



House of Commons
Committee on the Future
Relationship with the European
Union

**The need for progress
in the negotiations**

First Report of Session 2019–21

*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

*Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 17 June 2020*

Exiting the European Union Committee

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Publication

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Conclusions and recommendations

1. Negotiating a new relationship between the UK and EU in eleven months would be an ambitious undertaking even in ideal circumstances. The pandemic has greatly increased the challenge negotiators face. We recognise their hard work under extraordinarily difficult circumstances but these may focus minds on arriving at a timely deal. We welcome the desire of both sides to accelerate the pace of negotiations, now that some of the lockdown restrictions are beginning to be relaxed, and the intensification of the negotiations including face-to-face meetings in both London and Brussels, meetings between the negotiating teams to accompany and complement the negotiating rounds and specialised sessions to work on issues of particular difficulty. Given uncertainty about the progression of the pandemic the Government should seek to make as much progress as possible over the next few months. This is vital for providing certainty to businesses on what the future relationship will look like. (Paragraph 9)
2. We urge the EU to give Michel Barnier greater flexibility in his mandate in the interests of securing an agreement. (Paragraph 19)
3. The substantive progress sought by both parties has so far proved elusive, and there are significant gaps between the two sides on several important issues. But it remains in the best interest of both the UK and the EU to reach a deal. Political leadership is now essential to break the deadlock and both sides will have to compromise. We note that the high level meeting was used to endorse the plan advanced by the chief negotiators for an intensification of the talks, rather than a moment when political leaders addressed and resolved key points of difference. We agree with both sides that the negotiations need new momentum, and for that both sides will need to show where they are willing to move. (Paragraph 23)
4. The UK's and EU's respective red lines make it difficult to find common ground on "level playing field" issues. We urge the parties to look for a solution that takes as its starting point the de facto alignment of the UK and the EU when it comes to current rules and standards, and explore how the UK and the EU could be given access to their respective markets on the basis that if either side moves away from these standards or acts in a way that one side believes gives the other an unfair competitive advantage then that access could be varied. For example, progress in relation to the "level playing field" might be made if both parties considered an arrangement where the UK had the freedom to set its own level-playing field standards but, if those standards fell below the standards which were in place at the end of the transition period or if standards were changed in such a way that gave the UK an unfair competitive advantage, the EU could suspend parts of the trade agreement. An independent body would be needed to rule on whether the change gave rise to an unfair competitive advantage and whether the EU's proposed action was reasonable. In relation to subsidies, both sides could agree to have in place clear rules on the granting of subsidies/state aid that would be monitored and enforced on the EU side by the Commission and on the UK side by an independent authority. If one party considered that a subsidy granted by the other party was adversely affecting its interests, it could make a complaint to the Commission or the

UK independent authority which would have to be investigated and then referred to the independent body. This could offer a way forward in the negotiations in line with the Political Declaration. (Paragraph 24)

5. The EU has made clear that timely implementation of the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol is a prerequisite for any deal. More importantly, both parties have a responsibility to the people of Northern Ireland to ensure the Protocol works. The Government's recent command paper is a welcome start and it acknowledges that checks on GB-NI trade will be required, but more detail is needed soon to ensure that businesses trading from and with Northern Ireland are ready for the end of the transition period. The Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee has a key part to play in resolving many of the remaining areas of uncertainty, particularly in terms of deciding which goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland are at risk of entering the Single Market. (Paragraph 27)
6. We urge the UK Government to take steps to improve the involvement of the devolved nations. (Paragraph 29)
7. We look forward to the publication of the border operating model. We welcome the Government's pragmatic decision not to introduce full border controls on goods coming into the UK from 1 January 2021. More time is clearly needed for businesses to prepare for the new UK-EU trading arrangements, including rapid expansion of recruitment and training of customs agents. The Government should use this time to ensure that the many organisations involved in making the new border arrangements work, from HMRC to port authorities, businesses and logistics firms, are fully prepared to implement new arrangements on 1 July 2021. At a minimum this will mean the Government making information and advice available in a timely manner and engaging in discussions with different sectors to design arrangements that best fit their needs. The objective must be to deliver the certainty, stability, and predictability businesses need to help them cope with the deeply worrying economic effect of the pandemic. (Paragraph 39)
8. While this approach will make it easier for UK importers, firms exporting to the EU are likely to face full border controls from 1 January 2021. The Government must ensure that these businesses know what the rules and customs arrangements are going to be in time to be ready for the end of the transition period. Trade in goods represents only part of the UK's overall trade with the EU; 41% of our exports to the EU is accounted for by services. Firms in sectors ranging from hospitality to broadcasting to financial services also have concerns about preparing their businesses to operate under the terms of the future relationship from 1 January 2021. This will be especially challenging as much of the detail will not be known until autumn at the earliest. The Government should actively seek the views of these sectors and show the same pragmatic flexibility when responding to their needs. (Paragraph 40)
9. *The Government should set out in its response to this Report how it is preparing for circumstances in which no agreement on the future relationship is reached by the end of the transition period. This should include what support it intends to give to sectors that would be particularly affected, for example by the introduction of tariffs on certain products. The Government should also set out the preparations it believes*

are needed whether or not an agreement is reached and publish an assessment in the Autumn of both how far advanced these preparations are and the likelihood that they will be completed in time. This assessment should cover which measures will be needed by 1 January 2021 and how they will be affected by the plan to bring in full border controls on imports coming into Great Britain from the EU in three stages. (Paragraph 43)

10. The pandemic has posed unprecedented challenges to businesses in both the UK and EU and has naturally set back preparations for the new relationship. The economic impact of coronavirus on the global economy will be very severe, and the Government needs to assess the additional effects that the new trading relationship will have on firms that are already facing significant difficulties. The pandemic may permanently change business models in sectors such as hospitality and tourism, and these businesses may in future have different needs and priorities than they did in February 2020. The Government needs to engage with businesses that have been affected by the pandemic and ensure it takes into account their capacity to prepare. *The Government should develop, and publish, an economic and readiness assessment showing the evidence it is using to determine how well prepared the UK economy is to leave the transition period. (Paragraph 47)*

Introduction

1. The purpose of this report is to set out the Committee's views on the progress made in the negotiation of a future relationship with the European Union, following the 15 June high-level meeting between the Prime Minister and President von der Leyen, President Michel and President Sassoli, and what we see as the key challenges the Government faces over the next six months. It is not a detailed commentary on all areas of the negotiations.

