Transport Committee
Oral evidence: Offshore helicopter safety, HC 992
Monday 17 March 2014
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 17 March 2014.
Members present: Mrs Louise Ellman (Chair), Sarah Champion, Jim Dobbin, Jim Fitzpatrick, Karen Lumley, Mr Adrian Sanders, Chloe Smith, Graham Stringer and Martin Vickers
Questions 90-162
Witnesses: Keith Conradi, Chief of Inspectors, Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Mark Swan, Director Safety, Airspace and Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Chester Armstrong, Helicopter Specialist, Civil Aviation Authority, and Trevor Woods, Approvals and Standardisation Director, European Aviation Safety Agency, gave evidence.
Chair: Good afternoon, and welcome to the Transport Select Committee. I would like to declare that I am a member of Unite. Are there any other declarations?
Graham Stringer: I am a member of Unite.
Jim Dobbin: I am a member of Unite.
Q90 Chair: Thank you very much. Could we have your names and organisations, please?
Chester Armstrong: My name is Chester Armstrong of the Civil Aviation Authority.
Mark Swan: I am Mark Swan. I am from the CAA as well.
Trevor Woods: I am Trevor Woods, European Aviation Safety Agency.
Keith Conradi: I am Keith Conradi, Air Accidents Investigation Branch.
Q91 Chair: Thank you very much. The CAA has reported that the mortality rate for occupants of offshore helicopters is 10 times higher than that for commercial aircraft. Does that mean that helicopter flights are inherently unsafe?
Mark Swan: No, it does not mean that the helicopters are inherently unsafe. I can assure this Committee that, if they were, they would not be flying. We classify the terrain over which they operate in the North sea as hostile. It is a different environment from the commercial air transport operation in itself, so we apply a different set of rules and regulations for the helicopter operation per se. Comparison in terms of the statistics and the way heavy commercial aircraft are operated and operational helicopters are operated is perhaps not useful to the Committee, because we operate a different regulatory process in the way we look after that side of the operation. I can assure you that the standard of operational safety in the North sea is just as good as that in other comparable parts of globe, but it is essentially a hostile environment, unlike commercial aviation, which clearly operates in a less hostile environment.
Q92 Chair: But there have been five major crashes over the past four years. Doesn’t that say something?
Mark Swan: Indeed it does. Tragically, after the Sumburgh accident and several fatalities, I immediately kicked off the review that the Committee has been briefed on. We wanted, effectively, to do a root-and-branch review of all aspects of the helicopter operation to ensure that we had not missed anything, and also to see where we could further improve safety performance, where that was applicable, for this particular type of operation.
Q93 Chair: Is there a particular problem about Super Puma helicopters? They have been involved in all of these accidents.
Mark Swan: The Super Puma is a breed or variety of different helicopters. How many types would you say there are?
Chester Armstrong: Historically, there have been four different variants. Technically, it would perhaps be incorrect to conflate all the accident data from different variants across the brand name that is Super Puma.
Mark Swan: Essentially, there are four different types of aircraft under a single name. They are quite distinct aircraft with a common name, although of course they fulfil the same role.
Q94 Chair: Is the Sikorsky S92 safer?
Mark Swan: I don’t believe so. It is a variant that is used in the North sea, as you will be well aware. I guess that on paper it has a better record, but from my knowledge I do not think we have any statistics to say it is inherently more or less safe, given the sort of accidents we have encountered in the North sea, than any other particular helicopter in terms of what we call causal factors—the things that contribute directly to an accident. Let me just check with Keith Conradi from the AAIB.
Keith Conradi: The problem is that, dealing with such limited numbers, to try to get any statistical relevance from them could be misleading. If you look globally, I do not know of any information that suggests that the EC225, or any of the Super Pumas, is more likely to have an accident than any other type.
Q95 Chair: Mr Woods, do you have any views on helicopter safety in relation to particular types of helicopters or particular sorts of operations?
Trevor Woods: If we look more globally, for the UK the rate quoted is 0.34 per 100,000 hours, and for Norway it is 0.11 per 100,000 hours. I think that has already been reported to you. If we look at the US, figures in a comparable time period show a rate of 0.49 for multi-engine public transport aircraft operations, and in Gulf of Mexico operations 0.23 per 100,000 hours. This indicates that, statistically, it is difficult to say that one type is safer or less safe than the other. These numbers are all in the same region. The important thing is to learn from the accidents and what goes wrong, and move forward to improve things in the future.
Q96 Karen Lumley: Since you have done your investigation, would you say that oil and gas workers’ confidence in the Super Puma helicopters has fallen?
Mark Swan: We have not looked at that specifically either by asking or sending out a questionnaire. My colleague to the right sits on the helicopter gas safety forum, and perhaps I will ask him to interject in a minute. In the review, the CAA board mandated me to focus primarily and principally on the safety and survivability aspects of the report. That we have done. I know that Committee members will have read the relevant bits of the review. We are absolutely committed to those safety and survivability features of the helicopter operation as a priority. As you will be aware, by 1 June we are mandating improved emergency breathing systems, for example, some work on state certification and other specific safety and survivability aspects that we hope, as we move forward, will considerably assist in the confidence of oil and gas workers, as they look at the measures that are about to come into place, or the mitigations we have demanded until those safety and survivability measures become fact on the ground.
Q97 Chair: Mr Swan, perhaps I may stop you at that point. You said that you were mandating emergency breathing systems. The CAA has been looking at this since 2001 but nothing has actually happened. What power do you have to make this happen?
Mark Swan: As you will know, currently there is what is called a category B emergency breathing system, which all oil and gas workers have to wear as part of their survival equipment on board the helicopter. We had a very good look at that and, having looked around the current market and at other countries, we decided there is newer and better technology that is now matching our new standard, which we started working up a couple of years ago. Effectively, it is called category A; it is just a better standard of emergency breathing equipment. It is within our national remit, under what is called an operational directive, for us to insist that on all helicopters operating in the North sea within the UK side of the oil and gas operation that equipment has to be worn by workers, and that is transmitted through what is called the AOCs.
Q98 Chair: Mr Woods, is it correct that the CAA can insist that that be done?
Trevor Woods: Before I answer that question, I would like to give an overview.
Q99 Chair: No, no. I want an answer to that question. We will come back to other issues as the meeting proceeds. I want an answer to that specific point.
Trevor Woods: The CAA has the legal competence to insist on that additional operational requirement.
Q100 Chair: How is it, Mr Swan, that the CAA has been looking at the whole issue of breathing systems since at least 2001 when it instigated an investigation? In 2013, CAP 1034 was issued, but there appeared to be no EASA rules at that time to make it enforceable. Has something changed in the rules, or were you doing something wrong before?
Mark Swan: We have been working very closely with EASA, as you say, over several years to improve safety standards generally across the operation. The cat B system, which is the one available on the market and fitted for workers to use, is now in operation. The CAP that you are referring to, which is our new standard, is working with EASA. It is only in draft at the moment; it is not mandated, but the intent is to work with EASA to make that CAP—the civil air publication—the standard across the whole—
Q101 Chair: But when will that become mandatory? Mr Woods, can you answer that question? One of the concerns we have is the connection between what the CAA thinks is appropriate and what EASA does, and the time lag between one authority and the other and the different interpretations that can take place. Can we be absolutely categoric about this?
Trevor Woods: The operations regulations for Europe become effective in the UK in October this year, so whatever we have in the European rule book for operations will not apply in the UK until October anyway. In those operating requirements, there are already operating rules for offshore operations. That includes some provisions for hostile environments and safety management systems. In that rule, there is also a provision that the national authority can add an additional regulation for offshore operations. Under that new European rule in October, the UK CAA can mandate any such regulations—additional requirements.
