address the underlying causes of insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. We regret the Government’s decision to merge the well-regarded Department for International Development with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as was announced pre-emptively in advance of the Integrated Review. We request urgent confirmation that UK ODA will continue to be administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective. We seek urgent assurances that the merger does not represent a change to the UK’s approach to ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa.

We find that UK trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has flatlined over the last decade. Concerted action by the Government will be needed to address this. The UK–Africa Investment Summit in January 2020 was a high-profile beginning, but follow-up will be required. We also identify leaving the EU as an opportunity for the UK to re-cast its trade relationships in the region, and remedy some of the defects in the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements. We were surprised to hear that no detailed work has yet been done to consider how to offer better access to African exporters.
There remain significant challenges to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are likely to be exacerbated by wider trends affecting the region, including population growth, weak states, governance challenges, violent ideologies and the climate crisis. Witnesses highlighted instability in the Sahel, Nigeria, Somalia and Cameroon as of particular concern, and areas where the UK could play a constructive role including through peacekeeping, diplomacy, and the support for human rights. We welcome the UK’s increased attention to instability in the Sahel, as part of the ‘strategic approach’, but are concerned that the Government’s wider strategy in the Sahel is unclear, and the UK risks being unable to add value in a highly contested space. We conclude that the Government should, in its Integrated Review, consider how the UK can best use its resources and influence to develop longer-term strategies to prevent conflict, and above all to prevent genocide, and support regional partners.

We conclude that at the same time as the UK pursues new economic opportunities and seeks to tackle security challenges, human rights remain critical. The Government should consider support for accountability, human rights, the rule of law and anti-corruption as a package that helps build the necessary conditions for democracy to function in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The UK and Sub-Saharan Africa: prosperity, peace and development co-operation

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has committed to “helping change the narrative about Africa, so that Africa is rightly seen for its dynamism and enormous potential, as a continent of opportunity”.2

2. Baroness Amos, Director, School of African and Oriental Studies (SOAS), said that the “narrative” about Sub-Saharan Africa3 had “been about poverty and philanthropy, without recognising the totality of what these countries and their peoples are about”.4 David Lammy MP said that “the world’s fastest-growing economies” were “largely African: Ghana, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Tanzania.” Recognition was needed of “the dynamism and upward mobility of youth, the explosion in higher education”, the role of “innovations, technology and social media”5 and the continent’s “active creative arts industry”.6

3. The Royal African Society said that life expectancy had “improved dramatically” in the region, and the working-age population had expanded significantly.7

4. James Duddridge MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DfID), said that the population of Africa was “expected to double to 2.1 billion … by 2050, taking up a quarter of the world’s population”. This projected growth made the continent “massively more important than it has been historically”. He said that “an expanding middle class”8 and “some of the biggest growing economies”—before the COVID-19 pandemic—made Africa “an important trading partner” for the UK. It was also “the biggest bloc at the United Nations”.9

5. The UK has an interest in stability and peace on the continent.10 Search for Common Ground said that “Transnational challenges, such as climate change, migration, and arms flows” connected Africa and the UK and posed “new challenges that threaten global stability”.11 The Minister said that Africa’s projected population growth presented opportunities, but could

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3 In this report, Sub-Saharan Africa refers to all African countries except Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco.
4 Q 41
5 Q 3
6 Q 41 (Baroness Amos)
7 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
8 Q 124
9 Q 119
10 Q 35 (Dr Nick Westcott); Q 22 (Jane Edmondson)
11 Written evidence from Search for Common Ground (ZAF0009)
be destabilising: “an expanding poor underclass that does not have work and is vulnerable” would require support; these people could be “much more predisposed to extremism”.12

6. The Minister said that another reason for the UK to “reposition” itself towards Africa was that the continent was “attracting a lot of interest from our international partners and competitors”.13 Dr Nick Westcott, Director, Royal African Society, described “a struggle … for influence in Africa”,14 which Dr Comfort Ero, Programme Director, Africa, International Crisis Group, said reflected increasing “multipolarity” in Africa’s international relations.15 Countries including China, Japan, India, Turkey, Russia and the Gulf states were all increasing focusing on Africa.16 Dr Ero said the continent was “no longer dependent on or always open to its traditional partners, the UK being one, or to the West”. African states had “become a lot more assertive in insisting on respect and wanting a seat at the table”.17

7. There are major trends, opportunities and challenges facing the 49 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa.18 Dr Terence McSweeney, Southampton Solent University and the London School of Economic and Political Science, cautioned that “while it is relevant to talk about general trends across the continent, at the same time it is vital to understand that Africa is not a homogenous entity and that the diversity of nations, religions and communities should be taken into account more than has been done in the past”.19

8. First, population growth. Sixty-two per cent of people in the region are under 25.20 By 2050, “one in four of the world’s consumers will be in Africa”,21 and by 2100 the continent will account for “just under 40% of the world’s population”.22 Dr Dambisa Moyo, author and economist, said that “a young, vibrant African population” was needed “to support economic success and for future generations”.23 The continent would need investment,24 training and skills development, the development of IT and manufacturing,25 and “jobs for perhaps as many as 100 million young people annually”.26

9. A second trend is uneven economic growth.27 Dr Dirk Willem te Velde, Principal Research Fellow and Director of Programme, International Economic Development Group, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), said that in the last decade the continent’s GDP had grown by around 33%, and this was likely to increase due to population and income growth.28 However,

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12 Q 126
13 Q 119
14 Q 34
15 Q 75
16 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002), Q 61 (Professor Tim Murithi) and Q 31 (Dr Nick Westcott)
17 Q 81
18 54 African countries are recognised by the UN.
19 Written evidence from Dr Terence McSweeney (ZAF0013)
20 Written evidence from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (ZAF0003)
21 Q 49 (Dr Dirk Willem te Velde)
22 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
23 Q 64
24 Q 12 (Harriet Mathews)
25 Q 64 (Myles Wickstead)
26 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
27 Q 64 (Myles Wickstead) and written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
28 Q 49
the African Development Bank’s *Africa Economic Outlook 2020* showed that economic growth had been accompanied by a reduction in poverty for the majority of the population in only one-third of African countries.\(^{29}\) The continent was unlikely to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030;\(^ {30}\) there were over 400 million people living in poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa.\(^ {31}\)

10. Professor Tim Murithi, Head, Peacebuilding Interventions and Extraordinary Professor of African Studies, University of Free State, South Africa, said Africa was “not a poor continent”; it had “been impoverished by the extractive agendas that have been played out over a very long time”. African politicians and business leaders had exploited the extractives industry—for example minerals and fossil fuels—“for their own benefit”, and there was a concern that non-African countries’ interest was likewise based on this agenda.\(^ {32}\)

11. Dr Moyo said that to “put a meaningful dent in poverty in one generation”, economic growth of 7% per year was needed. Annual growth before the COVID-19 pandemic was around 3.5%.\(^ {33}\) We heard of a number of economic challenges to increasing growth and making it more inclusive, including the limited amount of intra-African trade and its poor integration with the global economy.\(^ {34}\) We heard that there was sometimes a link between a lack of economic opportunity and instability, including violent extremism.\(^ {35}\)

12. A third trend is migration. Witnesses said that most African migration was within the continent;\(^ {36}\) in 2019, over 21 million Africans were estimated to be living in another African country. Dr Will Jones, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, said that “almost all migration flows are ‘mixed’ in character (i.e. a combination of economic, security, and personal motivations)”.\(^ {37}\)

13. Jane Edmondson, Director, East and Central Africa Division, DfID, said that intra-African migration was in part the result of “increasing urbanisation”, which presented potential risks “but also some huge opportunities”.\(^ {38}\) Dr Moyo said that, if Africa’s growing population could not find employment, this would be likely to result in increased “disorderly migration across the rest of the world”.\(^ {39}\)

14. A fourth trend is climate change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has said that “Africa as a whole is one of the most vulnerable

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\(^{31}\) Written evidence from Health Poverty Action (ZAF0024)

\(^{32}\) Q 62

\(^{33}\) Q 64 The IMF’s initial forecast for 2020 was 3.5%.

\(^{34}\) Written evidence from the Africa Trade Policy Centre UNECA (ZAF0037) and Q 66 (Myles Wickstead)

\(^{35}\) Q 30 (Dr Nick Westcott) and written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)

\(^{36}\) Q 89 (Professor Gibril Faal) and written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)

\(^{37}\) Written evidence from Dr Will Jones (ZAF0055)

\(^{38}\) Q 24

\(^{39}\) Q 64
continents due to its high exposure and low adaptive capacity”. Witnesses said that, while Africa produced just 2% of global emissions, the impact of climate change would be significant, in particular given the reliance on agriculture in the region.

15. Dr Carl Death, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, University of Manchester, said that impacts were already being felt, such as floods in Mozambique and drought in northern Kenya. The Minister said that Togo, Benin, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire were experiencing rising sea levels, while changes to rainfall patterns in Southern Africa, highland East Africa and coastal West Africa were raised by the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich.

16. Witnesses drew a connection between climate change and instability: it could drive conflict for resources, as seen in Darfur, and could increase vulnerability to natural shocks.

17. A fifth trend is insecurity and weak governance. There are many areas of instability and conflict, including the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, Cameroon, Sudan, South Sudan and the Great Lakes region. There are 6 million refugees and 17 million internally displaced people across Africa. Andrew Mitchell MP, former Secretary of State for International Development, said that economic problems—from resource competition to lack of employment—often contributed to instability, and conflict “mires the poorest in the world in endless demeaning poverty”. Witnesses said that the reliance of many countries on natural resources, and weak institutional capacity, often led to corruption, and contributed to instability and conflict.

18. A final trend is the rising level of debt across Sub-Saharan Africa, after the implementation of the debt-relief efforts of the late 1990s and 2000s, principally the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the

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41 Written evidence from Dr Terence McSweeney (ZAF0013) and Q 73 (Myles Wickstead). Mr Wickstead said this was particularly an issue for growing crops such as tea and coffee, which survive within narrow temperature ranges.
42 Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAF0036)
43 Q 127
44 Written evidence from the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (ZAF0047). Southern Africa was facing less rainfall, while in highland East Africa and coastal West Africa rainfall had increased.
45 Q 4 (Andrew Mitchell MP) and written evidence from Christian Aid (ZAF0038). Dr Death said that large-scale climate change mitigation initiatives, such as reforestation and carbon sequestration, also had potentially negative impacts on local economies and land rights. Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAF0036)
46 The Sahel is the region south of the Sahara Desert. Definitions of the Sahel differ, but all include Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.
47 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002), Q 75 (Dr Comfort Ero) and written evidence from Search for Common Ground (ZAF0009)
48 Q 118 (James Duddridge MP)
49 Q 1
50 Q 62 (Professor Tim Murithi), written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002), written evidence from the Africa Regional Office of the Open Society Foundations (ZAF0048), written evidence from Christian Aid (ZAF0038) and Q 116 (Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala)
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Witnesses said this was a potential risk factor in the event of a major economic shock; the COVID-19 crisis put this into starker relief.

The impact of COVID-19

19. There have been 337,315 recorded cases of COVID-19 in Africa to date, with 8,863 deaths and 161,254 recoveries.

20. The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) said that the region was “likely to face particular contextual challenges” from COVID-19, including “economic, social and cultural inequalities, lack of personal protective equipment … and the additional health burden of communicable and non-communicable diseases”. It cited three factors which could worsen the impact: “overcrowding and large household sizes”, which increase transmissibility, a “high baseline prevalence of co-morbidities”, and “lack of intensive care capacity”.

21. Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, African Union (AU) Special Envoy to mobilise international support for Africa’s efforts to address the economic challenges African countries will face as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, said that COVID-19 had “come with a huge exogenous shock”. Box 1 outlines some of the major impacts.

Box 1: Data and projections relating to COVID-19 in Sub-Saharan Africa

The African Trade Policy Centre of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) said that “the price of oil, which accounts for 40% of Africa’s exports, has halved in value, and major African exports like textiles and fresh cut flowers have crashed. Tourism—which accounts for up to 38% of some African countries’ GDP—has effectively halted, as has the airline industry that supports it.”

51 The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative was launched in 1996 by the IMF and World Bank and worked with the international financial community, including multilateral organisations and governments to lower to sustainable levels the external debt burdens of the most heavily indebted poor countries. In 2005, this was supplemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, to help accelerate progress toward the UN Millennium Development Goals. It allows for 100 percent relief on eligible debts by the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Fund for countries completing the HIPC Initiative process. International Monetary Fund, ‘Debt Relief Under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative’ (25 March 2020): https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/11/Debt-Relief-Under-the-Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries-Initiative25 [accessed 24 June 2020]

52 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003) and written evidence from Christian Aid (ZAF0038)


54 Written evidence from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (ZAF0054)

55 Q 116
UNECA projections showed that “in the best case scenario, Africa’s average GDP growth for 2020 will fall 1.4 percentage points, from 3.2 percent to 1.8 percent—equivalent to a loss in GDP growth of $29 billion in 2020. In a worst-case scenario the projections indicate Africa’s economy contracting by up to 2.6 percent in 2020—equivalent to a loss in GDP growth of $120 billion.”

Oil and mineral-dominated economies—Angola, Nigeria and South Africa—would be the worst affected.

UNECA estimates “point to COVID-19 pushing 27 million people into extreme poverty, while imposing $44–$46 billion in additional health costs.”

“At least $100 billion” would “be needed to immediately resource a health response and an additional $100 billion for economic stimulus.”

Source: Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (ZAF0037)

22. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said COVID-19 had “hit Africa first as an economic problem. When China, and subsequently Europe and the US, got the virus and locked down, the major markets for Africa’s products went into lockdown; demand fell and prices fell precipitously. Africa exports mainly commodities, and the biggest markets are China, Europe and so on.”

23. COVID-19 had a number of economic impacts on Africa:

“exchange rates … started depreciating against major currencies. There was a flight of capital to safety, remittances went down and tourism went down … There was both a demand and a supply side shock. At the same time, the supply chains for many of the products Africa imports, such as pharmaceuticals—we import 94%—were disrupted, and prices for those products went up, as well as some aspects of food.”

24. African leaders introduced social distancing and lockdowns. This was “very difficult” because many people work in the informal sector. She said that “People have complained … that they will die of hunger before they die of coronavirus”.

25. The Minister said COVID-19 would “have a disproportionate impact on the African continent”, in part because “people live on subsistence, not savings”. He said that the World Bank projected “40 million to 60 million additional individuals falling into extreme poverty”, the majority of whom would be in Sub-Saharan Africa.

26. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said that, unless there was careful and quick action, COVID-19 “could reverse the gains of the last two decades”. The World Bank has projected that the economy of Sub-Saharan Africa will be “between 2.1% and 5.1% smaller by the end of the year.”

56 Q 102
57 Q 102
58 Q 102
59 Q 118
60 Q 122
61 Q 118
62 Q 116
63 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
This report

27. We launched our Call for Evidence in July 2019 in the context of the Government’s new ‘strategic approach’ to Africa, the UK’s commitment to support the AU’s delivery of Agenda 2063 through the UK–AU Memorandum of Understanding—signed in February 2019—and the UK’s exit from the EU. We heard oral evidence from January to May 2020. We have also reflected on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on Sub-Saharan Africa in the report, as its deleterious impact became clear. Our planned visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was cancelled due to the pandemic.

28. In Chapter 2 we consider the UK’s Africa strategy, and lack of one or any clear action plan. In Chapter 3 we consider Africa’s regional organisations, including the AU, regional economic communities (RECs) and the Commonwealth. In Chapter 4 we consider Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development, and in Chapter 5 we consider the UK’s economic relationship with the region through UK aid, trade and investment, and remittances. In Chapter 6 we consider peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the UK’s contribution. In Chapter 7 we consider human rights, democracy and governance, and UK activity in support of these areas.

29. We thank our specialist adviser, Dr Julia Gallagher, Professor of African Politics, SOAS, and all our witnesses.

CHAPTER 2: THE UK’S AFRICA STRATEGY

The priority afforded to Africa by UK governments

30. Witnesses considered how important Africa is to UK decision makers. General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, former Commander, Joint Forces Command, and Distinguished Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said that while “politicians … and officials” often say that “Africa really matters”, “almost in the next paragraph, Africa becomes the fourth priority.” On “the one hand” the “importance” of Africa was set out, and “on the other”, people explained “why they cannot do very much”.

31. The Royal African Society said that Africa had suffered “political neglect from the UK”. UK Prime Ministers had “rarely visited the continent” and Ministers for Africa had “changed on a more or less annual basis”. Africa policy was seen “as an extension of aid policy” or “a destination for philanthropic endeavour”, and not “an area of strategic geopolitical significance and trading opportunity”. This had been noticed by African leaders, as it was “not the partnership of equals” they sought.

32. Baroness Amos said every time there was a new Minister for Africa there was “some kind of change in direction”. This was linked to a sense on the African continent that ministerial changes were “beginning not to matter”, because they reflected that Africa was “not perceived as important for the [UK] Government, despite what successive Prime Ministers” had said. In 31 years since 1989, there have been 20 ministers for Africa, an average tenure of just over 18 months (see Table 1).

Table 1: UK Ministers for Africa since 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/title</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baroness Chalker, Minister of State for Overseas Development and Africa</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>24 July 1989–1 May 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Lloyd MP, Minister of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>5 May 1997–28 July 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter Hain MP, Minister of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>28 July 1999–24 January 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Wilson MP, Minister of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>24 January 2001–11 June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baroness Amos, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>12 June 2001–12 May 2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65 While this report concentrates on Sub-Saharan Africa, this chapter considers issues relating to the UK’s approach to the continent as a whole, consistent with the Government’s ‘strategic approach’.
66 Q 95
67 Since 2017, the Minister for Africa has been a joint DfID and FCO role. Baroness Amos said this was helpful. Q 38
68 Since 1997 there have been 17 separate appointments to this position. Written evidence from Dr Alex Vines OBE and Bob Dewar CMG (ZAF0027)
69 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002). Also see written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039).
70 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
71 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
72 Q 36
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chris Mullin MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 June 2003–10 May 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Triesman, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>10 May 2005–28 June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord Malloch-Brown, Minister of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>28 June 2007–24 July 2009</td>
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<td>Chris Bryant MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>9 June 2009–11 May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baroness Kinnock, Minister of State</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 October 2009–11 May 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sir Henry Bellingham MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 May 2010–5 September 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mark Simmonds MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>5 September 2012–11 August 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grant Shapps MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
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<td>11 May 2015–28 November 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobias Ellwood MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td>17 July 2016–14 July 2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rory Stewart MP, Minister of State</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
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<td>15 June 2017–9 January 2018</td>
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<td>Harriett Baldwin MP, Minister of State</td>
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<td>Andrew Stephenson MP, Minister of State</td>
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<td>25 July 2019–13 February 2020</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Duddridge MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td>13 February 2020–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Written evidence from Dr Alex Vines OBE and Bob Dewar CMG (ZAF0027) and https://members.parliament.uk

33. **The evidence we received demonstrates why the international community in general, and the UK, a country with world-wide interests and responsibilities, in particular, should take a greater interest in Africa, and recognise its political and economic importance.**

34. **Africa is of strategic and geopolitical significance to the UK. It is a region where the UK really can make a difference. To do so, the UK’s future relationship with the countries of Africa and their regional institutions needs to be based, as has not always been the case in the past, on a genuine partnership. Within such a framework there are important trade and investment opportunities.**
35. It is already clear that the impact on Africa of COVID-19, both in health and economic terms, will be very damaging. This adds urgency and scale to the collective responses to the challenges we have identified. We consider that it is in the UK’s national interest to work with, and to help, African states to respond to these challenges and to do so more effectively than it has done in the past.

36. Successive governments have said that Africa should be given a higher priority across Whitehall, but have failed to make this a reality in the face of competing demands.

37. For over two decades there has been too high a turnover in the role of Minister for Africa. In order to build and maintain relationships in the region, greater continuity is needed.

Sub-Saharan African perceptions of the UK

38. Dr Westcott said that “the overall perception of the UK” was that it had “been a major player and a major partner for Africa,” but it was “fading”.73

39. The Royal African Society said that African countries were “waiting to see what kind of Britain emerges from this period of political turbulence”.74 Professor Murithi said that, in a “post-Brexit era”, there was “scope to establish a relationship on a slightly different footing, one that is more engaging and responsive to the interests of both sides”.75

40. Several factors shape perceptions of the UK. First, Dr Westcott said the UK had “a huge amount of soft power”, giving the examples of the influence of the “Royal Family, the BBC” and the “Premier League”. There was respect among African Commonwealth countries for the UK’s “strong tradition of a free press, free speech, democratic institutions and visible and effective accountability”.76 General Sir Richard Barrons said that while the UK had a “lot to offer”—including the private sector, the legal sector, the economy, the City, the Premier League and its entertainment industry—these had never been “harnessed” as a “force for good”.77

41. Through its presence in 19 countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, the British Council helps to facilitate “more profound and meaningful engagement with counterparts in the UK”.78 Lord Boateng PC DL, former UK High Commissioner to South Africa, and former Chief Secretary to the Treasury, said that the British Council was “no longer funded as the effective instrument of public diplomacy it might be”. He also regretted that the BBC World Service “though widely respected” faced “severe budgetary restraints”.79

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73 Q 29
74 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
75 Q 61
76 Q 29. UK legislation which is part of this accountability framework included the Bribery Act 2010 and the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
77 Q 101
78 Written evidence from the British Council (ZAF0012). It does this through language training, support for skills and enterprise, strengthening civil society and communities, international examinations and qualifications and higher education and science.
42. In February 2019 the then Minister for Asia and the Pacific, Mark Field, told the House of Commons that the FCO was “developing a cross-Government soft power strategy to further project” the UK’s “values and advance … [its] overseas interests.” No strategy has been published.

43. Second, Lord Boateng said that the UK’s “generous” commitment of official development assistance (discussed in Chapter 5) was an advantage.

44. Third, multiple witnesses said the UK’s visa policy affected its reputation. Dr Westcott said the UK’s “engagement with Africa” could “be undermined by one issue”: “visas.” Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience, and Director, Africa Programme, and Bob Dewar CMG, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, said the UK’s “onerous visa requirements” had damaged the UK’s “reputation” and they hampered the “projection of soft power.” This was the “single most common cause of complaint against” the UK. It was a “competitive market” and people who gave up on coming to the UK would go elsewhere. The Royal African Society said “potential connections” were “being impeded by Government policy on visas, where the rejection rate for African visitors is running at double the rate of that for any other region.”

Box 2: African interaction with the UK’s visa regime

In July 2019 the All Party Parliamentary Groups for Africa, Diaspora, Development and Migration, and Malawi published a joint report, *Visa problems for African visitors to the UK*. They identified six challenges:

- “Practical and logistical barriers”, including the volume and type of “documentation” required, and the “significant costs” and “inconvenience” of having to apply in neighbouring countries due to the rationalisation of visa services;
- “Inconsistent and/or careless decision-making”, including “divergent decisions taken in effectively identical cases”;
- A “perceived lack of procedural fairness”, including the requirement of “additional documentation and evidence … over and above that specified in the guidelines”;
- “Financial discrimination in decision-making”, including applicants being denied visas due to having little money, despite costs being guaranteed by a sponsoring third party;
- A “perceived gender or racial bias”; and
- A “lack of accountability or a right of appeal”.


80 HC Deb, 26 February 2019, cols 145–148
81 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
82 Q 29
83 Written evidence from Dr Alex Vines OBE and Bob Dewar CMG (ZAF0027)
84 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
45. Dr Westcott said the issue with the visa regime was not necessarily that it was “too tight”, but rather that it seemed “arbitrary, expensive, time-consuming and … humiliating.” He gave the example of when, as the UK’s High Commissioner to Ghana, he had had to ask the Vice-President to show him his bank accounts. Dr Westcott said that no “British Minister would be willing to have their personal finances exposed to a foreign country in return for a visa.”

46. Fourth, Baroness Amos said that how the UK treated its citizens at home had “a direct relationship back to the perception of the UK by African governments.” This was “a domestic relationship as well as a development, trade, political and diplomatic one”, because there were “huge” Sub-Saharan African diaspora communities in the UK (discussed in Chapter 5) and “a huge number of citizens who are of African descent”.

47. David Lammy MP too said the way the UK Government had treated immigrants affected the “perception of Africans” entering the UK. He cited the Windrush scandal and the ‘hostile environment’ policy. Baroness Amos said that “a lot of young Africans I speak to are very ambivalent about Britain, partly because of the issues around visas and the perception of a hostile environment, but also … [because] they will have family here who are constantly reporting back on what it is like to be living and working here.”

48. Finally, witnesses raised the lasting impact of the UK’s history in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lord Boateng said that the UK had a comparative advantage over European and North American partners, in part because of “closer and deeper historical ties and cultural understanding”. Baroness Amos however said that the UK would have “an ongoing problem … in our relationship with a number of African countries” until the UK acknowledged “the important role that the slave trade played in building Britain, and its consequences for the dehumanisation of people from the African continent.” David Lammy MP said that a “pecking order”—“scientific racism”—had been “established largely to give white Europeans the right to conquer the world”; “we live with the legacy of that pecking order today”.

49. Professor Murithi said that some African leaders still made “references to the lingering effects of colonialism” and that was likely to continue. David Lammy MP said that “recognition, and repairing, of the past” by the UK was needed.

50. The UK has considerable soft power assets, which could be used to better effect in Africa. We regret that the Government’s global soft power strategy was not published. We invite the Government to explain how it is seeking to build on and support the UK’s soft power in Africa. Any action plan for Africa, such as we call for in paragraph 84, will need to ensure that the UK’s soft power assets, in

85 Q 29
86 Q 36
87 Q 9
88 Q 41
89 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
90 Q 37
91 Q 2
92 Q 61
93 Q 2
particular those of the British Council and the BBC World Service, are sufficiently resourced.

51. The UK’s visa policies are damaging its reputation and the ability of international departments to build and strengthen relationships across Africa, and in some cases fall below the standards of basic human decency. One witness described the process as “arbitrary, expensive, time-consuming and ... humiliating”. The Home Office should, as a matter of urgency, review how the UK’s approach to the issuing of visas for people from the continent is working. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Trade should participate in this review, to ensure that diplomatic and trade and investment priorities are reflected in how the system operates.

52. The UK’s domestic policies affect how it is perceived in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Windrush scandal and the ‘hostile environment’ have damaged the UK’s reputation.

53. The UK's historic engagement with Africa has had a lasting impact on its relationships in the region. This has positive elements, such as the widespread use of English and common-law systems in former colonies, and more negative aspects, including ongoing tensions over the history of how it colonised many countries in Africa, and in some countries its role in the slave trade. The Government should recognise, be open about and address the challenges that this history brings to its relationships.

54. The Black Lives Matters protests have brought to greater attention the ongoing problem of racism in the UK, and the importance of appropriately addressing both the treatment of black people in the UK and the UK’s historical legacy.

55. In order to develop a better understanding of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Government should seek to foster knowledge of the UK’s historic relationship with the region among UK citizens.

The ‘strategic approach’

56. In a speech in Cape Town, South Africa, in August 2018, the then Prime Minister, Theresa May MP, announced the Government’s plan to “create a new partnership between the UK and ... Africa”, which she described as a “fundamental strategic shift”.

57. A document outlining the new approach was not published for more than a year. In a September 2019 submission to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, the FCO outlined its “strategic approach to Sub-Saharan Africa” (summarised in Box 3). This has been referred to by many observers, including the Minister, as a new “strategy” for Africa.

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95 Q 110
Box 3: The UK’s ‘strategic approach’ to Africa

The FCO’s submission to the Foreign Affairs Committee said the ‘strategic approach’ was structured around five ‘shifts’—areas of particular focus that are not necessarily “wholly new areas of work for the UK”. These shifts are:

- **Prosperity**: “Stronger economic partnerships will deliver increased investment into African countries, encourage job creation and grow UK–Africa trade relationships. This is for African partners looking to transition from aid recipients to commercial and political partners, capable of financing all their own development needs … We are strengthening our commercial expertise on the continent by 50%”.

- **Security and stability**: “The UK has long been supporting African capacity to tackle African crises. We have a strong history of supporting United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) operations across Africa.” It referred to “long-standing engagement on Somalia” and “effective training partnerships with troop contributing countries”. It also referred to support for the International Organisation for Migration, and to tackling organised crime.

- **Climate change and sustainable natural resource management**: “A sharper focus on climate change and natural resource management will deliver stronger African capacity to build resilience to the impacts of climate change, support clean growth and energy security. This will enable economic growth and prosperity, and protect the environment”.

- **Demographic transition**: “Sub-Saharan Africa is the region with the world’s youngest and fastest growing population … the UK will work in partnership on supportive policies and investments. In particular, we will partner on: greater access to quality education, especially for girls; healthcare including voluntary family planning; measures that tackle gender inequality and enable women to enter the labour market; and the creation of productive jobs that keep pace with numbers of workforce entrants.”

- **The Sahel**: “We will pivot UK resources towards Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania”. The Government would work with its partners in this area, “seek to contain threats to regional security and wider UK interests”, and “make migration safer while providing critical humanitarian support.”

The Government’s ‘strategic approach’ is underpinned by three “enablers”:

- **People and platform**: the Government had increased funding to eight participating departments\(^{96}\) to allow them to fund “approximately 400 new positions” and five new diplomatic posts in sub-Saharan Africa—eSwatini, Chad, Djibouti, Lesotho, and Niger (see Table 2).

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\(^{96}\) The Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Department for International Development, the Department for International Trade, the Department of Health and Social Care, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, HM Revenue and Customs and the Ministry of Defence.
• Science and technology: the Government had increased the amount of ODA spent on research and innovation from £550 million in 2016–17 to £1.2 billion in 2020–21.

• Soft power: Government research had shown that some African nations, including Commonwealth nations, “no longer feel an instinctive affinity with the UK and have limited awareness of what the UK has to offer”. To address this the Government had “set aside up to £7 million of ODA programme funds”.

As well as the five ‘shifts’ and three ‘enablers’, the Government said “international engagement” was “central”, and values and democracy were “at the heart” of its work.

Source: Written evidence from the FCO to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (UKA0012)

58. Baroness Amos said whenever she heard of a new UK “plan for the African continent”, she thought, “Here we go again”. New approaches often said “the same thing, but perhaps in slightly different language.” The Government needed to learn the lessons from “various strategies” it had “had to date”.97

59. The Minister said the five ‘shifts’ had been identified by the National Security Council in early 2018. It was right that the Government had decided to “reposition” itself around them.98

60. Witnesses said that the Sahel ‘shift’ represented a change in approach for the UK, which had traditionally focused on Anglophone Africa. Harriet Mathews OBE, Director for Africa, FCO, acknowledged that the UK had “not been very involved in the Sahel”, but there was now a “recognition” that the four trends identified in the ‘shifts’ came to an “absolute confluence” in the region. This was why the UK decided it “should and could do more”.99 The Minister said the region had “perhaps” been “left for too long as a French sphere of influence.”100

61. Some witnesses supported this change: Dr Vines and Mr Dewar said the Government was prioritising a “crucial region”.101 Lord Boateng said that it was “important to be able to identify new partners as our strategic interests dictate without being limited to previous historical patterns of engagement”. He said that problems in Mali and Burkina Faso had an impact on countries with which the UK had longstanding relationships, such as Nigeria and Ghana.102

62. Dr Ero said the UK should be “cautious” about further engagement in the Sahel.103 Dr Moyo wondered whether the UK was trying “to do too much”. It was a “hard proposition” to engage in Francophone West Africa. The UK had “long-standing relations” in Anglophone Africa: “Why go against a closed door when there are places such as Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa which have very long-standing historical connections with this country and a very open door?”104

97 Q 36
98 Q 119
99 Q 12
100 Q 119
101 Written evidence from Dr Alex Vines OBE and Bob Dewar CMG (ZAF0027)
102 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
103 Q 81
104 Q 74
63. International engagement on peace and security issues in the Sahel, including by the UK, are discussed in Chapter 6.

*The Africa ‘uplift’*

64. Ms Mathews said that the Government had “increased staffing by 440”, which the Government termed the Africa ‘uplift’. Seventy-five per cent of the positions were in Africa, 20% based in the UK and 5% were deployed in the UK’s global network.

65. As of January 2020, 70% of these staff had been recruited. They were a mix of locally employed and UK-based staff. The uplift as it applies to the FCO is outlined in Table 2.

### Table 2: FCO staff ‘uplifts’

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Uplift</th>
<th>Total agreed FCO staff</th>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>304&lt;sup&gt;108&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Britain</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Exit</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,154</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Supplementary written evidence from the FCO* ([ZAF0058](#))

66. As part of the new ‘strategic approach’ five new diplomatic posts had been opened (see Figure 1). Ms Mathews said that “sovereign countries” were “very proud” and requested “more and more representation”, rather than having UK ambassadors and high commissioners covering countries from a neighbouring post.

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105 Q 12
106 Written evidence from the FCO ([ZAF0003](#))
107 Q 12
108 An additional 62 staff will be from DfID and 33 will be in other Government departments.
109 Q 15
Figure 1: UK diplomatic posts in Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: Supplementary written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0058)

Government co-ordination

67. Lord Boateng said the new ‘strategic approach’ needed to be driven from Downing Street and HM Treasury, otherwise “the old departmental battles, rivalries and a profound unwillingness to pool resources” would “limit” the Government’s “capacity to deliver meaningful changes in policy”.110

68. Government witnesses stressed the cross-Whitehall nature of the new ‘strategic approach’. Ms Mathews said that each embassy in the region was “working together across government” to consider the five ‘shifts’ and apply and prioritise them in the particular context of the country in which

110 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
they operated.\textsuperscript{111} The Minister said that Government departments and overseas posts had organised “around the strategy”. This had prevented the strategy from becoming “siloed or” just “integrated with Department for International Development … and [the] FCO”.\textsuperscript{112}

\textit{Communication of the ‘strategic approach’}

69. Witnesses criticised the way the ‘strategic approach’ had been communicated. The All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Africa had been “left with the strong impression” that the ‘strategic approach’ was “less a comprehensive ‘strategy’” and more an “outline of some broad policy themes where the UK would like to focus more with regards to Africa.”\textsuperscript{113}

70. Lord Boateng said the “‘new strategic approach’ to Africa” seemed to “exist primarily … in a series of [Prime Ministerial and ministerial] speeches”. There was “little by way of specifics and no overarching document”, “let alone [a] set of targets” by which success could be measured.\textsuperscript{114}

71. Dr Westcott said the strategy had “never [been]… clearly expressed”.\textsuperscript{115} He said the Government should make the strategy “slightly clearer … and more public”.\textsuperscript{116}

72. In January 2020 Ms Mathews said that the word “strategy” had been used as “shorthand”, and this might have been the source of confusion. The Government had designed a “strategic approach that aimed to provide a framework and guidance for … broader work across the continent, rather than having a traditional document that set out milestones and the point at which it would be achieved.” She added that there would be a “series of strategies” “underneath” the ‘strategic approach’.\textsuperscript{117}

73. The APPG for Africa said the lack of “a public reference point” for the approach had limited “its impact on African perceptions that the UK is re-prioritising the continent.” A “clear strategy” was “essential”.\textsuperscript{118}

74. In May 2020 the Minister said that the Government had a “very clear strategy” and that the strategy was “very much a real document”.\textsuperscript{119}

75. He said that “Later this year, following our analysis of the impacts of COVID-19 in Africa, we will be updating the strategic approach and will publish the updated information online.”\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{The UK’s investment target}

76. Theresa May MP had announced one target during her visit to Cape Town: the “ambition” for the UK to become the largest G7 investor in Africa by 2022.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{itemize}
\item[111] Q 14
\item[112] Q 120
\item[113] Written evidence from the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Africa (ZAF0007)
\item[114] Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
\item[115] Q 29
\item[116] Q 29
\item[117] Q 12
\item[118] Written evidence from APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
\item[119] Q 120
\item[120] Written evidence from James Duddridge MP (ZAF0057)
\end{itemize}
77. By the time of the UK–Africa Investment Summit in January 2020 (discussed in Chapter 5) this target had been dropped. Instead, the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson MP, wanted the UK to be the “partner of choice” for the continent.122

78. The Minister said it had been “a crass target”. “As Africa expands massively, the cake expands more”. China was “eating up a lot more of that investment opportunity than before”. This had made hitting such a target “harder and harder”.123 We note that China is not a member of the G7. Debbie Palmer, Director, West and Southern Africa, DfID, said that another reason for dropping the target was that targets “bounce up and down as the data changes”.124

79. UK trade and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa is discussed in Chapter 5.

*The Integrated Review*

80. In February 2020 the Prime Minister announced a “government-wide review” of foreign policy, defence, security and international development. The ‘Integrated Review’ will run in parallel to the Comprehensive Spending Review.125 Both have been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

81. Lord Boateng said both reviews would “provide an opportunity to “demonstrate a political commitment” to the Africa strategy.126

82. We are disappointed to conclude that the Government’s new ‘strategic approach’ to Africa falls short. It is not a strategy, but rather some broad ideas and themes, and there is little clarity on how the Government plans to put it into action.