2. We are grateful to the witnesses who have taken time to prepare written evidence or have appeared before us. In this short report we cannot reflect on all the views that we have received but the evidence we have published provides a great resource for anyone interested in the state of the negotiations on the UK's future relationship with the EU. We will continue to collect evidence to inform our deliberations and welcome further submissions.

The state of the negotiations

The lead up to the negotiations

3. The UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, under terms set out in the Withdrawal Agreement and given legal effect in the UK by the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. The Withdrawal Agreement focused on “separation” issues: it provided clarity on how the financial commitments between the UK and EU would be settled, put in place measures to preserve an open border on the island of Ireland, and secured the rights of EU citizens in the UK and UK nationals in the EU. It did not, however, establish the terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU. Both sides’ aspirations for this future relationship were set out in the non-binding Political Declaration that accompanied the Withdrawal Agreement.¹ The Political Declaration has subsequently been translated by the EU into a mandate for their lead negotiator,² and by the UK Government into a set of aims and objectives, which it published in *The Future Relationship with the EU, The UK’s Approach to Negotiations*, in February 2020.³

Timeline

Date	Event
23 June 2016	UK votes to leave EU
29 March 2017	UK triggers Article 50 setting a departure date of 29 March 2019
17 October 2019	Revised Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration agreed between UK and EU
19 October 2019	UK requested Article 50 extension
28 October 2019	EU agrees to Article 50 extension until 31/01/2020
23 January 2020	EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act given Royal Assent
29 January 2020	Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration approved by European Parliament
30 January 2020	Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration approved by Council of the EU
31 January 2020	UK leaves the EU
25 February 2020	EU adopts mandate for negotiating future relationship
27 February 2020	UK Government publishes its approach to negotiations on future relationship
02 to 05 March 2020	Future relationship negotiations: round 1
18 March 2020	EU publishes draft legal text
20 to 24 April 2020	Future relationship negotiations: round 2
11 to 15 May 2020	Future relationship negotiations: round 3
19 May 2020	UK publishes draft legal texts
2 to 5 June 2020	Future relationship negotiations: round 4
15 June 2020	High-Level Meeting held
31 December 2020	End of the Article 50 transition period

1 See Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement for how the Political Declaration links with the Agreement. See also article 50(2) of the TEU which stipulates that the withdrawal arrangements must take account of the framework for the future relationship.

2 [ANNEX to COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement](#), 25 February 2020

3 [HMG, *The Future Relationship with the EU: The UK’s Approach to Negotiations*](#), 27 February 2020

4. Under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, the UK is currently in a transition period, during which it continues to be bound by EU law⁴ but is not represented on the EU's decision-making bodies. At the Joint Committee meeting held on 12 June 2020 the UK confirmed it would not seek an extension to the transition period and accordingly the transition period will now end on 31 December 2020.⁵ Michel Barnier, the Head of the EU's Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom, said "At this stage, I do not have many grounds for optimism [...] but an agreement is still possible, and that is what I am working toward".⁶ We note that the Government is optimistic that the negotiations can be completed in the time available.

5. Consequently, the UK and the EU now have just over six months in which to negotiate and ratify an agreement (or agreements) on the future relationship, and, in parallel, to establish the new arrangements and structures required to implement this new relationship. This is an ambitious timetable. The EU has stated that the negotiations have to be completed by 31 October at the latest, to provide two months for ratification. Although trade deals between the EU and third countries typically take several years to negotiate and ratify, we note that the starting point for these trade talks is zero tariffs and quotas and full alignment, which is significantly different to that for other EU trade deals. Both sides' mandates make clear that the future relationship will involve significant changes to the existing terms of trade between the UK and EU. Given the Government's clear policy not to extend the transition period beyond the end of this year, the UK now needs certainty on its relationship with the EU.

The effect of the pandemic on the negotiations

6. The negotiations on the future relationship began in March 2020. Measures to control the spread of Covid-19 were introduced shortly after the first round of face-to-face meetings and the second round was cancelled. Staff working on the negotiations, in Whitehall and beyond, were redeployed to work on the response to the pandemic.⁷ David Frost, Prime Minister's Europe Adviser and Chief Negotiator of Task Force Europe, estimates that only a week or two of negotiating time was lost due to the Covid-19 pandemic.⁸ Talks resumed in April, with three rounds taking place using video conferencing. The two negotiating teams worked hard to combat the challenges faced by meeting remotely. What Mr Frost told us suggests that negotiating in this manner has been less than ideal.⁹ The two teams must have found it challenging to resolve difficult issues in trade negotiations when they had not been given the opportunity to establish personal relationships.

7. After the fourth round of negotiations, Mr Frost said: "We are close to reaching the limits of what we can achieve through the format of remote formal Rounds. If we are to make progress, it is clear that we must intensify and accelerate our work".¹⁰ Similarly, the EU's chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, said that he hoped the negotiating teams "will be able to meet physically again in the coming weeks and months, as this could help us gain

4 Subject to limited exceptions.

5 S15A of the [European Union \(Withdrawal\) Act 2018](#) prohibits a Minister from agreeing to an extension in the Joint Committee.

6 Q396

7 [Qq197, 198 & 218](#)

8 [Q263](#)

9 [Q263](#)

10 [HMG, David Frost's statement following the conclusion of round 4 negotiations with the EU](#), 5 June 2020

in efficiency”.¹¹ On 12 June, a new schedule for negotiations was published giving details on the future rounds, in order to “intensify the talks”.¹² The new schedule, for negotiating groups to meet physically “subject to health constraints required by the relevant national health recommendations”.