We are running a number of rule-making activities. One of them is for offshore operations. That will result in possible approval specifically for offshore operators, and we have another task that covers hostile versus non-hostile environments.
Q102 Chair: What is the time limit in all of this? A number of recommendations about what should be done have come from the recent CAA report. What is the time lag in the recommendations being implemented as far as EASA is concerned?
Trevor Woods: We are currently reviewing each of the recommendations from the CAA report that have been directed at EASA. Some of those reflect what we are already doing under some of those rule-making tasks. We are talking different time scales for the different rule-making tasks. I think it would be better for me to set out in written evidence the rule-making tasks with their deliverable timelines.
Q103 Chair: I would like to know the projected time by which these individual recommendations will be agreed.
Trevor Woods: I can do that. I think it would be more accurate to give you written evidence.
Q104 Chair: Is EASA opposed to any of the recommendations in the UK report?
Trevor Woods: As I said, we still have not responded. We are reviewing those—
Q105 Chair: When are you going to respond?
Trevor Woods: We will respond by the end of this month.
Q106 Chair: Will that response be an answer, or further consultation?
Trevor Woods: It will take time to put some of these things in the rules, so we cannot implement them at the end of this month. Some of them will require working groups to be set up; for some we may have an alternative; or for some we may want to conduct our own review. It will be a mixture of different responses to different recommendations.
Chair: We would like to have your response to each one on what you intend to do and the anticipated time. Miss Smith, do you want to ask anything further on this?
Q107 Chloe Smith: I have one question on the CAA report and a broader question about safety. I am a Member of Parliament for Norwich and I take a particular interest in the southern North sea. On the CAA report, it is the case that the southern North sea is predominantly a gas basin rather than oil and gas, and that the price you can get for gas is half what you can get for oil. Have you done an analysis, including any regional aspects, of the costs to industry of the recommendations in your report? I should add of course that the industry and I acknowledge that safety comes first. Let that not be misunderstood.
Mark Swan: Exactly, and I think that is the point. In the time we had available—I set three months for the whole report to be done, given the urgency of the problem post-Sumburgh—we have not done any detailed analysis of the economic impact of the safety recommendations on the oil and gas industry. First, we have not had the time; but, secondly, we have focused specifically on the core role of safety. We have already been told that a lot of people think the safety timeline is aggressive, purposefully so for obvious reasons, and what I said to oil and gas representatives and the AOC holders, the people who are specifically in charge of running the helicopters—the three accountable managers and the oil and gas senior executive—is that, if a safety case is presented to the CAA that shows a greater risk to life, or to hazard, than the timeline we have currently imposed, we will look at that and we will reappraise. What we have not done is said to oil and gas, “If this is going to affect your economic prospects, i.e. in the worst case you may close down a rig or field,” which is some of the talk around at the moment, “that is not a factor for us unless it affects safety.” That is where we stand at the moment, and we do not intend to change that position.
Q108 Chloe Smith: Have you any intention of going on to do any further analysis, or do you expect any partner, either present or not, to do such analysis?
Mark Swan: We have set up the safety action group, which we are calling the new forum. You will have seen in the report that I undertook to set up a new safety forum that I would chair, because that was based on the best practice that we found working with the Norwegians. The first meeting of that group is this Thursday. It has all the relevant people in the room. There are about a dozen people from oil and gas, unions, accountable managers—all the sort of people you would expect to be there—and we will work through those sorts of issues together in that safety action group and then we will reappraise. Safety is front of centre, as you quite rightly observe, but that forum is now the conduit to look at these issues. If it demands further cost-benefit with the industry or ourselves, we will do that.
Q109 Chair: Mr Conradi, in the report you issued you refer to the flawed passenger safety briefing given to people in the Sumburgh helicopter before the flight. What significance do you attach to that, and who is responsible for that?
Keith Conradi: We think it was worth bringing up because passengers were getting on board with incorrect knowledge of the equipment they were using. Potentially, it meant that people might find themselves submerged not knowing that they could still use the equipment—the rebreather—that they were wearing. Although we do not have any evidence of its being used in this particular accident, we feel that for the future it is important that the correct brief is given so that people understand exactly what their equipment can and cannot do.
Q110 Chair: Could you give us an indication of the key findings of your most recent report?
Keith Conradi: The investigation is still live. We have issued two special bulletins so far and we do not believe we are looking at a technical problem with the helicopter. We are focusing very much on operational procedures and the training of crews, and we are looking at some of the problems with search and rescue and the use of boats. We have made two recommendations about the craft they were using from Sumburgh airport, both of which have been accepted. We are content with the work that is going on with those. As you say, we have reported on the safety action taking place to correct the briefing given on the rebreathing apparatus.
Q111 Chair: Mr Woods, EASA is seen as distant. We have heard representations that it represents a watering down of standards. Do you think that is a fair comment on the way EASA operates?
Trevor Woods: No, I would say that it is certainly not a fair comment. We have a number of roles, one of which is the setting of essential rules, which we have already discussed a little, but we also have an executive responsibility in type certification and the continuing airworthiness activities of the type. As a result of the safety investigations into these accidents, for a start we have issued 15 airworthiness directives following recommendations made from the accidents. We are not distant; we have worked very closely with the aircraft manufacturer to investigate the cause of the accident and, following the recommendations, to find a solution.
As to watering down the regulations, in October we have our operations regulations coming into effect, and a number of those provisions are quite stringent. I know that the operators in this case already have safety management systems, but this is something that is added to give responsibilities for reporting inside the organisation, analysing risks, following them up and ensuring that crew have the right training and skills.
Q112 Chair: But you are talking now about new things. Oil & Gas UK say that there is very little progress from EASA on implementing safety recommendations coming from the February 2009 Super Puma crash 125 miles east of Aberdeen. That suggests inaction from EASA. Why have you failed to implement those recommendations?
Trevor Woods: I believe we responded to all the recommendations.
Q113 Chair: What does “responded to” mean?
Trevor Woods: We have taken action on most of them. Some of those actions take longer. When you get into research programmes, it takes time to carry them out. We have issued a lot of ADs requiring inspections and modifications to the aircraft, and we are carrying out research on things like gearbox running without the lubrication system functioning, and that kind of thing. It takes time to set up these tests. They are very technical; you need the right equipment, and the tests need to be valid because they are very expensive. If we had the wrong result, it would be a waste of time. We need to make sure we get a safety benefit. I would say that we have been very productive and responsive.
Q114 Chair: Thirty-two countries are members of EASA and only four of them, including the UK, have an offshore helicopter industry. Does that mean that in the way EASA looks at things this sector is not of particular importance?
Trevor Woods: We have been doing a lot of research and we have working groups. We give it a great priority. We have a European aviation safety plan, and in there we have an item to identify the priority areas for helicopter safety. This is being led by the European helicopter safety team. We work with national authorities, and the authorities you mentioned would have more involvement because of their interest. The UK has the largest contribution to our rule-making teams of all those 32 nations; it contributes over a quarter of our rule-making team members. We are very pleased with the co‑operation from the UK CAA. We take on board their work. They assist us in developing those rules, and we are certainly not dumbing down rules to the lowest level across Europe. The states that do not have such operations would not be asking for the rules to be lowered for their benefit, because they would not have an interest anyway.
Q115 Chair: I do not think it is just about that; it is whether there is a real impetus to address this sector that you feel coming from the UK. I am not entirely clear whether there is or there isn’t. You are talking about other diversionary things. I am asking about that particular point.
Trevor Woods: We have a lot of rule-making activities in this area, as I mentioned. We must not forget that a lot of things we learn here would also be applicable to other helicopter operations elsewhere. Some of the design issues might be relevant. It may be that we learn lessons in offshore operations that are more widely applicable; and we must not forget that we have other special types of operations for helicopters.
Chair: Yes, but I am asking you about something else.
