Joint Committee on the Draft Conversion Practices Bill
Uncorrected oral evidence: Draft Conversion Practices Bill, HC 741
Thursday 19 November 2026
11.20 am
Members present: Olivia Bailey; Danny Beales; Baroness Brown of Silvertown; Baroness Browning; Marie Goldman; Lord Hope of Craighead; Lord Isaac; Baroness Prentis of Banbury; Lord Scriven; Naz Shah.
In the absence of the Chair, Lord Hope of Craighead took the Chair.
Evidence Session No. 5 Heard in Public Questions 188 - 248
Witnesses
I: Des Johnson, Chair of Trustees, FFLAG; Shabana Jaffar, Head of Legal, CAFCASS; Sarah Branson, Member, Family Law Bar Association; Matilda Gosling.
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Witnesses: Des Johnson, Shabana Jaffar, Sarah Branson and Matilda Gosling
The Committee is dealing with highly sensitive matters and we appreciate that this can be a challenging area, especially for our witnesses. We very much appreciate the concerns you have expressed in writing and which we look forward to developing in our questions this morning. I ask the witnesses to introduce themselves.
Sarah Branson: I am Sarah Branson and I am a senior junior family law barrister. I have been practising in this field for over 25 years. I specialise in the law concerning children. Most of my practice involves care proceedings, which is where the state intervenes to protect children. I am also an elected representative on the national committee of the Family Law Bar Association; I think the invitation for someone to attend the Committee came through that.
I am not here to speak in favour of or against the Bill. The Family Law Bar Association is clear that that is a policy consideration for you, but we will try to help whenever we can to bring a perspective from the family law jurisdiction about how it might work and what we understand. I will do my best to help.
Des Johnson: Hi, everybody. I am Des Johnson. I am the chair of FFLAG. We are the longest-established UK charity that works specifically with parents, carers and families of LGBT+ people. We have been working in this space for 61 years. Our first president founded Parents Enquiry in 1965, when it was still illegal to be gay—thankfully, no longer the case. Every year, we support something like 500 parents, carers and families with direct peer-to-peer support. We have thousands more who access our resources online. I am also a very proud dad to two gay sons, which gives me a little bit of lived experience in the space as well.
Chair: Thank you for the paper you have put before us. We look forward to studying it with care. Matilda Gosling?
Matilda Gosling: I am Matilda Gosling. I am an independent social researcher. Of relevance to the session this morning, I have written two books: “Evidence-Based Parenting” and “Teenagers: The Evidence Base”. In the background work to those, I did a lot of synthesis of the evidence on teenagers and gender identity. I have done quite a few research projects looking at issues of sexual orientation and gender identity. Former clients include Stonewall and The Lesbian Project. I have also recently conducted a piece of research on behalf of Sex Matters with 30 mental health professionals on the effects of the draft Conversion Practices Bill.
Sarah Branson: That is an interesting question, because the language in the Bill—particularly in the schedule to the Bill, which would be the area of law that would impact on my jurisdiction, because those orders could be made within the family law setting—is not language that I recognise as a family lawyer.
We have a very clear and well-defined definition within my jurisdiction regarding circumstances in which the state can intervene in the lives of families. You may know about the threshold criteria contained in section 31 of the Children Act 1989, where a state can only intervene in a family if the court is satisfied that there is a likelihood or evidence of significant harm that is attributable to the care being provided by the parent, that not being reasonable to expect a parent to provide.
We are very familiar with terms such as “significant harm”. That is not the language of this Act, and therefore I am not clear whether it is the intention of Parliament in drafting this Act that there would be a different test for intervention in family life if the issue of conversion practices is engaged or whether it is drafting that is meant to replicate “significant harm”, but that is not what it says. When you are asking about whether I think the definitions are sufficiently clear, I have to say, as a family lawyer, they are not. I do not know whether the test is less or more than evidence of “significant harm”. Of course, we do have similar sorts of orders that already exist within the family court arena, and I will come on to talk about those if you wish.
Des Johnson: There are four specific areas where we would request changes. I will come to those in a minute. What I would like to say initially is that FFLAG and I believe the Bill is very welcome. It tackles a very specific form of abuse that is not covered elsewhere under current legislation. It brings us in line with a growing list of jurisdictions around the world, and it responds directly to calls from both the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and from the Council of Europe, and therefore it is long overdue, in our opinion.
We welcome that it offers protection on the basis of both sexual orientation and gender identity. We are well aware they are different, but they are both equally worthy of protection from abuse and harm, in our opinion. We like the fact that, as we understand the wording, it also includes those people with no sexual orientation—asexual—as well as those with no particular gender identity—in other words, agender.
We know that these abusive conversion practices happen. I think you have seen evidence. Of the 108,000 respondents to the 2018 national LGBT survey, which is the most authoritative source that we seem to have available, 2% had undergone conversion practices. That rises to 4% for trans people, and that has been confirmed by more recent research from both Galop and YouGov on behalf of Stonewall.
Chair: Do you have figures for the third category?
Des Johnson: What is the third category?
Chair: You have dealt with people who are gay, if I can put it that way, and you deal with the transgender changing people, but the third category is those who say they have no gender either way.
Des Johnson: We do not have reliable data on those people, but we know from our work with families that they exist.
Chair: They do exist, but you do not have figures.
Des Johnson: No.
It is helpful to set out the context of where the compulsion to change somebody else’s sexual orientation and gender comes from, because I think that helps understand the root cause of this abuse. It appears to come from two, in our opinion, false beliefs. The first is that these are matters of choice, and the second is that they are wrong—that somehow you are less than and that you are a less valuable part of society if you have a sexual orientation or gender identity that is different from what that person believes you should have. We know our children. We know that they know who they are, and we know that they are not broken and they do not need to be fixed.
