Oral evidence: The UK’s relations with Hong Kong: 30 years after the Joint Declaration, HC 649
Tuesday 16 December 2014
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 16 December 2014
Members present: Sir Richard Ottaway (Chair); Mr John Baron; Sir Menzies Campbell; Ann Clwyd; Mike Gapes; Sandra Osborne; Andrew Rosindell; Mr Frank Roy; Sir John Stanley
Questions 71-133
Witness: Jonathan Fenby, CBE, Managing Director, China Research, Trusted Sources and former editor of the South China Morning Post, gave evidence.
Q71 Chair: I welcome members of the public to this sitting of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the second evidence session of our inquiry into the UK’s relations with Hong Kong 30 years after the joint declaration. Today’s session was postponed from the original date of 2 December due to the emergency debate that this Committee secured on China’s decision to ban the Committee from travelling to Hong Kong. The second part of that postponed session will take place on 6 January.
Today, the Committee will hear from Jonathan Fenby, CBE, managing director of the China team at Trusted Sources and editor of the South China Morning Post from 1995 to 2000. Mr Fenby, I gather that it is from your position as a former editor that you wish to speak today.
Jonathan Fenby: Yes. The research firm Trusted Sources really has nothing to do with Hong Kong, so it is as that and as somebody who has written eight books on China.
Q72 Chair: I give you a warm welcome. Thank you very much for finding the time to come along. I am sorry there has been a delay because of the vote. I will start with a fairly general question. When you left Hong Kong in 2000, three years after the handover, what were your expectations for the political and economic future?
Jonathan Fenby: On the reform front and political change, I was always of the opinion that it was going to be a very slow process indeed. The changes brought in under Chris Patten were obviously going to be reversed immediately after the change in sovereignty. One felt that there would be space, if you like, for the pro-democracy politicians in Hong Kong, but that the central authorities in China would always wish to keep a fairly tight hand on the political evolution of Hong Kong.
Economically, one could see that increased links with the mainland would be—they had been already, of course—to Hong Kong’s considerable advantage, particularly when the entry arrangements for mainland visitors were changed from a group basis to an individual basis, so individuals could come in, buy property, buy retail goods and so on. So, from the economic point of view, it looked quite promising, but I was always sceptical about the pace of political evolution and political change. That is not to say that I thought a slow pace was a good thing, but I thought that was the reality of the time.
If I might say so—I think this might go through a number of our points today—everybody in Hong Kong welcomes the one country, two systems formula, which had originally been drawn up for Taiwan and was then applied to Hong Kong. There was I felt, at the time of the handover and immediately afterwards, a tendency to focus on the two systems and the preservation of the Hong Kong system, and to forget the first part of the formulation, which was one country. It always seemed to me that for the central authorities in Beijing it was the one country that came first. If I may quote myself, I remember writing a front-page editorial on handover day saying, yes, very good, the preservation of the Hong Kong system and the high degree of autonomy, but don’t forget that Hong Kong is now part of one country, China, and that is Beijing’s bottom line.
Q73 Chair: Are you saying that the fault of the west is forgetting that it is one country and the fault of China is forgetting that it is two systems?
Jonathan Fenby: There is a lot to be said for that. It is not so much a fault, but to forget or ignore the one country part of the formulation and the importance it has for an Administration in Beijing who set such store by national unity and the recovery of Hong Kong and Macau, of course, that is rather unrealistic. I would hazard that what we have seen this year with the change in the position from Beijing, which is not surprising at all, given the general tenor of Chinese policy this year, reflects that. It has taken 16 or 17 years to come out but was always latent.
Q74 Chair: After the handover, you were quite critical in a book of the fact that Hong Kong almost retreated into itself and there was a lot of kowtowing to China. Do you think 14 years on from then that the situation has now improved?
Jonathan Fenby: No. I think that those who hold positions of authority in Hong Kong, many of them have been chosen and for this reason no doubt put priority on getting on well with Beijing. In that process, whatever we call it, the assertion—that may be too loaded and strong a word—of what I call the Hong Kong identity has been underplayed and underworked.
Of course, something like the composition of the electoral committee for the Chief Executive does not, as I believe was laid down in negotiations between Beijing and London—it cannot be seen as broadly representative of the Hong Kong people. The trouble is that, partly because you have had the polarisation of politics in Hong Kong, what has suffered has been the Hong Kong identity, the sense of Hong Kong as a rather peculiar—in a good sense—particular place.
Q75 Chair: Do you want to point the finger of blame at anyone or any organisation or institution?
Jonathan Fenby: Not really. I would say that the system that evolved after the handover was such that it was going to produce this kind of result. Could anything have been done about that? I wish it could have been done, but in reality I rather doubt it could have been changed.
Q76 Chair: You are probably aware that this Committee has been banned from going to Hong Kong. In fact, we were meant to be there now. Anyway, we have the pleasure of seeing you instead.
Jonathan Fenby: I am sorry, but I am glad to be here.
Q77 Chair: Do you think that tells you anything about the direction of travel of China and/or the Hong Kong authorities?
Jonathan Fenby: Correct me if I am wrong, but I understand the ban on you and other actions against travel and groups have been taken directly by the central Government through the embassy here.
Q78 Chair: Correct. It was the Chinese deputy ambassador who came and saw me.
Jonathan Fenby: That’s what I read. That makes you think about a high degree of autonomy. I don’t want to be over-cynical, but somebody could have told the Hong Kong immigration authorities, “Stop these people coming in,” which could have been done through the Hong Kong authorities. This seems to be part and parcel of an assertion of the one country—I go back to that—which we have certainly seen this year, such as in the State Council White Paper in the summer, the tenor of which was that a high degree of autonomy was promised and that it would be one country, two systems, but that that is all basically subject to the one country and the authorities of the one country. I would see this as part and parcel of that process.
Q79 Chair: Do you think that it will affect UK-Hong Kong relations?
Jonathan Fenby: It is difficult to tell. I am unsure what precise effects it will have, because I am not quite sure where UK-Hong Kong relations are at the moment.
Q80 Chair: The evidence that we have received is that they are not bad at all.