Q116 Sarah Champion: Mr Woods, you are making me nervous.
Trevor Woods: I am sorry.
Q117 Sarah Champion: Not you specifically, but the relationship between the CAA and EASA. I have just heard that the 2009 recommendations are still going through various committees. Mr Swan said of his recommendations to you that by the end of the month you should be coming back with some comment, but it is then likely to go through committees again. I am now getting nervous that EASA is slowing down UK recommendations, which is having an impact on our safety. Can you give me some reassurance, please?
Trevor Woods: We have not slowed down anything. We will respond to the UK recommendations very quickly. We decided to treat them as if they were from an accident investigation board.
Q118 Sarah Champion: It is not the responding to them but the being able to implement them that I am anxious about.
Trevor Woods: A lot of these recommendations are already related to work we are doing in rule-making in the development of our safety plan. Those will be taken on board along with those actions. I cannot guarantee that we will accept every one of the recommendations.
Mark Swan: May I add a point that might be helpful to the Committee? I met Patrick Ky, the new chief executive of the European Aviation Safety Agency, who has just taken over. He paid a personal visit to the UK last month. We then had very good engagement with him and his top team. He personally committed himself and his executives to all the recommendations in our report, which I thought was a bold and brave move by him. He is absolutely 100% behind all the recommendations; there is no quibble about that, and he is going to do his utmost to fast-track the recommendations that belong to EASA as quickly as possible. As Mr Woods has said, some of those are already in what is called the rule-making task and they will take a bit of bureaucratic time to rinse through, but from the CAA’s perspective, as I mentioned earlier, we have the ability to fast-track key safety recommendations at national level. That is what we are doing, so we have strong support from EASA.
Chair: The Committee is adjourned for a Division, and for 10 minutes more if there is another one.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
On resuming—
Q119 Chair: Mr Conradi, you told us about the results of your investigation. How do you feel that recommendations you make are being implemented by other bodies? Do you think there is a problem from recommendation to implementation?
Keith Conradi: I think there have been problems in the past. We have had problems with EASA particularly responding to safety recommendations. The trend is a positive one. Like Mr Swan, I also recently met Patrick Ky, the executive director of EASA. He has promised to take more action more swiftly with regard to safety recommendations. On this front, we have also talked to the European Commission, and they have taken an active interest particularly in the initial response and the monitoring of safety recommendations thereafter.
Q120 Chair: Mr Swan, we were talking about the link between EASA and the CAA. What are the key recommendations of your report that you would want to be taken forward swiftly, and how are you going to do that?
Mark Swan: EASA’s competence, as the Committee probably knows, is in the design and certification of the aircraft—the helicopters—themselves. The focus of EASA’s work is therefore on ensuring that, where they have what is called the competence, i.e. they are in charge of that bit, so the design, certification and critical parts—a helicopter is all about the gearbox and the one transmission system—and all the safety aspects and maintenance related to that, we get clearer, better guidance and training coming from the manufacturers. That is one of the principal recommendations. On the pilot side, although EASA does not have exact competence for that, when you look at the training documentation that the manufacturers produce as part of the product, we want to ensure that that is made available to what we call the front line, for pilots to use commonly across the whole of the operations. It is on things like that, starting right from the design and certification stage, that we expect EASA to move forward on the engineering side—pertinent to what you were talking about earlier, Madam Chair.
On the things Mr Woods was talking about—the EASA rule-making task—it is true that some of that is still subject to research, but helping with mandating the safety recommendations, side flotation devices and other areas where they can put this into European law, serves to reinforce what we already wish to happen. I stress again that we do not need to wait, nor do we intend to, for EASA’s rule-making machine to grind these out in due course. We are going to take action in the next few months to get those key recommendations embedded in our operations.
Q121 Chair: We have heard representations that extra standards put on operators by oil and gas customers are causing unnecessary complexity for pilots. You are recommending that offshore helicopter operators identify a set of best practice procedures and see how they can be incorporated into contractual requirements. Why have you not decided to lead that review yourself? That is what the industry thinks should happen.
Mark Swan: We will kick this off using the new safety action group. There are representatives of the industry on that forum. I know that some of the senior execs in the oil and gas industry have already started looking at what they call a workstream on standardisation. I was briefed on it just last week. That is absolutely fine, but we intend to bring this into the open. The key point for me is that we have heard that, in the standardisation of contracts and the conditions put into them, particularly when it comes to pilot performance or extra weather limitations, a helicopter operator sometimes might not know which particular set of standards he should be flying to if he suddenly had to switch from one to the other. We want to see all that put on a level playing field, so that when a pilot is in the cockpit he knows exactly what standard he is flying to and nothing is added. If it had to be added, we would want to add it for everybody, so that there is a standard of safety—it is there and it is absolute. We are looking at that.
On the commercial side, of course we acknowledge that this is a commercially competitive environment. The helicopter operators are in it to make money. That is absolutely fine, but I want to ensure that there is absolutely clear blue water between the standardisation of the contracts, the commercial pressures of the contracts and the guy or girl in the cockpit who is responsible for the safe operation of that helicopter on that day and for the passengers on board. In terms of your question, that is where we want to make sure we have really good transparent clarity between the commercial side, standardisation and all the contract stuff that oil and gas say might inhibit or stop the operation or whatever, and we will do that review collectively through the safety action group. I can see no other forum. It is not as though we are asking them to go it alone, but we are asking them to lead on this because, at the end of the day, they are responsible for letting the contracts.
Q122 Chair: You have been criticised for having too much light-touch regulation. What do you think has led to that criticism?
Mark Swan: I disagree that we have light-touch regulation. If I was to throw statistics at you, in the last four or five years we have had 21 helicopter findings and put five on notice. We have been pretty heavy in threatening to pull licences and imposing conditions on helicopter operations in the round. In North sea offshore helicopter operations, I have five fully qualified and highly experienced pilots who fly there on a routine basis. They are personally overseeing, as pilots in the cockpit, the operation of these folk. I can assure you that, if they see something they do not like, we raise what is called a finding, and that is then further investigated. To take it to its natural extreme, if there are findings of significant severity, after a notice period we will ground that operator, and have no hesitation in doing so. I would contend the view that we have had a light touch.
To go back to the tragic Sumburgh accident, for me that was a catalyst to say that this really is a very hostile environment; it is very challenging. A root-and-branch review does not necessarily mean that we are now going to change to being a heavy-handed regulator that grounds somebody at a moment’s notice, but I hope you agree that we now have a review and report that allow us to look at all aspects of the offshore operation and make interventions in a proportionate and timely manner, which I would say is our job.
Q123 Karen Lumley: How many have been grounded?
Mark Swan: We have not grounded anything recently. After the Sumburgh accident, as you know, the helicopter operators grounded themselves. What I did refuse to do was to let them get airborne again. It took a considerable number of meetings with the senior executives of the three helicopter operations. I had two three-hour conference calls with them and demanded a raft of written evidence, I guess you would describe it—as in this Committee—and an audit trail of the corrective action before even the AAIB had finished its work, before they were allowed to get airborne again. Although we did not specifically ground the operators in that accident—they beat us to it—I can assure you that we certainly took a very keen interest and demanded some significant evidence before we let the operation resume.
Q124 Karen Lumley: Have you ever grounded anyone?
Chester Armstrong: To clarify that point, after the 2012 second gearbox driveshaft failure, the CAA took action to place operational restrictions on that aircraft type. Effectively, while we did not ground it, we stopped it operating in the North sea until the situation was clarified.
Mark Swan: That was in conjunction with EASA.
Q125 Chair: Are you under financial pressure? Is it right that you are about to lose 120 staff?
Mark Swan: Not quite.
Q126 Chair: How many?
