Joint Committee on Human Rights

Uncorrected oral evidence: Legislative Scrutiny: Immigration and Asylum Bill, HC 556

Wednesday 11 November 2026

2.15 pm

 

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Members present: Alex Sobel (Chair); Baroness Chakrabarti; Tom Gordon; Baroness Hamwee; Afzal Khan; Baroness Lane-Fox of Soho; Baroness Maclean of Redditch; Lord Murray of Blidworth; Lord Rook; Euan Stainbank; Peter Swallow; Sir Desmond Swayne.

Questions 21 - 27

 

Witnesses

Eleanor Lyons, Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner; Eleonora Fais, Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group Coordinator, Anti-Slavery International; Professor Parosha Chandran, Barrister, One Pump Court.

 

 USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

  1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and webcast on www.parliamentlive.tv.
  2. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct the record. If in doubt as to the propriety of using the transcript, please contact the Clerk of the Committee.
  3. Members and witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Clerk of the Committee within 14 days of receipt.

Examination of witnesses

Eleanor Lyons, Eleonora Fais and Professor Parosha Chandran.

  1.             Chair: Welcome to the 12th meeting of the new session of Parliament of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Committee is made up of 12 members, drawn equally from both Houses. Our role is to examine how public policy, including legislation and practice, impact the human rights of people in the United Kingdom. You can view our recent reports, including on human rights and the regulation of AI and the Northern Ireland legacy Bill, on our website.

Our current thematic inquiry is on the impact of security, safety and protests on human rights. This is the second oral session of the inquiry on the Immigration and Asylum Bill, which is our current legislative inquiry.

I would like to introduce our witnesses: Eleanor Lyons, who has come before us before on this matter, Eleonora Fais and Professor Parosha Chandran.

The Bill makes various changes to the law relating to modern slavery. Are there problems with the current system for identifying and protecting victims? If so, does this Bill provide the solutions?

Eleanor Lyons: It is good to be here today. First of all, it is worth noting the good things that the system does at the moment. We should be proud that we identified over 23,000 victims of modern slavery in the UK last year. We have offered them our support and care.

It is also fair to say that there are broader challenges in the system when it comes to supporting victims. First-responder organisations are not always aware of their responsibilities, and they are not always very good at referring victims to the national referral mechanism consistently and with quality applications.

We have seen the Home Office make steadily poorer decisions when it comes to the national referral mechanism, and then being less able to make the right decision the first time around when identifying victims of modern slavery.

Alongside that, we have also seen a lack of political will, with there being no modern slavery statements or strategies published by the Government for a very long time now. Against this backdrop, we are also failing to prosecute the perpetrators of the crime.

Looking across those things and asking myself the question of whether the Bill fixes them, it does not. I took the question to my lived experience summit, which brings together 15 lived experience advisory panels, and asked them, “What do you think of this Bill? Will it help survivors?”

I just want to start by saying what a survivor said to me. They said, “I believe that this Bill will not bring any real change to stop slavery, but it will make it worse. It does not support the survivor. It gives a safe and stronger hand to the perpetrator. It is one of the main reasons that survivors will stay silent”.

Unfortunately, this Bill will make it harder for us to be able to identify and support victims of modern slavery in the UK.

Professor Parosha Chandran: It is a pleasure to be here today. Thank you for inviting me. I am grateful to Unseen, the charity, for inviting me to write an opinion, which may be before you.

We have had a long history—two decades now—of developing the laws relating to modern slavery and human trafficking. We started off by ratifying the Palermo protocol on human trafficking and the Council of Europe convention in 2005 on action against trafficking in human beings.

Before then, in 2003, we criminalised sex trafficking through amendments to the Sexual Offences Act. We followed that, in 2004, by criminalising trafficking for all forms of exploitation under the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act.

It is nice to see you, Baroness Chakrabarti. In 2009, involved with Liberty and Anti-Slavery International, Baroness Young of Hornsey raised the amendment to the Coroners and Justice Bill, which then produced Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act, which criminalised slavery, servitude and forced labour as freestanding criminal offences.

In 2012, we criminalised the trafficking of a person within the UK and out of the UK, which were omissions at that time in the current legislation, under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.

