Work and Pensions Committee

Oral evidence: Pensions adequacy: auto-enrolment contributions for low earners and their employers, HC 669

Wednesday 11 November 2026

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 11 November 2026.

Watch the meeting

Members present: Debbie Abrahams (Chair); Rushanara Ali; Mr Peter Bedford; Damien Egan; Patrick Hurley; John Milne; Andrew Pakes.

Questions 1-39

Witnesses

I: Jonathan Cribb, Deputy Director, Institute for Fiscal Studies; Chris Curry, Director, Pensions Policy Institute; and Carl Emmerson, Partner, London Economics.

II: Zoe Alexander, Chief Policy Officer, Pensions UK; Dr Daniella Jenkins, Director, Women’s Budget Group; Will Sandbrook, CEO, Centre for Inclusive Money; and Jack Jones, Pensions Officer, TUC.

Written evidence from witnesses:

Institute for Fiscal Studies

Pensions Policy Institute

Pensions UK

UK Women's Budget Group

 


 

Examination of witnesses

Witnesses: Jonathan Cribb, Chris Curry and Carl Emmerson.

  1.                 Chair: A very warm welcome to this first oral evidence session for our new inquiry into pensions adequacy, particularly looking at auto-enrolment for low earners. It is a pleasure to welcome our first panel of the morning. We have Jonathan Cribb, who is Deputy Director at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, Chris Curry, Director of the Pensions Policy Institute, and Carl Emmerson, a partner in London Economics. Thank you again. It is lovely to see many of you again.

My first question relates to the Second Pensions Commission, which obviously you will be very aware of, due to report in the spring, and we hope that this inquiry and the evidence that we manage to get together will contribute to that. However, the Commission has made the point that we need to be clear about what adequacy objectives are. From your points of view on auto-enrolment, what do you think that they should be for low earners? Who would like to start with that one?

Carl Emmerson: I will start if you want. I think we need to look at the system as a whole, not just automatic enrolment. I think there are two obvious objectives for pensions policy as a whole. One is that we want to have a state and private pension system that ensures that we do not have scandalous levels of pensioner poverty and pensioners living in deprivation. We have had periods in history where very large proportions of the pensioner population—extremely large proportions—are living in very low-income households for a long period of time. Thankfully, we do not have that any more. There are some poor pensioners, but pensioner poverty is below the working age poverty rate.

The other objective of pension policy in the round is to try to create an environment where we are helping individuals to achieve a standard of living that is smoothed through their lifetimes so they do not have undue hardship in working life, saving unnecessarily, and they also do not have perhaps too much to spend in working life and then get to retirement and they are disappointed with what they can afford. We are helping people smooth their living standards over their lives. It is those two objectives, I think: a minimum standard in retirement plus some earnings replacement so that people can have a living standard that relates to what they enjoyed when they were working.

That is pretty close to what Beveridge had in mind in his report and I think it is really the system that we have been getting better at and moving closer towards since about 1980, to be honest, where we have been making the flat rate component of the state pension closer and closer to universal for those who spend their whole working lives here. We have also done more and more to ensure that a greater proportion of the adult population are in a private pension scheme, particularly women.

Chris Curry: Yes, I agree with a lot of what Carl has just said. I think if you look at what we are currently using, those are the two main measures—one, in terms of the minimum standards that are used, that, I think, is very important for low earners. As Carl was saying, it is about trying to make sure that people have a standard of living in retirement that allows them to participate in some way in society, which I think is important, and not seeing big drops in living standards when people reach retirement. I think that in itself is difficult. It is a different objective from the poverty alleviation objective that the Government must have as well.

I think there are also some real challenges in how we have been measuring that up until this point. One of the things that is often overlooked and not included is the role of housing. In particular, work that we and others have done is suggesting there will be an increase in the numbers or the proportion of pensioners who are renting in retirement rather than being homeowners, as perhaps previously expected on the trends we were seeing. That in itself creates different challenges in terms of the amount of income that people might need in retirement or how you measure that adequacy.

Jonathan Cribb: Building on those points, this is all right, and these two objectives match to these minimum living standards or replacement rates as adequacy objectives. The only concern I have about the minimum living standard framework is that 20 years ago we would have looked at minimum standards broadly being around pensioner poverty. Pensioner poverty has come down so much and the state pension, the 2010 reforms and the new state pension create a much more solid basis for helping to avoid poverty than was the case before. Although in principle I think we should all be thinking of some level of minimum standard, the current levels that are discussed in the Pensions UK retirement living standards are quite high when you compare them to working age incomes.

So 23% of working age people in a working household fall below the minimum pensioner level and it is much higher for working age singles—lone parents, for example. If you think that is a very strong, important level to get people to, what you are saying is that you really want pensioners to get to a much higher-level minimum than you do working age people. Then there is a question of whether it is appropriate for the state to use resources to try to get to that level. Or is it appropriate to get individuals to save, reducing their resources in working age to get to that higher level in the pensioner period?

  1.                 Chair: In terms of a hybrid approach?

Jonathan Cribb: I think there is some merit in a hybrid approach. In a sense, you can think about a hybrid approach that takes replacement rates where, roughly, the higher income you have, the higher retirement income you need, although you might need only 50% of pre-retirement income if you are a very high earner, for example. As for the ways of making a hybrid approach, broadly, you can put a cap on the amount—so anyone with an income above X is adequate irrespective of whether they have £3 million or £5 million a year—and set the bottom, below which we say that you are inadequate even if you have a good replacement rate. Broadly, putting a cap on the top does not make very much difference to overall adequacy measures unless you pull it down a very long way. The bottom cap in a hybrid measure would make a lot of difference. The only concern I have is whether integrating two very separate concepts into one is confusing.

  1.                 Chair: Chris and Carl, anything on the hybrid approach, particularly focusing on low earners?

Chris Curry: It is interesting, isn’t it? I think for low earners the overriding impact would probably be on the standards rather than the target replacement rate if you are talking about very low earners as part of that. A hybrid approach does have some attractions. It really depends on what you are using it for. If you are using it as a way of evaluating policy over time, I think that can be useful. If you are trying to use it to help individuals understand better, it probably is a much more difficult concept to try to get across.

I want to add a couple of bits to what Jonathan said about the comparison between pensioners and the rest of the working age population as well. I think there are some differences that you also need to take into account in there. One is that for pensioners, when they get to that income level, that is set for the rest of their lives, whereas some of the lower groups or some of the groups we are seeing in the working age population may not be in that situation or in that low-income situation for the rest of their life. Low earnings can fluctuate and people’s positions in the earnings distribution can fluctuate as part of that as well.

You also need to take account of the additional needs that pensioners might have—disability benefits or lack of mobility and things like that. You need to make sure that even if you set a standard of living that you think is higher for pensioners than the rest of the population, there could be very good reasons for doing that but you need to be aware of what you are doing and why. I think that is important.

Carl Emmerson: I think as long as we keep clear that the broad objectives are the outlook for pensioner poverty and the outlook for the number of people who perhaps get to retirement who might be disappointed with the standard of living they have relative to their working age level incomes, I think that is what really matters. We can have a range of measures to try to get at that.

When thinking specifically about low earners, I would also add that earning do not only change over someone’s lifetime, meaning they may have more capacity to save in some years than others. Some low earners are partners to someone who is not in work or another low earner and they are in hardship today. Other low earners are often people working part-time, perhaps with a higher earning partner—perhaps they are not in a low-income household. There are issues around what we think about, as to whether the household is poor or whether this is about an individual’s circumstances. Clearly, then there are risks around what happens if that couple splits up subsequently, and there are issues for women there when often the lower earner, the part-time worker, might often be a woman. If she has a higher earning husband, for example, you might think that she would benefit from saving more, whereas another household with a low earner, perhaps with a partner who is not in work, you might really question whether they should be saving more at the moment. I think it is quite difficult to think of policies, at least in the private sector space, that can really target that well and there are lots of trade-offs here.

  1.                 Chair: One last question from me for the moment. The Commission is suggesting that the pensions policy should be subject to arrangements for holistic review. What should that look like from your perspectives?

Chris Curry: It is important that policy is continually looked at in a holistic sense, whether that is done on a statutory or regular basis or whether that is done in a different way. You can think about it in a broader sense. The IFS has recently done a pensions review. At the PPI, we produce an annual report on the pensions framework which looks at sustainability, adequacy and fairness, which you may recognise as pillars. So there is work that goes on externally in this place.

I think it is really important that that independence is maintained, but if you are thinking about holistic review, you really need to be very clear about what it is that you are actually reviewing and what the output and outcome is of that. There are several different international models but there are very few where it is actually binding. It is more about whether it can be advisory, evaluating, or monitoring, and whether it is maybe an early warning system; there are all sorts of different things that it could be.

Jonathan Cribb: I think that holistic reviews are broadly a good idea and we have had a lot of success in pensions policy in the UK, partly coming from the Pensions Commission and the implementation of the reforms there.

By the time we got to the early 2020s we thought that enough economic change and policy change had happened and that it was time for another review, so if I had to say a number, maybe every 10 to 15 years you might want a good quality review to allow for both some stability in the interim but also the ability to reflect change.

Carl Emmerson: Yes, I agree with that. I think that the Second Pensions Commission is well overdue, so, having a review like that every 10 to 15 years, and I would probably wrap the state pension age review into it as well and think about that system as a whole.

Chair: Thank you. Over to Patrick Hurley.

  1.                 Patrick Hurley: I want to ask about the triple lock, specifically the Government’s proposed changes to the triple lock. Could you speak to the impact of those proposed changes on the work of the Pensions Commission and specifically whether or not the predictability that we are going to see makes the job easier or whether, because it is less generous, it makes it more difficult? Is there something you can speak to on that perspective?

Jonathan Cribb: I think it does make the Pensions Commission’s job easier in most ways, in that we now will have a more predictable state pension tied in the long run to growth in average earnings, and the underpinning of living standards for the working age population, and it will provide that confident base layer to the pension system. The reform has reduced the fiscal risk to the Government that they will have to cut back dramatically at some point in a crisis, whether that be on the level or a much higher state pension age. Broadly I think it makes it easier.

If you really believed that the triple lock were to actually stay for a very long period—I think we have to put a very big question mark on that—then clearly the change now means a lower state pension as a fraction of average earnings in the long run, so you would probably want higher levels of private saving to make up for that. However, I think there really is a question about whether it was ever credible that we were going to keep the triple lock for a very long period.