Mark Swan: We are under financial pressure, as you would expect us to be. We have recently merged two groups. I was asked by the board, and we have done it, to merge the airspace and safety groups, so I now direct both. During that merger we made about 30 head-count savings out of nearly 500 people; we saved 30 posts. None of those was what I call front-line posts, apart from one inspector last December, and, if we need to, we will replace him. We do not feel we need to at the moment. The 120 you refer to is over a four-year period. It is part of our performance and process improvement programme, which is just about to launch, to bring a new round of technology into the business to make it a lot more technology-dependent. We have quite old systems in terms of processes and the way we do business. We intend to replace over time about 120 staff. They are principally what Committee members would recognise as back-office staff, not front-line inspectors. They are people who are used to running the business on a day-to-day basis. For some of our licensing staff, we have already automated our processes and that has also had an effect in reducing head count.
Let me assure you that in terms of flight operations inspectors—Chester Armstrong is a helicopter pilot—and airworthiness inspectors, I have ring-fenced their role and they are currently being replaced like for like. In the normal routine way of business, if these people walk out to other jobs—they are highly prized in the industry, as you can imagine—they are replaced like for like, once they have achieved the required training standards.
Q127 Chloe Smith: Can I just note the context of another civil accident in Norfolk over the weekend? You will be well aware of it, particularly Mr Conradi; as I understand it, the AAIB is doing the initial investigation, and you may be able to explain it further. Can the panel give us their views on the differences between the safety records of offshore and onshore helicopters and, therefore, the safety regulation requirements for both?
Keith Conradi: I do not have any details of the most recent accident.
Chloe Smith: Nor is that expected.
Keith Conradi: I think you have to bear in mind that the offshore one is the commercial aspect; very little commercial helicopter transport takes place onshore, so we are looking mostly at private operators. A different set of rules applies for private and commercial, so trying to do a comparison probably would not lead us anywhere.
Q128 Chloe Smith: They are two entirely different spheres?
Keith Conradi: They are using helicopters, but substantially different sets of rules apply from one to the other. It is a whole different sort of operation. Flying a helicopter just for a pleasure flight over the country is completely different from trying to land on an oil platform in the middle of the night.
Q129 Chloe Smith: In that case, we had better go to those who set the rules. Why are there different sets of rules?
Mark Swan: There is just one addition. The police helicopters and the emergency service helicopters are a slightly different basket of activity. What we identified from the report you have just seen is that of the recommendations, some belonging to EASA on the design and certification side and some to our regulatory processes, we believe that about 50% have a bearing, as you quite rightly observed, on helicopter operations in the round. Clearly, the safety ones are applicable only to the North sea, because those are to do with water. We have set in place another piece of work—it will not be a formal public review; it will be an internal report—which breaks out those recommendations. We will start taking those forward as soon as we have kicked off the safety action group, and look at how we start applying those recommendations, or the value of those recommendations, to onshore, specifically police and air ambulance. As Mr Conradi has already said, unless there are particular design or certification issues which I am not aware of—the accident may throw something up; I don’t know—private helicopter flights tend to be looked at in a different way because it is a different operation, but we still regularly inspect those people; they are subject to pretty stringent rules, particularly if they have a commercial basis to their private flying.
Q130 Chair: Going back to offshore helicopters, over the past decade Norway’s record has improved and the UK’s has declined, yet the inquiry concludes that we do not have anything to learn from Norway. Can that really be correct?
Mark Swan: We have worked very carefully on this with the Norwegians over the last three to four months. I was certain we would find two or three things we could put our finger on and say, “They are doing this, it’s completely different from the way we carry out our regulatory duties, and we need to implement it as soon as possible.” We were able to find only one major difference, and maybe I will come to that in a second. Perhaps it is not surprising, because at least two of the three operators—the third is the same apart from the name—essentially work both sides of the dividing line. They provide the same services; they are part of the same global consortia; and they use the same aircraft, essentially. On pilot training, servicing and everything else, we really did not find anything.
There are perhaps two things, not just one. The major thing that we found to be a substantial difference was in the governance. The safety forum that my opposite number in Norway chairs on a quarterly basis has him in the driving seat, and they keep a very tight hand on every aspect of offshore operations. That is the one major difference. That is why we have replicated it, and why that committee, under my chairmanship, starts on Thursday.
The other thing to bring to your attention is that we found that the reporting culture of the Norwegian fleet appears to be better, so more reports go in on minor problems, and so on. We believe that is because their reporting culture is much younger than ours. It was introduced only a couple of years ago, and it still has a very good cultural ring to it. We are looking at whether we have missed something there, but at the moment I can say in front of this Committee that in our analysis and report, where we had independent support—maybe I will turn to Mr Armstrong in a second—we genuinely did not find anything germane to the differences in operation.
Q131 Graham Stringer: What did the committee do differently that you have not done? A committee structure in itself is not going to stop a helicopter crashing, is it?
Mark Swan: No.
Q132 Graham Stringer: What did the committee do that is not being done in the United Kingdom?
Mark Swan: I think the major difference is that my opposite number in Norway is head of the committee. It is his committee; he runs it, and because Statoil is essentially a large state-owned company in Norway he has a lot more influence and direct action capability than the governance structure we had here, where Mr Armstrong was a member of the helicopter safety group, but was not an executive in driving some of the outcomes and issues we have seen over time that we would perhaps have liked to integrate and institute more quickly. That is probably the major difference.
Chester Armstrong: If I could just take it back, we spent quite a lot of time talking about the differences between Norway and the UK. They are as wide as socio-economic factors and the state power in that area. We wondered quite a bit about the differences. The relationships with the work force seemed less oppositional. But, in the end, while there were different characteristics, did they have a bearing on safety? What we put in the report was about governance, as Mr Swan mentioned, and also human factors about reporting. From a safety perspective, that was what we felt was relevant.
If I may comment on the CAA’s role in going beyond regulation, our presence in the oil and gas industry’s safety committees has been basically that. The difference that this new structure would give is the driving seat position of the CAA. To a large extent, that has reflected a position where we set the rules; we imposed the rules and checked them, but there is a level of safety where the industry voluntarily sought to go. They have contributed to research projects in a collaborative way, with the helicopter operators as well as the oil and gas industry spending a lot of money working with us while we have been managing a research committee to bring these things along. It has always been seen as a collaborative venture to go beyond regulation. The difference is what everybody here is concerned about today. The recent accident history calls for more sense of control.
Q133 Chair: Last week, the sheriff principal found that cutting corners on safety maintenance may have contributed to the April 2009 Peterhead crash. Does that have lessons for you—for what the CAA ought to be doing?
Mark Swan: Obviously, we looked at the report. We instituted straight away a deep audit into our own processes and those in the helicopter industry. My head of airworthiness has started to look at both the report and the potential lessons we may draw from it. That work started over a week ago when we got early sight of the report. If there are any lessons, I can assure you that work is in hand to bring them out, and we will act on them, and, as ever, we will report on them publicly and transparently. I cannot go into the details of the accident.
Trevor Woods: We worked very closely with Airbus Helicopters to look at the inspections and what should have been done. As a result, we issued safety information bulletins to clarify how those maintenance activities should take place. We have responded to those specific cases already, and for the future we must learn that these maintenance tasks must be clear and understood, and the organisation must look at where the risks might be and check that it is carrying out those activities as well.
Q134 Chair: If we had a full public inquiry into what happened at Sumburgh, what more information could come to light that is not available now?