83. Communication of the new ‘strategic approach’ to Africa has been confused and confusing. Since it was first mentioned in July 2018, when Theresa May MP was the Prime Minister, it has been necessary to piece together the ‘approach’ from different speeches and documents. Moreover, the language it has used to describe its approach has been imprecise—referring to a “strategy” and then a “strategic approach”—and has relied on jargon—referring to “shifts” and “enablers”.

84. The Government should publish a clearly articulated list of its priorities for its engagement with Africa, and an action plan for meeting them, including ministerial and departmental responsibilities. This should include how it intends to better engage with African governments and institutions, and the role to be played by more high-profile initiatives such as visits and summits. The action plan could be used to measure the Government’s success and could be periodically updated as circumstances change.

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123 Q 137

124 Q 124


126 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
85. The context of the UK’s departure from the European Union, and the Integrated Review of foreign policy, defence, security and international development, present a timely opportunity for a renewal of the UK’s engagement in Africa. This should build on the initiative launched by the former Prime Minister and the welcome ‘uplift’ of staff in the region.

86. We recognise that the Government’s target to become the top G7 investor in Africa by 2022 may have been overly ambitious; it was unlikely that it could have been achieved. Nonetheless, we regret the Government’s decision to drop a formal target for investment in Africa, in favour of an ambition of being the “partner of choice”. This new ambition cannot be measured or quantified, and could be seen as signalling the downgrading of Africa as a Government priority.

Other countries and organisations

87. Witnesses outlined the policies of some of the most influential non-African actors on the continent.

France

88. Witnesses said that France’s approach to Sub-Saharan Africa since decolonisation had differed from the UK’s in a fundamental way. Professor Tony Chafer, Professor of French and African Studies, Portsmouth University, characterised France’s approach as “hands-on” and the UK’s as “hands-off”.127

89. Myles Wickstead CBE, Visiting Professor (International Relations), King’s College London, and former Head of the Secretariat, Commission for Africa (2004–05), said that France had not been as good as the UK at “withdrawing from” its colonial relationships “and building up different ones”.128 François Dr François Gaulme, Associate Research Fellow, African Studies Center, Institut français des relations internationales, said that during the period of decolonisation France had been “keen to disseminate” its “own political model to these new and very fragile” states, while maintaining a military presence to protect “post-independence stability”.129 Professor Chafer said that because France had left troops in former colonies it had been able to launch approximately 30 military interventions in the “three decades after political independence.”130

90. Francophone African currencies had remained pegged to the French franc (and then the euro) through the CFA franc. This had allowed France to

127 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF00039)
128 Q 74
129 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF0033)
130 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
maintain significant economic influence. This relationship still existed today, although the CFA franc arrangements had recently been modified.\textsuperscript{131}

91. According to Professor Chafer, two events in the 1990s caused a rethink of French policy towards its former colonies and Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. First, the end of the Cold War meant that “France could no longer present itself as the key guarantor of Western strategic interests in its former colonies”, as there was no longer a need to preserve them “from Soviet incursion”. The second was the Rwandan genocide: France’s actions prompted “renewed accusations” of “French neo-colonialism”, and provoked “widespread domestic, regional and international criticism.”\textsuperscript{132}

92. France’s approach to Africa subsequently became focused more on “multilateralism”, with a recognition of the need to better use UN processes and co-operate more with European partners. France made all countries in the region eligible for French aid, not just its former colonies. French aid had since become highly multilateral; by 2016 “some 40% of the total aid budget was multilateral aid”, with 57% of that aid channelled through the EU.\textsuperscript{133}

93. Professor Chafer said the 1998 Saint-Malo summit between the UK and France “was supposed to draw a line under the history of rivalry that had long hampered Anglo-French co-operation”.\textsuperscript{134} Dr Westcott said France was the UK’s “best friend and oldest rival” in Sub-Saharan Africa. The UK had “a lot of common interests with the French”; it was important to cooperate as the French often had the “hard power” and the UK often had the “economic soft power.”\textsuperscript{135} Ms Mathews said the UK had “excellent co-operation with the French”.\textsuperscript{136}

94. One such area of common interest is the Sahel. This, along with its implications for UK–French cooperation, is considered in Chapter 6.

\textit{The European Union}

95. Dr Ero said the EU was “very willing” to engage on issues relating to Sub-Saharan Africa but was “oftentimes overly bureaucratic and slow, and not agile.”\textsuperscript{137} In March 2020 it announced a plan to develop a “new comprehensive EU strategy with Africa”.\textsuperscript{138} Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie, Senior Research Fellow for Africa Security, and Obasanjo Fellow, RUSI, said this would be

\textsuperscript{131} Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039) and written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF0033). The CFA franc zone consists of 14 countries split into two groups: the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte D’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo) and the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMCU, including Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon). These countries, using the CFA franc, had their currencies pegged to the French franc and then later the euro. In December 2019 France and the countries of WAEMU announced that the eight west African countries would reform the CFA franc into a new currency, the eco. Landry Signé, ‘How the France-backed CFA franc works as an enabler and barrier to development’, Quartz Africa (7 December 2019: https://qz.com/africa/1763066/how-the-france-backed-african-cfa-franc-works/ [accessed 24 June 2020]

\textsuperscript{132} Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)

\textsuperscript{133} Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)

\textsuperscript{134} Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)

\textsuperscript{135} Q 34

\textsuperscript{136} Q 13

\textsuperscript{137} Q 81

built on five partnerships: green transition; digital transformation; sustainable growth and jobs; peace and governance; and migration and mobility.\footnote{Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)}

96. Dr Westcott said that “historically” the UK had been “central to the EU’s approach to Africa.” Before the UK joined, the bloc’s Africa policy had been “basically French”. After the UK joined it “very much became a joint effort.”\footnote{Q 33}

97. The UK had had significant influence over the EU’s approach and policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa. Dr Westcott said EU aid programmes had “been enormously influenced” by DfID, and the UK had been “absolutely central” in “terms of the effectiveness of sanctions and aid conditionality”. The UK had used its membership to influence the EU’s prioritisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. He said France had “always” tried to “drag resources away from the Horn [of Africa] towards the Sahel”, but because of UK influence, the EU had “paid for AMISOM”, which was critical to the UK’s objective to “stabilise Somalia”\footnote{Q 33} (discussed further in Chapter 6).

98. Dr Westcott said the UK’s interests were “still broadly aligned” with those of the EU’s member states.\footnote{Q 34}

\textit{Germany}

99. Dr Tchie said Germany’s engagement focused on “investment, humanitarian aid, conflict resolution and mitigation”.\footnote{Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)} It had been a major troop contributor to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) in Mali.\footnote{Written evidence from Paul Melly (ZAF0027)} Dr Westcott said it was “nearly as big a donor” as the UK and the two countries co-ordinated closely.\footnote{Q 34}

\textit{The United States}

100. Dr Westcott said the US had two “areas of interest in particular”. First, “democracy and [aid] conditionality”, although this appeared to “be a lower priority” at the moment. Second, the “struggle against terrorism”, which remained a “high priority” for Washington.\footnote{Q 34} Dr Tchie said increased US engagement with Africa “since the 2000s” had a strong security focus.\footnote{Q 34}

101. General Sir Richard Barrons said the “US security footprint in Africa” was “designed to be light (by US standards)”. Washington focused on “two missions”: “direct action against” non-state armed groups; and “building the capacity of … African partners” in the security space.\footnote{Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)} Dr Tchie said there had been recent reports that the US was planning to significantly lower its security commitments in the region.\footnote{Q 29}

102. Dr Westcott said the US approach to the region had traditionally aligned with the UK’s but was “perhaps” less so “at the moment”.\footnote{Q 29}
Ms Mathews said China had “the biggest presence” in Sub-Saharan Africa. China’s economic power in Africa gave it a “very strong influence and interest in individual countries”, and in relation to “broader themes”.

Dr Tchie said China’s approach to Africa was centred around four areas: “infrastructure projects” through its Belt and Road Initiative; “strengthening and maintaining partnerships with states … open to and supportive of the Chinese government and its businesses”; protecting “its financial interests” through loan repayments; and ensuring “intervention in the politics or policies of partner states” was seen as “being at the invitation of their governments.”

China’s economic role in Africa was not new. Dr Moyo said that China had been “a large participant in Africa’s growth story dating back to the … 1930s and 1940s.” However, the “extent and depth of China’s incursion into Africa in the last decade” had been “meaningful in terms of foreign direct investment and trade.”

Ms Mathews said trade between China and African countries was worth over $200 million, its foreign direct investment over $30 billion, and Chinese state banks were “the largest external source of infrastructure finance”. China was “a larger creator of jobs than any other external player.”

China presented itself as a model for Sub-Saharan African countries to follow. Mr Wickstead said the “China–Africa dynamic” was “more one of South–South partnership than of North–South partnership.” China presented itself to Sub-Saharan African partners as “a developing country just 10 years further along the road”, which could “help and teach lessons.”

Dr Moyo said China’s role was “fundamentally a good thing” but there were problematic aspects. Andrew Mitchell MP said “a lot of what China” had done in Africa was “good”, but Beijing needed to be more “transparent”. David Lammy MP was “deeply concerned” about aspects of the China–Africa relationship. He said “very extravagant” private finance initiatives, funded by China, were “largely weighted in favour of China and not the country in which” the project was developed.

China’s ownership of African debt was of concern. Ms Mathews gave the example of Ethiopia, where China was both “the largest foreign direct investor” and was “estimated to hold about half of” the country’s “external debt”. Dr Moyo said China purchased African debt on the secondary market to influence negotiations with countries on access to their natural resources or land.

Dr Westcott said China used to be “eager to listen to” the UK on issues relating to Africa, but China was now “much bigger and more influential.

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151 Q 25
152 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
153 Q 64
154 Q 25
155 Q 68
156 Q 67
157 Q 3
158 Q 3
159 Q 25
160 Q 66
All African leaders will go to summits with President Xi and they do not feel that they need to listen to [the UK] any more”.161

111. Ms Mathews said there were “quite strong disagreements” between the UK and China on Africa, including on issues that “the Chinese would see as interference” and the UK viewed as “engagement and necessary change”.162

112. Baroness Amos and Dr Westcott said there were competing and common interests between the UK and China.163 China shared the UK’s interest in “promoting rapid growth in Africa”, but did this in “slightly different ways”. China’s interest in economic growth meant it had a “high interest in stability in Africa”, another mutual interest, “because instability and conflict reduce growth.”164

113. Baroness Amos said China was “respectful” to Sub-Saharan African countries. It was “clear about its economic interests and what it wants” out of its relationships in a way that the UK was not.165

Other countries

114. A number of other countries have increased their engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. These include Turkey, India, Japan and countries in the Gulf and Scandinavia.166

115. Russia was “playing an increasing role” in Sub-Saharan Africa.167 Ms Mathews said its trade with Africa had “risen significantly”.168 Dr Westcott said Russia ‘thrived’ “on disorder”,169 and deployed “very small resources very strategically and very effectively.”170 The UK’s interests were “less closely aligned with Russia” than with other countries, including China.171

116. France and the UK have common interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the Sahel in particular. It is time to draw a line under traditional rivalries. The Government should continue to work closely with France on issues of common interest.

117. The UK and the EU are likely to remain largely aligned on policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. The UK’s departure from the EU means that new methods of co-operation will need to be built up with the objective of engaging with the EU member states and institutions on issues of common interest.

118. The current US Administration is regrettably less engaged on Africa than its predecessors. Should this change, the UK should seek to re-engage with its principal ally on policy towards Africa.

161 Q 34
162 Q 27
163 Q 29 and Q 45
164 Q 34 (Dr Nick Westcott)
165 Q 45
166 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002), Q 61 (Professor Tim Murithi) and Q 31 (Dr Nick Westcott)
167 Q 34 (Dr Nick Westcott)
168 Q 25
169 Q 31
170 Q 35
171 Q 34
119. The UK and China’s interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are not always aligned, but there are areas where their interests overlap. The Government should continue to engage with China on issues of mutual interest, such as stability in the region. Many African governments regard China as an important partner and source of investment, and the UK should seek to work constructively with China where appropriate, especially through multilateral institutions, on issues such as debt, health, climate change and trade, while defending UK national interests and values.
CHAPTER 3: AFRICA’S REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The African Union

120. The AU is the continent’s regional body. All 54 African states, and the Sahrawi Republic—a partially recognised state—are members.172

121. The AU was launched in 2002.173 This followed the 1999 Sirte Declaration, which called for the establishment of a union “to work towards increased co-operation and integration of African states”, and to “drive Africa’s growth and economic development”.174 Its vision is: “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.”175

122. Professor Murithi said that the experience of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was one of the “driving factors” behind the creation of the AU. This could be seen in its Constitutive Act, which had “a very strong emphasis on addressing conflict”. It “empowers the AU to intervene in situations of grave concern, when crimes have been committed—war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide”.176 There had also been momentum from “economic processes going back to 1980”,177 which “led to a strong case for regional integration and economic collaboration across borders”.178

123. The AU is the successor to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), established in 1963 as Africa’s first post-independence continental institution. Its principal areas of focus were the fight for decolonisation and ending apartheid.179

Structure of the AU

124. There are five regions of the AU: north, south, east, west, central,180 plus the diaspora. Figure 2 shows these regions and their members.


176 Q 56


178 Q 56


Figure 2: The regions of the African Union

North (7 countries): Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (disputed territory) and Tunisia

South (10 countries): Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, eSwatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe

West (15 countries): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo

East (14 countries): Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda

Central (9 countries): Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and São Tomé and Príncipe

Diaspora (c. 170 million people): “People of African origin living outside the continent, irrespective of their citizenship and nationality and who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the African Union”, Definition of the African Union.

The Chairperson of the AU

125. The Chairperson of the AU is selected by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, following consultations by member states. The current Chairperson is Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa.

The African Union Commission

126. The African Union Commission (AUC) is the AU’s secretariat. It undertakes the day-to-day activities of the Union. It is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

127. The Chairperson of the AUC is the chief executive officer, legal representative of the AU and the Commission’s chief accounting officer. The current AUC Chairperson is Moussa Faki Mahamat, Republic of Chad. He assumed office in March 2017.

Views of the AU

128. The FCO said that the AU had “proven better equipped and more willing to intervene than the OAU”. It was “increasingly building consensus among African countries on issues such as peace and security, elections, and regional integration”. Ms Mathews said the AU had “convening power” and “a mandate to speak for African countries”, which was “really important and powerful”.

129. The Minister said that in the last five years the AU had been “much more effective” on peacekeeping and co-ordination; it was now “more important and effective … than it ever has been”.

130. However, Dr Westcott said that, though “influential”, the AU “does not have the levers of power”. Dr Daniel Mulugeta, Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, said the AU was “widely seen as a paper tiger”. It was also not always effective: implementation was largely left to individual countries, resulting in patchy adoption of AU decisions.

131. Witnesses said that a key challenge was AU member states’ reluctance to pool sovereignty. Professor Murithi said that leaders would “always profess the need to work together with fellow African countries” on the international stage, but “when it comes to domestic issues they retreat to their cocoons and prefer to be left to do what they will in their own countries”. As a result of colonialism, African states were “especially sensitive to sovereignty and independence issues in political integration”.

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185 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
186 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
187 Q 17
188 Q 123
189 Q 32 (Dr Nick Westcott)
190 Written evidence by Dr Daniel Mulugeta (ZAF0014)
191 Q 17 (Harriet Mathews)
192 Q 32 (Dr Nick Westcott) and Q 17 (Harriet Mathews)
193 Q 56 (Professor Tim Murithi)
194 Written evidence by Dr Daniel Mulugeta (ZAF0014)
132. Dr Daniel said that member states’ “lack of political commitment” to the AU was also a result of the “centralised and monopolistic nature of African states”.195 Professor Murithi said that a lack of openness was an issue for the AU: it had not been willing to engage with African citizens and civil society, who were keen to “engage, share ideas and put forward solutions”.196

133. Ms Mathews said that, ultimately, the AU was “as effective as its members want it to be”.197 There were examples where it had been effective—such as its peacekeeping deployment to Somalia—the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)198—the protocol on the free movement of people,199 and securing agreement on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)200—and those where it had been divided and failed to act—such as in Burundi201 and Cameroon.202 The AU’s work on trade, and on peace and security, is discussed further in chapters 4 and 6 respectively.

134. Professor Murithi concluded that the AU’s performance was “a mixed bag”. Significantly, it had “begun to change the nature of the game on the African continent”: unconstitutional changes of government were now frowned upon and there was a degree of proactive intervention.203 Baroness Amos considered this to be “extremely good”; it “promises well going forward”.204

AU resourcing and capabilities

135. Dr Ero said that financing was the AU’s “Achilles heel”.205 The AUC—the AU’s secretariat—has a core staff of 1,500. This was equivalent to around 5% of the staff of the European Commission, for a population that is more than twice that of the EU’s. The AU’s 2016 budget was £315 million, compared to the EU’s budget of £128 billion.206

136. The source of the AU’s funding is also a challenge. The AU website states that “On average, 67 percent of [the] assessed contribution is collected annually from member states. About 30 member states default either partially or completely on average, annually. This creates a significant funding gap between planned budget and actual funding, which hinders effective delivery of the African Union’s agenda.”207 In 2016, 60% of the AU’s budget was provided by donors.208 Baroness Amos concluded that “If you are not paying for your own organisation and somebody else is, it does have an impact … on your ability to set your own agenda”.209

137. Professor Murithi said that while the AU still relied on donor funding, its “culture” had “now moved towards much more autonomy, self-determination and self-written agendas.” In 2016, the AU had taken the “very bold step”
of levying a 0.2% tax on imports to provide sustainable funding for its operations.210 As of September 2019, 16 AU member states were collecting the levy: Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic (Congo-Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Sudan.211

138. Witnesses said the AUC faced resourcing and capacity problems.212 Professor Murithi said that it suffered from a lack of professionalism, including the necessary capacity, knowledge and skills to support peacemaking, mediation interventions, peacebuilding interventions and peacekeeping operations.213

139. Professor Murithi said that there had been “a strong critique from the member states themselves of the limitations of the AU”. A “root and branch culling, a tree surgery, of the African Union Commission and its departments” was under way.214 Dr Ero was concerned that “though these reforms are innovative and important and aim at streamlining the African Union”, they could undermine the organisation. For example, “at least 40% of the positions in the African Union may be lost if the AU goes along with its current proposal to streamline and cut back some positions.”215

Agenda 2063

140. Agenda 2063 is the AU’s blueprint for 2013 to 2063.216 Box 4 summarises Agenda 2063.

**Box 4: Agenda 2063**

The AU has set out 14 flagship programmes for Agenda 2063.

1. Development of an integrated high-speed train network to connect all African capitals and commercial centres.

2. Formulation of an African commodities strategy to transform Africa from a raw materials supplier to a continent that uses its own resources for economic development.


4. The African passport and free movement of people across the continent.

5. Silencing the guns by 2020. Ending all wars, civil conflicts, gender-based violence, violent conflicts and preventing genocide.

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210 Q 58. At a ‘Retreat on Financing of the Union’ during the 27th African Union Summit in Kigali in July 2016, AU Heads of State and Government decided to directs all member states to implement a 0.2% levy on eligible imports. The decision entered into force in January 2017. AU, ‘What is financing of the union?’ : https://au.int/en/what-financing-union [accessed 24 June 2020]. The levy will be to fund up to 100% of the ordinary budget, up to 75% of the programme budget and up to 25% of the peacekeeping operations’ budget. AU, Frequently Asked Questions about Financing the Union: https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31953-file-faq.pdf [accessed 24 June 2020]


212 Q 17 (Ms Mathews); written evidence from Dr David Mulugeta (ZAF00014); written evidence from the FCO (ZAF00003)

213 Q 57 and Q 58

214 Q 57

215 Q 75

(6) Establishment of a single African air-transport market.


(9) The pan-African e-network, to lead to transformative e-applications and services in Africa.

(10) The Africa outer space strategy.

(11) An African virtual and e-university, to use ICT-based programmes to increase access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa.

(12) Cyber security.

(13) The Great African Museum, to create awareness about Africa’s cultural artefacts and the influence of Africa on the cultures of the world.

It identifies key ‘transformational outcomes’ of Agenda 2063: improvements in living standards; transformed, inclusive and sustainable economies; integrated Africa; empowered women, youth and children; and a well-governed, peaceful and cultural-centric Africa in a global context.


141. Professor Murithi described it as “very ambitious”. This was “necessary from an African perspective, because the pace at which change is coming has been very slow, so it is important to have a vision of where we need to get to as a continent.”

142. Ms Edmondson welcomed the alignment between Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. The AU Commission and the UN have signed a framework to enhance collaboration in implementing Agenda 2063 and the SDGs. The AUC and UN SDG staff have been discussing a common framework for the integration of the two measurements nationally. Ms Edmondson said Agenda 2063 was “a mixture of here-and-now, practical projects that it can get on with and ones that feel more aspirational, such as a high-speed rail network”.

143. Witnesses identified some challenges to implementing Agenda 2063. First was its scale. Dr Moyo said she was sceptical about “proclamations”.

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217 Q 57

218 Q 17. The 17 SDGs were agreed by all countries in 2015. They “recognize that ending poverty and other deprivations must go hand-in-hand with strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth—all while tackling climate change and working to preserve our oceans and forests”. United Nations, ‘Sustainable Development Goals’: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300 [accessed 24 June 2020]


220 Q 17

221 Such as the SDGs or the AfCFTA.
“Looking back on 70 years of the post-colonial era, it seems to me that Africa has never had a shortage of visionary ideas and good intentions”.222

144. Dr Daniel said that Agenda 2063 “does not define the scope, content, purpose and indicators to monitor its implementation.”223 It was “a goal-driven rather than process-oriented strategy”; it had “the ultimate objective of creating a united and integrated Africa rather than with an emphasis on institutional capacity building and workable programmes.” By giving equal priority to all issues, the result might be that “none of them could be realised in the end”. He thought this approach risked “raising false hopes”. It would enable the AU, RECs (discussed below) and member states to “pick and choose issues according to their perceived political and institutional interests”.224

145. Second, Professor Murithi said that the “biggest challenge” would be “to transform the AU, as “the vehicle for achieving Agenda 2063”. To deliver Agenda 2063, the AU needed a “cultural shift”, to become “a much more efficient machine, a much more effective operator to deliver the desired outcomes”.225

146. Third, Dr Daniel said that pan-Africanism—the “ideological framework that underpins Agenda 2063”—was “an ambiguous and contested concept”. There was “no continental agreement on what exactly it is, let alone evidence of a capacity to galvanise political will and action.”226 Pan-Africanism had “little or no resonance beyond capital cities”: African citizens were “never held together by sentiments which could create the feeling of belonging to the same society”.227

147. Fourth, Dr Daniel identified an inconsistency in the aims of Agenda 2063: its vision was “inward-looking and defensive”, but had the aim of reframing Africa’s international presence.228 Agenda 2063 would encourage “a self-contained rather than globalising political economy which may lead to the imposition of protectionist policies”.229

**The AU and international organisations**

148. Professor Murithi said that African countries often lacked unity on international issues. The AU was often “exploited and manipulated” in global forums, particularly by China, which exerted leverage through its extensive investment across the continent (discussed in Chapter 2). As a result, “African countries do not necessarily make decisions on the basis of their own interests”.230

**The AU at the UN**

149. Africa has the largest group of countries in the UN General Assembly.231 Dr Westcott said that African countries “operate quite effectively as a lobby
in the UN”, having “learned from the independence struggle that unity is strength”.232

150. An ISS study showed that in 2018 “over 50% of UNSC meetings, 60% of its outcome documents, and 70% of its resolutions with Chapter VII mandates concerned African peace and security issues.”233 Ms Mathews said that the African members of the Security Council sought to develop common positions.234 The FCO said that the AU’s 54 UN votes and three non-permanent seats on the Security Council “potentially give it pivotal influence in multilateral fora”. It was particularly influential on Darfur (Sudan) and Somalia.235

151. The three, non-permanent, African seats on the UNSC—the A3—rotate between the members of the AU. The current members are Niger, Tunisia and South Africa.236 Ms Mathews said that there was “now a stronger lobbying campaign” between African states for “some of the big countries to come on to it more often and more frequently, but the selection process also tries to manage fairness.”237 Professor Murithi said the A3 were “often fragmented. They do not operate from a single hymn sheet and … they are not necessarily the countries with the greatest influence.” Improving the selection of countries was a work in progress.238

152. Professor Murithi said that the structure of the UN Security Council disadvantaged African countries. One of African countries’ “biggest gripes” was that “Africa is not on an equal footing as far as the international system is concerned”.239 African countries wanted “agency”, but due to the structure of the UNSC, “they often find themselves subject to much larger forces.”240 In 2005 the AU issued a proposal that Africa should have two permanent seats on the Security Council. This had been “roundly dismissed”. This memory “still lingers in the mindset of African countries, particularly the dominant countries in the African continent.”241 He thought that fundamental reform of the UN was needed.242

153. The Government should continue to support constructive reforms to the rules-based international order to provide African countries with a voice commensurate with their size and importance. This should include supporting reform of the UN Security Council to better represent Africa.

African countries at global climate negotiations

154. Witnesses discussed the AU’s engagement with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations. Dr Death said...
the region had experience of challenging environmental contexts—including
droughts, floods, famines and diseases—which could be an important
contribution to global climate co-operation. It was “welcome to see the need
for climate action being noted prominently by the African Union, as well
as by other continent-wide institutions”, such as the African Development
Bank and the African Group of Negotiators in the UNFCCC. As a region,
Africa had been well-represented in the UNFCCC process, aided by an
African Common Position on climate change (since 2008–09), which had
“enabled African negotiators to ‘punch above their weight’”. 243

155. However, Dr Death had three concerns. First, the AU did not “go far enough
in appreciation of the scale of the challenge ahead”. Second, climate change
occupied “a lower rank in priority relative to issues of development, trade,
economic growth and peace and security” for the AU. Third, he thought that
the AU’s “weaknesses” in “organisational capacity, budget and political buy-
in” (discussed above) were a problem in tackling climate change. Individual
African states took different approaches to climate change—a problem which
was not unique to the continent. 244 He saw “potential for climate change to
become a unifying campaign for the AU, bringing together member states
and becoming the institutional embodiment of a strong continental voice for
more robust and radical international action for climate justice”, but “there
is little sign of this at present”. 245

The AU–UK relationship

156. The FCO said that the AU was “an important partner for the UK” as “the
pre-eminent multilateral organisation on the continent, and a champion of
the rules based international system”. 246

157. In February 2019, Harriet Baldwin MP, then Minister of State for Africa, and
His Excellency Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the AU Commission,
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on a partnership between
the AU and the UK. 247

158. The FCO said the agreement was based around five ‘pillars’:

(1) Strengthening resilience;

(2) Mobilising investments for African sustainable transformation;

(3) Migration and human mobility;

(4) Promoting multilateralism and the rules-based international system;
and

(5) Investing in people. 248

243 Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAFO036)
244 He said that South Africa, Morocco, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Kenya were often singled out as “continental
leaders” on the climate change agenda. In Nigeria, ambition and capacity were increasing, but “the
particular challenges of reforming a petrostate have so far appeared almost insuperable”.
245 Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAFO036)
246 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAFO003)
247 AU, ‘Joint Communiqué on the African Union–United Kingdom Partnership’ (22 February 2019):
https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20190222/joint-communiqu%C3%A9-african-union-united-kingdom-
partnership [accessed 24 June 2020]
248 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAFO003)
It said that “peace and security” remained “the bedrock of our relationship”, and the UK engaged with the AU on issues including trade, migration, climate change, demography, serious and organised crime, human development, education, health and jobs.249

159. The “core” of the agreement was “increased political engagement, including an annual high-level dialogue”.251 The FCO said that, through “political and diplomatic engagement … we hope to achieve the most meaningful progress towards greater cooperation and alignment of wider UK policy and development activity in Africa with AU objectives”.252 Moussa Faki Mahamat attended the UK–Africa Investment Summit in London in January 2020 (discussed further in Chapter 5).

160. A planned UK–AU summit was postponed as a result of the 2019 general election. The Minister admitted that the Government had “been somewhat distracted”, and the COVID-19 pandemic had caused further delay, but planning was now under way to hold an AU–UK dialogue in June 2020. This would be “a more light-weight high-level dialogue”, held virtually.254

161. The FCO said the UK already had “a regular, open dialogue with the AU on UN Security Council business”, and sought to engage with the A3 “in a spirit of collaboration and partnership”. It was “exploring the possibilities for greater co-operation with the AU” in other forums, such as the Commonwealth, the World Trade Organisation, the International Criminal Court, the UNECA, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.255

162. The UK is investing up to £30 million in AU-related projects over three years from 2018. In 2018–19, the UK contributed £7 million to support AU peace support efforts, including early warning capabilities, and £1.5 million to AU electoral observation, trade and migration activities. Through the UN, the UK provides £28 million in assessed contributions to the United Nations Support Office in Somalia, which supports AMISOM. It contributed around €30m to AMISOM in 2019 through the EU’s Africa Peace Facility, plus an additional £7 million in 2019.256

163. The Royal African Society said the MoU was “an important step forward in building a joint and equal partnership in the priority areas identified”.257 Dr Wescott thought the MoU was “a helpful basis” but said specific areas of co-operation were now needed.258

164. The African Union (AU) is an increasingly effective and influential organisation. The UK is right to focus more resources on it, particularly focusing on peacekeeping, climate change and regional integration.

165. While it has had important successes, the AU faces significant challenges, including organisational capacity, funding and its
members’ willingness to pool sovereignty. The UK should continue to seek to help strengthen the AU, while recognising that the AU is one of a range of regional stakeholders with which the UK should engage.

166. The AU–UK Memorandum of Understanding provides an important framework for a reboot of the relationship. Resources and effort should be committed to developing this partnership. Agenda 2063 provides a broad, but useful, framework for engagement. We would welcome further explanation as to how the Government’s work with the AU, and on Agenda 2063, fits into its ‘strategic approach’ to Africa.

167. Bilateral relationships with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa should remain a key part of the UK’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa and with the AU.

The AU’s engagement with external stakeholders

168. The AU has partnership arrangements with a number of countries. The FCO said it had “at least seven strategic partnerships with states other than the UK… and three with regions and regional organisations” as well as “partnerships with the Commonwealth and la Francophonie”.

169. Professor Murithi said that the AU’s relationship with the EU—on which the AU is loosely modelled—had “been perhaps the most productive.” Although the two organisations were like “chalk and cheese”—not least because the EU has around 10 times the level of staffing—the two have tried to come up with “joint strategies and joint frameworks of operation”. When compared to the 2019 UK–AU MoU, the EU was “much more elaborate … in its approach”.

170. The Africa–EU Partnership was established as a “formal political channel” in 2000 at the first Africa–EU Summit in Cairo. It is guided by the Joint Africa–EU Strategy, adopted at the second EU–Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007. Co-operation currently focuses on: investing in people (education, science, technology and skills development); mobilising investment for African structural sustainable transformation; migration and mobility; and strengthening resilience, peace, security and governance. This support includes the African Peace Facility, which has provided more than €2.7 billion to conflict prevention and management since it was established in 2004.

171. China is one of the largest funders of the AU through the China–Africa Co-operation Forum. Professor Murithi described the relationship as “fairly robust and quite strong”, and “based on mutual interest”. China spent $120 million on building the new AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, which opened...
in 2012, and it continues to maintain the building. The building is widely thought to have been bugged.\textsuperscript{266}

172. Germany has a longstanding relationship with the AU;\textsuperscript{267} along with China it is one of the AU’s largest funders.\textsuperscript{268} Professor Murithi said it had a “very extensive programme on peace and security, democracy and governance, human rights and the Pan African University.” Germany was “quite committed to the project”; it had “put a lot of resources into it. They are quite well-known for their operations in relation to the AU system.” For example, Germany built the new Peace and Security Department building, which opened in 2016. He said Germany was “quite open about what they are trying to achieve”—namely “to access markets in the African continent”.\textsuperscript{269}

173. France has prioritised political engagement with the AU. In 2019 President Macron visited Addis Ababa to meet Moussa Faki Mahamat. He invited Moussa Faki Mahamat to events during France’s G7 presidency in 2019.\textsuperscript{270}

174. Japan holds a regular high-level dialogue, the Tokyo International Forum on African Development, around every five years.\textsuperscript{271}

Regional economic communities

175. Regional economic communities (RECs) are sub-regional bodies which aim to facilitate integration between their members. Eight RECs are considered the building blocks of the African Economic Community by the AU.\textsuperscript{272} Box 5 details the membership of these groups.

Box 5: Regional economic communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)</th>
<th>Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD)</td>
<td>Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo and Tunisia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{267} Q 61

\textsuperscript{268} Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)


\textsuperscript{270} Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)

\textsuperscript{271} Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)

The East African Community (EAC)
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Principe, Chad and Rwanda.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Angola, Botswana, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, eSwatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.


176. All RECs have the common goal of creating an African Economic Community. The Abuja Treaty “assumed that RECs would all conduct economic integration programs to become customs unions by 2017”, but this “did not happen.”273 Dr Westcott said that while economic integration had been the original mandate of the RECs, “they have done more on security issues, apart from the East African Community, which has quite strong economic integration.”274

177. The Africa Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said that the method and extent of integration in each REC was different. “Four RECs operate free trade areas. Some have islets of deeper integration, including customs and monetary unions. Others have free trade arrangements entirely alongside and above the REC groupings.”275 Dr Daniel said that regionalism was “fundamentally an elitist and state-led process” in Africa, and that “initiatives designed to reform regional economies” often moved “slowly, not because countries don’t understand what is needed, but because they are not in state interest.”276

178. Only 12 African countries belong to a single REC, while 33 belong to two RECs, eight to three RECs and one to four RECs.277 This is shown in Figure 3.

273 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
274 Q 32
275 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
276 Written evidence from Dr Daniel Mulugeta (ZAF0014)
277 Written evidence from The Africa Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
Figure 3: The membership of regional economic communities

179. Dr Daniel described REC membership as “a ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect of overlapping mandates, tasks, trade rules and duplication”. This “hindered” the RECs’ performance.278 Dr Ero said that states “forum shop; they pick and choose which body they want to use at a particular time to serve their own interests”.279 Baroness Amos said that “There are way too many overlapping mandates and way too many countries that belong to so many of these regional blocs”. 280

180. Professor Murithi said that subsidiarity between the AU and the RECs was “a work in progress”.281 Dr Ero said that “The regions do not always recognise the African Union and they often do not want it to stick its nose in in their backyard.” There was a tension between the AU, which “sees itself

278 Written evidence from Dr Daniel Mulugeta (ZAF0014)
279 Q 78
280 Q 40
281 Q 58. Also see Q 16 (Harriet Mathews).
as the primary political body on the continent” and the reality, that “not all its member states necessarily see it as the go-to institution when there is a crisis”.282

181. She said there were times when the AU had to defer to the RECs, for example ECOWAS had “a longer heritage than the African Union with Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea Bissau”283 Professor Murithi said this relationship could be “tense”.284 There were also times when RECs and the AU took different approaches, for example in January 2019 SADC “took a very different view from that of the African Union on the elections in the DRC”. The REC had “recognised the decision of the constitutional court”, while the AU “wanted to halt recognition of the elections there”.285

182. The AU and the RECs held their first co-ordination meeting in July 2019 in Niamey, as part of the AU’s institutional reforms to rationalise its relations with the RECs.286

183. The UK should continue to engage with the regional economic communities (RECs) across Sub-Saharan Africa. RECs are often regarded by their members as the ‘go-to’ institutions to address crises in their regions, and many have made progress towards regional economic integration. The UK should concentrate on those which have significant influence, and develop a more clearly-defined offer for its engagement with them.

**The Commonwealth**

184. Nineteen Sub-Saharan African countries are members of the Commonwealth, accounting for 35% of its membership (see Figure 4).287

185. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the Commonwealth’s work focuses on three broad areas:

(1) Promoting democracy, strengthening public institutions, access to justice and court transformation;

(2) Countering violent extremism and promoting youth participation in politics; and

(3) Supporting inclusive economic growth and sustainable development.

