Examination of witness
Jessica Cox.
Q94 The Chairman: Jessica Cox, good morning and thank you for being with us. We realise that you are under a time constraint, as we are. The issues are massive and we cannot solve them all, but we can learn from your wisdom as we go along. Please remember that the entire session is televised. There will be a transcript, which you can change if it does not fit with your idea of what you say. Again, thank you for being with us. This is a difficult time. We are told that the level of nuclear risk is rising. We have had ominous developments in relation to the INF Treaty[1] and we have had predictions that the NPT[2] system is in prospect of serious danger. We have a general feeling that the arms control symmetry of the 20th century is giving way to an asymmetry and confusion in the 21st. Tell us, first, whether you agree with that negative assessment, or are we too alarmist?
Jessica Cox: Thank you, Lord Chairman and Members of the Committee, for asking me to come to speak to you here today on these very important issues. As I am sure you have heard from many other witnesses, the NPT continues to be the foundation of our global non-proliferation regime nearly 50 years since it entered into force. Its fundamental bargain—that all states will work to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, that all states will work towards disarmament and that all states can access the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy—remain sound today. NATO, consistent with those goals, is committed to seeking a safer world for all and to taking practical steps and effective measures to create the conditions for further nuclear disarmament negotiations, with the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. That said, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.
Unfortunately, the system established by the NPT is under stress today. Countries such as Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea are expanding their nuclear arsenals, although France, the United Kingdom and the United States have all made significant nuclear reductions since the end of the Cold War and NATO has itself reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe by 85% since the end of the Cold War. However, the pace of disarmament has slowed in recent years and numbers in the West are largely holding firm. The most notable non-proliferation win within the last decade—preventing Iran from going nuclear—is fragile at present. The rise of the nuclear weapons ban movement, which culminated in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, threatens to undermine the strong and fair safeguards and monitoring regime governing peaceful energy technology and eroding long-standing norms of behaviour.
As Director of the Nuclear Policy Directorate at NATO, I am keenly aware of all these challenges. In my role, I focus on ensuring that NATO’s nuclear capabilities provide an effective deterrent against potential threats for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance. Given the nature of this work, there will be some issues that I may not be able to go into today, but I will strive to answer all your questions as thoroughly as I can within that constraint.
In response to your question, Lord Howell, about living in dangerous times, I agree that the risks posed by nuclear weapons have increased in recent years, particularly the threat from nuclear weapons in the hands of state actors. Russia’s continuing belligerent behaviour, including its nuclear rhetoric and destabilising actions in Europe, has brought the Euro-Atlantic theatre closer to military conflict than at any time since the end of the Cold War. As I mentioned, many of the nations that possess nuclear weapons are expanding their arsenals. With increased tensions between the US and Russia, there is a real threat of great power conflicts with a nuclear dimension and, of course, as nuclear weapons arsenals expand around the world, particularly of non-strategic nuclear weapons, there is also a threat of terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons or materials, which remains a significant challenge.
That said, I do not want to leave you all with the impression that I think that nuclear use is imminent. I believe that all responsible nations with nuclear weapons, and certainly those in NATO, know that the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict would, as we have said in successive NATO nuclear communiqués, fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. All bets would be off and we would be in unknown territory. Therefore, it is vital that we constantly evaluate the safety, security and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal so that we can make sure that our deterrent capabilities work and work well.
On the INF Treaty and the broader arms control architecture, it is a bit too early to tell what the end of the treaty will mean for nuclear risks in Europe. Certainly, NATO is in the process of evaluating how Russia’s development and deployment of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles affect our deterrence and defence posture. NATO’s deterrence and defence include nuclear capabilities, conventional capabilities and missile defences. NATO is in the middle of this process, so I do not want to tell you where we will go, as I do not know yet, but I do know that we will have to take meaningful steps to ensure that Russia is not at any significant military advantage through the development and fielding of these systems. At the same time, any steps to enhance the defence and deterrence of NATO will be accompanied by our continuing call to Russia to return to compliance with INF and restore this important pillar of Euro-Atlantic security. I shall stop there but will be happy to expand more on NATO’s position on INF and deterrence as our discussion proceeds.