By the time we got to 2013, when it came to the Modern Slavery Act and its passage through Parliament over just short of two years, we were in a position to consolidate all that legislation together, take with it all the learning that had been obtained by various departments in Government and, importantly, by the Crown Prosecution Service, and to produce quite a robust framework under the Modern Slavery Act, which I think is the starting point for today’s discussion.

One thing was decided at that time by Ministers, which was not to include victim identification measures in the Modern Slavery Act; that was to be delegated to statutory guidance. That guidance has improved and improved over the years. It has been down to some of the cases that I have brought. R v O in 2008 was the first non-punishment case; it was the Nigerian girl prosecuted for holding a fake passport she was using at Dover docks to escape her trafficker in England. That developed Crown Prosecution Service policy on the indicators of trafficking when it came to looking at whether victims were offenders.

In 2013, just a few months short of the Home Secretary announcing the intention to have the Modern Slavery Act, I succeeded in the case of R v L and others, which involved the Vietnamese trafficked children who were prosecuted for drugs offences and sentenced to detention and training orders that amounted to periods of imprisonment for them. That was a critical decision, because it meant that, for the first time, the police could look at children and vulnerable people they found in circumstances that looked like offending positions, particularly criminal exploitation, divert them into safeguarding, and enable the prosecution of the traffickers. The Zakaria case followed in 2018, which was the prosecution of human traffickers for their involvement in the trafficking of children.

I wanted to point out this very crucial link between the protection of victims and witnesses and their identification as being trafficked or subject to modern slavery, and the impingement of the criminal justice system, which cannot operate in the modern slavery space without there being either direct evidence or intelligence that can only come from the victims who are experiencing the crimes.

The protection of victims goes beyond those who are able to give criminal evidence or intelligence, of course. We have obligations to protect and secure safeguards for everyone within this country who is found to be a victim of human trafficking, according to the definition of human trafficking in the Palermo protocol Article 3 and the Council of Europe convention Article 4.

What is wrong with the current system, even though I have given it a lot of praise right now? May I just add to that praise? If one looks, as it is crucial to do so, at the Home Office’s own statutory guidance on identifying victims, the most recent version of which is this month in 2026, and at the CPS guidance on prosecuting offenders—I think the most recent version is 2023, but I can correct anything in writing—we see all the features that are in Clause 41, which was Clause 36, namely delayed, inconsistent and incomplete accounts, as being wholly consistent with the experiences of victims of human trafficking and modern slavery.

Coming back to some defects in the current system, I would invite the committee to consider four things. The first is the failure of initial identification. This arises because victims cannot refer themselves directly into the NRM; they need to have a designated first responder to do that. Many front-line professionals do not have specialist training. It is a requirement under the Council of Europe convention for the identification experts to be qualified in identification. Victims are often treated primarily as immigration offenders, criminal suspects or people with behavioural problems who are unreliable, which is especially serious in the cases of criminal exploitation.

That brings me to another point, which is that the Bill is looking at immigration enforcement as being its raison d’être or rationale. If you have read my opinion—I am grateful if you have read any parts of it—you will see that I mention that a hugely significant percentage of trafficking victims who are accepted as having being trafficked under the NRM are British nationals; it is over a quarter.

On identification, my case of VCL and AN v the United Kingdom, which was successful in the European Court of Human Rights in 2021, outlined this not only for the United Kingdom but for the world, because it is the lead judgment that is being used by the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the OSCE in all their policy and decision-making on non-punishment, but more so on identification.

The court of human rights said that a victim must not be required to self-identify. As soon as there is a credible suspicion that a person may have been trafficked, they need to be subjected to their citizens’ requirements, the recovery period and all that is needed in order for them to be able to give an account as to what happened to them, which may oftentimes be incomplete, delayed or inconsistent, as the Court of Appeal had found in my R v L and others case back in 2013, namely that inconsistent accounts can be characteristic of trafficking itself.

  1.             Chair: I am going to stop you there because you are in danger of straying into all our other questions, so we will not have any other questions to ask you. Eleonora, in relation to the Bill, what is Anti-Slavery International’s view on whether the Bill provides the solutions?