It also provides support for its members on climate change.288

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282 Q 78
283 Q 78
284 Q 58
285 Q 78 Also see Q16 (Harriet Mathews)
287 Written evidence from the Commonwealth Secretariat (ZAF0053)
288 Written evidence from the Commonwealth Secretariat (ZAF00053)
Views of the Commonwealth

186. The Minister said that the Commonwealth was “a strong convening group”. The Government worked with it, and wished “to strengthen it”, but “we should be under no illusion … the Commonwealth is a tricky concept” to understand. More could be done “to sell the Commonwealth”.\(^{289}\)

187. The Royal African Society said that the UK had “tended to rely on the Commonwealth link to sustain its engagement with Africa”. This brought “many benefits” but—as set out in Chapter 2—was “not a substitute for high level political contact with African governments on their own priorities”.\(^{290}\)

188. Dr Lyn Johnstone, Lecturer in International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London, said there had been a “surge in Commonwealth attention by British establishment figures” in the context of Brexit, who saw opportunities for trade deals. African members were “watching Britain carefully”; there was “a sense that some … in the UK see the Commonwealth

\(^{289}\) Q 140
\(^{290}\) Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002). It had also “led to the neglect of francophone countries”.

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as a continuation of the Empire with member states under Britain’s influence”.  

189. For Sub-Saharan African countries, initial membership of the Commonwealth after independence had been motivated by “economic and trade opportunities, the transfer of technology, and cultural cooperation”. It continued to be “a convenient club”, and there was “a certain fondness for the Queen that appears to be a draw-card for continued membership”. Sub-Saharan African members of the Commonwealth saw the organisation as “a trade partner, investor and development partner”.  

190. Dr Johnstone said that a “major area” where the Commonwealth had had an impact was agriculture, where the UK had “pushed for … liberalisation within the EU”. This had “benefitted African farmers and producers”. Another “rather attractive benefit” of membership was access to higher education, and funding, for students.  

191. Baroness Amos said that the Commonwealth had been “a vehicle for … people-to-people relationships”. Dr Westcott said that “Commonwealth networks … particularly among lawyers and chief justices” were “really valuable”. These provided “a kind of peer group support”, which was helpful in the context of the pressure being placed on judiciaries in countries such as Kenya and Malawi.  

192. Two Sub-Saharan African members of the Commonwealth—Rwanda and Mozambique—are not former British colonies. Dr Johnstone said that “by far the most important” factor behind Rwanda’s desire to join the Commonwealth was to access the Commonwealth’s Fund for Technical Cooperation. A second reason had been opportunities to develop English language skills, to “improve opportunities for Rwandans in education and work”. Third had been “the organisation’s emphasis on shared values”, and the opportunity both to gain from membership and to share its experiences, for example in post-conflict management. It became a member in 2009.  

193. Hosting the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kigali (postponed from June 2020 as a result of COVID-19) would be “a fantastic opportunity for Rwanda to project itself and its Commonwealth membership to the world”.  

194. Dr Johnstone said that the case to allow Mozambique to join in 1995 had been “pushed heavily” by Nelson Mandela as a “‘unique and special case’”, because of the country’s role in supporting anti-apartheid efforts. Mozambique had particularly benefitted from Commonwealth assistance in the wake of Cyclone Idai in March 2019.  

195. The Commonwealth Secretariat said that Africa was “the region from which the Commonwealth has received recent requests for membership”.  

291 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)  
292 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)  
293 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)  
294 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)  
295 Q 37  
296 Q 33  
297 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)  
298 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)  
299 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)
This demonstrated “that the Commonwealth’s impact in Africa has not gone unnoticed”.  

Dr Johnstone said that this “narrative … that countries are evincing an interest in joining the Commonwealth and therefore the organisation must still be relevant” was commonly used by the Commonwealth Secretariat and “keen observers’ of the organisation”. A “very small handful of African countries” had expressed interest. Two of these, Burundi and South Sudan, had “more than questionable approaches to human rights”, so would not meet the threshold for membership, which required countries “to demonstrate commitment to the Commonwealth’s values, principles and priorities”.

196. For Burundi and South Sudan, the impetus was “trade and economic benefits”: the Commonwealth has a programme to stimulate trade in the East African Community (EAC),—and these two countries are the only EAC members that are not part of the Commonwealth.

197. Dr Johnstone said that, however, “we ought not kid ourselves that the Commonwealth has any real importance amongst … its African membership.” It provided “some useful trade and development attractions, but since the end of apartheid has lacked any real stand-out relevance in Africa”.

198. Baroness Amos said that it was “not clear … how Britain—with the other countries across the Commonwealth—wants to expand the role of the Commonwealth”. She said that countries which had expressed interest in joining “clearly see some benefit”, and “we should perhaps explore what they see those benefits as being and think about how we can best utilise them”.

199. The Government should discuss with African members of the Commonwealth ways in which its work in Africa could be strengthened. The Government should be open-minded about any African country wanting to join the Commonwealth so long as it fulfils the criteria for membership in terms of democracy and respect for human rights.

200. The Commonwealth’s role in supporting ‘people to people’ contacts is of value, and the Government should continue to support such engagement, including between UK and Sub-Saharan African judges. The Commonwealth’s value in terms of people-to-people contacts underscores the need for a review of the UK’s visa policies.

300 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)
301 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)
302 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)
303 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)
304 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)
305 Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)
306 Q 37
CHAPTER 4: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA’S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

201. Witnesses said that the economies of many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are fragile, have poor infrastructure, high levels of unemployment, low levels of trade within the continent, are dependent on commodities in their trade with the rest of the world, and many people are employed in the agricultural sector.

202. As set out in Chapter 1, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused a significant economic shock to the region. The impacts of COVID-19 are exacerbating many of the underlying issues discussed in this chapter; these specific problems are discussed at the end of the chapter.

203. Box 6 sets out the SDGs, which build on the eight Millennium Development Goals (2000–15). A report by the Sustainable Development Goals Center for Africa (SDGC/A), published in 2019, found that minimal progress has been made in achieving the goals—Belay Begashaw, Director General, SDGC/A, said that in some instances there was “complete stagnation”. The report found that all regions of Sub-Saharan Africa were unlikely to meet the SDGs, with the least likelihood in Central Africa across all goals. African countries were “relatively on track” to meet three goals by 2013: SDG 5 (gender equality); SDG 13 (climate action); and SDG 15 (life on land).

Box 6: The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.
4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.
5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.
6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.
7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.


308 Based on the SDGs for which it had sufficient data, namely: poverty, malnutrition, maternal mortality, net school enrolment, access to electricity, and access to drinking water.

(9) Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation.

(10) Reduce inequality within and among countries.

(11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.

(12) Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.

(13) Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.

(14) Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.

(15) Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.

(16) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

(17) Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.


204. **Building on the achievements and successes of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals remain an important universal agenda for all countries.**

**Employment**

205. Jodie Thorpe, Dr Seife Ayele and Dr Lars Otto Naess, Institute for Development Studies, said that the dominant source of income in Sub-Saharan Africa is the informal sector, and most of those working in this sector are poorly paid.310

206. The Africa Regional Office of the Open Societies Foundation (OSF) said that, following “many years of structural adjustment, deregulation and economic orthodoxy”, “countries such as Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Mauritius have been amongst the fastest growing economies”, but “their growth has been jobless and non-inclusive”.311

**Youth employment**

207. Sub-Saharan Africa has the youngest population in the world, with at least 60% of its 1.1 billion people aged under 25.312 The ODI said that among this growing population was an increasing middle class, which was expected to account for over 40% of the population by 2030.313

208. Three-quarters of young people in Sub-Saharan Africa are either unemployed or underemployed.314 The British Council said that Africa’s working-age
population would grow by about 3% per annum between 2015 and 2035—approximately 450 million people.\textsuperscript{315} CDC Group said that 20 million new jobs would need to be created each year; many of the region’s economies did not have the scale to support such job creation.\textsuperscript{316} The British Council said that only 100 million could “hope to find decent work”. Three-quarters of new entrants to the labour market would be self-employed or work in microenterprises.\textsuperscript{317}

209. The OSF said that the “un(der)employed youth” of the region were “restless and hostile towards the state”.\textsuperscript{318} The link between lack of economic opportunity and violence is discussed in Chapter 6.

210. The FCO said the UK and the AU were “working together” (through the MoU discussed in Chapter 3) to address the “demographic transition”, with the aim of enabling “a dividend of prosperity and growth”.\textsuperscript{319}

Women

211. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said that over 50% of African SMEs, micro-enterprises and markets were “owned and run by women”.\textsuperscript{320} Dr Rachel Bennett, Senior Lecturer in Human Geography, University of Gloucestershire, and Dr Philippa Waterhouse, Lecturer in Health and Social Care, Open University, said that women’s participation in the labour force was a vehicle for gender equality. However, the high average percentage of women in employment in Sub-Saharan Africa—61%—did “not always translate into empowerment”.\textsuperscript{321}

212. Ninety-two per cent of women working in Sub-Saharan Africa are part of the informal economy.\textsuperscript{322} Christian Aid said that “a great proportion of women” were “condemned as unpaid labour”.\textsuperscript{323} Dr Bennett and Dr Waterhouse said to change this there was a need for family leave, early childhood care and education, and support for caregiving by men in order to challenge gender norms.\textsuperscript{324}

Migration for work

213. Professor Gibril Faal OBE JP, Visiting Professor in Practice, London School of Economics, and Director, GK Partners, said that Africa had “a long history of regional migration” for employment.\textsuperscript{325} Dr Jones said that there was “cyclical” regional demand for labour. As a result, much of the migration within the continent was “extremely temporary ... under two years, often much less than that”.\textsuperscript{326}

\textsuperscript{315} Written evidence from the British Council (ZAF0012)
\textsuperscript{316} Written evidence from CDC Group (ZAF0026)
\textsuperscript{317} Written evidence from the British Council (ZAF0012)
\textsuperscript{318} Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002) and written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048)
\textsuperscript{319} Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
\textsuperscript{320} Q 109
\textsuperscript{321} Written evidence from Dr Rachel Bennett and Dr Philippa Waterhouse (ZAF0006)
\textsuperscript{322} Written evidence from Dr Rachel Bennett and Dr Philippa Waterhouse (ZAF0006)
\textsuperscript{323} Written evidence from Christian Aid (ZAF0038)
\textsuperscript{324} Written evidence from Dr Rachel Bennett and Dr Philippa Waterhouse (ZAF0006)
\textsuperscript{325} Q 89
\textsuperscript{326} Written evidence from Dr Will Jones (ZAF00055)
214. Professor Faal said that seasonal farmers “come and go”, while “others are there for generations”. He gave the example of Ivory Coast, which had “been hosting West African migrants for hundreds of years”.327

215. Dr Jones said that environmental factors were major drivers of migration, in particular “depleted land, irregular rainfall, soil degradation, and the ensuing fall in agricultural yields.” The situation was made worse by “some state policies”, including “industrial development plans” that were “often extremely expensive in terms of water consumption and disruption to land”, such as Sudan’s “extremely aggressive plan of industrialisation built on dam construction”. However climate change had not yet produced the “truly terrifying levels of displacement … seen in other regions, notably South East Asia.”328

216. Considering migration beyond the continent, Onyekachi Wambu, Executive Director, The African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), said Africa was likely to remain an exporter of labour. He thought this would result in African diaspora remaining “an important political, social, cultural and economic force”.329 The role of the diaspora is discussed in Chapter 5.

217. The AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018–2030) “takes into account AU priorities, policies, Agenda 2063, the Sustainable development Goals (SDGs) and international migration management policies and standards”.330 Dr Jones said there were also “regional structures for supporting migration and displacement” within with SADC, ECOWAS, and the EAC.331

218. He said that the UK had an “excellent reputation” among many African states for its technical assistance on policy challenges, but it had “not used that advantage in supporting regional arrangements on mobility and migration”. It should support “regional inter-governmental mechanisms for the smooth regulation and enabling of” migration.332

219. The FCO said the UK was “continuing our support to the AU to maximise the benefits of regular migration”. This work included “ethical recruitment, lowering the cost of remittance transfers, improved use of data and evidence in policy making, and encouraging mutual recognition of qualifications”. The UK had “seconded a technical adviser to the AU migration policy team”, to promote “better migration governance across the continent to facilitate safe, orderly and dignified migration”. It was exploring further work with the AU.333

220. The population of Africa is projected to double to 2.1 billion by 2050. Providing employment is already a major challenge facing the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa: 20 million new jobs will be needed every year. The UK should support the UN and its agencies,
in partnership with the AU, in their work to both harness the benefits and meet the challenges of population growth in the region.

221. **Intra-Africa migration is a longstanding and continuing phenomenon, with over 21 million Africans living in another African country in 2019. We welcome the Government’s provision of technical support to the AU on migration through the 2019 UK-AU Memorandum of Understanding, including support for the implementation of the AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa.**

**Agriculture**

222. More than 60% of people in Sub-Saharan Africa live in rural areas and are largely dependent on agriculture. Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess said agriculture was “the backbone of economies” in Sub-Saharan Africa, “the source of growth of their economies, jobs and livelihoods” and central to achieving the SDGs334 (see Box 7).

223. Agriculture accounts for 15% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s overall GDP,335 which they said was “indicative of the very limited transformation of many [Sub-Saharan African] economies to the manufacturing and services sectors.”336

224. Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess said that crop production and livestock-keeping took place across the region, at “different intensities and scales, including smallholder family farmers and large commercial farmers”. Land productivity was roughly one fifth of that of East Asia, but had grown by approximately 50% since the early 1990s. Labour productivity was also low but had been rising. There was a low level of use of improved inputs (such as seeds) and farm implements or mechanisation: Sub-Saharan African farmers use 10 times fewer mechanised tools per farm hectare than in other developing regions.337

225. The Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, said that many farms were small and depended on rainfall. Small-scale farmers had low labour productivity and incomes. Many could not access loans, lacked up-to-date information on agricultural practices, were not well linked to markets and received low prices for their produce. Improving small farms was part of SDG 2.3, which aims to “Double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers”. There was a trend towards larger farms, and greater agricultural intensification and mechanisation.338

226. The Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, said that agricultural enterprise offered “one of the few pathways to dynamic and self-sustaining economic growth.” Agriculture provided “opportunities for trade” and the “exploitation of comparative advantage”, representing “the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of future economic development”.339 Agricultural commodities are the main exports of many countries in the region; for example, cocoa accounts for 20–25% of Ghana’s total foreign exchange earnings. Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess said there were “segments”

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334 Written evidence from Jodie Thorpe, Dr Seife Ayele and Dr Lars Otto Naess (ZAF0042)
335 In some countries the share was significantly higher. For example, agriculture accounted for 35% of Ethiopia’s GDP, and 30% of Ghana’s GDP.
336 Written evidence from Jodie Thorpe, Dr Seife Ayele and Dr Lars Otto Naess (ZAF0042)
337 Written evidence from Jodie Thorpe, Dr Seife Ayele and Dr Lars Otto Naess (ZAF0042)
338 Written evidence from the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (ZAF0047)
339 Written evidence from the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (ZAF0047)
of the sector—such as farms and agro-processing and services—which were creating “decent jobs”.340

227. Some common “structural bottlenecks and barriers” across the agricultural sector were access to finance—credit, remittances, savings and insurance—transport costs, inadequate returns for investment, high risks and a lack of increased demand to create the impetus for greater productivity.341

228. The Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, said that investment was needed in rural infrastructure (roads and irrigation facilities) and agricultural research.342 Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess said that the “enabling conditions for investment” were “insufficient, or … only slowly developing”.343

229. Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess and the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, said that investment did not just relate to economic development but to food and nutrition security, diet-related health issues, incomes, jobs and livelihoods and the environment.344

Climate impact

230. Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess said climate change had a “severe” impact on agriculture. Much of the continent’s agriculture was rain-fed, and crops were “highly vulnerable to both drought and to excess rainfall, particularly in terms of seasonal changes that affect crop growth as well as post-harvest processing and storage.”345

231. The Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, said climate change had a significant negative impact on cereals production and cash crops such as coffee. The impact on other crops, such as root crops, livestock and the post-harvest sector was not yet known.346

232. The impact would “be exacerbated by [the] pre-existing vulnerabilities” of the sector: “poverty, various forms of inequality, low access to information, land tenure insecurity, limited ability to influence policy, and other forms of environmental degradation”.347 Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess likewise said that the impact of climate change often acted “as a threat multiplier, compounding other drivers of poverty and food insecurity”. “Even modest changes in rainfall and temperature patterns” could “push marginalised people into poverty as they lack the means to recover from shocks.”348

233. Agriculture remains the main source of jobs and growth potential in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a sector highly vulnerable to the impact of the climate crisis, thus magnifying the impact of environmental change on the economies of the region.
Infrastructure

234. Dr Moyo said that Africa needed “basic infrastructure and public goods. We still need healthcare and education.” Mr Wickstead said that transport infrastructure was an enormous challenge. This was linked to the objectives of increasing trade (discussed below).

235. In 2018, the African Development Bank estimated Africa’s infrastructure investment needs at $130 to $170 billion a year, with a financing gap in the range of $68 to $108 billion. The London Stock Exchange Group said that the size of infrastructure investment required “significantly exceeds the sums that domestic capital markets are currently able to provide”. Raising debt was “the most predictable source of financing”, via international capital markets, including through local currency bonds to minimise the risks to the issuer.

Energy infrastructure

236. Dr Moyo said that there were still “1.5 billion people who have no access to cost-effective, reliable energy”, many in cities and towns. Dr te Velde too said that renewable energy—”hydropower, solar power, wind power”—had “promise” in the region. They could “now sometimes be generated at an equivalent cost, or even more cheaply, than some fossil fuel generation”. Africa had “the richest solar resources on the planet” but was responsible for “only 1%” of global solar energy production.

237. There are opportunities and demand for infrastructure development across Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly for renewable energy infrastructure. Raising debt via international capital markets has become an increasingly important source of finance. The Government should continue to work with the London Stock Exchange Group in this area, particularly in support of local currency bond issuances.

Industry and manufacturing

238. The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said that industrial development was “central to Africa’s development agenda”. Industrialisation could “shift the continent’s over-reliance on the low value added commodities sector to higher productivity and value added activities”. It would drive productivity and the creation of decent jobs.

239. The African manufacturing sector grew between 1995 and 2017. Manufacturing value added (MVA) in absolute terms more than doubled from nearly $112 billion to $240 billion. However, the sector still plays “a limited role in the performance of Africa’s economies”. The contribution of MVA to Africa’s GDP from 1995 to 2016 was between nine and 12%.

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349 Q 67
350 Q 69
351 Written evidence from the London Stock Exchange Group (ZAF0049)
352 Q 73
353 Q 51
354 Written evidence from Dr Terence McSweeney (ZAF0013)
355 Written evidence from The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
356 Written evidence from The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
357 Constant 2010 US dollars
358 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
240. The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said the development of manufacturing in Sub-Saharan Africa was impeded by tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the fragmentation of economies across the continent. These issues are discussed further below.

**Business environment and investment**

*Business environment*

241. Witnesses set out the challenges of the business environment in the region, and said these had a negative impact on investment. These challenges include corruption (discussed below and see Box 7), poor or uneven regulatory frameworks, an uneven application of the rule of law, and security concerns and political uncertainty. Poor macroeconomic factors—such as high interest rates and unstable exchange rates made it “difficult, costly or risky for companies to borrow” and “affected investor sentiment”.

242. The Minister said that “growing the continent so that it has a tax base and functions in a more normal way” was important. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said that Nigeria, for example, had a diversified economy, “but unfortunately our revenue source is absolutely not … we have not found a good way to tax the other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, creative industries and some aspects of manufacturing”. “A large percentage” of the Nigerian economy was “in the informal sector” and there was a question as to how to “formalise those things and tax them better”.

243. The OSF said that billions were lost annually to “petty bribes; the under-pricing of commodities and the over-pricing of goods and services publicly procured; tax evasion; and illicit financial flows”. Box 7 sets out the costs of corruption in the region.

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359 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
360 Written evidence from ODI (ZAF0022), written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002), written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048) and written evidence from CDC Group (ZAF0028)
361 Written evidence from ODI (ZAF0022) and CDC Group (ZAF0026)
362 Written evidence from CDC Group (ZAF0026)
363 Q 82 (Colin Buckley)
364 Written evidence from the CDC Group (ZAF0026)
365 Q 122
366 Q 113
367 Written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048)
Box 7: The costs of corruption

Africa ranked lowest among global regions in Transparency International’s 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index, with an average score of 32 out of 100, significantly below the global average of 43. Six of the bottom 10 countries were in Africa.368

Corruption affects every level of society. Half of Africans believed their country was becoming more corrupt and a quarter reported that in the last year they had been required to place a bribe in order to access public services.369

Transparency International estimates that over $50 billion worth of stolen assets flow out of Africa every year.370 The UNDP calculated that “corruption is subtracting more than half of the resources that could finance education for the whole continent every year”.371

244. Health Poverty Action said that, according to 2015 figures, $203 billion was extracted from Sub-Saharan Africa annually, mainly through corporations repatriating profits and illegally moving money out of the continent. The “unfair enactment of power by global north governments, institutions and companies … enables” tax evasion and tax avoidance, including the use of tax havens.372 Professor Murithi said African governments were often complicit.373

245. The Minister said that “greater convergence of international rule sets to allow monies not to leave the continent illegally” was needed. There was “no point doing that unilaterally … if the money still flows out of the continent”. It was better to move “at a slower pace but within global standards”.374

246. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said that the problem underlying corruption was “the lack of institutions”. It was necessary to build “financial management systems using technology and biometrics” and “strengthen” the independence of judicial systems.375

247. The AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption entered into force in 2006.376 The OSF said that its country reports showed “disappointment” among citizens of the States Parties to the Convention, with “national executives and legislatures” said to have undermined and curtailed the mandates of national anti-corruption agencies. There were some positive examples, however: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda and South Africa had “ensured that national anti-corruption agencies” were

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372 Written evidence from Health Poverty Action (ZAF0024)
373 Q 62
374 Q 124
375 Q 117
independent, with adequate mandates, budgets and capacities.\textsuperscript{377} Governance issues are discussed further in Chapter 7.

248. Box 8 considers human rights in the extractive industries.

\textbf{Box 8: Human rights in the extractive industries}

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has some of the world’s largest untapped mineral deposits, including the world’s largest deposits of coltan and significant cobalt and lithium deposits.\textsuperscript{378}

Much of the mining in the DRC is undertaken by artisanal miners, who have been moved off mining sites, sometimes violently. The monetary return for the minerals they extract can be as little as £1.50 a day.\textsuperscript{379} Those working in the industry are vulnerable to systematic exploitation from powerful local figures and armed groups.\textsuperscript{380} Conditions in such mines are dangerous, with fatal accidents regularly reported. Human rights activists in the country have suffered intimidation and many have been forced to flee the country after receiving death threats.\textsuperscript{381}

In December 2019 a group of families launched landmark legal action against Apple, Google, Tesla, Microsoft and Dell, which it claimed were linked to mines in the country in which children had died or been injured.\textsuperscript{382}

The UK Government said it was “fully committed to seeing an end to … practices such as child labour” and “actively encourages all states to implement the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights”.\textsuperscript{383} The UK had been “a world leader in investment in responsible and sustainable business practices abroad”. For example, its “support for the Voluntary Principles of Security and Human Rights” in Madagascar and Angola had “helped to address communal tensions surrounding extractive industries”. There were “opportunities to further promote responsible mineral sourcing, such as cobalt mining in the DRC, oil extraction in Nigeria, or gold in South Sudan”.\textsuperscript{384}

The Minister said that the UK remained “committed to the urgency of addressing child, forced and bonded labour in cobalt supply chains”, and “regularly” raised “concerns about child labour” in the mining sector with the government of the DRC and in multilateral forums.\textsuperscript{385}

\textsuperscript{377} Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002) and written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048)
\textsuperscript{382} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{383} HL Deb, 25 February 2020, HL1511
\textsuperscript{384} Written evidence from Search for Common Ground (ZAF0009)
\textsuperscript{385} Written evidence from James Duddridge MP (ZAF0057)
249. Corruption, tax avoidance and evasion, and illicit financial flows continue to deprive citizens and governments of Sub-Saharan Africa of much-needed funding for development. The UK should seek to ensure that UK businesses operate to the highest possible standards in the region. In particular, this should include compliance with the Bribery Act 2010, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the Ruggie Principles) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative global standard on oil, gas and mineral resources.

250. The Government should use its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa to pressure countries in which politicians and officials are themselves guilty of corruption to enact and implement reforms. The Government should make such reforms a central component of its relationship with the countries in question, in particular its aid and trade relationship.

Investment

251. While Africa has 15% of the world’s population, it accounted for only 2% of global inflows of FDI in 2015. Dr te Velde said that investment in Sub-Saharan Africa was “crucial for growth and job creation … so helpful in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.”

252. Dr te Velde said there were examples of countries which had successfully attracted investment. For example, Ethiopia had taken a targeted approach and secured investment in its manufacturing industry.

253. The ODI proposed actions for the region’s governments to improve the business environment and attract capital, including eliminating regulations which discriminate against foreign firms, reducing investment requirements and improving energy and logistics infrastructure.

254. Mr Colin Buckley, General Counsel and Head of External Affairs, CDC Group, said that there had been a reduction in the availability of private capital for investment in Africa. Banks were “shutting up their retail operations” around 10 global banks had “cut back their operations in Africa due to tighter regulations around risk and money laundering”. Private equity was “largely fleeing Africa”; it had “reached a peak in about 2014–15 and has been declining since”. While it was important not to “fall into the trap of describing Africa as a homogeneous whole”, “overall capital has reduced”.

255. CDC Group said that private investment was needed for sectors including infrastructure, SMEs, food and agriculture, manufacturing, construction and real estate, health and education. The “gap in investment” for the region’s small and medium-sized enterprises was about $330 billion.

386 Written evidence from the CDC Group (ZAF0026)
387 Q 49
388 Q 50
389 Written evidence from the ODI (ZAF0022)
390 Q 82
391 Q 88
392 Q 82
393 Q 88
394 Q 82
395 Q 82
396 Written evidence from CDC Group (ZAF0026)
Investment was needed to “transform those small businesses into larger ones that are engines of job growth”.397

256. One challenge of attracting investment into the region was the size of the economies. Mr Buckley said that “Kenya’s GDP is approximately the size of Glasgow’s; Ghana’s is approximately the size of Liverpool’s; and Ethiopia’s is approximately … the size of that of Leeds.”398 A “regional approach”—such as the planned AfCFTA (discussed below), which would allow businesses “more easily” to “expand their markets beyond their national borders”—would “be welcomed by us as a financial institution”.399

257. Peter Maila, Investment Director, Africa Coverage Team, CDC Group, said that a second challenge was the small size of most companies in the region: many were “micro-SMEs”.400 Mr Buckley said that the UK had more than 15,000 businesses with revenue of over £50 million a year; in Ethiopia there were around 15.401

258. Multilateral institutions support countries to raise money through financial markets. The London Stock Exchange Group said that the African Development Bank and the World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had been working to develop local currency bonds, and offshore Nigerian and Rwandan local currency bond markets.402

Trade

259. Lord Boateng said that Africa accounted for less than 3% of global trade.403 Africa faces particular trade challenges: the extractives industry dominates exports (particularly fossil fuels such as coal and oil) at 70% of earnings404 and its infrastructure leads out of the continent, not across it.405

260. Tom Pengelly, Director, External Secretariat for All-Party Parliamentary Group on Trade out of Poverty, and Managing Director, Saana Consulting, said the region had “lots of small countries and small markets” (discussed above), with “ thick borders between them”. It was “not easy to ship trade across” them, “even if they are neighbouring.”406 Intra-African trade accounts for just 15% of continental trade.407

261. The majority of intra-African trade is between members of a REC (see Chapter 3). The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said that there was “overlap and duplication of [existing] trading arrangements”, which complicated customs procedures, “allows forum shopping, frustrates the creation or functioning of customs unions and complicates the advancement of deeper continental economic integration”.408

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397 Q 83
398 Q 83
399 Q 82
400 Q 82
401 Q 82
402 Written evidence London Stock Exchange Group (ZAF0049)
403 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
404 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
405 Q 69
406 Q 50
407 Q 53 (Tom Pengelly)
408 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037). On average, 55% of REC exports to Africa are within the same REC, and about 50% of REC imports from African countries originate from within the same REC.
262. The AfCFTA (summarised in Box 9) seeks to address these problems.

**Box 9: The African Continental Free Trade Area**

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will be the world’s largest free trade area since the formation of the World Trade Organisation, covering a market of 1.2 billion people and a GDP of $2.5 trillion.

The AfCFTA agreement has been signed by 54 of the 55 member states (all but Eritrea). It came into effect on 30 May 2019 (30 days after the 22nd signatory ratified the agreement); 28 signatories have ratified the agreement. The operational phase of the agreement began in July 2019.

The agreement aims to:

- Create a single market, deepening the economic integration of the continent.
- Establish a liberalised market, through multiple rounds of negotiations.
- Aid the movement of capital and people, facilitating investment.
- Move towards the establishment of a future continental customs union.
- Achieve sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development, gender equality and structural transformations.
- Enhance the competitiveness of member states.
- Encourage industrial development through diversification and regional value chain development, agricultural development and food security.
- Resolve challenges of multiple and overlapping memberships.

It will remove 97% of tariff lines on goods imported from other African countries, over a period of 5–15 years. It will be implemented in phases, commencing with tariffs, then services, investment and competition.

Implementation was scheduled to begin with tariff cuts in July 2020, but has been put on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic.


263. Mr Pengelly said that, if all the planned tariff cuts were implemented, there could be an increase in intra-African trade of up to 50%. If trade facilitation measures—such as reducing red tape and improving transport systems and customs points—were also implemented, this could result in “about three times the benefits”.

264. The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said it would be “a game changer … upgrading manufacturing and spurring industrialization”. It was “expected to support the processing of raw materials and development of African regional value chains”, because it would “boost incentives to source inputs and intermediates from within the continent.”


410 Written evidence from The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)

411 Q 53

412 Q 53

413 Written from The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
aid diversification: less than 40% of exports within the continent are in extractives (compared with 70% of exports to outside the continent). The economic benefits of the AfCFTA, based on UNECA modelling, are in Box 10.

Box 10: UNECA modelling on the economic benefits of the AfCFTA

- The value of intra-African exports would increase by between about 15% ($50 billion) and 25% ($69.1 billion) in 2040, relative to the baseline without the AfCFTA in place.
- Intra-African exports would increase the most for industrial products, with gains ranging between around 25% ($36.1 billion) and almost 30% ($43.3 billion).
- All African countries, including those categorised as Least Developed Countries, would be expected to benefit from increased industrial exports.
- The largest increases in intra-African exports (over 25% in the most ambitious scenario) for industrial sectors would be: wearing apparel; textiles; vehicles and transport equipment; wood and paper; leather; electronics; and other manufactures.

Source: Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)

265. The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said that the AfCFTA would support export-driven growth. Modelling showed that “industry dominates the gains in intra-African trade, and this is particularly pronounced for African Least Developed Countries”. However, the AfCFTA was “not … a panacea to Africa’s development challenges”. Adjustments would be needed, alongside arrangements for Less Developed Countries in the region, “to offset any short-term shocks”.

266. It acknowledged that implementation would be challenging. Mr Wickstead and Dr Moyo said delivering the AFCFTA depended on political will. Mr Wickstead was “pretty confident” that it would be achieved; Mr Pengelly said there was “strong heads-of-state buy-in”.

267. Mr Pengelly said there was a valuable role for the AU in implementing the AfCFTA, as a pan-African initiative. Dr Moyo said the vital countries for the success of the AfCFTA were Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria.

268. The RECs were “expected to play a key role in coordinating implementation of the AfCFTA”, developing “complementary measures at the regional level”, and offering advice. The AfCFTA agreement provided for “the resolution of

414 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037). Average figures 2014–16. Also see written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0010).
415 Written evidence from The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
416 Written evidence from The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
417 Q 69
418 Q 70
419 Q 53
420 Q 53
421 Q 71. She said that any “failure from them”, be it “a default, recession, downgrading of their credit rating or any of these things” would be “really harmful and has material, second-order, knock-on effects for the rest of the region”.
incompatibilities or inconsistencies between the AfCFTA and other intra-African trade instruments”.422

269. **The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has the potential to transform the continent’s economy, by boosting intra-African trade and supporting industrialisation and diversification.**

Addressing the impact of COVID-19 on Sub-Saharan African economies

270. The economic impacts of COVID-19 are set out in Chapter 1.

271. The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said that the projected fall in GDP across the region meant that “complementary large-scale stimulus and cooperative partnership measures” would be “crucial”.423

272. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said that African Finance Ministers had “estimated the immediate need to be $100 billion, possibly $200 billion if it lasts longer”. The “fiscal space” was “very constrained”. African nations were “able to implement a fiscal stimulus of only 0.8% of GDP, compared with rich countries” which had “provided 8% to 10%”.424 Christian Aid was concerned that most Sub-Saharan countries already bore “a high debt burden due to external loan servicing”, which would be “exacerbated by the current COVID-19 crisis”.425

273. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said help from international partners was needed, “to provide the additional resources”. These resources included “supplies” and work to “strengthen health systems”—the AU had “estimated an immediate need for $350 million to help the African CDC and ... national centres for disease control”—and “help with the economic impact”.428 To date, “partners have acted responsibly through the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Bank” (see Box 11) and “some resources” had been provided, but they were “not enough”.429

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422 Written evidence from The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037). AfCFTA is to prevail, but “RECs that have achieved ‘among themselves higher levels of regional integration’ are to persist as islets of such higher integration”.

423 Written evidence from the African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)

424 Q 105. The London Stock Exchange Group said that on 3 April 2020 the African Development Bank admitted its $3 billion ‘Fight COVID-19’ social sustainable bond to the London Stock Exchange. Proceeds will be used to alleviate the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 pandemic across the continent. It is the largest social sustainable bond to be admitted to London’s Sustainable Bond Market. Written evidence from the London Stock Exchange Group (ZAF0049)

425 Written evidence from Christian Aid (ZAF0038)

426 Q 104

427 Q 106

428 Q 104

429 Q 104
Box 11: International efforts to support the poorest countries from the effects of COVID-19

The G20

On 15 April the virtual meeting of G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, hosted by Saudi Arabia, agreed to “support a time-bound suspension of debt service payments for the poorest countries that request forbearance.” The countries “agreed on a coordinated approach with a common term sheet providing the key features for this debt service suspension initiative, which is also agreed by the Paris Club. All bilateral official creditors will participate in this initiative, consistent with their national laws and internal procedures.”

The G20 countries “call on private creditors, working through the Institute of International Finance, to participate in the initiative on comparable terms.”

They asked “multilateral development banks to further explore the options for the suspension of debt service payments over the suspension period, while maintaining their current rating and low cost of funding. We call on creditors to continue to closely coordinate in the implementation phase of this initiative.”

The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund

On 17 April 2020 the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund convened African leaders, bilateral partners and multilateral institutions to spur faster action on the response to COVID-19 in African countries.

This followed calls from the President of the World Bank Group and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund for creditors to suspend debt repayments to provide support to the poorest countries.

The statement said that official creditors had mobilised “up to $57 billion for Africa in 2020 alone … to provide front-line health services, support the poor and vulnerable, and keep economies afloat in the face of the worst global economic downturn since the 1930s.” Support from private creditors “could amount to an estimated $13 billion”. It said that Africa needed “an estimated $114 billion in 2020 in its fight against COVID-19, leaving a financing gap of around $44 billion.”