8. Shanker Singham suggested that the new context that the COVID-19 outbreak has brought to the negotiations could lead to more rapid resolution of differences between the UK and EU. He told us:

Given the urgent need to kickstart the global economy, and the political drivers bringing the Parties together, I would anticipate that some of the differences [...] that have been key stumbling blocks so far will become less difficult as the deadline is approached. There will also be powerful economic drivers which will push the parties to agree a deal.¹³

New schedule for the negotiations

Date	Location	Format
Week of 29 June to 3 July	Brussels	Restricted round in the format of a meeting of the Chief Negotiators and of specialised sessions
Week of 6 July	London	Meetings of the Chief Negotiators / their teams / specialised sessions
Week of 13 July	Brussels	Meetings of the Chief Negotiators / their teams / specialised sessions
Week of 20 to 24 July	London	Round 5
Week of 27 July	London	Meetings of the Chief Negotiators / their teams / specialised sessions
Week of 17 to 21 August	Brussels	Round 6

Source: [Addendum to the Terms of Reference on the UK-EU Future Relationship Negotiations](#), 12 June 2020

9. **Negotiating a new relationship between the UK and EU in eleven months would be an ambitious undertaking even in ideal circumstances. The pandemic has greatly increased the challenge negotiators face. We recognise their hard work under extraordinarily difficult circumstances but these may focus minds on arriving at a timely deal. We welcome the desire of both sides to accelerate the pace of negotiations, now that some of the lockdown restrictions are beginning to be relaxed, and the intensification of the negotiations including face-to-face meetings in both London and Brussels, meetings between the negotiating teams to accompany and complement the negotiating rounds and specialised sessions to work on issues of particular difficulty. Given uncertainty about the progression of the pandemic the Government should seek to make as much progress as possible over the next few months. This is vital for providing certainty to businesses on what the future relationship will look like.**

11 European Commission, [Statement by Michel Barnier following Round 4 of negotiations for a new partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#), 5 June 2020

12 [Addendum to the Terms of Reference on the UK-EU Future Relationship Negotiations](#), 12 June 2020

13 Shanker Singham ([FRE0003](#))

Status of the negotiations after round four

10. The fourth round of negotiations took place between 1 and 5 June. Mr Barnier said that both parties had agreed in this round to focus on the four big sticking points. These have been publicly known since early March:

- Governance of the Future Relationship
- Fisheries
- The level playing field, and
- Police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters.¹⁴

11. Reports from the first two rounds of negotiation were optimistic. This tone shifted somewhat after the third round, when both sides expressed frustration about the lack of progress. In May, the lead negotiators made public an exchange of letters in which they set out key areas of disagreement in stark terms and what they felt was needed ahead of the fourth round of negotiations.¹⁵ After the fourth round, David Frost said that “progress remains limited”.¹⁶ Michel Barnier similarly said there had been “no substantial progress”, although he also stated that “if we keep our mutual respect, our serenity and our determination, I have no doubt that we will find, in the course of the summer or by early autumn at the latest, a landing zone between the United Kingdom and the European Union.”¹⁷ The need to inject new political momentum into the negotiations was recognised by the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the European Commission, European Council and European Parliament at their high level meeting on 15 June 2020. In their joint statement after the summit, they said:

The Parties agreed nevertheless that new momentum was required. They supported the plans agreed by Chief Negotiators to intensify the talks in July and to create the most conducive conditions for concluding and ratifying a deal before the end of 2020. This should include, if possible, finding an early understanding on the principles underlying any agreement.¹⁸

12. The aspiration set out in the Political Declaration for an agreement on fisheries by the end of June is very unlikely to be realised.¹⁹ In addition, the Political Declaration said that assessments under equivalence frameworks for financial services should be carried out, “endeavouring” to conclude these before the end of June 2020.²⁰ We urge both sides to conclude these assessments as soon as possible.

14 [HMG, The Future Relationship with the EU: The UK’s Approach to Negotiations](#), 27 February 2020; [HMG, Statement on the conclusion of the first round of negotiations](#), 5 March 2020; [European Commission, Negotiations with the UK: Michel Barnier, the European Commission’s Chief Negotiator, sets out points of convergence and divergence following the first round of negotiations](#), 5 March 2020

15 [HMG, Letter to Michel Barnier](#), 19 May 2020; [European Commission, Reply from Michel Barnier, Chief Negotiator, to David Frost, UK Chief Negotiator](#), 20 May 2020

16 [HMG, David Frost’s statement following the conclusion of round 4 negotiations with the EU](#), 5 June 2020

17 [European Commission, Statement by Michel Barnier following Round 4 of negotiations for a new partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#), 5 June 2020

18 [European Commission, EU-UK Statement following the High Level Meeting on 15 June](#), 15 June 2020

19 [Q296](#)

20 [HMG, Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#), para 36

Governance

13. The UK position is that there should be a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), supplemented by a range of other international agreements, and that each agreement should have its own appropriate governance arrangements, with no role for the Court of Justice.²¹ This is consistent with FTAs the EU has signed with Canada, Japan and South Korea. The EU wishes to establish a single governing body, to manage and supervise the agreement, including dispute resolution.²² Professor Anand Menon, Director of the UK in a Changing Europe, told us that the EU wants a single governance arrangement, partly because it does not wish to replicate the [unwieldy] Swiss model, and partly because it wants to handle dispute resolution “across the piece”. The UK wants to ring-fence each specific area and its dispute resolution.²³ Professor Barnard, Professor of European Union and Labour Law, University of Cambridge, and Sam Lowe, a senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform, reminded us that, under the dispute resolution provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement and under Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol in respect of state aids, the UK has already agreed to an ongoing role for the Court of Justice on questions of EU law, although its role will diminish in importance going forward except in the specific areas of citizens’ rights and state aid.”²⁴

Fisheries

14. The UK position is that there should be a separate fisheries agreement not linked to any wider trade agreement or subject to cross-cutting dispute resolution.²⁵ Fishing opportunities and access to waters would be negotiated annually based on the principle of zonal attachment, rather than relative stability. The EU is seeking an agreement to uphold “continued reciprocal access” to fishing waters and “uphold stable quota shares” with dispute settlement linked to the wider trade agreement.²⁶ One group of witnesses told us that “any agreement, other than to maintain the status quo, will actually represent a loss to the EU. Whether or not the UK is able to achieve even modest gains will depend on its ability to assert itself as an independent coastal state and convince the EU that at least some change is inevitable”.²⁷