Eleonora Fais: We concur with my fellow panellists that the Bill does not give a solution to all the issues that have been spoken about today.

If I may add a point, the issues mentioned by Eleanor and Parosha have been exacerbated by the many reforms, both legislative and in statutory guidance, that have been introduced over the past few years, justified by unevidenced claims of misuse of the system, and focused on the prioritisation of immigration enforcement approaches over safeguarding.

Evidence from the front line suggests that the identification system is becoming more and more difficult to access for survivors of modern slavery. Particularly since the introduction of the Nationality and Borders Act, we have seen an increase in negative decisions. Before the Nationality and Borders Act was commenced in January 2023, nine in 10 survivors received a positive reasonable grounds decision. Statistics for the year ending in June 2026 suggest that only 64% of survivors are receiving a positive reasonable grounds decision.

However, this is not a reflection of the merit of their case, but due to the systemic issues we have spoken about today. Most importantly, when these cases are then reconsidered, 81% of them go on to receive a positive decision.

Considering all these issues, the current Bill passing before Parliament is not going to provide a solution. The issues we need to tackle are quite different, and we do not need to restrict access to identification and protection mechanisms further.

  1.             Baroness Maclean of Redditch: The Bill provides that, when deciding if a person is a victim of modern slavery, delay, inconsistency, omission and striking similarity must be treated by decision-makers as damaging credibility. I would like to hear the panel’s views on whether this is compatible with the state’s obligation under Article 4 of the ECHR and also under ECAT—the European convention against trafficking. Those identifications mean that we must identify and support victims of trafficking. What safeguards are necessary to ensure that genuine victims are identified?

Eleonora Fais: We believe the credibility clause is incompatible with Article 4 of the ECHR, which puts a positive obligation on the state to create a legal and administrative framework to identify and protect survivors of modern slavery, as well as to prevent re-exploitation. These rights need to work in practice, so the system needs to be accessible. We believe the credibility clause undermines these principles.

Equally, Article 10 of ECAT, and in general the principle underpinning ECAT, suggests that the system needs to be victim-centred and human rights-based. Again, a system that is based on this belief and begins from a position where a survivor will not be believed and needs to prove their credibility undermines this principle.

The Bill effectively risks turning indicators of exploitation into indicators of disbelief, where disbelief is put into law. These are the very same fears that survivors tell us are discouraging exploitation from being identified. We know perpetrators use these same threats against survivors. They say that they will not be believed if they come forward, that they will be criminalised, that they will be deported, and that they will not be supported. This clause is doing just that, unfortunately.

Eleanor Lyons: I will be brief because Eleonora has covered most of the points. I agree with her in terms of the clause not complying.

I would also add that I have the honour, in this role, of working with survivors, including children who have been exploited and women who have been sexually exploited, including in historic cases. I cannot stress how damaging it will be to have in law that we should not believe these victims just because time has passed, and that we should question their credibility if they cannot quite remember the order things happened in, or if they were exploited in a similar way to someone else, which we know happens, unfortunately.

It goes beyond ECAT and ECHR, and it is a question we need to ask ourselves about whether we are uncomfortable doing many harms towards these survivors that will inflict further torment. The message we are sending them is, “If you come forward, you will not be believed”.

I echo everything that Eleonora said. This will have a really detrimental effect on survivors of modern slavery.

Professor Parosha Chandran: I completely agree with my colleagues. The reason behind the Modern Slavery Act when it was first being considered was to make the United Kingdom a hostile environment for human traffickers. I am recalling that when I have been considering the provisions in the Bill. The first line for a human trafficker in order to prosper and thrive is to make the victims feel that, if they go forward to the authorities, they will not be believed. That is the control mechanism that makes it such an efficient practice and such a huge profit-dealing exercise.

As I have mentioned, the Crown Prosecution Service, in its own policy, which has developed over the last close to two decades, has very clearly recognised that trafficking victims may disclose late and may initially give inaccurate accounts because of instructions to them or threats from traffickers, including from trauma.

The CPS’s child sexual abuse guidelines, which are also relevant because many children who are exploited for sexual exploitation may be seen through the lens of victims of CSE, also recognise the dangers of what they call stereotypical assumptions concerning delayed disclosure, inconsistencies and apparent co-operation with perpetrators.