Mark Swan: A public inquiry is for the Government to decide on. We have done a very thorough review of the totality of the operation, so it truly has been an end-to-end process. It has been in conjunction with the Norwegians, and we have looked internationally at colleagues abroad to make sure we do not miss best practice. We had a red challenge team of industry experts; I invited several highly respected helicopter operators, or people with helicopter experience, to challenge our report all the way through. They did a very good job. I do not think we missed anything. There have been calls of, “Well, hang on, CAA. You haven’t looked at yourself and how good you are at your job.” Clearly, that is for others to remark on, not me, but in terms of how the operation is being conducted and all the factors you see in the report, I do not think we have missed anything. We have had independent external challenge to ensure that we have not. We have been very open and transparent with both EASA and the Norwegians to make sure we have collected everything. I cannot answer your question. All I can do is assure you that we do not think we have missed anything that could or should have gone into the report.
Q135 Chair: Mr Conradi, do you have any view on that?
Keith Conradi: From a technical point of view, I do not see what else a public inquiry would bring to that type of investigation. I do not know how many more safety recommendations are likely to come out of the Sumburgh accident. I think we hit the ones that we felt were safety-critical at an early stage. An area we might want to look at is how safety recommendations are monitored and their progress is checked, beyond us making them and the addressee responding to them. At the moment, it is not an area that is clearly covered by any particular group.
Q136 Jim Fitzpatrick: Mr Swan, in response to a question from Mr Stringer, you said that the one major reference you took from Norway in terms of the safety committee was your taking over the personal chairing of it from this Thursday. Who was chairing it before? Was it an independent? Was it the helicopter operators, the oil industry or the unions? Was it rotating? How did it function before?
Mark Swan: Mr Armstrong is a member of the helicopter safety steering group in the UK, so he can explain it to you.
Chester Armstrong: There is a co-chair arrangement between an oil and gas executive and a senior flight operations person within a major helicopter operator. That is the helicopter safety steering group. Underneath it is a functional group, the air safety technical group, which is a bit wider. I believe that is chaired by the Health and Safety Executive for Oil & Gas UK.
Q137 Jim Fitzpatrick: Given the significance of chairing it and the symbolism of your taking over, there was no resistance from existing members to that new arrangement?
Mark Swan: No. Both the oil and gas industry and the operators have warmly embraced the report. As you can imagine and as you would expect, there has been absolutely no pushback on the key safety findings we made. There may be some noise on the commercial side, but that is absolutely trumped by safety. I can assure the Committee that the report has been very warmly embraced from senior exec level in the oil and gas industry to the accountable managers, so that is great news. They put the right people in the room to move these things forward. The safety action group meets on Thursday. I am very keen that we progress those recommendations really quickly. We have had no pushback; that has been reassuring, but using the forum, as you quite rightly pointed out, now being in that executive position to push those forward, and having the ability to fast-track at national level key recommendations will make a difference. It will make a quick difference; that is the thing for me. We have seen a lot of good work in the past; it has perhaps been too painstakingly slow, as Madam Chair has pointed out already.
Q138 Martin Vickers: are you wholly satisfied that all the various agencies involved in safety work together as well as they possibly could? Is there any recommendation you would make that you think would improve investigation and regulation?
Keith Conradi: The investigation process is mature and it is well understood on an international level, with international protocols. I think that works pretty well. It is hard to think of a better way of doing it from that independent, impartial standpoint.
Mark Swan: From our perspective, we have a very robust and experienced safety culture. That does not mean for one second that we do not continually try to improve it. One of the reasons for reorganising the CAA at the beginning of last year was that we felt we could be a more effective regulator by combining two groups and joining it up better. That process is now largely complete.
We are also moving ourselves towards a CAA safety management system. Even as the regulator, we are trying to replicate industry best practice in having a safety management system that can mirror the best practice in industry. There are always things we can do. From the CAA perspective, we have to make sure we do these things—to bring in fresh thinking and capture best practice where we find it.
As to areas for improvement, Mr Woods has already mentioned the amount of resource we put into EASA. That is purposeful, because we want to have influence and get good results at both national and international level. Part of the reorganisation has set up within my group an EASA-focused cadre of 80 people who have been stripped out of all the other areas of the CAA specifically to improve the speed of rule-making, increase safety and better influence this partnership, particularly when the operational directive hits the European legislation in October and we become subject to EASA operational rules. All that is in hand, and I am sure there will be more to do. I can assure you that we certainly do not rest on our laurels, so there is quite a lot of work in hand at the moment.
Chair: Thank you very much to all of you.
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Robert Goodwill MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Transport, and Tricia Hayes, Director of Aviation, Department for Transport, gave evidence.
Q139 Chair: Good afternoon, Minister, and welcome to the Select Committee. Would you tell us who you are, and perhaps your colleague would introduce herself as well, just for our records?
Mr Goodwill: For the record, I am Robert Goodwill, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department for Transport with responsibility for aviation. I am joined by Tricia Hayes.
Tricia Hayes: I am director of aviation at the Department for Transport.
Q140 Chair: Do you want to make any opening statement, Minister?
Mr Goodwill: Could I make a brief opening statement to express sympathy with the families and friends of those who were killed in some of the accidents we have been discussing, in particular to express regret at the fact there has been quite a long delay, for legal reasons, in fully investigating the April 2009 crash? I know it has been very difficult for the families involved not getting the answers they wanted more quickly.
Q141 Chair: There have been five major offshore helicopter crashes in four years. What can you and the Department do to reassure offshore workers that their safety is paramount?
Mr Goodwill: In terms of aviation, I think standards of safety are higher in that industry than for any other form of transport. Any accident that takes place gets a lot of publicity. Therefore, often the perception of risk involved in aviation is greater than the actual risk. For example, it is interesting to look at the risk factors of various forms of transport. For offshore helicopters, there are 15.2 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres, which is five times the level for cars, but seven times less than the level for motorcycles. Indeed, if you look at UK airline operations, they are 50,000 times safer; in fact, I do not think we have had a fatality since the Kegworth crash in the UK. But there is a perception among many of the travelling public, not least the Secretary of State himself, that people are nervous about flying. I think it needs to be put into context. Yes, there is greater risk flying in non-fixed-wing aircraft in a very hostile environment, but, putting that in the context of other forms of transport, it is certainly not as dangerous as walking, or riding a bicycle. We need to make sure people understand the actual levels of risk, but there is no reason whatsoever for any complacency. We need to follow up any actions that are recommended, and make sure everything that can be done is done to ensure the safety of the passengers and crew on those flights.
Q142 Chair: Do you think the regulation we have is effective? In particular, do you think that EASA’s role is one that strengthens safety or slows down decision taking?
Mr Goodwill: The role of EASA is slightly different from that of the CAA, given that they are involved in the certification of aircraft, as I think you just heard in the last evidence session. When I asked the CAA whether there was anything it might need to do where it had worries about safety that it would be prevented from doing by EASA, the answer came back very clearly, “No. We can take action where necessary if we need to ground aircraft or change operating practices.” I think the two work very well together, and any concerns that people might have had that they were compromising the levels of security and safety in the UK because of the operation of EASA are unfounded.
One should also look at the fact that many British citizens travel by helicopter or fixed-wing craft in other EU countries. The general effect on the safety of the entire European travelling public has been very positive. There are some European Union countries—I will not list them at this moment—whose safety record and standards may not be quite the same as the gold standard that I think has been set by the CAA.
Q143 Chair: Sometimes it is claimed that EASA is lowering those gold-plated standards in relation to the UK, not Europe as a whole. Is that something you would agree with?
Mr Goodwill: We certainly had that argument put forward by BALPA when we discussed flight time limitations and pilots’ flying hours. The advice I have had from the CAA, who are primarily concerned with safety and would not wish to see it compromised at all, is that there has been no diminution in safety standards because of the operation of EASA. There is nothing that the CAA might wish to do that they have been prevented from doing because of the operations of EASA.
Q144 Graham Stringer: How do you square that with the fact that EASA are not implementing a significant number of recommendations from the AAIB?