Chris Curry: I think that is right. It has definitely made the job clearer. It has brought it into a starker focus. I do not think anyone really expected the triple lock to remain until the 2050s or the 2070s, which is the timeframe that the Commission is looking at in terms of where the outcomes of its changes are likely to really impact. By having the change in advance, it does make it clearer.

It does provide more challenges, though, I think, as Jonathan was saying, in that the role of the state is now probably slightly better defined but it is at a lower level than many of the projections that the Pensions Commission would have been working with were actually showing. That does increase the importance of the role of private pension saving. We have not had a chance to run all the numbers through and do a lot more different analysis, but looking back at analysis that we did at the PPI when the triple lock was first introduced, we estimated that the introduction of the triple lock would mean that people could put about 6% less into their private pensions because that would be coming from the state pension instead. It is probably not quite that big a gap now because the triple lock has been more generous than expected and has been in place over time, so it is probably a smaller gap than that.

There was some interesting OBR analysis in the Pensions Commission the interim report that suggested that on the central scenario for the triple lock going forward, we had the number of people undersaving as 15 million. If it looked at a lower triple lock, and one that is going to give an outcome much more similar to the new policy, where it was about 0.1% ahead of average earnings, that increased to 19 million people undersaving. It does actually make it clearer how big the challenge is and that might be something that is more helpful to the Commission in making some of the decisions it has to make.

Carl Emmerson: I agree with everything that Chris and Jonathan have just said.

One set of analysis we did and published last month in a report for the People’s Partnership shows that if you take someone on £40,000 a year and you had them saving at 8% of qualifying earnings with the triple lock, and then you move to the adjusted triple lock to get the same retirement income after tax, we think they would need to save about 12% of qualifying earnings. I think the change that the Government have announced makes the case for what the Pensions Commission needs to do much, much clearer because it does not need to get into the world of predicting when the triple lock will go. It has a lot of clarity there, but it also makes the case for more private saving stronger, as we have just heard.

  1.                 Patrick Hurley: You have all mentioned the changes or the impact on levels of private saving. Could you speak to the disproportionate impact on how much low earners specifically might need to save—that is, people who are earning quite a lot less than £40,000?

Chris Curry: As we have already touched on a little bit, the state pension is really important for low earners in terms of what it provides as a proportion of the full income in retirement that they are likely to get. We know about, and we will talk further about this, I am sure, the challenges for low earners in saving and diverting money away from what they need to live on today to contributions to fund their future as well, but I think this does make it clearer that there is still a role for private saving for low earners. I think it does provide that longer-term level that the state will provide as part of that. We already know the level it is likely to be at, around 30% of national average earnings, which is already below the Pensions UK minimum retirement living standard, so there is already a gap there that needs to be filled.

I think it brings into sharp relief the fact that there will need to be saving across people’s working lives irrespective of what level of income they have across that working life, but it does also bring those challenges. In terms of reaching the minimum level, I think it might disproportionately impact the lower earners but it does also have an impact on higher earners, who now have to do more in order to avoid that fall in living standards that we were talking about.

  1.                 Patrick Hurley: To tease that out and to make it explicit then, is it your view that the new state pension, for those who are solely reliant on it, is not an adequate income in retirement?

Chris Curry: It depends, going back to what we were talking about, on the adequacy definition as part of that. The current level of the new state pension, and what it is predicted to be when it gets to the new triple lock arrangement, will be below what is currently used and has been used by the Commission and others as the minimum income level.

Carl Emmerson: Different people will reasonably disagree about what the right level of standard of living for someone to have is. I think it is worth noting that if you have a couple where they both receive a full new state pension and they have no housing costs, they are well above the commonly used poverty line. I am not saying they have a fantastic standard of living in retirement, but they are well above the poverty line. If you take a single pensioner getting a full new state pension, they are pretty close to that poverty line. I think for them the big issue is their housing costs. If they are an owner-occupier who owns outright, they have no housing costs; if they are in the private rented sector and their housing benefit covers their rent, they have no housing costs; but often pensioners are living in the private rented sector and often the housing benefit is not covering their rent. There is an issue for those people, as we spoke about earlier, around the housing market and the costs there.

  1.                 Patrick Hurley: Do you think there needs to be some mitigation for those who might be in pensioner poverty through housing benefits and other measures that could be implemented?

Carl Emmerson: In my previous role at the Institute for Fiscal Studies, when I was working with Jonathan, we put forward a suggestion—this would cost money. If you are a single pensioner or a couple pensioner, with no one else in the household at the moment, you are entitled to a rent that is based on the local rents of one-bedroom accommodation; we put forward the suggestion that maybe every pensioner should be entitled to at least two bedrooms. That would give them more money if they still wanted to live in one-bedroom accommodation, of course, and you might think there are arguments why pensioners need slightly a bit more than working age population. They spend more time at home. They might have special caring needs. There may be reasons why that is there. They may have adult children who want to come and visit. There may just be reasons why you might think it would be justifiable to suggest that a second bedroom would be justified, and in the social rented sector the policy that is commonly known as the bedroom tax—that is not its formal name—does not apply to pensioners so it would also be an equalisation between those two sectors.

Patrick Hurley: I am out of time, so I will pass it back to the Chair. Thank you.

  1.                 Mr Peter Bedford: You have already touched on contribution rates in some of your answers today. I am keen to hear your views on Pensions UK and other organisations’ views on increasing the contribution rates from 8% to 12%. Perhaps each of you could give me a short response to that.

Jonathan Cribb: I do not have a recommendation for an exact number, but broadly I think that a move towards 12% is sensible, although I would be much more supportive of 12% on qualifying earnings, so that is on earnings above about £6,000, than of 12% on all earnings because of the disproportionate impact of reducing the qualifying earnings lower limit down to zero on the living standards today of low earners.

Chris Curry: There is certainly a case for higher contributions. Whether 12% is the right level or not depends on individual circumstances. I think the case for higher contributions is partly about individuals providing for themselves in retirement. I think there is also a wider general economic case that we are thinking about more generally in terms of investment into the UK and the relatively low savings rate that we have in the UK, and a way of improving that, as well as the wider potential implications there as well.

I think the real challenge, as Jonathan has alluded to, is the real crux of automatic enrolment is low earners, and we know that some people will benefit and will be able to afford 12% contributions and some will not. We have to make a view as to whether we want an inclusive system, which includes people who will benefit at the risk of some people who will end up, if I can term it that way, oversaving, or do we have an exclusive system that protects those people from oversaving, but brings in or means that people who might benefit from automatic enrolment do not get the employer contributions.

It is very gendered in how we look at this as well. Women are disproportionately impacted if we go for an exclusion system, and disproportionately benefit if we come to an inclusive system. Whichever way you want to go, irrespective of what the contribution level is, you need to look at the mitigation—so, how you either, in an exclusive system, help those people to come into saving or, in an inclusive system, protect them from oversaving. That is one of the challenges the Commission is going to have to grapple with.

Carl Emmerson: The case for going for something bigger than 8% of qualifying earnings is really clear. There is a significant minority on DWP’s own numbers of middle earners undersaving, so we are talking 40%-plus. Those numbers will go up when we move to looking at it under the adjusted triple lock. If you take the first Pensions Commission’s report, it said we will do automatic enrolment, and actually that happened, and it has been successful at bringing people in. It said we will have these 8% defaults and that will bring about a load of additional saving, and it has been really successful at doing that and I think probably even more successful than was predicted on those things. It also said a whole load of additional voluntary saving would come on top of that, and that has not happened. Even the first Pensions Commission’s report was basically saying we needed more saving than we have ended up with. We know automatic enrolment works, it is really powerful; we just need to be careful about where we are using that power.

Jonathan Cribb: I think there is a big difference here: if you go to 12%, say, is it a default or is it a minimum? If we are going to increase it, are we going to allow people to save slightly lower, or if they want to save slightly lower do they have to leave entirely and go to zero? If you default people in at 12%—say 6% and 6% for employer and employee—and you do not let them, then you are making the choice of staying in or going out much starker than you are at, say, 8% of qualifying income.

  1.             Mr Peter Bedford: You would suggest some flexibility and agility in any policy change in this space, because it would perhaps allow lower earners to be able to participate more in the process?

Jonathan Cribb: I would agree that certainly the higher you push these default rates, the stronger the case is for allowing people to save, stay in a pension scheme, retain an employer contribution and save a little bit less, and that underlies various things that Carl and I proposed a couple of years ago, either allowing in extremis people to retain an employer contribution even if they did not save themselves, and/or being able to opt down to a lower level. That does increase flexibility, and it does at least give people the potential to do something different than just go, “I am opting out entirely” if they are financially stressed by default or minimum pension contributions.

  1.             Mr Peter Bedford: I am keen to hear views on how that could be split. If it was to go to 12% between employee and employer, there are different views on this. Some suggest it could be equally split between employee and employer. I am keen to get your views on that, given that at the moment, business in the UK is under a lot of pressure—there have been a lot of increases in taxation, inflation, and all those economic headwinds. How would that work in reality without having an adverse impact on the broader economy?

Chris Curry: I will take this one. A lot depends on implementation and how you go about doing it. I think the UK and the automatic enrolment system is quite unusual compared to international systems and to the previous system we had in the UK with the split between employer and employee contributions. Generally, the employer contribution tends to be higher where there is a mixed economy system. If you go right back to the underlying economics, if you give employers enough notice of a change coming, then actually, ultimately, all the contributions come from the employee as part of the remuneration. It is not necessarily completely that—there is potentially some impact on prices, there is some impact on employment—but if you give an employer enough notice, then they will adjust the remuneration package to make sure that earnings growth is slightly subdued to make up for the impact of the contribution that the employer is paying on the individual’s behalf.

  1.             Mr Peter Bedford: On that point about notice, what would you consider to be a reasonable period of notice for businesses to adapt to any potential change in this area?

Chris Curry: If you look back to the successful implementation of automatic enrolment and when it started to go ahead, we are talking about a minimum of five, probably up to 10 years. When it was introduced, it was introduced for larger employers first, at very low contribution levels, then the rest of the employers, and then slowly over time it increased over another two to three-year period, but that was set out a long time in advance and I think that is really important.