In summary, we welcome this Bill because it protects all LGBT people from this form of abuse, and it sends a very clear and unambiguous message from the state that my kids and all the LGBT+ kids of the parents that we work with are not broken, they do not need to be fixed and anybody that believes that they do and forcibly tries to change them rightly risks criminal sanction.
I will be very brief on the specifics of the definitions. There are four that we would change. In clause 1(2), we think you should add suppression. Suppression is just as harmful as change, and there are a growing number of jurisdictions that include that, including France, Canada, Norway and New Zealand. Clause 1(3) deals with healthcare professionals. We are very comfortable that there is a healthcare exemption, but it needs to be limited in scope to professionals who are regulated by a statutory regulatory body or listed on a register held by an organisation accredited by the Professional Standards Authority. Otherwise, anybody could claim that healthcare exemption, and we do not believe that is the intent of the Bill.
In clause 1(4), we request that you consider rewording the term “abusive conversion practice”. In our opinion, all conversion practices are abuse and are abusive, but not all of them will meet the threshold of abuse laid out in the Bill. The long form of that would be something like “conversion practices that meet the threshold for criminality”. Maybe you can call them “criminally abusive conversion practices” to add an extra distinction, because all conversion practice is abuse, as defined in the Bill.
Finally, in clause 2(1), we ask you to add “or is likely to cause” alongside the definitions for serious harm, serious alarm and distress. By the time that a potential offender reaches that point, you have clearly already established conduct that is a conversion practice and meets a threshold of abuse. Therefore, at that point, we believe that courts and the police should be capable of determining whether something is likely to cause harm. You already use the test of “likely to cause” harm elsewhere in the draft Bill—in clause 3, as it relates to overseas, and later, as it relates to protection orders.
Chair: Thank you very much.
Matilda Gosling: I am concerned about the definitions of abusive conversion practices as they relate to gender identity specifically, and particularly in the context of children and young people. An equivalence is assumed within the Bill between sexual orientation and gender identity, whereas gender identity brings risks of long-term physical and mental health effects through a medicalisation pathway. The Bill also overlooks the relevance of social context, trauma and reasons other than an innate, immutable identity, for which somebody might identify as transgender. I can perhaps talk a bit more about data on, for example, the proportion who have experienced prior sexual abuse, and the over-representation of looked-after children within young people who identify as transgender.
The Bill potentially makes an abusive conversion practice of helping children and young people feel comfort in their body, or helping them feel that they do not have to conform to stereotypes. I am sure the panel is already aware that data from the former Gender Identity Development Service shows that the vast majority of adolescents who were referred to the service were same-sex attracted—either lesbian, gay or bisexual.
There is a risk of potentially targeting those young people and making them feel as though there is something wrong with their same-sex attraction if they are gender non-conforming. There is a link in the research between childhood gender non-conformity and later same-sex attraction. There is also a risk that parents and other responsible adults will not be able to have open conversations that help people feel comfortable with their gender non-conformity, their same-sex attraction and so on.
There is also a problem with the definitions, in that the Bill does not distinguish between adults and children. Some of the terms in the definitions seem much more appropriate to adults than to children. For example, “psychological or emotional pressure” has not been defined. It would be very difficult to separate ordinary parenting from that. Any parent will be aware that psychological or emotional pressure is part and parcel of family life. Parents make mistakes. Sometimes it is not always appropriate, and sometimes it is appropriate, and pressure needs to be used to support children’s long-term wellbeing and development.
On the definition of transgender identity, and particularly the point about transsexualism and not identifying solely as male or female, or not as male or female, those seem to be quite adult concepts. A child who identifies as not male or female potentially encapsulates ongoing changes in identity. Anyone who has spent time with a small child knows that they regularly identify as strange objects. Obviously, that would not be the intention of the Bill, but because the definitions have been so widely drawn, it could potentially draw in those examples.
Matilda Gosling: Sexual orientation is measurable by behaviour, attraction and identity, whereas transgender identity is only about a sense of who you are, for which you cannot have an objective measure. It relies entirely on self-report. Sex—as in biological, binary sex—is measurable and immutable, whereas identity is constantly shifting. You cannot say for certain whether, for example, a 13-year-old who might identify as the opposite sex has an ongoing state of gender identity that harm would be baked into, if people were to have conversations about that identity.
Chair: I interrupted you. Danny Beales, do you want to ask your question?
Danny Beales: I do not know whether the witness wants to finish what she was saying. My question is on this point, but I am happy to come back later.
Matilda Gosling: It was just the point about “serious alarm or distress”, which I think most teenagers feel from time to time over very many issues. It would be very difficult to draw that out in a way that would enable criminalisation of parents and other interested adults.
Matilda Gosling: I mean that it can potentially be a factor in their transgender identification, which may then need further unpacking and exploration. For example, if you look at the proportion of children referred to GIDS who were looked-after children, they are over-represented in trans-identifying adolescence by a factor of eight.
Matilda Gosling: With respect, I don’t think that is relevant if you are looking at adolescence, in particular. You might be referring to a lot of the research for young adults and into adulthood, but if you are looking at adolescent populations—
Matilda Gosling: I am not aware of any research that shows that experience of care would be over-represented in people who are lesbian, gay and bisexual. I may be wrong, but I am not aware of any research that shows that.
Matilda Gosling: I absolutely agree that they should have support and ongoing conversation, but I think the risk is that the definition of “conversion practices” in the Bill is so widely drawn that it encapsulates ordinary parenting and ordinary conversation, as well as help with some of those wider issues that might be experienced.