Mr Goodwill: The UK has a well-established leadership role within EASA, especially on helicopter safety issues, and there is clear recognition that both the UK and Norway can bring much to the table in those terms. We are well represented as a country in all EASA’s rule-making processes, and working hard to improve the pace and productivity of this process. Indeed, EASA’s management board is currently chaired by a senior official from the CAA.
Although it is true that the CAA’s February report identified a number of areas where it was thought action was needed by EASA to respond to previous accident investigation reports, the CAA is in regular contact with EASA on resolving any outstanding issues. This includes a number of face-to-face meetings with the relevant experts within the EASA organisation. I am encouraged that EASA has recognised the need to respond quickly. EASA has made a written commitment to provide an initial position on each of the recommendations no later than 7 April, and they have just repeated that undertaking. EASA can move to take action, but there is nothing to prevent the CAA from moving more quickly and taking action, should they deem it necessary. I do not know whether Tricia wants to add anything.
Tricia Hayes: There is a danger of this afternoon becoming a list of people who have had a meeting with Patrick Ky.
Mr Goodwill: I have had one.
Tricia Hayes: We have also recently had a meeting with Patrick Ky. It is clear from those conversations that EASA is committed not just to responding to the recommendations in the CAA report but to tracking each of them individually through to a definitive conclusion. We have had that commitment from him personally. More widely, we are very heavily engaged with EASA. As you heard in the previous session, we are the single most represented country in the rule-making process, so our strategy for making EASA work more quickly is to work within the system.
Q145 Graham Stringer: But involvement is not sufficient, is it, Minister? I think you were a member of this Committee when it produced a report saying that EASA was not fit for purpose in its early days. Do you really believe what you have just read out to this Committee—that there has been sufficient improvement, even though the evidence, despite all this involvement, is that they are not implementing recommendations from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch?
Mr Goodwill: I suppose that, if I was to make any criticism of EASA, it would be that any organisation that involves a large number of member states tends to act more slowly than the CAA, for example, which can take action immediately. If there were ever an instance where we had to ground a fleet, the CAA would take action, but if longer-term action needed to be taken at European-wide level EASA is the body to do that.
It is absolutely true that at the start we were very concerned that EASA did not have the personnel; it could not attract the expertise. There was all sorts of confusion about the location of its headquarters, and that meant it had difficulty recruiting people. Many of the problems that we identified then are now not such important issues, but I repeat that the British public travel by a variety of means in a whole variety of different countries. Therefore, the overall impact on the safety of British citizens travelling, particularly in some of the eastern or southern European countries, has been very positive. The CAA, which is the gold standard in terms of aviation safety, is, first, very engaged with EASA in putting forward recommendations and engaging with them, but, secondly, it can take action if and where necessary to ensure that we do not compromise safety.
Q146 Graham Stringer: Isn’t that just Eurospeak for acknowledging the reality that there have been lowest common denominator safety standards? You did not name the countries in your first answer, but you are doing so now. The air safety standards in southern Europe and in some parts of eastern Europe are lower than those in this country. The reason for the slowness and the lack of response is that standards are being reduced in northern European countries and the United Kingdom to bring people up. It is Eurospeak to talk about the safety of all European citizens, is it not, because some standards are being brought up, but our standards are not being kept up and we are not responding to recommendations following serious accidents?
Mr Goodwill: I specifically raised this issue with the CAA when we were discussing the flight time limitations. It certainly could not be described as a case of the lowest common denominator, but there was a situation where there were different rules in different countries and there was some need for compromise to ensure that those standards could be agreed. When I asked the CAA whether there were any instances where they felt that in that situation safety was being compromised, they said no. In fact, they went to great lengths to explain why in that case having three pilots on the flight deck for very long flights was not a necessary recommendation. If it ever came to my attention that we were compromising safety because EASA was applying diluted rules, I would certainly ensure the CAA took steps to ensure that the UK dealt with that, because it is a minimum standard, not one that we cannot improve and take action on at short notice.
In terms of the helicopter fleet in the North sea, it is important that the CAA can take swift action if they identify a particular problem and ensure that we do not have to move at the speed of EASA, which, for understandable reasons, can be a more bureaucratic process than the CAA’s action. Tricia is nodding.
Tricia Hayes: I am.
Q147 Graham Stringer: I do not want to go back through the history of this Committee’s reports, but you are right; eventually, the CAA said they were satisfied, but that was after behind-doors compromises, was it not, when the Government said they were not satisfied with the original safety regulations? It is just another indication that we are not getting the standard of safety in this country that we should be getting. Another piece of evidence is that the CAA have been accused of light-touch regulation. Is it not possible that that is a response to EASA’s slowness and a reduction of our standards, as southern Europe’s standards are brought up to speed?
Mr Goodwill: All the advice I have is that that is not the case. I know that for many it would be very easy, maybe for more political reasons, to criticise anything that was based at European level, but the CAA is one of the most respected safety regulators in the world. In terms of the regulation in the UK, some of the industry complains that the CAA gold-plate regulations are too prescriptive; other parts of the industry feel that more detailed regulation and oversight is required. I suggest that means the CAA is getting the balance about right.
In terms of EASA, I believe that the CAA have all the powers they need to act over and above the EASA standards. Therefore, we do not need to be concerned about UK citizens on UK flights or UK helicopters. However, we can be heartened by the fact that, if somebody books a flight with another airline from a different country, the standards will have been brought up to at least the European minimum, which in many cases is far superior to some of the standards that have been commonplace, until fairly recently, in some other countries.
Q148 Chair: Last week, the sheriff principal found that cutting corners on safety maintenance may have contributed to the April 2009 Peterhead crash. That does not suggest too much regulation, does it? Does it suggest too little regulation? What lessons have you taken from that finding?
Mr Goodwill: I spent an hour this morning reading the fatal accident inquiry. I would recommend that everyone read it, because it shows how mistakes were made in the way that an aircraft’s gearbox faults were spotted and monitored. I do not know whether you are aware of the situation, but the gearbox in a helicopter is the key component. It is put under very great stress, and a lot is done to ensure that the gearbox itself can be monitored, including the use of magnetic plugs to pick up any fragments of metal. A number of problems were identified, the first being that a scrap of metal that was discovered was not correctly identified as coming from the epicyclic gears of the helicopter, and it was assumed to be metal from a different place. Secondly, there were also issues in terms of how the maintenance schedule was organised, and how telephone calls were made that should have been put in writing so there could be no confusion. Therefore, I believe it was not a problem of regulation so much as a problem that the regulations were not being applied. It is mentioned in the report that to an extent there was a tick-box mentality, which should not have been allowed to prevail.
Lessons have been learned from that. Indeed, helicopters are now fitted with enhanced monitoring devices, including HUMS—the health and usage monitoring system—with funding from the offshore oil companies themselves to ensure that it is installed, so that vibrations from gearboxes and rotor drives can be picked up at a very early stage. The card that is taken out of the helicopter when it lands can be analysed to ensure these are picked up very early indeed. Lessons were learned from that, but, reading the report, my impression is that this was not a fault of under-regulation; it was a fault in application of the regulations, and some mistakes were made, as identified by the fatal accident inquiry inspector.
Tricia Hayes: Perhaps I may add a quick comment and relate it back to the question about EASA. It reflects on where EASA is in its life history. EASA is still a relatively new organisation, and it spent its first decade getting the rule book in place. We are now in a position where the job of putting in place the regulatory framework is essentially done, and EASA is now turning its attention to the broader issues around compliance and organisational culture. As the Minister rightly says, one of the lessons from this particular accident is that, no matter what the rule book says, the right organisational culture and incentives for people who work in organisations need to be in place, so it is very welcome that EASA has got past the first phase of its work and can now look at these broader issues.
Q149 Chair: Why has it taken five years to produce that report? The crash happened five years ago.