431 Ibid.

432 Ibid.


434 Ibid.

435 Ibid.
Uptake of the G20 agreement

Around half of the 77 eligible countries have expressed interest in the G20 scheme, and are expected to defer approximately $12bn of payments this year. Eligible debtor countries have been cautious about the G20 scheme because it contains a clause which blocks countries requesting relief from “contracting new non-concessional debt during the suspension period, other than agreements under this initiative”. For example, Kenya has rejected the proposal, reportedly because this might result in a downgrade of Kenya’s credit rating.437

In June 2020, the Institute of International Finance reported that some developing countries were using the global financial markets to finance their coronavirus-driven deficits. Following issuances by investment-grade countries, the Financial Times reported that from the start of June, the market was opening for what it described as “speculative-grade sovereign and corporate issuers” from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.438

274. Dr Okonjo-Iweala suggested some actions that the UK Government could take. First, “additional resources directly from the UK”.439 This could include funding for the Africa Centres for Diseases Control and Prevention and “any supplies that could go to us”. In the short term, there was an issue of how “to feed those who cannot work”, especially as most Africans are employed in the informal sector,440 with a particularly significant impact on women.441

275. Second, the UK could “support the World Bank to get more … supplemental emergency IDA”,442 that it can pass on to African countries”, and “urge the International Monetary Fund to get rich countries”, including the UK, “to pool … the special drawing rights in the reserves of rich countries that they are not using”.443 The UK could “pull $100 billion and lend it to the central banks”.444 Such liquidity support could help African states to support small and medium-sized enterprises.445

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438 Jonathan Wheatley, ‘Developing economies borrow more despite debt relief initiative’, The Financial Times
439 Q 105
440 Q 107
441 Q 109
442 Q 105. The International Development Association (IDA), part of the World Bank, is the single largest source of concessional finance for the poorest countries in the world.
443 A proposal to create additional SDRs was blocked by the US in April, because only 3% would have been available to the poorest countries. Eric Martin and Enda Curran, ‘IMF chief calls on private creditors to join G20 debt relief for poorest states’, Business Day (9 June 2020): https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/americas/2020–06-09-imf-chief-calls-on-private-creditors-to-join-g20-debt-relief-for-poorest-states/ [accessed 24 June 2020]
444 Q 105
445 Q 107
276. Third, the UK could “support a two-year standstill in debt service for African countries”. A two-year standstill would “immediately release … between $30 billion and $44 billion”.446

277. She said that the AU was “asking for a two-year standstill across the board for both bilateral debt and private debt”. The World Bank and the IMF had said they could not “entertain debt relief or a standstill because of their credit ratings”, but would “give lots of new money”.447

278. The AU thought two years was necessary for bilateral debt “because of the longer-term impacts and the resources” that would be released, and to give time to assess the nature of different countries’ debts. It was necessary to “look at it country by country to see what debt sustainability will look like”.448

279. Christian Aid thought the Government should “help broker a debt relief deal for the poorest countries”.449 Dr Okonjo-Iweala said that the two year standstill, if agreed, would be used to assess which countries needed debt relief, and this could then be considered.450

280. Lord Boateng identified coordinating “a global response to the looming debt crisis on the continent” as an opportunity for UK leadership.451 Dr Okonjo-Iweala said that the UK could help by raising the AU’s two-year standstill proposal with China and other bilateral creditors. China had already—as a member of the G20—agreed to a standstill until the end of 2020. As “the largest bilateral creditor on the continent, with debt service of slightly more than $8 billion”, its participation was “paramount”.452

281. The UK could also assist on private sector debt. Some private creditors and bondholders were using “scare tactics”, stating that if African countries asked for a debt standstill they would be considered in default. This was “a very short-term approach, because if we do not do something in an orderly fashion now, there may be disorderly behaviour later by countries that cannot pay”.453

282. Fourth, the UK could offer “technical assistance and advice” to African central banks “.454

446 Q 105
447 Q 107
448 Q 107
449 Written evidence from Christian Aid (ZAF0038)
450 Q 107
451 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
452 Q 114. According to an OECD report published on 27 May 2020, “implementation of the [G20] standstill from China remains uncertain” because “its implementation might be subject to different interpretations”. It might, for example, “distinguish between loans extended by development banks … and official government loans”, which “would exclude at least two thirds of the debt stock from the standstill”. There are also “uncertainties on the magnitude of Chinese lending”. OECD, ‘A “debt standstill” for the poorest countries: How much is at stake?’ (27 May 2020): [accessed 24 June 2020]. On 8 June 2020, Ma Zhaoxu, China’s Vice Foreign Minister, reconfirmed that China would suspend debt repayments for 77 low-income countries as agreed by the G20, but did not provide details of the beneficiaries, amounts or the terms of this standstill. Lu Xu, ‘China, World’s Biggest Creditor, Delays Debt Repayments for 77 Nations’, Voice of America (10 June 2020): [accessed 24 June 2020]
453 Q 107
454 Q 107
283. Fifth, there were three countries facing specific problems. Sudan and Zimbabwe were under sanctions, and a way needed to be found to “put sanctions issues aside for health reasons, and mobilise resources” for them. Eritrea owed “about $100 million in arrears to the World Bank”, and so was “not getting help”: “a fund to help Eritrea would be welcome”.  

284. Sixth, if and when a vaccine was developed, it would be necessary to “make sure that we have volume and quantity for everyone and that poor countries are not locked out”. The UK could “play a very important role in being active in the international group to make sure that that happens”. On 4 June 2020 the UK convened Gavi—the Vaccine Alliance’s third donor pledging conference.  

285. The COVID-19 pandemic has already had a negative and disproportionate impact on economies in Africa. Export markets have dried up, remittances have fallen, currencies have depreciated and the continent has experienced capital flight. Significant economic support from international partners will be needed to prevent the continent’s economic gains over the last two decades being reversed.  

286. The contraction of the global economy due to COVID-19 will have a negative impact on UK trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and on UK aid, given that the UK’s 0.7% development assistance target is tied to Gross National Income.  

287. The Government should continue to encourage other countries to maintain their official development assistance (ODA) commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa to avoid exacerbating the impact of the crisis.  

288. The Government should support the AU’s call for a two-year standstill for African countries’ public and private debt, and engage with major creditors to the continent in support of this objective.  

289. Some countries are likely to need debt relief, in addition to the two-year debt standstill sought by the AU. The Government should work with the AU, the IMF and the World Bank to understand which countries need debt relief, and seek to play a constructive role in their international efforts to secure this.  

290. The Government should continue to work with the AU on its response to the economic impacts of COVID-19 in Africa.  

291. We commend the Government for its additional funding to the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, and its work in support of the Global Vaccines Alliance Summit on 4 June 2020.  

292. Access to a vaccine for COVID-19, should one be successfully developed, must be available on the basis of need. The Government should continue to work with international partners—including through Gavi, the Vaccines Alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness—to ensure any such vaccine is made available to developing countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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455 Q 109
456 Q 111
457 Gavi, ‘World leaders make historic commitments to provide equal access to vaccines for all’ (4 June 2020): https://www.gavi.org/news/media-room/world-leaders-make-historic-commitments-provide-equal-access-vaccines-all [accessed 24 June 2020]
CHAPTER 5: THE UK’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

293. In this chapter we consider three aspects of the UK’s economic relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa: official development assistance, trade and investment, and the diaspora and remittances.

Official development assistance

294. Box 12 explains official development assistance (ODA).

Box 12: Official development assistance

In 1970 a UN resolution committed donor countries to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income on official development assistance (ODA).

ODA is defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries.

The OECD maintains a list of developing countries and territories, based on per capita income. Only aid to these countries counts as ODA. The list is updated every three years.

Aid may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channelled through a multilateral development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank. Aid includes grants, ‘soft’ loans and the provision of technical assistance.

The OECD maintains an online database on ODA eligibility. (1) Military aid and promotion of donors’ security interests and (2) transactions that have a primarily commercial objective, such as export credits, cannot be treated as ODA.


295. In 2015–17, the UK was the second-largest bilateral donor of ODA to Africa, behind the United States.458 Of all donor countries, the UK was the ninth highest for the share of its bilateral aid spent in Africa.459

296. Dr Vines and Mr Dewar said that the UK was “one of only a handful of countries to meet the UN target of spending 0.7 per cent of national income on aid.”460 The Minister said that the UK should be “very proud” of this.461

297. The Minister said the UK spent “more than £5 billion on the African continent each year”. This was spent in three ways: “bilaterally”, “across

460 Written evidence from Dr Alex Vines OBE and Bob Dewar CMG (ZAF0027)
461 Q 126
regions”, and through “multilaterals” such as the World Bank, and the EU. The Minister said that a quarter of bilateral funding was spent on “economic development and long-term transitional work”, and a further quarter on humanitarian response. The remaining 50% was spent “on health, social protection, education, water, sexual health, governance and security”. Many of these programmes were “cross-cutting”. Table 3 shows the top 10 recipients of UK bilateral ODA in 2020–21. The UK aid strategy is summarised in Box 13.

Table 3: Top ten recipients of UK bilateral ODA 2020–21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project budget</th>
<th>Top sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>£316,546,954</td>
<td>Health (34.917%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>£270,066,066</td>
<td>Health (39.75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>£230,204,041</td>
<td>Health (42.78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>£196,037,503</td>
<td>Disaster relief (31.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>£184,586,815</td>
<td>Disaster relief (82.90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>£175,495,631</td>
<td>Disaster relief (31.96%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>£171,886,579</td>
<td>Health (55.043%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierre Leone</td>
<td>£167,168,751</td>
<td>Health (59.347%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>£164,040,684</td>
<td>Health (51.56%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>£157,951,124</td>
<td>Disaster relief (52.56%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


298. UK ODA relating to peace and security, and human rights and governance, is discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

299. The Royal African Society said DfID had a “reputation for efficiency and effectiveness, with well-targeted policies and programmes, and constructive partnerships with African governments”.464

Box 13: The UK aid strategy

**UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest**, published in 2015, states that “The government will meet its promises to the world’s poor and put international development at the heart of its national security and foreign policy.”

462 Q 125. Over £1 billion of the UK's aid budget is spent through the EU. After Brexit the Minister said there would be “an opportunity to realign that money and spend it either bilaterally or multilaterally”. Q 133
463 Q 125
464 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
The Government would “shape its ODA spending according to four strategic objectives … All four of the objectives support poverty reduction and all are aligned with the UK national interest”.

1. “Strengthening global peace, security and governance”;
2. “Strengthening resilience and response to crises”;
3. “Promoting global prosperity”; and
4. “Tackling extreme poverty and helping the world’s most vulnerable”.


UK approach to ODA

300. Witnesses raised four overall concerns about how UK ODA is allocated. First, Lord Boateng said that in the past 20 years the UK had moved to “a project and/or programmatic led approach … at the expense of direct budgetary support”. While there was value to many of these initiatives, and he acknowledged that monitoring direct budgetary support was challenging, the result had been that “many otherwise successful initiatives have simply not realised their potential benefits at scale”. This was because many African governments lacked the capacity—resources, administration, infrastructure, the ability to create and enabling environment—for “sustainable implementation”. This weakened the governments’ capacity to respond to threats such as climate change or global pandemics.

301. He said that budget support, “with strong oversight through diplomatic engagement”, would “generate enhanced capacity and effectiveness in governance, promote institutional strengthening [and] offer increased job generation and improved livelihoods on the continent”.

302. Second, Dr Vines and Mr Dewar said that development aid had “increasingly focused on spending volumes, often delivered through multilateral organisations, contractors or NGOs”, “often on short timetables” and with “fewer people”. This made it harder for programmes to adapt as circumstances changed, or to provide the necessary long-term investment. The Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD) said that there had in recent years been a “shift” by the DfID and other donors “towards large commercial contracts with for-profit contract managers, who then subgrant to [international non-governmental organisations] and local NGOs” in Sub-Saharan Africa. This had “not been conducive to effective partnership or risk sharing with local NGOs and faith groups”.

303. Third, under DAC rules, determined by donor countries (see Box 12), ODA is no longer provided when recipients become middle-income countries. Baroness Amos said that there was “a case for looking again at the criteria” for what is eligible for ODA. Donors should “look more at the fragility and vulnerability of countries”, for example the threat posed by climate change, and the absolute number of people in poverty in a country.

465 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
466 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
467 Written evidence from Dr Alex Vines OBE and Bob Dewar CMG (ZAF0027)
468 Written evidence from CAFOD (ZAF0040)
469 Q 47

304. Fourth, Health Poverty Action was concerned about the Government’s shift, described by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) as using UK aid “to generate economic and commercial benefits both for recipient countries and for the UK”.\footnote{The Independent Commission for Aid Impact, ‘The use of UK aid to enhance mutual prosperity’, https://icai.independent.gov.uk/html-report/mutual-prosperity/ [accessed 24 June 2020]} For example, the January 2020 UK–Africa Investment Summit (discussed below) cost £15.5 million, funded by the aid budget. It noted that the ICAI had expressed concern about “a lower share of UK aid being allocated to the world’s poorest countries or poorest people”, including Sub-Saharan Africa. There was a risk that this resulted in “economic growth for the UK and partner country business but not for poorer countries themselves”, “undermining of poverty reduction as a global development norm”.\footnote{Written evidence from Health Poverty Action (ZAF0024)}

Government structure

305. On 16 June the Prime Minister announced that DfID and the FCO will be merged. A new department, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), will be established in September, under the leadership of the Foreign Secretary.

306. The Prime Minister said that aid and foreign policy “are one and the same endeavour, and they’re designed to achieve the same goals, which are right in themselves and serve our national interest”. The Foreign Secretary would “be empowered to decide which countries receive—or cease to receive—British aid”. The UK gave “as much aid to Zambia as we do to Ukraine, though the latter is vital for European security”, and gave “ten times as much aid to Tanzania as we do to the six countries of the Western Balkans, who are acutely vulnerable to Russian meddling”.\footnote{HM Government, ‘Prime Minister’s Statement to the House of Commons’, 16 June 2020 (16 June 2020): https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-statement-to-the-house-of-commons-16-june-2020 [accessed 24 June 2020]. The Minister for Africa has been a joint position between the two departments since 2017.}

307. The Government said that the new department’s objectives would “be shaped by the outcome of the Integrated Review” (discussed in Chapter 2).

of “tying aid to foreign policy” was “worrying.” Health Poverty Action likewise said that DfID and the FCO should remain separate.

309. The UK is a major donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sub-Saharan Africa. The Department for International Development’s approach to funding and its expertise is well-respected.

310. We regret the decision to merge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development (DfID). The UK’s commitment to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on international development, DfID’s expertise in overseas aid and the separation of aid spending from UK foreign policy priorities are part of the UK’s international influence.

311. We request urgent confirmation that UK ODA will continue to be administered with the promotion of the economic development and the welfare of developing countries as its main objective, in line with the definition of ODA agreed by the Organisation for Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee.

312. The reorganisation of Whitehall departments does not change our conclusions and recommendations on the value of UK ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa. We seek assurances from the Government that the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office does not represent a change to the UK’s approach to ODA to the region.

313. The UK’s commitment to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on international development should be maintained. Given that the UK’s ODA is fixed at 0.7% of GNI, the Integrated Review will need to consider the impact of the expected decrease in the overall ODA budget as a result of the negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis.

**Aid for Trade**

314. Mr Wickstead said that one element of UK aid spending was to bring Sub-Saharan African countries into the global economy, for example, DfID provided funding to support African trade negotiators. This is in line with the objectives of the World Trade Organisation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Aid for Trade initiative.

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476 Q 7
477 Written evidence from Health Poverty Action (ZAF0024)
478 Q 66
479 Q 4 (Andrew Mitchell MP)
315. Lord Boateng said that Aid for Trade was “a very effective form of ODA”\(^\text{481}\), the ODI said the UK had “a good track record” in this area.\(^\text{482}\) Aid for Trade should “be central to the UK’s development partnership” with the region.\(^\text{483}\) The ODI described this role as facilitating co-ordination, helping to address bottlenecks and contributing to the provision of public goods that countries might require.\(^\text{484}\) Lord Boateng said Aid for Trade could help build African countries’ capacity to trade and address the adjustment costs arising from the implementation of trade agreements. The UK development sector had “built up considerable experience” in “support for economic infrastructure, regulatory reform, protection of indigenous intellectual property rights [and] effective internal resource mobilisation through taxation” Aid for Trade also had “proven effectiveness in improving export performance and the reduction of import costs.”\(^\text{485}\)

316. Witnesses gave examples of the areas to which the UK had contributed. Several witnesses cited TradeMark East Africa as a positive example (see Box 14).\(^\text{486}\)

**Box 14: TradeMark East Africa**

TradeMark East Africa is a donor-funded not-for-profit Aid for Trade organisation. It was established in 2010 to support the growth of international and regional trade in East Africa, through reducing barriers and increasing business competitiveness. It is funded by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US.

It works closely with the East African Community (EAC), the private sector and civil society, to support a portfolio of programmes across East Africa. It has offices in Arusha, Bujumbura, Dar es Salaam, Juba, Kampala and Kigali.

TradeMark East Africa’s first phase focused on making trading in East Africa an efficient process. The priorities in this phase were corridor transit time reduction, port time reduction, more efficient borders, better trade infrastructure, using ICT to facilitate trade, institution building and private sector engagement. This phase was completed in December 2017.

Some highlights of its first phase were:

- Mombasa Port: 52% reduction in import time and 59% reduction in export time.
- Dar Port: 28% reduction in import time (11.6 days in June 2017 from 16 days in 2010) and 53% reduction in export time. This helped the port to secure a $350 million loan from the World Bank.
- An average 70% decline in the time to pass through borders.
- Through harmonisation of standards within the EAC, clearance time for certified goods was reduced by 99%. Testing costs were reduced by 59%.

\(^{481}\) Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)  
\(^{482}\) Written evidence from the ODI (ZAF0022)  
\(^{483}\) Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)  
\(^{484}\) Written evidence from the ODI (ZAF0022)  
\(^{485}\) Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)  
\(^{486}\) Q 50 (Tom Pengelly and Dr Dirk Willem te Velde)
TradeMark East Africa is now in its second strategic phase, which will end in 2022–23. The UK Government has committed £26,461,028 regionally to its second strategic phase. It has further committed £32,000,000 to TradeMark East Africa’s strategy II programme in Rwanda, £31,060,000 to its programme in Tanzania and £25,000,000 to its programme in Uganda.


317. The ODI said UK aid had had helped to support Ethiopia’s industrialisation, in line with the Ethiopian government’s priorities for economic growth and transformation. Ahmed Soliman, Research Fellow, Chatham House, said the UK could further “play a role in advising the government on how to manage the process of privatisation and generate employment, providing technical and regulatory support in key sectors”.

318. Dr te Velde said the UK had successfully helped countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to build industrial parks, which attracted investors and built an ecosystem around them. This was “important for the development objectives in developing countries”, and “UK investors and traders, as well as other traders, might help in the process”.

319. The ODI said that the UK was a shareholder of or contributor to a number of bilateral and bilateral bodies—including the CDC Group (discussed below), AgDEVCO, the African Development Bank and the International Finance Corporation—which were working to stimulate investment in Sub-Saharan Africa.

320. Lord Boateng said that the UK was “uniquely positioned” to support the AfCFTA. Tom Pengelly said African countries could “do the tariff cutting themselves”, but the UK could usefully “help with … the trade facilitation side, which is where most of the benefits are” (discussed in Chapter 4). Mr Wickstead said “lots of capacity building and technical assistance” from the UK “could help” with the development of the AfCFTA.

321. The Minister said that the UK would “invest more” in the AfCFTA, both “putting cash in … through programmes such as TradeMark East Africa” and “time and expertise, particularly on the capital market side”. A UK trade expert had been seconded to the AU’s AfCFTA Unit. The UK was also providing research support for this unit, and planning a capacity-
building event for both national and regional trade negotiators involved in the AfCFTA negotiations.498

322. Mr Pengelly, however, said that the UK had “faded a bit into the background as a partner” on the AfCFTA. It had been active at the start of discussions and had provided the AU with technical assistance “to support the first stages of the negotiations”. However, that role had “been taken over by the European Commission and the German aid agencies”, and “the question is: what is the UK position?”499

323. More broadly, Mr Pengelly said that the UK had largely left the EU to fund Aid for Trade and trade facilitation work, through the European Development Fund.500 After Brexit, it would be “sensible and right for the UK to look at increasing its bilateral aid-for-trade contributions”. He said the UK should commit 50% of its total Aid for Trade to Africa. It should make a long-term commitment on Aid for Trade, “with a bound target”.501

324. **UK development assistance is supporting the development of the AfCFTA and helping to improve the business environment and address trade barriers. The UK should offer any form of technical assistance which facilitates achieving the AfCFTA’s objectives. This support has benefits for both Sub-Saharan recipient countries and UK businesses seeking to do business in the region.**

325. **We would welcome further information from the Government on how it will fund Aid for Trade for Sub-Saharan Africa after Brexit, and how it intends to reallocate its funding and direct support that has been channelled via the EU for Aid for Trade projects after the transition period ends.**

*Agriculture*

326. Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess said that DfID had “been according reasonably high priority to agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa”.502 The Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich said there were “fewer project opportunities with a specific focus on agriculture than ten years ago, albeit agriculture may well feature as an important component within sectoral programmes”.503

327. The FCO said that UK ODA for agriculture would “improve incomes for 5 million people and encourage £300 million of new private investment in the sector by 2021”.504 Lord Boateng said that DfID had provided ODA for initiatives such as improved seeds, and to help farmers link to supply chains so they could “engage with the private sector, agribusiness and global markets”. DfID was “in many instances” a ‘market leader’ in this area.505

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498 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
499 Q 53
501 Q 55
502 Written evidence from Jodie Thorpe, Dr Seife Ayele and Dr Lars Otto Naess (ZAF0042)
503 Written evidence from the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (ZAF0047)
504 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
505 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
328. Ms Thorpe, Dr Ayele and Dr Naess said the UK also funded programmes with the World Bank, the UN and NGOs. The Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, said that in addition to DfID spending, UK Research and Innovation managed the £1.5 billion ODA-funded Global Challenges Research Fund, which included work on agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa. 

329. The Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, said that the most recent DfID conceptual framework on agriculture had been published in 2015. This had re-emphasised the importance of the agricultural sector, “but with an increasing focus on resilience and promoting food security”. There had “been a clear push towards commercial agriculture in more recent years”. As there had been “significant change in the past five years”, there was a “need for an update” from DfID.

330. Lord Boateng said that African governments often did not have the “human resources or infrastructure capacity in place to provide the necessary support to farmers” to help them take advantage of the improvements funded by DfID and its partners. Agricultural extension services and research institutes in some countries had been closed down as part of IMF-mandated structural adjustment programmes, and African governments’ “budget lines” to provide this support were “inadequate or non-existent”.

331. We welcome DfID’s support for the agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, and its recognition that this sector is critical to growth and job creation. We were told that an update to the DfID conceptual framework on agriculture would be helpful, to reflect the changes to the sector, and ask the Government to give this consideration.

332. Further technical assistance to support improvements in agricultural productivity should be a high priority for the UK’s development work.

Energy

333. The FCO said UK ODA would “help 3.2 million people get access to electricity in their homes for the first time by 2021”. Andrew Mitchell MP said that there was “strong DfID support, both technical and financial” for the African Development Bank’s efforts to ensure that the 250 million people in the region without access to electricity and energy were able to get this off grid.

334. Dr te Velde said it was important to “make sure that we do not subsidise the use of fossil fuels or investment in them, and that we do subsidise the use of, and develop, renewables”. The UK’s aid budget was “going much more into renewables than into fossil fuels”.

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506 Written evidence from the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (ZAF0047)
507 Written evidence from the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (ZAF0047)
508 Written evidence from the Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich (ZAF0047)
509 Structural adjustment was required by the IMF in return for lending. The terms included the privatisation of state-owned enterprise, economic deregulation and labour market reform.
510 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
511 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
512 Q 11. The overall project cost was around £20 billion.
513 Q 51
Water and sanitation

335. Andrew Mitchell MP said that DfID’s successes in providing access to clean water were very important.\textsuperscript{514} Lord Boateng said that DfID funding for water and sanitation was “building institutional capacity and partnerships across the private and public sectors”. The Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor scheme in Kenya had provided 20 million low-income residents with improved water sanitation and hygiene since 2004. The project had engaged with corporate companies and improved infrastructure. DfID had provided technical expertise and concessionary finance in Ghana in order to expand the take up of household toilets, including working with the municipal authorities to encourage private landlords to invest in toilets in housing compounds.\textsuperscript{515}

Health

336. Lord Boateng said that there had been “highly successful interventions in the field of AIDS, Malaria, Polio and lifesaving vaccines for children”.\textsuperscript{516} The APPG for Africa said DfID did “excellent work” in “improving access to family planning and contraceptives services which are essential for the empowerment and participation of women and girls and the Disability Rights Fund”.\textsuperscript{517}

337. However, Lord Boateng thought health was “a classic example of the weaknesses inherent in” the UK’s approach. In spite of DfID’s contributions, “overall health care systems” in Sub-Saharan Africa were “weak.” Tackling this required “a whole systems approach”, which was “currently lacking”. To build resilient health systems, “direct budgetary support by … donors” and “more effective generation and collection of local resources” were needed.\textsuperscript{518}

338. The FCO—in a submission before the COVID-19 pandemic—said that the UK was “sharing learning, best practise and expertise on issues relating to global health security, including direct support to the AU’s ‘African Centre for Disease Control’”. A UK public health specialist from Public Health England had been seconded to the AU.\textsuperscript{519}

Health and COVID-19

339. We heard about the links between UK aid and the health impacts of COVID-19 on Sub-Saharan Africa. The OSF said that funding from the UK for healthcare was welcome, but “only a small part” had been provided to the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The UK needed “to take a more long-term strategic view in its support to the African CDC as well as the World Health Organisation” … as part of future pandemic preparedness measures”.\textsuperscript{520} The LSHTM said “emergency interventions” should include “strengthening health systems, particularly their governance” as a critical element.\textsuperscript{521} As discussed above, the UK has made a further contribution to the Africa CDC. The OSF said the UK

\textsuperscript{514} Q 4
\textsuperscript{515} Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
\textsuperscript{516} Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
\textsuperscript{517} Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
\textsuperscript{518} Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
\textsuperscript{519} Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
\textsuperscript{520} Written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048)
\textsuperscript{521} Written evidence from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (ZAF0054)
should also support “national health system strengthening” and national health insurance schemes.\textsuperscript{522}

340. Lord Boateng said that, to respond to COVID-19, the UK should revisit “the case for increased targeted direct budgetary support to African governments” for health, water and sanitation”. This would “better assist in addressing the fragilities that present a block to development and a global public health risk”.\textsuperscript{523}

341. CAFOD said that a comprehensive response to COVID-19 would “need to support health services run by the Church and Church-linked institutions”, and “work with faith actors … to engage with the population and influence social norms and behaviour”. This was particularly the case in areas which the government and UN agencies struggled to reach.\textsuperscript{524}

342. The LSHTM said that it was important not to neglect services such as immunisation, maternal and child care, treatment for other communicable and non-communicable diseases during the pandemic.\textsuperscript{525}

343. \textbf{We welcome successive Governments’ work to support public health initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. While direct budgetary support for governments in the region may be necessary in some cases, it can often lead to corruption. The Government should only employ this approach where there are no other options.}

\textit{Climate change}

344. The Minister said that the Government had given consideration to “what we could do that was innovative and thought-leading” on climate change in Africa in the run up to the—now postponed—26th UN Climate Change conference (COP26), which had been scheduled to be held in Glasgow in November 2020 under the presidency of the UK Government. This had included consideration of “solar and … energy issues, and … leadership through the CDC [Group]”\textsuperscript{526} (discussed later in this Chapter).

345. Ms Edmondson said that a new cross-Whitehall Africa climate programme had been established, “in which we will be investing a lot”.\textsuperscript{527} Ms Palmer said that climate change was one of the Government’s ‘shifts’\textsuperscript{528} (discussed in Chapter 2). DfID was focusing on “adaptation to climate change”, while the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) was concentrating on “the mitigation angle and the big picture around emissions”.\textsuperscript{529}

346. Part of the UK’s response was to fund research, because while some of the impacts of climate change on Sub-Saharan Africa were known, “we need lots more data, lots more modelling and lots more evidence”. UK-funded research aimed to improve “understanding of weather and climate events and what is happening”, and to help “improve [countries’] ability to collect,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{522} Written evidence from OSF (ZAF0048)
\item \textsuperscript{523} Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044). He also cited agriculture as an area that would benefit from direct budgetary support.
\item \textsuperscript{524} Written evidence from Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (ZAF0040)
\item \textsuperscript{525} Written evidence from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (ZAF0054)
\item \textsuperscript{526} Q 127
\item \textsuperscript{527} Q 24
\item \textsuperscript{528} Q 128
\item \textsuperscript{529} Q 24 (Jane Edmondson)
\end{itemize}
model and predict things so that they can adapt ahead of time—to strengthen the capacity at a country level to do that.” For example, the £20 million Future Climate for Africa programme aimed “to generate … new climate research in partnership with African institutions.”

347. The Government was working with the World Bank and African countries to provide direct support to those affected by extreme weather events, and to build resilience in affected countries—for example in Mozambique in the aftermath of Cyclone Idai.

348. The Climate Policy Institute said DfID’s focus on adaptation was “likely appropriate” given the “high level of vulnerability to the impacts of climate change” in Sub-Saharan Africa. It noted that DfID “provided half of the global spending recorded on disaster risk management” (disaster risk reduction—DRR)—an average of $100 million per year—which was “quite important given there is a disproportion of DRR allocation in Sub-Saharan Africa in general compared to other regions.”

349. Dr Death said that while the UK was a significant donor, and had a number of good programmes, its contribution was “meagre and tokenistic, a mere drop in the ocean compared to the scale of the challenge”. The “bottom line” was that the UK needed “to ‘get its own house in order’ in terms of decarbonising the economy”. He said that “progress” on UK decarbonisation would “outweigh any support offered on poverty or sustainable development in Africa, in terms of the direct impact on [greenhouse gas] emissions and the potential for international climate leadership.”

350. Witnesses considered how UK aid should be used to address climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, “financial … and technical capacity support” for low-carbon development was needed.

351. Second, the Climate Policy Institute said that while it understood why DfID was “mainstreaming climate change” across its programmes, this did “not negate the need for dedicated projects focussed on climate”.

352. Third, it called for “innovation in climate action”, particularly for adaptation finance. It recommended that a Sub-Saharan Africa-wide climate innovation lab should be established.

353. Finally, the APPG for Africa said the UK “should work in partnership with African governments, communities and development partners to urgently design and implement better funding incentives and programmes” to address the destruction of ecosystems in the region.

354. We welcome the UK’s provision of development assistance to mitigating and adapting to climate change in the region, particularly in support of low-carbon development. The most significant

531 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
532 Q 24 (Jane Edmondson)
533 Written evidence from the Climate Policy Initiative (ZAF0051)
534 Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAF0036)
535 Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAF0036)
536 Written evidence from the Climate Policy Initiative (ZAF0051)
537 Written evidence from the Climate Policy Initiative (ZAF0051)
538 Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
contribution the UK can make, in addition to action to decarbonise
its own economy, is to ensure that the COP26 meeting in Glasgow
in 2021 consolidates and strengthens the Paris agreement on climate
change. Support from the UK to enable African countries to ramp up
the substitution of renewables in place of oil and coal exports and use
would also help combat global emissions, while not disadvantaging
African development as it grows.

355. The Government should consider how it can learn from its successful
climate programmes, and those of other donors, and deliver them
more widely across the region. We urge the Government more actively
to employ science and technology in its work to combat the effects of
climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**CDC Group**

356. CDC Group is the UK’s development finance institution (DFI). It is
wholly owned by the UK Government. DFIs are specialised development
organisations, usually majority owned by national governments, which invest
in private sector projects in low- and middle-income countries, with the aim
of promoting job creation and sustainable economic growth.\(^539\) In 2014, DFI
investments represented 16% of foreign direct investment\(^540\) and 22% of aid
flows into sub-Saharan Africa.\(^541\)

357. Mr Buckley said CDC Group represented about 8% of the UK’s ODA spend
each year.\(^542\) It was the only bilateral DFI with more than 50% of its portfolio
invested in Africa (£750 million, 70% of its portfolio).\(^543\) In the past two
years CDC Group has invested £1.5 billion in Africa.\(^544\)

358. Mr Buckley said CDC Group aimed to have two impacts. The first was
generating “poverty reduction through job creation”.\(^545\) In 2018, the
companies it invested in had employed almost 370,000 people in the region.\(^546\)
The second was “increasing and improving market efficiencies.”\(^547\) It had
“backed over 88 investment funds with local exposure in Africa helping
support hundreds of enterprises across the continent”. It was “responsible
for over 10 per cent of all capital invested through Africa-focused private
equity funds”, acting as “an anchor investor catalysing Africa’s nascent

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2020]

540 FDI is an investment made by a firm or individual in one country into a business in another country.
This is usually via a foreign investor establishing a business operation in that country, or acquiring
assets in a foreign company.

541 Isabella Massa, Max Mendez-Parra and Dirk Willem te Velde, The macroeconomic effects of development
finance institutions in sub-Saharan Africa (December 2016) p 8: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/

542 Q 83. In 2017 DFID provided a capital increase to CDC of £620 million per year, with an option to
increase this to a maximum of £703 million per year, over the five years from 2017 to
2021, supporting investments until 2022. HM Government, Business Case Summary Sheet—Capital
increase to CDC, the UK’s development finance institution: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/

543 Written evidence from CDC Group (ZAF0026). 2017 figures.

544 Q 82

545 Q 83

546 Written evidence from the CDC Group (ZAF0026)

547 Q 83
capital markets”. The Royal African Society said that CDC Group had a role “as a catalyst and repository of knowledge”.

359. Mr Buckley said that CDC Group was trying to learn “how our investments affect poverty reduction in ways other than job creation”. He gave the example of CDC Group’s investment in home solar systems for Kenyan smallholder farmers, which had saved them $676 a year on average. CDC Group was also investing in renewable energy, such as solar units.

360. Another area of substantial investment was infrastructure and power to reduce the cost of energy. In Uganda these investments had “reduced the cost of energy on average for all users in the country by about 10%”. It was seeking to change local market dynamics—for example investment in MedAccess which “seeks to reduce the price, and increase the availability, of medical supplies and equipment.”

361. CDC Group said it employed “three broad categories of financial product”. The first was “direct equity”, supporting large businesses. This aimed to create jobs, deliver new products and services and increase economic activity across the firms’ supply chain. In 2019 it invested $180 million in Liquid Telecom, to “support the roll out of better quality internet across Africa”.

362. The second was “direct debt”, with a similar impact to direct equity investments. In 2019 CDC provided a €90 million 18-year loan to Nachtigal Hydro Power Company.

363. The third was “intermediated equity”, where investments were “pooled with the capital of other investors and managed by a third-party”. This was used “to channel finance to smaller businesses”. CDC Group had invested via SGI Frontier Capital to support “the first private equity fund focused on Ethiopian SMEs”.

364. Mr Maila said that CDC Group was working with financial institutions such as banks to provide finance to SMEs. It was making direct investments into financial services businesses, such as a 2019 investment in Morocco-based BMCE Bank of Africa.

365. Mr Buckley said that following the Government’s new strategic approach (see Chapter 2) there had been “a step up” in its activity. In 2018, Theresa May MP, the then Prime Minister, announced that CDC Group would invest £3.5 billion in Africa by 2022. It had been “a significant challenge to us as an organisation to build up the operational ability” to deliver this. CDC Group had opened offices in three additional countries: Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia. It had “done a better job of co-operating with the broader HMG effort”, alongside the FCO, the Department for International Trade (DIT) and BEIS.
366. CDC Group expected to invest £2 billion in the next two years. Mr Buckley said that “regardless of the economic headwinds and challenges that Africa might face, CDC will be there as a constant partner in its quest for inclusive growth.”559 Andrew Mitchell MP said that in 50 years’ time the CDC Group, not DfID, would be “the visible symbol of British support for Africa in development”.560

367. Witnesses raised some issues with the way that CDC Group invests. First, Mr Wambu said that there were “limited investment opportunities from CDC between the much needed £500k to £5m ticket size”. This was where there was “the most amount of investment need and opportunity for growth.”561

368. Mr Maila said CDC Group had invested in “several funds that target small and medium enterprises”. It invested in funds with “local knowledge, insight and ability to speak the local language, and connecting the dots so that there is a point of distribution in the market.” Fifty per cent of the CDC Group’s investments in these funds were for less than $5 million.562 Mr Wambu acknowledged that “services from CDC” were “beginning to bridge the gap towards the smaller ticket size”, such as “CDC Plus, a technical assistance and support facility to support under-served sectors”.563

369. Second, CDC’s use of private equity funds has been criticised. By investing in private equity funds—rather than directly—it is harder to see where capital is being invested. Private equity funds often invest via tax havens, which many DFIs say is to make up for shortcomings in the legal systems of the countries in which they invest, but critics say raises transparency concerns and may be motivated by tax avoidance.564 Health Poverty Action referred to a Global Justice Now report which had found that “of the companies and private equity funds in which CDC owns more than 20%, two-thirds are based in a tax haven”.565

370. Mr Buckley said that “without investment funds and banks, we would not be able to reach … small and medium enterprises and micro-enterprises”. The minimum size of direct investment it could make from London was “about $20 million”. Private equity funds were “doing something manifestly different” to this.566

371. Third, Health Poverty Action said CDC Group failed to assess the development impact of its investments. CDC Group’s impact assessment

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559 Q 82
560 Q 3
561 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
562 Q 88
563 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
565 Written evidence from Health Poverty Action (ZAF0024) HPA was referring to CDC Group’s 2018 accounts, quoted in; Global Justice Now, Doing more harm than good: Why CDC must reform for people and planet (February 2020): https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/web_gin_-_doing_more_harm_than_good_cdc_-_feb_2020_2.pdf [accessed 24 June 2020]
566 Q 88
“mostly measures the rate of return and the number of jobs created without a proper analysis of what kind of jobs are created and for who”\textsuperscript{567}

372. Fifth, Health Poverty Action said that it was concerned by CDC Group’s investment in fossil fuels. It referred to a Global Justice Now report, which cited recent CDC Group investments in companies that operate coal-burning cement factories, own a petroleum pipeline and own a heavy fuel oil-burning power plant.\textsuperscript{568}

373. The UK’s CDC Group is a leading development finance institution in Sub-Saharan Africa. It will be central to scaling up investment in the region.