There is also the point that, prior to social transition becoming common, the vast majority of children who identified as trans in the past desisted. Studies vary, but around about 70% seemed to have desisted before social transition was common. In more recent times, since the advent of social transition being more common, the proportion desisting is much lower, and that suggests that social transition contributes to a more concrete identity, which can then lead into future medicalisation. A medical pathway might cover, although I am less—
Matilda Gosling: Because if you are making a conversion practice out of, for example, a conversation that a mother might have with a 13-year-old girl who identifies as a boy, and you make it illegal for that mother to help that child feel comfortable in her body, you are effectively embedding a social transition pathway in law, which potentially leads to a more concrete identity, which potentially leads to—
Matilda Gosling: The research that I did for the Lesbian Project suggested that sexual orientation is defined across three different axes: attraction, behaviour and identity. You can draw out measures, and if you look at—
Matilda Gosling: How would you define it on the basis of behaviour in a way that does not revert to stereotypes?
Matilda Gosling: No, because in the Bill, I think it is defined as per the Equality Act definition.
Matilda Gosling: I think it is very clear that sexual orientation is a mostly stable construct that lasts throughout life and that you can measure across those three axes, whereas a subjective state of identity is not.
Danny Beales: We will agree to disagree. I think people’s understanding of sexual orientation develops. Fundamentally, sexual orientation and trans identity are both identities, but I will hand back to the Chair.
Shabana Jaffar: Thank you; I apologise for being late. My name is Shabana Jaffar. I am head of legal at CAFCASS, the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service.
Chair: Thank you very much. Before I come to Baroness Prentis, Olivia Bailey was going to ask a question; do you have a question, or can I move on?
Olivia Bailey: Danny has asked it for me, Chair.
Sarah Branson: I have seen that the Act does not define “abusive”. “Abusive” is doing quite a lot of heavy lifting, but it is not clearly defined, I would say.
Sarah Branson: I cannot speak about criminal law, because I practise only in family law. We have very clearly defined terms in the Children Act that we use, such as “significant harm”. There is a body of case law that establishes what “significant harm” means. When you are looking at the word “abusive”, with the Act as defined, you would have to have a body of case law that established what that meant. We as lawyers say, “What did Parliament intend?” Well, it looks as if Parliament intended for someone else to define what “abusive” means. If the language was more in line with the language that we use in the family courts—not “abusive”, but “conduct that causes or is likely to cause significant harm”—we would very much be clear about what was meant.
Baroness Prentis of Banbury: Would you agree, Shabana?
Shabana Jaffar: Absolutely, yes. One of the points I was going to raise is that the terminology and the definition are very unfamiliar to family practitioners because we are used to working within certain terms and thresholds that local authorities use, for example, to initiate child protection processes even prior to initiating court proceedings. They are very well known and familiar, whereas the definitions here are quite wide in some aspects and subject to interpretation, which is not what we are used to. We are used to working within defined parameters.
Let us say parents subject their 14-year-old gay son to repeated deliverance sessions, sleep deprivation and isolation from friends. Would that be a criminal act? At the moment, would family law deal with that?
Sarah Branson: Yes. That would constitute, in my view, significant harm attributable to the care provided by the parents—that certainly not being what is reasonable to expect a parent to give. That would therefore trigger the court to have jurisdiction to make care orders, which could remove that child, or supervision orders to advise that a system befriend the family.
It would not give the local authority the ability to apply for protective orders, which are contained within the schedule to the Act because, at the moment, local authorities are not able to apply for non-molestation orders, prohibited steps orders or any section 8 orders. Care and supervision orders are the range of powers available to the court. That would fall under the category of significant harm and therefore give jurisdiction to the court to intervene.
Sarah Branson: That is an interesting one. I have spent quite a lot of time looking at case law and the way that the courts have approached it. There is very little to help us. What we do not have within the existing family law framework are injunctions to prevent certain practices. A local authority has the ability to intervene and remove the child into foster care, if the test for significant harm or the likelihood of significant harm is met, or to support them through supervision orders.
If the policy decision that those practices need to be outlawed is made, there is a gap around the preventative order that we see in the schedule to the Act. I do not believe that exists, but we do have the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court steps in when there is no legislation, like in deprivation of liberty cases. Parliament has not legislated on that yet—maybe you can help us out with that—but the High Court does intervene and uses its inherent jurisdiction to prevent significant harm.
I have not seen any examples of that. I have found two quite interesting High Court cases. They are different on the facts. Injunctions could theoretically be made, but Parliament has not told the courts what to do, and since we are engaged in this process, we can say there is a gap there.
Sarah Branson: I think that that might be what is happening in the schedule to the Bill where you are looking at family courts making injunctions—let us call them that, to use language that non-lawyers can understand—based on language that is firmly grounded in the criminal jurisdiction.
I will not talk about the criminal law aspects of the Bill, because they are outside my expertise. But if you are asking the family court to make conversion practice protection orders—I do not know whether the intention is that magistrates would deal with these orders—you are asking the court to do a lot of heavy lifting in the factual determination about what constitutes abuse.
Sarah Branson: I am not a draftsman, but—
Lord Isaac: I know you cannot comment on criminal law, but just on the philosophical approach.
Sarah Branson: It seems to me that if you want the family court to be engaged with making orders that protect children from a type of harm that you have identified on a policy basis, I really do not understand why you do not say, in the schedule or elsewhere in the Bill, that the family court has the power to make these orders. The test might be conversion practices that cause or are likely to cause significant harm. It is so simple.
