Scottish Affairs Committee
Oral evidence: Scotland and the High North, HC 804
Wednesday 25 January 2017
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 25 January 2017.
Members present: Pete Wishart (Chair); Deidre Brock; Mr Christopher Chope; Margaret Ferrier; Chris Law; and Anna Soubry.
Questions 1-69
Witnesses
Professor Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Author and Academic; Dr Dwayne Menezes, Director, Polar Research and Policy Initiative; and Rod Downie, Polar Programme Lead, WWF–UK.
Witnesses: Professor Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Dr Dwayne Menezes and Rod Downie.
Q1 Chair: We welcome our three guests to our first session in an inquiry—I think I speak for all the Committee—that we are finding particularly interesting, exciting and are looking forward very much to conducting. You are our first three guests in the evidence on Scotland’s relationship with the High North. We will start things off by asking who you are, who you represent and if you have anything in the way of a short introductory statement. We usually go from left to right, but I am feeling a bit sort of funny today, so we will start right to left. Mr Downie?
Rod Downie: Thank you and good afternoon everyone. My name is Rod Downie. I lead the Polar Programme for WWF here in the UK. We are a global conservation organisation with a vision for a world in which people and nature can thrive. We have offices in seven of the eight Arctic states, where we work across the conservation agenda on issues of governance, sustainable development, climate change and biodiversity conservation. We also participate as an observer to the Arctic Council. We have done so since its beginning in 1996.
We very much welcome the Committee focusing on Scotland’s interests in the north, but of course it comes at a time when the Arctic is very much at a crossroads. Climate change is rapidly transforming the Arctic ecosystems, industrial development is increasing and stewardship of the Arctic is not keeping pace. Personally, as someone who comes from Dumfries and Galloway, I feel the connection very strongly between Scotland and the Arctic. Every year, usually around the middle of October, when the barnacle geese from Svalbard fly in to locations like Caerlaverock, and other places along the Solway coast, we are indeed the Arctic’s closest neighbour.
Dr Menezes: I am Dwayne Menezes and founding director of the Polar Research & Policy Initiative, a UK-based international, independent think-tank dedicated to the Arctic and the Antarctic. Needless to say, this inquiry is very relevant to what we do, which is why we welcome the inquiry and welcome the opportunity to contribute to it.
Partly, the role we try to fulfil is to facilitate, both within the UK and across the Commonwealth, a crucial, sustained, high level, high impact dialogue between the different stakeholders dealing with the Arctic, right from governance, non-state actors, indigenous peoples, explorers, journalists and also try to connect producers of research with end users.
We believe the Arctic is critical to a number of the UK’s vital national interests. We believe there is both the need and the opportunity for Scotland to carve out a greater role for itself in Arctic affairs, and we definitely see Scottish engagement with the Arctic as something entirely independent from other political issues that may vex the Scottish political system.
Q2 Chair: I am grateful. Professor Johnstone, I understand you have come in from Genoa today to join us.
Professor Johnstone: Yes.
Chair: We are very grateful for that. Please.
Professor Johnstone: Thank you very much for inviting me to take part in this discussion. I am Rachael Lorna Johnstone, Professor of Law at the University of Akureyri in Iceland, University of Greenland. I am originally from Scotland. I grew up in Caithness but I have been gone for many, many years.
Anything I say today is in my own personal capacity and does not represent my university’s views. I would like to let my written statement speak for itself, and I hope you will have an opportunity to review that. But there is one priority for the Arctic and that is to make sure that any engagement recognises the peoples who live there, first and foremost, and does not see it as an empty frontier region to be colonised and exploited. I think that sometimes non-Arctic countries can go a little bit wrong by looking at it as a resource opportunity rather than a place where people have been living for thousands of years.
If I could just add, happy Burns Day to you.
Q3 Chair: I am grateful to all of you. As you were getting settled, we determined that Scotland is, in fact, 369.29 miles from the Arctic Circle, which actually makes the Arctic Circle closer to Scotland than London. I am glad we were able to sort that out. As a first very general question, other than our close proximity: why should Scotland have an interest in what is happening in the Arctic? We will start with you, Professor Johnstone.
Professor Johnstone: Thank you. I think Scotland has a number of things in common with the Arctic that differentiates it from the rest of the UK, a number of areas of expertise and practice that can be useful. We can see that, for example, in Nicola Sturgeon’s recent signing of the memorandum of understanding on tourism, but we can also see connections, for example, in the challenges of delivering rural healthcare services, education. For the last 20 years, Caithness has been battling attempts to downgrade the maternity hospital. These are experiences we see throughout the Arctic of problems of trying to make sure that people have the services where they need them.
In Scotland we also have a different approach on energy policy, especially looking at renewable energy. We have experience in trying to provide supply to off-grid communities—again, things that can be very welcome in the High North. We can see problems of transport, challenges in demographics: for example, ageing populations, losing communities from rural societies, especially smart young people who go off to university and don’t come back. How can we keep them or how can we bring them back?
Finally, the work you have done in revitalising the Gaelic language in Scotland has lessons that can be shared through the Arctic with all the minority languages that are under severe threat.
Dr Menezes: I do believe Scotland has reasons romantic and historical but also reasons practical for having great interest in the Arctic. When we look at the Arctic, I would not refer just to the Arctic Ocean but also to the Arctic Council and member states, so they are very much looking at Scotland as both a near-Arctic but also a potentially Nordic player. When it comes to its historical background, in relation to Viking history or to cultural festivals, Scotland still celebrates or commemorates that Viking heritage, to the understanding of this entire approach today about looking to Nordic models for how to move Scotland forward on various aspects of contemporary policy.
There is an enormous amount Scotland could gain from closer co-operation with its Nordic neighbours, with melting polar icecaps, increased navigation in the Arctic. Of course, there is going to be greater maritime traffic in the waters north of Scotland. There is an enormous opportunity for Scotland to look into what the future holds here and how Scotland can best explore it and exploit the opportunities opening up, from shipping to fisheries and the energy sector and anything else on trade. That would be our reason for advocating greater interest on behalf of Scotland in the High North.
Rod Downie: Rather than repeating much of what my two colleagues have already said, I will just highlight three areas where I think Scotland has a particular interest in the Arctic. First of all, scientific excellence and innovation. Clearly, science needs to underpin good governance of the Arctic, and Scotland’s science is well placed to support that.
Secondly, climate policy. Scotland is one of the world leaders in climate policy, and I think Scotland just gets the urgency of climate change perhaps better than most other nations. Scotland’s Climate Change Act has targets of reducing emissions by 80% by 2050 and we saw in the news today that we have new targets to secure 50% of all of Scotland’s energy needs from renewable sources by 2030, so Scotland is a world leader in climate change policy.
The third area that I would focus on is renewable energy and technology, in particular for remote off-grid communities. Again, this is an area in which Scotland is a world leader.
Q4 Chair: I know we have specific questions on that for you, Mr Downie, which hopefully you will be able to help us with in the course of this session. But the formal relationship that the UK has with the Arctic and High North is that we have observer status in what is called the Arctic Council. According to our hopefully reliable notes, there are six members of the Arctic Council just now. Seven?
Rod Downie: Eight.
Chair: Eight? I am sure that is in my notes somewhere. You don’t need to all answer, but could you help us understand what the work of the Arctic Council is, what sort of responsibilities it has and perhaps a little bit of a talk through about what the UK’s role with the Arctic Council is.
Dr Menezes: The Arctic Council is an intergovernmental forum of the eight Arctic member states proceeding from the Ottawa declaration in 1996. It has eight member states. There are about 13 observer states, if I am right, the UK being one of them. It also includes India, China, Singapore and—
Chair: Singapore?
Dr Menezes: Singapore as well. The reason I am particularly interested, of course, is then to see how many of these are Commonwealth players. There is Canada, which is within the Arctic Council as the only Commonwealth member state inside and of course you have the rest.
In terms of what they do, it is right from co-operation in search and rescue to co-operation in basically the global governance of the region. Would you like to add something on that point?
Professor Johnstone: Yes.
Q5 Chair: As you reply to this question, Professor Johnstone, maybe you could say whether Scotland has any formal relationship with this in your response.
Professor Johnstone: Within the Arctic Council you have the eight Arctic states, plus you have, very importantly, six permanent participants—the six organisations of indigenous peoples who also sit at the top table at the Arctic Council. It is extremely important to also engage with them. One of the interesting things about the Arctic Council is that it does not take votes. It works from a consensus model, so everyone around the table of the eight Arctic states representatives must agree for anything to go forward, or at least must not object.
The six permanent participant organisations are the Saami Council, RAIPON for Russia, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council and the Aleutian Islands International. These six groups of indigenous peoples don’t have a formal veto within this consensus process but in practice, if they object to something it will not go forward.
They have a much stronger influence than the observer organisations, including WWF as well as these 12 states plus the European Union de facto, a number of NGOs, and a number of regional organisations. They have observer status but those observers do not have the opportunity to block something going forward. They are also rather limited in the discussions.
Every two years there is a ministerial meeting with the eight states, plus the six permanent participants, plus the observers can go. Twice a year the senior Arctic officials have a meeting, but in those meetings the observer representatives are not allowed to speak. They don’t take part formally; they observe. If you go to a meeting, they actually sit at a different table. They sit at the children’s table and they are not able to take part directly in the discussions.