Jonathan Fenby: That’s how it seems to me, but you’re bound to get a certain nervousness with the ban on you and, I understand, on another group that you were going to visit China as part of. That is bound to have an effect on those who want to go to China, who might now say, “We have to be a bit careful.”
Q81 Sandra Osborne: May I ask you about the White Paper? You said on your China blog that—
Jonathan Fenby: I am glad to hear that someone is reading the blog. I never know who is reading it.
Sandra Osborne: You said that the White Paper made it plain that autonomy was subject to limitations. What do you say to those who would argue, including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, that this does not mark a shift in China’s policies towards Hong Kong?
Jonathan Fenby: I saw the White Paper and what has happened subsequently, and indeed various statements just this week about the need for Hong Kong to have a new awareness of its position in the world. I apologise for repeating myself, but this all goes back to the policy trend that we have seen from Beijing, which is a much greater assertion of the one country in this state, or of what are perceived as China’s rights in Beijing. That is part of a broader evolution in China under Xi Jinping, who is probably the most powerful leader in the world today in terms of domestic positions and so on. He has set out this idea of the China dream, which is about strengthened national identity and the projection of China. I think that Hong Kong is a part of that. I wouldn’t put it just down to Hong Kong. This is part of a broader evolution that we are seeing.
Q82 Sandra Osborne: You have also written about Hong Kong being increasingly economically dependent on mainland China. How do you think that affects the political relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong?
Jonathan Fenby: It is bound to affect that relationship in a city where business counts for a great deal and where, for instance—I don’t have a number for this—the property market, which is important throughout the economy in Hong Kong, undoubtedly has a degree of dependency on purchases of apartments by mainlanders. There is the retail trade in the central district, for example, and there are a lot of mainland visitors. There is bound to be an effect.
There are other perhaps negative sides. For example, if the container ports up the Pearl River are fully developed, that may hit Hong Kong’s position as a trade entrepôt. Hong Kong is less needed by mainland China now as a bridge to the rest of the world. However, there are certain elements in Hong Kong—I may have mentioned them in some of the postings—that still do make it a unique place within the People’s Republic. The most of important of those—I apologise for straying from the subject, but there is an economic and political effect—is the continuing rule of law in Hong Kong, which is undoubtedly a very big source of strength for Hong Kong economically as well as from a strictly legal point of view.
Q83 Sandra Osborne: Do you think there is a relationship between that and the hardening of the attitude of China, following the White Paper?
Jonathan Fenby: No. I see the White Paper as being—how many years on is it; 16 or 17?—part of the assertion of what the authorities in Beijing see as being their right, and we have had this with various sovereignty disputes in the region, and so on. I think that’s what I would put it down it to. There is now a national security council for the first time, which was created last year, to bring foreign policy together in Beijing, and one of the effects of that—not surprisingly—has been, if you like, a more straightforward foreign policy, driven, I think, from the very top.
Q84 Sir Menzies Campbell: Do you think the United Kingdom Government attach too much importance to the trading relationship with China in the way in which they deal with Hong Kong?
Jonathan Fenby: I think there has been a general tendency to let the trading relationship and commercial questions lead the path. I mean, it’s not just here. We had Hillary Clinton, when she made her first visit to Beijing as Secretary of State, saying we’ve got to separate trade and human rights; put everything in its box and deal with it differently. I am not entirely convinced of the fragility, if you like, of the trading relationship and that if you do anything that annoys Beijing, it may send it off the rails. I believe that while the Prime Minister was in the naughty boys’ corner—
Sir Menzies Campbell: Over the Dalai Lama?
Jonathan Fenby: Over the Dalai Lama, yes. Actually, during that period trade increased. I have seen the figures: British exports increased, albeit from a pretty low level. This is not Germany, and so on and so on. But I think these relationships can be managed and it’s a mistake to let any one dominate, because then you’re making yourself hostage to action on that front.
Sir Menzies Campbell: I should say to you that your comments on this are largely consistent with the comments we had from Lord Patten when he gave evidence.
Jonathan Fenby: And of course the trouble is that I can’t prove that I’m right. The only way to do that would be to do something egregious and see if it had any results or not, and that might be rather too dangerous.
Q85 Sir Menzies Campbell: I have asked the question from the point of view of the British Government. In a sense, you have answered it, but perhaps you might just answer this supplementary: how do you think that Beijing regards the trading relationship with the UK when it comes to Hong Kong, and representations by the UK in relation to Hong Kong?
Jonathan Fenby: Sorry, how does that affect the British-China, or the—
Sir Menzies Campbell: Yes. I am turning the coin round and asking for the obverse side. You have given an indication, I think, that you don’t think the trading relationship, particularly in the one instance you gave, suffered as a consequence. But I wonder if that was a one-off, or do you think there is a more fundamental attitude, consistent with the nationalism you described?
Jonathan Fenby: My view is that when it comes to matters of business and commerce particularly, like most countries, China, in the end, will pursue its interests there, and therefore the commercial relationship will always be a function of what the two sides have got to offer each other.
Q86 Sir Menzies Campbell: Supposing the British Government had been, or were to be, more vociferous in their support for the demonstrations, how far do you think that would upset the analysis you’ve just given us?
Jonathan Fenby: I think that the reaction to that from Beijing would have been to multiply the reactions there have been so far—with your visit, for instance. I think this is a matter for Beijing of national sovereignty and this is all part of the way policy is evolving at the moment. Hong Kong is a small part of it, but it is interesting. I understood that when the present leader, Xi Jinping, joined the standing committee of the politburo, he was given responsibility for Hong Kong affairs on the politburo. This is not just this week’s policy, as it were.
Q87 Mr Baron: The Chinese are great pragmatists, I suggest to you, if nothing else. It is an interesting time for them economically. They are trying, in a reasonably major way, to transform the economy from one led by state investment to one more based on consumerism and a better quality of growth going forward, but still unpredictable in the short term. Leading on from what you said earlier about trade, given that many believe that trade will flourish because of the nature of the product, rather than the politics of any situation, do you think that trade would really suffer if the British Government were to adopt a slightly more robust view in support of democratic reform in Hong Kong?
Jonathan Fenby: I doubt whether it would suffer greatly.
