Constitution Committee

Uncorrected oral evidence: The UK’s constitutional safeguards

Wednesday 11 November 2026

10.30 am

 

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Members present: Lord Strathclyde (The Chair); Lord Bichard; Lord Beith; Lord Griffiths of Burry Port; Baroness Hamwee; Lord Jones of Penybont; Baroness Laing of Elderslie; Lord Murphy of Torfaen; Lord Waldegrave of North Hill.

Evidence Session No. 10 Heard in Public Questions 99 - 109

 

Witnesses

Doug Chalmers, Chair, Ethics and Integrity Commission; Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston, First Civil Service Commissioner; Vijay Rangarajan, Chief Executive, Electoral Commission; John Pullinger, Chair, Electoral Commission.

 

 USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

  1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and webcast on www.parliamentlive.tv.
  2. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct the record. If in doubt as to the propriety of using the transcript, please contact the Clerk of the Committee.
  3. Members and witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Clerk of the Committee within 14 days of receipt.

Examination of witnesses

Doug Chalmers, Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston, Vijay Rangarajan and John Pullinger.

  1.             The Chair: Good morning and welcome to this meeting of the House of Lords Constitution Committee. I welcome our witnesses: Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston, the First Civil Service Commissioner; Doug Chalmers, chair of the Ethics and Integrity Commission; Vijay Rangarajan, chief executive of the Electoral Commission; and John Pullinger, chair of the Electoral Commission. You are all very welcome this morning. I remind members of the committee to declare any interest relevant to this inquiry or today’s meeting the first time they speak. I have no relevant interests of my own to declare. I remind everyone that we will pause the evidence session shortly before 11 am to observe the two minutes’ silence of Remembrance Day, the beginning and end of which will be marked by the ringing of Division Bells.

We are doing an inquiry into the constitutional safeguards in the United Kingdom. We are looking at a whole variety of things. We will have former Cabinet Secretaries and existing ones. We are looking at some of the organisations that make up the safeguards of the British constitution. However, we also very much wanted to hear from you about the role you play in protecting the UK’s constitutional democracy. Do you consider your organisation to form part of the UK’s network of constitutional safeguards? Although there are four of you here, you do not all have to answer every question, but I will ask Baroness Stuart to start off on that broad question, which you might all want to comment on.

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: Thank you very much, Chair. I regard the Civil Service Commission as an integral part of the constitutional framework of this country. It arose out of Northcote-Trevelyan in the last century, and I think we have now existed for 150 years. We are now within a statutory framework of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—CRaG. The reason why it is an important element is that we now regulate and advise on the entire career cycle of a civil servant. We regulate entry into the Civil Service, either by chairing competitions, ensuring that the process is open and fair and decisions are based on merit, or by auditing departments on that process. We are the final arbiter of any complaints under the Civil Service Code. Since October last year, we have taken on the role of advising civil servants and special advisers of a certain pay grade when they leave the Civil Service on business appointment rules. The overall oversight, assurance and education from our role are really important for the constitution.

It may also be useful to say at this point that we regard our role as a regulator as well as an educator. What we are driving at is that we should spend as much energy on preventing wrong decisions being taken, ensuring that the system works and educating everyone on what is expected of them to ensure that the system functions properly.

The Chair: We had a lot of evidence early on about the Civil Service, and one witness said that what the Civil Service really needed was more responsibility and more accountability, which would make it react more beneficially to the issues that were facing us. Do you see that as part of the problem that needs solving, and do you play a role in that?

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: We do not play a role in that. However, the current Cabinet Secretary, Antonia Romeo, gave a speech at the LSE last night in which she emphasised that that kind of decision-making by civil servants should be effective and improve things. She has led by example; I think she is the first Cabinet Secretary who has made public her own performance criteria for what should be expected of her. In that context, she is showing leadership. That element of leadership, which my colleagues will have much more to say about, is important, in the Civil Service as in public life in general.

Doug Chalmers: We as the Ethics and Integrity Commission are slightly different. I was the chair of the Committee on Standards in Public Life before I became the chair of the EIC, and I will come back to its remit shortly. To build on something that Baroness Stuart said, we do not do casework, so I am not a regulator, but I would say that I am an educator and an adviser.

To take us back to first principles, why do we as a standards body have a part to play in this constitutional work that you are doing now? I think it is because standards do matter. Expectations among the public—having looked at some of the previous evidence, I know that might come up as a question—definitely have risen over time about those who are elected or appointed into public office. We are a country that should be governed without bias and the rest of it, and we still tax and police by consent, so that trust and linkage to consent remain very important.

We as standards bodies are focused on ensuring that that power in public office is exercised fairly, consistently and without favouritism or bias. The EIC, built off the CSPL, is an umbrella organisation. We do not regulate per se and we do not do casework, but we look over the standards landscape and then advise. We make policy proposals over time, just like the CSPL did in times past, that have led to much of the landscape that there is now. In fact, the team to my right are a result of a CSPL recommendation in the past.

The EIC is growing and has been given a few extra remits, one of which is to keep on doing what the CSPL did; another is a more formal element on engagement—that comes back into the “educator” word that you heard both of us talk about so far already. We are also to become a centre of excellence in codes of ethical conduct, which we might explore a bit further later on. I write an annual letter to the Prime Minister, and I chair a network of those who are in the regulatory space. Baroness Stuart, Vijay and John are part of that network, so we get to know each other quite well from there.

