Examination of witnesses
Hayder al-Khoei and Haid Haid.
Q122 The Chairman: Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for coming to share your thoughts with us. We appreciate the time you are giving to the Committee. I am obliged formally to advise you that this is a public session. There will be a transcript of what you say, which will be supplied to you, and if you want to change anything or emphasise different aspects after the meeting you will be absolutely free to do so.
I will begin by repeating my welcome to you both. Mr al-Khoei, in our view you are uniquely placed to help us this morning, as is Dr Haid Haid. The Committee is trying to focus on the entire shifting power scene in the Middle East and on what that means for the United Kingdom—we are a United Kingdom Committee—and our international position. We want in particular to try to unravel what forces are at work in the region and who is really calling the shots.
We note that at the moment the US, the UN and the EU seem to be slightly taking a back seat, particularly in the Syrian peace process, which at this moment is being analysed and developed in Astana. Do you think that marks a permanent change? Is this a world that has fallen into the hands of Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and other forces, or is it just a passing phase? We would like the expert take of both of you on this and on how the UN may or may not be a key player. Are we looking at a fundamental change, or is this just a temporary phase? The floor is yours.
Hayder al-Khoei: Thank you, Lord Chairman. It is an honour to be here today. Perhaps I may start by giving a brief overview of how I see the changing scenario in the Middle East. I think we should understand just how badly the international community has failed with Syria and in Iraq, in particular by thinking that, as was the case in Afghanistan in the 1980s, extremists and radical jihadists could be supported for short-term policy goals. This of course backfired badly in America on 9/11. With Russia and Iran stepping in to protect their ally, Assad and his regime have survived, but the hundreds of rebel groups remain in Syria. We have seen a mainstreaming of extremist radical Islamic ideology across the board that was on the fringes but is now evident both in public discourse and in regional and social media. On the fringes, we have jihadist and extremist groups outdoing each other on just how sectarian and brutal they can be.
There was a clear contradiction, particularly in US policy, when it came to Syria and Iraq. On one side of the border, rebels were being armed and funded with the clear aim of ousting Assad, while on the other side of the border in Iraq the international community was supporting the Iraqi Government in fighting the same groups. Of course, transnational jihadis do not much care for borders drawn colonially in the 20th century, and we have seen how they swept across the two countries. On ISIS, I want to note that the military campaign is progressing quite well. The anti-ISIS coalition has bombed ISIS thousands of times, but we need more than just bombs to defeat these groups; you cannot defeat ideas with only bombs.
On the shifting power balance, to put it more bluntly, it is very clear that western countries are becoming less relevant in the Middle East when we look at Syria and Iraq. I think this will continue to be the case. This is first and foremost a regional struggle for power and influence in which countries like the US and the UK have less influence. Also, I do not think they are seen as credible players by either side in Syria. Opposition forces in Syria think that the West has largely abandoned them to Assad and his allies and not followed through on red lines that were made quite clear when it came to the use of chemical weapons. On the other side, the Syrian regime and its allies think that the West has only fuelled the fire in Syria by arming and funding some of the more radical jihadis.
Where I think the UK can play a more positive role—for the record, I do not think that the UK has much, if any, leverage in Syria—is by using its influence with some of the stakeholders involved in the Syrian crisis, particularly its Gulf Arab allies who are backing some of the rebel groups. I think there is also scope to put more pressure on those allies to stop this hateful and violent interpretation of Islam being exported.
The Chairman: Mr Haid, would you like to add your opening thoughts on that theme?
Haid Haid: Yes, I would like to do so. First, thank you for inviting me. We all know that the conflict in Syria has been going on for almost six years now. Around 500,000 people have been killed, the majority of whom were civilians. It is also clear that there is no military solution to this conflict. That said, all attempts to find a political solution have failed, and they have failed for two main reasons. The first is that there are no enforcement mechanisms and the international community has either not been willing or not been able to enforce any kind of deal. The ongoing ceasefire now, as well as previous ceasefires, is a perfect example. They reach a deal, but there are no enforcement mechanisms in place to make sure that these deals will be implemented. Unless they are, we cannot expect any kind of political progress to be made in order to end the conflict.
The other problem is the vicious circle that the ongoing political talks are in right now. Whenever there is political talk, all parties start discussing issues from scratch; they do not build on what they agreed upon before. Whenever they reach a critical moment and have to discuss the authorities that will lead the transitional period, they stop, suspend those talks and go back home. The next time they meet they start from scratch, and when they reach a critical moment they go back. There is no pressure to force them to start discussing the elephant in the room and address it.
Going to the question, the regional powers, mainly Turkey, Iran, and Russia as an international power, have not been able to achieve anything in the recent Astana talks, first, because they do not have influence over all the actors on the ground. No one among those powers has influence over the Kurdish forces. One of them, Turkey, is a clear enemy of the Kurdish forces. Iran has its own problems with its own Kurdish groups, which influences its position towards Kurdish groups in Syria. Russia is trying to build good relations with the Kurdish forces but has not been able to do so. So the only group right now that has influence over Kurdish forces is the Americans, and they were not there. They were not willing to invite Kurdish forces to the table and they will not be able to force them to accept any kind of deal that they reach. There are also the forces who are fighting in the southern part of Syria and are influenced by Jordan and the US. The three powers that have been trying to reach a deal alone do not have influence over all actors. They also need the funds that will come from the EU and other western countries at a later stage to rebuild Syria. They cannot fund that themselves. They know that unless those actors are involved in the process they will not be happy just to pay the bill at a later stage, so they have to involve them.
The last important point to make is that there is also a general agreement among opposition groups that any kind of political process should be conducted under the supervision of the UN, the EU and the US, because they do not trust Russia or Iran and they want independent observers, not only to observe what is happening but to enforce any deal that they reach.
The Chairman: All sorts of questions arise out of your comments, which we are going to pursue in the next hour or so, if we may. The obvious one is: is this a power struggle that we are looking at or a religious war, or just social disintegration? What role, if any, will the outside powers be playing in this? Not so much the western powers as the new players—Russia, Turkey and so on. These are the themes that we want to discuss.