Where it does matter, because the delivery is important, is on incentives as well. If you have a large individual contribution and a small employer contribution, the incentive to opt out is that much greater, because you get back more of a contribution and you give up less to your employer. I will caveat that by saying we are not seeing a large number of people opting out at the moment, even though we have that imbalance. We know that the automatic enrolment is very sticky at the moment, but we do not know what that might be like at higher levels.

There is something about the delivery mechanism. There is something about it being a shared endeavour, I think, as well, between employer and employee and Government being in it all together. However, I think you would probably see a better long-term sustainable impact if it was more on the employer rather than the employee, assuming that you could give enough notice to allow employers to adjust, and assuming that you did not introduce it at a time when it was already very difficult for employers. I think you do have to look at the wider economic circumstances around the time of implementation as well.

Carl Emmerson: I can add a little bit to that. I definitely agree that giving plenty of notice and then going gradually is important. I think you want to encourage consideration of the national living wage to be done alongside that. If you are increasing costs on employers of employing people in one dimension, you might want to be just a bit more cautious in another dimension and think about the overall package. The case for slightly slower national minimum wage increases could be made if you are increasing employer contributions at that moment.

The other observation, and this is easier to hope for, I guess, is that it is probably easier to do in an environment where there is relatively strong nominal wage growth, and therefore the forecasts in the Budget from a couple of weeks ago suggesting that, at least in this decade, real terms income is not growing very fast makes it a difficult time. Clearly, if the mechanism is that employers are going to run wage growth slightly slower to offset the costs, it is probably easier for them to do if there is some wage growth in the system.

  1.             Mr Peter Bedford: We are talking about employers as one holistic group of people. Actually, they vary. There are large employers, small employers, and there are some sectors that may need additional support. What do you think could happen in this space policywise to ensure that maybe smaller employers, or employers in particular sectors, can play their part but also not be put out of business by these pressures?

Carl Emmerson: That is also where the giving plenty of notice and allowing gradual adjustment helps as well, because maybe the bigger employers can handle quick change more comfortably than smaller employers. They will have the systems to do that.

We also have to be very mindful that some sectors will get hit harder than others by any change and exactly how you change the system will have different consequences for different sectors. The other side of the what about low earners coin will be what about the sectors that disproportionately employ low earners.

Jonathan Cribb: It is also about that interaction of the national living wage in different sectors because we have a much higher minimum wage now. Although I agree with Chris that the evidence points to very high pass-through into wages, that is more difficult in the presence of a high national minimum wage or national living wage. What does that mean? That means if employees cannot pass it through, then minimum wage employees become more expensive to employ. That is, I think, what underlies—I would hope underlies—Carl’s point about moderating that.

Another thing I would say on small employers is about the administrative burden of automatic enrolment. Broadly, we have a system that was set up in part to try to minimise the burden on small employers, for whom it is harder to administer these things than it is for large companies with very large HR departments or finance departments. I think if you move away from the relatively simple system that we have to any other form of complexity—although I am not saying we should not consider that—we should consider how small employers are going to actually implement it.

  1.             Mr Peter Bedford: I am really concerned about the smaller businesses because, as you say, large companies can often adapt because they have huge HR departments, they have the infrastructure, they perhaps have reserves to do so, but if you are a small family-run business, if you are running a café or a local restaurant, then it is very difficult for you, when your margins are already very tight, to find additional contributions for a pension scheme.

Chris Curry: We have talked about the notice, we have talked about the time, we have talked about gradual implementations so people have time to adjust, but it is also I think a good example of where we have to look more broadly than just the pension system for some of these challenges. The difficulties faced by small employers, in much the same way as the difficulties faced by people on low incomes at the moment, are not necessarily issues that the pension system can solve, but they are ones that the pension system needs to be acutely aware of. I think this is where we probably need a more—we mentioned “holistic” earlier—holistic and joined-up approach across different policy areas.

Also, when you talk about the implementation, you might want to think about some of the implementation being conditional in what you are looking at. When automatic enrolment was introduced, it started in 2012. It originally aimed to be introduced earlier, it was delayed, and then the introduction of the increasing contributions was pushed back because of the economic conditions at the time. It is much easier to do that when you have a timetable in place and everything set out than it is to try to bring something forward quickly when you think the economic conditions are in the right place. That communication is really important, but if we are thinking about implementing this in 10 years’ time, there is a lot that can happen in the labour market, in earnings terms, in business, in the economy, and you might want to start thinking about how all these things interact and how you work with them in order to make it work when implementation does come.

A final point on this: one of the things that worked really well was the increases being introduced at the start of the financial year, which meant that there were other changes. Back in that decade, we had things such as changes in the personal allowance and national insurance thresholds, and that offset to a certain extent some of the changes that both employers and employees were seeing when they were making that change. So think about how you can work with other parts of the system to maybe make sure that the burden is shifting towards pensions but away from other aspects as well.

Mr Peter Bedford: Thank you very much.

Chair: We are on to John Milne now.

  1.             John Milne: This question is for you initially, Chris. In your 2017 review of auto-enrolment, you recommended removing the lower earnings limit altogether. Do you still think that? What do you think about the risks to lower income individuals?

Chris Curry: A lot has changed since the 2017 review, but unfortunately not in terms of implementing the recommendations; they are still outstanding. A lot of the issues that we were dealing with then still exist, and we have talked about a lot of them, including the challenges for low earners, and in particular those low earners who probably could benefit from being part of automatic enrolment and having higher contributions as part of automatic enrolment.

It is important to remember that the recommendation in 2017 was part of a package of recommendations. It was not stand-alone. We were also recommending that contributions or automatic enrolment started from age 18 rather than 22, and that we should bring in the self-employed into saving in some way, as then unspecified and I think as still unspecified at the moment, but it was really part of a package that was aiming to build on the introduction of automatic enrolment to make it become a social and cultural norm, so that pension saving is something that is just part of the workplace. So everybody, when they go into work or even if they work for themselves, makes a contribution. At that time, it would have been an 8% contribution that covered all their earnings, and it becomes a very simple message and something that becomes very easy for people to get behind and to understand.

The situation may be different now. I would still consider it as part of a package of reforms, but it has to be part of a package of reforms, and it depends on what else you are doing as to what the benefit might be. We are already seeing it being eroded slowly over time anyway. It was, I think, £5,800 back in 2017. It is only £6,200 now, so it is not really—

John Milne: A bit of fiscal drag. We love fiscal drag.

Chris Curry: Fiscal drag does help in that. Interestingly, however, there was also some research from Pensions UK that came out earlier this year, which was talking to people about their experiences of automatic enrolment. Many of them did not realise that the contributions were not being paid below the lower earnings limit, and they were not very happy with the fact and thought that their employers were maybe getting away with not making the full contributions because of that. I think there is a discussion to be had about how it plays with individuals, but also how it fits into a set of wider reforms because, as we have already talked about, there are challenges in particular around low earners. That does not mean you should not be doing it, but it means you need to be careful about how it interacts with other things, and you need to consider whether you want specific mitigations in that space.

John Milne: Qualified support, I think.

Jonathan Cribb: I have spoken already about scepticism about reducing the lower earnings limit down to zero, but can I pick up on a point on the fiscal drag idea? I think that whatever system the Pensions Commission recommends and then what the Government implement, if you have these levels that are fixed in cash terms, then you are at the mercy of whatever inflation happens to be in how many low earners you affect. I think there is a very good case that whatever levels they choose for a lower earnings limit, if it were not zero, and for the trigger, currently £10,000 above which you are automatically enrolled, that there is some form of uprating either in line with prices or earnings, because £10,000 now is not £10,000 10 years ago and is not £10,000 in 2040.

Carl Emmerson: Back in 2014, you had to be full-time on the national minimum wage to hit the earnings trigger. You now have to work about 15 hours a week because the £10,000 is the same number and the minimum wage has gone up a lot. If you take that person earning £10,000 a year doing their 15 hours a week on the national minimum wage, if you did reduce the LEL to zero, you would increase their pension saving by 5% of their earnings. That is quite a big boost to their savings. I think it is important to remember that concentrating the savings on them sits a bit uncomfortably with the idea that it is middle earners who are the most likely to be undersaving for retirement.

When we look at private sector employees, and I think this is really a conversation about private sector employees, and you take in these low-income families, or if you take couples, about a third of them have a higher earning partner. They are typically women. They may well have the resources to save more. It could well be a good thing if they save more. It would certainly reduce the gender pension gap. For about a third of them, their partner is also a low earner or is not working at all, and I think that they might currently be really struggling and potentially in poverty at the moment. Therefore, increasing their saving by something like 5% of their earnings might just look excessive. I think that is the difficult trade-off here.

Jonathan Cribb: I will pick up on the gender point. It is very clear that if you have things that get low earners saving more, disproportionately women, and they are going to end up with higher pensions in retirement, that would, all else equal, reduce the gender pensions gap, and I think there are good reasons to be concerned about those gaps. However, to the extent that we are thinking about those gender inequalities, including within the household—women and their partners or husbands—we also, again, need to think about those gender inequalities in working age. If women, low earners, saving more shrinks the gender pension gap, it increases the disparity in resources for working age women compared with their partners or husbands at a point where they are not supported by the equalising impact of the state pension.

I take no views on the level of inequality. It is not my job to do so. However, if you do not like inequality, what does women low earners saving mean? It means gender inequality getting better in retirement, and it means gender inequality getting worse in current resources.

  1.             John Milne: Thank you for that. Another argument for removing the lower earnings limit is to improve the incentive to opt in to pension saving for those 1.3 million low-paid workers with multiple jobs, all under £10,000 so they never hit the trigger. Do we have any idea how many actually do, and what would be effective in increasing those numbers or drawing them in?

Chris Curry: I do not have those figures to hand for how many opt in. My suspicion, but I will check, is that it is relatively low unless they are put in by an employer. If you are working for an employer who automatically enrols everybody irrespective of the rules—they are generally better employers with higher contributions that do that—then they will be in there.