The Chairman: Thank you very much. In a moment we would like to pursue questions on the meaningful steps, but we turn, first, to Lord Hannay.
Q95 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: You mentioned INF. I understand that you cannot say what NATO’s response will be to the Russian breaches of the INF treaty and the move to withdraw from it by the United States, matched by a similar move by the Russians, but can you tell us what the options and possible courses are for NATO? Without indicating which ones NATO will choose, can you indicate the possible course of action? Before you answer that, can I also ask you about NATO’s attitude to New START? It is getting fairly close to the date when it could cease to exist, if not renewed. Does NATO have a view on the New START? Presumably it welcomed it at the time and continues to welcome the constraints that it applies to the nuclear arsenals of the two biggest holders of nuclear weapons in the world. Can you say a word about NATO’s attitude towards the continuation or non-continuation of New START?
Jessica Cox: I do not know that I can get into the specific options that are under consideration, but what I can say is twofold. First, the Secretary-General has made it clear that we do not feel that reintroducing nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missiles into the European theatre is an appropriate response to Russia’s development of the SSC-8. However, we will be looking at the other dimensions of the problem that we have in the Euro-Atlantic theatre. We will be looking at ensuring that our deterrence and defence across the spectrum of nuclear, conventional and missile defences remain sound and effective and that we are able to counter the threat that Russia poses from the deployment of intermediate-range cruise missiles. Without going into more detail, which I think would be premature at this moment from the point of view of where our discussions are, that is the spectrum that we are looking at right now.
NATO has been clear that New START was, at the time it was signed, beneficial to strategic stability, and several NATO allies have repeated that loudly in recent weeks. Although NATO has not reaffirmed its position in a public statement, we believe that New START contributes to strategic stability more broadly and, in that sense, is a net benefit for NATO. To the extent that there is an opportunity for the United States and Russia to extend New START, I think that NATO allies would welcome it.
Q96 Lord Grocott: I am sure that you will not be able to give a short answer to this, but we will try. The NATO statement on the NPT dated 20 September 2017, which refers to the Warsaw meeting, says, ‘Allies emphasise their strong commitment to full implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’. How will we know when we have got there?
Jessica Cox: That is a great question. Inherent in the NPT is the goal of having a world without nuclear weapons, and it is one that NATO certainly subscribes to. Certainly, it has been working towards that goal both in relation to its own nuclear arsenal and more broadly, encouraging other countries. NATO takes seriously our contributions towards creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. To the extent that we have tried to instil measures step by step to get us to that goal, we have done so.
Lord Grocott: Can you spell out a few of those?
Jessica Cox: Sure. At NATO we have made significant progress in this regard. As I mentioned, we have reduced the number of nuclear weapons deployed on European soil significantly—by about 85%—since the end of the Cold War. We have also reduced the reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO’s strategy more broadly. Allies individually have taken steps as well and we continue to reaffirm the benefits of arms control and disarmament whenever we have the opportunity to do so. It is not under my purview as the Nuclear Policy Director but we have another directorate that looks specifically at the step-by-step process towards arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. In that context, work is being done to further promote these values and steps that can be taken and to promote working with NATO allies more broadly on creating the right conditions.
The problem that we face right now is that further reductions have to be based on the principle of reciprocity, both in a US-Russia context and in a NATO context. It is clear that the current conditions are not right for further reductions. Russia has rejected any additional talks about disarmament, not just on the INF front but more broadly. Repeated attempts by both the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration to initiate negotiations on Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons have been rebuffed by Russia. We see Russia expanding its arsenal of nuclear weapons and deploying them on NATO’s borders. Therefore, although we try to do what we can to create the right conditions, we have to balance that with the security environment in which we live. Arms control and disarmament require willing partners but right now we do not have a willing partner in Russia.