Q88 Mr Baron: Can you give us any more than that? That is a feeling and one respects that, but there is no cast-iron evidence. You have cited the Dalai Lama case and trade increasing. One senses with the British Government at the moment that there is a sort of nervousness, to say the least, at the extent to which trade relations could suffer if we were to be slightly more robust in our relations. Is there any more that you can add to that?
Jonathan Fenby: I go back to what I was saying a moment ago. I would not argue that trade automatically suffers, so long as this country has things to trade in that China wants. It is as basic as that. If Chinese consumers fall in love with Land Rovers, for instance, that will not be affected, I think, by our position on Hong Kong.
Q89 Mr Baron: What is your reading, then, of the situation? Why have the British Government not been a little more robust on this? Is it because of trade or are we looking in the wrong place? Is there another reason?
Jonathan Fenby: I think it is nervousness, as you say. It is not just trade; it is also, one gathers, a desire to attract Chinese inward investment into this country, where you may be in a more political area, because some of the investors are state entities, whether directly or behind IPOs. You might get more effect there. There is also an awareness that when it comes to European countries, we are very much behind Germany or France. There is a desire from the Government’s point of view to make up some ground there. The problem is long term. With Germany in particular, the big heavy industries have been there for a long time. They have been supplying steel-making equipment and everything else, including logistics and so on. They are pretty well embedded there. It is difficult to play catch-up on a short-term basis. This flows through into politics. I do not want to get into the European debate here, but to answer the old Kissinger question, “Who does Beijing ring when it wants to find out something about Europe?”, it rings Berlin.
Q90 Ann Clwyd: When you served as editor of the South China Morning Post, did you feel that press freedom in Hong Kong was respected at that time?
Jonathan Fenby: You open a door to memoirs. My case was probably different from some of the other newspapers there, although not all of them. The pressure that I was under as editor did not come directly from the Chinese authorities, from Beijing or even from the post-handover Government. It came through the owner of the newspaper. The newspaper was a tiny bit of his empire. He had big investments in China and had always worked closely with the Chinese authorities there. Was I under direct pressure? Perhaps not all the time, but there was certainly an internal pressure the whole time. There was never any overt attempt at censorship from the authorities, either in Beijing or in Hong Kong after the handover. If I was being flippant, I would say that there was probably more attempt at spin before the handover than after it, but that is the way our systems work.
One important element in this—I go back to what I was saying in answer to an earlier question—was the legal system and the rule of law. We did not have to use it very much, but there was a kind of legal defence. There were the courts that were there. There was not the kind of arbitrary censorship or pressure that you might get in other systems, and that was why the maintenance of the rule of law after the handover always struck me as being absolutely basic and fundamental, and why, I don’t know whether you recall, there was a big kerfuffle in 1999, when the Hong Kong Government lost a case at the Supreme Court—the Court of Final Appeal. Although they lost the case, they actually had a very good case for what they were arguing. It was about children born in Hong Kong to mainland mothers automatically having Hong Kong rights. Because they lost it, they went to the National People’s Congress in Beijing and got a different interpretation of the law, so the Court of Final Appeal then found for the Government on the appeal. There was an enormous outcry at that and it has never been tried again. I keep coming back to the law, because it is actually a very fundamental thing in Hong Kong and it certainly applied to the press.
I was in a slightly different position editing the main English language newspaper, because our readership was 50% Chinese, 25% non-Chinese living in Hong Kong but not able to read Chinese, so they could not read a Chinese paper, and the other 25% were English-speaking expats. So one was dealing with a fairly heterogeneous readership, and also, although I won’t go into any details, a lot of the readership was why the paper was the most prosperous paper in the world at that point, in terms of making US $100 million on a sale of 100,000 copies a day. There was nothing quite like it. That readership, which patently got the advertisers, did not want a version of China Daily. They compared us with international papers, such as the Financial Times or the Herald Tribune, and so on. I was in a slightly privileged position because I could always reply to any suggestions that we should change this or that: “Well, we will lose the respect of that kind of readership”, which was quite true, so I was in a bit of a different situation. However, most of the pressure on the media in Hong Kong has come from the owners, who have a commercial interest that is linked to China. You have seen that with several other newspapers and broadcasting stations.
Q91 Ann Clwyd: How would you compare it with press freedom in Hong Kong now?
Jonathan Fenby: I think that pressure from the commercial side—the business side—has increased. By its nature, you don’t necessarily see it, because a lot of it is—I won’t use the famous word “self-censorship”, which one was always being accused of, because you can never prove that you are not self-censoring. However, I think that pressure has increased, certainly, and you have seen it in a number of media organisations there. Again, not to go back too far down memory lane, but I certainly had a feeling around the handover that—as a journalist, I know that the bad news story sells. The bad news story was that Hong Kong would be muzzled and everything would go wrong. There would be attacks on the street and so on. A lot of foreign journalists at the Post took that as a kind of bellwether. I was actually told by one American author, “You’re the canary in the coal mine. We’re watching.” So certainly there were a few occasions at the paper where you could interpret what we did as our kowtowing to Beijing. I remember once—ridiculously—I changed a photograph between editions and somebody the next day said, “Did you get an order from Beijing to do that?” I mean, I changed a black and white for a colour photograph and they thought the colour one made the Chinese leaders look nicer than in the previous one. So, one was under that kind of microscope.
I think in the later years before the handover and immediately afterwards the press did a pretty good job in general and remained—but it has become a part of a process, I think, which is probably playing itself out now.
Q92 Ann Clwyd: The FCO wrote in its latest six-monthly report that the freedom of the press is “one of the fundamental freedoms protected by the joint declaration”, adding that the FCO, “takes seriously concerns about press freedom” and “welcome the Chief Executive’s clear statements on press freedom”. Is this an appropriate position to take, in your view?
Jonathan Fenby: I can sympathise with that for precisely the reasons I just gave. If there was overt censorship—if you had the anti-subversion article 35 put through and that had then been used, let us say, against the media and the press—then it would be very cut and dried. But the nature of internal pressures and slanting of editorial, or doing something like that, is very difficult to—it can be very corrosive. But it is very difficult to establish there. That is what makes this whole debate really quite difficult to follow through.