One of the experiences we find from automatic enrolment, as well as it being sticky for people who are put in, is it does not actually affect people who are outside. We get very few people who are opting in to gain what they need to, which is why I think there has been some concerted efforts to try to find alternative ways of reaching those individuals who might have multiple jobs, who actually, if you look at their earnings in total, probably have enough to pass the automatic enrolment threshold but because they have different earnings from different employers, not any one single employer is responsible for putting them into a pension scheme. It is very difficult to see how you could do that administratively. I will go back and look to see if I can find any additional evidence, but I think there are very few who are in that situation who are actively opting in to get that pension.

  1.             John Milne: Given that, is that not a case for removing the 10K trigger?

Chris Curry: That is a different area, but it has the same issues that we have been talking about in terms of the low earners that you bring in and who you impact. It is a similar discussion on the lower earnings limit and the lower earnings trigger. The lower earnings limit affects a much broader group of people because that affects everybody. The lower earnings trigger just brings more people into automatic enrolment in dealing with that. With some of the things we have been talking about, on whether people would benefit or not, we still have almost exactly the same issue that we have been talking about, about whether a low earner would benefit from being automatically enrolled or whether a low earner might benefit from not pension saving or doing additional pension saving because of their current living standards and the cost of living challenges they face. It is another tricky question. Again, it is not one of the things that I think you can probably look at in isolation. It is what you need to consider as part of a wider package.

Going back to what Carl and Jonathan were saying earlier about fiscal drag, in some ways it can be used as a policy lever in bringing people in over a period of time in a gradual way. I am not sure whether it has actually been by design that the trigger has been left at that £10,000 in order to bring more people into automatic enrolment as much as anything else. Again, it goes back to what your objective is and who you think should be saving and who you think does not need to save, and that is always a difficult question.

John Milne: Thank you.

  1.             Patrick Hurley: You have mentioned the lower earnings limit and there is the perspective or the possibility, if it is removed, of an impact on lower earners. If the lower earnings limit is removed, what extra support needs to be put in place to make the extra contributions affordable?

Carl Emmerson: For some of these households, the household as a whole might be reasonably well off if they have a higher earning partner. For those who are on low incomes, or whose household is a low-income household, you really want to think about whether they are getting the Universal Credit to which they are entitled. Is their Universal Credit award taking into account their pension contributions correctly? It still means that if they put money into a pension they will have less to spend today, but their Universal Credit award will offset some of that because it will increase slightly when they put extra money into a pension, so the price of pension saving is not so great for them in that situation. You might worry more about the take-up of Universal Credit. You might worry more about whether we are administering it well. I think they are the key things I would point to.

Jonathan Cribb: I would agree, and I would particularly think about the take-up of Universal Credit. You have relatively small fractions of people on £10,000 to £15,000 in households receiving Universal Credit, something like 20% or so. Some of that is because of the higher earning spouses or partners, and some of it is because of lack of take-up.

Chris Curry: Sometimes it can be useful to look at what happens overseas in some of these examples as well as some of these cases. We have a challenge and a struggle here in the UK as well with a focus on long-term pension saving and a challenge, especially for low earners, of short-term financial resilience with what is happening day to day.

I was fortunate enough recently to be invited to go to South Africa to look at some of the policies that are being implemented there. One is the two-pot policy, where when they receive a contribution from their employer it is split into two different pots. One is invested long term as a pension contribution. One is available as a short-term emergency saving pot, which can be accessed once a year. The split is one-third, two-thirds. If you are looking at something that you are concerned about—an increase in contributions, a removal of the lower earnings limit or a removal of the earnings trigger—you might also want to consider whether there is a way in which you can allow that additional saving or that challenge for the low-income individual who is not with a high-earning partner or in a higher income household to be able to insulate themselves.

One of the things you can do is opt out, which I think Jonathan mentioned earlier, but another one might be to take the contribution but allow people to use it almost as a form of savings that they could use day to day to try to mitigate the reduction in their take-home pay by making some of it available to basically top it back up again if you wanted to. I know that the Centre for Inclusive Money has been looking at things like this, which are similar to the two-pot system, not identical. I think they call it the pension adjacent emergency savings account, previously known as the sidecar.

There are ideas out there that will provide some mitigation and allow people to protect themselves if we think we are taking too much from them, if it allows people who we think should be saving and will benefit from that saving to do so. I think there is a way in which we might want to look at more creative solutions in that space as well.

  1.             Patrick Hurley: Another way of saying creative solutions is added layers of complexity. There is a trade-off here because you want people to be able to understand what is happening with their money and their pension contributions. Where do you sit on this trade-off between creative solutions and people understanding what they are paying in and how they can get it back?

Chris Curry: I am very pragmatic on this. I think simplicity is probably really important, as I was saying about the 2017 review, in establishing a cultural norm and a social norm about pension saving. I think the simpler the message that you can give people, and how you can bring it to bear over time—this is what we have seen in Australia, but we have also seen to a certain extent in the UK with low opt-out rates—once pension saving becomes part of the normal workplace, then actually that makes it more powerful and helps meet other objectives for pension saving as part of that as well. I think that is easier to do if it is kept simple, but there is always a trade-off in pensions and there is this simplicity of a nice, easy system to administer for employers that people will understand—that people will get—while also wanting to make sure that you are not harming individuals at the same time as doing that.

I think something like a dual account system is probably easier than lots of different thresholds and cut-offs. It is certainly easier to get across and to establish that baseline norm, but again what is important is what you put in the package and how it all sits, rather than necessarily any one individual component.

Jonathan Cribb: I totally agree with that. You can imagine one bit of extra complexity. There might be cases for three or four different types, but I think the case of extra complexity on top of another one on top of another one becomes lower, basically.

  1.             Patrick Hurley: Jonathan, still with you—Carl, if you would like to come in feel free—you have both made the case for allowing low earners to opt out while retaining the employer contribution. This will have attracted objections and challenges. Talk us through what those challenges are and where they have come from and how you have met them.

Jonathan Cribb: Okay. Maybe I can start and then Carl can come in. We proposed this a few years ago. It is quite a different structure to the current system, where to get an employer contribution you have to make an employee contribution. We thought that there were good grounds to broaden pension saving, not only to the low earners who are not included in automatic enrolment, but there is still 10% or so of disproportionately low earners of people who opt out of automatic enrolment. Pension policy is relatively slow moving. I think we got a better pick-up than I would have expected, given it was quite a major suggested change.

On the two key counters we got, one was about the administration of a system to small employers. Any change to the current system is going to take some time to work through. The second is a little bit of the communication side of how you communicate a system potentially where you get X% of earnings from an employer for everybody and on top of that you might have an employee contribution that is a more complicated function of earnings. I think those are the two things we got.

Carl Emmerson: The motivation for proposing it was that automatic enrolment has got loads more people into pensions. Maybe the incentive of the employer contribution has done a bit, too, but it is almost certainly small relative to the big nudge. Therefore, it is at least worth considering that if we said that the employer contribution was, say, 3% of all earnings flat for all employees, and we will opt you in with an employee contribution and you can opt out of that if you want, the win would be, as Jonathan says—if you started that at the first pound, you would also include all the low earners—you would be getting something into all their pots. You would have a few more people opting out, almost certainly—I think that is true, but that might be a trade-off worth making. I am not sure if we had introduced this from the start we would have described it as a more complicated system. It just looks different from what we currently have.

Patrick Hurley: I think I will end there. Thank you, Chair.

  1.             Damien Egan: My question to wrap up is: what happens next and in what order? One of the messages that came through was that any changes should be made gradually so that employers have time to implement. Also, perhaps it was mentioned last time, the application was with larger employers first. I do not know if there are any reflections on that. However, assuming the Pensions Commission recommends a range of reforms—minimum contribution rates, lower earnings limits and the scope of auto-enrolment—do you have any thoughts or reflections on the ordering and sequencing of how that should be done?

Carl Emmerson: I would suggest, if the Government are sure they want to go ahead, legislating early with a clear timetable and going gradually once things start to come in is the right thing to do. I would probably prioritise increasing from 8% up of qualifying earnings first and I would not do that differentially by employer size. I would do that uniformly across employers. I would then, maybe at the same time, if I was attracted to the suggestion that Jonathan and I put forward as a possibility of having non-contingent employer contributions, I might see if there were some big employers out there who might be willing to trial that to see what happens. I think it is a bit of an unknown about whether there are any things that we have not noticed or whether the opt-outs would increase to an unacceptable degree. Maybe you could persuade some people to try it out and see what happens. You could run that trial at the same time.

I think having got to 12% or wherever you get to, then you can think about whether you want to be easing the LEL down, for example. That would have to be lowered very gradually, I would suggest, because you do not want to drop that to zero quickly. It is a big increase in saving and therefore could be a big drop in take-home pay from one month to the next.

Jonathan Cribb: I agree with essentially all of that. I think the only thing is there is also some value in stability here. With a model in which you have four to five years of waiting, plus every single year a changing level, and then after you have got to 12 you go down the LEL each year, I think there is some value in getting towards a medium run that does not necessarily involve change every year.

Chris Curry: I would be pragmatic. I think it depends on what the package is as to what works. If you are increasing contributions and you think you need mitigations, you need to be introducing the mitigations at the same time as the increases. It is no good introducing them afterwards because you might already have done the damage by then. I think what is really important is to be mindful of what works and what will last. I think it is important that you do not try to go too quickly. It is important that people have lots of notice, because what you are trying to put in place is a system that you want to last for decades. What you do not want to do is to cause difficulty, implement it at the wrong time, try to do it too quickly and have unintended consequences. You need to be mindful of the time it is going to take to do it, but also what else is going on around it.

There were changes in the implementation of automatic enrolment to begin with. I think that has helped them land. The way that they were introduced gradually meant that people did not really notice the changes as they came in. If you can do something similar with any further changes, then that makes it more powerful and more likely to be sustainable going forward.

It very much depends on what package you put in as to what measures you want, as to how you might want to do it, but try to work in a way that is as little disruptive as possible and potentially offset by other changes that you are making at the same time.

  1.             Damien Egan: Thank you. Now you have answered my next question, which was going to be whether you agree with Pensions UK that the priority should be the increase in the minimum contribution rates. I feel like you would agree with that.

If I may—I know it is out of scope of the Commission—I did want to get your reflections on the tax relief on pension contributions. I was surprised. There was a study by Hargreaves Lansdown last year and one by PensionBee this year, which showed that most people do not know about tax relief on pension contributions, yet HMRC has found that when they do know they are more likely to pay in and contribute more money. We talked about that small group that still opt out. In terms of the value for savers and encouraging people to save, how important do you feel those tax reliefs are?