That is not to say participation is not important, because you can have a lot of influence at these meetings of record. You can have a lot of discussions; you can understand better. There is a lot of information sharing that takes place away from the meeting room. Where observers are much more involved is through the working groups. There are six working groups, five of which are environmentally focused and one is on sustainable development, and there are British experts involved in all those working groups.
If you look back at the House of Lords report on the Arctic, they commented that there was rather poor participation or at least inconsistent participation of the British experts, and this goes back to insecurity of funding. They don’t know between one meeting and the next if they will have the funds to travel to take part in those meetings, but there is, as Rod mentioned, the great scientific expertise we have in Scotland and in the UK and that is very welcome in the Arctic.
We used to call the observers “permanent observers”, but that language of “permanent observer” has dropped out. Formally they were never actually permanent but there is now a formal four-year review of observers’ participation and contribution. Effectively, the observers have to show that they are bringing more than they take; they are bringing something to the table. Usually that is through in-kind scientific co-operation and research contribution, so that is where the UK as a whole would have an influence.
Scotland separately simply cannot have a separate status within that. There was a meeting in Kiruna a few years ago where Greenland did not take part because Greenland wanted to have its own seat. Greenland of course is an Arctic nation and, in fact, Greenland just did not go. They did not send a delegation, and that is among the Arctic nations. They were not willing to give Greenland an extra seat, so there is absolutely no possibility—
Chair: It is part of the kingdom of Denmark.
Professor Johnstone: It is because it is within the kingdom of Denmark, and it was to try to keep that state focus, so it is the eight states rather than the nations that have the seats at the table. It is simply inconceivable there would be any consideration of Scotland having a separate delegation. Nonetheless, I think it would be beneficial for the United Kingdom and the Scottish Government, and the research institutions behind this, to work together and present a common front, to have those meetings, have those discussions in advance before the United Kingdom goes to the meetings or participates in working group activities, to make sure that everyone’s understanding of the issues at large are on the table.
Q6 Chair: In your view, is the Arctic Council a functional council? Does it get work done? Are there solid agendas and a working programme that seems to be getting met?
Professor Johnstone: We talk about the Arctic Council being a policy-shaping rather than a policy-making body. It doesn’t itself create laws or create treaties but the Arctic states can do so, and through the Arctic Council there have been two treaties agreed. But these are treaties between the Arctic states. The United Kingdom is not party to those treaties. It cannot join those treaties. The permanent participants, these indigenous organisations, are not part of those treaties either, but the Arctic Council is probably most effective in doing research into science, especially environmental science, and that comes through into policy and policy shaping.
They don’t deal with defence issues. That is absolutely off the table, but nonetheless they have a new Arctic Coast Guard Forum where you have co-operation, you have trust building exercises, practice exercises between the Arctic states and their coastguards, which are in some cases technically within the defence infrastructure. They are very important for trust building as well as for preparation for a rescue situation, for either an oil spill or—probably more likely in the near future—a cruise ship accident.
Chair: That pretty much sums up the Arctic Council for us. Thank you for that.
Q7 Anna Soubry: Can you help us with this: how much does this Arctic Council cost, and who pays for it?
Professor Johnstone: Each delegation pays its own funds to get there and attend meetings but it does not have a state budget. It does not have its own fixed budget. It has a secretariat in Tromsø in northern Norway, which is funded by the Norwegians. There are secretariats for some of the working groups, two of those actually in Akureyri beside me, but it works on action-by-action issues, so we have to raise funds for each issue. Those normally come from the Arctic states and there is a rule—I think it is probably stronger than a principle—that there cannot be more money coming from observers than comes from the Arctic states themselves.
Q8 Anna Soubry: How often does it meet?
Professor Johnstone: The Arctic Council itself, the senior Arctic officials, which are basically the ambassadors, meet twice a year and the Ministers. In somewhere like Iceland it would be your Foreign Minister; in somewhere like the United States, it might be a slightly lower standing Minister.
Q9 Anna Soubry: Could you just tell me how often does it meet? I know the Ministers meet twice a year. How often does it meet?
Professor Johnstone: The Arctic Council itself meets twice a year, but the working groups meet—
Q10 Anna Soubry: How often do they meet, the working groups?
Professor Johnstone: It depends on the working group, but probably about twice a year.
Q11 Anna Soubry: They only meet twice a year?
Professor Johnstone: But they meet separately because they are kind of research groups.
Q12 Anna Soubry: It is paid for on a project-by-project basis?
Professor Johnstone: Yes.
Q13 Anna Soubry: But the only stuff it actually does is bring together research? It does sound a bit like a talking shop.
Professor Johnstone: Well, it is a talking shop. It is a forum. It is not an international organisation in the technical legal sense. As a talking shop, it has been incredibly important in establishing trust between the Arctic states.
Q14 Anna Soubry: Can I move on to you, first of all, Professor Johnstone? You rightly identify—you use the example of maternity hospitals closing—this centralising that often happens throughout the United Kingdom. You talk about demographic problems of young people leaving more rural areas. Would you agree with me that that is a problem that people in parts of, say, Suffolk or Northumbria or Cornwall would also absolutely identify with?
Professor Johnstone: Absolutely. It is not something that is unique to Scotland. There are clearly rural parts of England and Wales that have similar issues. It is perhaps more common in Scotland and there is perhaps more experience of it in Scotland, just because of the distances involved and the size of those populations. If you think of the journey from Thurso, for example, to Inverness to the hospital, it is going to take you, on an excellent day, two hours and 50 minutes, so you are talking about those wider distances. That is still nothing to compare with trying to travel through the Arctic at its worst in terrible conditions.
Q15 Anna Soubry: Quite. Could I turn to you Mr Menezes? You were talking about the historical and cultural links, and I think there would be no debate about the cultural and historical links, for example, between Shetland and other Nordic countries. Shetland is nearer to Norway than I think almost the mainland of Scotland. If you lived in certain other parts of Scotland, say the south of Scotland, the central belt or Glasgow, you would not identify with Norway perhaps as much as you might identify with Carlisle or even Newcastle and beyond. Would you agree with me on that?
Dr Menezes: Absolutely. I must say, when you look at the geography, or rather the geographic distribution of festivals that commemorate the Viking heritage of Scotland, it is rather interesting to see how popular it has proven to be all across. There is a sense that those who do wish to see Scotland embrace a more Nordic identity more actively have been quite effective into fusing this sort of enthusiasm and it has spread.
Just to give you a few examples, you have Viking festivals like Up Helly Aa in Shetland. This started in the 1870s, but even beyond the Shetlands you could go any day to Thurso celebrating the Viking heritage of Caithness. You have a Largs Viking festival that started in 1980 and last year it had 17,000 people, and it had a net economic impact of £350,000 on the local economy. I do believe, as I said, that it is not just the romantic aspect of remembering Viking history; there is an economic benefit to all of this.
Q16 Anna Soubry: Absolutely, and I don't know what the figures are. But of course we know that there has been a huge celebration of the Vikings in places like York, for example, as well.
Dr Menezes: Indeed.
Anna Soubry: It is a commonality that extends throughout much of the United Kingdom.
Professor Johnstone: If I could perhaps respond also on that. It is very interesting and very nice to look at the cultural and historic links, and certainly those cultural links are strong. The dialect where I grew up is much more similar to the Norse dialect than it would be to Robert Burns.
Q17 Anna Soubry: Yes, and where was that?
Professor Johnstone: Thurso.
Anna Soubry: Yes, exactly that.
Professor Johnstone: But there are still links. If you look at the west coast of Scotland and those links to Canada, this is not something that is just an entirely far north tradition. On the other hand, I think the tendency that we have from outside of the Arctic is—and you see it in pretty much every Arctic strategy or policy paper from a non-Arctic nation—the focus is on these historic and cultural links, and I think it is looking backwards. It reinforces the European approach to the Arctic as this frontier that we need to colonise, and it matters who got there first, who conquered it and who discovered what river when, when really that is not what the contemporary Arctic is about.
When we look at the conditions for observer participation at the Arctic Council—recall the criteria—it is looking at what we offer now, so we have to look more at the future, to what exchanges we can have today, rather than looking back to history. It is not necessarily a mistake, but it is a pattern we see in all these Arctic strategies and policies, “Look at all these wonderful historical links we have”, and the Arctic looks back and it says, “But what are you bringing us now? We don’t really care who discovered a river actually. We were living here long before white Europeans came in and found a river”.
Anna Soubry: Would you agree with me also that you could argue, especially in the world that we are living in at the moment, that the more links we make—wherever we are in the United Kingdom—with anybody we have anything in common with, the better? We look outwardly and have a good open Britain, rather than the dangers we face perhaps of looking far too inward. I am sure you do agree. Sorry, that is just a statement.
Chair: Excuse me for looking back, just for a tick. Apparently my name Wishart is descended from the Norse, which is what I am reliably informed by some Danish friends. I have the condition Dupuytren's contracture, which is one of the most researched genetic conditions in the world. It is the footprint of Vikings who actually gave it to Scotland and the other parts of the UK they inhabited, as well as where their further descendants went. I will just leave that one with you.
Q18 Deidre Brock: With regard to the development of UK Arctic policy, I think you have all noted the importance of Scottish interests there. Could you tell me where those interests diverge from UK interests when it comes to the High North?
Dr Menezes: When it came to the preparation of the 2013 Arctic strategy, it has been widely observed that Scotland had very little input in the process. To some degree, while it was an excellent strategy in many ways, there was that Scottish participation missing, while at the same time the very Arctic strategy is predicated upon the fact that a lot of Scotland is very near to the Arctic, and so there was a gap there.