The trouble is that, of course, regularly you get people saying, “Oh yes, Hong Kong journalists are self-censoring.” You can point to a few occasions where it is evident that a story has been underplayed in some newspapers, including my former newspaper there, but in general it is quite difficult to pin down. The extreme argument on this, which I had once with the owner of a newspaper that was changing its attitude after the handover—he said, as I remember, “Well, you believe in the freedom of the press. If you believe in the freedom of the press, that means the owner of a newspaper in a capitalist system has the right to decide what is going to go into that newspaper. So I have a perfect right to tell my journalists what to do.” That is an interpretation which obviously I don’t share, but you can see, for a business person buying a newspaper as a business asset, it may seem all too evident.
Q93 Sir Menzies Campbell: It’s not unusual for owners in this country.
Jonathan Fenby: Well, we do know—I was not going to make any references to other countries.
Sir Menzies Campbell: Perhaps we should just keep British names out of it; but, for example, the influence of Kate Graham on the Washington Post was very considerable.
Jonathan Fenby: No, and it can be for good. Absolutely, the influence of the ownership can be very good pattern, and it can give—extreme cases, obviously, here being the Scott Trust and The Guardian—the editorial the kind of freedom which you wouldn’t normally expect.
Sir Menzies Campbell: Within parameters.
Jonathan Fenby: Yes. I was at The Guardian for five years and The Observer after that, as you know, and there was no interference. It was wonderful from that point of view.
Sir Menzies Campbell: But you wouldn’t have written an editorial in The Observer saying Britain must come out of the European Union.
Jonathan Fenby: I personally wouldn’t have.
Sir Menzies Campbell: Thank you.
Q94 Mr Roy: Mr Fenby, there are indications that United Kingdom firms have been put under pressure to show public support for the Hong Kong Government and to oppose the protests. Do you think that’s true?
Jonathan Fenby: I think that there were cases of this. I’m not speaking for these companies and I don’t know; this is speculation. I think this was probably done on a local level—for instance, advertisements in the press against the Occupy movement—rather than being handed down from head office.
Q95 Mr Roy: So how would you look upon, for example, the Hong Kong branches of the big four accountancy firms, such as Ernst and Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, which all warned of the doomsday scenario of economic catastrophe and everything that would befall Hong Kong? What is your perception of those sorts of words used by those global companies?
Jonathan Fenby: I think it was probably the local management who thought, “We had better keep our noses clean” and did so in a rather counter-productive manner.
Q96 Mr Roy: Did they make that decision on their own, do you think?
Jonathan Fenby: I don’t know, is the answer to that, but I would think it quite probable.
Mr Roy: Okay.
Jonathan Fenby: Sorry; I just do not want to impugn anyone.
Q97 Mike Gapes: In general, looking at the FCO’s six-monthly reports to Parliament, do you think they present an accurate picture of the implementation of the Joint Declaration?
Jonathan Fenby: Can I answer in a slightly nuanced way here?
Mike Gapes: Of course. Answer in whichever way you prefer.
Jonathan Fenby: I think if you look at the Joint Declaration, there is a lot of language in there which is diplomatic language and which made the agreement possible. You can talk of elections, but you do not define the elections in any way. You can talk of “broadly representative of Hong Kong”, but you do not define what that is. You talk of a high degree of autonomy, but under the one country you do not define that. If you take the FCO, and if you take the diplomatic approach that you want to maintain the relationship there over Hong Kong, I think that their interpretation is probably broadly understandable. It is not necessarily the one that I would always have taken, but that is another matter.
Q98 Mike Gapes: How would you then assess the UK Government response to recent developments since the last six-monthly report, and specifically since the publication of the White Paper in June?
Jonathan Fenby: As I say all the time, this is not necessarily what I would have hoped for or wished for, but I think the British Government are facing a reality that stems from Beijing’s interpretation of how it will run Hong Kong and how it will do things. There is an awareness that actually, Beijing holds the upper hand there.
Q99 Mike Gapes: Some journalists and commentators have referred to the FCO response as weak and spineless. The word appeasement has also been used. What would your view of that be?
Jonathan Fenby: You may equate some of this with what you have just said, but I think that the FCO has been trying to make the best of a not very promising job at the moment.
Q100 Mike Gapes: What would have been the impact in Hong Kong if the UK Government had shown more vocal support for more far-reaching democratic reform, rather than the approach the Government seem to have taken?
Jonathan Fenby: The demonstrators and the pro-democracy camp would have been considerably heartened, I think. They were looking for that.
Q101 Mike Gapes: Do you think that would have strengthened the protests and made them last longer?
Jonathan Fenby: It might have strengthened the protests, but it also would have strengthened the denunciation of the protests as being inspired by foreign agitators and foreign powers. That is still an argument brought forward regularly—the black hands, as they are called.
Q102 Mike Gapes: We have referred to one country, two systems. Of course, China today is a capitalist country and the only thing communist about it is that it has a Communist party. Do you think that one country, two systems—whatever that now means—can last until 2047?
Jonathan Fenby: I go back to what I was saying earlier. It can last as long as, increasingly, the preponderance of the one country is accepted. If the second system—the Hong Kong system—is seen as challenging the one country in any way, you will get a further tightening. I think that is the way present policy is evolving in Beijing. Mr Baron referred to the economic reform in China. We are having economic reform but at the same time there is considerable political tightening on the mainland. That is the way of party strengthening, as it is called.
Q103 Mike Gapes: Is that mainly to do with this anti-corruption focus that is going on?
Jonathan Fenby: It is everything. It is the anti-corruption campaign, the revival of the Maoist mass line, as it is called. It is in general the strengthening of the Communist party as the ruling body in a system that I would quibble with being described as capitalist. It is a kind of Leninist capitalism.
Mike Gapes: State capitalism.
Jonathan Fenby: Yes. Some 75% of the Shanghai A-share market is state enterprises. So it is with Chinese characteristics.
Q104 Mike Gapes: So there is a real question mark, then, about whether we will have two systems in 2047.