Q123 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I will ask you to look at the wider region, not just Syria but including Syria, and try to help us understand whether, as some people argue, this is a fundamental religious dispute between Shia and Sunni that bubbles up in different places. Those people say that it is that dispute, that battle between those two, which is the fundamental feature of the instability in the Middle East. A lot of other people would say that that is not really the case: Shia and Sunni have lived side by side perfectly amicably for thousands of years—hundreds of years, anyway—and this is more about power relationships and the role of Iran, Saudi Arabia and so on. If you could comment on that, it would be quite helpful.
Hayder al-Khoei: It is a bit of both, and both sides are partly right; it is mainly political and it is a struggle for power, but what might be slightly more difficult to understand in the West—for the record, I am both British and Iraqi, so I have a bit of understanding on both sides—is that religion plays a very big role in the day-to-day lives of people in the Middle East. It is a very powerful factor. It affects them from the moment they wake up to the moment they go back to bed. Because this is the case, it also gives politicians an opportunity to play on religious and sectarian discourse as a way to mobilise and manipulate their people for political purposes. It is political and it is religious, but I am not entirely sure where we can draw the line, because those lines are blurred.
Another extreme argument is that they have always been at each other’s throats and have been killing each other for 1,400 years. That is not entirely true, but we should also be more frank and understand that sectarianism in Islam is as old as Islam. We have had violence from day one, in the seventh century. There were brutal massacres, beheadings, heads placed on pikes—some of the things we see now in Syria. This was happening in Syria and Iraq 1,400 years ago. That is not to say that Shias and Sunnis have been at each other’s throats for 14 centuries, but certainly sectarianism has been an element from day one and there have been brutal episodes of sectarian violence. But if you look at a broad sweep of history, it is noticeable that when these tensions flare up and it becomes the most bloody, particularly 16th-century Turkey versus Iran, it is when external powers have a political struggle and use religion as a means to mobilise and manipulate. Some academics call these people sectarian entrepreneurs. They could not care less about Sunni or Shia Islam. They could be atheist and not religious at all, but as a politician it is something powerful to play on.
As a practical example of why this is not technically a Shia-Sunni struggle, we are constantly reminded that Assad is an offshoot of Shia Islam and is backed by Shia forces. Assad himself, after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, openly, blatantly, incited Sunni sectarian jihadists to go and fight in Iraq. Ostensibly, this was to combat the Americans, who had grand visions of redrawing the Middle East and exporting democracy, but these Sunni jihadists were going to Iraq and systematically targeting Shia civilians in mosques, markets and schools. So we have a so-called Shia player using Sunni extremists for a clear foreign policy agenda. To sum up, it is a bit of both: it is political and religious.
The Chairman: Mr Haid, would you like to comment on this central question? Is it a power struggle or is it religious?
Haid Haid: I agree that it is a bit of both. To understand it better, I think it is important to differentiate between the motives of local players and the motives of regional players. Looking at what happened in Syria, or even in Iraq or in Lebanon before, most of those struggles or conflicts started as political conflicts. People in Syria started calling for their rights, because they did not have any, and later when they picked up arms to defend themselves, that is when the regional powers had the ability basically to influence the agendas of locals along the lines of sectarian discourse. They all picked their own allies and said, “Okay, we will fund you”, the Qataris and the Turks as well. On the other side, the Iranians also picked their own ally and said, “If they fight us, we will fight them back”. They both started using sectarian discourse. Local groups also started using that at a later stage.
What I am trying to say here is that the motives of these two groups are different, which is why you have a bit of both. When you address the root causes of the problems in Syria, in Iraq and even in other countries in the region, you will be able to differentiate the local groups who have legitimate demands from the sectarian war that has been going on for ages among the regional powers.
To highlight why this is not a sectarian conflict, whether we are talking about Sunnis or Shias, people within the same sect are also fighting each other, using religion and different religious pretexts to justify their actions. They say, for example, that they want an Islamic state or to be ruled by Islam. They all agree on the same issues, but none the less they fight each other. You can see this in Syria among the Sunni groups, in Iraq among Shia groups, and in other places. That is why this is not merely a religious struggle; it is a power struggle. When we can differentiate between these two different agendas and then start work on distancing them, I think we will be able to address the root causes of the problem, which will help to bring to an end to this sectarian war and to the independence of local actors against regional activists.
The Chairman: Thank you. That is very clear.
Q124 Lord Reid of Cardowan: My question is addressed in the first instance to Mr Hayder al-Khoei. In one of your papers—incidentally, I find your writings very illuminating, especially as regards the complexity, contradictions and dangers in what you call sectarian entrepreneurship—you point out that over the past few years the policy of the United States has ended up apparently supporting forces against jihadism in Iraq, and, whether it intends it or not, supporting the forces of jihadism in Syria.
You also make the point, which has been made by several witnesses, that we cannot win this just with bombs and that there has to be the narrative of stabilisation and resources have to put in afterwards. You say in one of your papers, “Some European member states recognise the importance and urgency of committing to a stabilisation effort. Others are still too complacent”. Where would you place the United Kingdom on that spectrum, given that it is still a member of the European Union, and how might that be affected if the United Kingdom plays outside the European Union?
Hayder al-Khoei: Thank you for the question. First, I should explain what I meant when I mentioned fighting jihadists in Iraq but supporting jihadists in Syria. The situation in Syria is actually much more complicated because you have departments within the US Administration, particularly under Obama, supporting different sides in the Syrian conflict which are fighting each other. You have Pentagon-backed Kurdish forces using American anti-tank missiles to destroy armoured vehicles that had been given to Sunni rebels by the CIA. At times it has been so confusing that it seemed as though the US was at war with itself and that there was no internal consensus on what we should do.
Lord Reid of Cardowan: Perhaps I may make one comment on that. This is not only a recent thing. The dispute between handling by the state department and the Pentagon in the United States goes right back to 2003, particularly on this question of post-conflict stabilisation.