Lord Grocott: We are talking about Russia’s deployment on NATO’s border as a potentially provocative act, but is it not the case that what has moved is NATO’s border—in the last 15 years, at any rate? Russia has not moved but NATO’s border has.
Jessica Cox: Certainly, Russia’s recent deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad is a new movement.
Q97 The Chairman: We heard from earlier witnesses that the proliferation issue was not just geographical but technological in the sense that there is a blurring between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. I am quite surprised that you do not see this as an almost existential threat to the NATO structure and to the central European powers. Do I have that right?
Jessica Cox: I absolutely think that it is a threat to the European security architecture. The blurring of the lines in the development of dual-capability systems is clearly a threat to NATO. It reduces our ability to determine what is coming at us. It certainly makes it more difficult for us to determine an appropriate and proportionate response. One reason why Russia’s development and deployment of SSC-8 missiles is so problematic from a NATO perspective is that it reduces the warning time and we will not know whether we have been hit with a nuclear or conventional weapon until it happens. That lowers the threshold for nuclear use and makes responding, and figuring out how to respond, much more difficult in a time of crisis, so, yes, this is very much of concern to us.
Q98 Lord Reid of Cardowan: Good morning. We learned this morning that a NATO Summit is to be held in London in December, I think.[3] What part will nuclear deterrence and reducing nuclear risk play in that conference? Are you able to say at this stage? The second question relates to a rather more complex matter. We read—and indeed we have heard testimony from witnesses—about the increased complexity of the risks that we face compared with, say, the situation back in the 1970s in a relatively bipolar world. I can put it no better than what Rear Admiral John Gower said when talking about signalling and the interpretation of signalling being the core of responsible nuclear weapon ownership. He said, ‘It was a difficult task during the Cold War, and shaping perceptions and communication of nuclear weapon intent has become more complex, nuanced, and important in a world with multiple nuclear powers and raising tensions. A rapidly evolving information and communications paradigm that is outstripping the ability of traditional signalling to achieve coherence and stability has added to this challenge’. That would no doubt encompass cyber, cybercommunications, autonomous weapons systems, decision-making and so on. Basically my question is: how do you rate that complexity and the difficulty of distinguishing the signal from the noise that that creates?
Jessica Cox: First, I did not know that there was going to be a London Summit. I thought that it was a leaders’ meeting, but that is my information. The programme for that meeting will probably be decided after the defence ministerial meeting this summer. It is just in the cycle of where we are. However, I fully anticipate that whatever we will have done at that point on INF responding to Russia’s development and deployment of intermediate-range cruise missiles will be on that agenda. Certainly, if there are other developments between now and then on Russia and its nuclear weapons arsenals—even statements over the weekend from the Kremlin saying that it is doubling down on hypersonics and converting the Kalibr into an intermediate-range ground-launched system—those actions will be contemplated and discussed. However, I would be overstepping my pay grade if I were to say what specifically would be on the agenda. The world in which we live and the security environment in which we are operating are risky and complex, and Heads of State will have to contemplate those issues, as they do at every summit meeting.
On your question about distinguishing the signal from the noise and the complexity of the environment that we are in right now, the signalling question is of critical importance. It is something that we at NATO and nuclear weapons states more broadly need to practise and think about in greater detail. Signalling is really about understanding how your adversary will react to something that you do, so that you can calibrate the message that you are trying to send. One way in which you can do that is by understanding your adversaries better—that is, through intelligence and study, and through dialogue and discussion with them. For instance, we recently held discussions between NATO and Russia in the Russia-NATO Council. Things like that are critical to helping us to calibrate an appropriate response to an action, whether in peacetime or in a crisis. This is one of the biggest challenges that we have in the nuclear domain because the consequences are potentially so grave.
Lord Reid of Cardowan: I have one final point. Is this complexity so profound that it would justify or provoke a NATO nuclear deterrence review, as has been argued by some people?