Sarah Branson: Exactly. If you want the family courts to make orders, I suggest you have something in the Bill that says, “Within the family court, this is the test,” because we have a really good system of understanding what significant harm is. Since 1989, you have this body of case law. Magistrates and local authorities deal with it, so use that language. Say that this has to be referable to “significant harm”, and then we will all know what we are dealing with.
Naz Shah: We have heard about the possibility of vexatious complaints. Can you talk us through the potential consequences of a parent or teacher, etc, being investigated over a safeguarding concern, even if they are not ultimately convicted?
Chair: Who was that question put to? Matilda Gosling, would you like to answer it?
Matilda Gosling: Okay. If a vexatious complaint were made, my understanding is that a conversion practice protection order allows anyone with the court’s leave to make such a complaint. That could be a teacher, it could be somebody from an activist organisation, it could be a grandparent, or in the case of family breakdown, it could be parents trying to place protection orders against other parents.
I think there is a risk on several fronts. One is obviously the high-level risk that a parent loses contact with their child, but I think that there is a chilling effect within the family as well, on two fronts. One is that a parent will self-censor—again, I am talking about gender identity specifically. If you have a teenager who identifies as transgender, it removes a whole swathe of conversation that is possible within the home, and if you have a parent who is self-censoring that is very difficult. On the second front, a child could potentially threaten a parent into complying with a particular framing of the world from the child’s perspective.
If you look at the research on effective parenting, authoritative parenting, which is a version of parenting that combines high warmth with high boundaries and limits, and in which the parent’s authority is absolutely central, that is vital to positive outcomes. There are multiple meta-analyses showing that there are best outcomes for adolescents and younger children if you have those boundaries combined with warmth. Those are in mental and physical health, the tendency to get involved in risky behaviour, and all sorts of other areas. If you remove the parent’s authority in this one area, that potentially leaves the child at risk because they do not have those healthy limits set around them. It creates friction between parents and children, and it makes things a lot worse for the child as well as for the parent.
Chair: Can I go across the panel for any comments?
Shabana Jaffar: Yes. I think that was one of the most striking things about looking at the way the Bill is drafted. I agree with what Matilda said about this inhibiting of parental discussions, particularly when parents have separated, which are the cases that we deal with. The natural discussions that would take place within families could potentially be prohibited or controlled in some way because parents are worried about falling within the definition of exerting unreasonable controls over the views their children may be expressing.
Sarah Branson: It seems to me that there is a lot of concern about unintended consequences, and that is what everyone is worried about. If it is not the intention of Parliament for open-ended conversations involving exploration or, in the case of social workers, assessment or advice where the purpose is to help the person understand their experiences with no particular conclusion about their identity, then why does the Bill not say that? In the definition of conversion practices, why do you not just say, “This is not intended to prohibit open-ended exploration, assessment and advice”. It is fixable, isn’t it? It is about how it is drafted. I have heard so many debates about, “What is intended by that,” and, “That is not intended,” so just make it clearer.
Sarah Branson: I do.
Sarah Branson: No, no, no. Well, there are two ways to approach that. I can be a lawyer, and I can go to specific words and say, “How do you interpret what is ‘serious harm or distress to an individual that has a substantial adverse effect’?”
Sarah Branson: Yes. But we are talking about social workers who are worried about breaking the law having a conversation with a child in care, who has been sexually abused, about their identity. The chilling effect is about unintended consequences, and it does not matter whether we as lawyers can drill down and say, “Well, actually no, because you’ve got these three hurdles.” If the effect on the individual is that they feel like they cannot do their job, then make it clearer.
Chair: Des Johnson, please come in. I have various people wanting to put questions, so I will try to bring people in in some sort of order, but go ahead.
Des Johnson: I will try to be very brief. I just want to centre us back on the heart of this Bill, which is the definition of a conversion practice. It says that it is the “conduct carried out by a person towards an individual with the intention of”—distress is the final test of three. Distress, by the way, is “serious alarm or distress to the individual which has a substantial adverse effect on their usual day-to-day activities.” This is not normal backwards and forwards between parents and their children.
There is nothing in this Bill, in our opinion, that should have a chilling effect on messy, cautious parenting. Parenting LGBT+ young people is complicated—being a parent is complicated, but being the parent of an LGBT+ person is even more complicated. This Bill specifically seeks to address a compulsion—an extreme reaction—in a minority of parents who feel compelled to change the sexual orientation or gender identity of their child. This is not about a restriction on messy, complicated, distressing conversations. I have heard arguments that say these offences are covered under existing law. If that is the case, then vexatious claims are already happening and there should be no increase.
I also encourage the Committee to seek evidence from jurisdictions that already have comprehensive, trans-inclusive conversion practices bans and ask those jurisdictions for evidence on whether they have seen a spike in vexatious claims against parents, religious figures or therapists. I have had a look and I can find zero evidence that that is the case. Honestly, it feels to me like it is scaremongering. I would really encourage us to centre our thinking on the victims, not on trying to protect the rights of potential perpetrators of abuse.
Chair: Can I mention we have 45 minutes left before we have to finish? I am going to ask Naz Shah whether she is satisfied that the question she wanted to be put is complete before I move on. Is there anything else you want to say, Naz Shah?
Matilda Gosling: May I come in on that first question?
Chair: I think Shabana comes in first, and then I will come back to you. Shabana.