Hayder al-Khoei: Absolutely. I am currently doing doctoral research on this at the University of Exeter, and my PhD thesis will address the issue. I have not reached a conclusion yet, but the divisions in America were almost along sectarian lines. Back in 2003 you had the neocons supporting the Shia opposition forces in Iraq, and the Arabists in the State Department and the CIA very openly supporting Sunni forces in Iraq. That is just an initial conclusion, which I plan to study.
On the role of the UK, I think it is already clear to everyone here today that the United Kingdom gives almost unconditional support to its Arab allies in the Gulf who, to put it mildly, have not been very helpful in combatting the various radical forces over the long term. Yes, Saudi Arabia does not tolerate such forces inside the kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself, but it is openly backing, funding and arming radical Islamic jihadists outside the Saudi kingdom. We have had leaked diplomatic cables that reveal even US frustration with this. One that particularly comes to mind was written by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who described Saudi Arabia as the number one global financial hub for Islamic terrorist groups worldwide. This should be of great concern to British policymakers, but when the Government are pushed on it—and they have been, particularly by journalists here in the UK—their response is that aside from the economic interests through trade deals and the supply of weapons, there is a clear economic interest on the part of the UK to have the Saudis buying weapons.
Besides that, the Government say that Saudi Arabia passes on very good intelligence that saves British lives. To be frank, I find this laughable, because while it may be true that Saudi Arabia provides good intelligence to the British security services, it is also using petrodollars to export a violent and radical interpretation of Islam across the world. It has spent billions, particularly since the 1970s, in schools not only in the region but here in the UK. We have evidence of textbooks used in Saudi schools that show where on the arm you need to cut if someone steals as a first offence. These are our allies and their books are even being used in schools here in the UK. These are official textbooks, and of course that does not include what is being taught in their mosques.
When I talk about complacency, I would say that the UK in particular is one of the most complacent countries, and I do not believe that it is doing enough to push the Saudis by saying that enough is enough. The Germans, for example, are now making it clear that this is intolerable and that they cannot tolerate the Saudis using German money to export such a radical interpretation of Islam. I believe that the UK should be doing much more to tell the Saudis the same. I understand the difficulties of saying that in public, but privately the UK should be saying, “Enough is enough. We cannot take any more of this”.
The Chairman: Mr Haid, do you agree that we have the wrong sort of allies?
Haid Haid: In the end, you have to deal with what you have, right? You do not have that many options. Looking at the approach of the various different allies in the region, I think that more pressure should be put on the different groups not only to comply with international principles and allow their communities and other communities in the region to claim their entitlement to the same rights as everyone else, but to stop financing groups for power struggle purposes.
I will just comment on whether the UK has any influence and whether the role the UK is playing is contributing to stabilisation and security or whether it is basically going in the wrong direction. At least when it comes to Syria, I think the UK has been playing a good role, first, by employing local actors and organisations that have been providing governance in various different rebel-held areas. The British are trying to empower these local actors in order that they can provide sufficient services to stabilise their areas and encourage resistance against extremist groups that are trying to exploit people’s needs in order to have greater influence over them and then recruit them. In that sense, the UK has been playing an important role.
At the same time, the UK is not doing enough. While it is fair to say that the UK cannot do this alone, it has mainly to co-operate with its allies, whether they are in the EU or elsewhere. That is because we have many actors who share the same goals and agendas. You have to create a powerful alliance among the groups so that everyone works together to reach a specific goal that all can agree on. This is not the case right now. Different countries are trying to achieve different goals even when they agree on the goals they want to reach. They are not establishing institutions and they are not trying to bring people together—here I am talking about local actors in the region. What they do in the main is try to influence them, but that is basically about distancing those actors from each other. What has been done is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. The model which the UK is using for Syria should be changed in order that it can work as part of a bigger alliance with clear strategies that can be achieved not only in Syria but across the region. That alone will make it possible to set things moving in the right direction.
Q125 Lord Purvis of Tweed: I want to follow up on what Mr Haid said earlier, which I thought was really interesting: that there is also a very major consideration of the disputes within, rather than between, the religious communities. Is there a straightforward way of understanding why, for example, al-Sistani might have a different view from Khamenei, or that within Shi’ism there is a different view about the theocratic state, so that Iran can be governed in one way within Shi’ism and in Iraq there is a different view?
Why, within Salafism, is there a difference in view between those who believe in violent revolution and those who believe in peaceful governance? Is it straightforward to understand or not? What I am trying to get at is whether this is more relevant for us to understand, for the future uncertainty or stability of the region, or whether it is more relevant for us to understand the difference between Sunni and Shia. Which is the most relevant for future uncertainty? Perhaps an even more complicated question is what role the UK can play in this. There will have to be a huge element of reconciliation and perhaps transitional justice. Can the UK bring anything to the table in that respect?
Hayder al-Khoei: I agree very much with Haid’s comments. It is the intra-sectarian dynamics that are much more important and that say much more about the region than the very easy-to-say thing, which is that it is a Shia versus Sunni power struggle. I would not say it is easy to understand the intra-sectarian dynamics, particularly within the Shia world, but it is not impossible. Very broadly speaking, for over 100 years now there has been an intellectual struggle over what Shia Islam means, and the role that religious clerics can or even should play in politics.
So, yes, the Shia world is divided intellectually along the line of whether you believe in the revolutionary interpretation of Shia Islam, which Ayatollah Khomeini first put into practice in 1979 and which is currently led by Ayatollah Khamenei; or the apolitical, I would say much more traditional, orthodox—mainstream version of Shia Islam, which says that at a very basic level religion is pure, politics is dirty, and we cannot mix the two. Actually, the majority of the Shia world—I would even include Iran itself—believes in the apolitical, orthodox, mainstream interpretation of Shia Islam that says, “Leave politics to the politicians. We take spiritual guidance from our clerics”.