Our remit is focused on England but we have quite strong relationships, and we are building strong relationships, with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. They are all looking at the same problems and address them in different ways; their contexts are slightly different but we need to learn from them and share. We also look at other European countries, as well as countries like New Zealand, Australia and Canada, which are more aligned, about how they are addressing similar challenges. The challenges that we are talking about here are not unique to us; others are addressing the same challenges.

John Pullinger: The answer to your question is yes, we are definitely part of this system. That is what the CSPL recommended and was taken up in Parliament: that there should be a body that has the duty to give independent oversight to elections across the UK. We have a lot of elections. We have had general elections in Wales and Scotland this year, and for the last couple of days Vijay and I have been in Northern Ireland overseeing the preparations for the combined elections that are taking place there next May.

We have also had a lot of local elections in England and a whole string of by-elections recently. All those are part of our constitutional settlement, giving democratic legitimacy and giving those in power accountability and, using Doug’s word, consent—ensuring that there is popular consent for the system. So we would say we are absolutely at the heart of this constitution.

The Chair: Are you confident that what you do supports what Mr Chalmers just talked about: trust in the electoral system, without which the whole thing collapses like a pack of cards?

John Pullinger: Absolutely—the whole emphasis is on free, fair and trusted elections. We start from pretty strong foundations. There are high levels of public trust in the smooth running of elections. We survey this after each election, and we have a statutory duty to report within six months of an election. We have just done the reports for the May elections and, across the board, we have high levels of trust. That is down particularly to the efficient running of elections by local authorities up and down the country.

We also have high levels of compliance with the political finance regime. We work with all political parties and, to follow the conversation earlier, we try to create a framework that supports political parties to comply but of course calls out non-compliance. We have statutory authority to call out non-compliance and to fine people. To that extent, the system does well.

We have a whole range of threats coming down the line. If you think of the electoral system as part of critical national infrastructure, which we do, we need to renew our investment in it if it is to keep the strengths that we have had in the past into the future. I do not know whether you want me to go on and name some of those threats.

The Chair: We might come back to that, because it would be very interesting to hear what external threats you feel exist to the electoral system. Mr Rangarajan, do you want to add anything to that?

Vijay Rangarajan: I will add two things to what John has said. The first is that the part of the process with the lowest trust is the transparency of political finance. The current Bill, which you will all be involved in scrutinising, will help significantly on that. But it is a very complex system and one area where we think there needs to be some significant improvement.

The second area, which you may want to touch on later, is education; we have already touched on it briefly. Because of votes at 16 coming in, we are running a major programme to get materials to help young people understand not just the system—why politics matters to them and the issues that they care about—but where to get information from and, frankly, what information not to trust.

The third is: how to argue with a politician or a candidate whom you may agree with but may strongly disagree with as well. This is partly to tackle one of the fundamental threats that we see: the increased abuse and intimidation of political party candidates across the country. It is rising steadily over time—we track that—and that is a significant worry in the longer term. If people are not standing to be candidates, that is pretty fundamental.

So we are running a big programme of education. We are now in about 500 schools testing out the materials we have produced. We want to go to all schools in the course of 2027, which should help some of the underlying trust issues and expectations.

The Chair: Will this again be England only?

Vijay Rangarajan: No, that is across the whole country—it is UK-wide. We are starting in England and Northern Ireland at the moment, and we had a fantastic session in Northern Ireland with a whole lot of youth voices, networks and our key partners on Monday night. It is England and Northern Ireland because that is where votes at 16 is coming in immediately, but we will expand that. We have already done quite a lot in Scotland and Wales, where they already have votes at 16. But our new material is getting a very good reception. So we will go across the UK.

The Chair: It is helpful to confirm that.

  1.        Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Lord Strathclyde mentioned that a very big part of our inquiry is about the safeguards to our constitution. Can you tell us a little about how effectively you think your organisations are able to fulfil your roles as constitutional safeguards? What factors, if any, constrain your ability in so doing?

Doug Chalmers: Shall I lead off, as the umbrella, if I could describe myself as that? It was useful for me being chair of the CSPL and then coming to the EIC, because we have taken the literature that the CSPL did, the evidence-based inquiries and the recommendations that have been made from there, and we have moved them through. As you know better than I do, sometimes recommendations for action are not linear. They do not go in an algebraic way. You put something into the mix—into the system—and it takes a while for the system to truly absorb it before it finally comes through.

I have been a key advocate of much of the stuff that the CSPL did. Strong recommendations were made on things such as local government. It was great to see some of the stuff about finance in the Representation of the People Bill that we had put in before. So we keep on advocating that. The metric I judge by is: do we do high-quality, evidence-based reports that pick up well, with external credibility, as well as being tested by those involved? The other side of it is how the Government enact them and take them forward. Both are really important because there is an external credibility element, which also helps influence the Government and how they pick it up. But, for me, it is how the Government pick those up.

I watch quite carefully, and my two concerns are: how our reports are picked up and enacted by the Government over time; and whether I have the resource to deliver the quality and evidence-based work that we do. As I mentioned, the EIC has grown quite a lot and, if we get given additional tasks, then obviously my ability to match resource to task to get the quality that we are after can come under stress. We did a report on lobbying, business appointments and disclosure, which was asked for by the Government, and it stressed our system to get that in. We might want to come back to that later.