When it comes to the various aspects of fisheries or shipping, and how Scotland has the benefit most of all, or in particular ship building, again, while the national strategy does touch upon these issues, a Scottish strategy would have focused to a much greater degree on these issues. There would have been a much greater priority to Scotland. Without saying that a national strategy diverted attention from Scottish interests, I would say Scottish interests would be better represented if Scotland were to have its own Scottish Arctic strategy to complement the national one.
Rod Downie: I think it is probably too early to determine whether Scotland needs its own Arctic strategy or whether it can build upon the UK strategy, and clearly we, like yourselves, are looking forward to weighing up the evidence that you receive at this Committee. But I think what is very clear is that Scotland and the Scottish Government should be very involved in creating a UK Arctic policy and in implementing Arctic policy.
Q19 Deidre Brock: More than has been the case up to now?
Rod Downie: Yes, perhaps. I think the UK’s Arctic policy framework provides a reasonable foundation but we can move forward with it. It is probably time. The Arctic is changing very rapidly. The UK’s policy was called Adapting to Change. It probably is time to adapt that policy, to have more of a Scottish input into it. I would certainly agree with that.
Professor Johnstone: I mentioned a few of the things that Scotland has experience in that are useful as exchanges of information, but I think also Scotland as a non-state, as a sub-state Government, can also engage directly with the nations and the Arctic, like Greenland and Faroe Islands, on a nation-to-nation basis. We can also look at regional co-operation, for example, between Highlands or between the Northern Isles and the regions and the Arctic, rather than having to go at this very high level state-to-state co-operation. It gives a bit more flexibility. It can deal on an issue-by-issue basis.
I wrote a paper many years ago now looking at whether Scotland should indeed have an Arctic strategy, and I left that door open. Right now I would probably say that I am not sure a formalised strategy is the way to go, if we think of a strategy in the very technical sense of a plan of action with agendas, with targets and goals and measureable outcomes. It might be better for Scotland, especially as a non-state and especially as being from outside the Arctic, to rather emphasise some priorities for engagement and some principles for co-operation. Here we can be progressive, for example in respect of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which the United Kingdom voted for at the General Assembly and is an absolute paradigm of co-operation in the Arctic.
I think Scotland can be very progressive on that. It can be progressive on sustainable development, on equitable sharing of the benefits of development in the Arctic. I think Scotland can take this in a little bit of a different direction, partly for structural reasons of not being a state and not having to worry about those kinds of high level state-to-state issues, being able to leave military and security issues completely to one side, but partly also politically because it has quite a different approach to a number of issues, if you look at the very different policies of the Government in Scotland compared to that of the United Kingdom when it comes to development.
Q20 Deidre Brock: That is very interesting. The academic Erik Kruse wrote to the Committee and concluded that the possibility for Scotland to develop its own Arctic policy is fairly limited in large part due to the constructional context it currently finds itself in. You gave some examples of subnational governments having Arctic policies. Could anyone expand on that a little bit more, just to give us details of how those relationships work?
Professor Johnstone: We have strategies for all kinds of things, or at least policy papers. The eight Arctic states each have one but, within the kingdom of Denmark, the Faroe Isles has its own Arctic policy as a sub-state nation and a sub-state Government, obviously with a slightly different historical and constitutional set-up to Scotland but nonetheless it is an example.
Then we have cities like Rovaniemi that have strategies or policies. We have the three Arctic territories of Canada that jointly have an Arctic policy document. Then we have things like the Circumpolar Council that has an Arctic strategy, so it is a non-governmental, indigenous organisation. We have all different kinds of approaches emphasising different things, and that is where Scotland might be emphasising things rather differently from the United Kingdom.
Dr Menezes: Also, there are a number of different forums beyond the Arctic Council, which is the most obvious forum for co-operation in the Arctic. There are a number of forums that we should not discount, the Northern Forum being one of them. In our consultations with the executive secretary of the Northern Forum, there is great interest there for Scotland to be a member. The Northern Forum exists as a body for subnational regional co-operation.
The Northern Forum was established in 1991. The secretariat is in Yakutsk in the Sakha Republic. It is a non-profit international organisation composed of 18 subnational or regional governments from eight northern countries. The membership includes Akureyri in Iceland, Yukon in Canada—rather obvious—Lapland and Finland and there are several in Russia, but also the Gangwon province in Korea and the Hokkaido prefecture in Japan. I do think Scotland has a rather legitimate reason to participate and to benefit from the subnational level co-operation that the Northern Forum can facilitate.
At the same time, there are those sorts of regional collaboration mechanisms—if I may call them that—currently being explored, led by the Government of Norway to see how best at the subnational level different governments could contribute and work together. Scotland has been part of this process since the very beginning. It was in March 2013 that the Government of Norway organised a seminar in Bodø to explore the prospects of greater collaboration through territorial co-operation programmes in the Arctic and near-Arctic. The event was followed with events in Norway House in Brussels in September 2013, April 2014, and concluded in Toronto at a seminar in January 2015. It looked into the potential for the establishment of a mechanism that can facilitate regional collaboration. It brought together Norway, Sweden, Finland, Faroe Islands, Greenland, Canada, Russia and Scotland, along with various bodies in the EU like the European Territorial Co-operation, the European Commission and the European External Action Service.
Within this framework, the discussions have been quite interesting because Norway did suggest, if this were to go through—and it has been delayed a little bit—that one node could be Tromsø; Norway could provide a node in Tromsø near the Arctic Council to inform what is happening there. Scotland put forward an idea saying Scotland could host a node, largely to be the point of engagement between Arctic states and the near-Arctic states as well as between the Arctic and the world. The Northern Periphery and Arctic Programme Secretariat also suggested they could host a third node.
Where have we reached with this? It is not very clear yet. It is still in discussion, but the development of forums like this I do think suggests that there is a greater role for Scotland to play or to do more in the Arctic without necessarily having to be independent. While Scotland remains in the UK it can also start building these important ties and participate in these emerging forums.
Q21 Mr Christopher Chope: Professor Johnstone, in your paper you say that there should be more co-operation between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on issues relating to the Arctic, and then you say that these consultations should not be influenced by domestic, political concerns. What do you mean by that?
Professor Johnstone: This is on record, so I want to be a little bit careful. This comment was really in response to how I viewed the development of the UK policy framework for the Arctic, which seems to have been developed without any real consultation with the Scottish Government. I think at that time it may have been in the shadow of the Scottish independence referendum, where there was some attempt to try to keep a kind of cohesive idea of a national United Kingdom identity and to try to limit the idea of Scotland having some distinct interests internationally. That was my interpretation of what happened.
That may be wrong, but what I intend by that is that it would be good for the Scottish Government and London, irrespective of very different views on all kinds of things, including, for example, climate change mitigation, including issues regarding the approach to environmental and sustainable development—these seem to be quite different priorities—when it comes to the Arctic to appear with a common front and for that common front to be developed with good co-operation between Whitehall and Edinburgh.
Q22 Mr Christopher Chope: Do you think that is now happening?
Professor Johnstone: I believe it is happening more now than it was, for example, before the 2013 policy paper but, to be quite honest, I think you are probably more expert in those than I am. I hope so.
Q23 Mr Christopher Chope: I would count on that, very much so. What do you think that 2013 framework has achieved?
Professor Johnstone: You always have at least two audiences for a paper like that. One is your domestic audience to try to create a kind of identity and the other is your international audience. I think it was very weak, for example, on respect for indigenous rights. We had a lot of discussion about respect, respect, respect through that framework. I very much suspect that was a response to what I mentioned, these Nuuk criteria for observer status at the Arctic Council. We saw a plethora of Arctic strategies emerging after those Nuuk criteria were established, which basically set out the conditions under which you are allowed to stay an observer or become an observer at the Arctic Council. I think what the UK was doing with that was trying to show the Arctic states, “This is the way we meet your Nuuk criteria”.
It was very much emphasis on sovereignty of the Arctic states, which is naturally very important but, on the other side of that, I saw an emphasis on sovereignty as kind of passing the buck when it comes to issues like environmental protection, business, sustainable investment, when it comes to responding to a cruise ship accident or search and rescue issue. That was something that I considered could have been developed better in that policy.
Q24 Mr Christopher Chope: Do any of the other witnesses have any views on what has been achieved by the 2013 framework?
Rod Downie: I can highlight at least one example—a positive example, hopefully. In the 2013 framework, the UK committed to taking a more progressive and leading role on shipping issues in the Arctic, because, of course, the International Maritime Organisation is based here in London, and to a certain extent they have done so. In fact, the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency chaired a number of the working groups in the development of the Polar Code. That is probably the only strong example of where you can see actual implementation of that framework.
Dr Menezes: As a think-tank, we obviously work more on the public outreach front trying to raise awareness of the polar regions. Towards that end, I think the strategy did help, so I have not been so much concerned by the implementation as raising the profile of the Arctic.
Again, it does bring together what Professor Johnstone mentioned earlier. I don’t think the history, the romance, the scientific research and everything else, and the policy implementation, are necessarily separate. From a think-tank perspective, we have used the existing interest in the Arctic, which sometimes can be more about—at the public level—explorers and everything else, and brought it back to discussing contemporary Arctic issues. I think the Arctic strategy did offer a very good framework to bring together all of these different strands of British engagement, historically and now, with the Arctic.