However, Iran is a state; it has state resources, an army and a propaganda machine. Sometimes it seems, when you look at the region, that Iran’s interpretation is the dominant one in the Shia world, but whether in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, even Bahrain, across the GCC[1] it is the Najaf-Sistani school that is dominant. In some ways, they are a silent majority. They do not have the military capability of the Iranians’ Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or the vast oil wealth, so it sometimes seems disproportionate.
Again, because we are talking about Syria and Iraq, when the Iranian security and military establishment was mobilising Iraqis to fight in Syria, they said, “Look, there is a war going on in Syria. If you don’t fight them there they are going to come in Iraq”, and eventually they did come to Iraq. When the Iranians were clearly mobilising Iraqis and using emotional religious and sectarian discourse to say, “We have to fight for our community in Syria”, it was Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq who discouraged Iraqis from going to Syria. So there are clear policy clashes. It is not just an intellectual debate; it had an impact on Iraq. Actually, I was in the room when a tribal leader—this was in Najaf in the south of Iraq—came asking permission from one of the grand ayatollahs to send his son to Syria. The grand ayatollah said, “No. We have a problem in Iraq, we deal with the jihadists in Iraq. Syria is not our fight”.
Q126 Lord Grocott: I picked up on one comment that you made in your broad sweep of the history of the region. I think you said that there is greater violence when outside parties are involved. What does that mean for British foreign policy? That is obviously one of the main focuses of our inquiry. You said that the British influence is minimal, particularly in Syria. You mentioned the United States arming both sides in certain conflicts. Would the region be better off if the “great powers” left it to the region to sort things out? If not, what are you actually recommending British policy should be?
Hayder al-Khoei: That is a very tough question to answer: whether it would be better or worse if they leave. Again, I agree with Haid that the UK cannot do this alone: no one country can do this alone. It really needs an international campaign to address not just the military side of things and the violence but the ideological legacy that this conflict and previous conflicts have had on previous generations. I am much more worried about the next generation. We see young six, seven and eight year-old kids shooting, executing, cutting throats. What monsters will they grow up to be? The next generation of jihadist fighters will make some wish we had ISIS in the way people today are saying, “If only we had al-Qaeda. They were a bit less extreme”.
On that note, and on the practical way the UK can help—I think it is helping, but I am arguing that it can do much more—there is now a US-led effort to address the crisis of education that we have and some of the violent and hateful texts that are being taught in schools, not just in Saudi Arabia but from the US to Malaysia and Indonesia, which are seen as models of Islam and democracy. We have big problems coming with the next generation of children, not just through the official education system but through training in the Islamic traditional seminaries. Through the Global Counterterrorism Forum the State Department is leading an effort, alongside ISESCO[2] and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, to go through text books one by one, and the educational curricula across the region, to pick out not just the dangerous parts of this education but the parts that make it very easy for ISIS, al-Qaeda and other extremist groups to push people over the edge. If you grow up in these schools being told 24/7 that your fellow Shia Muslims are infidels, that the Jews should be killed and that the Christians are pigs, and this is how you punish this crime, if you grow up through this education—which is sponsored by Governments; it is not secret education—when ISIS says, “You believe this. Now put it into practice”, it is not a big leap to jump. That is why we are seeing thousands of young people being recruited; they are being almost trained very quietly behind the scenes.
Again I want to stress that the UK is part of this formula; it is working with the State Department. But I think it should go beyond saying, “Here are our recommendations. These are the books we think are unacceptable”. I am not saying that any western power can or even should be the arbiter of what good Islam or bad Islam is; that is not the role of the UK or the US, and in fact this will backfire. Muslims in the region will say, “This is British Islam, this is American Islam”, and it will empower the more radical elements. I am saying that instead of this, the UK and the US should be doing more to work with local partners—religious establishments, mosques, clerics, foundations, civil society organisations—to promote a more tolerant and plural interpretation of Islam. You are not reinventing the wheel, this existed 100 years ago, but it is being undermined by some of our allies, and we can empower the more pluralist and tolerant interpretations of Islam.
The Chairman: Lord Jopling has a question, and then I want to move on to some of the more specific issues.
Q127 Lord Jopling: You have majored on the activities of Saudi Arabia in encouraging jihadism, but with oil prices being what they are, the Saudis are deeply concerned about their budget. At the moment there is a good deal of retrenchment going on in Saudi Arabia. Egypt, for instance, is shivering because it is worried that there will be much less Saudi assistance coming its way. Do you think that the Saudi activities in encouraging jihadism are ring-fenced, or could their budgetary problems encourage them not to be so active in the mischief that you have been describing to us?
Hayder al-Khoei: In some respects the genie was let out of the bottle when the original money and support was given to these groups. I am not suggesting in any way that Saudi Arabia or any other country in the region controls ISIS or al-Qaeda. Many of these groups are now self-sufficient and are receiving private money from wealthy donors in these countries. So even if restrictions are put on official government spending, many of the groups will survive because of their private donors. So we are not talking only about official government sponsorship and I see no signs of that abating.
I have mentioned Saudi Arabia many times in our exchanges, but it is not only Saudi Arabia. Qatar has played a particularly nefarious role, and again I am not talking only of the Qatari Government but about wealthy donors in the country. Kuwait is also extremely problematic. These countries have been named by the Treasury Department in the US as allies who are not doing enough to combat the supply of these funds. The answer they usually give when the Americans push them on it is, “Well, it’s not my ministry funding these groups, it is those wealthy donors”. But in these very authoritarian, centralised states, which are almost police states, it is very hard to believe that people are spending hundreds of millions without at least some form of government oversight or control. That beggars belief.
The Chairman: Dr Haid, do you have any comments to make?
Haid Haid: I do. We have to differentiate between the policies implemented by Saudi Arabia in the past and the one that is currently being implemented. Let me make this clear by focusing on Syria. Saudi Arabia is one of the few regional countries that not only supported Islamist groups but tried to support other groups. Qatar and other countries such as Turkey supported Islamist groups. The Saudis tried to move in a different direction, because by that point they knew that the challenge they were facing was not limited to those who were resident inside Saudi Arabia but included Saudis living outside the country and who at some point would go back. That, I think, is why there has been a shift in the way they deal with the jihadi groups in Syria. That has certainly been clear.