15. Michel Barnier noted that the EU and UK had so far stuck to contradictory positions on fisheries with the EU arguing for no change and the UK for changing everything. He told us “If we remain entrenched in that way, there will be no discussion on fisheries. If there is no discussion on fisheries, there will be no agreement on fisheries, and if there is no agreement on fisheries, there will be no agreement on trade. I want to find an agreement on fisheries because I know that that is a prerequisite on the European Union side for finding an agreement on aspects such as commercial and economic matters”.²⁸ He went on to say “This is an important part of the economic agreement. It is not just a question of

21 HMG, [The Future Relationship with the EU: The UK’s Approach to Negotiations](#), 27 February 2020, para 6
 22 [ANNEX to COUNCIL DECISION authorising the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for a new partnership agreement](#), 25 February 2020 (EU negotiating mandate), Part IV, Section 2

23 [Qq113 & 350](#). See also written evidence: Sir Jonathan Faull ([FRE004](#)) & Dr Kamala Dawar ([FRE009](#)) paras 4–7

24 [Q339, Q359, Q370, Q372 and Q373](#)

25 HMG, [Draft Working Text for a Fisheries Framework Agreement between The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The European Union](#), 19 May 2020

26 European Commission, [Draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the UK](#), 18 March 2020

27 Unpublished written evidence from Richard Barnes, Griffin Carpenter, Christopher Huggins, Bryce Stewart & Chris Williams

28 Q397

fishing, because you also have to process those fish. We are talking about reciprocal access to our waters and markets, which is why the fisheries agreement is part of the economic agreement, because it also includes access for processed products to the European Union market.”²⁹

16. Mr Barnier told us that an “annual discussion of the allocation of quota and access to waters... [would be] economically and technically impossible”.³⁰ Sam Lowe and Catherine Barnard said there was no known technical impediment; Professor Barnard noted it would be resource intensive as a result of the number of fish stocks requiring negotiation.³¹

Level playing field

17. Paragraph 77 of the Political Declaration states that, given the geographic proximity and economic interdependence of the UK and the EU, the “future relationship must ensure open and fair competition, encompassing robust commitments to ensure a level playing field” and that:

To that end, the Parties should uphold the common high standards applicable in the Union and the United Kingdom at the end of the transition period in the areas of state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change, and relevant tax matters.³²

Mr Barnier said that “any future trade agreement between us will have to include strong level playing field guarantees, irrespective of whether it covers 98% or 100% of tariff lines.”³³ Asked about state aid, Michel Barnier told us that the EU was seeking to build a relationship with the UK on a fair, long-lasting basis. He noted, however, that “we have seen no British proposal regarding our proposals, apart from this reminder about the WTO framework, which is not sufficient. Nor do we know what national state aid regime will be implemented by the UK on 1 January next year.”³⁴

18. For level playing field areas such as social and environmental standards, climate change, taxation or sustainable development, the EU has said it is open to discussions on non-regression mechanisms.³⁵ However, on state aid, it is asking for more. George Peretz QC told us that

The EU position is that the UK should continue to follow EU State aid rules, albeit applied by a domestic State aid authority [...] To that extent, the EU is seeking arrangements similar to those that it has with Turkey and Ukraine, which both agree to apply EU State aid rules domestically. The EU is also proposing, however, that UK courts would continue to be able to—and at the supreme appellate level required to – refer questions of interpretation to the CJEU, a court on which the United Kingdom is no longer represented.

29 Q404

30 Q416

31 Qq347–8

32 HMG, [Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#), para 77

33 HMG, [Letter to Michel Barnier](#), 19 May 2020; European Commission, [Reply from Michel Barnier, Chief Negotiator, to David Frost, UK Chief Negotiator](#), 20 May 2020

34 Q393

35 European Commission, [Statement by Michel Barnier following Round 4 of negotiations for a new partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#), 5 June 2020

That latter proposal has no equivalent in the EU's agreements with Turkey or Ukraine: and it may be noted that even Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein are not subject to such a provision (the EFTA Court being independent of the CJEU and composed of judges from those countries).³⁶

In contrast, the UK position asks for an agreement to keep each other informed of subsidies every two years.³⁷ Catherine Barnard said the Government was yet to set out the state aid rules it proposes to apply or the role of the Competition and Markets Authority.³⁸ David Frost told us:

... we are not saying that there can be no level playing field provisions. We are simply saying that there must be provisions that are appropriate to a free trade agreement, like those found in the Canada or Japan agreement, and that is what we have put forward³⁹

The UK regards the EU's state aid proposals as going substantially beyond what was envisaged in the Political Declaration. Michael Gove called their approach "cheeky"⁴⁰ and David Frost suggested they were "more about control" than market access.⁴¹

19. Michel Barnier told us he thought that his mandate gave him sufficient room to strike a deal.⁴² Asked about whether changes were needed to the EU's negotiating mandate, David Frost said "It is their call. It is their internal process. If they think they need to rewrite it, that is up to them, but what is clear is that the policy that is enshrined in that mandate is not one that can be agreed with us."⁴³ **We urge the EU to give Michel Barnier greater flexibility in his mandate in the interests of securing an agreement.**

Law enforcement and judicial cooperation

20. Both parties wish to continue to cooperate on law enforcement measures. The UK has asked to maintain cooperation in the areas of data exchange for law enforcement purposes (including asking for "capabilities similar to" those provided for by the EU databases on criminal records (ECRIS), DNA, fingerprints, vehicles (Prüm), and 'persons and objects of interest' (SIS II)), and has acknowledged that receiving a data adequacy decision from the EU is "extremely important" for such data exchange.⁴⁴ It also wants operational cooperation with EU bodies such as Europol and Eurojust, and arrangements on extradition. The EU has said that the scale and scope of future arrangements in this area should be in line with agreements the EU has with other third countries, suitable for a country outside Schengen. Precedents in the area of law enforcement cooperation do not give the same level of access as an EU Member State and the closest precedents involve third countries that are members of Schengen, which the UK is not.⁴⁵