Jonathan Cribb: There are a couple of things. We know that there are some people who are more likely to respond to these tax reliefs than others; for example, self-employed people are more likely to change their pension saving and indeed save in a pension as a result of tax relief and how it changes for people who have basic rate versus higher rate tax. They respond more than employees. Broadly, I think there is a good principled case for maintaining the income tax relief up front at the rate you face in the system that we have in which you are taxed on the income of a pension rather than the contributions.

Whatever system we end up with ultimately—whatever your views on pension taxation, I think there is some value in a stable system that does not have too much speculation around it.

Chris Curry: I think the evidence that I have seen suggests that tax relief has a limited impact in terms of incentives and changing savings behaviour, unless people have advisers or understand the system. That generally tends to be at the higher end of the earnings distribution rather than the lower end of the earnings distribution.

In fact, one of the things that was trialled—and may still be important in the automatic environment—was trying to rebadge the tax relief as a positive government contribution towards pension saving as part of that, with the feeling that might resonate more with people who are not used to working in that world of tax relief. We certainly see—we talked about voluntary saving levels earlier, where there are high levels of voluntary saving—that that tends to be higher earners, where they are maximising tax relief in what they are doing as part of that.

Also, if I can go even further beyond the scope, it is starting to look at inheritance tax as well, for example, and estate planning. Using pensions for that has become something that has grown as people understand the value of the tax relief or the tax system and how that operates. It is not necessarily something that will impact on the group that we are most interested in here, I think—so, on lower earners and maybe even median earners where the decisions are much more marginal and where people do not necessarily choose where they want to save, which I think is where it has the most impact at the moment.

Carl Emmerson: The parts of the tax system that I would describe as being particularly favourable to pensions include the national insurance break, so that pension contributions made by an employer escape employer and employee national insurance contributions, both on the way in and the way out of the pot. I think that is really opaque and I do not expect very many people at all understand that.

The other big tax incentive comes from the 25% that you can take free of income tax, which I think is very salient. Certainly, as someone who has suggested that we might be able to target that better, I have seen quite an adverse response from many people to that. I think that probably is clearer to people and does have the attractiveness of being a relatively stable part of the system, as I say, with high salience. Whereas I think the national insurance tax break, which is really rather generous, is not very well understood at all.

Chair: Thank you so much. That concludes our first panel for this first oral evidence session in our pensions adequacy for low earners on auto-enrolment. I am going to have to get better at saying that. Thank you so much, everyone. It has been really enlightening.

 

Examination of witnesses

Witnesses: Zoe Alexander, Dr Daniella Jenkins, Will Sandbrook and Jack Jones.

  1.             Chair: Welcome back to the inquiry on pensions adequacy for low earners on auto-enrolment. It is a pleasure to have our second panel with us. We have Zoe Alexander, who is Chief Policy Officer for Pensions UK, Dr Daniella Jenkins, who is the Director of the Women’s Budget Group, Will Sandbrook, who is CEO for the Centre for Inclusive Money, and Jack Jones, Pensions Officer from the TUC. A warm welcome to you all.

I am going to start the questions. The first one I want to put to you is in relation to the triple lock adjustments that have been announced by the Government. What does the Government’s planned adjustment mean for how much low earners need to save overall? Who would like to start with that?

Zoe Alexander: I am happy to start off. I am very pleased to be here, and thanks for inviting Pensions UK to the Committee. I would agree with the previous panel that having the triple lock adjusted has made the job clearer and has put more pressure on the private system to do the job that we all know it needs to do. What we would like to see, famously, is contributions to rise from 8% to 12%. We think that is incredibly important and urgent.

The previous panel quoted some research by London Economics for the People’s Pension, which did some modelling around the impacts and showed that for a median earner heading for a 62-replacement rate, under the adjusted triple lock this would change to 55% and raising AE contributions to 12 would only get them to 67% replacement rate. Albeit that we saw this coming, it does have an impact and it does place more onus on the private savings system to do its job.

  1.             Chair: Yes, I think it is correct to say that the first Pensions Commission suggested that the state pension needed to be pegged with earnings at 30%. We are at that now, aren’t we? When the adjustment is made, it will still be just above that 30%. It will keep it slightly above what was anticipated 20 years ago.

Can I just think about those who are solely reliant on the state pension? I think it is still one in eight currently who are reliant solely on the state pension. What might this mean to them?

Dr Jenkins: Perhaps I can come in here, because many of those one in eight are actually women. Women are much more likely to be financially reliant solely on the state pension as they age. It is really important. Triple lock gets a lot of flak, but it has done a really good job since 2011 to raise the state pension, to bring people into financial dignity and ensure that fewer people are reliant on things like pensions credit.

When we look at the intended changes—now obviously we need to work through the detail of that—and when we look at the adjusted lock, looking at our modelling, we think that if you look at the adjusted earnings aspect of that, probably the triple lock if left unchanged would outrun the adjusted model by around 0.5% per year. That does not sound like a lot, bearing in mind that these changes will not come in until 2030, for example. Where we think that that really might affect women is in terms of longevity, because that happens over time.

Because women live longer, they are more likely to start to feel that pinch, and we project that more women are likely, if they are living beyond, say, the age of 80 to 85, for example, to then meet the threshold potentially for pensions credit. However, those who are likely to be most squeezed are those who are reliant on the state pension financially but do not quite meet the threshold for pensions credit.

Thinking about those who are coming through—because obviously this is not just about those who are in retirement now, it is those who are coming towards retirement—Women’s Budget Group wants to ring the alarm bells for women in their 50s. That might sound old, but I would say that that is the Spice Girls’ age, so they are not actually that old.

If a woman is born in 1975, for example, we know that those women are less likely to have benefited from auto-enrolment because auto-enrolment has not been in place for that long. We know that those women are likely to have around £15,000 in private pensions income if they are solely reliant on DC. When you take that financial effect of that change into account, by the time they reach state pension age at 67, they will be losing £1,000 a year compared to now. If they then reach 85, 86, they would be losing £3,500 a year. That is taking into account all the other inequities that those women will be carrying forward into retirement.

Because of that small amount of private pensions income, these women would not necessarily be eligible for pensions credit. We think that there is a policy imperative now to recognise the projected impact of those changes, particularly for those women—those Spice Girl-age women—who could benefit from targeted pensions interventions now and we know will not be able to catch up, even if they increase their contributions into an auto-enrolment.

  1.             Chair: Jack and Will, what would you think?

Jack Jones: I would agree with Zoe’s points on what the impact is in terms of providing a lot of clarity around what we will need from the occupational side of things. It does mean that that state pension is going to remain probably a little bit below any needs-based assessment of what the minimum income is going to be. That means that everybody will need to build up some workplace pension.

It probably means that, because that state pension is going to be a bit lower than was projected, we are in the Pensions Commission’s modelling, and its low volatility scenario, which means over half of workers are not on track to meet their target retirement rates, with about 18% falling below the Pensions UK minimum standards. Almost all of those are going to be low and medium earners. You need to make sure that you have more people in the system, that they are building up their pension wealth a little bit faster, and that you have a system that does a good job of turning those quite modest contributions over a working life into a retirement income.

That is something that does not do particularly well at the moment. However, we are moving in the right direction with things like guided retirement, things like collective DC, where you have systems that are better set up to deliver a retirement income out of those fairly low levels of retirement wealth.

In terms of the impact on current pensions, obviously it is not going to have a huge impact right now, because the impact of changing the block accumulates over time. I would agree with Daniella that—I call them Gen X rather than the Spice Girls generation, but I might rethink that—there are a lot of people who are potentially going to have a lot less defined benefit pension contributions, perhaps not at all, when they retire. They will not have an auto-enrol from the start of their career, and they definitely will not have had much time to benefit from the changes that we are looking at now to increase that going in.

I think that the only way you are going to tackle poverty among those groups is the social security system, and things like tackling that cliff edge that means people are just above pension credit. They do not get pension credit, but they miss out on all those passported benefits that are associated with that.

Looking at housing, which is a little bit out of scope, that clearly has such a big impact on people’s retirement incomes and what they need from their retirement income. Therefore, looking at more generous support, people in private rented accommodation, those measures are worth it and can have the greatest impact on tackling poverty for people either retired now or retiring in the next 10 or 15 years.

Will Sandbrook: I do not have a great deal to add. I would agree with everything that was said in the previous panel and, in particular, just to echo that it clearly does somewhat increase the focus on private saving for lower earners, since that is where the gap is created. In turn—as we will get on to—that therefore increases the importance of making sure that the private pension savings system is designed in a way that works for low earners holistically and mitigates some of the challenges that we may talk about.

  1.             Chair: Cutting to the nuts and the bolts now—Jack and Daniella, if you could go first, please—what would your specific recommendations be to the Second Pensions Commission about this?

Dr Jenkins: Avoid a new set of WASPI women coming through. We should really be talking about 1970s-aged women. We should be putting that focus on now. We can avoid it. We can kick that can down the road, but what we will be seeing is crystallised pensioner poverty in the future. That would be a targeted focus, looking at both the pension system but all the other aspects for that age cohort in particular to avoid them reaching that cliff edge when they do reach state pension age.

Jack Jones: We need to increase contributions, particularly employer contributions. There are other measures that were talked about in the earlier session around the low earnings limit and the earnings threshold to bring in more low-paid people. Also, as touched on in my previous answer, more collective pensions, risk sharing, pensions that do a better job of providing an income for life and that spread risk among members better.

Zoe Alexander: Yes, I would just support the Spice Girls point, and it is worth quoting the figure that 35% of Gen Xers are on track to not reach the Pensions UK minimum retirement living standard. That is a really low base. It is just above where we think the state pension is going to get to, and that is just not good enough. We have a political moment now to increase contributions. That is the fundamental message. I will say it one more time at least. If we don’t do that—you know, we had a Pensions Commission 20 years ago. We have another one now. We cannot wait another generation. This is urgent and really meaningful.

Having said all that, there are a load of issues that we need to think about very hard around low earners and how we balance their needs. We will, of course, get on to that, but we have proposed in our response that the Pensions Commission looks really hard at the lower earnings limit, and looks hard at the earnings trigger, thinking about how they might be reduced, but also what that means in terms of the easements you might need to put in place for lower earners. It is critical that we address that as well.