What they did not do sufficiently—here I agree with Hayder—was control those wealthy Saudis who have been privately funding various different groups. The Saudis are also not putting enough pressure on other Gulf countries such as Qatar and private citizens in Kuwait who are doing the same thing. In that sense, they could definitely do more.
I want to comment on what was said earlier about two of the main issues. The first is whether we have to spend time understanding the differences between the different Sunni and Shia groups. I think that would be a waste of time, because those groups will always find differences if they want to focus on them. That is not the main problem. The main problem is that there is a power struggle; they want to gain power. That is why they always use different pretexts in order to justify what is happening.
Right now in Syria there is an al-Qaeda affiliated group called Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which is fighting other Sunni rebel groups. They share the same religion and agree on almost everything when it comes to religious principles, but that is not enough to stop them fighting. They are fighting the regime right now and they are also fighting against those Sunni groups. This explains how the main problem is not a religious one; it is about the power struggle. This is why I said earlier that we need to differentiate between the different agendas and motives of the various groups. That will help us to differentiate between these people.
The other issue is that of not dealing with the root causes of the problem. It is also about empowering groups and encouraging a sectarian discourse. People who have taken up arms and joined ISIS and other groups in Syria and Iraq can see that those groups have been marginalised for years. They do not feel that they can participate in ruling themselves in a new way. They have no rights. For years now they have been exposed to these grievances and have been forced to deal with them. This is why when other groups try to exploit that, it will be easy for them to do so. What we can do is deal with the causes of the problems, because that is more efficient and saves time. What we are doing, why we are doing it, and what we are doing it for will become clearer. When we start addressing these issues from that perspective, the outcome will be more successful.
Turning to what else the UK could be doing, it could do a lot inside Syria. Let us start by protecting civilians. This is an area that no one is discussing right now, particularly with regard to putting enough pressure on the actors to respect facilities such as hospitals, schools and markets, all of which have been systematically targeted for years now, and not only by the Syrian regime or some of the rebel groups but by the Russians themselves. We are talking about groups that have signed various different treaties that state clearly that such attacks are not acceptable, and we have done nothing to stop them. We always say that it is complicated and that we have two options: either we do nothing, which is what we are doing right now, or we go to war against Russia and everyone else.
We have a range of different options, but they are not being explored. The international community and the different western countries have access to enough intelligence to start building cases against the perpetrators when, say, a hospital is targeted. Until now we have had no information about who has been targeting hospitals, and there is a willingness to continue ignoring what has been happening in Syria. This is dangerous not only because it contributes to the conflict but because it makes people to think that they are isolated from everyone else and no one cares about them. When you foster that kind of feeling, it is easy for groups like ISIS and others to come in and recruit new members, and we then have to deal with the consequences. Protecting civilians should be a priority and that is where we should start. The UK can mobilise their alliances in order to do that.
Q128 Lord Grocott: My question is about the Kurdish aspirations for nationalism in the area. There is bound to be a potential conflict between recognising nationalist aspirations on the one hand and being concerned about upsetting state boundaries in this or any other region on the other. I would like your thoughts on this. How can we strike a balance when we consider the region in terms of backing state Governments on the one hand and recognising nationalist aspirations on the other? I suppose that is a subset of my broader question, which is whether it is, in any case, any of our business. I always find it slightly odd that we have these kinds of discussions. If a country in the Middle East was now advising Britain on whether it should have regional government or not, or on the extent of Scottish independence, I would tend to say, “Mind your own business”. Those are the two questions.
Hayder al-Khoei: On the issue of balance, I do not think that one has been struck, particularly when it comes to Iraq – and I’ll let Haid deal with Syria. We should note that the Kurds are not one monolithic bloc, whether in the region itself or in individual countries where they have significant populations. It is strange to many observers that the West supports its NATO ally Turkey in its war against the Kurds in that country, because they are separatists and we consider them to be terrorists, yet the Kurds in Syria, and therefore on the other side of the border but from the same party and with the same ideology, are suddenly vital allies in the war against ISIS. The West funds them, and the United States even embeds Special Forces to fight alongside them. So they are terrorists on one side of the border and freedom fighters on the other. It is even stranger when you consider that a NATO ally, Turkey, is shelling those Kurdish forces from across the border, so there is a lot of confusion.
My cautionary message to the British Government would be this: at least understand how your policy is perceived in Iraq, because it appears that the UK—and not just the UK but the US along with many other European member states—is supporting one man and one party in Kurdistan at the expense of other Kurdish politicians and political parties. It seems as if the de facto President of the Kurdistan region, President Masoud Barzani, has been given a blank cheque by the western states. His mandate expired 16 months ago and there is a deep political crisis over his legitimacy and a broader representation in Kurdistan, which I do not think is being addressed.
I have just returned from a visit to Iraq during which I visited the Kurdish central and southern regions of the country. There is great fear among the other Kurdish parties that the KDP,[3] Barzani’s party and the one that receives unconditional support from the UK and the US, is stockpiling weapons that are being supplied to fight against ISIS. There is also a perception that they are being saved up and stockpiled for a rainy day; that is, for future conflicts with fellow Kurds. We should also remember that the KDP, which controls Kurdistan or at least the security elements, has physically prevented the Speaker of the Parliament from attending or even entering Irbil, the regional capital. The Kurdish Parliament has not convened in more than a year, which is a great shame.
More broadly, again there is a contradiction, because the Kurds in Iraq are federalists. They want as much power as they can get from Baghdad, but within Kurdistan they are hardcore, diehard centralists. All the power is concentrated quite literally in one man, one family and one party. I do not think that the UK has struck a balance there. In fact, I am fearful of the UK’s unconditional support, alongside the unconditional support being provided by the US. They are taking sides in an internal dispute that one day may become vicious and bloody again. If that happens and they are seen so publicly to be backing just one man, the western nations will not be regarded as credible players or even as being able to mediate.
Lord Grocott: Is it better if we say nothing? Is that what you are saying?