Q25 Mr Christopher Chope: What you are describing some critics might describe as rather thin gruel that has come out of this. Now we are talking about revising it. What is the purpose of that? You have described this framework and the relatively limited achievements that have come from it. Why is it necessary to revise it?
Dr Menezes: Personally, I think there was a great need to add more about indigenous participation and indigenous knowledge. We have to be more explicit about the Arctic and, like the Antarctic, actually having people living there who own it, or rather they are the chief stewards of the region and that anything we do must go through them: it must take into account their voice, their knowledge, their consent, their participation. I think there are more opportunities for the strategy to be reworked to a degree.
Also with the Polar Code in force now, since 1 January, I do believe there have been a sufficient number of developments that warrant such a revision and more practical steps and methodologies as to how to move forward.
Q26 Chair: What is the thrust of the strategy? What does the UK hope to achieve in setting this out? It is all right to have a strategy but if you don’t know what it wants to try to do, then what is the point of it?
Rod Downie: To be frank, I think the UK probably felt the need to take a very soft “footprints in the snow” approach in the development of its first strategy, so it clearly did not want to rock the boat with its Arctic neighbours. I think that was very clear at the time.
Q27 Chair: What is it attempting or intending to do then?
Rod Downie: I believe it was an attempt to be a little bit more transparent about where the UK Government is in terms of the Arctic, and to discuss some of the opportunities in a shifting landscape.
But I would like to add to one of the areas where I think the policy does need to be reframed and redeveloped—it was fairly inadequate when it came out: offshore oil and gas exploration. I see this as one of the biggest shortcomings in the current Arctic policy. It did not adequately recognise the incredible risks associated with frontier oil and gas development and, since the Arctic policy framework was published, there has been this whole groundswell of movement against offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic.
For example, we saw the Obama/Trudeau announcement just before Christmas last year, effectively setting the whole of the US Arctic marine off limits to oil and gas and all of the Canadian Arctic waters off limits to oil and gas, subject to a five-yearly review. It is less well known but we have also seen a moratorium in Russia on all Arctic nations. We are not quite sure how long it is—five or 10 years—but a moratorium on new oil and gas development in the Russian Arctic.
We have seen that the Scottish company Cairn Energy has closed down its office in Nuuk in Greenland following a number of years of attempted oil explorations off Greenland. We have seen Shell’s dramatic retreat from the Alaskan Arctic. We have seen the French oil giant Total write off drilling in the Arctic in May 2016, interestingly not on the basis of risk of pollution events but more in line with the Paris agreement on climate change.
Q28 Chair: Have we not also seen TV images of pipelines being laid in the United States following the recent decisions by the current Administration?
Rod Downie: You are absolutely correct, but the way that the US moratorium was brought into force was it was playing on a 1950s US law and there is an understanding, certainly among my colleagues in WWF United States, that it would take at least, if not more than, four years to revoke the law that Obama has brought in. There is this whole groundswell that I think the UK Government and the Scottish Government need to address in a revised Arctic strategy and I think that would be a priority.
Q29 Chris Law: A short question with regards to policy by oil and gas and hearing about the five-year reviews. I read today that President Trump has removed all climate change information from the Environmental Protection Agency. How much does that concern you and how important is it for the UK Government—particularly on Friday, when Theresa May is visiting—to press home our commitment to the Paris climate change deal and also our position with regards to the Arctic Circle?
Rod Downie: Clearly, the US is one of the major players in the Arctic so it is absolutely critical. However, I don’t think the UK can base its Arctic policy and Arctic strategies on what Donald Trump is doing; I think that would be a reasonably short-term approach. The UK, and Scotland in particular, is very robust on climate change and has extremely strong policies in place. I think we should be making those very well known internationally across the world, including in the US.
Q30 Chris Law: What I am asking is would you want to see the Prime Minister being quite vocal in public about it this weekend?
Rod Downie: Absolutely, yes.
Q31 Anna Soubry: Of course, she has already in the House of Commons today, and she has made it very clear. We are very proud as a Government of our implementation of the Paris agreement. I just wanted to be quite clear, though, when you were talking about oil and gas exploration and work, and you are rightly identifying concerns that I think we all share about exploration in areas where, frankly, it should not be done, you are not including the Scottish or the UK waters in that, are you?
Rod Downie: Scotland is far north but it is certainly not Arctic, no.
Anna Soubry: No. I just wanted to make clear because I was getting a bit nervous about that.
Professor Johnstone: This is a matter on which Rod and I might have a minor disagreement. I just do not think that it is up to Scotland or the United Kingdom to make a decision about what the Arctic states should do with their offshore resources. I think that is something that has to be in the hands of the Arctic states.
That being said, as a good citizen of the world, there are serious concerns about oil and gas development offshore in the Arctic—more so than there are onshore. Nonetheless, the hydrocarbon price right now and just the alternative energy supplies that are available are making that less and less attractive, which is why we are seeing quite a large stop. Greenland exploration is very little compared to even just five years ago.
Again, with the Paris agreement, if that is going to be taken seriously, it is very difficult to justify on any basis more exploitation in the marine Arctic. On the other hand, as I say, I do not think that should be in a Scottish policy position on the simple basis that I do not think you would be very happy if Iceland said, “You should stop drilling in the North Sea”. I think we have to be very respectful of the people who live in the Arctic in all our interventions.
Where Scotland can make a difference, especially with regard to implementing the Paris agreement, is to use its very highly developed and ever-developing technology transfer in renewable energy and to promote that. If you look at the huge hydroelectric resources in the Arctic, this is something that there is a great opportunity for shared co-operation and sharing technology and for our own energy firms to be diversifying even further into renewable energy and to be sharing those technologies in the Arctic.
Q32 Deidre Brock: Further to that, Professor Johnstone, you stated that the approach should not be about seeking benefits for Scotland and the UK but what can be mutually beneficial for Scotland, the UK and the Arctic partners. Is it your view that UK policy up to now has achieved that or will this require a big change in attitude from the UK and Scottish Governments?
Professor Johnstone: I am not sure that Scotland really has a policy on the Arctic at all as things stand right now. Nicola Sturgeon came to Iceland in October and gave a very excellent paper on climate change and the work that Scotland is doing and made a lot of friends, but I do not think the Scottish Government as a whole have a clear Arctic priority. They do not recognise it as a region as such in its affairs, at least not transparently.
On the United Kingdom policy, I am going to be a little bit cautious about how I answer this and be more general and say that pretty much all the Arctic strategies of the non-Arctic states are focusing on exploitation, resources, how we can get stuff from the Arctic and looking at it as a frontier. I can think of one Arctic policy that I have written about where there is a good two pages that is basically an infomercial for a national energy company. That is exactly what the Arctic states do not want to see and the people in the Arctic do not want to see. They are not a resource frontier. This is not the wild west. There are people living there that are recognised now. When the wild west was colonised there were people living there but they were ignored. Now in the 21st century we recognise that these are developed civil societies. They have populations, economies, their own priorities, and it is about making sure that any development is led by those societies.
Of course, on the other hand, Scotland is not going to say, “Here, just have all our knowledge, have all our technology, here is a whole bunch of money so you can do lots of wonderful things”. Engagement has to be two-way, otherwise why would Scotland bother? We are not talking about a developing country or sending aid. There has to be some mutual interest, but it is very important to colour our engagement with the Arctic in a mutually respectful manner and not to look at it as an empty frontier, as a wild west where we can go and get rich quick, because it is simply not that.
Q33 Deidre Brock: You say there is potential for that with a forthcoming Scottish strategy towards the Arctic Circle?
Professor Johnstone: I have already mentioned my caution regarding something as fully fledged as a strategy, but I think some statement of priorities for engagement; for example, indigenous-centred dealing with the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples first and foremost, but there are also ways that we can engage in the Arctic and development. For example, there is the Arctic Economic Council, which is a kind of separate organ that works alongside the Arctic Council, which is representatives of Arctic state businesses and organisations of indigenous peoples. There is space for southern partners to be involved there—right now it is probably mostly a networking opportunity, but there are certainly opportunities there—and just to follow sustainable development business models when we engage.
Q34 Chair: We are going to seek the views of the Scottish Government on this because I think it is really important. You have rightly identified that there is a real interest here. You mentioned the First Minister’s speech in Reykjavik, wasn’t it, when she came just a few months ago?
Professor Johnstone: Yes.
Chair: You said that was relatively warmly received. Could you talk a little bit more about that? What message were the recipients of that meeting hearing from Scotland and how did they respond to that? I don’t know if Mr Downie wants to come in, too.
Professor Johnstone: I think we were all there, actually.
Rod Downie: Yes, I think we were.
Professor Johnstone: I am probably a little bit biased on this. I think I am going to ask somebody else to answer it.
Rod Downie: If I could start, and just to echo what the First Minister said at that meeting, I have brought a quotation along with me. If you will indulge me I will read it out. It is very short. It just says, “The need to tackle climate change, first and foremost, is an overwhelming moral imperative, but it is also a significant economic opportunity” and one that Scotland should aim to grasp. I would echo that. That significant economic opportunity that she was talking about relates to Scotland’s expertise in renewable energy and taking that to the High North.
Q35 Chair: Was there anything beyond the climate change renewable energy message that was recognised from her statement, or was it exclusively framed in that type of context?
Professor Johnstone: Her speech was very much focused on climate change, but outside of that she was also engaging in this. She went to the embassy and signed a memorandum of understanding between the Icelandic Tourism Board and the Scottish Tourism Board. It is not just energy co-operation, but that was the focus of the keynote speech.