So we have had a good effect, and we have talked about some of the recommendations creating other elements that help guide and guardrail life in public office. But for me, as I look forward, it is: are they being picked up and enacted, and then how are they being done and in what sort of time?

John Pullinger: We are pretty well placed, but, going back to the threats that Vijay hinted at, the Electoral Commission is part of the electoral system, which comprises a whole range of people beyond us. The critical factor is how those bits of the system work well together. So I will just run through a few things.

The toxic information environment is an absolutely critical threat at the moment. Trying to get a handle on how foreign actors and others are manipulating the information space to confuse voters and destabilise campaigns is becoming a massive issue. The Electoral Commission can call attention to that. In the elections in May 2026, we ran a deepfake detection tool that threw out a whole range of issues there, including 15 cases where we thought there was a threat to democratic integrity. We are not a technological deepfake detection organisation, and we think that the state should have some systematic monitoring of this so that we can call out bad behaviour. That is number one.

Secondly, as Vijay referenced, the increasing levels of abuse and intimidation of candidates are putting people off and degrading our political capacity. The Speaker of the House of Commons has taken a lead on how we tackle that and ran a Speaker’s Conference last year. There is a critical role for the police here to step up and understand that they need to step in when there is unacceptable illegal abuse of candidates. Some of the police forces are very good, but some have been hesitant—how do they navigate the boundary between freedom of speech and harassment? It is really hard in the political space.

The third one, which Vijay referenced, is political finance. The public have very low levels of trust, even though we do a pretty good job of making public where the money is coming from. The Representation of the People Bill should help, but there is serious public disquiet about money buying influence, which we need to tackle. I am nearly getting to the end, Chair.

The next one is that British law around elections is so complicated that it is becoming very difficult for those involved—voters, candidates and electoral administrators—to manage. Much of it is very out of date. It is becoming inconsistent, because we get one layer over another, particularly for voters in Wales and Scotland. The complexity is enormous and, although there are very many good things in the Representation of the People Bill, it will add another layer of complexity. Amendments have been tabled to the Bill in this House, about to be debated, on making some progress with simplifying and consolidating electoral law. We think that is very important. It is one of these “boiling the frog” issues: it gets more and more complicated until one day it is so complicated it collapses under its own weight.

The final issue that is a constraint on us is the pressure on local government. Our elections are run by local authorities up and down the country. Returning officers have personal responsibility for running them and they do a really good job. We set and monitor standards, and we call them out if they fail to meet the standards—and a few do not—each time. They desperately want to do a good job but they struggle to get the staffing and resources that enable them to do it, given the complexity of the task that they have to undertake. So there is a range of things there and we are well placed, but there is significant work to be done between now and the next general election.

The Chair: You would not change it from local authorities?

John Pullinger: No, not at all. That is a real strength of our system.

The Chair: So you are saying there is a potential weakness there but you would not change their role?

John Pullinger: No. We know that in many fields local authorities are stretched.

The Chair: So it is basically about money.

John Pullinger: It is about ensuring that they have the ability to give the right level of resourcing to this job.

The Chair: Okay, I have got that. You said there was public disquiet about people buying influence with money. I completely understand about external people putting money potentially directly into trying to speak to Ministers or Members of Parliament, but your disquiet was wider than that, about the generality of spending around a general election campaign, for instance. Do you feel that you have a greater role in deciding what passes muster and what does not?

John Pullinger: Vijay may wish to add something, but at the moment we get input from the public about the things they are happy with and the things they are concerned about, and the lowest ratings of public trust are in the transparency of the political finance regime. I am saying no more or less than that. The public also want political parties to make sure that they are well informed about the issues they are going to be debating, and that costs money. So we are drawing attention to that disquiet.

At the moment we are running a review on the spending limits that political parties have at election time, and we are taking evidence from all political parties about how those should be set. This is quite challenging territory for us—we had a discussion of it at a board meeting yesterday—but it will enable us to put an evidence base before Parliament about what those spending limits should be. That will help to inform this debate in a much better way than maybe it has been in the past.

Lord Murphy of Torfaen: That is a fascinating account, and the question of resources is critical. Basically, if local authorities do not have the money, they cannot run electoral services properly, but there are other things too.

The Chair: Lady Stuart, do you have something you want to add there?

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: Yes. Just as the Electoral Commission has expressed its view on the plethora of legislation, which has layer after layer, at the other extreme we are the beneficiaries of CRaG, which is clear, precise and enabling, so legislation, when well drafted, can be really helpful.

It is worth putting on record that, in the four and three-quarter years that I have done this role, there has never been a moment where on either the political or the Civil Service side I have felt there was any undue pressure. However, if there were to be any, the political pressure would probably be the one that was slightly more difficult.

That leads me to the search for my successor. I believe I am the first former politician to fulfil this role in 120 years. I suggest—it is for others to decide, but I offer it as an observation—that it may not be a bad idea to have this role filled by a former politician. That also leads me to the observation that my term of office comes to an end at the end of February. It is a complicated process: PACAC has to approve and the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales and opposition leaders have to be consulted. The role was advertised in the summer but interview dates have not yet been set. I urge anyone who may be taking note of these proceedings to ensure that we do not end up with an interregnum. In regulators or any other organisations, if you do not fill vacancies in a timely fashion and do not provide the budgets, you weaken those organisations. You do not destroy them but you weaken them, and avoiding weakening them is really important.