The state should not apply just one understanding of trafficking when prosecuting offenders, and an inconsistent understanding when deciding whether victims are entitled to identification and protection. All these categories are victims and witnesses of crime.

When it comes to the historical consequences of misunderstanding victims, we can also take some learning from the child sexual abuse inquiries that have been conducted: the Jay inquiry in 2014, the Rochdale review in 2024 and the Oxford serious case review in 2015. These were the grooming cases where children were disbelieved. There were inconsistent accounts. They were delayed. There were messy testimonies that did not correspond to one another.

Another feature of some of these is that, after all the failures that happened with the police not understanding these cases as the abuse cases that they were, once the testimonies came to light, they were strikingly similar. One of the provisions in the new clause is to find someone dishonest, frankly, for having a strikingly similar claim, but in the broader trafficking context, traffickers use the same mechanisms by which to control people: threats, force, abuse of a position of vulnerability, coercion, et cetera.

Sometimes, there can be a situation where huge numbers of people are being trafficked or exploited in a country, and if there is not a robust criminal justice response to that to investigate those cases, then not only will you eventually have cases that may have striking similarities because they are cohorts of victims in the same forms of exploitation or being controlled by the same people, but you are also going to have a situation where the traffickers are thriving and flourishing. That, at the moment, is my fear for the United Kingdom, because we are not having this robust criminal justice response.

This is just a mere suggestion. It would be a crucial addition to the evidence being taken by the committee to invite some of the police enforcement experts on human trafficking to give evidence, because they would be very clearly able to say that the inconsistency in accounts, delayed disclosure, incomplete accounts and striking similarities are entirely consistent with trafficking. Indeed, in the prosecutions they have been able to obtain, notwithstanding those features, because they are those that arise from trauma, exploitation and harm, they have been able to secure prosecutions too.

Baroness Maclean of Redditch: The Bill would also allow the current 30-day recovery period to end immediately following a decision that the person is not a victim of slavery, even when fewer than 30 days have passed. I would be interested in the panel’s reflections on the implications of that. Could that be challenged subsequently? Is that also compatible with our obligations under Article 13 of ECAT?

Eleonora Fais: We believe the ending of the recovery and reflection period before the minimum of 30 days is not compatible with Article 13 of ECAT, which sets a minimum 30-day recovery and reflection period for survivors of modern slavery.

It is very important that we look at the purpose of the recovery and reflection period and why this was introduced. This is to allow survivors to recover and understand the process that they are going through, and to start accessing the support needed to break the chain with their traffickers. It is a time of reflection and access to support.

If we are expecting competent authorities to make a decision within this period, this also means that survivors will be asked to share information as soon as or even before they have entered the support. We have heard from organisations supporting survivors on the ground that sometimes they receive requests to inform a conclusive grounds decision, so to share information about a survivor, even before they have met them or while they are still doing a needs assessment to understand what support they need to recover. How is a survivor supposed to give this very high-threshold evidence to have a positive outcome in terms of conclusive grounds if they have not accessed support yet? This defeats the purpose of the recovery and reflection period.

It also means that, if someone receives a negative decision because they were unable to present sufficient information, they will be discharged from support, potentially exposing them to destitution, homelessness and therefore further risk of exploitation.

There have also been changes to the modern slavery statutory guidance in relation to reconsideration that are quite important to flag. If the recovery and reflection period protection comes to an end with a conclusive grounds decision, and the person does not have any other pathway to be granted leave to remain, they can be liable to be removed. The statutory guidance allows the competent authorities to make an assessment as to whether someone is eligible to have a reconsideration if they are liable to be removed. As you can see, if someone is in that situation, they might not be able to re-enter the NRM and they might be removed, even if they are a victim of modern slavery but simply could not provide sufficient information to inform the process.

Professor Parosha Chandran: I have something to add specifically on Article 4. Thank you for the question. Just for the record, of course, my answer to the last question is that I believe that the provision is incompatible with Article 4.

On question 3, yes, I believe it is incompatible with Article 4. I say this out of experience in having litigated two cases recently in the European Court of Human Rights. Those are BB in Slovakia and TV in Spain. Both of those cases involved victims of human trafficking who were misidentified by the authorities, and as a direct result they were to be thrown out of their specialist care and shelter.