Jessica Cox: We continuously review our deterrence posture and policies at NATO to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is safe, secure and effective. We were given specific guidance on doing that in the 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture Review. It mandated that we continually review our nuclear deterrence policy. Do I think that that issue would kick off a whole new review cycle? No, but it is something that we are looking at as part of our broader and ongoing review of issues.
Of even more concern than the signalling issue is the development of new technologies, with the increasing capabilities of cyber, space domains and lethal autonomous weapons. What worries me more is that, as you see more of these capabilities coming online and being actualised in a military context, you will start to see entanglement—the term that is now thrown around in publications—between these systems. I really worry about making sure that we reduce any vulnerabilities in NATO’s nuclear forces, that our command, control and communications remain sound, safe and secure, and that our nuclear infrastructure is survivable—that it is able to face the threats that we see coming down the road. To me, that is not just a question of whether we are able to use our arsenal and tools to signal effectively; it is about making sure that nuclear weapons remain effective, even in the face of all these new technologies.
That is a priority for me personally in this position. It will take investment and a real understanding of the potential threats that we face—more so than just asking what will happen if there is a cyber hack against nukes or something like that. It requires a real understanding of the challenges that we face. I think that some are underplayed and some are probably overplayed, so it is a case of understanding what the threats are and then investing to make sure that we stay ahead of the potential challenges.
Q99 Baroness Hilton of Eggardon: We turn to something simpler—the so-called Ban Treaty. I wondered how much it had been discussed within NATO and whether you have a view on its substance and have been involved in the negotiations.
Jessica Cox: On the Ban Treaty itself?
Baroness Hilton of Eggardon: Yes.
Jessica Cox: I have not been involved in the negotiations, but this is certainly an issue on which there have been substantial discussions in NATO, resulting in the 2017 statement.[4] Allies remain very strongly opposed to the Ban Treaty. They have repeatedly stated in the 2017 communiqué and in follow-on documents that the Ban Treaty undermines the core tenets of the NPT. We do not believe that the Ban Treaty accounts for the realities of the world that we face today. We do not think that a treaty that does not account for those realities will be effective in reducing nuclear arsenals and getting full disarmament. It does not enhance our security and it might actually undermine some of the safeguards and part of the regime that is already in place. That is why no NATO Ally has signed or ratified the treaty.
The other issue of concern to NATO is the precedence for international law. NATO strongly rejects the notion that some have put out that this treaty changes the legal status of nuclear weapons under the NPT for nuclear weapons states. In addition, we do not feel that it will put any new obligations on any of our countries with respect to nuclear weapons possession, our security assurances or NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements. Allies are strongly unified in their belief that this treaty does not contribute to customary international law.
The Chairman: You are saying that NATO is strongly against the Ban Treaty, but we heard from an earlier witness that one NATO member, Austria, is strongly in favour of it.
Jessica Cox: Austria is not a member of NATO.
Baroness Hilton of Eggardon: Perhaps I may follow that up. I think that the proponents of the Ban Treaty would say that it has demonstrative moral value, rather than practical value. Would you go along with that?
Jessica Cox: Absolutely. I think that the issue that the Ban Treaty is trying to solve is the perceived lack of progress in global disarmament, but that is a bit of a false dichotomy. Nuclear weapons arsenals have been significantly reduced across Russia and the United States, as well as in other countries, since the end of the Cold War. Although NATO strongly believes that a world without nuclear weapons is the right goal, and that is our aspiration, you cannot divorce that goal from the security environment that we face.
One challenge from the Ban Treaty is that it does not seek to address any of the security challenges that are making it difficult for further disarmament to take place: it does not seek to resolve issues between India and Pakistan; it does not put the spotlight on Russia’s increasing number of non-strategic nuclear weapons; and it is not solving our challenge with North Korea. It just sets out a lofty goal that does not even account for the full range of safeguards and the long history of the body of work that has been done under the NPT to make sure that we have in place a system that provides benefit for states in the form of access to peaceful nuclear energy through states’ adherence to the NPT. The Ban Treaty can be very damaging and erode some of the principles. It gives some countries an ‘out’ for not tackling the hard challenges that we need to tackle—that is, really gaining an understanding of, and finding solutions to, some of the conditions that keep nuclear weapons in the world.