Jonathan Fenby: In actually operating in the way that you or I would understand it, I think so. Of course, the other thing that is very difficult to talk about now is this question. If you do have Chief Executive elections by universal suffrage and if—a lot of ifs—the qualification of the electoral committee was changed and you had more competition for the Chief Executive, would Hong Kong actually elect a Chief Executive who would stand up more for Hong Kong? We all assume that would happen. There are a lot of uncertainties along that line, which is why I hesitate to give a yes/no answer to your question.
Mike Gapes: That is very helpful, thank you.
Q105 Mr Baron: I have two very quick questions because we are running out of time. Mr Fenby, we touched briefly on the economic transformation taking place in China—not just that it is a fast-growing economy, but that it is trying to change the nature of the mix of the economy more towards consumerism. What are the implications for Hong Kong? In a way, on the mainland it is a way for the conservative party to tighten its grip.
Chair: Communist party.
Mr Baron: For the Communist party to tighten its grip. Surely Hong Kong is going to be a thorn in its side in that respect. That is question one. For question two, can I return you to your lovely diplomatic-speak about the British making the best of what is not the most promising situation? Can I tempt you a little bit? It is probably true, what you say, but can I tempt you beyond that? Could we make more of the situation if the British Government had been or is going to be more robust? Are we underplaying our hand?
Jonathan Fenby: I am afraid my answer to your second question is that I don’t think we are, because I don’t think we have much of a hand to play. That may be overly lowering my expectations and sights, but I think our hand is weaker than we think it is. That does not mean that you should not say and do things, if only for our own sake and decency. That is a slightly different question from the one I am talking about.
The first point is fascinating, because if you believe in China’s ever-growing expansion and modernisation programme, it could be that Hong Kong will come under increasing pressure from Shanghai. That was something that was talked about at the time of the handover and it hasn’t really happened, because the Shanghai free trade zone, for instance, has not really taken off. Above all, there is the question of contracts and the rule of law, which I keep coming back to.
Here is one brief anecdote from the time before the handover. There was a great argument going on about the composition of the court of final appeal, over which China wanted a veto power over the judges. One of the senior Chinese negotiators flew to Hong Kong, had lunch with the Chinese Hong Kong tycoons, who said to him, “If you change the composition of the court of supreme appeal, we will move all our headquarters business to Singapore,” and China changed its mind a week later. That is what I have heard from people who were present at those meetings. So it does have a great importance there.
What we now have in Hong Kong—this perhaps goes more to your question—is, on the one hand, a stronger assertion of the Beijing position through the White Paper and various other statements and, on the other hand, on the democratic side, we have the generational change. I know you have heard from Martin Lee here, and when I was there it was Martin—fine, duh, duh, duh. Now it is 18-year-old Jason Wong on the barricades with a different kind of modus vivendi and background. I think the pro-democracy demonstrators will continue, particularly when the electoral system comes to the LegCo, but that generational change raises the question of whether there will be a stronger assertion of what I called earlier the Hong Kong identity. If you look at polls, the actual identification with Hong Kong is still very strong, so you could get a different kind of political context there that would be very difficult to handle. I’m not sure who can act as the mediator and glue in this.
Q106 Mr Baron: I have one final, quick question. If the protestors keep going—maybe nuance their approach a little bit but still keep going—something has to crack, hasn’t it?
Jonathan Fenby: Yes. We are not here to hypothesise but, as I mentioned, it could well be when the Legislative Council considers the electoral arrangements. As I understand it, there has to be a two thirds majority to accept the Beijing proposals. Either there is not a two thirds majority, at which point Beijing might say, “Okay, all bets are off. We go on with the electoral committee. We offered you universal suffrage and you didn’t want it”, or LegCo accepts some modified form of the Beijing proposals, and at that point the demonstrators accuse it of kowtowing and go out on the streets. That is why I am rather pessimistic about everything becoming sweetness and light in Hong Kong, because I think we are getting those, and they are fairly deep things, plus there are the social problems in Hong Kong—unemployment, graduate unemployment, wealth disparities, housing costs, etc. There is a lot of ferment for trouble.
Q107 Chair: That completes our line of questioning. I thank you very much indeed for coming along. You have been very forthcoming, and it is very much appreciated by us. On behalf of our Committee, thank you very much indeed.
Jonathan Fenby: I do just emphasise that, although I still follow Hong Kong closely and visit often, I am obviously not as involved in Hong Kong today as I was 16 years ago, so some of what I said may be tinged with nostalgia.
Chair: It wouldn’t be the first time that nostalgia had hit this building. Thank you very much.
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Tang Chi Tak, Student, Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Hui Sin Tung, Student, University of Hong Kong, gave evidence.
Q108 Chair: May I welcome our next two witnesses? They are both students in Hong Kong. Can I start with a formal question? Do you understand that this is a public sitting and that you are on the record?
Both Witnesses indicated assent.
Q109 Chair: That’s great. Could you start by telling us what your group is about, what you’ve been doing and what your objectives are? We have quite a lot of detailed questions, but could you give us a broad outline?
Hui Sin Tung: Let me start. I am a university student, and I am here to represent Daniel Ma, the initiator of the plan to occupy the British consulate in Hong Kong. Today, I am here to provide evidence on how China has breached the Joint Declaration since the handover of Hong Kong, and I will tell you about the experience of Daniel Ma and the group that has occupied the British consulate in the past two months.
Q110 Chair: Does your organisation have a name?
Hui Sin Tung: The group is formally called Occupy British Consulate.
Q111 Chair: Does this distinguish you from other Occupy groups?
Hui Sin Tung: Yes.
Q112 Chair: Roughly how many people have participated in the protest outside the consulate?
Hui Sin Tung: It started off as a group of 10 students led by Daniel Ma. At the beginning of October, when the umbrella revolution reached gridlock, Daniel and 10 of his classmates started to stay outside the British consulate. They then escalated the action in mid-November because they didn’t receive a proper response from the consulate. The highest number was about 200 people, who stayed overnight outside the consulate.
Q113 Sir John Stanley: Welcome. Could you tell us whether those who have been demonstrating peacefully are now in detention as a result of the actions of the Hong Kong police? If so, could you give us any broad indication of the numbers of student protesters, and possibly non-student protesters, who have been demonstrating peacefully and who are now in police custody?