Other than that, I would say that the Civil Service Commission has a long history. It is important and, as long as they do not weaken this organisation and allow the line management of the civil servants who serve on those organisations to be properly managed, these things can work really well.

  1.        Baroness Hamwee: This is to the Electoral Commission. In your written evidence, you said that the UK’s paper-based voting system is an important safeguard. I was a member of the Greater London Authority. It was immensely frustrating as a candidate, and then it provided quite a lot of work for me as chair, to be involved with the automatic counting. It is hard to think that there might not be a pressure for more automatic counting, the way the world is going, so I wondered whether you might want to expand on that.

Vijay Rangarajan: You are right, Lady Hamwee, there is pressure to use technology more extensively to make the systems simpler and better for voters, and better for candidates and administrators. The reason why we think that paper voting—you can use a pen or a pencil, I hasten to add—is important is because it is so transparent and scrutinised by agents, candidates and everyone in counts; you can track it every step of the way.

Internationally, there is a massive level of cyber attacks on counting systems around the world. We have it in the UK; we get between 30,000 and 50,000 cyber attacks on the Electoral Commission every month. That cyber threat to our systems means that it is important for voter trust so people can be absolutely clear what happened and it is scrutinised every step of the way. I argue that it is even more important for candidate trust. If you are a losing candidate, you really want to be sure that the system worked. For us, that emphasis on losers’ consent is very important. It is very public in the UK, and we think that is a significant trust.

That is not to say that we cannot strengthen the systems electronically in other ways. The biggest one that would help is automatic voter registration, because it is a real barrier that we have up to 8 million eligible British voters not on the electoral register. We very much welcome the provisions in the Bill that are going to bring that in. The Welsh Government did pilots in four local authorities last year; we evaluated those, and they went well. Again, as long as we get the cyber defences right for that and the law is very clear, I think that will hugely strengthen the system.

There are also experiments going on where, when you walk into a polling station, you can be ticked off on an iPad, and that is working well in many polling stations around the country. Again, that speeds up the process and makes it easier for local authorities, as we have touched on. Fundamentally, though, there is an element of voter trust and losers’ consent in having a clear, open and transparent paper-based system.

The Chair: Lord Beith, you have a question.

  1.        Lord Beith: Which may be interrupted in a moment, for good reason. Before asking my question, I want to go back to Baroness Stuart’s evidence to PACAC, where she pointed out that, when it came to business appointments, her writ did not run to the military, the intelligence services and some other elements of the Civil Service, and was advisory in any event. This is an area where there is public concern. Does she want to elaborate on that?

The Chair: Before you answer, I can see that our session will be suspended in a few seconds. We will pause the meeting and you can think about your answer to Lord Beith’s question. The Bell will go and then we might all rise and contemplate for a couple of minutes.

Sitting suspended.

Lord Beith: Shall I just add a bit of context to my question? The reason for the concern is, of course, that people who have had senior policy positions may find themselves in businesses that benefit from future decisions in that policy area. That is a genuine public concern.

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: The Advisory Committee on Business Appointments—ACOBA—ceased to operate 12 months ago. Decisions for civil servants and special advisors of a certain grade came to the Civil Service Commission and decisions for politicians went to the Prime Minister’s Independent Adviser on Ministerial Standards. We have now administered the system for a year and we will, probably next week, publish our first review of how the system’s transparency, speed and risk assessment can be improved. But you are right that, at the moment, some ranks of the MoD and the intelligence services are not part of our remit.

The rules belong to the Cabinet Office. We have to report on how we find the system and then agree any changes to the rules in conversation both with the Cabinet Secretary and the propriety and ethics team, who I think you are taking evidence from in future sessions. From my point of view, as we publish decisions, we have started to make clearer to applicants how long it will take, where the decisions rest and who is responsible for them. We have taken those first steps on openness and transparency and making information available contemporaneously, which is always really helpful in encouraging people to comply with the rules.

Lord Beith: I will move on to a more general question. Perhaps each of you could briefly say whether there is something that would make your organisation more obviously independent of the Government, and not perceived to be in any way dependent on the Government’s good will to do your job?

Doug Chalmers: Can I follow up, if I may, on the previous question? As you know, we were asked by the Government to do a review into lobbying, business appointment rules and disclosure. With the dissolution of ACOBA, we looked at that and identified exactly what you described. Civil servants were fine and Ministers went to the independent adviser, but military officers and Crown servants, such as in the agencies, did not fall under Civil Service rules. Previously, ACOBA dealt only with the top end and the departments always dealt with the lower level. We found that there should be better Cabinet Office corralling of the people who are delivering the Business Appointment Rules, because they are still owned by the Cabinet Office. 

We also felt that the Business Appointment Rules themselves needed to be updated, because some of the mechanisms are quite old. I really welcome some of the review that Baroness Stuart and the Civil Service Commission has done on their side of it; there are many lessons in there that will, I hope, be translated through the Cabinet Office to the business rules as a whole. Therefore, all organisations should be done.

We also made a couple of observations about things such as national interest and who should be the judge of national interest, to protect against some of the concerns that you have. I realise that I say that as a retired general, so I feed that into the mix.