374. Although we understand and support the objective of providing smaller amounts of funding to SMEs in the region, we remain concerned about CDC Group’s investment in private equity funds. We are not convinced that enough has been done to seek alternative ways to invest in smaller companies.

375. It is essential that CDC Group is able to demonstrate the development impact of its investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, to ensure that it generates jobs which have a meaningful and sustainable impact on economic development.

UK trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa

376. Dr te Velde said there had been “a flatline” in UK trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Trade had been at the same level in 2008 and 2018. The stock of UK foreign direct investment was only £2 billion more in 2018 than in 2008.\textsuperscript{569} The UK was the fourth-largest source of FDI to Africa in 2017, accounting for 6\% of FDI stock.\textsuperscript{570} Box 15 sets out data on the UK’s trade and investment relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa.

\textsuperscript{567} Written evidence from Health Poverty Action (ZAF0024)

\textsuperscript{568} Written evidence from Health Poverty Action (ZAF0024) and Global Justice Now, Doing more harm than good: Why CDC must reform for people and planet: (February 2020): https://www.globaljustice.org.uk/sites/default/files/files/resources/web_gin_-_doing_more_harm_than_good_cdc_-_feb_2020_2.pdf [accessed 24 June 2020]

\textsuperscript{569} Q 49 and written evidence from the ODI (ZAF0022). Around £37 billion in 2008 and £39 billion in 2018.

\textsuperscript{570} Written evidence from the ODI (ZAF0022)
Box 15: UK trade and investment relations with Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 2.06% of UK exports and 1.76% of UK imports (goods and services combined).  

The UK’s five largest trade partners in Sub-Saharan Africa (goods and services combined) are:

**Exports**
1. South Africa: £4,319 million
2. Nigeria: £2,619 million
4. Ghana: £686 million
5. Angola: £593 million

**Imports**
1. South Africa: £4,998 million
2. Nigeria: £2,754 million
3. Kenya: £737 million
4. Mauritius: £733 million
5. Ghana: £663 million

In 2017 the UK was Africa’s fourth largest investor, after France, The Netherlands and the US.

The top five Sub-Saharan African countries receiving UK FDI in 2017 were:
1. South Africa: $424 million (the UK was the biggest source of FDI, followed by The Netherlands, Belgium, the US and Germany)
2. Nigeria: $331 million
3. Ghana: $84 million
4. Gabon: $24 million
5. Togo: $21 million

377. The Royal African Society said that UK companies had “substantial investments in Africa, particularly in primary resources”, such as BP, Shell, Tallow and Anglo-American. UK FDI is focused largely on the extractive

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572 Ibid.


575 Written evidence from the Royal African Society ([ZAF0002](https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/balanceofpayments/datasets/9geographicalbreakdownofthecurrentaccountthepinkbook2016))
sector, with 54% in mining and quarrying. Almost 30% of all UK FDI in Africa is in South Africa. 577

378. However, the UK had “been falling behind” that of China, India and Turkey “in relative terms”. 578 Lord Boateng regretted that Barclays had “withdrawn from what was once a commanding position”, while British Airways had “failed to respond competitively to its Middle Eastern rivals” and “underinvested in some of its most profitable routes and abandoned others”. 579

379. Lord Boateng and Mr Wickstead said “opportunities” had been “missed … by large sections of the UK private sector”, which had been “complacent, risk adverse and seemingly lacking in the entrepreneurial ambition of their global rivals.” The UK private sector had “too readily put Africa in the “too risky box” and “not engaged”. 580 Mr Wickstead described UK companies as having “an out-of-date historical narrative”, which discouraged investment. For example, there was still a perception of Ethiopia as “as a place where there is drought and famine”, although it had “been the fastest-growing economy in the world over the last 10 years”. 581

380. The Royal African Society said that “African leaders complain that British companies are no longer bidding for many of the big contracts”. Many companies were “clearly distracted by Brexit uncertainties”. 582

381. Lord Boateng said there were some “notable exceptions”, namely “Unilever, Diageo and the London Stock Exchange”, which had “taken some excellent initiatives and strengthened their engagement with Africa”. 583 Box 16 shows African companies and bonds on the London Stock Exchange.

**Box 16: African companies and bonds on the London Stock Exchange**

There are 121 African companies with equity listed on and/or trading on the London Stock Exchange. This is more than on any other international stock exchange. These companies have a total market capitalisation of over US$185 billion. Since 2008 they have raised $25 billion on London’s markets.

In 2019 there were two landmark initial public offerings from telecommunications companies—Helios Towers and Airtel Africa—which raised a combined value of over $1 billion.

African sovereigns that have recently listed bonds in London include Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria. Fifty-five bonds are currently listed in London from African issuers (both governments and companies) that have collectively raised over $40 billion equivalent. Of these bonds, 50 are denominated in US dollars, with one each in pounds sterling, the euro, the South African rand, the Kenyan shilling and the Ghanaian cedi. Most African local currency bonds are issued in South African rand by non-African corporates and DFIs.

Source: Written evidence from the London Stock Exchange Group (ZAF0049)


577 Ibid.

578 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)

579 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)

580 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)

581 Q 73

582 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)

583 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
Opportunities

382. Lord Boateng said there were opportunities for financial and legal services.584 Considering African countries’ focus on manufacturing, Mr Pengelly said that “we need to think through how finance, legal and professional services can boost industrialisation in Africa indirectly”, a point also made by Dr te Velde.585

383. Lord Boateng and Dr Westcott both identified opportunities in UK education.586 Dr Westcott said that while it was “not high-value investment”, it was “high-benefit”. He saw opportunities for students to come to UK universities and in “building up African higher education institutions”.587 Baroness Amos thought that support for the region’s universities and “promoting partnerships between UK universities and those universities” was “critical”, a point also made by David Lammy MP.588

384. The Royal Africa Society said that the cultural industries were an “area where existing British links with Africa are strong”; the Government “should be doing more to encourage these”, for example “through support to festivals” and “the activities of the British Council in cooperation with the private sector”. These activities “will have knock on benefits to the African economies of origin”.589

385. The Royal African Society identified a possible UK competitive advantage in “sustainable investment that addresses the climate agenda”.590 The Climate Policy Initiative identified opportunities in green buildings and electric vehicles.591 Ms Palmer said the Government was “thinking hard about the nexus between prosperity and climate—that is, how the two intersect and how we can make Africa a better offer, as well as support it in moving forward quickly in its transition to new fuels”. This had been part of the UK–Africa Investment Summit.592 Lord Boateng highlighted opportunities in health, and food and beverages.593

386. Lord Boateng said there was demand from African governments for UK investment in infrastructure. Since Theresa May’s 2018 visit African leaders had “been singularly disappointed by the uptake”, particularly in infrastructure investment. Civil engineering firms had “been slow to come forward”.594

584 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
585 Q 50 and written evidence from the ODI (ZAF0022). While industrialisation was a priority for many African countries, Mr Pengelly said it was “unlikely that UK manufacturing will be building factories in Africa”, given the services-based nature of the UK economy.
586 Q 29 and written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
587 Q 29. Rebecca Tinsley said that UK education was well respected in Sub-Saharan Africa, written evidence from Rebecca Tinsley (ZAF0029).
588 Q 48 and Q 3
589 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
590 Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)
591 Written evidence from the Climate Policy Initiative (ZAF0051)
592 Q 128
593 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
594 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
Government support for trade and investment

Box 17: The UK Trade Commissioner for Africa

Emma Wade-Smith was announced as Her Majesty’s Trade Commissioner for Africa in June 2018.

HM Trade Commissioner for Africa works closely with the wider diplomatic network and others to coordinate the UK Government’s effort to promote UK trade and investment across the African continent.

The Trade Commissioner has full responsibility for all Department for International Trade (DIT) work in Africa, including: growing the overall bilateral trade and investment relationship between the UK and Africa; improving market access for British companies, including small and medium-sized businesses; and developing finance and trade policy.


Staffing and resources

387. The role of the Trade Commissioner for Africa was established in 2018 (see Box 17). Mr Pengelly said that the role was welcome, but the APPG for Trade out of Poverty had two concerns. First, there were not enough staff supporting her work. For example, DFID’s Kenya office had more staff than were allocated to trade promotion work across Africa.595

388. A second issue concerned the job description. This should have been different to those for Trade Commissioners to other regions, to encompass diplomacy, aid and development. A more senior appointment should have been made—such as a former cabinet minister—“who could regularly talk with Presidents and heads of state in Africa” and exercise real influence in Whitehall.596

389. On 16 June, the Prime Minister announced that in order to “align … British assets overseas”, “trade commissioners … will come under the authority of the UK ambassador, bringing more coherence to our international presence”.597

Trade and investment strategy and targets

390. Mr Pengelly said that “successive Ministers and Secretaries of State at the DIT and DFID” had the “intention and willingness … to do more for Africa and more on trade for development”. However, “the delivery has not really come through”. In 2017 there had been a White Paper598 and in January 2018 the Secretaries of State for International Development and International Trade announced that they would “launch a new, integrated, comprehensive package on trade and development for developing countries”. This had not been delivered. He said that “other competing priorities, particularly to do with Brexit, were taking up Ministers’ bandwidth”. It was “easy for Africa

595 Q 54
596 Q 54
to get pushed down the list of priorities, and then it falls off" (also see Chapter 2).

391. The Royal African Society said the private sector had “received less systematic support”; UK policy had “focused heavily around the twin pillars of aid and security”. It called for a “change” of approach on “driving prosperity”, “to stimulate greater awareness of opportunities” among firms and “more willingness to manage the risks of operating there”.

392. Theresa May’s 2018 commitment for the UK to become the top G7 investor in Africa by 2022, and the subsequent revision of that target, is discussed in Chapter 2.

393. The ODI said that the UK lacked “a coherent, over-arching medium-term economic partnership framework with Africa”. Other major economies, including the US, China, Germany and France, had such a framework.

The UK–Africa Investment Summit

394. The UK–Africa Investment Summit was hosted by the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson MP, in London in January 2020. The responsible minister was Alok Sharma MP, then Secretary of State for International Development. A range of government departments were engaged at a senior level. The main outcomes are set out in Box 18.

Box 18: The UK–Africa Investment Summit

The UK Government statement on the summit said that it had “laid the foundations for new partnerships between the UK and African nations based on trade, investment, shared values and mutual interest. Billions of pounds of new commercial deals were announced highlighting the strength of the UK’s offer and existing relationship with Africa. The UK also announced new initiatives and funding which will: strengthen the joint trading relationship, support African countries in their ambition to transform their economies, launch a major new partnership with the City of London, turbo-charge infrastructure financing, and enable Africa’s clean energy potential. Taken together, this will help to realise the UK’s ambition to be the investment partner of choice for Africa, create hundreds of thousands of jobs and ensure the mutual prosperity of all our nations.”

Commercial deals between UK companies and African partners worth over £6.5 billion were announced at the summit, in sectors including “infrastructure, energy, retail and tech”. Firms which announced deals included Rolls Royce, GSK and Diageo. New bond issuances on the London Stock Exchange, including local currency bonds, were announced (see Box 16).
The Government “announced over £1.5 billion of UK aid-funded initiatives”, which were “expected to create hundreds of thousands of jobs and mobilise over £2.4 billion of additional private investment for the continent”.

The UK would “work to help … support the global transition to clean energy”. It would “no longer provide any new direct Official Development Assistance, investment, export credit or trade promotion support for thermal coal mining and coal power plants overseas”.


395. The Minister said that the event had combined “an African summit, bringing together all the leaders and stating very clearly, building on the work that Theresa May had done as part of her Africa visit, that we were interested in and passionate about the continent”, and “an investment summit”. 603

396. Mr Pengelly said the summit had been long overdue—countries such as the US, Japan, Germany, France and China already held such events. 604

397. The Minister said that the “biggest impact” had been “on the perception of British commitment and interest”. There was now “an awareness of and a greater expectation” from African foreign and finance ministers of “what the UK, particularly DIT, is doing across the board”. 605 Ms Palmer said that, in addition to “27 deals worth more than £6.5 billion”, “one of the other really exciting things about the summit was the focus on partnerships” between governments, local investors and UK investors.606

398. Mr Pengelly said representation at the summit had been good: small-scale entrepreneurs and manufacturers had been present, and representatives “from a wide range of countries”. 607 Professor Faal however said there had been an “almost total absence of diaspora finance, investment and enterprise themes and/or practitioners at the formal proceedings”. 608 Mr Wambu said that a “limited number of diaspora entrepreneurs” had participated, which “represented a missed opportunity”. 609 Professor Faal said this “occurred despite the fact that the government engaged with the UK diaspora investment sector in the preparatory phase”. The “lack of diaspora prominence” contrasted with “the demonstrable fact that the UK diaspora makes huge investments in the African social economy”. 610 The role of the diaspora is discussed later in this chapter.

399. Mr Pengelly said while there had been announcements of new investments (see Box 18), some had already been in the pipeline. Follow up to the event would be important, and he regretted that a framework for next steps had not yet emerged.611
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**Trade policy**

400. Trade policy with external countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa, is an exclusive EU competence. The UK will be a member of the EU’s customs union until the end of the Brexit transition period on 31 December 2020.  

401. A summary of the EU’s trade arrangements with Sub-Saharan African countries is in Box 19.

**Box 19: The EU’s trade arrangements with Sub-Saharan African countries**

*Everything But Arms*

Through the EU’s Everything But Arms scheme, full duty-free and quota-free access to the EU Single Market are granted for all products (except arms and armaments) to countries listed as a Least Developed Country by the UN Committee for Development Policy.

As of 1 January 2019, in Sub-Saharan Africa this covered: Angola; Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; DR Congo; Djibouti; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Ethiopia; The Gambia; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Lesotho; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Mozambique; Niger; Rwanda; Sao Tome & Principe; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Sudan; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; and Zambia.

*Generalised Scheme of Preferences*

The EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences removes import duties from products coming into the EU market from vulnerable developing countries.

As of 1 January 2019, this was applied to the following countries in Sub-Saharan Africa: Congo; Kenya; Nigeria; and Cabo Verde (GSP+).

*Economic Partnership Agreements*

- A provisionally applied Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the Southern African Development Community (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and eSwatini),

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612 HM Government, ‘The UK has left the EU: Find out what this means for you’: [https://www.gov.uk/transition](https://www.gov.uk/transition) [accessed 24 June 2020]


615 Developing countries are automatically granted GSP if they are classified as having an income level below “upper middle income” by the World Bank and do not benefit from another arrangement (like a Free Trade Agreement) granting them preferential access to the EU market. European Commission, ‘General Scheme of Preferences (GSP)’: [http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm) [accessed 24 June 2020]

616 European Commission, ‘Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP)’: [https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm](https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/development/generalised-scheme-of-preferences/index_en.htm) [accessed 24 June 2020] Beneficiaries are required to ratify 27 international conventions (see GSP+ above) and to cooperate with the Commission to monitor implementation of these conventions.

617 This will replace the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement with South Africa when fully in force.
• An initialled EPA with West Africa (six West African states, ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union)—until this comes into force, ‘stepping stone’ EPAs are in force with Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana;
• An EPA with Eastern and Southern Africa (Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe)—Zambia has signed but not ratified; and
• An EPA with Cameroon—the EU and the Central African regional organisations (CEMAC and ECCAS) are studying the possibility of developing this into a regional EPA.  

402. Many witnesses were critical of the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with Sub-Saharan African countries. Lord Boateng described EPAs as “contentious, unequal and far from universally welcomed on the continent”. He said that “the EU and its member states … tend to be protectionist in relation to agriculture and both the manufacturing and service sectors at the expense of Africa’s producers”, a point also made by David Lammy MP. Andrew Mitchell MP said that it was “obscene that … the richest bloc in the world, the EU” was “putting up barriers against the one thing that a poor country can often produce, which is its agriculture”.  

403. Dr Stephen Hurt, Reader in International Relations, Oxford Brookes University, said that EPAs had “served to weaken the collective bargaining power of both the [African, Caribbean and Pacific] group of states as a whole and the unity of Sub-Saharan African states within this bloc”. EPA negotiating groups in Africa “often contain both LDCs and non-LDC” countries, which further complicated negotiations.  

404. The Africa Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said that EPAs did not match regional economic community membership (see Chapter 3). The process had also “not evolved with Africa’s industrialisation and development objectives”, and the “fragmented approach” of the EPAs had “created obstacles for regional value chain development in Africa”. The existence of several cumulation regimes “as well as the difficulties linked to the administrative cooperation requirements” had “constrained opportunities for value chain development between countries in different EPA blocs”.  

Post-Brexit arrangements

405. The Minister said there had been “a bit of confusion over what [Brexit] would mean for Africa”, but now “particularly on the trade side there is a feeling of refreshing bilateral relations”. Witnesses said Brexit was an opportunity to

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619 Written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0010), written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044), written evidence from the Africa Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037) and written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
620 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044) and Q 3 (David Lammy MP)
621 Q 3
622 The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States is a group of countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific which was created by the Georgetown Agreement in 1975.
623 Written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0007)
624 Cumulation is a mechanism that allows non-originating materials used, or processing carried out in another country, to be considered to originate in country A or carried out in country A under the terms of its free trade agreement with country B.
625 Written evidence from the Africa Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
626 Q 132
reboot the trade relationship” and to “reflect on the lessons of the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements”.

Lord Boateng said the UK was better placed than the EU to “be seen as a friend” focused on development that supports the poor and to develop “a more equitable relationship”. Dr Westcott said “countries in the region saw Brexit “as a great opportunity to get a better deal with the UK than they have had with the EU.”

From 1 January 2021 the UK will apply the UK Global Tariff, which will replace the EU Common External Tariff. The new UK GSP “will continue to provide trade preferences to the same countries as the EU’s GSP” from 1 January 2021. The UK has negotiated trade continuity agreements with Eastern and Southern Africa, and the Southern Africa Customs Union and Mozambique. It is in discussions with Cameroon, the East African Community and Ghana. The Minister said that the UK needed a trade deal to cover Kenya, “either as part of the East African Community or bilaterally, to protect some key flows”.

Mr Pengelly said that it was “great that there will not be sudden disruption”, but it was “unlikely that continuing that system will in itself lead to a big increase in trade flows”.

Witnesses considered the options. Dr Hurt said that, in the short-term, “the UK could create a unilateral preference scheme for Sub-Saharan African countries that improves on the terms of the EU’s EBA arrangement with LDCs”. One “viable proposal” would be “an extension of duty-free, quota-free access to the UK market to non-LDCs deemed economically vulnerable”. This “could be made compatible with” WTO rules by “using the Enabling Clause”. The UK should also use its independent WTO seat after Brexit to “advocate for rules that allow greater scope for non-reciprocity for developing countries when negotiating FTAs”.

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627 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
628 Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
629 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
630 Q 33
634 Q 133
635 Q 54
636 Written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0010). The WTO introduced the Enabling Clause as a permanent mechanism to allow developed countries to offer preferential, non-reciprocal terms to developing countries as a generalised system of preferences. The Enabling Clause means that developed countries can bypass Most Favoured Nation commitments and offer lower or zero tariff rates to developing countries without offering them to other WTO members. It also enables these rates to be offered without developing countries reciprocating. Traidcraft, Post-Brexit Trade: Options for continued and improved market access arrangements for developing countries (February 2019): https://www.tjm.org.uk/documents/briefings/post-brexit-report.pdf [accessed 24 June 2020]
637 Written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0010). He said that when the EU had negotiated EPAs, it had portrayed WTO rules “as fixed and immutable”.

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410. Dr te Velde thought that the UK could “sweep up all the African countries” in its post-Brexit Generalised System of Preferences. This “would be a win-win situation”. 638

411. Dr Westcott said the key countries for the UK to negotiate with were “middle-income countries that are emerging as prosperous ones”—South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. He said EPAs had been the “most contentious” in these countries. The UK needed to “to listen to the African objections to them and respond to those concerns”. 639

412. UK interests were better access for the UK’s education, financial and legal services. Dr Westcott said there would “be some tensions in negotiating these trade deals”; there was demand for UK “expertise”, alongside “a great deal of protectionist pressure”. 640 On the other side of the negotiation, many African states would “would like to reduce conditionality” on human rights and governance, compared to EU EPAs. He said that as an EU member state, the UK had had “the cover of collective negotiation”; the UK was now “exposed and we will have to make these trade-offs”. 641

413. Many witnesses highlighted the need to ensure that external partners did not undermine African efforts to integrate (as set out in Agenda 2063 and the plans for the AfCFTA). 642 The APPG for Africa said that “we need to ensure any trade agreements made post-Brexit between the UK and African states respect African priorities, such as the AfCFTA … as well as our own, in particular the desire and ability of African countries to industrialise.” Dr Hurt said that there was “a danger that the nature of Africa’s external trade arrangements may stifle the integrationist aspirations of ‘Agenda 2063’”. 643 Trade agreements with external partners could “play a major role in shaping the parameters of what is possible” for African governments to achieve in terms of industrialisation. 644 The UK should “allow real policy space for African countries to industrialise and build value adding supply chains between African countries”. 645

414. The African Trade Policy Centre of UNECA said that, as the AU was creating a single market through the AfCFTA, and “the continent’s trading partners—including the UK—should aim to negotiate with Africa as one single market.” Ensuring that UK trade policy was consistent with the development of the AfCFTA was in the UK’s own interest. The AfCFTA would benefit the UK by addressing key challenges facing UK companies, such as non-tariff barriers, harmonisation and customs cooperation, and “make it easier to engage with African countries on designing trans-boundary investment projects”, 646 as discussed in Chapter 4.

415. Leaving the EU provides an opportunity for the UK to re-cast its trade relationships with African countries and remedy some of the

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638 Q 53
639 Q 33
640 Q 33
641 Q 33
642 Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007), written evidence from the Africa Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037), Q 53 (Dr te Velde) and written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0010)
643 Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
644 Written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0010)
645 Written evidence from Dr Stephen Hurt (ZAF0010). Also see Q 3 (David Lammy MP).
646 Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
647 Written evidence from the Africa Trade Policy Centre of UNECA (ZAF0037)
defects in the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements. We were surprised to hear that no detailed work had yet been done to identify ways in which the UK could offer better access to African exporters than was possible when the UK was in the EU. This gap needs to be filled in the UK government action plan on Africa for which we have called in paragraph 84.

416. **There is appetite within Sub-Saharan Africa to improve trade with the UK; the UK should explore these opportunities with countries in the region.** African partners are working to develop the AfCFTA and are likely to seek new agreements which are consistent with this planned continental agreement.

417. **In its post-Brexit trade policy, the UK should explore ways of giving better access to Africa’s agricultural exports and supporting the processing in Africa of a greater proportion of its agricultural products.**

*Actions for the Government to increase trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa*

418. We heard of several ways in which the Government can increase trade with and investment in the region.

419. First, the Government should communicate to businesses “that there are real opportunities to invest in Africa”.\(^{648}\) The Africa Investment Summit was one such initiative.

420. Second, Lord Boateng said that “active government support” was needed. For example, “concessionary finance and insurance guarantee systems” would be needed if interest from civil engineering firms in Africa was to be increased.\(^ {649}\)

421. Third, Dr Death said the UK’s should consider the coherence of its ODA and trade support work. He said that its climate-focused ODA contributions (discussed above) were “completely undercut by apparently ‘higher’ priorities”, including “investment opportunities for firms.” The UK’s “credibility and good faith” was “jeopardised by continued funding and encouragement for oil and gas infrastructure”.\(^ {650}\)

422. He gave the example of the UK–Africa Investment Summit in January 2020 (see Box 18). More than 90% of the £2 billion of energy deals announced were in fossil fuels, in spite of the commitment to “support African countries in their transition to cleaner energy”.\(^ {651}\) The Climate Policy Institute had been “concerned” by this preponderance of fossil fuel investments.\(^ {652}\)

423. The Prime Minister had said that the UK would end all direct support for overseas coal mining and power plants but would help African countries to extract and use oil and gas (via export credits). Dr Death said that the

\(^{648}\) Q 73 (Myles Wickstead)

\(^{649}\) Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)

\(^{650}\) Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAF0036)

\(^{651}\) Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAF0036)

\(^{652}\) Written evidence from the Climate Policy Initiative (ZAF0051). It said that there was “strong evidence that the lowest cost development pathway is often not oil and gas”. Subsidising investments in these technologies in developing countries could create stranded assets as well as dependency on imported fuel.
“perception” was that “any talk of climate policy or sustainable development evaporates, and is little more than ‘hot air’, when lucrative opportunities to promote UK companies investing in oil and gas infrastructure are spotted”.653

424. Fourth, as discussed in Chapter 2, some witnesses said that the UK’s immigration policy was an impediment to trade and investment. The APPG for Africa said that the policy meant that “many Africans and companies working in Africa are deciding to take their business elsewhere, often to other European countries”.654

425. This was a particular issue for the higher education sector. Dr Johnstone said there was “frustration at the difficulty that African students have had in gaining student visas to study in the UK”.655 The Minister said the approval rate for study visas increased from 81% in 2018 to 85% in 2019.656

426. Delegates on the British Group Inter-Parliamentary Union visit to Liberia in February 2020 heard concerns about UK requirements for recipients of Chevening and Commonwealth scholarships to travel to other countries in the region to take English language tests. For example, Liberian students had to travel to Ghana.657

427. The Minister said that if there was no test centre in that country, the FCO would pay Chevening candidates’ travel costs or arrange for an invigilator to deliver tests in the home country. There was not a requirement for Commonwealth scholarship candidates to complete an in-country English language test.658

428. The Minister said that, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, “we have removed the language requirement for the Chevening scholarship for 2020–21”.659 Ms Mathews said that the Government was “talking to the British Council about more online testing, so that people can do their qualifications remotely”. The COVID-19 pandemic provided “an imperative to speed up that process”.660

429. Finally, Dr Vines and Mr Dewar said that “sharper HMG focus” was needed on “supporting higher education, youth engagement and quality English-language training through the British Council”, including extending its operations beyond Anglophone countries.661

653 Written evidence from Dr Carl Death (ZAF0036)
654 Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)
655 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044) and written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnston (ZAF0041)
656 Q 133
658 Written evidence from James Duddridge MP (ZAF0057)
659 Q 135
660 Q 135
661 Written evidence from the British Council (ZAF00012). The British Council said that its work also aimed to give “entrepreneurial, technical, vocational and practical employable skills” to young people in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in Ethiopia it provides social enterprise training and in Nigeria it supports the creative industries. Written evidence from the British Council (ZAF0012) Christopher Vandome said that the Newton Fund and the Chevening scholarship scheme were useful to “develop wider and deeper patronships beyond top universities and in other tiers of education”. They had “been central to the UK’s relationship with South Africa over the past decade”. Written evidence from Christopher Vandome (ZAF0027)
430. UK trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has flatlined over the last decade. The appetite of UK businesses is uncertain, and a concerted effort will be needed by the Government if it is to deliver on its goal significantly to increase trade with and investment in the region.

431. The UK–Africa Investment Summit was a high-profile beginning to this initiative, but concerted follow-up will be required. The Government should set out the steps it is taking in this regard.

432. The Government must ensure that its provision of export credits is consistent with its commitments to tackling climate change. It should match its announcement at the UK–Africa Investment Summit that it will no longer invest in new coalmining or power production projects with similar commitments on gas and oil.

433. Education is an important UK sector for UK–Sub-Saharan African trade. The visa regime for potential students from the region is unduly onerous and requires reform.

434. We welcome the decision to suspend English language tests for visas for Chevening scholars. We recommend that the Government should: move away entirely from English language tests for visas for both Chevening and Commonwealth scholars; expand both of these schemes; and, where English language tests may be required for visas for undergraduate and post-graduate students, they should be carried out in the student’s country of residence, or online.

The diaspora, and remittances from the UK to Sub-Saharan Africa

435. Remittances provide “hard currency to poor countries.”\(^{662}\) In 2019, $49 billion in remittances (from all countries) was sent to Sub-Saharan Africa.\(^{663}\) In Nigeria in 2018, the amount officially remitted through financial systems from all countries, $25.08 billion, slightly exceeded the entire federal budget for that year, $25.06 billion.\(^{664}\)

436. Box 20 details remittances from the UK to Africa.

\(^{662}\) Q 90 (Professor Gibril Faal)
\(^{663}\) Q 90 (Professor Gibril Faal)
Box 20: Remittances to Africa from the UK

According to a 2018 World Bank report, the total value of remittances to low- and middle-income countries in Africa was three times higher than the combined official development assistance they received, and similar in size to their total foreign direct investment. In 2019, the 49 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa received an estimated $49 billion in inward remittances.

According to World Bank estimates, in 2018 £7.7 billion ($10.2 billion) in remittances were sent out of the UK, representing 0.4% of the UK’s GDP. A 2006 DfID survey of 10,000 black and minority ethnic migrants in the UK found that Black Africans were the most likely ethnic group to remit to their country of origin. According to the World Bank Bilateral Remittance Matrix 2018, three Sub-Saharan African countries—Nigeria, Kenya and Zimbabwe—featured in the top 20 countries receiving remittances from the UK.

The Minister said remittances from the UK to the region were “massive”. Professor Faal and David Lammy MP said that, at around £6 billion, they were larger than all UK ODA and charitable donations to Africa.

Mr Wambu said that diaspora investment was “relatively informal and ad hoc”. Professor Faal said that remittances were sent in three main ways: via banks and money transfer companies—90% of remittances from the UK to the region were cash-to-cash transfers, through organisations like Western Union; through unregistered companies; and through informal money transfers—for example carried by a visiting friend or relative. Professor Faal said there were also “in kind” remittances”, where money was transferred indirectly. The figures for remittances included only official transfers.

A 2018 World Bank report found that the average fee for an international money transfer was 9.4% in Sub-Saharan Africa (compared with 7%...
globally). It called for global efforts to reduce the cost of transferring money to below 3%, consistent with SDG 10c, which commits to “reduce to less than 3 per cent the transaction costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5 per cent” by 2030.

**Benefits of remittances**

440. Witnesses set out the benefits of remittances. First, they go “almost directly to the beneficiary—to the target group—with no unnecessary intermediation”, supporting “individual livelihoods and [the] welfare of relatives”.

441. Second, they “stimulate other activities”. Remittances “indirectly” support “millions of jobs in the educational, healthcare, water [and] power sectors, as well as … funerals and wedding ceremonies”. Professor Faal said that the biggest remittances related to property and building homes, and the resulting “construction boom” had a “multiplier effect”, with “a multifaceted positive impact”.

442. Third, Mr Wambu said that, “as well as seeking a financial return, diaspora-led business and investment initiatives” were “frequently driven by the need for broader social impact through contributing to the development of their countries of heritage”.

443. Fourth, remittances provided funding for a small and micro enterprises. AFFORD has estimated that around 25% of remittances are spent on starting family businesses and other enterprises—“micro, small and medium enterprise”—and real estate. Mr Wambu said that this was valuable because “in all developing economies, it is the SME sector that provides over 80 per cent of the jobs”. Professor Faal said that “decent jobs are the answer to the route out of poverty”.

444. Fifth, Professor Faal said that remittances were “more sustainable than all the main forms of development finance”. In the event of political instability, FDI would fall, but “remittances go up because families in the diaspora are worried about their family and they give more”. If an economy was “picking up and doing well” then ODA would not increase, but remittances might. Professor Faal and Mr Wambu said that remittances were therefore “countercyclical”.

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677 Q 90 (Professor Gibril Faal)

678 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

679 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

680 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

681 Q 90

682 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

683 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

684 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

685 Q 93

686 Q 90

687 Q 90 and written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
445. Mr Wambu said that in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, ensuring remittances could be sent was especially important.\(^{688}\) On 21 April 2020 the Government amended the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) Regulations 2020 to include money transfer organisations as essential service providers, allowing them to operate during the lockdown.\(^{689}\)

446. The Minister said that the World Bank expected that remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries would decline by around 20% in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The UK and Swiss governments, supported by partners including the World Bank, had launched “a global Call to Action”, calling for “policymakers, regulators and remittance service providers to take action to keep remittances flowing during the crisis” on 22 May 2020.\(^{690}\)

447. **Remittances from the UK to Sub-Saharan Africa are given too little profile in the narrative of the UK’s economic relationship with the region. Remittances from the UK exceed aid and charitable giving to Sub-Saharan Africa, and provide essential economic support.**

*Government support for remittances and diaspora financing*

448. Witnesses said that the potential of remittances had not been fully realised.\(^{691}\) They set out ways in which the Government could support remittances and diaspora financing.

449. First, the cost of remitting money from the UK should be addressed. The Minister agreed that it cost “far too much” and said that “anything” to reduce this “has to be good”.\(^{692}\) Dr Okonjo-Iweala said this was particularly important in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.\(^{693}\)

450. Professor Faal said that the EU Payments Services Directive\(^{694}\) imposed “heavy regulation” on the small money transfer companies used for remittances. He said these rules, which focused on terrorist financing and anti-money laundering, were “a red herring as far as remittances are concerned”. The companies used for remittances were “not being used for terrorist violence”.\(^{695}\) He said that “A Brexit UK should champion those points”.\(^{696}\)

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\(^{688}\) Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)


\(^{690}\) Written evidence from James Duddridge MP (ZAF0057)

\(^{691}\) Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044), Q 8 (Andrew Mitchell MP), written evidence from Professor Gibril Faal OBE JP (ZAF00034) and written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

\(^{692}\) Q 124

\(^{693}\) Q 107


\(^{696}\) Q 90
451. Professor Faal and Andrew Mitchell MP said that competition was needed to reduce the cost charged by companies to remit money. Some progress had been made: the Minister said that money transfers were “less monopolistic now than … in the past”, when there had been a reliance on a limited number of banks in each country. Professor Faal said that restrictive rules that Western Union had signed with many countries had been removed.

452. Andrew Mitchell MP said “the key thing about the middle-man cost is that there should be competition”. For example, Barclays had withdrawn from Somaliland—”partly because of the anti-terrorist legislation in Britain”—which had left “only one remittance maker into Somaliland”. Without competition, costs had gone up.

453. Professor Faal said there was “no stimulation for new players”. Mr Wambu said the UK should seek to identify incentives which could “encourage remittances services providers to lower cost of sending remittances”. The Minister said that there was an opportunity to “utilise end-to-end electronic systems”, using mobile telephony, which was widespread.

454. Second, there was an opportunity for the UK to consider how it could utilise and support remittances. Lord Boateng proposed “further study” by HM Treasury and DfID to “explore the potential for development bonds and other forms of innovative financing.” Andrew Mitchell MP thought “we have not done enough on the remittancing point”; for example, establishing “structures that mean that that money is not necessarily used for immediate consumption but can be invested in local activity is the way we could do better”.

455. Mr Wambu said that the UK could help to “improve the infrastructure for domestic and cross-border payments”—for example via fintech, work with African countries on regulations and financial inclusion, and undertaking research to assess the major obstacles to sending remittances and identifying solutions. Efforts “to reduce or avoid exclusive agreements, taxation measures on remittances including high exchange rates” would also be helpful.