Chair: We are looking forward to hearing from the Scottish Government on these issues, but thanks for that.
Q36 Deidre Brock: Professor Johnstone, you mentioned sharing the experiences of Gaelic language expansion and being able to share those lessons with members of the Arctic nations or indigenous peoples, I presume. Could you tell us a little bit more about how you could see that working and the sorts of issues that they are currently facing?
Professor Johnstone: I have not lived in Scotland since 1999, but I am aware that there has been a huge investment made in Gaelic-medium education. One of the problems—
Deidre Brock: I should declare an interest. I had two children who went through Gaelic-medium education. That is why I am interested.
Professor Johnstone: I am not a Gaelic speaker because I am from Thurso, which is almost too far north for Gaelic. The work that has been done to revitalise Gaelic—for example, the investment in early years education from kindergarten right through—is something that would be very welcome, I think, in many small communities. In Greenland, you have Greenlandic but you have a number of subjects where you do not have high school textbooks in that language so they are still studying in Danish. Within Greenland, you also have two minority languages where there are no books at all, or very few. It is about how we can make sure that for languages that are at real risk—and there are languages that have already died out in the Arctic, for example in Alaska—we can prevent that happening and keep the cultural integrity and continuity that is so important to a stable community.
Rod Downie: If I could comment beyond the language issue in terms of the UK Government’s engagement and support to Arctic indigenous peoples, which I think is relevant to this. We recognise the incredible value of the traditional knowledge that these people have as stewards of their environment. There is a real capacity issue at the moment for indigenous peoples. In order to get their traditional knowledge into the Arctic Council and the massive amount of Arctic meetings and conferences and evidence sessions and working groups that they are expected to participate in, there is a real capacity issue.
WWF has worked with the Arctic Council to establish a capacity fund for the permanent participants, the indigenous members of the Arctic Council. That is one area where there is an amazing opportunity here for the UK Government to support that traditional knowledge by supporting that capacity fund.
Q37 Chris Law: I think everyone here would agree that the Arctic is one of the most unique environments on the planet. I wanted to specifically look at climate change and the effects of climate change. The Government state that the effects of climate change are the most significant factors driving change in the High North. This is a question particularly for you, Mr Downie. Do you agree? What are these changes and what are the effects?
Rod Downie: Yes, absolutely. In summary, we are seeing a very rapid and continued trend in Arctic warming and that is effectively changing the Arctic landscape. If you look at the highlights of the Arctic report card, which is produced by NOAA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, every year on a yearly basis, the highlights from 2016 were that average surface air temperature for the year ending September 2016 was by far the highest since 1900. We saw new monthly record highs for January, February, October and November 2016. The minimum sea ice extent was the second lowest ever on record. It was the second earliest ever onset of melt of the Greenland ice sheet. The tundra is showing a net release of carbon due to thawing permafrost.
It is massive change and this is having an impact, both actual and predicted, on changes in the Arctic food web and Arctic ecology, literally from polar bears through to parasites. I can illustrate that with a range of examples if that would be helpful. We are seeing orcas, killer whales, moving into areas of the Arctic that they have never previously been recorded. That is because they have dorsal fins that are not compatible with heavy sea ice, but as the sea ice retreats they are moving further north in greater numbers. There is discussion about orcas becoming the apex predator of the Arctic, displacing polar bears. They predate on belugas, bowhead whales and narwhals.
We are seeing fish stocks and spawning grounds moving further north. In particular, cod, haddock and other Atlantic fish are moving north in the Barents Sea and moving much more rapidly than had ever been predicted. We are seeing impacts on Arctic seals. One very interesting example is the Saimaa seal, which is an endangered lake-dwelling seal. It is endemic to Finland. There are only about 360 individuals left, so it is critically endangered, although the numbers are increasing, I should say. In recent years, there has not been enough snow for the seals to build their lairs. It is where their pups go. They are protected from the elements and from predators. Our volunteers have literally been out digging snow banks for seals and clearly it is working. In 2014 there were 53 pups born to this population, of which 50 were in manmade snow banks.
We are seeing mass walrus haul-outs right across the northern coast of Russia and Alaska. This is because walrus generally use sea ice as a platform to rest upon when they are feeding, but because the sea ice is not there they are having to travel further and come ashore on land. This creates more issues. Walrus are very susceptible to disturbance and they can stampede. In a mass walrus stampede—and I am talking about thousands of walrus—their calves are going to get crushed. They are also expending more energy having to move between their feeding grounds and where they are going. I did not get to polar bears, but—
Chair: Yes, we will maybe see that in your further evidence.
Rod Downie: Okay. Many examples.
Q38 Chris Law: If we go back 30 years ago when projections were made then, is what you are seeing in the evidence accelerating beyond that and is it picking up as it goes along? To go back to our policy document in 2013, is it fast getting outmoded and outdated as a result? What more can be done in a future document?
Rod Downie: Yes, clearly it is happening faster than anyone had predicted, I think. The Arctic is changing incredibly rapidly. For species to build up the capacity for resilience, it takes time for species to adapt to this sort of change. What we are seeing, though, is there are certain areas within the Arctic, certain pockets of the Arctic, where the sea ice is projected to remain much longer than others. One of those, for example, is the Canadian island archipelago across to northern Greenland. That is an area that we call “last ice area”. These sorts of areas are going to become critically important for ice-dependent species in the Arctic. Clearly the key, most important part of the UK’s policy on the Arctic has to be understanding climate change and addressing climate change.
Q39 Chris Law: We talked earlier about the retraction of oil companies, partly because of the falling price but also because of moratoriums that have been supported both by the US and Russia, for example. The UK Government claim that they have no influence over private companies. It might be all good and well just now that there is a lack of interest, but what happens if there is a resurgence and what could the Government do more with regards to private companies?
Rod Downie: I think what the UK could do more of is encouraging the renewable energy companies to fill this space. The UK and Scotland in particular has an incredible track record in renewables. There are market forces and the UK Government clearly need to be careful. I think they need to send a signal that drilling for oil in the Arctic is very high risk. I think that is probably the critical thing.
Q40 Chris Law: Thank you. A broader question, and you have just brought me neatly to my next question, which is about renewable energy and the sector growing in the Arctic. Is that having a positive effect on seeing a reduction in the desire for mineral wealth being drilled for?
Rod Downie: In certain of the Arctic countries I think the renewable sector is still very much in its infancy but it is very high on the list of priorities for the Arctic Council. Under the US chairmanship, they brought a big focus on renewables and the links between renewable energy and sustainable development in northern communities. There are some very good examples in the Arctic. Iceland, for example, is almost operating on 100% geothermal and hydro. Greenland I think is operating on about 70% of its domestic energy. There are good examples.
We have just released a report about renewables in the Canadian Arctic. It is called “Fuelling Change in the Arctic - Renewable Energy Solutions”. We did a feasibility study on five of the northerly communities. They were Iqaluit, Sanikiluaq, Rankin Inlet, Arviat and Baker Lake. It was a feasibility study that we worked on with the Waterloo Institute for Sustainable Energy. It has absolutely exceeded our expectations in terms of what they are recommending. The summary of it is that in terms of hybrid systems based on solar, wind and some diesel, we could reduce greenhouse gas emissions in those communities by between 26% to 75%. The financial savings related to those recommendations ranged from between $9 million and $30 million—that is Canadian dollars—over the course of a 20-year period. Clearly, there is scope for more renewable energy in the Arctic.
Q41 Chris Law: I think this is a question to the whole panel. Is this not a golden opportunity, given that Scotland is one of the world leaders in renewables for technology and expertise, for Scotland to be involved in the Arctic region by working in conjunction with people there and taking advantage of renewable energy?
Professor Johnstone: Yes, and one thing I would maybe add to that is the importance of making sure that the benefits are widely shared and also benefit locally. That is true in Scotland as anywhere else. One of the problems with oil and gas is you drill it up from the Arctic and you have to send it hundreds, maybe thousands, of kilometres to be refined, and then you have to buy it back. It is not a particularly sustainable model even for its own sake, even economically for that community. They are selling a natural resource but they are getting no added value.
Instead what Iceland has done in the last few years or decades is not only to have produced a huge surplus of cheap, clean energy and not sell that—there is some discussion about having cables and so forth, but it is much better for Iceland’s economy to attract big business, manufacturing industry, aluminium, for example, to that country to build their factories there. Then you get the employment, you get the added value, and you are sending out a manufactured product. If we can do that in Scotland, which I think you do, but also do that elsewhere in the Arctic rather than just looking at energy as a thing that you can dig out of the ground and then take somewhere else—then if you look at the volumes, for example, if you are looking at trying to provide energy to a village of 100 people, oil and gas is not a particularly efficient way to do that. Instead you can have much smaller scale locally provided, generated and consumed electricity.
Dr Menezes: To come back to the discussion about entrusting the Arctic to the Nordics, we definitely believe that Scotland can do more, can focus more on greater interconnectivity with its Nordic neighbours in order to meet its own energy security needs. There were three particular examples that we felt offered great ways forward for how Scotland can work together with its Nordic neighbours: off the plant interconnectors; the connection with Iceland. IceLink, which has been in discussion for many years, is a particular interest. With 750 miles or 1,000 kilometres of undersea cabling, IceLink could be the world’s longest undersea interconnector and allow the direct export of over five terawatts of hydro and geothermal electricity from Iceland to Scotland—enough to power 1.6 million homes or half of Scotland. Again, this is a huge opportunity for Scotland’s energy security.