On your question about how important it is that we are independent and how we can be independent, we take that very seriously. I mentioned in my opening words that being independent is critical for our external credibility, the fact that we are here to support all Governments as they come into being and the balance of power that that sits within. For us, that really is key. We need to be seen to be neutral, without bias and focused on the public interest in the recommendations and safeguards that we put in place.

How do we deliver that? As you know, we have political members inside our committee. That is a remarkably strong balance, because it means that in some of those discussions, if they feel we are too much under the cosh of the Government, that will come up very quickly. I can evidence that by saying, for example, that when the Prime Minister asked us to do the lobbying review recently, we had a long discussion about whether to say yes or not, because we are not a branch of the Government to be tasked at will. But lobbying was always very high on our list of things to do, which is why we decided to do it.

Our relationship with PACAC, which holds us to account in Parliament, is very important to us. Of course, we also have to make sure that our external think tanks, et cetera, view our work as being independent, to keep going into it. But we would still need a sponsor, because I rely on civil servants to do much of our officials’ work. We rely on accommodation and on the funding stream, but it is about getting that balance. I have just gone through the MoU exercise with the Cabinet Office to make sure that we are independent in our output, the choice of what we do and how we do it. But I have to rely on the Cabinet Office for support.

  1.        Lord Bichard: I have a problem, which maybe you can help me with. First, listening to the advice, I could be reassured that everything was pretty good—in a good place, as I think you said a moment ago—and that while everything can always be improved, the suggestion is that we are in a good place. Then I think about the reality on the ground and the infected blood scandal, which I was involved in and found civil servants lying. I look at Hillsborough, the Post Office and Grenfell. I could go on and on. The reality on the ground seems to be very different. So I have to ask whether you really do believe the standards system is working.

My second point is that all these things have happened despite the existence of various codes—the Nolan principles, the Civil Service Code, the Ministerial Code—yet we seem to be prepared to trust codes in the future and have a centre of excellence on codes. Are you happy with the use of codes?

Thirdly, this may seem an odd point to throw in but, as someone who spent quite a lot of time working in local government, I know that every local authority has a monitoring officer as a statutory post. Central government departments do not. Would it not be quite a good idea? You are in a position—I am looking particularly at the EIC and the Civil Service Commission—to make that recommendation, but it has never been made. So central government departments just carry on, free of that burden.

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: I will make a first observation. We regulate entry and exit and compliance with the code. But you are absolutely right that there is an extra element. That is why the Cabinet Secretary’s speech yesterday was an important one in its emphasis on saying that the decisions you make have to make a difference and make things better and you are accountable for them. On the regulatory function, from our point of view there is nothing more important than that continuing to make decisions and the contemporaneous system information apparent. That is because, when you list all the things that have gone wrong—infected blood, for example, goes back to the 1970s—people will need to be held accountable at the time of the decision-making. Your analogy with the local authorities was an important one, albeit not within the remit of the Civil Service Commission.

Lord Bichard: Before Mr Chalmers comes in, I will say yes, effectively, I went back to the 1970s, but some of the things that I just referred to were not in the 1970s; they are much more recent than that. You talked about the Cabinet Secretary publishing her objectives. I have said on another occasion that I think that is a great innovation, but it does not talk about ethics, standards and values. If the Cabinet Secretary is not putting that first and centre then it seems to me that others are not either.

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: She has also mentioned that she wants to review the Civil Service Code. The fact is that you are discussing and raising awareness that these are the professional standards that we hold you by. For example, we are aware that there is very high awareness of the code among civil servants; the people surveys have revealed 93% are aware of it and who they need to turn to. The conversation itself, under proper leadership, will bring about an element of change—but Doug has much more concrete proposals.

Doug Chalmers: I will do my best to tackle the three questions. I do not think that we have actually presented that we are happy; we all do the jobs that we do because we believe that there is work to be done here. Public expectations have risen, as I mentioned, which means that we need to work harder. There are a whole range of reasons for that, which we might come back to on other questions, and sometimes the Government’s use of hyperbole and superlatives challenges those expectations.

I would not say that I am happy. I mentioned that I judge our impact by the recommendations we make for evidence-based stuff that is taken forward and picked up. We made recommendations about the standards system for local government quite a while ago, and it has taken this long for the Government to start to pick up some of that. Now, that is about sanctions regimes inside local government, not the monitoring of it.

Lord Bichard: Absolutely, but that is not the point I was making.

Doug Chalmers: And I will take away your point about the monitoring officer. We have not gathered any evidence on that, so I will take that away as something to look at.

To come back to my point about whether or not we are happy: we are not. We would not be doing half this work if we were happy. The last thing that we did as CSPL was a report called Recognising and Responding to Early Warning Signs in Public Sector Bodies. I have read more than enough of these inquiries, from recent ones to old ones, in maternity and all the other areas. What is common throughout them is that someone in the system knew that something was not right. There is a defensiveness in some of our structures, and all those elements go into it. So we are not happy. We play our part in trying to help those who are elected or appointed to public office behave in the public interest. That is what we are trying to do: to create a more trustworthy system.