456. Finally, there were opportunities for the Government to utilise diaspora financing. Mr Wambu cited the Diaspora Finance Initiative (DFI), which was funded by Comic Relief and UK aid through the Common Ground

697 Q 90 and Q 6 (Andrew Mitchell MP)
698 Q 141
699 Q 90
700 Barclays withdrew services from Somaliland because some money service businesses do not have the necessary checks in place to spot criminal activity. It said that this “could therefore unwittingly be facilitating money laundering and terrorist financing”. This followed the imposition of a $1.9bn fine on HSBC by US authorities the previous year for poor money laundering controls. ‘Somalis fear Barclays closure of remittance accounts will cut lifeline’, The Guardian (24 June 2013): https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/jun/24/somalis-barclays-remittance [accessed 18 June 2020]
701 Q 6
702 Q 90
703 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
704 Q 141
705 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
706 Q 8
707 These would include “structural and economic settings, sociocultural and political contexts, regulation”. Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
The Common Ground Initiative, and run by AFFORD.\textsuperscript{709} This was the “largest scale diaspora finance programme yet launched”, at £2.9 million. The DFI involved “diaspora capital mobilisation and investment”, by “increasing and diversifying diaspora SME investment in Africa to create jobs; strengthening diaspora business networks and knowledge exchange”. A pilot structured diaspora bond instrument had been launched, to invest in affordable housing in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{710}

457. Mr Wambu said the beneficiaries were “people in Africa who get decent jobs directly through social enterprise investments; or indirectly through growth of businesses that supply and trade with the diaspora enterprises”.\textsuperscript{711} Mr Wambu said that the Common Ground Initiative was “currently in abeyance”; the Government should “renew and expand” it.\textsuperscript{712}

458. Professor Faal said that the AU was looking at ways to make remittances “regenerative” and highlighted the new AU framework for the African Diaspora Finance Corporation (ADFC).\textsuperscript{713} This included a remittance-matching scheme. He said the UK should endorse the AU framework for the ADFC and provide “strategic, partnership, technical and financial support as appropriate”.\textsuperscript{714} Diaspora bonds were the “lowest-hanging fruit”. The UK diaspora saved “£2 billion a year”, which could be invested in diaspora bonds; “African governments have become prolific bond issuers in the London and international markets”.\textsuperscript{715}

459. We welcome the Minister’s acknowledgement of the importance of remittances from the UK to Sub-Saharan Africa and the May 2020 UK-Swiss ‘global Call to Action’ on remittances, to address the projected fall in remittances as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. We would welcome more information on the actions the Government is taking to facilitate the sending of remittances to Africa from the UK diaspora through this initiative and to avoid disruption, and whether it is exploring the possibility of remittance matching.

460. The Government should work to lower the cost of remitting money to the region, including the use of its powers over competition policy,

\textsuperscript{709} DfID Development Tracker, ‘Comic Relief—Common Ground Initiative Fund’: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-200645 [accessed 24 June 2020]. The Common Ground Initiative (CGI) is a demand led competitive fund managed by Comic Relief. CGI supports UK-based diaspora-led and small development organisations to provide effective development assistance to a number of low-income African countries, to make progress towards meeting Millennium Development Goals. DfID, Addendum to business case for bridge funding and scale-up cost extensions: http://iati.dfid.gov.uk/iati_documents/11825933.odt and written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

\textsuperscript{710} Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

\textsuperscript{711} Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)

\textsuperscript{712} Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043) Also see written evidence from Professor Gibril Faal OBE JP (ZAF0034)

\textsuperscript{713} Q 90. AU, ‘African Union Legacy Project in Diaspora Investment, Innovative Finance and Social Enterprise in Africa’ (24 September 2019): https://au.int/en/documents/20190924/cido-adfc-business-framework-report-abridged-final-may-2019 [accessed 24 June 2020]. Professor Faal said the African Diaspora Finance Corporation (ADFC) was being developed by the AU. It was aiming to attract investment of $200 million in its first Diaspora Mutual Fund and Diaspora Bond “from African migrants, multigenerational diasporans, and impact and ethical ‘friends of Africa’ investors”. It also planned to raise a $50-100 million Endowment Fund using Remittance Match Funding (RMF) from two to three participating countries. Written evidence from Professor Gibril Faal OBE JP (ZAF0034)

\textsuperscript{714} He said the UK should subscribe to Remittance Match Funding, provide match funds to the ADFC endowment fund, and facilitate a technical partnership with the Financial Conduct Authority with ADFC to issue diaspora bonds and mutual funds in the UK.

\textsuperscript{715} Q 90, Q 92 and written evidence from Professor Gibril Faal (ZAF0034)
consistent with the SDGs. It should review the application of the EU Payment Services Directive after the EU transition period ends and consider how it could support greater competition in the market for money transfer companies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

461. The Government should explore co-funding and support for the AU’s new African Diaspora Finance Corporation.

Engagement with the Sub-Saharan African diaspora in the UK

462. Box 21 gives figures on the African diaspora in the UK.

Box 21: The African diaspora in the United Kingdom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the last census (2011), 989,628 individuals identified themselves as Black African.716 This was over double the figure from the 2001 census, in which the Black African population stood at 485,277 people.717 The percentage of people who identified as Black African doubled from 0.9% in 2001 to 1.8% in 2011.718 According to ONS data released in May 2020, in 2019 the largest three largest diaspora groups in the UK from Sub-Saharan Africa were South Africa (251,000 people), Nigeria (215,000 people) and Zimbabwe (128,000 people).719</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

463. Many witnesses said that the Government should engage in a more coherent and consistent way with the diaspora community.720 Lord Boateng said there was “wisdom to be gained from wider and sustained contact and consultation.”721 David Lammy MP said that diaspora communities would “tell you what they are funding back in the villages and towns they come from, why they are funding particular schools in particular ways, why they are funding relatives’ start-ups in particular ways”.722

464. Mr Wambu said that “skills and knowledge transfer” from the diaspora were “at the cutting edge of many technological and other developments taking place on the continent.” These helped to create new jobs, as well as providing expertise to protect existing jobs and livelihoods.723

Government engagement with the diaspora

465. Professor Faal said that the size of remittances from the UK (discussed above) was “significant enough to deserve serious policy and engagement”.724

717 David Owen, University of Warwick, ‘Profile of Black and Minority ethnic groups in the UK’: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/healthatwarwick/publications/occasional/ethnicprofile.pdf [accessed 24 June 2020]
718 HM Government, ‘Population of England and Wales’
720 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044), Q 90 (Professor Gibril Faal), written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAP0043) and Q 8 (David Lammy MP)
721 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
722 Q 8
723 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
724 Q 92
466. However, Yemisi Mokuolu, Director, Hatch Africa, said the diaspora was “seriously untapped”, and Professor Faal said that consultation was “periodic and erratic.” Mr Wambu said that the relationship between the Government and diaspora organisations was not institutionalised, and there were “no long term guarantees” of engagement. This meant that “Under resourced diaspora organisations have to re-engage with rapid policy changes, which can feel like constantly rebuilding the foundations to a house that is never completed.” There were “few, if any, continuous channels for diaspora businesses—especially SMEs—to share their knowledge with the UK government on an ongoing basis.”

467. Professor Faal said that “public officials adopt a minimalist approach, seeking to deal with just one or two African diaspora organisations, as ‘representatives’”. This might “be convenient or expedient for management and bureaucratic reasons”, but it “stifles the possible benefits that come with diversity and plurality.” The division of responsibilities between the FCO, the DIT and DfID made it more difficult for diaspora groups to engage effectively.

468. On diaspora engagement with DfID specifically, Andrew Mitchell MP said that DfID was “pretty well wired into … diaspora communities”. He said that “if you are trying to help incubate entrepreneurs or do something to enhance the role of women in a country, you need to understand what is happening there, and a lot of that information comes through representatives of the diaspora”.

469. Mr Wambu regretted that that DfID “in most cases excludes diaspora contributions from its strategic funding”. Its IMPACT Programme had “historically relied heavily on CDC, Palladium and PWC”, and had “not included the deep level of intelligence and experience offered by diaspora led organisations who have intimate knowledge of development finance for economic development”. The organisations managing and advising on the Impact Fund had “attempted to gain knowledge on the diaspora”; AFFORD had worked with them, but questioned DfID’s “lack of recognition of the need to fund diaspora directly to support their economic development initiatives”.

470. Witnesses outlined actions for the Government to improve its engagement with the diaspora. First, the diaspora should be integrated into “formal policy processes on Africa, development, migration and related matters.” The Government should “articulate long term strategic and partnership commitment to UK diaspora-development organisations, and initiate a 10-year funding and financing programme, in line with the remaining 10 years of the SDGs.”

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725 Written evidence from Yemisi Mokuolu (ZAF0021)
726 Q 93
727 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
728 Written evidence from Professor Gibril Faal OBE JP (ZAF0034)
729 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
730 Q 8
731 The DfID Impact Programme supports initiatives that strengthen the market for impact investing and catalyse an increase in the flow of impact capital into businesses in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. UK AID Impact Programme, ‘What is impact investment’: http://www.theimpactprogramme.org.uk/ [accessed 24 June 2020]
732 Written evidence from Onyekachi Wambu (ZAF0043)
733 Written evidence from Professor Gibril Faal OBE (ZAF0034)
471. Second, the Government should engage with and utilise diaspora representatives in national, regional and international forums. For example, it should co-host “side and consultative events” with diaspora representatives at events, and include diaspora representatives in official UK delegations. Diaspora representatives should be given “more opportunities through the British Council, FCO and DFID to take part in relationship building on behalf of the UK in African nations”. UK posts in Sub-Saharan Africa should be “encouraged to provide networking support to [visiting] UK based diaspora entrepreneurs”.

472. Third, the Government should “enhance support” to “the few exemplar diaspora-development organisations”. These groups had maintained engagement with the Government for more than two decades.

473. Fourth, it should raise awareness “within government and at global platforms” of the fact that “the billions of pounds of annual diaspora remittances and investment to Africa are an integral part of the UK’s contribution to international sustainable development”.

474. Fifth, the Government should provide support for diaspora investments and businesses. This could include: match funding; investment guarantees; grants; and investment. Mr Wambu said that UK DFIs (CDC Group and PIDG) should “partner with and invest in innovative diaspora investment and enterprise schemes”.

475. Sixth, DFID’s IMPACT Programme could be “optimised” by investment from the diaspora.

476. Finally, Professor Faal said that, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK should “expand collaboration with diaspora organisations that manage small grant schemes reflecting the unexpected needs, challenges and opportunities arising”. The diaspora had “experience of providing enterprise and livelihood support to Ebola affected countries”.

The diaspora in UK business

477. Lord Boateng said UK businesses had “way to go” in including the diaspora in leadership roles. They suffered from “a lack of ethnic diversity and a degree of myopia when it comes to Africa that has damaged the advancement of our national interests”. This was now “changing in the legal and financial service sector … there are a number of highly influential diaspora Brits of Nigerian...
and Ghanaian origin in particular but also from the significant East African Asian community”. The value they brought was “increasingly evident.”

478. We heard that the UK’s Sub-Saharan African diaspora is not consulted and engaged in a consistent manner. Representatives of the diaspora are an essential resource in delivering the Government’s plan to increase trade and investment with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The Government should embed consultation with the diaspora into policy making towards Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular with regard to trade and investment.

479. The Government should give consideration to how and in what ways it could better encourage diversity on UK boards. It should work proactively with diaspora communities to make progress in this regard.

744 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
CHAPTER 6: PEACE AND SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

480. There are a number of pressing and long-term challenges to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa, many of which are interrelated and underpinned by the economic issues outlined in Chapter 4.

481. The ongoing significance of the continent’s colonial legacy was set out by Dr Westcott, who said that “almost all” the conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa since decolonisation had been “civil conflicts”. Many colonial territories “were carved up fairly arbitrarily”, leaving different groups of people to “find a way to get on together”. In the absence of the “uniting factor” of opposition to a colonial power, a “political balance” was needed, giving “rise to quite a lot of internal conflict”. Some countries had “emerged into quite robust and stable democracies” while in others the balance was “still being found”.745

Peace and security challenges

482. Dr Westcott said that the number of conflicts in Africa was “going down” but the remaining conflicts were “intractable”.746 Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa was not necessarily characterised by the “emergence of new conflicts” but by the “reoccurrence of [old] conflicts … birthed out of old grievances.”747 Search for Common Ground said that “very few countries” had transitioned “out of active conflict” in recent decades.748

483. While post-colonial conflicts in Africa had been largely internal, Baroness Amos and said that the “nature of conflict” had changed considerably;749 Dr Ero said this was particularly true of the last five to 10 years. Conflict in the region had become “more transnational”; “conflicts bleed into one another.”750 Professor Murithi said that when thinking about security in the region, “the unit of analysis” was “no longer the nation state.”751 This was echoed in the Government’s analysis: “many of the challenges to stability and prosperity” did “not respect borders”.752

484. The change in the nature of conflict has had profound consequences for traditional approaches to conflict management, including peacekeeping (discussed later in this chapter). Dr Tchie said there was an “increasing threat” from terrorist groups that were “embedding” into civilian communities and “linking with … local and global agendas” of jihad. For example, terrorists who had fought with jihadist groups in Yemen, Iraq and Syria were “relocating” to Africa. “New involvement from regional and international actors” had encouraged or created proxy wars. While not all existing conflicts involving non-state armed groups were caused by international networks, they were often “seen and tackled as part of the global terrorism narrative”.753

485. Figure 5 shows conflicts in Africa involving non-state actors.

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745 Q 30
746 Q 30
747 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
748 Written evidence from Search for Common Ground (ZAF0009)
749 Q 43
750 Q 78
751 Q 59
752 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
753 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
Figure 5: Conflicts featuring non-state actors


486. Dr Tchie said that terrorist groups were often embedded in “fragile and conflict-affected areas where the government presence is weak or … non-existent.” 754 General Sir Richard Barrons said that in some cases local populations considered the arrival of such groups “not entirely a bad thing”. They provided “order, security, sensible taxation and access to justice,” and removed “the predatory effect of the police force, the army and the local government.” Local people often said “What we had was terrible and what we have now is frightening, but at least I can go about my business with greater confidence than I did before”. 755 Specific examples of this phenomenon are discussed later in this chapter.

487. Witnesses said poverty was a driving factor in conflict. Andrew Mitchell MP said “very poor people” were “prone to exploitation, including by terrorism”. 756 Dr Tchie said that “unequal economic growth in many African countries as well as [issues relating to] structural wealth distribution”, notably “land rights”, were also factors driving conflict. 757

754 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
755 Q 96
756 Q 11
757 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
488. There had been an increase in challenges to maritime security and of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in west Africa. The levels of piracy now exceeded the levels seen off the Somali coast.  

489. Witnesses said that demographic change and climate change, issues discussed in chapters 1 and 4, were also linked to increasing insecurity. First, Baroness Amos said rapid population growth and urbanisation were contributing factors. Dr Tchie noted a link between “rapid urbanisation” and a “lack of security and governance”, making socially deprived communities more vulnerable. Dr Westcott said there was a “degree of conflict risk” associated with population growth because “unemployed young men … tend to get violent.” This reinforced a need to create “more jobs”. Dr Tchie said that youth unemployment remained “a driver for extremist recruitment”, with young people feeling “they have no … choice but to join groups because of the lack of education or … access to jobs”.

490. Second, Baroness Amos said there was “growing conflict as a result of climate-related emergencies”, giving the example of water scarcity. Dr Westcott said the “red zones where conflicts are greatest”—from the Sahel to Somalia—included the “zones of greatest environmental stress.” These areas are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

491. Where there was good governance, climate stress had been managed well; Dr Westcott gave the example of Ethiopia. Where governance was poor, such as in South Sudan, it was “very violent”. General Sir Richard Barrons likewise noted that the “conflict in Darfur arose out of desertification”. The role of climate change in driving insecurity in the Sahel is considered later in this chapter.

492. Several witnesses discussed the role of ideology as a potential driver of conflict. Dr Tchie said that, while it was a factor, the emergence of terrorist groups across parts of Sub-Saharan Africa was “less about ideology” and often “driven by local issues like security, access to infrastructure, economic deprivation and health care and unresolved grievances.” Dr Westcott said there was a “fundamental, underlying economic issue”. The Coalition for Genocide Response, however, thought that many attacks in countries such as Nigeria and the Central African Republic were ideological in nature.

493. There remain significant challenges to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa. These challenges are likely to be exacerbated by wider trends affecting the region, including population growth, weak states, violent ideologies and the climate crisis.

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758 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
759 Q 43
760 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
761 Q 30
762 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
763 Q 43
764 Q 30
765 Q 30
766 Q 100
767 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
768 Q 30
769 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response (ZAF00025)
COVID-19 and peace and security

494. Dr Okonjo-Iweala said the COVID-19 pandemic posed “a very serious problem”, particularly in places with significant “security concerns”. Fragile and conflict-affected parts of the continent posed a challenge for delivering COVID-19-related services. She singled out the Sahel and Somalia as particular areas of concern.770 The World Food Programme said the virus and its effects could have a “devastating impact on already highly vulnerable communities” in the Sahel.771

495. A similar issue had been seen in previous public health crises. Dr Okonjo-Iweala gave the example of outbreaks of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where “because of” conflict it had not been “easy to fight” the virus. “More lives” could have been “saved” “if there had been no conflict going on”.772

Conflict flashpoints

496. Witnesses raised a number of cases of conflict insecurity that were of particular concern, in the Sahel, Somalia, Nigeria and Cameroon. These are addressed in turn.

The Sahel

497. Dr Ero said that the Sahel was “at the top of the list” of areas of insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa, and that it was “right” that the Government had “singled out this region as a priority”773 (see Chapter 2).

498. Witnesses discussed the factors driving conflict in the Sahel. The first was climate change.774 Professor Chafer said that in Mali there was increased resource “competition” resulting from “accelerating desertification”. This, combined with “increased economic competition” had encouraged a “retrenchment into community-based self-defence groups” to help families protect themselves and their land. This in turn had increased a second factor, “intercommunal tensions”.775 Dr Gaulme described “rampant ethnic tensions, mostly between herders and farmers”.776

499. In turn, this provided “fertile ground for … jihadists”, a third factor. Islamist fundamentalist groups were often “the only source of protection” for vulnerable people.777

500. The World Food Programme London Office emphasised the urgency of the crisis. The recent “dramatic increase in violent conflict” in the Sahel was “leading to massive displacement and pressure on already vulnerable host populations.”778

770 Q 115
771 Written evidence from World Food Programme London Office (ZAF0035)
772 Q 116
773 Q 75
774 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF00039) and written evidence from the World Food Programme London Office (ZAF0035)
775 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF00039)
776 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF00033)
777 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF00039). Also see written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF00033).
778 Written evidence from the World Food Programme London Office (ZAF0035)
501. Within the Sahel, witnesses singled out Mali. Jihadists and local separatists had been active in northern Mali from the mid-2000s. Following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi of Libya in 2011, “fighters and weapons” moved south into Mali and jihadists “took control”.779

502. General Sir Richard Barrons said that in late 2012 there had been “a sense that Bamako might fall”, and that Mali might be overrun by Islamists. France “responded to this challenge … remarkably quickly”. It had a “major security concern”: that “counterterrorism and the spread of violent religious extremism … would grow within” the wider region780 and Europeans would “see the consequences on [their] streets”.780

France’s interventions in the Sahel

503. France’s initial operation in Mali (Operation Serval), its subsequent regional operation (Operation Barkhane) and the UN’s mission (MINUSMA) are outlined in Box 22.

Box 22: International action in Mali

In March 2012 the Malian military conducted a coup against the government of Amadou Toumani Touré. A coalition of ethnic Tuareg separatists and militant Islamists then pushed the army out of the north of the country.781

In December 2012 the UN Security Council authorised the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). AFISMA was organised by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and composed of troops from Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad.782

In January 2013 the rebels unexpectedly pushed southwards, potentially threatening the capital, Bamako, and raising fears the entire country could fall.783

On 11 January 2013 France launched Operation Serval, a military intervention to stop and roll back the rebel advance. Chad committed additional troops to the conflict in Mali, which were integrated into the French command structure. The UK provided logistical and tactical support.784

Operation Serval was deemed a success. France officially ended the operation on 15 July 2014.785

In June 2013 a ceasefire agreement was achieved between the Malian government and the most prominent Tuareg nationalist group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. Presidential elections were held in August, resulting in a victory for Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who remains in office.786

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779 Written evidence from Paul Melly (ZAF0027)
780 Q 95
781 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, Briefing Paper Number 7614, 8 June 2016
783 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, Briefing Paper Number 7614, 8 June 2016
784 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, Briefing Paper Number 7614, 8 June 2016
785 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, Briefing Paper Number 7614, 8 June 2016
786 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: June 2016 update’, Briefing Paper Number 7614, 8 June 2016
In April 2013 the United Nations Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission to Mali, and in July the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) was established. MINUSMA took over from AFISMA, and initially had up to 11,200 troops and 1,440 police officers. In January 2020 the UK announced it would deploy 250 troops to join MINUSMA.

On 1 August 2014, following the end of Operation Serval, France launched Operation Barkhane. Operation Barkhane is an anti-insurgency operation across five countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—and involving the governments of each. Since 2019 the UK has provided three Chinook helicopters for non-combat assistance to Operation Barkhane.

504. Dr Gaulme said Operation Serval was “launched very much in a hurry”, and directly “contradicted” President Hollande’s October 2012 “commitment … to limit French action in the Sahel to … financial, logistical and technical support” for African-led forces. From a “purely military point of view”, it had succeeded in preventing the “threatened takeover of the capital”. French and Chadian forces “repelled the Islamist offensive and disbanded the rebels”.

505. The Operation was declared a success and a peace agreement was signed in 2015 between the Malian government in Bamako and the northern rebels. Although the “implementation” of this agreement had “been very slow”, it had brought a “degree of security … to the north of the country”.

506. Professor Chafer said Operation Barkhane was established in 2014 in recognition of the “broader, regional” nature of the threats facing the Sahel: “Islamist extremism, transnational crime and migration”. In Operation Barkhane France had found itself “in a quagmire with a spiralling insecurity situation”, “not only in Mali but across much of the western Sahel”. Dr Gaulme noted growing local criticism of France, which had strained the relationship between Paris and “the political and social elite in Sahel countries”.

507. Paul Melly, Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House, said that, despite “significant international security engagement, violent instability” in the Sahel had “become more widespread and complex”. Professor Chafer said that since the launch of Operation Barkhane “security in both Mali and the surrounding states” of Burkina Faso and Niger had “deteriorated markedly”. Dr Gaulme said that France and its partners

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788 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: UK troop deployment’, Briefing Paper Number CBP 08903, 29 April 2020
790 House of Commons Library, ‘Mali: UK troop deployment’, Briefing Paper Number CBP 08903, 29 April 2020
791 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF0033)
792 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
793 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
794 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
795 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF0033)
796 Written evidence from Paul Melly (ZAF0027)
797 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
were “conceptually and operationally unable” to stop most of the region’s
conflicts.798

508. Witnesses discussed the limitations of the “predominantly military response”
in the region. It had “been criticised by observers for producing new breeding
grounds for violent extremism”. There had been a “growth in the capacity of
existing jihadist groups and [the] establishment of new groups”, principally
defined by their allegiance to two larger international terror networks: al
Qaeda and Islamic State. 799

509. As the focus in Mali had moved from the north to the more populated centre
of the country, there was a reluctance to engage in “large-scale military
operations”, where there could be an “unacceptable loss of civilian life”.800

510. There was “no clear end to the violence in sight”. If “sustainable peace”
was “to be achieved”, it would have to “address the fundamental underlying
issues of governance and development”. This was acknowledged by “external
state and international actors”, including the French and Sahelian states801—
known as the G5802—who agreed on the “need … to tackle the economic and
social pressures that push young people into criminal trafficking, banditry
or jihadist groups.”803

511. The World Food Programme London Office said that “resilience-building
interventions at the community level” contributed to “addressing the
drivers of social instability”, building “social cohesion” and contributing to
“reducing inter-communal violence.”804

512. Witnesses said that tensions between regional institutions were a factor
preventing progress. Dr Gaulme said French support for the G5 was “poorly
planned” and done without consideration of its duplication and potential
rivalry with ECOWAS, the local regional economic community. France had
since made efforts better to integrate non-G5 countries into its approach
to the Sahel.805 Professor Chafer said that ECOWAS’s “track record on
promoting good governance and democracy within the region” was “crucial
alongside military efforts”.806

The UK’s contributions in the Sahel

513. General Sir Richard Barrons said that the Government had quickly offered
France help in 2013, but “the very clear sense was that this was a French-led
intervention.” He noted “nervousness” about being drawn “incrementally
into something where [the UK] did not know where it would lead”, following
the experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq. UK support focused on strategic
air transportation and the training of Anglophone partners.807

798 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF0033)
799 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
800 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
801 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
802 The G5 Sahel (also known as the G5S) is an institutional framework for coordinating regional
development and security policies between Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It was
established in 2014.
803 Written evidence from Paul Melly (ZAF0027)
804 Written evidence from World Food Programme London Office (ZAF0035)
805 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF0033)
806 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
807 Q 95
514. Professor Chafer said the Government’s decision to send three Chinook helicopters to support Operation Barkhane, and its decision to deploy 250 soldiers to Mali in support of MINUSMA in January 2020, sent “a strong political signal” of support. Dr Gaulme said this was well received by France; its military was “at the end of [its] tether in the Sahel and in dire need of … support”. Professor Chafer said the UK’s “pivot to the Sahel” should be understood as the Government wanting to show support for European allies as the UK withdrew from the European Union. General Sir Richard Barrons described the UK’s deployment of 250 military personnel in Mali as a “token”, and told us that “these minor contributions … are not in support of a strategy of any kind other than ‘we should do a bit more UN peacekeeping’”.

515. Witnesses had concerns about the UK entering such a “congested space”. First, Dr Tchie had questions about the efficacy of a security-focused international effort. The approach lacked “synergy, communication” or “end mission or goal”.

516. Second, the UK was “not taking sufficient account of the needs of local and regional partners”. It should “add value” by better engaging local actors. There were tensions between regional institutions and the UK’s “good relations with Nigeria and the other Anglophone members of ECOWAS” made it “potentially well placed to help facilitate” a stronger role for this body.

517. Third, the UK still had “lessons to learn from Iraq and Afghanistan”, including those relating to equipment, regional understanding and engagement with local counterparts.

518. Fourth, Dr Tchie said the UK’s lack of history and cultural connection with the region would leave British troops “reliant on the French perspective and narrative of Africa, which may not serve them well”.

519. Fifth, the involvement of the UK could see countries more closely linked with the UK—such as Ghana and Nigeria—“dragged into new forms of conflicts” in a similar way that France’s partners have been involved in its intervention in Mali.

520. Finally, Dr Tchie considered the repercussions that UK intervention would have on “the way terrorist groups … view the UK overall”.

521. Insecurity in the Sahel threatens the welfare of millions of people across the region, and risks spilling over into neighbouring countries. We welcome regional and international efforts to stabilise the region.

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808 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
809 Written evidence from Dr François Gaulme (ZAF0033)
810 Written evidence from Professor Andrew Yaw Tchie (ZAF0039)
811 Q 97
812 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
813 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
814 Written evidence from Professor Tony Chafer (ZAF0039)
815 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
816 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
817 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
818 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
522. It is vital that the international response to instability in the Sahel is not overly focused on conflict management, nor overly securitised. To achieve a lasting peace, it will be essential to address the underlying causes of conflict, including climate change and economic inequalities.

523. We welcome the UK’s increased attention to instability in the Sahel, and the Government’s decision to contribute UK troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. However, the Government’s wider strategy in the Sahel is unclear and the UK risks being unable to add value in a highly contested space. We would welcome further information from the Government on its objectives in the Sahel.

Somalia

524. General Sir Richard Barrons described Somalia as “a deeply broken place” with extreme poverty, corrupt and inefficient governance, and “significant economic shortcomings that partly led to and fuelled the problem of piracy, and a major challenge from al-Shabaab”, an Islamist militant non-state armed group in east Africa (see Figure 5).\textsuperscript{819}

525. Box 23 outlines the history of conflict in Somalia.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Box 23: The Somali civil war}
\end{center}

The Somali civil war began from opposition to the regime of President Mohamed Siad Barre in the 1980s. When he was ousted in 1991, a power struggle between rival warlords killed and wounded thousands.\textsuperscript{820} In 1992 the United Nations established its first operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM I’s duties were taken over by the US-led and UN-sanctioned United Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992. A second UN operation in Somalia (UNISOM II) took over from UNITAF in 1993.\textsuperscript{821} International troops left Somalia in 1995, having failed to achieve their mission.\textsuperscript{822} Following continued instability and a growing militant Islamist threat, the AU began a UN-sanctioned Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. AMISOM remains operational.\textsuperscript{823}

526. Dr Westcott said that there was now “a sort of diffused governance arrangement” in Somalia, which had reduced the conflict. However, al-Shabab was still active.\textsuperscript{824}

527. Dr Ero said it was “very resilient and agile”.\textsuperscript{825} It was “feeding off people’s grievances and the difficulty of providing law and order in large parts of the country.”\textsuperscript{826} The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group,
said that “abuses” by the Somali National Army had been “a big recruitment tool” for al-Shabab. Civilian deaths caused by AU peacekeepers in AMISOM had turned “many Somalis against” the AU mission.\cite{827}

528. Dr Tchie said regional tensions about access to natural resources contributed to instability in the Horn of Africa. Somalia had, to an extent, been drawn into competition in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and into “disagreements between Turkey, Qatar”, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.\cite{828} Dr Westcott said that Gulf countries were “paying different sides in Somalia”.\cite{829}

529. Dr Ero described 2020–21 as “critical” for Somalia. The country would hold its first general election since 1969.\cite{830}

530. The UK is the UN Security Council penholder for Somalia.\cite{831} Ms Mathews said the UK worked with UN Security Council partners to maintain “unanimity”, which Ms Mathews said the UK had been able to achieve. A Joint Somalia Unit had been established to co-ordinate the UK’s Somalia policy across Whitehall.\cite{832}

531. As the UN Security Council penholder for Somalia, the UK has a position of particular influence, supported by its provision of aid and active diplomacy in support of stability. The UK should continue to support preparations for Somalia’s first one-person-one-vote elections this year—although there is doubt as to whether these elections will now be held—and to engage with its international partners in support of AMISOM.

Nigeria

532. Dr Modupe Oshikoya, Department of Political Science, Virginia Wesleyan University, said that Nigeria’s size meant its “security and stability” were vital to other countries in the region. There were four security challenges facing Nigeria. First, Boko Haram\cite{833} (see Box 24) continued to “wreak havoc” in the north east of the country. Its use of “guerrilla tactics” had seen it attack institutions, target young women and girls, and forcibly conscript young boys and men.\cite{834}

\begin{itemize}
\item \cite{827} Written evidence from Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group (ZAF0045)
\item \cite{828} Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
\item \cite{829} Q 35
\item \cite{830} Q 81
\item \cite{832} Q 25 and Q 28
\item \cite{833} Dr Modupe Oshikoya said that Boko Haram refers to itself as “Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād [JAS], which in Arabic means ‘People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad’”: Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya (ZAF0056)
\item \cite{834} Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya (ZAF0056)
\end{itemize}
Box 24: Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a Sunni Islamist terrorist group principally active in north-east Nigeria. It was formed in 2002 to reject the secular aspects of Nigerian society, in particular Western education. Its first leader was Mohammed Yusuf.

Boko Haram carried out its first attack in 2003. Its violent activity increased significantly following a violent clash between Boko Haram militants and the Nigerian police in 2009. A subsequent uprising was quashed by Nigerian security forces and Yusuf was killed.

Under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram carried out attacks between 2010 and 2014, including targeting inauguration of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and the UN office in Abuja.

In 2014 Boko Haram came to greater international prominence following its kidnapping of 300 girls from a secular school in Chibok. While many of the girls have since been rescued, over 100 remain missing.

In 2015 Boko Haram declared its allegiance to the so-called Islamic State.

In 2015 the AU-endorsed Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), including troops from Chad, Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Benin, was deployed.

In 2019, together with the breakaway Islamic State in West Africa group, Boko Haram was responsible for 765 violent events in the Lake Chad Basin region (including Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon). This represented a 35% increase in the number of attacks from 2018. The combined fatalities—3,225 people—represented a 4% increase from 2018.


533. The Nigerian government and regional partners have had some “success in countering the insurgency” and “recapturing swathes of territory”. However, despite that, Boko Haram still posed “a security threat to Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region.”

534. Second, Dr Oshikoya discussed the “settler/herder conflict” in central Nigerian Plateau state. There were “land disputes” between ‘settled’ farming communities—considered to be indigenous—and “semi-nomadic … herdsmen”. Being classified as “indigenous to a state” gave the ‘settlers’ preferential treatment, including better land rights and access to employment and resources. The “scarcity” of land, the “depletion of arable land due to climate change” and spillover from the insurgency in the north east had “led to an increase in violent confrontations”. Dr Oshikoya described the Nigerian government’s response as “ineffective at best”, “fomenting violence and killing ordinary civilians”.

535. Dr Westcott said that “internal conflicts” were “seriously exacerbated by resource scarcity in the middle belt of Africa, with “herders … coming down from the Sahel” into northern Nigeria. These migrants—who had a focus on pastoral farming—were coming into conflict with a growing
number of arable farmers in Nigeria. The overspill from the Sahel had “not yet registered” as a “very serious cause of instability”.837

536. Third, Dr Oshikoya raised the issue of violence in the Niger Delta. The 1970s oil boom had “vastly increased the opportunities for corrupt personal wealth accumulation” by the government and had been “exploited by the Northern Hausa ruling political elite”. This had led to “discontent amongst the civilian population”, including “non-violent opposition to oil exploration” by the Ogoni ethnic group. Dr Oshikoya said the Nigerian government had “responded with a massive onslaught of violence”.838

537. Fourth, there was “piracy in the Gulf of Guinea”, which was “so prevalent” that it was “compromising the economic development of the region” and had become a “growing international security concern.”839

538. Several witnesses considered the role of identity issues in Nigerian conflicts. The Coalition for Genocide Response said that the settler/herder conflict was “presented as a clash over grazing land”, but had an “underlying” religious and ideological nature.840 Ms Mathews said there was a “strong religious dimension” to some of the insecurity,841 and the International Organisation for Peace and Social Justice said that north-east Nigeria was “increasingly uninhabitable for Christians”.842

539. On the other hand, Elizabeth Donnelly, Assistant Head of the Africa Programme, Chatham House, said Nigerian conflicts were “increasingly and reductively described in ethnic and religious terms”, when they were in fact “rooted in mismanagement of rural land and resources”, as well as “environmental degradation”.843

540. The UK and Nigeria signed a security and defence partnership in 2018. This was “largely focussed on equipment and training to combat Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa … in Nigeria’s North East” and also included provisions on policing, reducing piracy and organised crime and corruption. Ms Donnelly said that the UK should “ensure that through this defence partnership specific reforms in the security sector can be carried out to ensure better outcomes—and avoid treating consequences rather than causes”.844

541. The Minister said that the Prime Minister had “discussed UK support for fighting terrorism in Nigeria with President Buhari” at the UK-Africa Investment Summit in January 2020. The Government was “committed to upholding human rights for all” and condemned “the appalling abduction and continued captivity of Leah Sharibu and other Christian and Muslim school children by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa”. The UK had “offered assistance and expertise to help the Nigerian Government in their efforts to recover the missing girls”.845

837 Q 30
838 Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya (ZAF00056)
839 Written evidence from Dr Modupe Oshikoya (ZAF00056)
840 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response (ZAF0025)
841 Q 22. She also said “there are many other layers” to the conflict.
842 Written evidence from the International Organisation for Peace and Social Justice (PSJ UK) (ZAF0031)
843 Written evidence from Elizabeth Donnelly (ZAF0027)
844 Written evidence from Elizabeth Donnelly (ZAF0027)
845 Written evidence from James Duddridge MP (ZAF0057)
542. Nigeria faces multiple security challenges. The UK should explore how its security and defence partnership with Nigeria, agreed in 2018, can be utilised to best support stability in Nigeria and the wider region.

543. We welcome Minister’s condemnation of the abduction and continued captivity of Leah Sharibu and other Christian and Muslim school children by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa, and his assurance that the Government will continue to engage with the government of Nigeria to support urgent action to secure the release of all those abducted by insurgent groups in Nigeria.

**Cameroon**

544. Cameroon was raised as a country of particular concern by several witnesses. Tensions between the ruling Francophone elite and Anglophone regions are known as the Anglophone crisis.

545. The Coalition for Genocide Response said that the Anglophone crisis began in 2016, but was “grounded in long-standing and unresolved issues surrounding the political, economic, and social marginalisation of the Anglophone minority community”—approximately 20% of the country’s population. The crisis began after the decision of the Francophone-led government to introduce French-language procedures in the Anglophone region’s courts and schools.846

546. The crisis is outlined in Box 25.

**Box 25: The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon**

Following the First World War, the German colony of Kamerun was divided between the British and French. During the process of decolonisation in the 1950s and 60s, a federal Cameroon was formed. In 1972 the federal agreements were scrapped by the Francophone-dominated central government.

Anglophone Cameroonians have long argued they are economically, politically and linguistically marginalised. There have been calls for the independence of the two Anglophone regions, known as the North West and South West Regions.

In 2016, the appointment of French-educated judges to the courts of Anglophone Cameroon triggered a crisis. Lawyers and teachers launched a campaign of strikes and demonstrations. The authorities in Yaoundé responded with force.

On 1 October 2017, the anniversary of Anglophone Cameroon’s independence from the UK, separatists declared unilateral independence. Subsequent demonstrations were met with force by the Francophone-led government. It is estimated that 17 people were killed.

The re-election of President Paul Biya—who has been the president since 1982—in October 2018 was boycotted by many voters in Anglophone regions.

The International Crisis Group estimates that the conflict between the central government and Anglophone separatists has killed 3,000 people and seen a further 600,000 displaced. It estimates that 800,000 children are out of school.