Will Sandbrook: I would very strongly echo what Zoe has just said. We believe there is a very strong argument for a path to higher overall contributions under automatic enrolment and clarity over what that path and timeframe look like. As part of that—to the point that was made in the previous panel about the choices between inclusivity and exclusivity—aspirationally, I think that path should be about a move towards a system that is both more adequate and more inclusive and ideally should bring in as many people as possible. Ideally, it would include calculating contributions from the first pound of pay.

However, as Zoe rightly says, from our perspective, what matters to make all that work is a clear articulation of the extent to which that does create specific challenges for lower earners. If it does—which we believe it may—there needs to be a clear articulation of what the mitigations within that more adequate and inclusive overall system should be to help knock the edges off those impacts for lower earners.

  1.             John Milne: Talking about minimum contribution levels, the Second Pensions Commission believes that the majority of people earning less than 10K a year could actually probably afford to save, and it puts the figure as high as 85%. Do you agree with that, Zoe?

Zoe Alexander: I think that is based on some research that Pensions UK did with PPI a few years ago now, two or three years ago. It is important to recognise that picture, and that is true, but actually affordability concerns and constraints go way above £10,000. People earning between £10,000 and £20,000, for instance, are often in material deprivation. That is the figure that the Centre for Inclusive Money has highlighted. It comes back to: we have some persistent low earners who are in households and can afford to contribute. It is very important from our perspective that they do, that they build meaningful savings in their own right. A lot of those people are women. A lot of those people might end up divorced and need meaningful savings to get them through.

There are also people who are living with another low earner, so it is a mixed picture. There is no absolute perfect answer to this, which is why we get into these more complex debates around flexibilities and how you allow the system to account for that.

Jack Jones: I would agree with most of that. There are clearly a lot of people who are at a threshold who would benefit from saving more into a workplace pension, whether that is because they are in a higher earning household, or potentially if they are on Universal Credit and they would not see much of the actual additional take-home pay in terms of higher actual income. However, there are clearly people who still should be opting out.

It is a bit of a mixed picture when you look at the positives of people not opting out or not ceasing to contribute through things like cost of living crises and through covid. Clearly, there are some people who probably should have opted out, so they have to be a bit aware of just how sticky the defaults are.

John Milne: It is definitely difficult, but we have to go one way or the other.

Jack Jones: Yes. I think the benefits of bringing in more people probably outweighs that. Again, you can think about those mitigations and how you can design a system that allows people to potentially opt out without losing all the benefits of being enrolled, certainly.

Dr Jenkins: I think we have to be transparent. We have to name the issue here. Seven out of 10 of those people who are earning under £10,000 a year are women. When we are talking about in households, what we are actually talking about is gender differences in pensions within households, where women will experience pensioner poverty in a household that is not poor.

Now, there may be much better mechanisms to deal with the gendered elements that are happening. You could deal with that at the crystallisation point, for example, with things like joint annuities. Yes, we absolutely think that women should have adequate pensions of their own. We can look at all the mitigations around relationship breakdown, for example, but I think that we are here to talk about lower earners and taking money out and assuming that people who are earning as little as £10,000 a year can afford to put more into pensions is almost perverse when we look at the cost of living crisis, where people are in energy debt, in utility debt and in debt overall. Therefore, when we are looking at the impact of coming into an auto-enrolment system, we have to take a 360-degree view of what that means for individuals and their circumstances as well.

As we have already said, when we are talking about reliance on state pensions, these are people who are most likely to need that money when they reach retirement. We should do a deep dive distributional analysis, recognising the impact specifically on women and the issues that specifically relate to women, rather than taking a broad-brush view, which could detrimentally impact those double low-income households that really could not afford to come into the system as it stands today.

John Milne: Thank you for that. Will, do you have anything to add?

Will Sandbrook: Yes. I think any system with a single default number in it is going to work better for some people and less well for other people. The Commission has done a really good job of setting out some of the reasons why, on the face of it, this might be difficult for low earners. It is nuanced and there are a lot of people living on low incomes but not in lower overall income households. There is the mitigating effect of Universal Credit. The Commission does a great job of setting out all those issues.

From our perspective, we would worry that there will be a residual of people who are on low incomes for whom the impact on their take-home pay of a higher pension contribution framework creates some acute trade-offs in the short term, which could really be quite difficult, and that the choice of opt-out versus stay in and face some of those trade-offs is quite a binary choice.

  1.             John Milne: In that context—and this will apply to everyone as well—are there specific mitigations we could give for the 15% or however large that number is?

Will Sandbrook: You heard about some of them from the previous panel. The mitigations set list includes several options—from our perspective, we have talked a lot about emergency savings. Do you allow some of the individual contribution that someone is making to sit in an accessible account, which offsets some of the acuteness of that trade-off? People talked earlier about opportunities to opt down without losing entitlement to the employer contribution or, indeed in extremis, non-contingent employer contributions. I think this is the right menu of potential mitigations to be thinking about, but I would say again, in order to make it possible to do the thing that I would hope we would be aspiring to do, which is to make the overall system more adequate while enabling it to remain inclusive.

John Milne: Any other mitigations?

Zoe Alexander: I think it is worth making the point that when we are talking about the overall contribution rate on its own, from the Pensions UK perspective at least we are talking about putting 1% on the contribution rate for employees and raising the employer contribution rate from 3% to 5%. So, 1% is 1%, but we are not talking about a significant rise. The much more significant impact is around the lower earnings limit, so we separate those two things out and say that we should have a national council for retirement adequacy looking and reviewing how the lower earnings limit might be tapered down, because that is a finely balanced judgment.

When it comes to mitigations, we did a piece of research called Closing the Gaps earlier this year, where we looked at flexibilities in the system. By and large, when we spoke to individuals and employers, they favoured a simpler system. There was a sense from employees who we spoke to—who were from a mix of earnings levels, it is really important to say—felt perhaps they should be contributing more. They were concerned about the complexities involved in things like opting down or pensions-adjacent savings accounts.

That does not mean we do not think those things are worthy of more exploration, but I think some of the mitigations discussed by the previous panel—particularly the non-contingent employer contributions and the opting down—require more research to understand the behavioural impacts and the extent to which people might be more inclined to opt down or feel the system is unfair if you introduce those mitigations.

  1.             John Milne: Thank you. Lastly, how significant is the affordability challenge and should we proceed with legislating for a timetable to increase contributions before we even know how we are going to address it? Is it reasonable to go ahead when we do not know how we are going to solve that problem?

Jack Jones: Are we talking affordability for employees?

John Milne: Yes.

Jack Jones: I think the key there is to put the emphasis on employer contributions. That is partly why looking at employer contributions first before you look at things like a lower earnings limit makes sense. It is also why there is a really good case for, I think—going beyond the Pensions UK standard—a balanced 6% and 6% approach to actually put all that increase on the employer.

We are quite ambitious and we would like to get to 15%, but if you got to 12% and you had that mix of 7% from the employer, 5% from the employee, you would be getting back towards where we were historically in terms of what a normal contribution structure looked like, where you would normally get one-third from the employee and two-thirds from the employer. You would be bringing us more into line with most of the international comparisons we look at, where we are very unusual in expecting more from the employee than the employer.

We need to do that, and we need to certainly load those contributions on to employers first so that if you do end up going for a 6% and 6% structure, you increase the employer contributions before you touch the employee contributions. That would go a long way to doing that. Then again, you have the mitigations to look at things like non-contingent contributions for the lowest paid. It is certainly very well worth exploring.

  1.             John Milne: Do others agree or do we think that is unfair on the employers?

Dr Jenkins: We certainly agree at the Women’s Budget Group that we should look at employer contributions first, but also recognising the fact that, under the current set-up, that does mean that that is a cost to business—it is a cost to employment. We know that looking at evidence from the IFS, for example, when we looked at the impact of national insurance contributions—we can argue that separately—actually what we saw was a retraction in lower paid and part-time roles, so it could have a perverse effect overall in terms of roles.

We suggested at the Women’s Budget Group—I saw that you were speaking with the previous panel about pensions tax relief—that pensions tax relief could be repurposed. Instead of incentivising the individual to put more in their pensions, that could be repurposed to incentivise the employers, so to mitigate the cost to employment of increased contributions.

Now, there is a lot of money up for grabs in terms of pensions tax relief. Between £50 billion and £60 billion a year is lost to the exchequer currently and, as we heard in the previous panel, that is mainly benefiting the higher earners. We think that a progressive system that looks at helping employers to play a greater role—as the TUC has indicated—in terms of pensions contributions, but supported by a pensions tax relief system, would help to create a sustainable, fairer system over time.

Jack Jones: Can I just come back in? Looking at where employers are particularly stretched at the moment is very sensible, obviously, but I think there are ways of supporting those employers that are completely separate from the issues that you are talking about today, through things like business rates relief for pubs and clubs and shops and so on. It feels like that is a much more desirable way to support those employers rather than looking at some kind of pension-specific way. Obviously, people’s needs in retirement are the same regardless of what sector they are working in and there is a need for a decent pension. We should look at the pensions question separate from all those other issues of how you support areas of the economy that are struggling with high energy costs or with particular issues around their business models.

  1.             Rushanara Ali: We are going to have to stop in a couple of minutes, but just briefly. I need to declare an interest. I sit on the board of the Sisters Trust, which has made donations to the Women’s Budget Group, Chair.

The trends around inequality—which was picked up in the previous session, and you have already alluded to it—mean that you have worse outcomes for women, low paid workers and so on. We can already see the medium and longer-term labour market trends, where we are going to see certain jobs disappear with the rise of AI and so on. Can you talk through what the implications of that for the thinking around contributions and how much those inequalities are likely to be exacerbated in the system?

Zoe Alexander: It might be worth talking a little bit about self-employment because, of course, the rise of AI and other economic trends are pushing towards many more people being self-employed. We would really like to see a systematic approach to automatically enrolling self-employed people via the tax system and payroll systems to make sure that we are bringing them into saving because, as we know, there is an enormous self-employed savings gap. It is worth highlighting that as part of the answer to your question. I wonder if I should pause.

Chair: I think that is very good of you, if that is okay. We are now going to suspend the sitting for two minutes to mark Armistice Day.

The Committee observed a two-minute silence.