Hui Sin Tung: Sorry. I didn’t understand the question. Can you make it shorter?
Sir John Stanley: Are those who have been protesting peacefully still in the custody of the Hong Kong police today?
Chair: From the witness’s group?
Sir John Stanley: No; can you give us any indication as to whether protesters are still in the custody of the Hong Kong police?
Tang Chi Tak: Over the months, they have arrested over 800 people. We guess that a large amount of them are students who were protesting peacefully.
Q114 Sir John Stanley: Thank you. And of those 800, are they all still in custody today or have many of them been released?
Hui Sin Tung: Many of them have been released. The rule is like this: if you have been arrested, you either go to court within 48 hours or you will be released unconditionally, but the police can still place charges after release. Most of them have left the police station.
Q115 Sir John Stanley: Thank you. Just one further question. Is it the case that some of the protesters, possibly a small minority, have damaged buildings and have entered buildings?
Hui Sin Tung: In late November, a group of protestors tried to break into the LegCo. They broke the glass wall of the LegCo, but they failed to enter. Some of them have been arrested.
Q116 Sir John Stanley: Could you give us your opinion, your view, of those who go beyond protesting peacefully and go further by breaking into or damaging buildings? Do you agree or disagree with that?
Hui Sin Tung: In my opinion, such physical violence is inevitable. In the past 10 years, protest has always been very peaceful. We go to parades, we demonstrate, we shout our slogans, and the Government never give us proper responses. Such escalation of action is inevitable.
Tang Chi Tak: The point of this event is not whether we have broken a wall but whether we are armed to harm anybody. In this event no Government officials or even a single police officer has been harmed by that group of protestors, so it is still acceptable for me.
Q117 Mike Gapes: Ms Tung, I think you said that you did not receive a proper response when you tried to communicate with the staff of the British Consulate. What response did you receive when you tried to contact them? Did you get any response at all?
Hui Sin Tung: We did get some response. Caroline Wilson once contacted Daniel Ma, who was the initiator of the operation. She offered to have a private meeting with Daniel, but the thing was that the meeting should be in private. She asked Daniel to promise that, after the meeting, he will never set foot in the Consulate again. Daniel found that unjust and improper, so he refused to have such a single meeting with Caroline.
Q118 Mike Gapes: So you have had no meeting with British Consulate staff?
Hui Sin Tung: No formal meeting.
Q119 Mike Gapes: What about other communications? Have there been any other communications with them by telephone or in writing?
Hui Sin Tung: There are face-to-face negotiations between them. The Consulate has always tried to drive the group of protestors away, so they have talked with each other face to face.
Q120 Mike Gapes: Can I be clear about the nature of your protest? You are directly outside the British Consulate-General’s office but you haven’t gone in. Is that correct?
Hui Sin Tung: Yes, that is correct. They set camp outside the British Consulate, and sometimes they set camp on the grey area outside the British Consulate. That space belongs to the premises of the British Consulate, but sometimes the Consulate staff drive them away and they need to stay on the land that belongs to the Hong Kong Government. When people stay outside the black area, they will be susceptible to violence or arrest by the Hong Kong police, so if they want to go under the protection of the British Consulate, they need to stay on the black area.
Tang Chi Tak: I have something to say about this, too. There have been reports that this movement started in November, but that was when people started to gather there. At the very beginning, Mr Daniel Ma, who was the initiator of this movement and a high school student, went there himself, sometimes with one of his friends who is also a high school student. At the beginning of October we had already experienced the police firing tear gas canisters at 87 completely unarmed protestors. On 3 October, in one of the areas of occupation—Mongkok, in Kowloon—gangsters attacked us with weapons. Some of them even drew knives. They were let go by the police. The police just turned a blind eye to them. They would just arrest us, even if we complained about that. The police would pretend that they were arresting those who used violent means to harm us, but we discovered that the police were just moving the so-called anti-protesters to the street corner, and they would just let them go.
Mr Daniel Ma thinks that that would constitute harm to the rule of law. So in that case it would involve the Sino-British Joint Declaration, because in that Declaration our freedom of assembly is guaranteed. So if the Hong Kong Government and the Chinese Government fail to conform to the Declaration, he thinks that the UK, as one of the signing countries, has the responsibility to make sure that everything happens according to the Declaration.
Q121 Sandra Osborne: You believe that China has breached the Joint Declaration. What are the specific ways in which you think the Declaration has been breached by China?
Tang Chi Tak: Apart from the experiences of the umbrella revolution?
Sandra Osborne: Yes.
Tang Chi Tak: Yes, I believe that in the Joint Declaration the executive power of the Hong Kong Government is guaranteed, so that the Chinese Government would not be able to interfere with any executive decision made by the Hong Kong Government.
I think that many people would agree with me that a certain kind of ethnic cleansing is under way in Hong Kong. I have to emphasise this, so you know about the seriousness of this problem and what is happening. That ethnic cleansing is done, I think, through a rather unreasonable adaptation of Hong Kong’s education policy and immigration policy. I will start with the education policy. Hong Kong people speak Cantonese as their mother language, but the Chinese people speak Mandarin, or Putonghua, so we speak different mother languages. Hong Kong has been practising its mother language education policy, but in 2000 the Curriculum Development Council of Hong Kong made the teaching of the Chinese language using Putonghua a long-term objective.
Let me explain how well planned their efforts to erase our mother languages are. In 2014, Putonghua was increasingly used in the classroom as a medium of instruction in subjects other than the Chinese language, including Chinese history and maths. This would threaten the position of Cantonese in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Education Bureau claimed that the use of Putonghua as a medium of instruction in schools was only on a trial basis. However, non-governmental groups soon discovered that the Bureau had actually gradually introduced Putonghua as the medium of instruction for core subjects, which continuously damaged the position of Cantonese in Hong Kong. That shows how the decision was taken to use the language education policy of Hong Kong to eradicate the Hong Kong people’s mother language.
You may be concerned whether that is really related to the interference of China. I am going to describe a critical event that provides evidence.