Hayder al-Khoei: No, I am not saying that you should withdraw entirely. In fact, western engagement with Iraq is better than a lack of engagement, but when the countries of the West do engage, they should be more fair and equal. That is all I am saying.
The Chairman: Dr Haid, do you have an additional point to make specifically about the Kurds?
Haid Haid: I agree totally with what Hayder has said, in particular that we have to understand the differences between the Kurdish groups themselves, not only in Syria and Iraq but right across the region. There are differences among them and we should not assume that they agree on all the specific issues.
The other thing to do is to admit that the policy which the US in particular has been implementing in Syria and Iraq has not been successful. The Americans have been sending mixed signals to the different parties and co-operating with different enemies, thereby ignoring the elephant in the room: they are ignoring the problems among the Kurdish forces and the Kurdish-Turkish forces. They have been saying that for now they should focus on only one goal, which is that of fighting ISIS, but that ought not to be the case, because one problem cannot be separated out from the rest. In order to reach any kind of deal and to address the Kurdish issue, you have to consider the broader issues of the conflict. One of those is that people have to understand that the Kurds who have been oppressed in Syria for years are not the only group that has been oppressed in that country. Any kind of solution to the Kurdish issue should be part of a broader strategy that addresses the main conflict in Syria, because one sub-conflict cannot be resolved without sorting out the main one.
Another issue is that we have to begin mediating between the different groups. That means both Kurdish and Arab groups, because the tensions arising in Syria between Arabs and Kurds are very great as a result of the incorrect policies that have been implemented, such as sending arms to and supporting one group over another. That does not address the issue of getting people together and saying, “Okay, there are differences between you. Let us discuss them and come to an agreement on how to coexist”.
The third issue, which is quite important, is the ability to reach a deal that can be accepted by the rest of the players, not only the regional players but the local ones. If we want to address the Kurdish issue in Syria we have to do so through democratic means because the rest of the Syrian people have to be able to accept it and deal with it, otherwise we will just be creating secondary conflicts in the country. That is why any strategy should be comprehensive and address all the interlinked issues. No one single specific problem can be solved without resolving the other issues around it.
I want to respond briefly to the question of whether the UK should intervene. The UK and broader western engagement not only in the Middle East but in other countries should be essential, but there is a difference between engaging to intervene in internal politics and interventions to protect rights and values. I think that we should highlight this and focus more on protecting rights and principles. People have rights and we should protect them.
The Chairman: Lord Reid, I know that you want to speak, but we are falling badly behind. Members should come in during the next phase.
Q129 Lord Jopling: Perhaps we could now move along and pick your brains on the rather gentler aspects of internal developments in these countries. We have noted that in Iraq in particular the Prime Minister has been moving towards a policy of decentralisation and devolving power to provincial governors. Can you give us your views on that process, and do you regard it as a positive step?
Enlarging the question to cover Syria, we have received evidence about how important it is to empower local actors who can influence more accountable and effective local governance. Perhaps you would comment also on that. Finally, following up on what Lord Grocott has said, is there any way in which the UK Government can encourage that, or not, or would it be better if we minded our own business? Is there a role for us to be helpful in this area?
Hayder al-Khoei: I will be as brief as I can and take the questions together. I think that the process of decentralisation is a very positive step for Iraq. We are lucky in a sense because the current Prime Minister, Mr Haider al-Abadi, recognises decentralisation as a mechanism for strengthening the country by empowering local people. This is in stark contrast to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who viewed decentralisation as a hidden plot or agenda to divide and carve up the country. So that is a positive move.
In 2015, Abadi shrunk the Cabinet by a third. He abolished some ministries and gave their powers to local provincial governments, and he merged four ministries together. But the Government faces a big problem and it is one that the Prime Minister cannot solve on his own, which is the institutional legacy of centralisation. This is something Iraq has inherited from the Baath regime under Saddam Hussein, where everything had to go through the central Government and even a local school teacher in Basra in the south had to be appointed in Baghdad. It is a ridiculous scale of centralisation. So the Prime Minister is going in the right direction but at a very slow pace, and he faces many hurdles, one of which is public perception, by the way.
In Iraq, if the international community are to do anything—again, this is a word of caution to the UK and the US—yes, we should empower locals, we should strengthen this process of decentralisation, but everything should go through the central Government. I know it can be frustrating and very slow, but the Government in Iraq are on very thin ice, because unfortunately one of the most widely believed theories—of every 10 Iraqis I speak to, nine believe this—is that the West wants to divide our country as a means to weaken it and exert control on it. The Government are dealing with this public perception, so please continue to empower locals but do it through the central Government and be aware of the sensitivities, because it could endanger other British interests if it seen by locals as a western attempt—I will not mention names—to empower certain leaders and bypass the central Government. This will backfire spectacularly. It will fuel further conflict and not solve it.
The Chairman: Dr Haid, decentralisation or break-up?
Haid Haid: Definitely. I think the UK has been doing a lot when it comes to empowering local governance initiatives and bodies in northern Syria and that is important for two main reasons. One is that empowering those groups and governance bodies will contribute to implementing whatever political solution is reached in the future, because when you reach a political decision or settlement on a national level, you will need local partners who will be willing and able to implement it on the local level. Empowering local actors will contribute to that and will help in that sense, but what is also important is that empowering local governance bodies will help to resist terrorist groups and radicalisation, because when you provide people with a sense of ownership over their communities and provide them with essential services, they will not look for those services elsewhere and will not be abused by other groups and enticed to join them in order to be entitled to such services.
Mainly, when it comes to Syria, the UK, along with other western countries, should focus on making sure that whatever political solution the Syrians or the international community agree on in Syria should be fair, just and accepted by all groups. Otherwise, whatever settlement ends the conflict now will create another conflict in the future. We should also focus on making sure that accountability is a major part of whatever solution is reached for Syria. Otherwise, we will see warlords enjoying the peace phase at a later stage and that will create more grievances and more tension, which will create another conflict in the future.
The Chairman: Lord Reid, does your question fit in here?