In the case of BB, the NGO, Caritas Slovakia, was so stoic that it refused to throw her out, even though it was under a government contract. It searched high and low for a shelter that could take her in. She was given a shelter space four hours away.

She had paranoid schizophrenia. She had been trafficked as a very young person. She was a child who had been brought up her whole life in an orphanage and trafficked to England, where she was sexually exploited. She had these psychiatric illnesses as a direct result of her exploitation. For 10 years, she had no trauma-related care. She had no assistance under the Government’s framework because of the decision, which was wrong, that she was not trafficked. The European Court of Human Rights came down heavily in that case, found unanimously a violation of Article 4 for the failure to identify and protect, and remarked on the length of trauma that she had suffered as a direct result.

That is my experience as to what Article 13 can do. It can take away the support from somebody who is a victim of trafficking, is suffering and is in a harmful psychiatric or psychological situation. Every single day, there is a legal system that allows for bad decision-making to be challenged. As was said earlier, the success rate is high; it is between 70 and 80%. It cannot be right to remove assistance and care in the form of the recovery period at that time.

Eleanor Lyons: This goes back to the core part of where we started with this. If the law was going to be changed in this way, and we recognised that it will not comply with Article 13 of ECAT and it would be very damaging to survivors of modern slavery, the broader systems have to be completely robust. When we have a system where there is very poor decision-making from the Home Office, people, when they get a negative reasonable grounds, are being thrown out of support structures, which leaves them very vulnerable to survival sex, re-trafficking and re-exploitation. For that then to be overturned and then having re-access again is a really harmful loop that we are almost directly trying to avoid.

My issue is with the law change, but we also need everything around it to be working far better than it is. At the moment, that is simply not the case.

  1.             Baroness Hamwee: I wanted to ask about another issue of compatibility, or not, with ECAT: disqualification from protection on the grounds of national security, threat to public order and bad faith. Secondly, does the Bill provide sufficient protection against the penalisation of victims for conduct that stems from their exploitation?

Eleanor Lyons: I will start by saying that I am very pleased that children have now been removed from the public order disqualification. That is welcome from the Government.

On both these measures, they should be used exceptionally, and there should be a very high threshold if they are going to be used. That is very clear in ECAT. We have had criticism from GRETA that that is not the case when it comes to the UK.

I will go further in saying that it is really important, particularly when it comes to the public order disqualification, that we are using Section 45 and the statutory defence from the Modern Slavery Act. It is very unusual to me that, 11 years on from this piece of legislation, when you ask the question, “How often is the statutory defence being used? Is it protecting victims?”, no one really seems to know the answer.

I am working with the Crown Prosecution Service to try to solve that issue, but unless we are protecting victims who are forced to carry out criminal acts as part of their exploitation, it is not only non-compliant, but it is also going to have a very negative impact in terms of victims who are forced to carry out criminal acts then being removed from support and care.

Baroness Hamwee: Over the years, we have been concerned that defence solicitors do not seem to know about Section 45. Working with the CPS is one side of the coin; I do not know whether you have any comment on that.

Eleanor Lyons: I have been asking this question for my time in role. The difficulty is that no one has any data on how much the statutory defence is being used. I hear two very different accounts, with some people saying that it is not being used enough, while others are saying that it is being misused in the system.

It should be a really simple question that we can ask of law enforcement: “How is it being used? Is it being applied properly across the board?” Until we have that answer, it is very unfair to introduce new measures that will be disqualifying more victims who have been criminalised as part of their exploitation.

Professor Parosha Chandran: On the public order disqualification, I wonder if it is important to draw the attention of the committee kindly to a case that I am not involved in. I am thankful to my learned friend Claire Physsas in my chambers, who brought it to my attention. It is R (ABW) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWHC 3280 (Admin), handed down on 17 December 2025. Mr Justice Morris considered the exact situation of somebody who was subject to a public order disqualification. The decision was made by the Secretary of State that they were not obliged to complete the conclusive grounds decision-making. The Court found at paragraph 199 that the Secretary of State had failed to properly assess the risk of re-trafficking from persons other than those who had previously exploited the claimant.