Moving on from the interconnector with Iceland, there is also a proposed interconnector with Norway. It is called NorthConnect, owned by three Norwegian power firms and Sweden’s Vattenfall. They are planning to seek permission to build a power link from Norway to Britain, costing up to €2 billion with the capacity for 1.4 gigawatts. NorthConnect’s 650-kilometre subsea cable can meet about a quarter of Scotland’s peak demand with power from Norwegian hydroelectric dams and wind turbines. There are also examples of offshore wind projects, as in off the coast of Peterhead with Norway again via Statoil. There are quite a few examples of how closer co-operation with Nordic neighbours on energy security is possible.
Q42 Chair: Just because you mentioned it, there is the Arctic Council that seem to be pretty well represented in terms of co-operation and working together and there is the High North that you mention, the Nordic countries. Is there a relationship between the two? Is there a distinction? I may be getting a bit mixed up because of a line that we call the Arctic Circle. How do we work with these definitions? Is it the High North, is it the Arctic, or is it the Arctic and High North?
Dr Menezes: From a scientific sense, we would regard the High North as Norwegian. It started off in Norway as a concept and then came to be applied to all of the Arctic. When it comes to dealing with science and research, we would say let’s refer to the Arctic itself as the High North. However, when it comes to signing trade policy in relation to Arctic states, we cannot limit UK trade policy only to what is above a particular circle. The way we go about it is to look at all Arctic Council member states and to see how best to enhance trade links between the UK and them. Again, we use High North in a rather fluid sense in that respect.
Q43 Chair: Is Scotland in the High North?
Dr Menezes: Well, we wouldn’t say that but it is potentially Nordic.
Q44 Chris Law: I just want to ask an additional question. You talk about energy being delivered to Scotland either from Iceland or Norway. Would Scotland see a reduction in prices of energy usage as a result? At the moment, for example, if you look at the National Grid framework, delivering energy from Scotland to the south of England, for example, is a lot more expensive than, say, in the south of England itself so it would be a higher price. What would the price be for energy coming from Iceland through to Scotland and being used? Any ideas?
Rod Downie: Sorry, no idea on the pound values, but it would be probably more cost effective to focus on renewable energy sources in Scotland itself.
Q45 Margaret Ferrier: I am going to stay on the subject of oil and speak specifically about the effect of oil spills and how it affects. There is a huge economic, environmental and social impact. I think that the WWF Global website states the massive harm to animals and plants and that it can take a decade or more for a clean-up. Specifically coming to you first, Professor Johnstone, your written evidence cited that Scotland was a leader in oil spill technology. Who invests in that? Is it the UK Government or is it privately funded?
Professor Johnstone: Scotland has had to develop a huge amount of technology to deal with that because of its experience in oil and gas extraction. In some sense fortunately, in that we have never had an oil spill in the Arctic, but in the other sense unfortunately, we have no idea if any of that technology will work in the Arctic because we do not know how oil behaves under ice. If there is ice on the surface of the sea, we do not know what the oil will do in that condition and we do not know how to get it out. There are different theories about it—all lovely theories, very nice to have your theory in your university—but it is a little bit harder when you are out there dealing with an incredible snowstorm in the Arctic conditions.
Scotland has dealt with oil and gas for decades. It is a very highly developed sector. There may be opportunities to share some of the work they have done on oil spill prevention, which I would much prefer to clean-up, but there are skills there that maybe can be shared, that can be utilised, especially as you are past peak oil in Scotland, you are moving downwards. Maybe there are opportunities to reutilise or refocus those skills.
If you have an oil spill in the North Atlantic Arctic, that is going to have repercussions for Scotland. Whether or not the oil arrives on Scottish shores, the perception of an oil spill, the perception of contamination, will seriously damage your fishing industry. Your fishing industry works on the assumption that the buyers believe that this is clean fish and that is very much true of Arctic fisheries. The price of Arctic fish is high because people think it is clean up there. If there is an oil spill, that price collapses and the market collapses.
It does not even have to be actual pollution to have a major impact, and that is why I think Scotland should express concern and should offer a hand of co-operation. On the other hand, you cannot tell another country what to do with its continental shelf, either Scotland or the United Kingdom. It is simply out of your jurisdiction.
Q46 Margaret Ferrier: I think we are going to come to the fishing question possibly later. I am going to come to Mr Downie for his input on this.
Rod Downie: I would echo Rachael that there is no proven technology for cleaning up oil spills in ice. It just does not exist.
Q47 Margaret Ferrier: Is that something that should be developed then and who should it be that develops it?
Rod Downie: Clearly, that is where industry would lead development.
Q48 Margaret Ferrier: What about the countries or the states that are involved in the Arctic Council?
Rod Downie: I think there already are existing industry-led initiatives to try to develop that technology, but at the moment it simply does not exist.
I also wanted to add to what Rachael was saying that the impact of a major oil spill in the Arctic is not only on wildlife, it is also on local peoples who depend on clean and very healthy marine ecosystems for their subsistence lifestyles. Hydrocarbons will also persist for much longer at lower temperatures and that increases the susceptibility of wildlife and ecosystems to long-term cumulative impacts of oil pollution.
Q49 Margaret Ferrier: One more question on that to Professor Johnstone again. If it is an area that you think Scotland could lead in and have a positive impact, should more be done to support and promote it? Who should be giving the support and promoting it?
Professor Johnstone: If oil and gas is going to be developed in the Arctic, that is a matter for the Arctic states. If it goes ahead, that is where Scottish industry might be looking at sharing technology. That would probably be industry led. The Scottish Government can support it. UK Trade & Investment can support it, just like they do for other major industries around the world. It would not be something I would expect to be done at governmental level but rather at an industry level. There might be some co-operation with university research and so forth. You have superb universities in Scotland; I am a graduate of one of them, as I suspect are many of you here. There is a huge amount of knowledge in Scotland and in the UK more broadly on this particular topic. You have long-term co-operation already with, for example, Stavanger and Norway and Aberdeen University. You have a lot of research work going on in this field.
Q50 Anna Soubry: I think it is right that, of course, a developer would always be liable for any oil spills, so it is in their interests to make sure when it happens that they have the right technology to clean it up.
Professor Johnstone: I have written a book about that, exactly about that. One of the issues is there is liability of the company under civil liability regimes under domestic law of whatever state’s jurisdiction it is, whether that is in Scottish or UK offshore or whether it is in Greenland offshore. There is also the possibility of a state responsibility if they fail to regulate the sector properly. The state that would have that obligation would be the state of jurisdiction. It would not be the United Kingdom.
Q51 Anna Soubry: Quite right. We all know that we can see the melting of the ice around the Arctic Circle. It is a very good example of the climate change that Mr Downie has quite properly described. When it says here the Government, does it mean the Scottish Government or the UK Government?
Chair: I think it means the UK Government.
Anna Soubry: Good. The UK Government have said that this could be an opportunity to utilise previously inaccessible trade routes. Could I ask each one of you what your view is of that?
Professor Johnstone: You mean shipping?
Anna Soubry: Yes.
Professor Johnstone: The shipping situation through the Northwest Passage is not going to happen anytime soon for the reasons that Rod pointed out, that that is the last ice. You might get some cruise ship tourism; we are already seeing a little bit of that. Russia is certainly pushing the Northern Sea Route across the north of Russia to promote that as a trade alternative, as a shipping alternative. It is still in no way competitive with the Suez or the Panama routes. It looks shorter on a map but when you factor in the unpredictable conditions, when you factor in the “just in time” model of shipping where you deliver your goods exactly when they are needed to manufacture so you do not have to deal with warehousing and so forth, the Northern Sea Route does not yet offer a particularly competitive system.
It might become a supplementary trade route in the medium term. If we think about even further expansion in manufacturing and international trade, it may become an additional route to Suez and Panama, but I do not think it is going to replace either of them or take significant shipping away from either of those routes.
Dr Menezes: With increased navigation in the waters north of Scotland eventually, whenever it does happen, I do believe Scotland should start preparing now in building the capacity of its ports to identify and exploit the opportunities that could open up. We have identified a few. I realise I am going through so many different areas so I cannot possibly be an expert on all, so do forgive me when I refer back to my notes.
I do realise that there is a lack or rather shortage of deep-sea ports along the northern routes. While Scotland does not necessarily have one that could cater to very large vessels—except possibly it does have container ports in Grangemouth and Greenock—in terms of what is necessary, the proposal to develop or rather to explore the potential of Scapa Flow in the Orkney or Hunterston is of great interest to us. When it comes to the North Atlantic and North Sea feeder markets, developing a transhipment hub potentially in Scapa Flow could have a great advantage on account of its northern position.
In terms of feeder distances—and this is to explore why we believe there is so much potential for Scotland over ports in northern Europe to meet this gap—in nautical miles, Scapa Flow is just 702 nautical miles from Reykjavik, whereas Rotterdam is 1,082 nautical miles away. Likewise it is 232 nautical miles from Torshavn and the Faroes, whereas Rotterdam is 732 nautical miles away. Even if you had to go to Bodø and Trondheim, the feeder distances are much nearer between Scapa Flow in Scotland and Norway or Murmansk with Arkhangelsk. In that sense, that does count. I do have the figures and I would be happy to go over them if necessary.