Mr Goodwill: The reason is that there was very real consideration of a prosecution being brought. Indeed, the sheriff principal’s report focused very much on whether the fault was due to a defect in a component, which would have been the responsibility of the manufacturer. This was viewed to be unlikely given the length of service of the helicopter. I think it had done 3,600 hours of operation, and the likelihood of an epicyclic gear failing decreases over time. In the report they said that it had reached the asymptote, but because the component was not recovered there was no way they could determine whether or not it was defective. The other potential cause of the failure would have been spalling in the roller bearings on that epicyclic assembly. That is where the fragment of metal had come from. I think the inspector ruled that, on the balance of probabilities, it was down to spalling, but that is not the level of proof needed to bring any prosecution.
Q150 Chair: Why did it take four or five years to do that?
Mr Goodwill: Investigations of this type generally take a number of years. The typical length of time for the Air Accidents Investigation Branch to carry out its work fully is 18 months. I stand to be corrected, but as I understand it, the further delays were down to lawyers and prosecutors determining whether a case could be brought. I agree that it is an unacceptable time for the families to wait, particularly as in the end no prosecution proved to be viable. The reasons for the failure were pretty apparent quite soon after the accident, and the investigation branch brought forward recommendations to prevent that type of failure from happening again, so we did not have to wait for the full report six years later before action could be taken.
Q151 Chair: When recommendations are made to improve safety, whether they come from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch or the Civil Aviation Authority, whose responsibility is it to ensure that they are implemented? Is anybody responsible? Is the Minister responsible? Are you responsible, Minister?
Mr Goodwill: Ultimately, as Minister I suspect that I am responsible for almost everything, but the responsibility for ensuring that compliance is properly carried out is a CAA responsibility. Responsibility for acting within the regulations is that of the operators themselves who may employ subcontract maintenance staff, in which case that responsibility is passed on to them. This is the most regulated sector of the transport industry, and responsibility is very much in the CAA’s remit. Indeed, they have six operatives working in the North sea to ensure that there is full compliance and that the standards of aircrew are maintained.
Q152 Chair: Would you see it as your responsibility to ask what has happened to recommendations on safety? We have had a session this afternoon and we heard accounts, sometimes long ones, of the whole process involved in looking at safety recommendations, whether it be the CAA, EASA or relationships between the two, but there does not seem to be any very clear vision of somebody being responsible for seeing what happens to a specific recommendation, particularly when it has been accepted as a reasonable one. It seems to get lost somewhere in the sea of time. Would you see it as your responsibility to follow that up, or would you just leave it to the CAA?
Mr Goodwill: There are a number of recommendations, particularly about the buoyancy of aircraft, the ease of escape from aircraft that have ditched and the type of rebreathing equipment or oxygen equipment that can be provided to people in the helicopter, as well as the training that passengers receive before they fly out to the North sea. I have heard criticism that when they do the training exercise they are sitting near the window and they know how to get out, but if they are in the middle of the aircraft it is much more difficult. It is the case, sadly, that in the most recent accident, in August 2013, as the aircraft landed in the sea on its approach to Sumburgh, the fatalities occurred in the water or inside the cabin; they were not as a direct result of the crash. If there are any suggestions that the recommendations made were not being fully taken forward, as Minister I would be bringing together the interested parties to ensure that we did what we could to make sure safety was not compromised. In that regard, we need to rely on the expert advice of the CAA, who are experienced in these things, and also talk to the trade unions who represent the operatives who fly in the helicopters, and who may have anxiety about some of the safety procedures and requirements and bring those through their union reps.
Q153 Karen Lumley: Minister, are you confident that enough is being done to reassure our oil and gas workers that the helicopter fleet is safe?
Mr Goodwill: Having flown out to a North sea rig on a helicopter myself, it is quite an anxious flight compared with some of the normal aviation one could do, so I can understand people being anxious, particularly reading about the accidents that have happened. We need to make sure that people’s concerns are addressed. In terms of the passengers themselves, the concerns are about the ability to escape from the aircraft, the flotation of the aircraft and the facilities available to allow people to survive as they are escaping. If I felt that the recommendations that came forward were not adequate, I would be asking some serious questions of the CAA, and I would expect Members of Parliament, not least this Committee, to be raising serious questions with myself and the Secretary of State. There is no way we can compromise safety, and if recommendations are made, we need to make sure we act on them.
Q154 Karen Lumley: If Scotland votes for independence later this year, what will happen to the regulation of the oil industry in Scotland?
Mr Goodwill: I suspect that, in the interim, the CAA would carry out their role before the Scots set up their own equivalent of the CAA. I would be very surprised if they could set up one as good as our CAA. Presumably, at some point they would have to try to rejoin the European Union and become a member of EASA as well, but we are speculating. In the unlikely situation that Scotland were to make the big mistake of voting for independence and there was a request for help from the new Scottish Administration, I would certainly feel it was our responsibility to extend the services of the CAA in the interim, not least because some of my constituents from Whitby work in the North sea oil industry and would need to be equally confident that they were being protected.
Q155 Graham Stringer: In the previous session we failed to get a good explanation as to why safety was improving with Norwegian helicopters and our safety record was getting worse. Does the Department have a view on why those statistics are going in opposite directions?
Mr Goodwill: I have thought long and hard about this. I know you have just had evidence that there were no specific issues that may have impinged upon the difference. Mention was made of whistleblowing and the opportunity for people to report instances. That is something the CAA are working on, to ensure people can feed in anything, so if somebody working on a gearbox maintenance contract was not happy with something they could feed that into the CAA. The Norwegians certainly have a review procedure that we would seek to emulate, which was the other point.
Given that the aircraft are, by and large, the same, and that many of the people flying them are Brits, or people with similar training, I suspect that some of it just comes down to statistical probability. You may recall that in London we had six cyclists killed in 10 days—a very short time—last year, but the total number of fatalities in London over the whole year was the same. I am inclined to think there is a degree of statistical effect; these are very unusual instances and you can get glitches, but if there is anything the Committee can glean from the way the Norwegian authorities approach this, I look forward to reading the report. As I understand it, and I have asked these questions, there is nothing specific that the Norwegians do that we do in terms of the aircraft they fly, the personnel and the conditions they fly in that would indicate a reason for the difference in the level of instances that have occurred.
Q156 Graham Stringer: We will do our best of course, but do you think there should be a full public inquiry, as the trade unions and many of the relatives want?
Mr Goodwill: No, and there are a number of good reasons for that. The first reason is that, having read the full report of the fatal accident inquiry regarding the accident in 2009 with the Super Puma when 16 people lost their lives, I am not sure what, if anything, any public inquiry could add to the degree of technical and engineering evidence and the report. I believe we have a very good system of air accident investigation. Looking at these accidents, there is no common thread. Some of the accidents were due to mechanical failure, some were due to lightning, and some were due to operational issues in terms of very poor flying conditions, and planes colliding with the sea or other objects. I do not think there is any common theme.
It is all very well to call for public inquiries, but in my experience a public inquiry is the best way to delay things, the best way to make sure nothing happens quickly and the best way to spend an awful lot of money without finding out an awful lot more. I would reject a public inquiry. Politicians often say, “We must have a public inquiry,” but looking back on previous public inquiries, they have often meant big delays in getting something done. If we have lessons to learn, there is nothing more important than that we look quickly at the specific accident on its own to see what lessons can be learned and what action needs to be taken. I do not believe that a public inquiry would be the right way forward.
Q157 Martin Vickers: We heard earlier from CAA representatives. When questioned about financial pressures on the organisation, it was reassuring that they said front-line staff would not be affected, but, as we all know, front-line staff need back-room support. are you 100% reassured that the CAA can operate fully with 120 fewer staff?
