Communications and Digital Committee

Uncorrected oral evidence: The Online Safety Act: implementation and impact

Tuesday 10 November 2026

3.30 pm

 

Watch the meeting

Members present: Baroness Keeley (The Chair); Viscount Colville of Culross; Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay; Baroness Fleet; Lord Holmes of Richmond; Lord McNally; Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge; Lord Storey; Lord Tarassenko; The Lord Bishop of Winchester.

Evidence Session No. 7 Heard in Public Questions 134 - 152

 

Witnesses

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt, Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol Law School; Maya Thomas, Legal and Policy Officer, Big Brother Watch.

 

 USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

  1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and webcast on www.parliamentlive.tv.
  2. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct the record. If in doubt as to the propriety of using the transcript, please contact the Clerk of the Committee.
  3. Members and witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Clerk of the Committee within 14 days of receipt.

Examination of witnesses

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt and Maya Thomas.

 

  1.        The Chair: I now open our second session today. We will explore with our second panel of witnesses what impact they believe the Online Safety Act has had on freedom of expression and privacy online. I welcome our two witnesses and thank them for joining us. I ask each of you to introduce yourself and your organisation.

Maya Thomas: I am legal and policy officer at Big Brother Watch. We are a civil liberties organisation fighting to roll back the surveillance state.

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt: I am a lecturer at Bristol Law School and a senior research associate at UCL’s Digital Speech Lab.

  1.        The Chair: I will start with the first question. We have a range of questions, which different members of the committee will ask. What impact do you believe the Online Safety Act has had on online safety and freedom of expression in the UK?

Maya Thomas: I thank everybody for the invitation to give oral evidence. Obviously, the Online Safety Act is a huge piece of legislation and there are a lot of differing opinions on it. As is evident from our written evidence, Big Brother Watch is against the Online Safety Act. Unfortunately, we believe that it is not fit for the very important purpose of keeping children safe and that it needs to be repealed.

On the safety elements of the Online Safety Act, unfortunately, we feel it has not achieved its purpose. I am sure the committee has heard from Ofcom that, before the implementation of the Online Safety Act, 70% of children between 11 and 17 had encountered an online harm in a four-week period. After its implementation, that went up to 73%. That is obviously very concerning and an indication that the Act is not doing what it was supposed to do.

Obviously, wanting the Online Safety Act to be scrapped does not mean that Big Brother Watch wants children to encounter online harms—quite the opposite. We think it is incredibly important that children have an online experience that is safe, that is secure and where they can easily approach an adult or ask for help if something goes wrong. We also think it is very important to regulate online services directly.

Unfortunately, we found that the Online Safety Act, rather than actually addressing the source of online harms, has basically gone after users, in particular the freedom of expression of users. Through our recent report, Britain’s Free Speech Problem, we found that the Online Safety Act has resulted in a host of unintended consequences, including the widespread censorship of non-harmful information, political information and sometimes quite trivial information. If the committee will allow me, I would like to name some examples of that, if I have not gone over my time too much?

The Chair: Yes, if they are brief. How many are there?

Maya Thomas: There are two or three.

The Chair: Yes, that is fine.

Maya Thomas: One particularly ludicrous example we found of content that had been age-gated was a Reddit post on the subreddit r/mildlyinfuriating, in which users share silly little things that happen to them day to day. This was a picture of a housemate’s dirty dishes that had been considered not appropriate for children, so it was restricted. We have also seen more serious situations where news stories by the BBC on the wars in Gaza and Ukraine were age-gated as well.

I want to be very clear: when I talk about age-gating, I will talk about age-gating and censorship interchangeably because, to us, if something is age-gated it means that that content is functionally restricted. It means that a user has to give up very sensitive personal information to pass that age-gate. Unfortunately, we do not think that that is a proportionate way to deal with speech that is lawful, not harmful and, in a lot of cases, democratically important.

  1.        The Chair: To be clear, are you saying that giving your age is equivalent to censorship?

Maya Thomas: No, not giving your age, but in order for a platform to understand what a user’s age is they would have to give sensitive information about themselves. That could be an identity document or a biometric face scan; Ofcom gives a whole list of ways in which this can be done. We do not think that typing in your age is sensitive information—of course not—but what Ofcom describes as “highly effective age assurance” comes, we think, with some very serious privacy concerns.

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt: By way of background, I came to this topic because I was concerned about the online abuse targeting journalists, politicians, public figures and others in the democratic sphere, and the effect that was having on democracy and public participation. There is also the corresponding view that tackling these sorts of abuses is very difficult because we also want to preserve freedom of expression and legitimate criticism of the media, politicians and democratic issues.

In the past four years since coming here to study the Online Safety Act, I have been looking at whether the Act would be effective at doing that. As a starting point, my view is that Ofcom’s guidance could be improved within the existing Online Safety Act framework but that the OSA ultimately will likely require amendment if its ambitions are to be met. I am quite critical of Ofcom’s approach to ensuring that platforms remove illegal content and the associated risk of harm, and of its approach to freedom of expression. If it can better account for freedom of expression, it will help to protect safety and users’ freedom of expression.