Parliament is being asked to legislate in a manner that would prevent the completion of the victim identification, notwithstanding a recent High Court judgment that establishes the duty to complete that process under the existing framework.

That brings me to non-punishment. Non-punishment cannot be seen on its own. It is not just to protect a victim of trafficking against prosecution or other penalty for an act they committed as a direct consequence of trafficking. It does not work unless you have a robust, effective identification process. That is what the European Court of Human Rights found as a violation of the United Kingdom in VCL and AN v the United Kingdom.

Baroness Hamwee: Would you like to put that in writing? That would help us all.

Professor Parosha Chandran: Yes, thank you. Just very briefly, the Bill does not protect victims of criminal or other forms of exploitation from being unlawfully prosecuted.

Eleonora Fais: As noted by Parosha, this case of ABW also highlighted the fact that the public order disqualification so far has been applied disproportionately against victims of criminal exploitation. As we have seen, 58% of those disqualified on public order grounds had an element of criminal exploitation in their case. This goes to show how important the application of the non-punishment principle is.

Just very quickly on bad faith, obviously this campaign also creates a standalone disqualification for the purpose of bad faith. It goes even further than the public order disqualification because it allows the Secretary of State not only to disqualify, but not to make any reasonable grounds decision at all, so the person will not receive any identification. Again, that fully departs from the intended purpose of ECAT, which is about exceptionality and discretion.

The public order disqualification, coming back to the proportionality of its application, will be implemented alongside Section 29 of the Illegal Migration Act, which turns the discretion into a power. There will not be any discretion anymore, which undermines ECAT Article 13 even further.

  1.             Lord Murray of Blidworth: The question you were asked was whether the Bill does an act that is permitted by the public order disqualification in ECAT, in particular allowing the Home Secretary to disqualify certain victims from protection on grounds of national security, a threat to public order or bad faith. I have heard a lot of mention of bad faith. Presumably, the panel accepts that it is appropriate that the Home Secretary should be able to limit protection on grounds of national security and threats to public order.

Eleanor Lyons: I do accept that. GRETA is clear that that needs to be used exceptionally, not on a blanket basis. I spoke to GRETA about it and discussed it with them; they feel like the UK at the moment is trying to use it as a one-size-fits-all. That is the issue that we are seeing in this legislation across the board: by putting many of the requirements in primary legislation, we are going to affect all victims of modern slavery.

That is why I welcome and think it is really good that the public order disqualification does not apply to children anymore. That would have been completely unacceptable.

Eleonora Fais: Unfortunately, on children it applies also for national security purposes. They have been exempted on general public order grounds, but it does apply on national security grounds.

Lord Murray of Blidworth: You would agree that that would be a sensible thing to do.

Eleonora Fais: No, that is what the Bill does.

Lord Murray of Blidworth: Are you saying it is not sensible?

Eleonora Fais: It is not sensible. The Bill applies to children in relation to national security. Children cannot consent to their own exploitation and to enter the NRM. It is very important that we remember that.

  1.             Euan Stainbank: Moving to quite a narrow point on Clause 44 of the Bill, the Bill limits the duty for the Secretary of State to grant temporary limited leave to remain to victims of modern slavery to assist their recovery. What are the implications of this change to victims, and what alternative forms of leave would still be available to them?

Eleonora Fais: In relation to the impact, currently data shared by the Helen Bamber Foundation in relation to 2025 show that 524 survivors were granted leave to remain on the basis of recovery. This corresponds to 92% of all grants received by survivors in 2025. As we can see, the majority of survivors currently receive leave to remain based on recovery grants.

Allowing the Secretary of State not to grant leave to remain on this basis will mean that people might not be able to access recovery. They also will not have a stable leave to remain in the UK, which is the pre-condition to continue their recovery, rebuild their lives and also to prevent re-exploitation.

It is well known and there is a lot of evidence out there that shows how survivors with insecure immigration status are targeted by perpetrators. They might not be able to access services. They may be more liable to become destitute or homeless. It is very important that we ensure that individuals have secure immigration status.