One in three Anglophone Cameroonians are in need of aid.


846 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response (ZAF0025)
547. The crisis was particularly acute in the opening months of 2020. Dr Ero said there had been an “up-tick in atrocities”, with 24 people—“mainly women and children”—killed on 14 February. This was the “worst” atrocity since 2018.847

548. Cameroonian government forces have been accused of extrajudicial killings, “disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force”, torture, “forcible displacement”, and the use of “rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war”.848

549. The Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon said that the Anglophone crisis was particularly relevant to the UK, as the former colonial power, and the country on whose legal and education systems the Anglophone regions modelled themselves.849

550. It proposed international action to resolve the crisis. International pressure had pushed the Cameroon government to hold a “Major National Dialogue” in October 2019, but the resulting “special status” for the Anglophone regions had been dismissed by separatists and had “not been implemented by the government”. Proposed talks hosted by the Swiss Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue were “the best way forward”. It said the UK should encourage the government of Cameroon to participate.850

551. The Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon said that the government of Cameroon had “largely avoided international scrutiny due to its usefulness”: Cameroon was “fighting ... Boko Haram rebels” in the north of the country and hosted “350,000 refugees fleeing the violence in the Central African Republic and Nigeria”. It said that “when the international community ignores ... atrocities of the kind happening in Cameroon, it often ends up paying a massive bill.”851

552. Dr Tchie said that the AU’s Peace and Security Council852 had “remained silent on the conflict”.853 Professor Murithi described the AU in relation to Cameroon as “almost impotent”, arguing it was “neutralised” by the practice of “always” seeking “the permission of the Government of the day before intervening”.854

553. Lord Boateng said the Government’s “humanitarian and diplomatic response to the appalling human rights abuses” had “been hampered by an undue deference to the French interest.”855 Ms Mathews described cooperation with the French and the UN Security Council on the issue of Cameroon as “outstanding”.856

554. We are concerned by reports of a deteriorating security situation in Cameroon and of human rights abuses against the Anglophone community, in addition to the closure of schools for four years and the displacement of civilians by the conflict.

847 Q 75
848 Written evidence from the Coalition for Genocide Response (ZAF0023)
849 Written evidence from the camp for Peace and Justice in Cameroon (ZAF0028)
850 Written evidence from the Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon (ZAF0028)
851 Written evidence from the Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon (ZAF0028)
852 The standing decision-making organ of the AU for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts.
853 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
854 Q 59
855 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
856 Q 13
555. The UK should work within the international community, including regional and sub-regional bodies, to promote an approach which would ensure the restoration of the long-standing autonomous rights of Anglophone Cameroonians and the end of human rights abuses. Such an approach would need to enlist the backing of key stakeholders, including France.

Migration and conflict

556. The FCO said that conflict and humanitarian crises resulted in “flows of refugees and immigrants across borders”. This migration was primarily to neighbouring countries.857

557. Dr Jones said most migration was not caused by conflict, although security was a factor. Despite a “continent-wide decrease in intra-state and inter-state violence” since the 1990s, there had been a dramatic rise in African migration. Conflict-driven migrations were, however, “particularly unmanageable, particularly brutal in terms of human suffering, and particularly destabilising to the regional theatres in which they occur.”

558. Dr Jones said that where migration was caused by insecurity, it was often “temporary”. For example, Somalis in Kenya moved “in large numbers back and forth” across the border “as conditions of physical safety and labour demand” waxed and waned.

559. Conflict-driven migration could lead to attempts to move to Europe and North America. The key driver in this kind of migration was not changes in migrants’ “home” countries, but “worsening conditions” in countries of residence in the region. As a result, support for “hosting countries in Africa” was the “simplest, cheapest, and most effective way to decrease onward migration.”

560. Conflict-driven migration, often from countries already hosting migrants, has a particularly high human cost. The high number of refugees hosted in the region, often for long periods, pose significant challenges for development and stability. The Government should continue to explore how it can support Sub-Saharan African countries which host significant migrant communities.

Women, peace and security

561. Several witnesses said that the experience of insecurity and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa was gendered. Dr Georgina Holmes, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading, referred to the “landmark” UN Security Council Resolution 1325, adopted in

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857 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
858 Q 30 (Dr Nick Westcott)
860 Written evidence from Dr Will Jones (ZAF0055)
861 Written evidence from Dr Will Jones (ZAF0055)
2000, which acknowledged “that armed conflict” had “a differential and disproportionate impact on women”.863

562. Dr Peace A. Medie, Senior Lecturer in Gender and International Politics, University of Bristol, said that women “participated in armed conflict in a variety of ways”, while also being “key actors in combating conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.”864

563. First, women were victims of violence perpetrated in conflict. Second, women and girls participated in combat. Women were “combatants within non-state armed groups” in conflicts, including in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Some had leadership roles. Women and girls had also, for example, been “deployed … as suicide bombers” by Boko Haram865 (see Box 24).

564. Third, they played “support roles in conflict”, including “cooking, cleaning, farming, and serving as porters”.866 Fourth, while “in the minority and typically not occupying leadership positions”, women were represented in national armed forces as part of peacekeeping missions and in combat. Women represented 4.7% of military personal and 10.8% of police personnel in UN peacekeeping missions in 2019.867

565. The role of women in conflict differed across Sub-Saharan Africa. Witnesses cited “coercion”, “ideology”, “survival”,868 “economic security” and “political activism”869 among the factors contributing to women’s participation.

566. Dr Ero stressed the need to “see women not just as peacebuilders but as political agents”. Women might be “forced into militancy, through family pressure or other pressures”, or “have chosen to go into militancy because there is no other survival route for them” in countries “where the state is either absent or predatory.”870

567. Agencies such as the AU and UN needed to “grapple with” this issue. Initiatives to support women affected by conflict offered “very generic solutions” with “little bearing on the reality faced by some of these women who have been stigmatised by association with jihadi groups or insurgencies”. There had been an “excessive focus on so-called deradicalisation efforts”; these focused heavily on issues such as “religious ideology”.871

568. Dr Ero said women and girls were “fundamental” to efforts to “bring … crises to an end”.872 Dr Medie said that at “the sub-national, national, and international levels, women have advocated for and worked towards the prevention and resolution of conflicts”. This made women “key actors in combating conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.”873 Dr Holmes said women’s
“long history of political activism spanning colonial and postcolonial eras” underpinned their role.874

569. **Women and girls play multiple roles in conflicts across the region, including as victims, participants, and in governmental responses to insecurity.**

570. **Women and girls are central to the prevention and resolution of conflict. The Government should continue to champion their rights in its work on peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa.**

*Sexual violence in conflict*

571. The House of Lords Select Committee on Sexual Violence in Conflict published a report, *Sexual violence in conflict: a war crime*, in 2016.875 Dr Holmes said that while “battle age” men were “more likely to be killed”, women and children were “more vulnerable” to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). This was principally a result of “prevailing structural gender inequalities”. Such violence could be “strategic or opportunist” and was often both.876

572. Dr Medie said that violence, including sexual violence, was widespread in non-state armed groups.877

573. Dr Holmes said that women “across the African continent” had been “at the forefront of campaigning to prevent and end CRSV ... for over five decades.”878 They had “drawn attention to these issues and placed them on the agenda” of the UN and the AU, and “developed instruments that urge state and non-state actors to address gender-based violence and other problems that confront women and girls in conflict-affected countries.” The UN’s ‘Women, Peace and Security’ (WPS) agenda had “been a major development”.879

574. Dr Holmes said there had been “continued strengthening of the UN’s normative framework” on women, peace and security. However, divisions within the Security Council threatened to undermine the agenda; for example, the US opposed the inclusion of “important language on provisions on sexual and reproductive health rights of survivors” of sexual violence in conflict as part of UNSCR 2467 in 2019.880

575. Dr Medie said that “more research” was needed to assess the impact of international efforts to combat sexual violence in conflict, but there were “indications that some of these measures have led to changes in conflict-affected countries.”881

576. Dr Holmes said the UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI) had been a “high-profile, cross-governmental initiative” established in 2012 and given greater prominence in 2014 under the leadership of the
then Foreign Secretary, now Lord Hague of Richmond. Dr Medie said the PSVI had “contributed to advancing the UN’s WPS agenda”.

577. In January 2020 the Independent Commission for Aid Impact published its report on The UK’s Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative. It reported waning “political leadership”, falling levels of funding, and the absence of a “theory of change” or “overarching strategy”.

578. Dr Holmes said the UK’s programming was “fragmented”. It was “not fully aligned to the African Union’s own WPS agenda”, which was “working towards … a cross-continental approach to the eradication of structural gendered inequalities and all forms of discrimination” and “emphasising the critical role of African women as agents of change.”

579. Witnesses made four recommendations to enhance work to prevent sexual violence in conflict. First, Dr Medie said there should be investment in “programs that have the potential to generate long-term impact” over “temporary initiatives”.

580. Second, work was needed to “address … global political and economic factors”—“macroeconomic policies, global capital accumulation, and trade liberalisation”—that “contribute to the perpetration of sexual violence and negatively impact the experiences of survivors.”

581. Third, countries should “invest time and resources in conflict prevention”, to “address underlying issues … that render women and men insecure.” Finally, Dr Ero said “we should not lay the burden of finding the solution at the doors of women only”.

582. The UK has been a leader in international efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict. This work has, however, suffered from a lack of senior political leadership in recent years. The Government should review its work in this area and consider carefully the issues raised in the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s recent report.

The African Union and the United Nations

583. The UN and the AU have a number of active peacekeeping missions in Sub-Saharan Africa. We consider here the role of these organisations in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in the region.

Peacekeeping

584. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Dr Ero said it was crucial to “appreciate … that the nature of conflict” had “changed tremendously”—becoming more regionalised—which was a challenge for traditional peacekeeping missions focused on single states.
585. Figure 6 shows AU, REC and UN peacekeeping operations.

**Figure 6: AU, REC and UN peacekeeping operations**

- **Burundi**: AU human rights observers and military experts in Burundi
- **Central African Republic (CAR)**: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR (MINUSCA)
- **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**: UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)
- **The Gambia**: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Military Intervention in the Gambia (ECOMIG)
- **Guinea-Bissau**: ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau
- **Mali**: UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
- **Somalia**: AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
- **Sudan/Darfur**: UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
- **Abyei**: UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
- **South Sudan**: UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)
- **AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army**
- **Western Sahara**: UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)

UN Peacekeeping

586. General Sir Richard Barrons said the UN had “a very well-structured peacekeeping operation”, with half of its “live operations” in Africa. While it was “used to running large-scale enduring peacekeeping operations” the UN’s mandates tended to be narrow “because it is driven by consensus.”

587. Dr Ero recognised the “limits of the UN”. It was “questionable how much difference the UN” had “made in some crises”, with Mali being one example.

AU peacekeeping and conflict management

588. The AU leads a mission in Somalia (AMISON, discussed above and in Box 23) and has a hybrid mission in Darfur with the UN (UNAMID). AMISOM is the largest peacekeeping mission in the world.

589. Dr Ero said that not all AU member states “necessarily” saw the AU as “the go-to institution” in a crisis. Often the RECs were seen “as the first point of contact”. The relationship between the AU and the RECs was “not always seamless”, as discussed in Chapter 3. Dr Westcott said that the RECs remained “in some ways more influential on security issues”.

590. The AU’s influence was dependent on “unity of purpose” amongst its members. Dr Westcott said when that was the case, such as with Somalia, the AU’s role was “critical”. Where the AU was divided, particularly countries neighbouring a conflict, the AU’s influence was limited. This was the case with Burundi and South Sudan.

591. Professor Murithi said that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) had “led the process leading to a peace agreement” in South Sudan in 2011. When there had been a “breakout of violence” in 2013 and 2015, the AU “struggled to relate” to IGAD and was not influential.

592. Progress has been made on relations between the AU and the RECs. There had been “much better movement” recently, in particular with a 2019 decision to arrange an AU “co-ordination and implementation summit … working directly with the” RECs.

593. The AU’s underlying principles and doctrines affect its role in peacekeeping and conflict management. First, Professor Murithi said that the founding Constitutive Act of the AU empowered the AU “to intervene when it perceives a crisis”. This had led to a plan to develop a “robust African Standby Force … made up of five continental brigades”. The Force was originally “due to be launched in 2010”, was subsequently delayed to 2015 and had now “pretty much fizzled out”.

891 Q 97
892 Q 78
893 Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
894 Q 78
895 Q 32
896 Q 32. Dr Ero said that the AU had achieved unity and played an important role in Somalia, where the AU led the peacekeeping mission. Q 78. Professor Murithi said the AU had, however, “not been effective in consolidating peace, securing a platform for stability … or national reconciliation”. Q 59
897 Q 58
898 Q 58
899 Q 59
594. Second, there is the AU’s ‘Silencing the Guns’ policy, agreed in 2013, which declared its:

“determination to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa, to make peace a reality for all our people and to rid the continent of wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters and violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide.”

595. Dr Ero said that the “idea of ‘Silencing the Guns’ by 2020 was never a realistic proposition”. By giving “itself just seven years in which to end wars … and prevent genocide” the AU “set a high bar”. The agenda was “one of those grand gestures” that contributed to “perceptions that the African Union does not achieve its goals.”

The AU–UN relationship on peace and security

596. Dr Ero said the organisations relied on each other. The UN derived “its political legitimacy on the continent from the African Union most of the time”. Similarly, the “AU depends on the UN”, with it being “hard to ignore the fact that” the AU “needs the UN and the financing that comes from it”.

597. Dr Ero said that there had been some recent “improvements” in the “still … awkward” relationship. She praised the relationships between the AU Chairperson and the UN Secretary General, and between the UN’s Chief of Peace Operations and the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security. Despite this, Dr Ero said there remained a perception, “real or perceived, that the UN still treats the AU like the … junior partner, despite the amount of heavy lifting [the AU] does and the great sacrifice that a lot of African troops contribute to … matters of international peace and security”.

Burden-sharing

598. Burden-sharing, both between the AU and its non-African partners, and between the AU and the UN, was discussed by several witnesses. Dr Ero said Africans and the AU were asked “to fill the gaps … where the UN is reluctant to go” and that it was “paying a heavy price” for this. For example, “one of the most dangerous peacekeeping missions on the continent today is Mali, a mission that is predominantly filled by African troop-contributing countries”.

599. General Sir Richard Barrons said that “many of the major troop contributors to the UN”—both African and non-African countries—had “made it pretty clear” they would not continue to support a situation in which they provide the “soldiers on the ground who are doing the doing and the dying while” other countries “provide the commanders and staff officers”.


901 Q 76
902 Q 78
903 Q 78
904 Q 78
905 Q 97
600. Equipment was also an issue in terms of burden-sharing. General Sir Richard Barrons said while there was “no shortage of ... young men and women who want to be soldiers and are good at it” in Sub-Saharan Africa, their governments often “cannot afford to equip [their] own armed forces”.\footnote{Q 98} (The UK’s support for Sub-Saharan African militaries is considered later in this chapter.)

601. Professor Murithi raised the issue of resourcing in the context of the AU. The AU’s partners should emphasise “increased ... capacity that is homegrown and located on the continent”, which would be a “win for everyone”—for example, NATO would not be required “to airlift on the hoof” and the Russians wouldn’t need to “come in with their Antonovs and lift troops” across the continent.\footnote{Q 60}

602. An issue of contention in the AU–UN relationship is financing. General Sir Richard Barrons said AU peacekeeping was “substantially cheaper than a UN solution.”\footnote{Q 95} Dr Ero referred to negotiations between the UN and the AU for the latter to pay 25% of the cost of Security Council-authorised missions and the UN to pay the remainder with assessed contributions. She said concern that the AU could not afford this was “central” to the dispute.\footnote{Q 78}

603. The Government supported “in principle” the “AU’s efforts to secure UN assessed funds for AU-led peacekeeping and enforcement operations”.\footnote{Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)} The All-Party Parliamentary Group for Africa urged the Government to continue this support.\footnote{Written evidence from the APPG for Africa (ZAF0007)}

604. We welcome the Government’s support of the use of UN-assessed contributions to fund AU-led peacekeeping missions. We would welcome more information on how the Government plans to use the 2019 UK-AU Memorandum of Understanding to support further security co-operation.

Limits of peacekeeping

605. Some witnesses questioned the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Dr Ero said the UN and the AU needed to “assess their own performance” in the context of missions that had not produced meaningful progress.\footnote{Q 78}

606. What the UN was good at, according to General Sir Richard Barrons, was “not making [a] problem worse”, but not necessarily “making the problem any better”.\footnote{Q 96} If there was “a peace to keep, having an awful lot of quite basically trained soldiers doing interposition between armed forces” would “work”, but it could “freeze the conflict for a generation”.\footnote{Q 97}

607. The “reluctance to see UN forces [in Africa] that are not African” was “good” and “bad”. On the one hand, it meant that “soldiers on the ground” had “a better sense of what is going on”. On the other, it resulted in “many African countries” sustaining their “armed forces on the back of” the UN...
paying “them to do peacekeeping”. This meant that some armed forces in the region did “not have a huge interest in [peacekeeping] finishing”.  

608. Search for Common Ground said there was “over-reliance on … militarised actions”. Peacekeeping missions had “undoubtedly contributed to the protection of civilians and the improvement of fragile situations”, but it was “impossible to look at ongoing violence” in some countries with peacekeeping missions and “believe that the situation is … the future envisioned twenty years ago”. There was “a need to move away from reactive responses to conflict and move towards long-term prevention-focused efforts.”

609. Dr Tchie said that African and international responses to the security challenges facing parts of Sub-Saharan Africa were “hampered by a prevailing focus [on] ongoing criminality, violence, conflicts and terrorism rather than on their prevention”. Dr Ero said the need to focus more on prevention had been recognised by the AU. The Chairperson of the AU, Cyril Ramaphosa, President of South Africa, had used the 2020 AU Summit to propose an “extraordinary meeting to focus on conflict prevention.”

The UK and Sub-Saharan African security

610. General Sir Richard Barrons said there were “many Anglophone countries in Africa that” looked “to the UK as a source of guidance, wisdom, inspiration and money”, and as a “military reference point”. The UK’s response to the “warmth” shown by African militaries had been “threadbare”. However, there were a number of issues with the UK’s approach. First, the UK “never bought [Sub-Saharan African militaries] any equipment”. Second, the UK had failed to “build institutions”. The UK had focused on “low-level training” and not supporting ministries of defence or military staff capability.

611. He praised the UK’s work to “impart … a really high standard of basic infantry skill”. However, there were a number of issues with the UK’s approach. First, the UK “never bought [Sub-Saharan African militaries] any equipment”. Second, the UK had failed to “build institutions”. The UK had focused on “low-level training” and not supporting ministries of defence or military staff capability.

612. Third, the UK was not willing to “accompany” partner militaries in battle. The UK was good at training, advising and assisting, but “entirely political reasons” meant British troops “waved” off their partners “at the camp gate”. This was not always the case in non-African theatres: the UK had managed to accompany partner troops successfully in Afghanistan.

613. Fourth, the Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, said that it was unclear how the Government built feedback from its Sub-Saharan African partners into planning and strategy making in Whitehall. It was concerned that the UK was presenting “‘ready made’ plans” for military training, not taking account of the local situation.

614. Witnesses said that there were risks associated with training state militaries in the region. The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, said that since 2007 “23% of violent incidents against civilians recorded were perpetrated by state forces”. The appropriate response was not always

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\[915\] Q 97
\[916\] Written evidence from Search for Common Ground (ZAF0009)
\[917\] Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAP0032)
\[918\] Q 76
\[919\] Q 98
\[920\] Q 98
\[921\] Q 98
\[922\] Written evidence Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group (ZAF0045)
to train national security forces, as this could serve to build “the capacity of predatory armed forces”.  

615. Dr Tchie said the training of state forces risked exacerbating internal tensions, including between ethnic groups. Once trained, groups “associated with the centre of power” often went on to inflict “large amounts of indiscriminate violence against civilians”. The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, said it was vital that the UK built on “its ability to recognise when local governments and state forces” were the “drivers of instability and violence”.

616. General Sir Richard Barrons said that, unless the UK spent its resources “very differently”, it was beyond the Government’s ability to tackle security challenges alone. France (discussed earlier in this chapter) was a particularly important partner. The United States, on the other hand, had a “light … security footprint” in Africa, focused on counter-terrorism; this was by design. The grounds for UK–US co-operation were “limited” and the US could not be expected to “carry all the water”. 

617. The UK’s contribution to African and international peacekeeping was considered by several witnesses. Ms Mathews said the UK sought to “build up African capability”, including “training and improving peacekeeping capability”. Dr Ero said the UK deserved “a lot of credit” for its “renewed engagement” in UN peacekeeping. In particular, the UN Secretariat spoke “highly” of the UK’s “role as a partner in Mali”.

618. Dr Ero said there were “tremendous opportunities” for the UK in conflict prevention and resolution, citing South Sudan and Somalia. The UK should use its “considerable influence … on the UN’s development agenda and on the World Bank … in terms of how money is deployed to serve conflict-related issues and making sure that the money is wisely deployed to appropriate places to shape conflicts.” Ms Mathews said the Government was “going right back to the beginning on the causes” of conflict, “through to mediation and early intervention.”

619. The UK and its international partners have too often focused on addressing the immediate consequences of conflict, to the detriment of efforts to tackle the underlying conditions that allow conflict to emerge. The Government should, in its Integrated Review, consider how the UK can best use its resources and influence to develop longer-term strategies to prevent conflict, and above all to prevent genocide, and support regional partners.

923 Written evidence Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group (ZAF0045)
924 Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)
925 Written evidence Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group (ZAF0045) In considering UN peacekeeping missions, the International Relations Committee’s report, The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General, noted the importance of pre-deployment training in improving missions and acting as a preventative measure against misconduct. Select Committee on International Relations, The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General (1st Report, Session 2016–17, HL Paper 60)
926 Q 95
927 Written evidence from General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE (ZAF0030)
928 Q 100
929 Q 22
930 Q 81
931 Q 81
932 Q 22
620. As part of efforts to support regional partners to take the lead in conflict prevention, management and resolution, the Government should review its approach to military training. It should consider whether the British Army should accompany the militaries it is training on some missions. The Government must be mindful that militaries in the region themselves sometimes contribute to instability and human rights abuses.

621. We reiterate the conclusion of the 2016 report of the International Relations Committee, *The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General*, on the “critical” importance of pre-deployment training to improve operations and “act as a preventative measure against misconduct”. This is relevant to training for the UK’s partners in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the context of UN missions.

622. The Government should consider ways to better engage local Sub-Saharan African partners, including civil society groups, in its conflict prevention work.

*Whitehall coordination*

623. The FCO said that it worked closely with DfID, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Home Office on conflict and stability issues in Sub-Saharan Africa.\(^933\) The Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group, thought there had been “real improvements” since the 1990s: the National Security Council was playing a valuable role and the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (see Box 26) had improved in-country co-ordination.\(^934\)

**Box 26: The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund**

| The Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) is “a cross government fund which supports and delivers activity to tackle instability and to prevent conflicts that threaten UK interests.” |
| It was launched in 2015 and has an annual budget of £1.26 billion. This budget is split between ODA and other funds. It is used by 12 Government departments and operates in 70 countries. |
| It is accountable to the National Security Council through the Cabinet Office. |


624. However, “enduring challenges” continued to “hinder” co-ordination between MoD and the FCO.\(^935\) Lord Boateng said that “closer co-operation across government departments” had “not happened”.\(^936\)

*Development assistance and security*

625. Witnesses considered the rules on ODA spending agreed by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (see Chapter 5).

626. General Sir Richard Barrons said the MoD had “no money but ... many challenges”. On the other hand, while DfID had “a lot of money”, it could

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\(^933\) Written evidence from the FCO (ZAF0003)
\(^934\) Written evidence from the Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group (ZAF0045)
\(^935\) Written evidence from the Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group (ZAF0045)
\(^936\) Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
not, “by law”, spend it on defence-related issues. This was a matter of “grave disappointment” to the UK’s African counterparts; British troops turned up “well-equipped and well-fed” and gave them “very little—almost nothing in some cases.” Ms Edmondson said there was “a lot” the Government could “do within DAC rules to support peacekeeping and good practice”, but there were “limits”.

627. Baroness Amos was not opposed to “a review of the DAC rules”, but said it was important such a review took place for the right reasons. She was “against” other departments trying to “grab a bit” of the UK’s 0.7% commitment. Part of the “strength” of the UK’s “development agenda” had been that the UK was “very clear” about what its resources were spent on. She would be “loath” to “see ODA money being used on military resolution to conflict.”

628. Lord Boateng said the Government had “consistently underfunded” and “paid too little regard” to the UK’s “military diplomatic effort in underpinning peace keeping and stability” in Sub-Saharan Africa. He said MoD and FCO budget cuts, and the failure to share “resources” in a way that could be legitimate under current rules, had weakened the UK’s efforts.

629. In February 2019, DfID responded to a Henry Jackson Society report, *Global Britain: a twenty-first century vision*, which called for the UK to gain “the freedom to define aid as it sees fit” and allow “more spending to be channelled through” the FCO and the MoD. The Government said “international rules set by” the DAC “ensure aid spending is genuinely focused on poverty reduction in developing countries.” There were areas where it considered the rules “outdated” and in which it had “led the way in pushing for reforms.” It gave the example of the UK having “secured an increase in the proportion of aid spending which can be contributed to peacekeeping missions.”

630. **Revisions to the Development Assistance Committee’s rules on ODA to help support peacekeeping efforts have been helpful. There could be value in further revisions to support work on addressing the underlying causes of insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the Government should be careful in proposing further changes to ensure that the function of ODA remains supporting poverty reduction in developing countries.**

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937 Q 99
938 Q 23
939 Q 46
940 Q 43
941 Written evidence from Lord Boateng (ZAF0044)
631. In this chapter we consider human rights, democracy and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the relationship between them.

**Human rights**

632. Human Rights Watch (HRW) said there had been some human rights successes in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, but these had happened “progressively and slowly”. They included: the 2016 conviction by the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese court system of former Chadian President Hissene Habré for torture; the 2019 conviction by the International Criminal Court of former Congolese warlord Bosco Ntaganda; the adoption of more progressive human rights legislation in several countries; and The Gambia’s leading role in bringing a case against Myanmar to the International Court of Justice.  

633. It said the “drivers” of poverty and inequality in the region needed to be considered in the context of human rights. These included: “corruption and mismanagement … the increased privatisation of public services, weak regulation of natural resource exploration … [and] environmental and climate … vulnerability.”

634. Dr Medie said “high levels of poverty” amongst women, “partly caused by conflict”, made “it difficult” for many women “to access basic needs, including food, shelter, and healthcare.” Such issues could not be “divorced from the social norms that support gender inequalities in most societies”.  

635. The AU’s Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the Maputo Protocol) came into effect in 2005. It “commits member states to adopt legislation on gender equality, including in the security sector”. HRW described the Protocol as a “progressive legal instrument” which had “pushed the frontiers of human rights”, in part for its “recognition” of the right of women and girls to “access safe abortion under specific conditions”. However, Dr Holmes said that, as of 2019, only 40 of 55 AU member states had signed the Protocol and fewer than 20 had ratified it.

636. Witnesses considered human rights issues relating to women and the LGBTQ+ community. Dr Holmes said African women had “been the driving force in developing … initiatives to end structural gender inequalities and empower women.” Dr Johnstone said African perspectives on LGBTQ+ rights “were complex” but not “static”. Thanks to “the hard work...
and determination of local advocacy groups”, “societal attitudes and legal precedents” were changing.\textsuperscript{952}

**Governance and accountability**

637. The Royal African Society said more countries in the region were “evolving stable, pluralist and accountable political systems.”\textsuperscript{953} Dr McSweeney said that in the last two decades public pressure had encouraged several African countries to move from authoritarian regimes to democracies.\textsuperscript{954}

638. Dr Tchie, however, saw “a lack of democratisation coupled with weak state capacity”, which had aggravated other challenges, including the insecurity discussed in Chapter 6. There was “over reliance” by international actors on “elections as the ultimate solution to transition countries to democracy”. Too much focus on relatively quick elections neglected the “weak” states that existed in conflict-affected countries. A push for elections could “further erode weak institutions” and make “states prone to democratic regression.”\textsuperscript{955}

639. HRW said “the rule of law and respect for human rights” were “important pillars of democracy”, and “weak institutional frameworks for protecting” both meant that democracy rested on “shaky foundations in many African countries”.\textsuperscript{956} The OSF said the “civic space” in Sub-Saharan Africa had “been shrinking for the last 15 years”, which was “fuelling democratic backsliding.”\textsuperscript{957}

640. Andrew Mitchell MP said “humility” was needed: “the Westminster system of government” was not “necessarily the answer to all problems everywhere in the world”. Multiparty democracy was not a “panacea”.\textsuperscript{958}

**Corruption**

641. Search for Common Ground said there were “deep issues of corruption” in Sub-Saharan Africa\textsuperscript{959} (discussed in relation to the business environment in Chapter 4). Dr McSweeney said “endemic corruption” was a “violation of human rights”,\textsuperscript{960} and Dr Vines and Mr Dewar said “entrenched governance challenges and endemic corruption” undermined progress.\textsuperscript{961}

642. The OSF cited “state capture’ by local and global corporate elites” as one of the most significant threats facing the continent. Some African political elites were both “the perpetrators of grand corruption” and the people “expected to support anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions.” Corruption and state capture were “fuelling grievance and the militarisation of politics”, which in turn was “opening the door to renewed authoritarianism in Africa.”\textsuperscript{962}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{952} Written evidence from Dr Lyn Johnstone (ZAF0041)  
\textsuperscript{953} Written evidence from the Royal African Society (ZAF0002)  
\textsuperscript{954} Written evidence from Dr Terence McSweeney (ZAF0013)  
\textsuperscript{955} Written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032)  
\textsuperscript{956} Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (ZAF0050)  
\textsuperscript{957} Written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048)  
\textsuperscript{958} Q 5  
\textsuperscript{959} Written evidence from Search for Common Ground (ZAF0009)  
\textsuperscript{960} Written evidence from Dr Terence McSweeney (ZAF0013)  
\textsuperscript{961} Written evidence from Dr Alex Vines OBE and Bob Dewar CMG (ZAF0027)  
\textsuperscript{962} Written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048). Also see written evidence from Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie (ZAF0032) and written evidence from the Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group (ZAF0045).}
Accountability

643. Dr Westcott said that encouraging “transparency and accountability” in Sub-Saharan African governments should be a priority for the UK. It was better to use the word “accountability” than “democracy”, as “effective accountability … can come in a lot of different ways”. Andrew Mitchell MP said he believed “accountability” was “more important than democracy” in the region.  

644. The OSF said there had been a “worrying regression in electoral integrity and accountability processes” in the region. An “unaccountable state” was “unable to: guarantee human security; curb abuses of power; capably make and implement laws and policies that generate economic growth and advance livelihoods and incomes; or assure the effective and efficient management of public resources.”

645. Dr Westcott said that African governments had “five to 10 years … in which to ensure that there is an accountable system of government and rapid economic growth”. If this did not happen, he thought there would be an “‘African Spring’ with fairly revolutionary change because the young people just will not wait.”

Rwanda

646. Freedom Now said that Rwanda had “undergone a miraculous transformation in the past quarter century”. “Much of the credit” was “due foreign aid administered and managed under President Paul Kagame”. The “extent to which President Kagame” had “built an authoritarian cult of personality” and was “eliminating dissent and committing grave human rights abuses” often went “unnoticed.”

647. Dr Westcott referred to this as a “dilemma”. President Kagame was an “autocrat” and there were “questions” regarding the country’s human rights record. On the other hand, the Rwandan government was “non-corrupt”, “spending aid money well” and “reducing poverty.”

648. Andrew Mitchell MP said “the first human right” was the right to “to life, to safety, and to be able to live in your community and not to be in fear of what may happen to you and your family”. He said President Kagame had provided this to the people of Rwanda.

963 Q 29  
964 Q 5  
965 Written evidence from the OSF (ZAF0048)  
966 Q 31  
967 Written evidence from Freedom Now (ZAF0008)  
968 Written evidence from Freedom Now (ZAF0008)  
969 Q 31  
970 Q 5
Justice and the International Criminal Court

Box 27: The International Criminal Court and Africa

The International Criminal Court was established in 2002. It is based in The Hague. It has some similarities to national judicial institutions, and to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and ‘mixed-model tribunals’ in countries such as Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor and Lebanon.971

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)—the “investigative and prosecutorial engine of the ICC—has been criticised for being “preoccupied … with Africa”.972

There are 13 ‘situations’ under investigation by the OTP, of which ten are in Africa. The 10 African situations are in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Sudan (Darfur), Kenya, Libya, Ivory Coast, Mali, Burundi and two in the Central African Republic. The three non-African situations are in Georgia, Bangladesh/Myanmar and Afghanistan.973 The OTP has decided either not to open investigations into other situations reported to it (including in Iraq, Venezuela, Palestine and Colombia) or to keep them under preliminary examination.974

649. Professor Murithi said there had been “a spate of confrontations” between the AU and the International Criminal Court (see Box 27). The decision in February 2020 by the new Sudanese government to agree to send former President Omar al-Bashir for trial at the ICC was “very welcome”. However, despite Sudan’s recent referral, the AU still had a “policy of non-cooperation with the ICC”.975

650. Professor Murithi said that a “balance between the restorative processes within countries” and “formal criminal justice processes”, including the ICC, was required to move “forward.”976

651. The AU had adopted a Transitional Justice Policy in 2019, the culmination of “a lot of hard work by a number of civil society organisations”.977 It had four dimensions:

(1) An appreciation of the need to recover “the truth about what happened”;
(2) A process of justice, “including punitive, criminal justice and restorative justice”;
(3) Processes of “reparation and restitution”; and
(4) The “institutional reform of constitutional and judicial systems” and other key sectors.978

972 Ibid.
974 ICC Forum, ‘Is the International Criminal Court (ICC) targeting Africa inappropriately’
975 Q 60
976 Q 60
977 Q 60
Without transitional justice, “many African countries” would not be able to move forward. Over the next five to 15 years, the “core business of the African Union” would be enabling countries that had “emerged from crisis and conflict to put in place processes, mechanisms and institutions to address historical grievances and injustices”.  

We recognise that some African countries have had a difficult relationship with the International Criminal Court. We believe that the court remains an important part of the rules-based international order. In this context, we welcome the agreement of the new Sudanese government to cooperate with the court regarding former President Omar al-Bashir.

The role of the UK and non-African partners

The OSF criticised the “self-interested policies and practices of external actors” which had helped to erode “the agency and voice of African citizens”. 

Dr Westcott said the UK had a role to play in helping to “build … transparent institutions of accountability”. Its influence was strengthened by “its strong tradition of a free press, free speech, democratic institutions and visible and effective accountability.”

HRW said that “despite its significant influence on the governments of former British colonies”, the UK focused “more public engagement on the promotion of trade and culture rather than human rights values”. The Government preferred “private diplomacy” to “co-opt rather than coerce abusive regimes”. The APPG for Africa said there was “some concern” the Government might choose to “prioritise working with African governments and new security partners over human rights”.

Ms Mathews did not “think that human rights, prosperity and business” were “mutually exclusive” or that “chasing deals” was “crowding out” human rights. While there was not a ‘shift’ on human rights as part of the Government’s ‘strategic approach’ to Africa (see Chapter 2), human rights were “a key part” of the Government’s work.

Dr Westcott said that encouraging “the development of good human rights and good governance in Africa” was “tricky”; countries hated “being lectured”. There was a “high risk” of advocacy being “counterproductive” if it was seen to be “hectoring”. Ms Mathews said sometimes there was a need for “megaphone diplomacy” on these issues, but not always.

Witnesses discussed the partners the UK could work with in this area. First, Dr Westcott said the UK needed to work with “European partners”—most
of which had a similar approach to the UK—and the US—which was less aligned “at the moment”.

660. Second, there could be engagement with civil society. HRW said the UK should “provide direct support to African human rights institutions, including through training, systems support and speaking out through bilateral channels to support their independence.” The OSF said the UK “must demonstrate political will by … listening to the continent’s citizens” and civil society organisations. Christian Aid said there had been a decrease in UK funding for local civil society organisations in the region.

661. A third avenue was the Commonwealth (see Chapter 3). Dr Johnstone said that there were limits. During the 2011 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Perth, Australia, then Prime Minister, David Cameron “provoked ire when he suggested” that the UK’s official development assistance “should be linked to respect for LGBTQ+ rights in recipient countries”. His statement had “evoked homophonic responses from political and religious leaders” from Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda.

662. The Government must continue to afford significant importance to human rights in its relationships in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time as the UK pursues new economic opportunities and seeks to tackle security challenges, human rights remain critical.