Q130 Lord Reid of Cardowan: It is a very brief question of fact about the Kurds and the alarming description given by Mr al-Khoei. Is this merely a matter of a power struggle inside the KRG[4] between Barzani and Talabani, or is it a much wider struggle?
Hayder al-Khoei: It is both. There is clearly a political party struggle, but actually, when you talk to Kurds across the spectrum, both in Irbil and in Sulaymaniyah, in Talabani-controlled and in Barzani-controlled territory in Kurdistan, there is a deep crisis over legitimacy. People are suffering, they have not been paid salaries—Peshmerga soldiers are not being paid—and at the same time people see two families amassing great wealth through oil, which technically should belong to all Iraqis. I do not want to single out Kurdistan here, because the central Government face very similar problems when it comes to corruption and the public’s perception of corruption.
I mentioned Kurdistan because they billed themselves as the other Iraq, as somehow detached from the rest of the country, but actually they are suffering from the same deep-rooted corruption challenges that the rest of the country faces. Actually, in answer to an earlier question, this is one area where the UK can do more. It can give Iraq not just money that will go down a black hole and line the pockets of politicians but know-how and technical support to address the issue of corruption, because corruption affects every other issue we have talked about today. That is one way in which the UK and others can be more helpful.
Q131 Baroness Coussins: Going back to what you were saying about decentralisation, it might go further than decentralisation of course. We have heard that there are some discussions going on in Syria and Iraq, and in Libya and Yemen, about the possible unravelling of the unitary state itself. What is your assessment of that conversation? In relation to the UK, given that we have little, if any, influence, what should our policy response to that be, should it occur?
Hayder al-Khoei: Again, I will leave Syria to Haid, but I think the unravelling or carving up of Iraq will open Pandora’s box and will in no way solve our problems. Iraq was never divided neatly along ethno-sectarian lines. Once you carve up the country along ethno-sectarian lines, because some think it will solve the problem, what you will actually end up with is a race to the bottom in each individual canton over who is more Sunni, who is more Shia, who is more Kurdish. The borders of Iraq were largely, although not entirely, drawn up in the 20th century and could be imposed by empires. Now—allow me to be frank—it is not going to be white men in suits meeting in London and Paris drawing lines on a piece of paper and imposing them; it is going to be young, angry armed men on the ground who will impose, change or redraw those lines with their blood. So it is going to be messy and it will have a knock-on effect on Iraq’s neighbours, including Syria, of course.
Haid Haid: I think when it comes to Syria it is even easier to address this issue, because dividing Syria, as a solution, is one of the main misconceptions that I have mainly encountered when I meet western experts and Governments. Of the different parties in Syria—I am talking about opposition, about Kurdish groups, about regional groups—none has said, “We want a divided Syria”. They all agree that they want a united Syria. So the discussion when it comes to dividing Syria is not coming from inside Syria. People think that because those groups are fighting each other, if we give each one a piece of the cake, that will be a solution and they will stop fighting each other. This is not something that people inside Syria are discussing.
The UK should be clear, in that sense, what should be done. The problem will be how to ensure that whatever political settlement is reached at a later stage will be the right kind of regime that will satisfy everyone. Here, we are talking about different formats for decentralisation. People agree to a certain extent that there should be decentralisation, but they disagree on the format. Having this Syrian-Syrian discussion over what kind of decentralisation format they can agree on should be explored and discussed further.
The Chairman: We will talk about the UK and the Americans. Lord Wood.
Q132 Lord Wood of Anfield: There has been a lot of talk about President Trump’s pledge to eliminate radical Islam from the earth, but underneath that, what is your sense of where American policy will go under Trump, with respect not just to Iraq and Syria and the Governments there and to conflicts but to the long-term alliance perception of groups on the ground?
We are also interested in Iran. Below the blustering protestation against the deal, do you have any sense yet of the expectations about American policy in those three countries?
Hayder al-Khoei: I do not, and I think you would need to be a very brave analyst to predict what the Trump Administration will do. We know very little about what they want to do. In fact, a colleague who has just returned from Washington says that no one there has a clue. If no one in Washington has a clue, London will be even more in the dark.
Lord Wood of Anfield: Do you think the Trump team has a clue?
Hayder al-Khoei: I do not know, but I do not think they do. Going on the little the Trump team has said about Iraq, Syria and Iran, again we are left with mixed messages. Trump himself said both during the campaign and as President that he would take Iraq’s oil, which is deeply disturbing given that there are almost 6,000 US troops on Iraqi soil at the moment. I think that such rhetoric from Trump is not only reckless but will endanger the lives of those US personnel in Iraq and only further complicate the war against ISIS, which Trump has vowed to destroy. We have a unique situation in Iraq, which is certainly not the case in Syria, where Iraq is both an ally of the US and of Iran. There is no consensus on what we call the US-Iranian relationship. Is it co-operation, is it de-confliction, or is it a tacit alliance? Whatever it is, something is there and that will go out of the window if Trump tries to do this.
I will turn to senior members of the Trump team. The National Security Adviser, Michael Flynn, is an interesting case, because when he ran the Defense Intelligence Agency he was the same man who was telling the Obama Administration, despite all the rhetoric about the US supporting “moderate” rebels in Syria, that it is actually the jihadists and the Salafists who are gaining ground. On the flip side, you have the Defense Secretary who thinks that Iran is “the single most enduring threat to stability and peace” in the Middle East. Again, if such rhetoric is transformed into policy, that will have a very negative impact on Iraq.
Again, I cannot predict what is going to happen, because the situation in Syria is the reverse. Trump sees utility in working more closely with the Russians, and of course Iran is a very strong partner of Russia in Syria. Once more the choice of Secretary of State is interesting, given how close Rex Tillerson has been to Putin through the business deals he made as the CEO of ExxonMobil. To put it in a nutshell, I think we will end up with an even more confusing and contradictory policy from the US.
The Chairman: Dr Haid, what is your take on President Trump?