When I said that individuals cannot continue their recovery journey, it is because, if they do not have any alternative leave to remain or path to any other immigration route, they are liable to be removed. It is not enough to have a positive conclusive grounds decision and to be accessing the modern slavery victim care contract to be safe from removal. You need another immigration route to access in relation to that.

When I speak about alternative routes, we cannot rely on alternative routes because these are not guaranteed to all. They might not be accessible or relevant to everyone. A common alternative route that is often mentioned is the asylum process. Not all survivors are going through the asylum process, and even if they are, they are not guaranteed to be granted that status.

We have also seen restrictions in relation to the asylum system. There has been a focus on prioritising certain nationalities such as Albanian and Vietnamese; they are also common nationalities referred to the NRM. Asylum rights are also restricted in relation to that. There are many other routes that might not apply to many survivors.

Eleanor Lyons: I echo what Eleonora said.

Professor Parosha Chandran: I support what Eleonora has said. I was looking at the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which relates to Section 65. Paragraph 362 of the Explanatory Notes to the Act identifies a relationship between the statutory residence provision and Article 14 of ECAT.

It is an important point because in 2022 the Government introduced a statutory residence framework that expressly recognised the recovery needs of confirmed victims of trafficking. I have not been able to find anything in the material published in relation to the Bill that seeks to present any argument as to why that has changed in the legal or evidential considerations of that.

Euan Stainbank: Eleonora, just to confirm, you said 92% of people qualify under the assistance under Section 65(2)(a). Are those people who definitively would not qualify under Section 65(2)(b), which is the right to stay for compensation, or 65(2)(c), which is co-operation with an authority, which will remain even with the changes in this Bill.

Eleonora Fais: They might qualify, but clearly they have not met those requirements, so probably they were granted leave on a recovery basis because that was the need they had. 

  1.             Baroness Chakrabarti: Thanks for the clarity of your answers so far. I hope you will forgive me if you feel by implication that you may have answered this next question. I am going to put it anyway because it is so important. The Bill would remove the duty to provide potential victims with support during the recovery period in certain circumstances. In which scenarios would victims be denied support? Would this once more be compatible with our obligations to provide assistance under ECAT? I will ask the commissioner first.

Eleanor Lyons: I was going to hand it over to Eleonora because she has very good examples of when it would not be compatible.

Eleonora Fais: We believe that this clause is also not compatible with ECAT. Article 12 of ECAT requires states to provide support to all survivors. This is clearly in contrast with what this clause is doing.

There are many reasons why survivors might not meet service requirements. Obviously, there are exemptions in this clause if it is clear that survivors have not complied because of reasons related to their trafficking, but there could be many other reasons why a survivor might not be able to comply with service requirements.

For example, in asylum accommodations, it could be related to the trauma and torture that they have experienced during their journey, or we have survivors accessing housing support through a local authority who might be exempted from accessing services. Because the support will be withdrawn, either from asylum support or from a local authority, they will not be able to then access modern slavery victim care contract support.

Baroness Chakrabarti: Just to be clear, because it is so important, you are suggesting that, under the Bill as proposed, there will be scenarios where, through no fault of their own, they will now be denied support for reasons to do with the authorities and the housing provision or another provision.

Eleonora Fais: Yes, there could be many reasons related to trauma or not understanding the system. We hear many times that people make themselves voluntarily homeless, for example when it relates to local authority housing, but there are many reasons why people might do that.

Professor Parosha Chandran: I looked at this in detail, Baroness Chakrabarti. Just to summarise, because I know you are short on time, I said that the clause’s qualification concerning harm arising from the identified exploitation may be too narrow in practice. Trafficking victims frequently have interacting vulnerabilities. A person’s behaviour may arise from trafficking-related trauma, but also from an earlier disability, mental health condition or a history of exploitation. It may be difficult or artificial to attribute a particular failure exclusively to exploitation, recognising the reasonable grounds decision. The legal framework should not require an unduly narrow causal assessment that leaves a vulnerable person without protection.

Eleanor Lyons: The practical implication of this is important. The Government say that they really want to tackle rough sleeping, which we all support. If you are withdrawing care and shelter from a victim, they are quite likely to end up, unfortunately, rough sleeping in a very vulnerable position, probably open to exploitation.