On resuming—

Chair: We are resuming the second panel for our oral evidence hearing on the pensions adequacy inquiry. I am going to hand back to Rushanara Ali.

Rushanara Ali: Thank you very much. Daniella, do you want to come in on that?

Dr Jenkins: Yes. I am just thinking about my answer. I find this quite a difficult question to answer, actually, because in truth we have a flawed system. We would not be here today if we did not recognise that the current UK pension system is flawed. We know from lots of evidence from this panel, the previous panel, that people are not saving enough—if we frame it that way—for retirement. We know that we are increasingly reliant on a financialised pension system, investment returns, and employment is increasingly fragile. We have a number of uncertainties, whether that is for women, paid and unpaid work, or workers overall.

If we take learnings from the 2005-2006 Commission, I would say that we really need to examine the fragility of the system that we are building, but also to build in checkpoints. What if so many of those assumptions do not come true? This is affecting people’s lives in real time, now. They are working now, but what can they expect in the future?

I do not have glamorous answers around self-employment or what AI will mean in terms of the impact of employment, but I think that there is a real hazard in us making assumptions around the long-term projections, around longevity, around employment patterns, and baking that into a system where those assumptions may well not pan out.

Will Sandbrook: I think your question about future dynamics of the labour market is a really interesting one. I would add that some of the things we are talking about in the here and now can potentially help with that. Therefore, as Zoe points out, thinking about how we expand automatic enrolment to the self-employed—which I will say a bit more about in a minute—but also when we talk about things like multiple jobs below the £10,000 threshold, considering the possibility that in the future the labour market might look like more people doing a bit of self-employment and a bit of employment, or who have volatile incomes or insecure attachment to the labour market. Designing a system that works for those people may help to future-proof some of the future trends in the labour market from the pension system perspective that you are describing.

Specifically on the self-employed, we have done a fair amount of work on this. We are publishing some more work next week and, broadly speaking, I would agree that finding a way to create an automatic enrolment-like moment for the self-employed to bring more of those people into the pension system is really important. I would tend to agree—we talk about this in our work—that there is a central role for the tax and self-assessment system within that, although we would suggest that that on its own may not be enough.

There are some challenges with a one-time annual contribution moment for the self-employed that we think could result in relatively higher rates of opt-out if that is the model on its own. We have also tried to do some thinking around how you get the broader ecosystem for the self-employed, things like their banking services, their accountancy services. How do you build a role for those things in to create more of a little and often savings habit for the self-employed that can then contribute to their pension?

We do aspire to levels of participation among the self-employed that come anywhere close to what we have seen among traditionally employed workers, but we are going to need a system that perhaps goes a little bit beyond that one-time self-assessment intervention.

Jack Jones: First, I hope we do not move to a labour market that is more unequal and insecure and fragmented. If we do, the only way of mitigating that, I think, through the pension system is probably through a greater role for the state pension, just looking at it broadly.

Coming back to the point of the self-employed, it is a really important one when we think about low pay, because half of self-employed people are on two-thirds of the median wage or less. A greater proportion of self-employed women, ethnic minority workers, disabled workers, there is a lot of low pay. It is hard to design an auto-enrolment style system that works for people on low pay in the absence of an employer contribution.

If you have low pay, and even if you can afford to make the contributions that are automatically deducted from you, it does not result in—the incentives are quite low, first of all, if you are a basic-rate taxpayer, certainly, and particularly if you are being asked to make that contribution biannually or annually, it is a difficult sell, I think. The outcomes are not very good either.

That is why in our submission to the Commission we looked at basically an additional state pension for the self-employed, where you would make a contribution, additional NICs as a percentage of your self-employed income, and you would get some flat rate additional state pension as a result of that.

If you are looking at other alternatives you could have a funded collective DC self-employed pension scheme, where you could have different accrual rates for different incomes. I think there needs to be something that will make it a bit more attractive for the low-paid self-employed and get better outcomes for those people as well.

  1.             Rushanara Ali: Thank you. There is quite a lot of consensus around removing the lower earnings threshold, provided there are mitigations. I was struck by Chris Curry’s comments—I think it was Chris Curry—about how working age disparities are worse, obviously, in certain groups, and that just will play out. If you have a trade-off, either you have the disparity during working age, or in retirement.

If we wanted that not to happen, what are your suggestions? What else would you suggest the Government do to make sure that by encouraging people—low earners—to save for later, they are not worse off now? What else should be done to prevent that, especially given the pressures right now of bringing up families and so on?

Jack Jones: I think it is repeating things that I and other people have said already, but it is—

Rushanara Ali: In addition to what you have said, do you have any suggestions for things that the Government should avoid doing so that they are not baking in these inequalities further in order to change the outcome later?

Jack Jones: I think the additional point is thinking carefully about how you communicate it. That is particularly for people who are on Universal Credit and might feel some pressure to opt out, but actually would not get very much of that benefit because it will have an impact on their Universal Credit take. That is a little different to how opt-outs are handled at the moment, so I think something quite specifically targeted there, and maybe even thinking about whether you would want to re-enrol people more often.

If you are looking at things like non-contributions, maybe you might want to look at whether you would communicate that differently and then basically say what you can do if you opt out in case there is a short-term financial pressure—

  1.             Rushanara Ali: So examples like the South African model would be helpful?

Jack Jones: Yes.

Rushanara Ali: Does anyone else want to come in?

Dr Jenkins: I think non-contingent employer contributions are important. That sounds like a really techy term, but you can do certain things with that. You can just say, “Do you know what, just hold it”. So even if I opt out because I need that money right now, at least I am not losing my employer contributions. That is one form of non-contingent employer contribution.

You can actually make that much more progressive than it is currently. Why is it that the 3% that I earn, if I am earning £15,000, is less in cash terms than that 3% that I am going to get from my employer if I am earning £50,000 or above?

We could, for example, look at tapering employer contributions and making them non-contingent, so that in cash terms we are giving more to those lower earners who we know are more likely to have fewer options in retirement. That means they are building up bigger pots over time while we are actually ensuring, in the case of those who have those options—higher earners—not just in terms of other investment vehicles but to actually leverage the ability to be able to negotiate or bargain with their employers on their pension terms, that we allow that.

That was the thinking behind auto-enrolment, right? It was supposed to be the equivalent of going on a diet. It was about willpower, but we know that for lower earners it is not about willpower. It is about affordability, so we should be building that into the system and, for those who have choice and agency, we can enable them to exercise that.

Will Sandbrook: I would just step back a bit and say, look, if you start with the Pensions UK structure of a 12% overall contribution rate from the first pound of pay, for lower earners a significantly increased amount of money is going into their pension just from the 6% that comes from the employer because it is calculated from the first pound and it is higher. For a lower earner on the current regime, they have a significantly lower than 8% overall contribution because of the effect of those thresholds.

That creates some opportunity to then think, within the bit that is directly affecting take-home pay, within the 6% individual contribution, about what else can you do, given this higher overall baseline of pension saving, to try to target and mitigate some of the things that have been discussed today and that people are worried about? To an extent, all the menu of things that people are describing, be that allowing lower earners to opt out of their individual contribution but retain the employer contribution or to opt down from 6% and retain the employer contribution, these are all variants on what you do with the 6% that the individual is contributing.

The reason we have made the argument around PAESA or sidecar savings is because we actually think it does the job of all those other things with some added advantages. If a portion of the individual’s contributions is going to an emergency savings account, it mitigates some of the risks of locking that money away because they can access it if they need it today. In that sense, it is partially non-contingent because you are not requiring a full pension contribution to get the employer contribution, but you are still requiring some behavioural connection between the two things.

Then there are a broader set of benefits from helping people to be more financially resilient in the short term, both for their capacity to be good long-term pension savers, but also just in the round today, including higher productivity at work, and lower use of the healthcare system. However, I just go back to the point that if we can get to that 12% for everybody as a base case, it creates a lot more flexibility—I know there are questions about complexity, and I am sure we will come on to those—for a little bit more targeting within the individual contribution to try to make sure that higher pension saving is predominantly focused on middle and higher earners where the adequacy challenge is the greatest. There is still a higher baseload of retirement saving going on for the individual and then that little bit more flexibility about how you target to mitigate some of the things you might be worried about in the margins.

  1.             Damien Egan: This is a question to you all. It came up in the last panel as well. Do we need more evidence to understand which employers would be impacted by this and targeted support that might be needed and which sectors we should be looking at? Do you have any idea how we help mitigate some of those additional costs to those people?

Zoe Alexander: If you look at the Pensions Commission’s work—and there is lots of evidence to suggest that large employees, by and large, are more likely to be contributing at these levels already, if not more than that, right? We are really talking about small to medium employers. We did a survey recently with them asking them about their contribution rates going up, and I was quite surprised by the level of understanding and anticipation that rates might rise.

We found 71% of employers with between 10 and 250 employees said that if they were given at least two years’ notice and contributions were phased, they would support rising contributions. That surprised me, and I think that is a positive finding from our perspective.

When you look at ameliorations for small employers, I would go back to what I think Chris said in the previous panel, which was we cannot solve everything by the pension system. The more you build complexity into the automatic enrolment system the more there are there are all the trade-offs that we have talked about. I would look at other things, like business rates and the overall picture for employers.

One of the things that I have not spoken much about, which I think is worth reinforcing, is we think it is important that we have an equivalent body—we propose a national council for retirement adequacy—that is sitting outside and making semi-regular recommendations to Government about the package in the whole and how it stacks up against the prevailing economic circumstances and how therefore you might adjust the lower earnings limit or the earnings trigger.

We have these quite big gaps in policymaking around pensions that are looking at the whole system. We have Treasury looking at it from one very fiscal perspective and DWP looking from a social policy perspective, and that does create some difficulties and tensions. Therefore, when we are thinking about the broader economic picture that employers and employees are operating within, having some independent counsel or advice to Government that looks across the whole system and potentially broadens the pensions policy as well would be really valuable.

Jack Jones: I think there are two slightly different questions there. One is: who are the employers or sectors that are going to be particularly impacted by the changes? Because they have lots of people with inadequate pensions at the moment, so they are going to see the biggest uplift for workers there and the biggest cost on those businesses.