There is something that worries me which links into this. Sorry, I am on my soapbox now because this is something I am passionate about; that is why I spend my time doing my role. Trust in politicians, frankly, has never been massively high, as my predecessor used to say, but trust in our institutions in the UK used to be much higher than it is now, and they are being damaged as a result of these elements. Regaining trust in those institutions is important work.

That brings me to codes. Codes have been around before; I have been in organisations using codes. This is a perennial question about how to ensure, in a human, hierarchical system with personal incentives of promotion and so on, that the decision-making cycle is orientated to the outcome and purpose of your organisation, not subordinate to personal interest or a sense that you need to do something in order to get on within the system. This is a perennial and is not new, but I hope that the Hillsborough law—the Public Office (Accountability) Bill—will provide a pivot point for everyone to look at them again and dust them off. Most organisations have codes, but if you have them and they do not shape your approach every single day then they are not affecting the decision-making cycle. Our role as a centre is to provide best advice and then keep doing research and providing examples of how people can make sure the codes are used to help the decision-making cycle inside public authorities. I do not think this is a light switch moment; it will be the work of months and years to bring about change.

Lord Bichard: First, I understand that you are advising on the codes that will be brought in under the Public Office (Accountability) Bill. Does that mean you are satisfied that the Bill’s suggestion that every public sector organisation should have its own code is the way to go forward?

Secondly, you have talked about local government monitoring. The Local Government and Housing Act under which the monitoring officers were appointed was in 1989, 40 years ago, yet no one associated with central government has ever suggested that we should have something similar in Whitehall.

Doug Chalmers: I will take away the point about monitoring. I am going to go away and do my homework on that and scratch that forward. I have not seen it that way, but thank you for bringing it up.

On the way for us to go forward, we are linked in with the mandatory requirement to have a code of ethical conduct. Our remit is to help public authorities to review, draft and then embed that code of ethical conduct. Public authorities are a huge landscape. For some, there will be a specific sector-wide code that will be adapted, and our advice will help that sector-wide. Other areas, such as the Civil Service, will then update their own code to make sure that it fits within that. Is your question, “Should each organisation have its own code and should we provide it”?

Lord Bichard: That is what the Bill provides for at the moment.

Doug Chalmers: We have seen variations, from first responders to education and all the other sides of it. One size will not fit all, and a level of tailoring would need to be done to make it fit right.

Consultation is required, because the code is not just about, “Do this, don’t do that”. It also distils a public authority’s values and purpose so that people within it know that those are the ethical standards in that public authority. You will not get that from a cookie cutter, and you are going to need to go through quite a lot of painful consultation with your organisation—and those who your organisation affects and impacts—in order to come up with the code. That is where we are aiming our advice. We are aware of an amendment in progress and we will watch that, but we are there to provide advice and, once the Bill is done, we will do so.

  1.        Lord Waldegrave of North Hill: I have two unrelated questions and I would be interested in answers to each. First, statutory or not? Does it help to be statutory? The second is a question for Baroness Stuart. There is beginning to be an argument that the so-called Robert Armstrong memorandum, saying that the Civil Service has no political personality, is under threat. There are some who say that the sort of leadership that the Cabinet Secretary is offering puts that at risk. I would be interested in your feelings about that. It has come up once or twice in the Chamber of the House of Lords—for example, during national campaigns on Black Lives Matter or things that some people call woke. Should civil servants have views on those things or are they political? This issue is difficult. It is the same in corporations and other things, but it is a real issue. I would be interested in your view as to whether there is any danger in the sort of leadership—we will be asking her this personally—that the new Cabinet Secretary is offering. Those are my two unrelated questions. The first was: statutory or not?

John Pullinger: On the general question, it depends on what you are trying to do. If you are trying to do what the Electoral Commission is trying to do then we have to have a statutory backing for it. We are a regulator and we issue sanctions, and that has to have parliamentary authority—that is a necessity for us.

The downside risk of it is that, once something is enshrined in law, you then have to come back to law to change it, and some of the challenges we face are because the world is moving faster than our ability to legislate for it. For example, the changes in the Representation of the People Bill to prohibit foreign money coming into politics, which was the subject of Philip Rycroft’s review, were first recommended by us and CSPL 13 years ago. There has been a consensus that it should be stopped. Indeed, I reread the original CSPL report last night, and it said that we should prevent foreign money coming into politics. It is an unintended loophole of the way it was legislated in the first place. That inhibition on innovation is challenging. However, the answer to that is not to say “law or not law” but to make sure that we have law that is properly considered, recognise that the world moves on and future-proof it as we go.

Doug Chalmers: On the statutory or non-statutory issue, it is very much about what they are doing. For those who do casework, being statutory is important, because they should be able to operate without a risk of fear or favour in order to be independent and deliver the casework that goes forward. We have two examples of statutory, but if I look around the other regulators that I connect with a lot, I should probably highlight that the Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests, currently Sir Laurie Magnus, is not statutory. Given the role that has been given to that post about advising the Prime Minister, running investigations and running the business appointment rules for exiting and incoming Ministers, that role should now be statutory.

On the other side, though, statutory is not the only answer. The Registrar of Consultant Lobbyists is statutory, and she sits over a piece of legislation that is really weak. Only 4% to 6% of lobbying that goes on is currently registered. That was the big thing in our recommendation—there is a big hole there that needs to be reviewed. That will require the legislation being reopened again to be able to get into it. For those doing casework or who need to have sanctions, statutory is a good position to have. But you then get locked into not being updated and you have to go through the need to unlock the legislation to get back in it, to make sure it is fit for today’s context. I would offer that the lobbying issue is a case in point

Lord Waldegrave of North Hill: But you could be done away with by a Prime Minister without Parliament knowing about it at all.