Q122 Chair: Can I just interrupt for a moment? The question asked you to look at the Joint Declaration and say how you think it has been breached. If you could focus your answer on that point it would be helpful.
Tang Chi Tak: Yes. But I am going to say that is the critical point, how it is breached. In 2014, the Education Bureau published an article called “Language learning support”, claiming that Cantonese is an illegal dialect. That claim is clearly ridiculous and derived from the viewpoint of China.
After that claim was criticised, the Education Bureau of Hong Kong replaced that article with a new one, and Apple Daily, one of the local newspapers, discovered that when that new article was shown in traditional Chinese some words were erroneous. Hong Kong people write traditional Chinese but the Chinese people write simplified Chinese. That error originated in a translation of simplified Chinese into traditional Chinese, by using a translation function of Microsoft Word. It means that the article by the Education Bureau was first written in simplified Chinese and then translated into traditional Chinese, since not a single local Hong Kong person would write in simplified Chinese and then translate it to traditional.
This practice is commonly adopted by those who are used to writing simplified Chinese. It is highly suspected that the education policy would be highly affected by Chinese officials, or perhaps officials from the Liaison office. I believe that does not conform with the spirit of the Joint Declaration, that the Hong Kong Government should have high autonomy.
Hui Sin Tung: I have two points. Apart from the diluting of local culture by the new culture and new educational system, I want to talk about basic human rights in Hong Kong and the mechanism of the election of the Chief Executive. Stipulated in paragraph 3.5 of the Joint Declaration, we Hong Kongers enjoy freedom of the press, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly. In recent years, I have observed oppression on media freedom has increased drastically.
For example, in July 2014 one of the most active pro-democracy online news platforms, The House News, closed suddenly. After the closure, one of the owners expressed concern for his personal safety and about political pressure. In addition to that, last year the Hong Kong Government refused to grant a free-to-air TV licence to a candidate called HKTV, which had been very popular with the public. Such refusals came with no satisfactory reason. So there has been a declining number of channels for Hong Kongers to receive information and news.
Apart from this, violent assaults against journalists and the media are another concern among people working in the media industry. We mentioned those exact examples in a petition letter so you can refer to them later. The victims are mostly known for their critical news coverage of the Hong Kong and mainland Chinese Governments.
Curiously, most of the crimes targeted at the press have remained unresolved under the hands of the Hong Kong Government. Of course, a common citizen like me cannot directly attribute such incidents to the political agenda or policy of the Chinese Government, but we can feel the chill on the media from what we read in newspapers, see on television or browse on the internet. It affects the daily life of Hong Kongers.
I still need to say something about the Chief Executive election mechanism. As stipulated in the joint declaration, the Chinese Government have the right to appoint the Chief Executive. However, on 31 August, the standing committee of the National People’s Congress issued a decision which imposes unreasonable restrictions on the proposed suffrage mechanism. The decision stipulates that all Chief Executives must first be pre-elected by a 1,200-member nomination committee, which is very unfair. Because such a committee not only involves less than 7% of Hong Kong’s electorate, its professional-oriented composition lacks accountability to the general public. A common citizen like me cannot ensure that a Chief Executive elected by such a mechanism can protect our well-being or welfare.
The decision also stipulates that the maximum number of selected candidates is capped at three. The mechanism effectively gives Beijing the power to filter the choice of candidates before we voters can vote on them. It also implies that the candidates are susceptible to discrimination based on political views. This is flagrant evidence of breach by China.
Q123 Mr Roy: Welcome. My colleagues and I are sorry that we did not have the chance to have this meeting in Hong Kong, and that you have had to visit London. You will be aware that the United Kingdom Foreign Office publishes a six-monthly report on events in Hong Kong. Do you think those reports are accurate?
Hui Sin Tung: To be honest, I do not think the report can reflect the political status quo in Hong Kong. I read the report published in July. It said that the human rights and political context in Hong Kong is still stable and satisfactory, but the situation is not like that. Violence happens day by day. I think the report cannot reflect a real picture of Hong Kong because of the people you approach—the people being interviewed by the writer of the report. I know that the writers of the report usually approach legislators from the pro-democracy camp. I think it has something to do with the interests of their parties that they do not tell the whole truth. To generate a real report reflecting the genuine situation in Hong Kong, more people like us should interviewed—people without political affiliation.
Q124 Mr Roy: The next report is due in January. Would you be so kind as to read the report and let this Committee know your views on the report when it is published early in the new year? [Interruption.]
Chair: We’ll explain it to you afterwards.
Hui Sin Tung: Okay. It is too complicated for me, sorry.
Q125 Ann Clwyd: Can you tell us what you think of the UK Government’s response to events in Hong Kong since the Umbrella Movement started in September? Are you happy with their response, or not happy?
Hui Sin Tung: I think the response so far is satisfactory and your Committee has decided to visit Hong Kong. Unfortunately, your visit was denied but we have been able to take our appeal to Committee level here. But whether it is satisfactory also depends on the action you are going to take, which concerns our future negotiation or future contact.
Tang Chi Tak: For me, I am not happy with UK Government’s response, because they have allowed the continued export of tear gas canisters for the reason that they think they cannot prove that the canisters used in Hong Kong are made by the UK, but I believe that the UK Government have not fulfilled their responsibility to conduct the report, because we can certainly provide evidence to the UK that the canisters used are made by the UK. They have not approached us, for example, for any photos or videos that would show evidence supporting that the canisters are made by UK.
Q126 Mr Baron: We are talking a lot about the Joint Declaration going forward, but can I just ask you both: are you happy with how robust the British Government have been in reaction to events in Hong Kong so far? There are some who would criticise the fact that we haven’t been very robust; some human rights groups have actually made that point. What is your view?
Hui Sin Tung: I think the response takes two levels. As we can show up on this Committee, for this part I am happy with that. But for the performance or the response by the British Consulate, it is very disappointing, because, as I have mentioned, we and a group of people have stayed outside the British Consulate for two months, under strong rain and under violence, and they actually need humanitarian protection from the Consulate. As we mentioned, Hong Kong people and Hong Kong protesters are in real danger. I have attached some of the videos about police brutality in the e-mail to the Committee and you can refer to it later. So, under such urgency and such a dangerous situation, the response and the assistance by the Consulate is very disappointing.