Correct me if I am wrong, but I think this will also only apply to England and Wales, and it will be different across Northern Ireland and Scotland. You will see different care standards for survivors depending on where we identify them in the UK. That will be very troubling in practice as well.

Baroness Chakrabarti: Does the discrepancy of treatment in the different nations of the UK create any further problems with our international obligations?

Eleanor Lyons: I would suspect so, but I will refer to Parosha as the lawyer.

Professor Parosha Chandran: I think so. Obviously, as you will know better than anyone, the European Convention on Human Rights, which we are looking at, contains an anti-discrimination clause under Article 14. That prohibits any difference in treatment for a number of reasons, including nationality or other status, for example. Of course, it is parasitic; there must be a violation of one of the other provisions that you argue it in tandem with, but it very much could give rise to a discriminatory, unlawful process.

  1.             Afzal Khan: Does the Bill adequately protect the best interests of child victims of modern slavery? If not, what additional safeguards would be required?

Eleanor Lyons: I will talk about the positive bits of the Bill for child victims of modern slavery. I am very pleased to see the independent child trafficking guardians being enshrined in law. They do fantastic work to wrap care around children who are being exploited. The advocacy support that Barnardo’s provides across England and Wales is really critical.

The one change that I would ask the Government to make is to extend the advocacy for children who are care-experienced beyond the age of 18 so that there is no drop-off in support and care.

It is also very positive that we are seeing devolved decision-making pilots being rolled out. It is right that the local areas and local safeguarding teams get the opportunity to come together and speak about children who are exploited and provide ongoing long-term care when it comes to that.

Just briefly to mention the credibility requirements we discussed earlier, there should be a clear carve-out for children on those sides of things as well. We should not be questioning children’s credibility.

I will pass on to any other panel members for their reflections more broadly.

Eleonora Fais: I agree that there are definitely some positives in the Bill for children, but there are also significant reforms made to the national referral mechanism and the wider framework to support survivors that will affect all children, including British children and every other child. That is quite important to note.

We also appreciate the expansion of the ICTG service that has proven to be very beneficial for children. However, this does not cover children post 18 in their transition to adulthood. We know this is a very important time in a child’s life, with many changes and vulnerabilities. It needs to not finish when someone turns 18. It will be quite important that they continue to be supported when they move on post 18.

We agree in relation to the application of the credibility clauses to children. We want them to be removed. It is irrational to think that children can be disbelieved or have to prove their credibility.

We also believe that children should be granted leave to remain on the basis of the best interests principle, as expected by ECAT. ECAT Article 14(2) requires children to be granted leave to remain on those bases, and those bases primarily, so not on the basis of other criteria as for adults.

Also, in relation to the public order disqualification that we mentioned before, it should not apply to children on any grounds.

Professor Parosha Chandran: I am not going to repeat, but, for the record, may I refer back to my answer to question 2, where I talked about some of the children’s cases that have been considered domestically and internationally, and to my opinion on the subject?

It is important that the trafficking definition directly recognises that it is not necessary to use force, fraud, coercion, threats or abusing a position of vulnerability for us to identify a child as having being trafficked. That applies to victims of modern slavery as well.

The reason for that is that children are vulnerable by virtue of age alone. A child may not know that they are being exploited. They may be doing what an adult tells them to do. They may not have choices, and they are much less likely to be able to come forward and say what has happened to them, as well we know.

In that context, I also very much support what my colleagues are saying, but my position is that Article 41 would be incredibly damaging and damning for all the victims of modern slavery, not just children. I feel that this would be a regressive step for the United Kingdom, not only at home but abroad.

In terms of the best interests of the child, there is no mention of that on the face of the legislation, although it is in the guidance. In order for that assessment to be properly in a Bill, each provision that would relate to a child must be adequately checked and considered comprehensively in terms of what its impact must be. I know you do not have time for me to go through every single feature of it, but I would be grateful to just put that on the record. Thank you.

Afzal Khan: You can also write in.

Chair: Yes, please follow up in writing.

Professor Parosha Chandran: Thank you. I am grateful.

Chair: Thank you to all of you. This concludes the first panel.