Shabana Jaffar: Thank you. To that question about the likelihood of a child being removed, that would be a decision made by the local authority, which may or may not have been involved with the child and the family. But in order for a case to come before the family court, you would expect that the local authority would have done some pre-proceedings investigations about risk. Perhaps if they were notified that a parent had been accused of this, that would then start the child protection inquiry, and if they were satisfied that that risk existed and that there was a risk to the child remaining in that household, they would apply in the usual way for a protective order for that child, either for them to oversee the child’s placement at home by making an interim care order and allowing the local authority to exercise parental responsibility over that child, or by removing that child into a foster care placement while proceedings were ongoing and the level of risk was established. I cannot give a definitive answer. It would much depend on the local authority’s risk assessment—and the court’s view, of course, when the case came before the family court.
Chair: Matilda Gosling, you were going to say something. Can you be fairly short, please, because various people wish to speak.
Matilda Gosling: Yes, of course. In terms of the legitimacy of a parent wanting a child to feel comfortable in their sex body and perhaps not have a given transgender identity, I think we need to come back to the potential for that child to enter a long-term medical pathway. The data on this, as you will be aware from the evidence provided by Dr Hilary Cass on Monday, is incredibly weak in terms of positive benefits. There is quite a lot of data to suggest that there are long-term harms, and it is under the auspices of parents to be able to say they want to make decisions that are in the best long-term interests of their child.
If you look at recent Finnish data that was based on a nationwide cohort study of everybody that went through gender services, the psychiatric morbidity of adolescents who went through medical gender reassignment increased in natal females from 22% to 55%, and sixfold in natal males, from 10% to 61%. There is no real evidence of positive mental health benefits, certainly not higher than the placebo effect, if you look at shorter-term studies. So I think it is reasonable and right for parents to be able to balance those long-term risks with a short-term identity that may or may not be long lasting.
Chair: Olivia Bailey, you have been very patient.
One of the things we have heard in evidence is that, because they are quite complex in their nature and can often involve multiple harms, there is a challenge with professionals and maybe social workers identifying those harms and recognising the problem. We also have to recognise that it is, as you say, a policy question as to whether or not Parliament wills it to be happening. Do you agree that, without that definition, it could be hard for prosecutions to be made and for professionals to recognise and spot potential abuse?
Sarah Branson: Yes. There are a lot of people who say, “You don’t need this law, because it is already covered by harassment, assault and a range of other offences.” We have some experience of that in the family court, because non-molestation orders govern assault, which is already outlawed. We have female genital mutilation orders, which plainly are criminal offences without the inclusion of the new offence, and we have forced marriage protection orders, which again would probably fit into a different number of offences. I am not a criminal expert, but that is clear.
There is something about naming; if you make the policy decision that these types of practices need to be outlawed, and if you name it, instead of trying to fit it into a number of different offences, then it is clear. It also allows orders to be made. With forced marriage and female genital mutilation, the inclusion of a separate Act that outlawed something that was already outlawed allowed the court to make orders that are preventative in nature, rather than waiting for the offence to have been committed and then prosecuting. Those are the two reasons why it might be beneficial to name it, if you make that policy decision.
Olivia Bailey: That is really helpful, thank you. Does anybody else want to comment on that? If not, we can go back to the Chair.
Chair: Thank you very much. I will go to Baroness Brown.
Sarah Branson: Dealing with the last point first, there is a Court of Protection case that deals with exactly this point; in fact, it was the other way round: the parents were seeking an injunction under the inherent jurisdiction under the Court of Protection—it was an older young person—to prevent any gender-affirming treatment, but there is no reason why it could not be the reverse. In respect of 16, 17 and 18-year-olds, you can make care and supervision orders until a child is 17. After 17, the High Court has some jurisdiction and you would have the Court of Protection, but in more limited circumstances.
Turning to the other point, I have spent quite a lot of time looking at whether there are reported cases on this specific point, and it is difficult to find any. We have very clear concepts of emotional harm, and these sorts of things would fall under the category of emotional harm if they crossed a threshold. There was another case that I found where the local authority did seek a care order because the mother was imposing her belief that her son was trans, when there was no evidence that her son was trans. The court in that circumstance made a care order and placed the child with the father. That is a reported case where it has happened.
We are moving towards transparency in the family courts, but not every case is reported. I have had cases, which I do not want to talk about, where these issues have been engaged and the local authority has been engaged. Beyond that, I don’t think I can help. We are moving more and more towards transparency in the open courts, but I cannot say that there is a body of case law where it is dealt with.
Shabana Jaffar: I agree with what Sarah said. In my years of practice, I have never come across a case in which the local authority has found itself unable to exercise the current jurisdiction or to encourage the court to exercise the current jurisdiction that it has to protect a child. I hope that helps.
Baroness Brown of Silvertown: It does. I thank both of you.
Des Johnson: I am happy to go first. In our view, they are. To answer Naz’s question from earlier, we do not believe there is anything in the Bill that compels a parent to affirm or accept their child’s sexual orientation or gender identity. Parents are free to agreeably disagree. They are sadly free to reject and withdraw love and care from children, including young adults, and we see that manifest itself in higher incidences of homelessness and hidden homelessness among LGBT young people. There was a very powerful report by akt last year that talked about 26% of young homeless people, including hidden homeless people, being LGBT. That was even higher for trans young people.
I like and welcome the simplicity of the Bill. The only compulsion in the Bill— “Do not pass go unless you can do this”—is test No. 1: to demonstrate that there is conduct with the intent to change the individual. We would argue for suppression, but you have to pass that first test with that first definition. It is entirely reasonable, and I have heard examples of it before, to say, “Well, you wouldn’t be able to turn down your child.” I fundamentally disagree. A parent could easily turn around and say, “You want funds for a binder?”—I have heard an example quoted before about a binder. If the child says, “I want you to buy me a binder to cope with my gender distress”, it is entirely reasonable for a parent to say, “I am very worried about the health impacts of that. That’s not something that I support. I accept that you are who you tell me you are, but that is not an action that I will willingly support and fund.”