663. The Government should consider support for accountability, human rights, the rule of law and anti-corruption as a package that helps build the necessary conditions for democracy to function in Sub-Saharan Africa. Organisations such as the British Council, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and UK-based NGOs and charities make an important contribution to this agenda.

664. The Government should seek to use its participation in the next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kigali to promote freedom of religion and belief, LGBTQ+ rights and issues relating to the human rights of women and girls.

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989 Q 29
990 Written evidence from Human Rights Watch (ZAF0050)
991 Written evidence the OSF (ZAF0048)
992 Written evidence from Christian Aid (ZAF0038)
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The UK’s Africa strategy

1. The evidence we received demonstrates why the international community in general, and the UK, a country with world-wide interests and responsibilities, in particular, should take a greater interest in Africa, and recognise its political and economic importance. (Paragraph 33)

2. Africa is of strategic and geopolitical significance to the UK. It is a region where the UK really can make a difference. To do so, the UK’s future relationship with the countries of Africa and their regional institutions needs to be based, as has not always been the case in the past, on a genuine partnership. Within such a framework there are important trade and investment opportunities. (Paragraph 34)

3. It is already clear that the impact on Africa of COVID-19, both in health and economic terms, will be very damaging. This adds urgency and scale to the collective responses to the challenges we have identified. We consider that it is in the UK’s national interest to work with, and to help, African states to respond to these challenges and to do so more effectively than it has done in the past. (Paragraph 35)

4. Successive governments have said that Africa should be given a higher priority across Whitehall, but have failed to make this a reality in the face of competing demands. (Paragraph 36)

5. For over two decades there has been too high a turnover in the role of Minister for Africa. In order to build and maintain relationships in the region, greater continuity is needed. (Paragraph 37)

6. The UK has considerable soft power assets, which could be used to better effect in Africa. We regret that the Government’s global soft power strategy was not published. We invite the Government to explain how it is seeking to build on and support the UK’s soft power in Africa. Any action plan for Africa, such as we call for in paragraph 84, will need to ensure that the UK’s soft power assets, in particular those of the British Council and the BBC World Service, are sufficiently resourced. (Paragraph 50)

7. The UK’s visa policies are damaging its reputation and the ability of international departments to build and strengthen relationships across Africa, and in some cases fall below the standards of basic human decency. One witness described the process as “arbitrary, expensive, time-consuming and ... humiliating”. The Home Office should, as a matter of urgency, review how the UK’s approach to the issuing of visas for people from the continent is working. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department for International Trade should participate in this review, to ensure that diplomatic and trade and investment priorities are reflected in how the system operates. (Paragraph 51)

8. The UK’s domestic policies affect how it is perceived in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Windrush scandal and the ‘hostile environment’ have damaged the UK’s reputation. (Paragraph 52)

9. The UK’s historic engagement with Africa has had a lasting impact on its relationships in the region. This has positive elements, such as the widespread use of English and common-law systems in former colonies, and
more negative aspects, including ongoing tensions over the history of how it colonised many countries in Africa, and in some countries its role in the slave trade. The Government should recognise, be open about and address the challenges that this history brings to its relationships. (Paragraph 53)

10. The Black Lives Matters protests have brought to greater attention the ongoing problem of racism in the UK, and the importance of appropriately addressing both the treatment of black people in the UK and the UK’s historical legacy. (Paragraph 54)

11. In order to develop a better understanding of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Government should seek to foster knowledge of the UK’s historic relationship with the region among UK citizens. (Paragraph 55)

12. We are disappointed to conclude that the Government’s new ‘strategic approach’ to Africa falls short. It is not a strategy, but rather some broad ideas and themes, and there is little clarity on how the Government plans to put it into action. (Paragraph 82)

13. Communication of the new ‘strategic approach’ to Africa has been confused and confusing. Since it was first mentioned in July 2018, when Theresa May MP was the Prime Minister, it has been necessary to piece together the ‘approach’ from different speeches and documents. Moreover, the language it has used to describe its approach has been imprecise—referring to a “strategy” and then a “strategic approach”—and has relied on jargon—referring to “shifts” and “enablers”. (Paragraph 83)

14. The Government should publish a clearly articulated list of its priorities for its engagement with Africa, and an action plan for meeting them, including ministerial and departmental responsibilities. This should include how it intends to better engage with African governments and institutions, and the role to be played by more high-profile initiatives such as visits and summits. The action plan could be used to measure the Government’s success and could be periodically updated as circumstances change. (Paragraph 84)

15. The context of the UK’s departure from the European Union, and the Integrated Review of foreign policy, defence, security and international development, present a timely opportunity for a renewal of the UK’s engagement in Africa. This should build on the initiative launched by the former Prime Minister and the welcome ‘uplift’ of staff in the region (Paragraph 85)

16. We recognise that the Government’s target to become the top G7 investor in Africa by 2022 may have been overly ambitious; it was unlikely that it could have been achieved. Nonetheless, we regret the Government’s decision to drop a formal target for investment in Africa, in favour of an ambition of being the “partner of choice”. This new ambition cannot be measured or quantified, and could be seen as signalling the downgrading of Africa as a Government priority. (Paragraph 86)

17. France and the UK have common interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the Sahel in particular. It is time to draw a line under traditional rivalries. The Government should continue to work closely with France on issues of common interest. (Paragraph 116)

18. The UK and the EU are likely to remain largely aligned on policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. The UK’s departure from the EU means that new
methods of co-operation will need to be built up with the objective of engaging with the EU member states and institutions on issues of common interest. (Paragraph 117)

19. The current US Administration is regrettably less engaged on Africa than its predecessors. Should this change, the UK should seek to re-engage with its principal ally on policy towards Africa. (Paragraph 118)

20. The UK and China’s interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are not always aligned, but there are areas where their interests overlap. The Government should continue to engage with China on issues of mutual interest, such as stability in the region. Many African governments regard China as an important partner and source of investment, and the UK should seek to work constructively with China where appropriate, especially through multilateral institutions, on issues such as debt, health, climate change and trade, while defending UK national interests and values. (Paragraph 119)

African regional organisations

21. The Government should continue to support constructive reforms to the rules-based international order to provide African countries with a voice commensurate with their size and importance. This should include supporting reform of the UN Security Council to better represent Africa. (Paragraph 153)

22. The African Union (AU) is an increasingly effective and influential organisation. The UK is right to focus more resources on it, particularly focusing on peacekeeping, climate change and regional integration. (Paragraph 164)

23. While it has had important successes, the AU faces significant challenges, including organisational capacity, funding and its members’ willingness to pool sovereignty. The UK should continue to seek to help strengthen the AU, while recognising that the AU is one of a range of regional stakeholders with which the UK should engage. (Paragraph 165)

24. The AU–UK Memorandum of Understanding provides an important framework for a reboot of the relationship. Resources and effort should be committed to developing this partnership. Agenda 2063 provides a broad, but useful, framework for engagement. We would welcome further explanation as to how the Government’s work with the AU, and on Agenda 2063, fits into its ‘strategic approach’ to Africa. (Paragraph 166)

25. Bilateral relationships with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa should remain a key part of the UK’s engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa and with the AU. (Paragraph 167)

26. The UK should continue to engage with the regional economic communities (RECs) across Sub-Saharan Africa. RECs are often regarded by their members as the ‘go-to’ institutions to address crises in their regions, and many have made progress towards regional economic integration. The UK should concentrate on those which have significant influence, and develop a more clearly-defined offer for its engagement with them. (Paragraph 183)

27. The Government should discuss with African members of the Commonwealth ways in which its work in Africa could be strengthened. The Government should be open-minded about any African country wanting to join the
Commonwealth so long as it fulfils the criteria for membership in terms of democracy and respect for human rights. (Paragraph 199)

28. The Commonwealth’s role in supporting ‘people to people’ contacts is of value, and the Government should continue to support such engagement, including between UK and Sub-Saharan African judges. The Commonwealth’s value in terms of people-to-people contacts underscores the need for a review of the UK’s visa policies. (Paragraph 200)

**Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development**

29. Building on the achievements and successes of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, the Sustainable Development Goals remain an important universal agenda for all countries. (Paragraph 204)

30. The population of Africa is projected to double to 2.1 billion by 2050. Providing employment is already a major challenge facing the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa: 20 million new jobs will be needed every year. The UK should support the UN and its agencies, in partnership with the AU, in their work to both harness the benefits and meet the challenges of population growth in the region. (Paragraph 220)

31. Intra-Africa migration is a longstanding and continuing phenomenon, with over 21 million Africans living in another African country in 2019. We welcome the Government’s provision of technical support to the AU on migration through the 2019 UK-AU Memorandum of Understanding, including support for the implementation of the AU’s *Migration Policy Framework for Africa*. (Paragraph 221)

32. Agriculture remains the main source of jobs and growth potential in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is a sector highly vulnerable to the impact of the climate crisis, thus magnifying the impact of environmental change on the economies of the region. (Paragraph 233)

33. There are opportunities and demand for infrastructure development across Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly for renewable energy infrastructure. Raising debt via international capital markets has become an increasingly important source of finance. The Government should continue to work with the London Stock Exchange Group in this area, particularly in support of local currency bond issuances. (Paragraph 237)

34. Corruption, tax avoidance and evasion, and illicit financial flows continue to deprive citizens and governments of Sub-Saharan Africa of much-needed funding for development. The UK should seek to ensure that UK businesses operate to the highest possible standards in the region. In particular, this should include compliance with the Bribery Act 2010, the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the Ruggie Principles) and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative global standard on oil, gas and mineral resources. (Paragraph 249)

35. The Government should use its influence in Sub-Saharan Africa to pressure countries in which politicians and officials are themselves guilty of corruption to enact and implement reforms. The Government should make such reforms a central component of its relationship with the countries in question, in particular its aid and trade relationship. (Paragraph 250)
36. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has the potential to transform the continent’s economy, by boosting intra-African trade and supporting industrialisation and diversification. (Paragraph 269)

37. The COVID-19 pandemic has already had a negative and disproportionate impact on economies in Africa. Export markets have dried up, remittances have fallen, currencies have depreciated and the continent has experienced capital flight. Significant economic support from international partners will be needed to prevent the continent’s economic gains over the last two decades being reversed. (Paragraph 285)

38. The contraction of the global economy due to COVID-19 will have a negative impact on UK trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and on UK aid, given that the UK’s 0.7% development assistance target is tied to Gross National Income. (Paragraph 286)

39. The Government should continue to encourage other countries to maintain their official development assistance (ODA) commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa to avoid exacerbating the impact of the crisis. (Paragraph 287)

40. The Government should support the AU’s call for a two-year standstill for African countries’ public and private debt, and engage with major creditors to the continent in support of this objective. (Paragraph 288)

41. Some countries are likely to need debt relief, in addition to the two-year debt standstill sought by the AU. The Government should work with the AU, the IMF and the World Bank to understand which countries need debt relief, and seek to play a constructive role in their international efforts to secure this. (Paragraph 289)

42. The Government should continue to work with the AU on its response to the economic impacts of COVID-19 in Africa. (Paragraph 290)

43. We commend the Government for its additional funding to the African Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, and its work in support of the Global Vaccines Alliance Summit on 4 June 2020. (Paragraph 291)

44. Access to a vaccine for COVID-19, should one be successfully developed, must be available on the basis of need. The Government should continue to work with international partners—including through Gavi, the Vaccines Alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness—to ensure any such vaccine is made available to developing countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Paragraph 292)

The UK’s economic relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa

45. The UK is a major donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Sub-Saharan Africa. The Department for International Development’s approach to funding and its expertise is well-respected. (Paragraph 309)

46. We regret the decision to merge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development (DFID). The UK’s commitment to spending 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on international development, DFID’s expertise in overseas aid and the separation of aid spending from UK foreign policy priorities are part of the UK’s international influence. (Paragraph 310)
47. We request urgent confirmation that UK ODA will continue to be administered with the promotion of the economic development and the welfare of developing countries as its main objective, in line with the definition of ODA agreed by the Organisation for Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee. (Paragraph 311)

48. The reorganisation of Whitehall departments does not change our conclusions and recommendations on the value of UK ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa. We seek assurances from the Government that the creation of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office does not represent a change to the UK's approach to ODA to the region. (Paragraph 312)

49. The UK's commitment to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on international development should be maintained. Given that the UK's ODA is fixed at 0.7% of GNI, the Integrated Review will need to consider the impact of the expected decrease in the overall ODA budget as a result of the negative economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis. (Paragraph 313)

50. UK development assistance is supporting the development of the AfCFTA and helping to improve the business environment and address trade barriers. The UK should offer any form of technical assistance which facilitates achieving the AfCFTA's objectives. This support has benefits for both Sub-Saharan recipient countries and UK businesses seeking to do business in the region. (Paragraph 324)

51. We would welcome further information from the Government on how it will fund Aid for Trade for Sub-Saharan Africa after Brexit, and how it intends to reallocate its funding and direct support that has been channelled via the EU for Aid for Trade projects after the transition period ends. (Paragraph 325)

52. We welcome DfID's support for the agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, and its recognition that this sector is critical to growth and job creation. We were told that an update to the DfID conceptual framework on agriculture would be helpful, to reflect the changes to the sector, and ask the Government to give this consideration. (Paragraph 331)

53. Further technical assistance to support improvements in agricultural productivity should be a high priority for the UK's development work. (Paragraph 332)

54. We welcome successive Governments' work to support public health initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. While direct budgetary support for governments in the region may be necessary in some cases, it can often lead to corruption. The Government should only employ this approach where there are no other options. (Paragraph 343)

55. We welcome the UK's provision of development assistance to mitigating and adapting to climate change in the region, particularly in support of low-carbon development. The most significant contribution the UK can make, in addition to action to decarbonise its own economy, is to ensure that the COP26 meeting in Glasgow in 2021 consolidates and strengthens the Paris agreement on climate change. Support from the UK to enable African countries to ramp up the substitution of renewables in place of oil and coal exports and use would also help combat global emissions, while not disadvantaging African development as it grows. (Paragraph 354)
56. The Government should consider how it can learn from its successful climate programmes, and those of other donors, and deliver them more widely across the region. We urge the Government more actively to employ science and technology in its work to combat the effects of climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Paragraph 355)

57. The UK’s CDC Group is a leading development finance institution in Sub-Saharan Africa. It will be central to scaling up investment in the region. (Paragraph 373)

58. Although we understand and support the objective of providing smaller amounts of funding to SMEs in the region, we remain concerned about CDC Group’s investment in private equity funds. We are not convinced that enough has been done to seek alternative ways to invest in smaller companies. (Paragraph 374)

59. It is essential that CDC Group is able to demonstrate the development impact of its investment in Sub-Saharan Africa, to ensure that it generates jobs which have a meaningful and sustainable impact on economic development. (Paragraph 375)

60. Leaving the EU provides an opportunity for the UK to re-cast its trade relationships with African countries and remedy some of the defects in the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements. We were surprised to hear that no detailed work had yet been done to identify ways in which the UK could offer better access to African exporters than was possible when the UK was in the EU. This gap needs to be filled in the UK government action plan on Africa for which we have called in paragraph 84. (Paragraph 415)

61. There is appetite within Sub-Saharan Africa to improve trade with the UK; the UK should explore these opportunities with countries in the region. African partners are working to develop the AfCFTA and are likely to seek new agreements which are consistent with this planned continental agreement. (Paragraph 416)

62. In its post-Brexit trade policy, the UK should explore ways of giving better access to Africa’s agricultural exports and supporting the processing in Africa of a greater proportion of its agricultural products. (Paragraph 417)

63. UK trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa has flatlined over the last decade. The appetite of UK businesses is uncertain, and a concerted effort will be needed by the Government if it is to deliver on its goal significantly to increase trade with and investment in the region. (Paragraph 430)

64. The UK–Africa Investment Summit was a high-profile beginning to this initiative, but concerted follow-up will be required. The Government should set out the steps it is taking in this regard. (Paragraph 431)

65. The Government must ensure that its provision of export credits is consistent with its commitments to tackling climate change. It should match its announcement at the UK–Africa Investment Summit that it will no longer invest in new coalmining or power production projects with similar commitments on gas and oil. (Paragraph 432)

66. Education is an important UK sector for UK–Sub-Saharan African trade. The visa regime for potential students from the region is unduly onerous and requires reform. (Paragraph 433)
We welcome the decision to suspend English language tests for visas for Chevening scholars. We recommend that the Government should: move away entirely from English language tests for visas for both Chevening and Commonwealth scholars; expand both of these schemes; and, where English language tests may be required for visas for undergraduate and post-graduate students, they should be carried out in the student’s country of residence, or online. (Paragraph 434)

Remittances from the UK to Sub-Saharan Africa are given too little profile in the narrative of the UK’s economic relationship with the region. Remittances from the UK exceed aid and charitable giving to Sub-Saharan Africa, and provide essential economic support. (Paragraph 447)

We welcome the Minister’s acknowledgement of the importance of remittances from the UK to Sub-Saharan Africa and the May 2020 UK-Swiss ‘global Call to Action’ on remittances, to address the projected fall in remittances as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. We would welcome more information on the actions the Government is taking to facilitate the sending of remittances to Africa from the UK diaspora through this initiative and to avoid disruption, and whether it is exploring the possibility of remittance matching. (Paragraph 459)

The Government should work to lower the cost of remitting money to the region, including the use of its powers over competition policy, consistent with the SDGs. It should review the application of the EU Payment Services Directive after the EU transition period ends and consider how it could support greater competition in the market for money transfer companies in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Paragraph 460)

The Government should explore co-funding and support for the AU’s new African Diaspora Finance Corporation. (Paragraph 461)

We heard that the UK’s Sub-Saharan African diaspora is not consulted and engaged in a consistent manner. Representatives of the diaspora are an essential resource in delivering the Government’s plan to increase trade and investment with the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The Government should embed consultation with the diaspora into policy making towards Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular with regard to trade and investment. (Paragraph 478)

The Government should give consideration to how and in what ways it could better encourage diversity on UK boards. It should work proactively with diaspora communities to make progress in this regard. (Paragraph 479)

Peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa

There remain significant challenges to peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa. These challenges are likely to be exacerbated by wider trends affecting the region, including population growth, weak states, violent ideologies and the climate crisis. (Paragraph 493)

Insecurity in the Sahel threatens the welfare of millions of people across the region, and risks spilling over into neighbouring countries. We welcome regional and international efforts to stabilise the region. (Paragraph 521)

It is vital that the international response to instability in the Sahel is not overly focused on conflict management, nor overly securitised. To achieve a
lasting peace, it will be essential to address the underlying causes of conflict, including climate change and economic inequalities. (Paragraph 522)

77. We welcome the UK’s increased attention to instability in the Sahel, and the Government’s decision to contribute UK troops to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. However, the Government’s wider strategy in the Sahel is unclear and the UK risks being unable to add value in a highly contested space. We would welcome further information from the Government on its objectives in the Sahel. (Paragraph 523)

78. As the UN Security Council penholder for Somalia, the UK has a position of particular influence, supported by its provision of aid and active diplomacy in support of stability. The UK should continue to support preparations for Somalia’s first one-person-one-vote elections this year—although there is doubt as to whether these elections will now be held—and to engage with its international partners in support of AMISOM. (Paragraph 531)

79. Nigeria faces multiple security challenges. The UK should explore how its security and defence partnership with Nigeria, agreed in 2018, can be utilised to best support stability in Nigeria and the wider region. (Paragraph 542)

80. We welcome Minister’s condemnation of the abduction and continued captivity of Leah Sharibu and other Christian and Muslim school children by Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa, and his assurance that the Government will continue to engage with the government of Nigeria to support urgent action to secure the release of all those abducted by insurgent groups in Nigeria. (Paragraph 543)

81. We are concerned by reports of a deteriorating security situation in Cameroon and of human rights abuses against the Anglophone community, in addition to the closure of schools for four years and the displacement of civilians by the conflict. (Paragraph 554)

82. The UK should work within the international community, including regional and sub-regional bodies, to promote an approach which would ensure the restoration of the long-standing autonomous rights of Anglophone Cameroonians and the end of human rights abuses. Such an approach would need to enlist the backing of key stakeholders, including France. (Paragraph 555)

83. Conflict-driven migration, often from countries already hosting migrants, has a particularly high human cost. The high number of refugees hosted in the region, often for long periods, pose significant challenges for development and stability. The Government should continue to explore how it can support Sub-Saharan African countries which host significant migrant communities. (Paragraph 560)

84. Women and girls play multiple roles in conflicts across the region, including as victims, participants, and in governmental responses to insecurity. (Paragraph 569)

85. Women and girls are central to the prevention and resolution of conflict. The Government should continue to champion their rights in its work on peace and security in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Paragraph 570)
86. The UK has been a leader in international efforts to prevent sexual violence in conflict. This work has, however, suffered from a lack of senior political leadership in recent years. The Government should review its work in this area and consider carefully the issues raised in the Independent Commission for Aid Impact’s recent report. (Paragraph 582)

87. We welcome the Government’s support of the use of UN-assessed contributions to fund AU-led peacekeeping missions. We would welcome more information on how the Government plans to use the 2019 UK-AU Memorandum of Understanding to support further security co-operation. (Paragraph 604)

88. The UK and its international partners have too often focused on addressing the immediate consequences of conflict, to the detriment of efforts to tackle the underlying conditions that allow conflict to emerge. The Government should, in its Integrated Review, consider how the UK can best use its resources and influence to develop longer-term strategies to prevent conflict, and above all to prevent genocide, and support regional partners. (Paragraph 619)

89. As part of efforts to support regional partners to take the lead in conflict prevention, management and resolution, the Government should review its approach to military training. It should consider whether the British Army should accompany the militaries it is training on some missions. The Government must be mindful that militaries in the region themselves sometimes contribute to instability and human rights abuses. (Paragraph 620)

90. We reiterate the conclusion of the 2016 report of the International Relations Committee, The UK and the UN: Priorities for the new Secretary-General, on the “critical” importance of pre-deployment training to improve operations and “act as a preventative measure against misconduct”. This is relevant to training for the UK’s partners in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in the context of UN missions. (Paragraph 621)

91. The Government should consider ways to better engage local Sub-Saharan African partners, including civil society groups, in its conflict prevention work. (Paragraph 622)

92. Revisions to the Development Assistance Committee’s rules on ODA to help support peacekeeping efforts have been helpful. There could be value in further revisions to support work on addressing the underlying causes of insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the Government should be careful in proposing further changes to ensure that the function of ODA remains supporting poverty reduction in developing countries. (Paragraph 630)

Human rights, democracy and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa

93. We recognise that some African countries have had a difficult relationship with the International Criminal Court. We believe that the court remains an important part of the rules-based international order. In this context, we welcome the agreement of the new Sudanese government to cooperate with the court regarding former President Omar al-Bashir. (Paragraph 653)

94. The Government must continue to afford significant importance to human rights in its relationships in Sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time as the UK pursues new economic opportunities and seeks to tackle security challenges, human rights remain critical. (Paragraph 662)
95. The Government should consider support for accountability, human rights, the rule of law and anti-corruption as a package that helps build the necessary conditions for democracy to function in Sub-Saharan Africa. Organisations such as the British Council, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and UK-based NGOs and charities make an important contribution to this agenda. (Paragraph 663)

96. The Government should seek to use its participation in the next Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kigali to promote freedom of religion and belief, LGBTQ+ rights and issues relating to the human rights of women and girls. (Paragraph 664)
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF MEMBERS AND DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

Members

Lord Alton of Liverpool
Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Chair)
Baroness Blackstone
Baroness Fall
Lord Grocott
Lord Hannay of Chiswick
Baroness Helic
Lord Mendelsohn
Lord Purvis of Tweed
Baroness Rawlings
Lord Reid of Cardowan
Baroness Smith of Newnham

Declarations of interest

Lord Alton of Liverpool
  Vice Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Eritrea
  Secretary, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan
  Vice Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Freedom of Religion and Belief
  Trustee, Arise Foundation
  Patron, Coalition for Genocide Response
Baroness Anelay of St Johns (Chair)
  No relevant interests declared
Baroness Blackstone
  No relevant interests declared
Baroness Fall
  Senior Adviser, Brunswick LLP
Lord Grocott
  No relevant interests declared
Lord Hannay of Chiswick
  Member, Advisory Board, Centre for European Reform
  Co-Chair, United Nations All-Party Parliamentary Group
  Co-Chair, All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation
Baroness Helic
  Director, J.D.H London Ltd
Lord Mendelsohn
  President, Commonwealth Jewish Council
Lord Purvis of Tweed
  Associate, Global Partners Governance Limited
  Vice-Chair All-Party Parliamentary Group for Africa
  Chair of UK Board, Search for Common Ground
Baroness Rawlings
  No relevant interests declared
Lord Reid of Cardowan
  No relevant interests declared
Baroness Smith of Newnham

*No relevant interests declared*

A full list of Members’ interests can be found in the register of Lords’ interests: [http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-interests/register-of-lords-interests](http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/standards-and-interests/register-of-lords-interests)

**Specialist Adviser**

Professor Julia Gallagher

*No relevant interests declared*
APPENDIX 2: LIST OF WITNESSES

Evidence is published at https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/360/international-relations-and-defence-committee/publications/ and available for inspection at the Parliamentary Archives (0207 219 3074).

Evidence received by the Committee is listed below in the chronological order of oral evidence session and in alphabetical order. Those witnesses marked with ** gave both oral and written evidence. Those marked with * gave oral evidence and did not submit any written evidence. All other witnesses submitted written evidence only.

Oral evidence in chronological order

* Andrew Mitchell MP, Member of Parliament for Sutton Coldfield, Secretary of State for International Development 2010–12
  QQ 1–11
* David Lammy MP, Member of Parliament for Tottenham
  QQ 1–11
* Harriet Mathews OBE, Director for Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
  QQ 12–28
* Jane Edmondson, Director, East and Central Africa Division, Department for International Development
  QQ 12–28
* Dr Nick Westcott, Director, Royal African Society
  QQ 29–35
* Baroness Amos, Director, School of African and Oriental Studies
  QQ 36–48
* Dr Dirk Willem te Velde, Principal Research Fellow and Director of Programme, International Economic Development Group, Overseas Development Institute
  QQ 49–55
* Tom Pengelly, Director, External Secretariat for All-Party Parliamentary Group on Trade out of Poverty, and Managing Director, Saana Consulting
  QQ 49–55
* Professor Tim Murithi, Head, Peacebuilding Interventions and Extraordinary Professor of African Studies, University of Free State, South Africa
  QQ 56–63
* Dr Dambisa Moyo, author and economist
  QQ 64–74
* Myles Wickstead CBE, Visiting Professor (International Relations), King’s College London, and former Head of the Secretariat, Commission for Africa (2004–05)
  QQ 64–74
* Dr Comfort Ero, Programme Director, Africa, International Crisis Group
  QQ 75–81
* Colin Buckley, General Counsel and Head of External Affairs, CDC Group
  QQ 82–88
* Peter Maila, Investment Director, Africa Coverage Team, CDC Group
  QQ 82–88
** Professor Gibril Faal OBE, Visiting Professor in Practice, London School of Economics, and Director, GK Partners

** General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, former Commander, Joint Forces Command, and Distinguished Fellow, Royal United Services Institute

* Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, African Union Special Envoy to mobilise international support for Africa’s efforts to address the economic challenges African countries will face as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic

* James Duddridge MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development, (Minister for Africa)

* Harriet Mathews OBE, Director for Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

* Debbie Palmer, Director, West and Southern Africa Division, Department for International Development

Alphabetical list of all witnesses

The African Trade Policy Centre, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

Africa Regional Office, Open Society Foundations

The All-Party Parliamentary Group for Africa

* Baroness Amos, Director, School of African and Oriental Studies (QQ 36–48)

Dr James Angove, University of Oxford

Dr Seife Ayele, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

** General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, former Commander, Joint Forces Command and Distinguished Fellow, Royal United Services Institute (QQ 95–101)

Dr Rachel Bennett, Senior Lecturer in Human Geography, University of Gloucestershire

Lord Boateng PC DL, former UK High Commissioner to South Africa, and former Chief Secretary to the Treasury

British Council

* Colin Buckley, General Counsel and Head of External Affairs, CDC Group (QQ 82–88)

Catholic Agency for Overseas Development

CDC Group

Centre for a Spacefaring Civilization
Professor Tony Chafer, Professor of French and African Studies, Portsmouth University

Christian Aid

Climate Policy Initiative

Coalition for Genocide Response

Commonwealth Secretariat

Dr Daniel Mulugeta, Department of Politics and International Studies, School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London

Dr Carl Death, Senior Lecturer in International Political Economy, University of Manchester

Bob Dewar CMG, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Elizabeth Donnelly, Deputy Director and Research Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

James Duddridge MP, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development, (Minister for Africa) (QQ 118–142)

Dr Charles Ebikeme, London School of Economics and Political Science

Jane Edmondson, Director, East and Central Africa Division, Department for International Development (QQ 12–28)

Environmental Investigation Agency

Dr Comfort Ero, Programme Director, Africa, International Crisis Group (QQ 75–81)

Professor Gibril Faal OBE JP, Visiting Professor in Practice, London School of Economics, and Director, GK Partners (QQ 89–94)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Freedom Now

Dr François Gaulme, Associate Research Fellow, African Studies Center, Institut français des relations internationales

Dr Linda Gibson, Associate Professor of Public Health, School of Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University

The Global Campaign for Peace and Justice in Cameroon

Health Poverty Action

Mark Higham, former Director, the Africa Centre London
Dr Georgina Holmes, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Reading
Human Rights Watch
Humanitarian Aid Relief Trust
Dr Stephen Hurt, Reader in International Relations, Oxford Brookes University
Dr Eka Ikpe, African Leadership Centre, King’s College London
The International Department of the Conservative Party
International Organisation for Peace and Social Justice (PSJ UK)
Dr Lyn Johnstone, Lecturer in International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London
Dr Will Jones, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Royal Holloway, University of London
David Lammy MP, Member of Parliament for Tottenham (QQ 1–11)
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
London Stock Exchange Group
Peter Maila, Investment Director, Africa Coverage Team, CDC Group (QQ 82–88)
Dame Rosalind Marsden, Associate Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House
Harriet Mathews OBE, Director for Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (QQ 12–28) and (QQ 118–142)
Dr Terence McSweeney, Southampton Solent University and the London School of Economics and Political Science
Dr Peace A. Medie, Senior Lecturer in Gender and International Politics, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol
Paul Melly, Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House
Andrew Mitchell MP, Member of Parliament for Sutton Coldfield, former Secretary of State for International Development (2010–12) (QQ 1–11)
Yemisi Mokuolu, Director, Hatch Africa
Dr Dambisa Moyo, author and economist (QQ 64–74)
Professor Tim Murithi, Head, Peacebuilding Interventions and Extraordinary Professor of African Studies, University of Free State, South Africa (QQ 56–63)
Dr Lars Otto Naess, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich

Dr Sarah Njeri, Africa Leadership Centre, King’s College London

* Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, African Union Special Envoy to mobilise international support for Africa’s efforts to address the economic challenges African countries will face as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (QQ 102–117)

Sandy Oliver, Director, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London

Dr Modupe Oshikoya, Department of Political Science, Virginia Wesleyan University

Oversea Development Institute

Chief Uzo Owunne, INGO Africa Ambassadors Interactive Forum

* Debbie Palmer, Director, West and Southern Africa Division, Department for International Development (QQ 118–142)

Tom Pengelly, Director, External Secretariat for All-Party Parliamentary Group on Trade out of Poverty, and Managing Director, Saana Consulting (QQ 49–55)

Remote Warfare Programme, Oxford Research Group

The Royal African Society

Search for Common Ground

Ben Shepherd, Consulting Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Ahmed Soliman, Research Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House

The Southern Africa Network of Democrats

Ruth Stewart, Director, Africa Centre for Evidence, University of Johannesburg

Dr Andrew Edward Yaw Tchie, Senior Research Fellow for Africa Security, and Obasanjo Fellow, the Royal United Services Institute

Jodie Thorpe, Cluster Leader, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies

Rebecca Tinsley

Christopher Vandome, Research Fellow, Africa Programme, Chatham House
Dr Alex Vines OBE, Managing Director, Ethics, Risk & Resilience and Director, Africa Programme, Chatham House

Onyekachi Wambu, Executive Director, The African Foundation for Development (AFFORD)

Dr Philippa Waterhouse, Lecturer in Health and Social Care, the Open University

* Dr Nick Westcott, Director, Royal African Society (QQ 29–35)

* Myles Wickstead CBE, Visiting Professor (International Relations), King’s College London, and former Head of Secretariat, Commission for Africa (2004–05) (QQ 64–74)

* Dr Dirk Willem te Velde, Principal Research Fellow and Director of Programme, International Economic Development Group, Overseas Development Institute (QQ 49–55)

Dr Roxana Willis, University of Oxford

World Food Programme, London Office
APPENDIX 3: CALL FOR EVIDENCE

In August 2018 the then Prime Minister said the UK was “seeking to work more closely with the more than 50 nations of Africa to deliver our shared security and prosperity, and through this strengthening a global system that is capable of delivering lasting benefits for all”. She emphasised the importance of inclusive growth, and said the Government would “put our development budget and expertise at the centre of our partnership”.

The African Union In 2015 the African Union (AU) outlined, in Agenda 2063, its strategy to achieve the Pan African Vision of “An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena”. In February 2019, the UK and the AU signed a Joint Communiqué on the African Union-United Kingdom Partnership. This set out “a broad range of shared priorities in support of the African Union’s objectives for the Continent and a shared vision for a prosperous, secure and innovative future for Africa, tackling common challenges such as climate change, and making the most of opportunities such as increasing trade links and the dynamism of Africa’s youthful population”.

The shared priorities set out in the Communiqué are:

- Strengthening resilience across the continent through continued co-operation in support of the African Union’s peace-making and peacekeeping role, and enhanced policy engagement. Particular areas identified by the AU are: South Sudan, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and Libya.

- Driving prosperity by mobilising investment including the promotion of UK-Africa trade and investment, the African Continental Free Trade Area, investing in people, and building opportunities to deliver a skilled workforce through shared work on education, science and technology and skills development.

- Creating the conditions to allow full participation of women and disabled persons in our societies.

- Recognise the added value of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and ensure that migration and human mobility in Africa is well managed both to migrants themselves and to host/origin countries for socioeconomic development as per the AU Agenda 2063. Support initiatives aimed at preventing irregular migration including protection of victims of trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants.

- Promote and protect an equitable and inclusive rules-based international system to ensure that countries and individuals have the freedom, security, justice and mechanisms to prosper, and includes co-operation on global issues such as climate change, human rights and serious organised crime. Supporting the AU’s desire to find African solutions for African problems, this includes UN-assessed contributions for AU-led Peace Support Operations authorised by the UN Security Council.

The call for evidence

- The Committee intends to focus on how the UK can best support the AU’s Agenda 2063 and the areas for co-operation set out in the 2019 AU-UK Joint Communiqué.

- The Committee is calling for written evidence on this topic. The Committee will use the written evidence received to further shape its inquiry.
APPENDIX 4: GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEC</td>
<td>The African Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfCFTA</td>
<td>The African Continental Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>The African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>The African-led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>The African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>The African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>The African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
<td>The African Union Commission</td>
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<td>AUPSC</td>
<td>African Union Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>AU-NEPAD</td>
<td>The African Union Development Agency—The New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEN–SAD</td>
<td>The Community of Sahel–Saharan States (a REC)</td>
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<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Central African Economic and Monetary Community</td>
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<td>CET</td>
<td>Common external tariff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA franc</td>
<td>A common currency among former French colonies, operating in west Africa (now called the eco) and central Africa (the Central African CFA franc).</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (a REC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Customs union</td>
<td>A custom union requires members to remove internal tariffs for goods produced within the region, and maintain a common external tariff for goods imported into the economic bloc.</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>The East African Community (a REC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>The Economic Community of West African States (a REC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>The UN Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eco</td>
<td>The new name for the West African CFA franc. Also the planned name for the ECOWAS common currency.</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>The Economic Community of Central African States (a REC)</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>An EU Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>G5 Sahel Joint Force</td>
<td>A force comprising five countries Force (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) fighting terrorism in the Sahel</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multi-National Joint Task Force, a joint force fighting Boko Haram in the Lake Chad area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, now merged with the AU to become AUDA-NEPAD</td>
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<td>IGAD</td>
<td>The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (a REC)</td>
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<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>The Organisation of African Unity, the predecessor of the African Union</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional economic community</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>The Southern African Development Community (a REC)</td>
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<td>SDGs</td>
<td>The Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNECA</td>
<td>The UN Economic Commission for Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAMU</td>
<td>The West African Monetary Union</td>
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