In terms of the average spoke port to feeder shipping cost, it is only $135 per TEU for Scapa Flow, whereas it is $196 per TEU for Hunterston or $200 per TEU for Rotterdam. On average, for these markets in the north, Scapa Flow should be able to offer a feeder cost saving of $65 per TEU, which is about one-third less than Rotterdam. In that sense, I think—
Q52 Chair: Before you go on with that, Professor Johnstone has thrown a bucket of icy water over the prospect of these trade routes opening up, certainly in the short term to medium term. If we are going to get these trade routes, is there going to be any value in investing in that type of plant?
Dr Menezes: I would not say that we need to invest in them right now. I would still say we need to be very actively focusing on exploring the potential right now and preparing for the time when—
Q53 Chair: Are we going to get these trade routes? What is the best scientific analysis about the opportunities? This is a big part of some of the things that we are looking at. Are they going to be opening up or, as Professor Johnstone said, not really going to make any great economic difference using these possible potential new trade routes than using traditional methods of Panama and Suez?
Dr Menezes: It is quite hard because as a think-tank we deal with both. We deal with the scientists, many of whom say no, it may not open up any time soon, but then we deal with the private sector in China, Korea and Japan who are not being deterred.
Q54 Chair: Is there private sector interest in looking at these trade routes? Are there people going there and saying, “This is a real option for us and a real potential”?
Dr Menezes: COSCO, the largest shipping company in China, has very much identified the Arctic as a priority and has very much begun to invest.
Q55 Chair: What is your view on this, Professor Johnstone?
Professor Johnstone: There is certainly interest from Singapore, China and Japan, and that is probably why they wanted observership at Arctic Council—not their only reason, but one of their concerns. From China’s position and probably Singapore’s position, Singapore being another observer, a new observer on the Arctic Council, Singapore is probably worried about competition because of the ships that are currently going through there.
Q56 Chair: I was wondering about Singapore’s interest in all this. Is their interest more of a concern that their prime position in world shipping may be challenged by the opportunities for the possibility of these routes opening up?
Professor Johnstone: It is one of their concerns, but they are also interested in the environmental and climate impacts of Arctic climate change, which have global ramifications. If we go back to shipping, yes, there is a serious shortage of harbours and infrastructure, and the shortage of harbours and infrastructure is one of the reasons why the ships are not sailing. There have been experimental passages, but if we look at the numbers on the Northern Sea Route, they are not inspiring. We are talking at most 40 ships a year.
Q57 Anna Soubry: I do not know about others on the Committee, but while I am all for commerce and trade and new opportunities, in a way I think I would be happier if the Arctic Circle was freezing up again. The melting of the ice is a sign of climate change, which we have identified as being a problem. Is that not going to stop business and—
Chair: I would imagine that Mr Downie has a contrary view.
Anna Soubry: Yes, but is that not going to stop business in reality? While there may be an opportunity there, it actually, we could say and we hope, would be only short term, so somebody is not going to invest what would be millions and millions of pounds in Scapa Flow.
Chair: Let’s hear from Mr Downie on the environmental concerns about these issues.
Rod Downie: Absolutely, but I would certainly acknowledge that shipping is a necessary and very important part of Arctic life. The northern communities, off-grid communities, depend on shipping for bringing everything from commodities to whatever they need to survive.
Shipping in the Arctic needs to be both safe and environmentally responsible, and that is where I would come back to the polar code, which was negotiated here in London, or rather step 1 of the polar code, which came into force at the beginning of this year. There are a few gaping holes in the polar code at the moment. One of the key issues, which is not covered in it, is the use of heavy fuel oils for shipping. Heavy fuel oils are very thick, viscous bunker fuels. They are extremely persistent in the marine environment where spilled. We are calling on the International Maritime Organisation to consider phasing out the use of heavy fuel oils. I would note that in the Antarctic there is a complete ban on the use of heavy fuel oils.
The second area that is not covered under the polar code is the smaller, what we call non-SOLAS vessels, vessels that do not fall under the Safety of Life at Sea Convention. That is small vessels like fishing vessels and smaller cargo vessels.
Q58 Chair: Interesting though all that is, I think it is the trade routes, the international shipping, that is interesting us just now. I think we have heard your environmental concerns and there does seem to be a range of views on this, which I think is interesting. We will want to examine a bit more of the evidence when it comes to us.
Anna Soubry: Yes, because one of the things obviously we will want to know is whether or not we should be looking and investing in any possibilities or whether or not there might be any environmental harm in doing it. In other words, I would have thought we need to get the balance right between all of this. But if there is opportunity, especially for the Scottish shipbuilding industry, then that would be worth looking at and may be welcomed by many.
Professor Johnstone: Even if we stopped burning oil and gas tomorrow, the sea ice is not going to come back over northern Russia. Even if we stop tomorrow, it is still a process that has already started and it cannot be entirely stopped. We can reduce it but we cannot entirely stop it.
When it comes to the Northern Sea Route, Rod already pointed out that most of the traffic is destinational, that is traffic that is going in to get resources out or bring resources in. That is why the use of the Northern Sea Route is very much tied to, for example, mines in northern Russia, oil and gas on mainland Russia, and also bringing resources into those very isolated communities. There are no roads up there.
Chair: Thank you. I have just noted that the Shadow Minister is on her feet and there will be a Division probably in the next 15 to 20 minutes, so I am hoping to wind up this session before that. We have Chris Law.
Q59 Chris Law: Professor Johnstone, I take particular interest in these questions because my background is anthropology and I also looked at circumpolar peoples during that time. The question I have is about your evidence. You made recommendations for economic development on an inclusive basis that benefits communities in the Arctic. How much do these communities currently benefit from economic development?
Professor Johnstone: It varies throughout the Arctic. It depends where you are. One of the tragedies in the Russian Arctic is that northern Russia or Arctic Russia produces about three-quarters of all product for the Arctic but is less than half the population, yet their human development outcomes are much lower. They are considerably lower on pretty much all spheres than the other seven Arctic states in northern regions.
There is a major problem of what we call leakage in economics, the problem of the benefits not staying there. Again, you have the frontier approach that you come in and you take stuff; maybe the workers are not local, we do not train up local people, but even if we do, if you have a mine it is only going to have a limited lifespan. Decisions whether to continue that mine or not depend on world prices. There is very little local control. If you are dealing with those kinds of large-scale resource projects, you are talking about massive capital investment that can only come from outside, which means the decision-making is not local and it means very often the benefits do not remain in the region.
Q60 Chris Law: Is there a specific good example in the different regions?
Professor Johnstone: I can maybe speak more generally. The good examples would be where you have a higher degree of devolution of governments by indigenous populations or at least populations at a local level. If you look at Nunavut in Canada, for example, where they have started to make decisions about what happens to their resources, there is more opportunity for those resources to stay. But even their devolution process is not complete. They still have much further to go. Greenland is probably the most advanced in that regard and still has an awful long way to go in order to catch up with the same kind of productivity that Denmark enjoyed. Part of that is just geographic and climatic.
Q61 Chris Law: You recommend that Scotland should ensure its corporate activities support equitable benefit sharing with indigenous communities. What main corporate activities is Scotland involved with in the region and what specifically are you calling on the UK Government to do?
Professor Johnstone: This was more looking to the future of when we are dealing with investment by British companies. It is a little bit difficult because this all has to be governed by the country of jurisdiction, so the state where it is taking place. I think that even in the United Kingdom strategy or policy framework the approach was very much we are going to, through UK Trade & Investment, encourage businesses to develop, to get engagement, but when it comes to things like environmental protection or decision-making at a higher level, we are going to leave that up to you, the Government of that state. That is all very nice on a state-to-state level, but I think Scotland can go a little bit further being a non-state and try to co-operate directly with more regional level or local and indigenous level organisation and management.
Q62 Chris Law: Thank you. I want to turn to fishing. It is obviously a significant industry and benefits greatly the Scottish economy. It is currently covered through the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission. The UK is subject to this agreement through its membership of the EU as well as the common fisheries policy. How will Scottish fishing interests in the Arctic change after Brexit and should the powers over fishing be devolved to Scotland?
Chair: It is a political question for you.
Professor Johnstone: I can make a stab at that. It is not just the NEAF, there is also NAFO, the Northern Atlantic Fisheries Organisation. These both cover the North Atlantic, where the UK is represented through the European Union. On the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union, the United Kingdom would have to apply again for membership of that organisation and would then have to negotiate its own quotas. I don’t think membership of the organisation will be controversial; I think it will be okay. Negotiating the quotas could be problematic. There are already problems, again related to climate change, negotiating quotas between the European Union and some of the Arctic states because of the way the mackerel has moved. The mackerel has moved from the European Union waters, the Norwegian waters, into Faroese and Icelandic waters.
It is a problem for Iceland, not just because we want to hunt the mackerel but because it eats, it competes with the cod. I wouldn’t like to call it an invasive species, it is in some ways welcome, but then you have a problem where you are basing it on old quota allocations, based on where the mackerel used to live. The mackerel is now coming further north and further west when it is young, when it is very hungry, and it is competing with the indigenous species. Then there are real problems negotiating quotas. The United Kingdom, as an independent state, is going to have much less bargaining power. It is going to find itself more like Iceland or the Faroe Islands in those negotiations.
Rod Downie: Scotland is a fishing nation, but the large majority of the Scottish fleet is small coastal operators. There is a larger pelagic fleet but, certainly from my understanding, Scotland has very little history of fishing in Arctic waters. We have a distant water fleet that operates in other parts of the world and I think you could probably count the number of UK fishing vessels that operate in Arctic waters on one hand. It would be a very new area for us.