Do not get me wrong: I would wish that that was not the case, but that is not something that gets even close to the thresholds and the definitions within the Bill. I don’t think anybody reasonably would argue that is conduct intended to change. Even if it were, you then have the two additional tests of proven abusive as a matter of fact, followed by “serious harm” or “serious alarm and distress” as effects.
Let me give you a tiny window into what it is like to parent—
Chair: I am sorry, but we only have 30 minutes left, and there is quite a lot of ground still to cover, so please try to keep your answers fairly short.
Des Johnson: This will be very, very short: parenting an LGBT child, whether they are LGB or they are trans-plus, typically involves a number of stages. There is shock and surprise. There is fear—fear about the child and what it will do to their life chances and happiness. There is very often shame: most parents today are living with the scars of the ’80s and ’90s; we are a generation scarred by section 28, which means that we are ill-equipped to deal with the reality of the lives that our young people exhibit, and there is an overwhelming sense of shame associated with that. That is very often followed by a period of grief, because you are losing the life that you imagined your child would have.
Those stages lead to messy, distressing conversations on both sides. In my opinion, from the conversations that we see and have, parental rejection happens in a minority, but probably a significant minority. What we are talking about here is a particular, extreme reaction among a very small minority, which is this compulsion to change.
I would just say that our children are not belongings. They must never be treated as such. These are not a spare room in your house that you can redecorate to suit your tastes; these are human beings with rights in their own regard.
Matilda Gosling: I do not. On the first test, I have already talked about why it might be reasonable for a parent to want to help a 15-year-old girl who has been sexually assaulted and wants to identify out of her body because she no longer feels safe in it, for example, to feel comfortable in her body rather than in a transgender identification, or why they might want to help somebody who is same-sex attracted and gender non-conforming to feel comfortable in their body.
On the second test—the definition of an “abusive” conversion practice—we have this issue of emotional, psychological and financial pressure, which I think falls into the area of normal parenting behaviours. You might have, for example, screen restrictions for safety, or you might talk about the effect on other family members of not following household rules; that could be defined as emotional pressure. You could remove pocket money for staying out late, which is financial pressure. It is not necessarily the right decision to be made in all circumstances. Parents make mistakes—there is messy, human family behaviour—but that should not be criminalised.
On the final test, “serious alarm or distress”, children can feel that over a number of things. I know that there is a reasonably high bar there in terms of it having to have an effect on day-to-day functioning, but teenagers in particular regularly experience things that have a significant effect on their ability to function over short, medium and long-term periods, and that is not necessarily down to the actions that their parents have taken. Again, family life is messy and complicated. You risk making it incredibly difficult for parents and potentially creating divisions between parents and their children through the provisions in this Bill.
Sarah Branson: Just one sentence: if there is a debate about whether it is sufficiently tightly drawn and there is concern about that, it is very easy, in the way that I have already outlined, to put in a definition to say, “It is not intended to cover this.” It is not complicated. It could be a line, and then the debate is gone, and everyone can breathe out and say, “Right, that’s fine.”
Baroness Prentis of Banbury: Shabana, anything to add?
Shabana Jaffar: CAFCASS is not for or against the Bill. We do not have a settled position on this; we are here just to offer a family law perspective. One thing to bear in mind, which might be useful to the Committee, is that, because of the lack of provision of legal aid, we quite often have parents trying to find their way through legal concepts in the family court, and that is a challenge. That is something to bear in mind when drafting.
Shabana Jaffar: Yes, without any access to legal advice and in the midst of a bitter separation. You can imagine a scenario where they have a child who is questioning their identity and the parents do not agree about the approaches that are being taken. That may be perfectly reasonable in their own rights; they may have differing views about how they should approach that subject. The risk is the unintended consequences that we referred to earlier, which are really real. People will, or may, immediately go to the courts to resolve issues that should actually be resolved in a family setting, if the definitions are not very clearly defined and if the parameters are not very clear for laypeople.
Chair: I will bring in Naz Shah and then come to Marie Goldman.
Sarah Branson: So they are at risk, or they are not at risk?
Sarah Branson: The way that the Bill is currently drafted, I think that everyone is debating it, aren’t they? So let’s make it clearer.
Sarah Branson: There are a lot of double negatives in that. I do not—I think maybe—
Des Johnson: Can I try to help? I would bring you back to the wording in the Bill. If not affirming is conduct intended to change, then it might be. If not—
Sarah Branson: I think the Bill needs to be clearer; I think that is all I can say about that.
Des Johnson: Yes.
Des Johnson: Yes. I think that other jurisdictions have a more comprehensive definition that clarifies that the legislation is not intended to capture this, that or the other. It is very, very clear.
The abusive practice here lies in the intent to change and what flows from that. So, I think that anything that helps to clarify that that is what the Bill is targeting would be a helpful thing.
Matilda Gosling: I think that a clarification would be helpful, but I also think that it does not go far enough, because you would still get massive unintended consequences with the wide drafting of the other parts of the Bill, particularly when you are talking about children and young people shifting identities, and the fact that identity formation continues to develop even into adulthood. You would really need to think about whether it is appropriate for these concepts to be applied to children and even to young adults, particularly when we are thinking of gender identity.
It would also require within the legislation a very tight definition that makes it clear what applies to adults, and to consider children’s safeguarding as well, because I think that currently that has not been factored into any parts of the Bill; I am thinking about children’s welfare capacity and their long term wellbeing.