IFS did some modelling on what those sectors are and what the costs are, and I was quite pleasantly surprised that in sectors like hospitality that are likely to be the worst affected the actual increase in costs seemed relatively modest, at under 2% for all those industries. That suggests that with the notice that you are looking at, that is a cost that can be absorbed over that time period.

Looking at sectors that will struggle with any additional costs or types of employers because of the environment they are operating in—as Zoe and I said before—I think that the way to support those businesses and those sectors is outside the pension sector.

Will Sandbrook: I have nothing really to add.

Dr Jenkins: Unsurprisingly, I would talk about care and the care sector. I agree with the TUC that a lot of these things are about the dysfunctional structures of those sectors anyway, that women are much more likely to work within, and the costs to employees, so wages and salaries, are driven down over time.

It is also worth saying that everyone is saying that 12% is going to be great and it is going to take everything up, but we know that that is not going to do anything to impact the gender pensions gap. The gap remains the same. Overall, more is going into people’s pots, and those real risks around part-time workers remain.

Thinking about those sectors that do tend to be overpopulated by women, who tend to work part-time for lots of other reasons, very often because they have unpaid care that they are delivering at the same time, it is worth thinking about the impact of employers helping them to ensure that there is not this perfect storm of changes or even improvements, but that those part-time women are not benefiting from those improvements to the system overall.

  1.             Damien Egan: Daniella, this one is for you. You spoke a little bit earlier about scrapping tax relief on pensions. Do you want to explain how that would work? Are you talking about abolishing it completely as a recommendation or like a flat rate?

Dr Jenkins: All I would say is £60 billion is a lot. That would fund your national care service in a heartbeat. It would fund a lot of buses. It would fund a lot of schools. That is money that is being lost to the Treasury today, right now. Every time you go and you have to have those political debates about, “Where are we going to find the money from?”, all I would say is that pensions tax relief is money forgone today. I think that there is a moral case around that. We know that it is massively regressive. It is benefiting high earners, and it is not benefiting low earners. I think that that is a political question, not one for me.

What the Women’s Budget Group has suggested is you could bring that into an overall pot of wealth taxes that we could use to fund other things. Even if you repurpose that, if you still kept pensions tax relief towards pensions but you supported precisely those employers who we are talking about, for some employers they only pay low-paid workers. They only employ low-paid workers. For them, actually, this is a cost to business. It will be. If the majority of your workers are low-paid, part-time workers, under proposals to lower the trigger, to lower the lower earnings threshold, they will be paying more in terms of their employees.

If you gave them some form of relief in relation to that, we know we would be safeguarding pensions and that relief would be doing what it is supposed to do. We heard from Chris Curry before that it was designed to increase people’s individual contributions. Well, actually, auto-enrolment has done that, so this is a redundant mechanism that is taking money away from the Treasury. I personally think that is a huge political scandal and it could be used better, and I think that there should be political mobilisation around changing that system as it sits today.

  1.             Damien Egan: Don’t you worry that longer term it will mean that more people would then opt not to put money into their pensions? Imagine a single parent in my Bristol constituency on £60,000 a year and, say, they want to put £500 into their pension, assuming their employer is going to match that. That is what they want to be getting on to do. They take home around £3,200 just over a month, according to Money Saving Expert Martin Lewis. If they lost that tax relief, it would drop £200 a month, to just over £3,000. Now, rent, if you want a two-bed, is already £1,500. If you need a house, it is close to £2,000 a month. Don’t you worry that that person would then just think, “Right, I am not going to put into my pension. That £200 loss is too big a hit”?

Dr Jenkins: As a single parent who lives in Bristol—I will not talk about my salary—I would say that there are very few people right now who are wondering what to do with their money. The economic reality, particularly for single parents, is that they are absolutely against it in relation to all the cost of living. We know that the majority of single parents—85%—are women, for example. We know that there are gendered spending patterns. We know that when you talk about housing, 57% of women’s average earnings goes on housing.

The idea that I am wondering what to do as a single parent in Bristol or wherever else with £500 does not speak to the reality of where people are at. Pensions tax relief has been in place for a long time now. We can see that it has not increased those measures, but auto-enrolment has. Are we going to continue to not use that, to effectively reward higher earners? Or can we be politically brave and think, “How can we use that tax relief to actually benefit the people who need it?”

Zoe Alexander: Can I just come in on this because clearly, as you would expect, I strongly disagree with that position? Tax relief makes up an enormous amount of people’s ultimate retirement income. It is critical to the adequacy debate, and it is critical to getting people to the levels they are at today, which are nowhere near where they need to be at, which is why we are all here and talking about what we do about low earners in the context of pushing contributions up. It is a relief on earnings. It is not a pot of money available to Treasury. It is in theory, but I think it is really harmful to talk about it in that way.

In the context of your question earlier, I think what we are getting at here is: are people making decisions based on that tax relief? No, they are not because they do not engage with pensions, which is why we need automatic enrolment. I do think that at the margins there is more that providers could do, like PensionBee and other big providers in the market, to make tax relief more salient. It would be great if I got a text every month to say that the Government had given me XYZ amount of money towards my pension. I think that would be really helpful. I do not think we should be rowing back on something that is already making up a really important proportion of people’s retirement income and will continue to do so.

We must not forget median earners—who we are not talking about today and we are not focused on—who are retiring with grossly inadequate retirement incomes and really rely on that relief.

  1.             Andrew Pakes: I was going to ask a series of questions on non-contingent employee contributions, but Rushanara has drawn out most of the answers. To avoid repetition, I suppose, I will just simply ask you: are there any more advantages or disadvantages of allowing low earners to opt out while retaining the employer contribution that you have not talked about today so far?

Dr Jenkins: You are staring at me. I am not sure if—

Zoe Alexander: I go back to the Closing the Gaps research that we did earlier in the year. When we spoke to consumers, they were saying, “This is a bit complicated for us. How would we trade off those choices? We would rather you told us what we should be contributing and just automate it”, which is what we all know leads to better outcomes for people.

There was also a really important point made by Chris—which we share and which came through the consumer research—about this idea of shared endeavour and people feeling it is right that they put some money in and their employer puts some money in. That is the mental model that people have.

I think there are real risks to be looked into. I am not discounting the idea of non-contingent employer contributions. If you could do it without negative behavioural impacts on the system, it might be a good thing to achieve. What if I am a median earner and I am having to contribute and then someone next to me is getting it for free? I think there is a lot of behavioural and systemic impacts we need to think through before we put something like that in, which is why I think it should follow the legislation to increase contributions overall.

Will Sandbrook: I would echo that. I think there would be some important questions about for whom, and is it forever or is it a temporary payment, a holiday type of non-contingent contribution, to work through and to figure out that it was well targeted. That is the first set of questions.

The bigger question for me is I am sure we have all at various points uttered the phrase that one of the greatest strengths of the first Pensions Commission was the consensus that it managed to build around the reform agenda that it proposed. It is well versed as a strength of the original set of recommendations.

Zoe talked about speaking to employers who will acknowledge to some degree that there might be a need for contributions to rise in the future. The question for me is: to what extent will the employer community remain in a consensus in a world where there is a perception that they are being asked to contribute more and some workers some of the time are not being asked to contribute? I think that would need to be tested with employers because employers play an important role in that consensus.

  1.             Andrew Pakes: Do you have any thoughts about how that would be tested?

Will Sandbrook: The consensus element of it?

Andrew Pakes: Are you saying that we should do some trials? Are you talking about—

Will Sandbrook: I think trials would help in understanding some of the behavioural questions that Zoe raises.

Jack Jones: There are employers that do this already, aren’t there?

Will Sandbrook: There are.

Jack Jones: I have only spoken to one or two, but they report very low levels of opt-outs from people where there is occasionally a bit more of an incentive, that you can take some of that cash home as well as just benefiting from the contributions. I think we could possibly look a bit more in depth at what is happening already where employers are voluntarily putting those—

Zoe Alexander: Of course, those are probably the larger, more paternalistic employers with better comms, and if you set something systemic the risks are more real, I think.

  1.             Rushanara Ali: Looking ahead, what are the factors that need to be considered when setting out a timetable for automatic enrolment reforms and what should be the priority?

Zoe Alexander: So, 12%. We would like to see it by 2035. We would like to see legislation in this Parliament for a timetable that would start in the 2030s to get to 12% between 2030 and 2035. We would like to see the employer contribution go from 3% to 4% to 5%, and then for the employer and the employee contribution to rise to 6% on an equal basis by 2035.

Jack Jones: I agree with all that, apart from the fact that obviously we would like it to keep going a little bit further beyond that. Yes, it is important to get the urgency of increasing contributions as soon as possible within the timeframe the Government set out, of saying not in this Parliament and giving a bit of notice to employers.

Rushanara Ali: Daniella, do you agree?

Dr Jenkins: It is very easy for us as the techies, and we think about the machinery of government and what we should do in order of operation. We really should start with the users, and I think that none of us should forget that this is affecting people’s financial futures in real time now and we need to go back to that. Whatever priority changes we put in place, we should look at what will make the most material difference to individuals, to lower earners, for example, where the behavioural factors may be different from other groups.

I have talked about a 360-degree view, so not just thinking about the pension system, thinking about Universal Credit, thinking about housing, and thinking about all the other cost of living measures as well. We should have a timetable that focuses first and foremost on securing the financial futures of the population, but particularly for low earners and prioritising whatever works for them most.

Will Sandbrook: Very similar to what Daniella said, I think the most important thing is that the destination we are describing hangs together and makes sense. We need to be clear that we are moving towards a system that in total works well for as many people as possible on all the dimensions that we have already talked about.

The second thing—probably what Zoe described as first—is stating very clearly and very early on what the timetable to get there is going to look like because, for all the reasons we rehearsed, clarity and certainty, particularly for employers, is really important. Then I think in terms of sequencing, where we have talked about the potential need for mitigations around impacts on lower earners, you need to try to make sure that you are sequencing in a way that the mitigations come with the risks, so you are trying to make sure that you are able to implement those in a way that means that you do not run ahead with a set of things before you are able to catch up.

I would just really echo, I think, the need to move to a higher overall contribution framework and the need for clarity that that is where we are going and that the timetable over which we are getting there is important. If we are also clear about the need to think through the lower earners’ issues, there is scope to figure out the exact detail of how to do that in parallel to having set out that timetable.

Chair: Thank you so much. That concludes the evidence session for this panel.