Q100 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: What are the implications for NATO’s nuclear posture of the fact that the three nuclear weapons states in NATO each give quite different negative security assurances? Are these matters discussed in NATO? Is there a case for trying to arrive at a unified approach to negative security assurances, rather than having these rather different approaches, which are quite confusing, I suspect, for countries outside NATO as well as non-nuclear weapons states in NATO?
Jessica Cox: Although there are differences between the three declaratory policies and the negative security assurances, they are not tremendously far apart. However, it is absolutely critical that NATO’s declaratory policy is in line with those of its three member states, particularly the United States, because of its extended deterrence, and the United Kingdom. France, of course, does not participate in nuclear planning at NATO, so it is a separate case. The United States has a much broader set of goals and objectives with its declaratory policy and its negative security assurances, and with the principles and tenets that it sets out. That applies also to the UK.
The declaratory policies of the United States, the UK and France are outlined from a national perspective. The NATO declaratory policy, formulated within the Nuclear Planning Group—our decision-making body on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence issues—is then tied to what is stated by the three nuclear weapons states but does not duplicate them, because we have a different environment and slightly different challenges from those of our nuclear weapons allies. I think that the approach that we take is the right one and it sets forth more clearly what NATO believes its declaratory policy to be.
NATO has a fairly ambiguous declaratory policy on purpose, really, because of the variety of the scenarios that we could face and because of the unique nature of extended deterrence and our burden-sharing arrangements. Although there has been some adaptation and updating of our declaratory policy throughout the years, it has actually remained fairly consistent and, I hope, straightforward, reducing confusion. It sets out that any nuclear use will fundamentally alter the nature of a crisis, that nuclear weapons are unique and that the nuclear weapons deployed in NATO and our nuclear forces are for deterrence purposes and to prevent coercion and promote peace. Those are the foundational statements of our declaratory policy that rest also within the policies of our nuclear members.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: This is an age when Russia has been playing about with chemical weapons, for example, both in this country and in Syria, where it seems to have colluded over the retention of a chemical weapons capability by the Syrian regime. Therefore, some of the security assurances that refer to perhaps using nuclear weapons in the context of the use of chemical weapons is a pretty large widening in scope. Surely that is quite different from the situation in which countries have said that they would use nuclear weapons only in a nuclear deterrence context. They are quite different things, are they not?
Jessica Cox: Yes, but those are national positions. The United States has indicated that there are several cases where it would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons for a non-nuclear strategic attack. We at NATO have said that, if the fundamental security of any NATO Ally is threatened, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to address that threat and to impose consequences on any adversary, which would far outweigh the benefits that any adversary would hope to achieve. We do not outline specific cases or tie our hands to specific circumstances, but fundamentally, although NATO has nuclear forces, with US deployed weapons and the dual-capable aircraft that support them, we are also reliant on the United States and the United Kingdom as the nuclear umbrella—as our security guarantee. Therefore, to limit what we say vis-à-vis those nations’ declaratory policies would be difficult. We have striven to state very clearly that nuclear use would bring about unacceptable consequences for any adversary and could put additional constraints on it or add in certain elements.
Lord Reid of Cardowan: I know that time is getting on, but this is quite important. When you say that NATO would not or could not be constrained by the Americans having a particular policy, are we to understand that at present it is open to NATO to respond to a non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons?
Jessica Cox: That has never been either affirmed or denied from a NATO context. It would certainly be a very difficult position for NATO to be in, but we have an ambiguous declaratory policy. We have specifically stated that NATO’s nuclear weapons are for deterrence and to prevent coercion, promote peace and deter aggression, but we have never put out a position either affirming or denying how NATO would respond to a non-nuclear strategic attack.