Mr Goodwill: I am certainly not 100% reassured, because part of my job is to keep asking the question, “Are you still able to do your job with the resources you are given?” What they say is reassuring. I heard the points they made with regard to some of the licensing procedures, which have been more automated, and some of the back-room savings they can make. I am reassured by the fact that they made the point that there will be no reduction in the number of front-line staff operating in the North sea as pilots monitoring the situation. I was pleased to hear what they said—they took the view that it would not impinge on their front-line operations—but I will continue to ask the questions you would wish me to ask to ensure there is no reduction or dilution in the work they do.
Q158 Martin Vickers: That is reassuring, but it poses the question: why did the CAA take on those 120 staff in the first place if it is a well-managed organisation? Those people did not just appear; they must have been there to do a particular function. Are you wholly satisfied that one particular aspect of the work will not suffer?
Mr Goodwill: Tricia was around then, so she might be able to assist.
Tricia Hayes: The nature of the task evolves, and admin functions have changed with new technology. You always need to reconfigure what the back-room tasks look like and how many people you need to do them.
If you wouldn’t mind, this may be an opportunity to build on what the Minister said about how the Department works with the CAA in practice and our ability to influence the CAA. It is important to be clear that the CAA has independence as a statutory authority with an accountable board, but the chair of the board and non-execs are appointed by Ministers. We have a joint safety strategy board where we can make sure that the CAA’s safety performance continues to improve and is being effective in tackling what the data tell us are the most important risks. We have some real machinery that we can use to hold the CAA to account on what it is doing to manage those risks.
Mr Goodwill: As does this Committee.
Q159 Martin Vickers: Following on from that, you heard my question to the previous panel about the way the various agencies work together. Minister, are you wholly satisfied that the structure is right and that no improvements could be made?
Mr Goodwill: The way EASA operates is probably still evolving to an extent. Patrick Ky, whom I met, is very keen to ensure that his organisation continues to work to build the sort of reputation that the CAA already has. I do not think it is quite there yet, but given that they now seem to have key personnel in place who would subscribe to that culture, and as the relationship between the various CAAs around the European Union and EASA evolves, I have no reason to believe that it should not be moving in the right direction. The CAA is in a position to take action if it needs to, so we would not be in a situation where we would be held back by EASA.
In terms of the certification of aircraft, it would be pointless to have duplication of effort. Like you, Mr Vickers, I have very grave reservations about some aspects of the European Union, but I think that working to ensure aircraft are properly licensed and that their safety is maintained is probably something we can do better together than as individual member states.
Chloe Smith: Minister, thank you very much for coming here today. One thing we have all picked up is that clearly safety comes first. Our previous panel of witnesses were very emphatic on that point. Could you give us your view on how new regulation—new law—that may arise from the CAA’s report and sit upon industry, should be balanced with industry’s arguments in turn? My question is about regional balance; there are different aspects.
Chair: We need to adjourn. We will be back in 10 minutes.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
On resuming—
Q160 Chloe Smith: I will summarise my question extremely quickly. New regulation naturally requires a dialogue with industry. As Minister, no doubt the balancing act of that will fall in part to you, to help mediate it. Could you tell us a little about how you think you would go about that in the light of the new regulation that the CAA proposes? Do you think there may be any regional sensitivities, considering some of the differences in the offshore industry in different parts of the UKCS?
Mr Goodwill: We have been concentrating on problems in Scotland, but I am aware that the southern North sea has gas fields, not far away from the hon. Lady’s constituency. There always has to be a balance between safety and practicality. That is not to say that we should compromise safety. For example, you could make a proposal that you would carry two fewer passengers in each aircraft so that more people are sitting near a window. That would make it safer, but you would have to have more flights, which would increase risk. It has been said that the slightly larger offshore workers have more difficulty getting out of the aircraft. You could suggest that anyone over a certain weight or body mass index should not be allowed to work in the North sea. That is not a road we will be going down, but it illustrates how you always have to make a certain compromise in terms of regulation and safety.
In any branch of the transport industry, there will always be pressures in terms of customers, whether that be somebody wanting to buy a low-cost EasyJet ticket to Malaga or an oil company commissioning services to fly out to the North sea. We should be aware that there will always be commercial pressures, but they should not be allowed to compromise safety, which is why we have regulation. The risks may be slightly different in the less stormy seas further south, but we need to make sure that the regulations are fully fit for purpose so that no one could even dream of cutting a corner for financial reasons. Any recommendations that come forward to the CAA that balance practicality and safety are ones we should look at and implement, if at all necessary.
Tricia Hayes: There is a fantastic situation where either you or the safety regulator can have a dialogue with an industry, which enables you to achieve the same safety outcome but in a different way. I think Mark Swan’s evidence is clear that the CAA is very open to having those kinds of conversations. The important thing is that the safety outcome is realised. There is a common interest in realising the safety outcome as cost-effectively as possible, and a serious conversation with the industry can help you get there.
Mr Goodwill: One example where safety has been improved is in relation to weather out at the rig. It used to be the case that the person who was going to be picked up would communicate with the shore and say, “Come and pick us up. It’s not too stormy out here; the wind isn’t blowing too hard.” Now we have automated weather stations on the rigs, so nobody who wants to get home and spend the weekend with their wife and kids can be slightly economical with the weather forecast. Simple things like that—it is pretty obvious that that could happen—can be addressed. We already have suggestions about better lighting of decks on production platforms and exploration rigs, and research into better non-slip aluminium surfaces. Practical things that can be done are the sorts of things we should be implementing as well.
Q161 Chair: We have heard concerns that powerful oil and gas companies exert pressure on helicopter operators to reduce their costs, and that could mean cutting corners. Is that something you are aware of, or that you have ever looked at?
Mr Goodwill: I am aware that claims have been made by a number of groups, including those representing workers. It is a risk we should be aware of, because any powerful organisation that is trying to procure services in a cost-effective way will try to drive down price. That should not be allowed to be done at the expense of safety; indeed, that is why we have regulation and why the CAA has people out there. Having said that, I think the portrayal of the oil and gas industry as people who are prepared to cut a corner to save a bob is completely unfounded. Since the Piper Alpha disaster, the safety culture in the North sea has improved by leaps and bounds for very good reasons. Therefore, talking to the oil and gas companies and exploration companies, they do not see safety as something they grudgingly pay for. They realise that there is only one thing more expensive than having good health and safety, and that’s having an accident, which is the last thing they want. The same goes for the operators themselves. They do not want their planes to fall out of the sky and be written off; they do not want their personnel killed or injured in accidents. While there is an image out there that evil oil and gas people are trying to drive down price and drive down safety, I do not have evidence that that is the actuality. If I did, I would certainly be keen to ensure that the CAA took action to stamp on it.
Q162 Chair: Has the Department ever looked for evidence in that area?
Mr Goodwill: The CAA will monitor maintenance schedules, flying hours and whether aircraft have flown in unsuitable conditions. If that was happening, they would be the symptoms; you would see corners being cut on maintenance schedules, and other measures being taken by companies to save cost. When one looks at the accident reports, while the one on 1 April 2009 had some aspects of maintenance that were of concern, there was no indication that that was endemic within the company. There were mistakes made, allegedly, by those maintaining the vehicles and, in some cases, things should not have happened, and unfortunately the resultant failure of the gearbox was the outcome.
Tricia Hayes: Another important element in this is the ability of people who have concerns to communicate them confidentially. One thing that the UK has led the way on has been creating a reporting mechanism that requires mandatory reporting of safety concerns in a way that allows it to be confidential and anonymous. If there is a situation where somebody feels they are being put under pressure through contractual terms, or through what is happening on the ground, they can get that information to the regulator in a way that is safe for them. We are delighted that there is going to be a new system of occurrence reporting across the whole of Europe, which will build on the model in the UK.
Chair: Thank you very much.
Oral evidence: Offshore helicopter safety, HC 992 21