Chair: Marie Goldman, is that the only question you have, or would you like to pursue this matter further?
Marie Goldman: I know that we are going to talk about some of this stuff a bit later if we have time, Chair, or I can move on to those questions now. Which would you prefer?
Chair: Yes. Thank you. Baroness Browning.
Matilda Gosling: Yes.
Matilda Gosling: I think they would, and that is evidence that came out of the research that I did with mental health professionals, too, so it is not just in relation to family situations; it is also to do with therapists and other professionals working in healthcare settings, and presumably other areas of practice as well. That is not only because the risk of criminalisation brings with it more of an intent to raise complaints and potential prosecutions, but also because of a perception that if people are behaving in normal, evidence-based, exploratory ways, they might be practising conversion practices. I think that does increase the risk of vexatious complaints.
You also talked about children, and I have a slightly different but related point. The age of criminal responsibility is 10, so children could be potentially brought into the criminalisation aspect of this Bill. What does that mean for siblings? I have not heard much conversation. Siblings fight desperately—
Baroness Browning: That is what I was thinking about—siblings, yes.
Matilda Gosling: Yes, and how can we protect them from criminalisation under this Bill?
Chair: I will come to Baroness Prentis on the conversion practice protection orders, because you have a number of rather important points to raise there, but Danny Beales, you wanted to raise a point before I get to that.
Danny Beales: Yes, I have questions.
Chair: I am sorry to keep pressing on time, but we have 20 minutes left.
I return to the point about the chilling effect on parental conversations or unintended consequences. I understand that there is existing legislation in Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, 22 US states, New Zealand, Canada, France and other jurisdictions. To what extent has there been a chilling effect? To what extent has good parenting stopped in those countries as a result of this legislation, in your experiences? Why is there a particularly higher risk to parenting in the UK than in these contexts?
Matilda Gosling: I don’t think there is. In the research that I did with mental health professionals, five of the interviews were with clinicians working in jurisdictions that already have conversion practice bans. They were very clear about the chilling effects both in terms of their own work and on parents. They said that parents were finding it very difficult and were no longer really able to practise effective parenting if they had trans-identifying children. It does not just relate to the UK.
Matilda Gosling: It is there in the international case studies as part of the research that I did for Sex Matters, but I am happy to send you a link to that.
Danny Beales: That would be very helpful, thank you.
Matilda Gosling: Australia, particular states within the United States that have conversion practice bans, including California, and Canada.
Matilda Gosling: Yes, and it is a lot wider than that, because people cannot speak openly. They cannot talk about what the research says, and they cannot find other people with whom they can have open, exploratory conversations that look at what the actual evidence says and how they should be practising as professionals, but also obviously relating to parenting. It means that you cannot have effective clinical supervisions. It chills in all sorts of areas—
Matilda Gosling: My particular piece of research focused on clinicians, and parenting was brought up more as a kind of by the by rather than as the key focus of the report, but it was definitely mentioned.
Matilda Gosling: There were cases where parents had been separated from their children even in the absence of prosecutions.
Des Johnson: I have said it before, but I would encourage you to speak to the jurisdictions where the legislation is already in force and ask them for their experiences. I am sad that the UK is relatively late to the party, but one of the unintended benefits of that is that we can learn from the experiences of other jurisdictions that have had this type of legislation for over 10 years. The evidence base will be there to prove or disprove the hypothesis. I do not have it, but I think you can access it.
Lord Isaac: Dr Gosling, can I establish that, from your research, you agree that there have been and continue to be abusive conversion practices?
Matilda Gosling: Just for clarification, I am not a doctor, but thank you. I have not seen evidence of abusive conversion practices, but I am sure they happen. My understanding is that what most of us understand to be abusive conversion practices are already prohibited under existing law.
There are some problems with the research that has been cited along with the Bill. Some of it that looks at the prevalence of conversion practices did not actually define conversion practices, and might include, for example, somebody using sex-based pronouns, as opposed to preferred pronouns. At that point, we do not know how prevalent actual conversion practices are. Again, I am sure they happen. They are entirely wrong and they should not happen, but I am not quite sure where the gap in the law currently is.
Matilda Gosling: Again, I have not seen evidence, but I am sure it happens.
Chair: Can we come back to CP protection orders?
Sarah Branson: I would suggest an amendment to the way that the Bill is currently drafted on this point. There should be a shift in emphasis, because at the moment there is a category of people who can apply, and then “An application may be made by any other person with the leave of the court.”
It would be better framed along the lines of the section 91(14) of the Children Act, which says that no party may bring an application “without leave of the court.” That shifts the emphasis and deals with vexatious claims. It also means the threshold is not higher, but it is also not just a rubber stamp, in which if you ask you can have permission. You have to engage with what the motivation behind this is. That is an important amendment that should be incorporated.
Shabana Jaffar: Yes, I think that is one of the risks with the way that protection orders are drafted and the general landscape of family law and litigants having to find their way through the minefield that is court jurisdiction. It is a real concern that children may be brought into yet another aspect of a parental dispute. That is one of the unintended consequences of the current drafting.
Shabana Jaffar: You could add another provision that says, “and any other provision that the court considers necessary,” because that is always open to the court. As Sarah said, the way things develop in a family jurisdiction is that cases are heard and then guidance is given through caselaw, so the definitions would ultimately be expanded on in that way by the courts—
Sarah Branson: I think we can learn from FGM orders and forced marriage orders.