Lord Reid of Cardowan: So there is no policy of no first strike.
Jessica Cox: No, there is no no-first-strike policy at NATO.
The Chairman: But is that not a green light, further down the command structure, for field operators to say, ‘We need to use something really strong now. Let’s go for tactical nuclear weapons’? Does that not open rather dangerous doors?
Jessica Cox: Absolutely not. NATO also operates on a principle of political control over our nuclear decision-making. There is no delegation of authority to commanders to identify when to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. It would be done through the Nuclear Planning Group, either at the ministerial level with Defence Ministers or with ambassadors at the permanent representative level. They would be the ones making any decisions on the deployment of nuclear weapons, on moving them around or on doing anything in a nuclear context. That is all done at the political level and there is full political control.
The Chairman: The last question is from Baroness Anelay on what the UK can contribute.
Q101 Baroness Anelay of St Johns: This follows on from the broader approach of NATO as a group of Allies. Lord Hannay spotlighted the issue of the nuclear weapons states having different negative security assurances. What about the UK? What is your assessment of our contribution to NATO’s nuclear policy? You have just talked about the political decision-making, but how do you assess our contribution to NATO’s nuclear policy? Can you also say something about our contribution within the command structure of NATO?
Jessica Cox: The United Kingdom is a very strong contributor to nuclear policy in NATO. It is one of the two nuclear countries—the other being the US—that contribute to the Nuclear Planning Group, as I said before. France does not contribute now, and never has contributed, to any nuclear planning at NATO. The United Kingdom has a very strong and clear voice in that process. It is often on the front line in nuclear matters, bringing to the fore issues such as President Putin’s speech last March and making sure that the Nuclear Planning Group and its subordinate committees were discussing and addressing it, and thinking through the implications.
Obviously, the UK’s most tangible contribution is that of its deterrent forces: its commitment to its independent submarine-based deterrent, its investment in the replacement of the Vanguard with the Dreadnought, and its continuous at-sea presence. Although NATO has independent DCA forces,[5] the UK is part of NATO’s deterrence, and NATO’s forces would not operate independently of the extended deterrence of the United Kingdom and the United States.
Additionally, the United Kingdom has been proactive in contributing to what we call leadership focus on nuclear issues within NATO. This is making sure that our leaders and policymakers fully understand the nuclear mission. I believe that the UK has hosted both the North Atlantic Council—the NAC—and the NATO Military Committee at Faslane to demonstrate the nuclear capabilities there. You have also hosted visits to London, Aldermaston and Faslane for NATO subject matter experts. Those events all bolster the community’s nuclear understanding.
One thing that we constantly struggle with at NATO is ensuring that we have very educated permanent representatives, ambassadors and subject matter experts. Most countries do not grow up with a nuclear culture—they do not have nuclear weapons—so the United Kingdom’s contribution to the discussions, its expertise and its understanding of nuclear deterrence and nuclear-deterrence-related issues are a critical part of education in NATO more broadly and on nuclear deterrence and policymaking in particular. They are a critical part of the work that we do at NATO.
Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I also asked about the command structure.
Jessica Cox: Of course. Within the current command structure, the chairman of the Military Committee is from the United Kingdom and is of four-star rank. People from the UK are basically at all levels of the military command structure at NATO, both on the civilian side—on my team, I have my colleague, Ian, who is here—and on the military side as well. The voices of the United Kingdom and France are also vital in helping our military colleagues understand the role of nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence and nuclear signalling. Because the United Kingdom has experience and understands these issues, that lends greater weight and credence to what it says in those forums.
The Chairman: Ms Cox, unless there are any further questions, and because of the time constraint, we will let you go to your next engagement. Thank you for sharing your views with us. They are very important to us in trying to assess this fast-changing situation. NATO, like every other organisation, faces completely new challenges. We are grateful to you for giving us your wisdom on this. Thank you very much indeed.
Jessica Cox: Thank you.