Doug Chalmers: I could, but it would know—

Lord Waldegrave of North Hill: It would know because it would be in the newspapers.

Doug Chalmers: Exactly.

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: We have benefited from the statutory basis and particularly there is one line in there that leads to your second question, which is that special advisers cannot have any role in appointing civil servants. That is a line in the statute and it is helpful if you are in a competition, and you ask, “Who is in the room?” and you can say, “I am terribly sorry, I have to ask you to leave”. If there is any argument, you can say, “No, it is in here: you are leaving”.

That line is important but it takes me on to impartiality and how that is sometimes misunderstood. If you are a civil servant, you are a professional. You have professional standards. Impartiality does not mean that you do not have any views. When you judge a lot of other professions, people hold strong views in their lives. But when you fulfil your function as a professional, there are certain expectations of you. If you feel so strongly about something and you are so out of line with what the Government of the day wish to do, then you have an honourable option: to say, “This profession is no longer the right one for me”, because your role is to serve the Government of the day.

One of the things that I hope that departments are starting to do is look at their functions and say, “What are the things this department has to do, irrespective of who is in Government, to keep the machinery of Government going? What are the priorities to fulfil?” There is a dependency on the Government of the day. We have seen something over the last 10 years, and this is just a reflection on the sheer numbers. After four and three-quarter years, I am on my fifth Prime Minister and on the third Cabinet Secretary. If you are living in a place of constant change, it is incumbent on the Civil Service to know what our core function is. Impartiality does not mean you are not effective. You need to be effective. You need to deliver on the day, but you also need to remember you are a professional who is delivering against some core principles.

The Chair: Lord Waldegrave, are you happy on both questions?

Lord Waldegrave of North Hill: Well, I do not think there is any easy answer to the latter one. The statutory one presents a different angle; that was very interesting, so thank you. The issue of impartiality is difficult. There are certain standards that we think of as being part of morality: being anti-racist, for example, is not a political position, I should have thought. But there are other positions where it becomes more controversial. Your answer is very helpful.

  1.        Lord Beith: May I ask a quick supplementary on that? When you say that the Civil Service responsibility, as Armstrong said, is to the Government of the day and does not have a personality separate from that, does its responsibility include being able to safeguard its ability to provide that service for future Governments? Are there not sometimes occasions when the decision a civil servant is being asked to make has implications for the future ability of the Civil Service to provide that support for Ministers?

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: Some on this committee have far more experience of this than I have. But I suggest that sometimes a senior civil servant having to ask for ministerial direction is a clear indicator that the senior civil servant at this moment thinks, “This is now beyond what I think is good to be done but if I am ordered to do so, I recognise at the end of the chain of command is the Prime Minister of the day”.

Lord Bichard: On this particular point, I know it to be true that directions can only be sought around value. Why cannot they be sought around standards?

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: You need to allow me to go away and think about that. It may have wide implications.

Lord Bichard: My point is that it is not being considered, and if we are serious about standards, then we should be considering these issues, like local government monitoring.

  1.        Lord Jones of Penybont: I have a question for Baroness Stuart. The fundamental question here is the impartiality of the Civil Service. How important is that for the health of our constitutional democracy? Is that principle under threat?

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: It is exceptionally important. It is a process of contesting views. If Ministers want to achieve something, even if it is quite radical, it is for the Civil Service to make them aware of what is possible to be done and to make sure they are aware of what the dangers and risks are in doing so. If there is a particular risk a Minister wants to take, then there has to be a clear understanding that this is what the advice was. Is the principle under threat? It is one of the most inherent tensions in democracy. Democracy always requires that whoever has more votes of the day has to have a wider responsibility to the country, the nation and the continuity of democratic system. It is the Civil Service that provides the continuity and, therefore, with it the caution and the risks that are advised on. But in our system, ultimately, it is the Government of the day whose will prevails. There is an inherent tension, and it is our role to ensure that it is properly managed.

Lord Jones of Penybont: Could I press you on the second part of the question? Is it under threat, that principle?

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston: It will always be contested. I would be worried if it was not contested. Part of your inquiry is so important to ensure there is a balance of power and a balance of effectiveness between those who impose the will of the day and those who have wider responsibility to the continuity. Do I think there is a proper balance? We have the institutional framework if we are allowed to fulfil our functions properly, whether it is by budget, filling vacancies and allowing us to work together. The system can work.

  1.        The Chair: I wish to ask the Electoral Commission: is there anything missing from the Representation of the People Bill that you would like to see in it, and what preparations are you making for its implementation when it becomes law?

Vijay Rangarajan: We are making a lot of preparation for it because it is going to be probably the dominant element of our work, apart from running elections and the day-to-day, in 2027 and 2028. On the implementation side, we will have to take on regulatory responsibility for candidates. There are going to be tens of thousands of candidates across the whole UK. We will need to set up whole systems to do that, including some electronic systems on, for example, candidate finance. But most of all, we want to set up systems to support candidates. Many people get put off. They do not want to be a candidate. They think it is all very complicated. For the reasons John has said, it is very complicated legally but we can do a lot of work to help political parties and independent candidates in understanding those roles. There is a tremendous programme there.