I looked through the hundreds of pages of Ofcom’s guidance and it has heavily focused on procedural protections for free speech. Those are things such as due process requirements, platforms having complaints processes in place, reporting tools, appeals processes and platforms having a sufficient amount of moderation. These procedural protections are very important and can help to protect freedom of expression, but my concern is that Ofcom has focused almost exclusively on outlining those procedural protections and has failed to substantively account for freedom of expression concerns.

I start from the perspective that there will always be error in content moderation, whether that be done by human or AI moderators. That means that there will be false positives, where content is removed even though it is not illegal or is non-violating, and there will be false negatives, where content is not removed even though it is illegal or violating. So we need to approach regulation of these processes on a more nuanced and granular level to ask: how can platforms best reduce this moderation error, and, secondly, from a system standpoint, what types of errors are proportionate?

I will give an example. To ensure that non-consensual intimate images are removed from the platform, it might be proportionate to allow more false positives, meaning that some content will be removed even though it is not strictly illegal or does not violate a platform’s terms of service. Recently, I was watching YouTube, looking at Muay Thai videos, and there was a deepfake thumbnail of a fighter that had clearly been manipulated, making her have larger breasts and a smaller top, and generally sexualising the image. This is not likely to run afoul of the new Sexual Offences Act provisions because she was not nude—she was still covered—but if this sort of content is flagged or removed by a platform making efforts to remove non-consensual intimate images, we might say that that might be a proportionate measure given the overall goal of those provisions and the fact that this is quite low-value speech.

But there are worries here. I will give another example. Meta removed a meme of US political candidates that were depicted as characters from a “Dumb and Dumber” film, where they had their arms wrapped around each other, grabbing each other’s nipples. This was removed allegedly for violating Meta’s sexualised Photoshop provision. After a user complained, Meta restored the post, which again shows that procedural protections work. In this case, this went to the oversight board. Meta’s oversight board recommended that Meta build better enforcement measures to enable it to detect political satire. At the time, Meta declined to do that, citing feasibility concerns.

My point here is that, if we look at these issues on a nuanced and granular level, we can see what types of measures might be proportionate or not. This is just one example, but this could be applied to a range of types of illegal content or certain terms that platforms have. My view is that if we look at this in a more nuanced manner, we can better protect safety and meet the Online Safety Act’s ambitions but also protect high-value content.

  1.        The Chair: I come back to you, Maya Thomas. You mentioned that it is the aim of your organisation to protect children with a safe and secure approach, and you mentioned them being able to seek help from adults. But I could not find in your written evidence what exactly your alternative solution is. You say you want to repeal the Online Safety Act, but what is your solution and how would it address the harms that you probably know are being outlined to us in evidence to this committee? What is your organisation’s alternative to that?

Maya Thomas: Fundamentally, it is really important to say, first of all, that there should be an online safety regime. There should be legislation in place that protects children online. It is absolutely appropriate for the Government to use their power to tackle big tech companies directly. By that we mean, for example, requiring big tech companies to look at their business models, which, as I am sure the committee has heard, are extremely harmful both to adults and children. We are very concerned about things such as data exploitation; the way data is handled by these big tech companies sometimes skims the edges of the GDPR, for example. We think that things such as that are more appropriate ways of tackling big tech.

Big Brother Watch is not a children’s rights organisation—that is not what we specialise in—but like any of us sitting around this table and anybody in this Parliament, we care about the safety of children. What we find concerning is that, at the moment, the regime, which we have seen is clearly not working, focuses on limiting the expression of adults and children alike, limiting Article 8 and Article 10 rights, while doing nothing to keep children safe. Especially worrying is that it could lull parents into a false sense of security in which they think, “It’s fine, my child will not be accessing harmful content online because there are all these pieces of legislation in place”. We know from the statistics that a huge number of children still face harms. In our view, simply doubling down on a regime that does not work is not going to keep children safe.

  1.        The Chair: I see. But you do not have any particular designs or suggestions as to what the regime should be that would enable the Government to tackle the big tech companies?

Maya Thomas: No, we do not have a clearly set out plan or anything like that, but we know that there are a lot of organisations that specialise in topics such as this and that the Online Safety Act has received a lot of criticism around the world for the way in which it deals with speech online. I am sure there are a lot of ways in which we can keep children safe.

One thing I can say right here and now is that research from Internet Matters shows that, as of 2025, only a third of parents use any form of parental controls on their child’s phone. Starting from a place such as that—looking at how we can empower parents and teach children about the online environment through digital literacy education—is how we can help to build a proper foundation. Obviously, that is a far-reaching project; it is not something we can easily just pass one law for and have it settled.

The Chair: This committee had an inquiry on media literacy. We were all clear at the end of it that there were a lot of desirable aims, but it was very difficult to do unless you have an awful lot of resources, which were not being committed.