Q63 Chair: What about the cod wars?
Rod Downie: It depends how you define Arctic and Arctic waters. I think we go back to that original discussion, but we tend to use the boundaries used by one of the working groups called the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, so that would be south of there. But as part of a green alliance coalition, WWF, together with eight other NGOs I think it was, has just developed and submitted to the UK Government a set of principles for establishing a sustainable fishery. I think if there are opportunities in the future, this is where the UK’s opportunity lies, to gain competitive advantage as the most sustainable fishery by delivering on sustainability.
We have put forward a set of 10 priorities. I will not run through all of them for the sake of time, but it includes effective legislation, sustainable catch limits, ecologically coherent networks of marine protected areas, ending discards, effective monitoring, a whole suite of areas that if we get them right could make the Scottish fishery one of the most sustainable fisheries in the UK. These are principles that we have developed for a sort of post-Brexit Scotland—or a post-Brexit UK, rather—but can be transferred to any other part of the world.
Q64 Chair: Thank you for that. We have a couple of important questions on defence that we want to get your views on. It is in relation to some of the evidence that Professor Johnstone gave us about tourism. I think that you said, Professor Johnstone—you can tell us if it is correct—that you have reservations that some of the traditional activities that we see in the Arctic region are being displaced by tourism. Maybe we have misquoted you giving that expression, but could you talk about if there are concerns about increasing tourism in the Arctic region and what we could maybe do to mitigate against some of that?
Professor Johnstone: I will try to be brief, but my experience from Iceland is that there has been a massive, massive increase in tourism in the last few years. Iceland has simply not been prepared. It has forced house prices to be impossible, unmanageable—again, something you have a lot of experience from in the United Kingdom in very attractive villages—and in Reykjavík the downtown is almost impossible for young people to live in these days. We are not very good at managing also the environmental impact of tourism, because it has exploded exponentially over the space of five years.
Q65 Chair: Is that not a good thing?
Professor Johnstone: Yes, it is. It is very welcome for the economy in that perspective. It is just making sure that it is done on a sustainable basis and it does not, for example, make a community uninhabitable because they cannot afford to live there. It is about trying to find that balance. Again, I think the United Kingdom broadly, not just Scotland, has experience of that and can maybe help these countries managing surges in tourism.
The biggest concern regarding tourism from my perspective would be cruise ships because, notwithstanding the Polar Code and some of the deficiencies with the Polar Code, if we have a search and rescue emergency with a cruise ship with even 500 people, who is going to get there? The United Kingdom has extraordinarily good search and rescue experience and talents and skills and equipment, where you can use your resources to be useful, almost indispensable in the North Atlantic. You have a problem: if you have a cruise ship accident off East Greenland, say you have 1,000 people—that is a small cruise ship—you are going to take them to the nearest village, maybe it is 300 kilometres away. Fine, you get them all there, and then what? The village has 100 people in it. You have 1,000 cruise ship passengers and 300 crew. Where they are going to sleep? What are they going to eat? Maybe they are going to eat out the local shop and then there are no supplies there for the next few weeks. Who is going to replace the fuel in that community? Even if you manage to get everyone off the ship, you have the problem of where you put them and what you do with the community after you have picked those people up.
Chair: I am grateful. I am just seeing the Minister is on his feet, so we do not have much time left. Unless anybody has anything important or dramatic to add to that, we will move on to Margaret Ferrier.
Q66 Margaret Ferrier: Coming to Dr Menezes initially, your written submission expressed some concern that northern Scottish waters have seen an increase in Russian submarine activity. I don’t know whether that has something to do with the fact that the Nimrod MR2 has retired and the fact that we still don’t have the nine P-8 Poseidons that are eventually supposed to be coming to Scotland. But quite frankly, the UK has had to rely on other nations, Canada, America and other NATO allies, to supply the capability. Why doesn’t the UK have the capability and what would you recommend the UK Government do to secure this area?
Dr Menezes: Getting the nine Poseidons sorted out soon would be a great priority, but also one thing we did suggest was possibly using in the interim period, before the Poseidons come in, the marine patrol aircrafts, to consider the RAF Sentinel planes. They were meant to be phased in in 2018, if memory serves me right. That is for the 2010 SDSR, but I think the 2015 SDSR went against that and said, “No, we are going to keep them”.
I do think the RAF Sentinel spy planes can be used in the interim until the Poseidon P-8 are constructed and procured. I believe the nine are meant to be coming in, I think two next year, two in 2018 and then three in 2020 and four in 2021. The RAF Sentinel spies could be helpful in the interim. In November 2016, when you had a number of Russian submarines supposedly in Scottish waters, we did rely on NATO for deterrence then.
Q67 Margaret Ferrier: We have no Royal Navy service outside or based in Scotland to protect its shores, so we are kind of wide open.
Coming to Professor Johnstone, in your written evidence you highlighted a lack of trust between Arctic governments as a potential military risk. Do you see the new American Administration as another one to add into the mix now? I think you mentioned in your evidence that especially in times of transition between Administrations, there is a lack of trust. How can we mitigate that?
Professor Johnstone: In a sense, the new Administration perhaps has greater trust with Russia than the previous one. In many ways, the Arctic Council itself has managed to separate itself and shelter itself from those international tensions and has continued co-operation, notwithstanding even the most tense period. During the annexation of Crimea, for example, we still had a functioning Arctic Council. People were still getting on; they were still having coastguard exercises. Those have been tailed off a little bit and there has been some pullback on that co-operation. That might resurface now with a more Russia-friendly US Administration, but I think it is very difficult to predict. There might have been a time where I would have pointed somewhere else, but I think because of the newness of the US Administration, it is very difficult to anticipate what the Arctic policy and approach will be, or if there will even be any interest in the Arctic whatsoever from the United States.
The United States, of all the Arctic states, has been the least Arcticy; it has been the least interested. If you ask most Americans if they are an Arctic state, they will look at you and go, “Where is the Arctic?” It is not on their radar in the way it is in the other seven states. Obama probably moved it a little bit forward, or maybe it was rather Clinton or just the Administration more generally. Certainly the US chairmanship put the Arctic on the map, but it is really unsure. There is no real clear Arctic interest from anything that we have seen in the run-up to the change of Government in the United States.
Q68 Margaret Ferrier: I am going to come to Mr Downie. Did Trump not say that climate change was a Chinese hoax? I am sure he will not be particularly sympathetic to what is happening in that area.
Rod Downie: Absolutely, but I was just going to comment on looking here from Europe, if you look to the south or the east, it is war, it is turmoil, it is conflict. If you look west, it is the Atlantic Ocean and the new US Administration, but if you look north, you have the Arctic, which is currently a very stable place. That is largely due to the Arctic Council. That is a forum where the US, Russia and other countries will come together and talk, so I think looking north we have a good platform for stability and peace.
Q69 Margaret Ferrier: We have received some evidence lamenting the retirement of the Sea King search and rescue helicopters. I believe new helicopters have come in. However, they have reduced passenger capacity. First, who is responsible for search and rescue operations in the High North? If the UK Government have decided to cut back on these operations, are the waters around Scotland now more dangerous than ever, notwithstanding housing Trident nuclear weapons on its shores?
Professor Johnstone: I will be brief again, because we are out of time, but there is a 2011 search and rescue agreement of the eight Arctic states, where they basically zone up the whole Arctic within the Arctic Circle region on who has the responsibility for search and rescue. The United Kingdom, of course, would be expected to take responsibility for search and rescue within its Exclusive Economic Zone, including around Scotland, right up past Shetland and so forth. But you would not have any obligation to support search and rescue in the North Atlantic beyond that. Nonetheless, in Iceland we have two coastguard vessels, two helicopters. Greenland has a very limited capacity in a very big ocean, where co-operation between the United Kingdom and these near-Arctic states would be very welcome.
Dr Menezes: We also need to think outside the box a little bit. I had a meeting with the chairman of the Royal Arctic Alliance in Greenland and they did mention that they were looking at purchasing aeroplanes for Greenland. Again, they targeted Britain as possibly the best source market. There are opportunities outside just the Arctic framework we generally think of for how we can work together with Arctic players and that would be one of them.
I also had a meeting with the person who heads business development for a municipality in South Greenland, again exploring the potential of developing airports there to boost infrastructure development in the country. When it came to deciding what sort of aircraft would be most suitable, it was Falcon jets. I said, “How do you plan to procure them?” “Oh, very much from the UK.” Again, there were these opportunities as you have development in the north and you have these opportunities for this country.
As a final point, the Royal Arctic Alliance has a sort of monopoly over the waters around Greenland. Very recently they went into a partnership agreement with Eimskip, the Icelandic carrier, as a result of which there is going to be greater access between Greenland and Britain, which hitherto may not have been as possible or at this particular level. Coming back to the fisheries, there are opportunities in the north. It is not just the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage; there is much more to the Arctic than that, which the UK and Scotland can currently explore.
Chair: There we have the perfect time, because we are just about to hear the bells of a Division and I think we have managed to conclude all the questions. We are very grateful for a very thorough session that has kicked off this inquiry in a good style and manner, so we are really pleased with that.
Thank you very much for coming along. The usual: if there is anything that you feel that you have missed, that needs to be emphasised or through the course of the inquiry something that you feel needs a further look at or further evidence, please give it to us and we will be more happy to accept it. Thank you ever so much for turning up today.