Haid Haid: It is similar to what Hayder has said. So far, and for many reasons, the position is confusing for everyone. Among them is that, first, the campaign promises on Syria and the region were built on misconceptions. One reason is that the Russians and the Syrian regime are the ones who are fighting ISIS, which is not the case. It is clear that the regime and the Russians are mainly fighting other opposition groups rather than ISIS. The second reason is the idea that ending support for rebel groups will help to eliminate ISIS and al-Nusra/al-Qaeda. That is difficult to envisage, because those groups are fighting the two elements. If you eliminate them, you will empower the radical groups even more.
There are also contradictory objectives. As Hayder mentioned, at least during the campaign Trump promised to weaken Iran, but at the same time he said that he will improve relations with Russia. That is quite difficult to imagine, especially in the context of Syria, because these two allies are fighting on the same side there. How can you weaken one and empower the other while they are co-operating within Syria?
The other conflicting issue is that Trump wants to continue support for Kurdish groups fighting ISIS while at the same time improving relations with Turkey. These enemies are fighting each other, so how is that going to be done? The bottom line is that if the Trump Administration begin to fulfil these promises, we will be dealing with a policy that is even more destructive not only for Syria but for the whole region. The consequences of such a policy will not be limited to the region. What we have been witnessing over the past few years is that what happens in the Middle East does not stay in the Middle East; it has an impact everywhere else around the world. The attacks in Europe were planned by people who either came from or were in the Middle East. That is why we have to be very careful and at least try to influence policies that will put peace on the right track; otherwise, we are doomed.
The Chairman: The media have been saying this morning that the Trump Administration wants to concentrate on Egypt and Israel, in particular the latter, and almost as an aside to wipe Daesh off the face of the earth. How do you think these things fit together? I see that you are both shaking your heads in bewilderment.
Haid Haid: When it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the position is even more complicated. President Trump has said that while he wants to find a solution, at the same time he wants to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. If that is the case, how can you even start a political process when you are changing the dynamics on the ground in order to influence whatever outcomes might be reached? We have just been discussing what might happen in Syria and Iraq, but the consequences will not be limited to those two countries because the policy is being built on misconceptions and contradictory objectives. As long as we do not deal with these two issues, the consequences will be huge, not only in the Middle East but elsewhere.
The Chairman: I think we had better let the fog close over American policy for a moment. Lord Purvis has the final question.
Q133 Lord Purvis of Tweed: When you work it out, if you could let us know, that would be greatly appreciated.
Clearly, there are military operations against Daesh in Iraq and separate processes in Syria, but should the UK be opening more dialogue with some of the marginalised groups that either have been sympathetic or have been excluded? What should the UK’s relationship be with the Muslim Brotherhood, in the context of our earlier discussion?
Hayder al-Khoei: I think there is some practical benefit in talking to groups that, whether we like it or not, have influence on power in the region; of course, with the exception of ISIS and al-Qaeda and other Salafi jihadist groups, which recognise no authority or law other than their own and, indeed, consider everyone else to be an infidel—and that goes for each other. We have a very strange situation where Salafi jihadists are cutting each other’s heads off, in the case of ISIS and al-Qaeda, over who really is true to the Salafi ideology.
The Muslim Brotherhood—I realise that this is a very contentious issue in domestic UK politics and in the region—is not just a key player in Egypt but it has a strong influence in Syria and Iraq, whether through political parties or their military wings. I think the UK should engage with the Muslim Brotherhood despite having strong allies that would protest against talking to it. At the same time, we should recognise the destructive role the Muslim Brotherhood has played in Iraq, Syria and Egypt in fuelling conflict. We saw clearly in its brief rule in Egypt how exclusionary its vision of democracy was, and how it gave a platform to other very radical Islamic groups to preach and be active.
In Iraq I would just say that it is worth noting how the Muslim Brotherhood initially hedged its bets by being both part of the political process but also by arming and funding jihadist groups. This infuriated al-Qaeda: we even have letters, which the US has declassified and published, from Zarqawi telling bin Laden, “They are very cunning, because if the political process succeeds they are part of it, and now they control the presidency of the parliament, and yet if the jihad succeeds and the Iraqi Government is toppled then the Muslim Brotherhood can legitimately say, well, we are part of you and we share in your victory”. So, yes, engage, but also recognise the very destructive role it is playing not just in Iraq and Syria but across the region.
Haid Haid: I think that when we talk about different Islamist group we have to be more careful—we cannot just give a generic answer. It depends first on what we mean by Islamist groups. Do we consider Hezbollah in Lebanon as an armed religious group or as a political actor? It is important to define that before we start discussing how to deal with it. It is the same in Syria and in other place. When you talk about Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam and others, these are influential players on the ground. Do we accept that we should deal with them, or do we consider them to be Salafi jihadist groups that we should not deal with or contact?
The other issue is that it depends on what the endgame is, what are the objectives behind it? Are we discussing with Islamist groups in Syria, for example, in order to guarantee that those groups will not attack civilians? Are we discussing with them to allow aid in to certain areas? Are we discussing the release of hostages or what are we discussing with them?
When it comes to political movements, especially Islamist political movements, we cannot ignore them. What is happening in Egypt right now, just fighting those groups and pushing them underground, is not the right choice. These are political actors with political agendas; you have to engage and discuss with them, otherwise you turn them from a peaceful political actor into an armed one, and contributing to that will only make the situation worse.
In principal, I think we should engage with different actors on a case-by-case basis depending on the objectives that we want to reach with them. That also depends on what kind of agreement we can reach with them. If you engage with them but do not reach an agreement that is fruitful and acceptable, you can just say, “This does not work”, but to push peaceful political parties to become armed ones is the wrong decision. We saw it in Syria and in Egypt before and we are seeing it again now. Engagement is the right decision, I would say; taking the right consideration.
The Chairman: On that note of realism, we must draw things to a close. We have pounded you with questions for an hour and a half and you have been very generous in your replies, and you have reminded us about the staggering complexity of all the conflicting issues in the whole region and the staggering complexity of the policies of the outside powers. I thank both of you very much on behalf of the Committee for being so explanatory and helpful with your comments.