On votes at 16, I have already mentioned the education programme and some of the work on automatic voter registration. There is a lot of work there. So every element of this, including the timing of when it comes into legal effect, will take a lot of work by us. There will be a very significant programme of secondary legislation after the Bill—remember that hundreds of pieces of secondary legislation will be needed. That is largely for the reason John has said, which is that the complexity of our legal regime here makes life much more complex—if I am right, this is the 27th Representation of the People Bill, layering up one over another. So we will have to produce guidance to simplify that and make it implementable by the very large number of people involved.

The Chair: Or it could be consolidated.

Vijay Rangarajan: We would love to see it consolidated; we would love to see a Law Commission piece of work to consolidate both the electoral administration and the regulatory parts of that.

There is one area where we would like to see further changes in the Bill. We think that everything in it is good and that it will make a huge difference. However, we have an issue—this is one of the edge issues now—with our investigatory powers to obtain information. The current Bill will let us get information from permitted participants and information about the income and expenditure of a political party, which are both crucial. However, it will not let us get information to assess whether an offence has been committed by a non-permitted participant, or something unconnected with the income and expenditure of a party such as the crypto world that we are going into, or an international or a domestic donor. We would like those restrictions on that broadened so we can assess some of these issues, because the regulation of some of the complex new provisions coming in will be a real challenge for us.

The Chair: We have a couple more minutes. Lord Waldegrave?

  1.        Lord Waldegrave of North Hill: I do not want to add to your workload, but you said that you looked at alternative systems around the world. We have been doing that a bit. Rather to my surprise, I found that the material from Australia about compulsory voting was much more persuasive than I ever thought. Have you ever considered making recommendations about that or done any work on it?

John Pullinger: The last time we did some work on this was about 15 years ago. If that were to get some traction—I know it will be debated in this House soon—we would want to get some evidence together, including the international evidence from Australia. We have met our Australian counterparts and, as you say, they are very enthusiastic and positive about it. But the British context is different. The most recent review that I have seen was, I think, from 2015—the House of Commons Library did something that pulled together the evidence—but nothing has been done that will give us the grounding to take a view yet, and we want to get that evidence before we advise you on what we think of it.

  1.        Baroness Hamwee: You mentioned investigatory powers. Do you think that you should have powers to prosecute? This rubs up against the criminal justice system. Where should the boundaries be?

Vijay Rangarajan: At the moment, we do not want the power to do private prosecutions, which is partly because our role is to support the political parties and support candidates. It is quite hard to then shift into that. However, obviously we increasingly use a lot of quite advanced data techniques to look across, say, all the political finance returns that we get to try to see whether we can spot patterns on trying to evade the rules, and then when we do that, we then provide that information at quite a high evidentiary level to the police or to others who can then take forward further investigations.

However, we do not have all the powers. We do not want all the powers of the police when a crime has been committed, because that really is very specialised. I do not think we are big enough or would necessarily have the right long-term institutional framework to do that. But we can prepare all the ground, get the evidence together, and then let others in the police or the CPS deal with it. Obviously, over the last few years we have done some quite extensive support for the police in various investigations of political parties where there has been some significant wrongdoing, but we are not looking for private prosecution powers.

The Chair: Lord Bichard, had you finished your questioning? Was there anything you wanted to add?

Lord Bichard: Lord Waldegrave asked a question that I wanted to ask. I thought the Australian experience was interesting. Some 70-odd per cent of Australians now support mandatory voting, but we have not looked at it for 15 years. Maybe the time has come to have a look at what is happening elsewhere.

Vijay Rangarajan: It would be very interesting to do a view on that. The Australian compulsory voting is the very top layer of an extremely rich cake, which is based on a very advanced set of automatic registration provisions. So they do a tremendous amount to get every Australian on their electoral register and keep it up to date. Frankly, we have talked a lot to my Australian colleagues, and we are a long way behind that, but we will catch up, with the Bill currently in Parliament, and get a good system of automatic registration, which is both accurate and complete and which will be a very great advantage. The other thing they do is spend a tremendous amount of money reaching every Australian to vote. I cannot remember the exact figure but they have a budget of over 1 billion Australian dollars for that.

Lord Bichard: Is that a good idea?

Vijay Rangarajan: It is a good idea because they try to get every Australian to vote, but it is a profoundly different system to the one we have at the moment. But I think that some of the underpinnings of automatic voter registration will begin to bring us more in line with Australia, and then we can make a better judge of whether we can implement it here.

John Pullinger: We would want to test some of those things in Britain, such as: do we want to spend large sums of money on this? Do we really think it is a good idea? How does compulsion work with the way we think about things in Britain? It is different here to Australia, and I think we need to get the evidence before we get too—

The Chair: It could be the subject of an entirely different inquiry, so we will not go there any more.

I am going to draw this to a close, and we are going to have a pause before we return to talk to Morgan McSweeney. But for the time being, thank you very much indeed for taking the time and the trouble to come and talk to us. You may have felt that you were not all getting a fair share, but we got a very clear message, which is very helpful. If there is anything you want to follow up, please write to us so that we can hear your views. For the time being, I call this part of the session to a close.