36 Unpublished written evidence from George Peretz QC

37 Unpublished written evidence from George Peretz QC

38 [Q341](#)

39 [Q289](#)

40 [Q72](#)

41 [Q286](#)

42 [Q395](#)

43 [Q239](#)

44 [Qq240-241](#)

45 Oral evidence taken before the House of Lords Home Affairs and Justice Sub-Committees, 3 March 2020, [Qq3 &10](#)

21. The UK wants a separate agreement, with no role for the CJEU in resolving disputes and no commitments on how the UK protects and enforces human rights. The EU has, however, said that the agreement is conditional on the UK's adherence to the ECHR with its continued effect in domestic law, so that UK citizens can rely on it in UK courts and on adequate protection of their personal data.⁴⁶ The UK has said that while cooperation will be “underpinned” by the importance attached by both the UK and the EU to human rights and data protection, the agreement “should not specify how the UK or the EU Member States should protect and enforce human rights and the rule of law within their own autonomous legal systems”.⁴⁷ Professor Barnard said that the UK was “doing its level best to ringfence or keep the European Convention on Human Rights out of the text”, and that this “clearly is a big issue for the UK and for the EU”.⁴⁸ In terms of finding a way forward, she said that one possibility was for the agreement to state that if the UK decided to abrogate human rights protection, by deciding to withdraw from the ECHR and terminating the Human Rights Act “at the same time”, then EU could terminate provisions in the agreement on law enforcement and surrender. Another approach would be to look at the UK's human rights regime in the round rather than focusing solely on the ECHR, by taking into account protections in the common law for example.⁴⁹

Ratification

22. As the transition period ends on 31 December 2020, any agreement or agreements on the future relationship will need to be reached by the end of October in order to leave time for both parties to ratify the agreement(s) and make any changes to legislation to give effect to their new obligations.⁵⁰ For the EU, this will mean at a minimum agreement in the Council (acting unanimously) and the consent of the European Parliament. If the agreement is a mixed agreement,⁵¹ each Member State will need to go through its own domestic procedures in order to ratify the agreement. This may involve regional parliaments as well as national parliaments. In the UK, any agreement will be subject to the parliamentary processes set out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, prior to ratification.

What is now required

23. The substantive progress sought by both parties has so far proved elusive, and there are significant gaps between the two sides on several important issues. But it remains in the best interest of both the UK and the EU to reach a deal. Political leadership is now essential to break the deadlock and both sides will have to compromise. We note that the high level meeting was used to endorse the plan advanced by the chief negotiators for an intensification of the talks, rather than a moment when political

46 [HMG, Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#); [HMG, The Future Relationship with the EU: The UK's Approach to Negotiations](#), 27 February 2020; [European Commission, Draft text of the Agreement on the New Partnership with the United Kingdom](#), 18 March 2020

47 [HMG, The Future Relationship with the EU: The UK's Approach to Negotiations](#), 27 February 2020

48 [Q374](#)

49 [Qq374–375](#)

50 [European Commission, Statement by Michel Barnier following Round 4 of negotiations for a new partnership between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#), 5 June 2020

51 A mixed agreement includes areas which fall within the sole competence of Member States and/or areas of shared competence where the Member States rather than the EU are exercising the competence.

leaders addressed and resolved key points of difference. We agree with both sides that the negotiations need new momentum, and for that both sides will need to show where they are willing to move.

24. The UK's and EU's respective red lines make it difficult to find common ground on "level playing field" issues. We urge the parties to look for a solution that takes as its starting point the de facto alignment of the UK and the EU when it comes to current rules and standards, and explore how the UK and the EU could be given access to their respective markets on the basis that if either side moves away from these standards or acts in a way that one side believes gives the other an unfair competitive advantage then that access could be varied. For example, progress in relation to the "level playing field" might be made if both parties considered an arrangement where the UK had the freedom to set its own level-playing field standards but, if those standards fell below the standards which were in place at the end of the transition period or if standards were changed in such a way that gave the UK an unfair competitive advantage, the EU could suspend parts of the trade agreement. An independent body would be needed to rule on whether the change gave rise to an unfair competitive advantage and whether the EU's proposed action was reasonable. In relation to subsidies, both sides could agree to have in place clear rules on the granting of subsidies/state aid that would be monitored and enforced on the EU side by the Commission and on the UK side by an independent authority. If one party considered that a subsidy granted by the other party was adversely affecting its interests, it could make a complaint to the Commission or the UK independent authority which would have to be investigated and then referred to the independent body. This could offer a way forward in the negotiations in line with the Political Declaration.

Implementation of the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol

25. On 20 May 2020, the UK Government published a command paper setting out its approach to implementing the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol.⁵² While this document has gone some way to assuaging the concerns raised by Northern Ireland stakeholders with us, and other Parliamentary Committees, significant questions remain.⁵³

26. The Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee met for the second time on 12 June 2020.⁵⁴ Maroš Šefčovič, the Co-Chair and European Commission representative, welcomed the UK's command paper. However, we note his call for further detail and reiteration of the EU's position that progress on the future relationship is "contingent on the faithful implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement".

27. The EU has made clear that timely implementation of the Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol is a prerequisite for any deal. More importantly, both parties have a responsibility to the people of Northern Ireland to ensure the Protocol works. The Government's recent command paper is a welcome start and it acknowledges that

52 HMG, [The UK's Approach to the Northern Ireland Protocol](#), 20 May 2020

53 Colin Murray and Clare Rice ([FRE0018](#)); FSB NI ([FRE0016](#)); FTA NI ([FRE0015](#)); David Phinnemore & Katy Hayward ([FRE0023](#)); House of Lords European Union Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2019–21, The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, [HL Paper 66](#), 1 June 2020; [Oral evidence taken before the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee](#), 30 April 2020; NI Business Brexit Group, [Implementing the Northern Ireland Protocol](#), 29 May 2020

54 HMG, [Second meeting of the Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee](#), 12 June 2020; European Commission, [Press statement by Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič following the second meeting of the EU-UK Joint Committee](#), 12 June 2020

checks on GB-NI trade will be required, but more detail is needed soon to ensure that businesses trading from and with Northern Ireland are ready for the end of the transition period. The Withdrawal Agreement Joint Committee has a key part to play in resolving many of the remaining areas of uncertainty, particularly in terms of deciding which goods moving from Great Britain to Northern Ireland are at risk of entering the Single Market.