Sarah Branson: Oh yes, I routinely deal with them. I would say, without any disrespect to magistrates in the family courts, that these sorts of orders are best dealt with by full-time judges. The Bill does not specify. Of course, it may be the subject of subordinate legislation, but I don’t think we can take that risk.
We have a single family court now. When you are talking about the family court, you could be talking about the High court or magistrates. My belief is that this is probably quite complicated, and certain concepts are doing a lot of heavy lifting in interpretation, so they are best dealt with by a full-time judge.
Sarah Branson: Just this insight: before we had female genital mutilation orders, you could only remove children into care if there was a risk of that practice. My experience—this is my experience; it is anecdotal—is that when the extra powers of these preventive orders were introduced, you could often keep children within the family with these orders in place, which mitigated significant harm. If there is a likelihood of significant harm from the parents as a result of these practices, at the moment the blunt instrument is removal or not. I know that there is a lot of talk of these sorts of things ripping families apart but, on the flipside, if you make that policy decision, there might be the ability to keep families together.
Sarah Branson: Prevent the child from being taken abroad and prevent the practices—prevent significant harm from being caused as a result of these practices. I am clear about the language that I am using. Rather than saying, “This child is at risk of emotional harm as a result of these practices,” it is “significant harm”. If the threshold for removal is met, they go into foster care, which of course causes a child significant harm as a result of being separated from their family.
If you have a family who are law-abiding and would comply with orders, that might help to keep families together. That is what we have seen with the availability of female genital mutilation orders. You can use less draconian measures to prevent significant harm.
Baroness Prentis of Banbury: Shabana, I can see that you want to come in.
Shabana Jaffar: I do not disagree with anything that Sarah said. I just want to add that, in my experience, forced marriage protection orders and FGM orders tend to be interim and a holding position until you have established what the risk is. The travel abroad components often cause an issue if they are made for a lengthy period, because obviously families want to travel from time to time. They are not just one and done; there can be other consequences that flow from them that mean that families have to come back before the court to review things such as travel.
Sarah Branson: And restrictions need to be necessary and proportionate. We do not always get that right, but there is an appeal process. I have something to say about the appeal process in the Bill, which I do not understand.
Sarah Branson: Yes. It does not make any sense to me. You have a provision that says that someone else who is not a party to the proceedings can bring an appeal, but there is no clarity about who. We can talk about vexatious appeals. Who is entitled to appeal an order if they are not a party? You had better tell us. Otherwise, I don’t think it is at all clear. I do not know whether that is just a drafting error, but why would a non-party have locus to bring an appeal? Under what circumstances would that happen?
Matilda Gosling: Unlike domestic abuse and FGM-related orders, there is no identifiable act for protection orders relating to gender identity. There are potential restrictions and inducements, and there is no obvious limit that can be placed on the court as to what they can instruct. That potentially means that a parent might be compelled into social transition, paying for breast binders and other things that they may not feel are compatible with their duties, rights and responsibilities as a parent. They need to be approached more carefully than the current drafting.
Sarah Branson: That is a very good question. I do not know whether you saw the Bar Council report on system overload, which talks about both the courts and barristers, and the work that legal aid lawyers are expected to undertake, without having any index-linked pay rise for 20 years, and with the amount of evidence growing and growing. If you are introducing something that will generate more work, it needs to be resourced. It is not complicated, but that has not happened.
Courts are overburdened. Private law proceedings now have waits of a year or more to get the case to final hearing. Public law proceedings are generally better because they are prioritised due to the 26-week statutory deadline. However, you cannot keep putting work on barristers and the courts without resourcing it. If these orders are made within existing family law proceedings, for example, you as a barrister or solicitor will have extra work and preparation and it would not be remunerated. That is just another thing on the list. If you are going to make more work for the family courts, resource it and make sure that it is properly dealt with.
Chair: What is your view, Shabana?
Shabana Jaffar: The family law jurisdiction is under pressure from a number of sides. There is also a lot of reform happening within family law at the moment. The child-focused court model is being rolled out across family courts. That is a streamlined model to deal with private law children cases. There is also reform happening for local authorities. I have seen some concern about how, if the Bill passes, there could potentially be an increase in safeguarding referrals. That is obviously another possibility. We know from the child-focused court model that local authorities are undertaking 20% more cases in private law. It is potentially another avenue in which their front door is going to be more active. We cannot say exactly how much that would increase, However, that being another consequence is something to bear in mind. Certainly, the family justice system is under pressure. CAFCASS is a part of that, and we may see an increase in these types of cases coming before the court.
Sarah Branson: It does. It is right that the criminal age of responsibility is 10. It is up to you to make a policy decision about whether you expect 10 and 11-year-olds to be criminalised as a result of trying to change. If you do not, then you need to make it clearer. It is not clear and it probably needs to be. It is not for me to say what you intend, but, as lawyers, we would quite like to know what you do intend. It is another thing that needs to be dealt with.
Chair: And what about you, Shabana?
Shabana Jaffar: I agree. The Bill as drafted is currently silent on the potential consequences for a child in that scenario and that is a concern.
Sarah Branson: I think I have already said that. I think the fact that we are debating what the Bill means and what it says, and we are lawyers, means that it should be made clearer.
Matilda Gosling: It is not just about parents; it is also about other adults that might be acting in the child’s best interests as well, for example, social workers, teachers, aunts and other relatives.
Sarah Branson: I suggested a form of words that is very imperfect, but is a starting point.
Chair: I am going to leave it there because we have to stop at 12.45 pm, and we have practically reached that time. On behalf of all members of the Committee, I thank you all very much indeed. There have been a lot of questions put to you, and you have been extremely helpful to us. We appreciate very much your attendance today and the assistance that you have given us.