Q127 Andrew Rosindell: First, thank you for coming today; we really appreciate you visiting us. And thank you for everything you are doing in Hong Kong. But what I would like to know particularly is this: what would you like Britain to do? What can we do as a country—as a signatory of that Declaration, if it’s not being adhered to—and as Members of Parliament, and the British Government, to help you in your struggle for democracy?
Hui Sin Tung: Parliament should take a more active role. We would like Parliament to step up as well on supervising the UK Government in relation to her obligations on the implementation and enforcement of the Joint Declaration. Also, we would like Parliament to conduct active investigations on the potential breaches of the Chinese Government of the Joint Declaration, and we want the result of such investigations to be published. Besides, we would like Parliament to pass a motion to denounce the PRC Government’s breach of the Joint Declaration and to support the introduction of genuine universal suffrage in Hong Kong in accordance with the Declaration.
Tang Chi Tak: I would like to talk about this as well. We saw from the news that the Foreign Affairs Committee was prevented from entering Hong Kong to conduct an investigation. I saw that Sir Richard said that he heard from Chinese officials that the Joint Declaration was invalid after the handover. We would like to know whether the UK Government would require the Chinese Government to make a response to that claim made by the Chinese official. If China made a response and admitted that they think that the handover ended the Joint Declaration, would the UK re-exercise the Nanking treaty and Peking treaty? As far as I know, the treaties are still valid.
Q128 Mike Gapes: Can I ask you about the wider aspects of the Umbrella Movement? You represent a particular group. Are your views about the UK Government and the things that you have just said to us representative of all those in the movement, or is the movement very diverse? If so, could you give us some idea about the nature of the movement as a whole?
Hui Sin Tung: I must say that we cannot represent all the participants in the umbrella revolution. As the name suggests, the umbrella revolution is indeed an umbrella term. It covers a wide array of political appeal. However, the main objective of the umbrella revolution is to pursue a real democratic system in Hong Kong. We request two mechanisms for genuine universal suffrage in Hong Kong. The first is the mechanism to elect the Executive committee. We want to do away with the current nomination system which focuses on a small group of people’s interests. The other mechanism has to do with the Legislative Council. There is a functional constituency in the Legislative Council, and some people in Hong Kong have two votes, while the majority of people have only one vote. That is obviously unfair. Because of the malfunctioning of the Legislative Council and the presence of the functional constituency, some policies that are not beneficial to most people in Hong Kong still get passed in the Legislative Council. Those are the main two requirements.
Tang Chi Tak: I have to talk about the problem of representation. In the past, Hong Kong’s protests or social movements have usually been led by the pan-democrats so they can claim that they represent the group of protesters. What is happening in Hong Kong right now with the Umbrella Movement is unprecedented, because we realise that the traditional leaders of social movements may have been compromised for various reasons, such as their electoral interests—they want to fight for the votes of some groups—or for any other reasons. They may have been compromised for China, because they have entered a covert meeting with the Liaison Office in 2010. We have gradually lost trust in traditional leaders who claim that they are pro-Democrat. This time, we do not need anybody to lead us and represent us, so we would just represent ourselves or at least represent a group of people, like this time, because a group of them sponsored us for this trip. We do not represent other protesters of the umbrella revolution, and they would be pleased if they could come here as well, I think.
Q129 Mike Gapes: Can I be clear about your specific requests or demands on what the UK Government and our Parliament should do? Is it fair to say that those are specific proposals that have come from your group and that they do not necessarily reflect the wider consensus that exists among the whole of the umbrella group?
Hui Sin Tung: Yes, that is fair.
Q130 Mr Roy: What would be the effect in Hong Kong if the United Kingdom Government was more outspoken in support of democratic reform? Would it help or hinder if the UK Government publicly supported more democratic reform?
Hui Sin Tung: I think it would definitely help, because currently the umbrella revolution has reached a gridlock. The massive occupied area has been cleared in the past two weeks so no spaces are being occupied now. But then people lost their direction and they started to take on various forms of civil disobedience. For example, they went out on the streets to increase the calls for the police to implement their work. But if the UK Government is willing to speak for us or to issue some statements, that would definitely encourage the Hong Kong people to continue our democratic movement. Also, if the British Consulate is willing to provide protection to people outside, such a system is tangible.
Tang Chi Tak: We favour any help from the UK through every possible means.
Q131 Chair: In the petition that you sent to us, at the end, when talking about the petitions, you set out four things that you think that the UK should be doing. In the third one, which I think is the most critical, you request the UK Government to “require” the Chinese Government to allow Hong Kong universal suffrage of the chief executive. What do you mean by require? We have no obvious levers at our disposal, so we have no obvious way of making the Chinese do that. How do you think that Britain can make China allow universal suffrage?
Hui Sin Tung: To begin with, we have to say that we are not experts in international relations, but I think that the UK Government can exert some diplomatic pressure on the Chinese Government. We do not have tangible plans to suggest to the UK Government. I look forward to future negotiation or discussion with the Committee, or we could even take it to a parliamentary level.
Q132 Chair: What do you mean by diplomatic pressure?
Hui Sin Tung: Issuing a statement or clarifying the UK’s stance on such a matter as a first step. I am not an expert in international relations, but surely there is some conflict of interests or economic relationship between countries, so I am not sure—
Q133 Chair: Should we use the economic relationship to force China to allow universal suffrage?
Hui Sin Tung: This is not a suggestion, because, as I have said, I am not an expert in international relations. This requires further negotiation.
Tang Chi Tak: I think it is not because we want universal suffrage that the UK needs to use economic means to force China to do that. It is because China has violated the Joint Declaration and the UK is one of the signing countries. So, in order to restore the balance or to make them act according to the international treaty, the UK may adopt any means that you think are appropriate.
Chair: Thank you very much indeed. That was a very interesting session for us. I hope that you were comfortable with it. I wish you well for the rest of your stay here in the UK. Thank you for coming along today.
Oral evidence: The UK’s relations with Hong Kong: 30 years after the Joint Declaration, HC 649 21