The involvement of the other devolved nations in the negotiations

28. In relation to the other devolved nations Dr Kirsty Hughes told us that;

There has been just one meeting of the JMC (EN) since the UK left the EU on 31st January. That was on the 21st May – and the meeting before that was on 28th January. These simple facts illustrate plainly that the JMC (EN) is not being used as a serious forum by the UK government and that the devolved administrations have had no genuine opportunity to input to the overall strategy of the talks.⁵⁵

29. We urge the UK Government to take steps to improve the involvement of the devolved nations.

Preparing for the end of the transition period

Getting ready for January 1st

30. Alongside the negotiations, the UK and EU have until 31 December to prepare for the end of the transition period. Leaving the transition period will require the introduction of checks, controls and new infrastructure relating to customs, security, animal and plant health checks (sanitary and phytosanitary checks), transport logistics, etc. Moving goods between the UK and the EU will require documentation, for example customs declarations, that will increase costs for UK businesses.⁵⁶ Firms will also need to know whether the UK has received a data adequacy decision from the Commission,⁵⁷ which will be so important for trade in both goods and services.⁵⁸ There will be other changes. The new immigration policy, which must be in place from the 1 January 2021 recognising that Freedom of Movement has ended, will have an impact on many sectors of the economy ranging from hospitality to farming to the care sector,⁵⁹ and the UK will no longer have financial services passporting.

31. Dr Anna Jerzewska, an independent customs and trade consultant, told the Committee:

... it is virtually unprecedented for an agreement of this size and magnitude to be implemented overnight. That just does not ever happen. That is just not realistic.⁶⁰

55 Dr Kirsty Hughes ([FRE0025](#))

56 CBI ([FRE0029](#))

57 HMG, [Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom](#), para 9

58 CBI ([FRE0029](#))

59 For further commentary on this, see: UK in a Changing Europe, [The Brexit Negotiations: A Stocktake](#), 9 June 2020, pp 14–15

60 [Q351](#)

Sam Lowe, Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Reform, agreed, saying:

You can negotiate an agreement quickly. The Withdrawal Agreement was proof of that. It is unusual and it does require taking shortcuts, which can come back to bite you later, but the really big problem is on the implementation side because, even if we reach an agreement, if we move from the relationship that exists now to this future relationship overnight on 1 January, it will look on the ground as if we had left without one.⁶¹

32. Dr Lars Karlsson, the President of KGH Border Services, was more optimistic in his analysis, but agreed that clarity would be needed for businesses to prepare in time:

In my opinion it is possible to prepare for the changes... in the time available. There is a need, however, to bring clarity to what businesses need to do to prepare, and for government to support business with these preparations. This preparatory work needs to start as soon as possible.⁶²

The scale of the customs challenge

33. The introduction of customs and border infrastructure is one of the most significant and challenging aspects of preparing to leave the transition period. In May Mr Gove told us:

It is the case that, by definition, people will be filling out customs declarations, because we will have left the customs union. Whatever eventual deal we conclude with the EU, we will be outside the CU.⁶³

34. In 2018, HMRC estimated that around 255 million customs declarations might need to be made after the UK left the EU. That was around 200 million more than the existing number of declarations at the time. They also estimated some 145,000 traders who traded solely within the EU might have to make customs declarations after the UK left the EU.⁶⁴

35. In written evidence, Dr Jerzewska told us:

The biggest change that the industry and the Government need to prepare for, will be in terms of volume. Third country processes will be extended to goods flowing between the UK and the EU. Current supplies and dispatches (movements of goods within the EU) will become imports and exports. Each will require customs paperwork and formalities.⁶⁵

In subsequent oral evidence, she said:

In terms of border readiness, one of the issues here is the fact that there are a lot of different actors that need to be ready. HMRC, Border Force and companies all need to be ready, as do customs brokers, freight forwarders and port authorities. We also have certain places where this readiness will cause more of an issue than in other places. We have our ro-ro ports—roll-

61 [Q351](#)

62 Lars Karlsson ([FRE0020](#))

63 [Q244](#)

64 NAO, The Customs Declaration Service: a progress update, [HC 1124](#), Session 2017–19, 28 June 2018

65 Anna Jerzewska ([FRE0024](#))

on roll-off ports—where the readiness aspect is much more complicated than in other types of ports, because of time constraints and lack of space. These ports have special requirements and there is a need for more prep and more testing to be done by the UK authorities and port authorities.

To summarise all this, we are not ready and we are not entirely sure what we need to be ready for.⁶⁶

36. A large number of trained customs agents will also be required to process these new forms. In a letter dated 26 May, Mr Gove told us:

While there is no central government estimate for agents required, we are monitoring business preparation closely. Government support has been designed to meet the needs of the sector to build capacity by covering training and IT innovation, as well as recruitment. £34m of funding has already been made available, including £31m in grants to support training, improvements in IT and recruitment of customs agents; and £3m for learning providers to make training courses available. To date, the grants scheme has been successful in providing funding for nearly 20,000 training courses, in addition to the 870 training courses delivered by the online customs academy, 14,500 pieces of IT kit, and recruitment costs for new staff.⁶⁷

37. The industry estimate is that an additional 50,000 customs agents will be needed. Pauline Bastidon, then Head of Global and EU Policy at the Freight Transport Association, said feedback from FTA members was that this was ‘an accurate estimate, if anything a conservative one’.⁶⁸ The UK Customs Academy offers a level 4 certificate in advanced customs compliance and recognises holders of that qualification as ‘certified customs practitioners, with a ‘comprehensive understanding of customs processes and procedures’. The Academy suggests the usual study period for it is 9 months. The Academy’s level 3 qualification in customs compliance typically takes around 6 months and holders are recognised as ‘associate customs practitioners’.⁶⁹ Dr Jerzewska told us she thought. “the number in HMRC’s Customs Academy is around 1,000 people”.⁷⁰ Lars Karlsson, President KGH Border Services, told us:

... approximately 1 500 future customs experts have taken advantage of the opportunity for education and training. While several hundred students have signed up for the HMG initiated UK Customs Academy, more needs to be done to ensure that the goal of over 50 000 private sector customs service professionals is reached by the end of 2020.⁷¹

66 [Q342](#)

67 [Letter from Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to the Chair](#), 26 May 2020

68 @BastidonPauline, [We asked FTA members in early March](#), 2 June 2020

69 UK Customs Academy, [Qualifications](#), accessed 12 June 2020

70 [Q356](#)

71 Lars Karlsson ([FRE0020](#))

Implementing border controls

38. In February the Government said the UK would implement full border controls on imports coming into Great Britain from the EU. On 12 June, however, the Government announced that it had decided unilaterally to introduce these new border controls in three stages up until 1 July 2021. Mr Gove wrote:

Recognising the impact of coronavirus on businesses' ability to prepare, and following the announcement in February that the UK would implement full border controls on imports coming into Great Britain from the EU, we have unilaterally decided to introduce these new border controls in three stages up until 1 July 2021. This policy which will apply in all scenarios—irrespective of the outcome of negotiations with the EU—is a flexible and pragmatic approach that will give industry extra time to prepare for the new procedures.⁷²

This change is in line with the Government's approach in 2019 when it took strategic policy decisions to minimise disruption and provide certainty to businesses and citizens should a no deal scenario arise.⁷³ There is no indication, however, that the EU plans to delay introducing full customs checks and procedures, particularly as much of what is needed had already been set up by late 2019. Goods travelling from the UK to the EU are therefore likely to face the full range of checks from 1 January 2021. Richard Burnett, Chief Executive of the Road Haulage Association, welcomed the Government's new policy, but said that "the UK taking a more relaxed approach to checks only works one way. All the issues surrounding customs agents and preparing British business for export still stand".⁷⁴ Pauline Bastidon, then Head of Global and EU Policy at the Freight Transport Association, commented that while it was a significant and welcome U-turn, it was not a sustainable solution and it would only help in one direction (imports into the UK).⁷⁵

39. We look forward to the publication of the border operating model. We welcome the Government's pragmatic decision not to introduce full border controls on goods coming into the UK from 1 January 2021. More time is clearly needed for businesses to prepare for the new UK-EU trading arrangements, including rapid expansion of recruitment and training of customs agents. The Government should use this time to ensure that the many organisations involved in making the new border arrangements work, from HMRC to port authorities, businesses and logistics firms, are fully prepared to implement new arrangements on 1 July 2021. At a minimum this will mean the Government making information and advice available in a timely manner and engaging in discussions with different sectors to design arrangements that best fit their needs. The objective must be to deliver the certainty, stability, and predictability businesses need to help them cope with the deeply worrying economic effect of the pandemic.

40. While this approach will make it easier for UK importers, firms exporting to the EU are likely to face full border controls from 1 January 2021. The Government must ensure that these businesses know what the rules and customs arrangements are

72 Letter from Rt Hon Michael Gove MP, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to select committee chairs, 12 June 2020

73 HM Government, [Implications for Business and Trade of a No Deal Exit on 29 March 2019](#), 26 February 2019

74 FT, [UK in U-turn on full post-Brexit border controls](#), 11 June 2020

75 @BastidonPauline, [I agree with @SamuelMarcLowe](#), 12 June 2020

going to be in time to be ready for the end of the transition period. Trade in goods represents only part of the UK's overall trade with the EU; 41% of our exports to the EU is accounted for by services.⁷⁶ Firms in sectors ranging from hospitality to broadcasting to financial services also have concerns about preparing their businesses to operate under the terms of the future relationship from 1 January 2021. This will be especially challenging as much of the detail will not be known until autumn at the earliest. The Government should actively seek the views of these sectors and show the same pragmatic flexibility when responding to their needs.

Additional preparation for WTO terms

41. Much of the preparation required for the end of the transition period will need to be undertaken regardless of whether a Free Trade Agreement is concluded. As Sam Lowe told us, “due to the nature of the future relationship that is on the table, most of these questions apply whether there is a free trade agreement or not.”⁷⁷ However, there will be some additional contingencies that the Government should consider in case the UK and EU move to trading on World Trade Organisation terms on 1 January 2021.

42. When the prospect of no agreement arose previously, both the UK and the EU made their own preparations for the possibility of that event. The European Commission developed a Contingency Action Plan and a series of unilateral measures.⁷⁸ The UK published a series of technical notes and guidance to help preparations in the event of no deal.⁷⁹ It is unclear whether the Government has undertaken any similar planning in the event that no FTA is agreed with the EU. On 9 June 2020, when asked if the Government had initiated any planning for the event of no deal, Penny Mordaunt, Paymaster General, told the House of Commons:

It would be prudent and wise for us to prepare for every scenario, just as we have always done.⁸⁰

43. ***The Government should set out in its response to this Report how it is preparing for circumstances in which no agreement on the future relationship is reached by the end of the transition period. This should include what support it intends to give to sectors that would be particularly affected, for example by the introduction of tariffs on certain products. The Government should also set out the preparations it believes are needed whether or not an agreement is reached and publish an assessment in the Autumn of both how far advanced these preparations are and the likelihood that they will be completed in time. This assessment should cover which measures will be needed by 1 January 2021 and how they will be affected by the plan to bring in full border controls on imports coming into Great Britain from the EU in three stages.***

76 UK exports to EU in 2018: £291 bn; UK services exports to EU in 2018: £120 bn. See: HoC Library, Statistics on UK-EU trade, [SN 7851](#), p 4; HoC Library, Trade in services and Brexit, [SN 8586](#), 20 December 2019, p 9

77 [Q343](#)

78 European Commission, [Preparing for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 30 March 2019: a Contingency Action Plan](#), 13 Nov 2018; European Commission, [Preparing for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 30 March 2019: Implementing the Commission's Contingency Action Plan](#), 19 Dec 2018

79 HMG, [UK government's preparations for a 'no deal' scenario](#), Updated 21 December 2018

80 HC Deb, 9 June 2020, [col 171](#)

Impact of the pandemic and engagement with business

44. The CBI told us that during the pandemic business “preparations for the end of transition haven’t just stalled, they’ve gone backwards” with staff reassigned, furloughed or laid off, and cash and stock reserves run down.⁸¹ The logistics sector has had to prioritise work to keep essential supplies moving during the lockdown and it will have been particularly hard for the sector to do that and engage with the process for negotiating a future relationship with the EU and preparing for the end of the transition period.

45. The Government said it would engage and consult with business “to invite contributions about the economic implications of the future relationship” in the Spring.⁸² The British Retail Consortium has called for “greater engagement” with the UK Government on preparations for trade after January 2021”, following the disruption caused by the coronavirus, stating:

we are acutely aware of the potential disruption to UK consumers of a thin deal with the EU or a lack of preparations to reduce border friction. We are now beginning discussions again with the UK Government, but retailers and their suppliers now face a rush to ensure supply chains are functioning by the end of the year.⁸³

46. Dr Jerzewska told the Committee that

A lot of the companies left the preparation work for 2020, and we obviously know that they now have other priorities with COVID. With what is happening right now, companies are struggling to survive. They are not necessarily thinking of January 2021; they are thinking about making it to the next month and they are thinking about their employees.⁸⁴

Sam Lowe put the case more starkly, telling the Committee that

asking businesses to prepare for a fundamental change to their trading relationships at the same time as dealing with the economic fallout of COVID-19 is very irresponsible.⁸⁵

47. The pandemic has posed unprecedented challenges to businesses in both the UK and EU and has naturally set back preparations for the new relationship. The economic impact of coronavirus on the global economy will be very severe, and the Government needs to assess the additional effects that the new trading relationship will have on firms that are already facing significant difficulties. The pandemic may permanently change business models in sectors such as hospitality and tourism, and these businesses may in future have different needs and priorities than they did in February 2020. The Government needs to engage with businesses that have been affected by the pandemic and ensure it takes into account their capacity to prepare. *The Government should develop, and publish, an economic and readiness assessment showing the evidence it is using to determine how well prepared the UK economy is to leave the transition period.*

81 CBI ([FRE0029](#))

82 HMG, [The Future Relationship with the EU](#), 27 February 2020, para 12

83 BRC ([FRE0028](#))

84 [Q354](#)

85 [Q358](#)

Formal minutes

Wednesday 17 June

Virtual Meeting

Members present:

Hilary Benn, in the Chair

Joanna Cherry	Nicola Richards
Mark Eastwood	Gary Sambrook
Mark Fletcher	Barry Sheerman
Sally-Ann Hart	Jane Stevenson
Antony Higginbotham	Wes Streeting
Dr Rupa Huq	Matt Vickers
Stephen Kinnock	Dr Jamie Wallis
Seema Malhotra	Dr Philippa Whitford
Nigel Mills	

Draft Report (*The need for progress in the negotiations*), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Question put, That the Chair's draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 47 read and agreed to.

Ordered, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned till Tuesday 23 June at 10.00 am

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Wednesday 11 March 2020

The **Rt Hon Michael Gove MP**, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Minister for the Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office

[Q1–79](#)

Tuesday 17 March 2020

Stephen Booth, Head of the Britain in the World Project, Policy Exchange; **Christophe Bondy**, Partner, International Trade and Investment Law group of Steptoe & Johnson LLP, London; **Professor Anand Menon**, Professor of European Politics and Foreign Affairs, Kings College London

[Q80–137](#)

Monday 27 April 2020

The **Rt Hon Michael Gove MP**, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Cabinet Office

[Q138–232](#)

Wednesday 27 May 2020

The **Rt Hon Michael Gove MP**, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Cabinet Office; **David Frost**, Prime Minister's Europe Adviser and Chief Negotiator of Task Force Europe, Cabinet Office

[Q233–335](#)

Monday 8 June 2020

Michel Barnier, Head of Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom, European Commission

[Q389–419](#)

Wednesday 10 June 2020

Sam Lowe, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Reform; **Professor Catherine Barnard**, Professor of EU law and Employment Law, University of Cambridge; **Dr Anna Jerzewska, PhD**, Independent Customs and Trade Consultant UN International Trade Centre

[Q336–388](#)

Published written evidence

The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

FRE numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete.

- 1 Customs Clearance Consortium ([FRE0011](#))
- 2 Dawar, Dr Kamala ([FRE0009](#))
- 3 Dee, Karen ([FRE0030](#))
- 4 Dennison, Pamela ([FRE0015](#))
- 5 European Policy Centre ([FRE0007](#))
- 6 Fairburn, Dame Carolyn ([FRE0029](#))
- 7 Faull, Sir Jonathan ([FRE0004](#))
- 8 Garner, Oliver ([FRE0017](#))
- 9 Golding, Jane ([FRE0014](#))
- 10 Hughes, Dr Kirsty ([FRE0025](#))
- 11 Jerzewska, Dr Anna ([FRE0024](#))
- 12 Karlsson, Dr Lars ([FRE0020](#))
- 13 Kings College London ([FRE0008](#))
- 14 Lamont, Sam ([FRE0013](#))
- 15 Lydgate, Dr Emily ([FRE0027](#))
- 16 Make UK ([FRE0006](#))
- 17 McKenzie, Tina ([FRE0016](#))
- 18 Murray, Mr Colin ([FRE0018](#))
- 19 Petherbridge, Luke ([FRE0021](#))
- 20 Phinnemore, Professor David ([FRE0023](#))
- 21 Seraphus Solicitors ([FRE0010](#))
- 22 Simmonds, Gavin ([FRE0012](#))
- 23 Singham, Shanker ([FRE0003](#))
- 24 Theochari, Harry ([FRE0026](#))
- 25 Usherwood, Professor Simon ([FRE0005](#))
- 26 Wilson, Katie ([FRE0028](#))

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website. The reference number of the Government's response to each Report is printed in brackets after the HC printing number.

Session 2019–21

First Report	Progress of the negotiations on the UK's Future Relationship with the EU	HC 458
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