  1.        Viscount Colville of Culross: Good afternoon and thanks for coming. I want to look specifically at the protections in the Online Safety Act for journalistic and democratic content. Since the Act has been brought into effect, there has been a lot of concern that the authors of both journalistic and democratic content have been subject to online abuse and pile-ons. Ricki-Lee, do you think enough has been done to try to protect those authors and the very specific content featured in the Online Safety Act?

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt: Thank you for that excellent question. I would like to answer it in two ways. The intent of those provisions was to protect journalistic content and content of democratic importance. Of course, journalistic content was not defined in the Online Safety Act; as a result, Ofcom was tasked with defining it. I will speak to that issue as well. On the abuse targeted at the authors of that content, there are no provisions in the Online Safety Act specifically to protect public figures or journalists. They have to rely on the general provisions available to everyone. There are specific provisions for that—for example, the prohibition against threats would be a primary one, and some of the communications offences.

There is no specific pile-on offence in the Online Safety Act and that is a grave missed opportunity. Pile-ons are an incredibly horrible issue that a lot of people face. The difficulty is that although you could look at whether harassment legislation, such as the Protection from Harassment Act, could encapsulate pile-ons, the way in which it is interpreted makes that very difficult. I should note, just to remind everyone, that the Law Commission recommended that pile-ons be addressed in the Online Safety Act regime. It did not recommend a specific criminal law provision, but it assumed, when making that recommendation, that pile-ons would be addressed in the Act and they were not. Again, this goes back to thinking about how Ofcom can regulate the design processes of platforms to better enable freedom of expression—in this case, the freedom of expression of users who are subjected to these sorts of pile-ons and, as a result, pull back and decide not to engage in the public sphere.

Going back to the specific ambitions of the journalistic content and content of democratic importance provisions, I am again critical of how Ofcom has approached them in its draft guidance. Ofcom is currently running a consultation on this and I have made submissions to it. I reiterate what I said earlier: in my view, Ofcom’s guidance has made really obvious indicators of journalism. It says that reporting on an election may qualify as journalism while a journalist’s post about their weekend plans may not. To me, that is wholly unhelpful guidance that does not ask the right questions as to what the actual problem is here.

There are two key problems in respect of journalistic content and platform moderation. The first is that the platforms’ policies are insufficiently nuanced; the policies themselves are not specific enough to protect journalistic content. The second problem is that even if it was specifically nuanced enough, the policies are not properly enforced by AI and human moderators.

I will give you a few examples. Everyone will likely remember when Facebook removed the historic “Terror of War” photo, which depicted nine year-old Phan Thị Kim Phúc fleeing a napalm attack during the Vietnam War. The censorship of that photo caused global outrage. However, it was properly removed by Facebook at the time because it did, in fact, violate its child nudity standards. The problem was that the policy itself was not sufficiently nuanced to allow for historic war photos.

There are many other examples that are routinely being brought up to Meta’s Oversight Board. They are actively happening everywhere. A broadcast of a protester was removed because the protester used a slur against men, comparing men to rats for not standing up to corruption. A news organisation had a severe strike applied against its account because it posted a video of a woman being assaulted by a group of men, which allegedly violated the adult sexual exploitation standard. That was a news organisation in India dedicated to reporting on the plight of the most marginalised members of society. Other examples include the removal of Washington Post articles reporting on the Israel-Palestine conflict for violating the dangerous organisations and individual standards because they mentioned Hamas, and the removal of a news article reporting on a speech made in Pakistan’s Parliament for violating the violence and incitement standard.

In all these cases—I am listing different Meta standards—the problem is that the policies themselves are insufficiently nuanced to protect journalistic content. Because these cases have gone to Meta’s oversight board, Meta has, in some of these cases, adjusted its policies to try to better account for that, but in some cases it has not. This is a great example of where Ofcom’s regulation should be going. It should be saying, “What are your specific policies? Looking at those policies, can you specifically show us how you are accounting for journalistic content and content of democratic importance?” That is the starting point. The second point is then following up and saying, “How are your enforcement mechanisms working? Are they actually enforcing these policies properly?”

  1.        Viscount Colville of Culross: I was involved in the Online Safety Act, and trying to define journalism was a really big issue. Frankly, any kind of content can be seen as journalism. Surely, journalism is the purveyance of information. You are saying, in the context of Meta, that this definition needs to be nuanced and that this is not happening at the moment. Do you think it would be helpful if, in these consultations that are going on at the moment, Ofcom could come up with a definition of what journalism might be, to ensure that it is protected? At the moment, as you said, we are leaving it to Meta and the other platforms to be able to decide what their definition of journalism is, and that is not effective. You are saying that it needs to be much more nuanced. What do you think should happen to be able to try to resolve that issue?

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt: By way of background again, the recognised news publisher provisions, which we are not talking about, also exist and are providing what I have termed as an institutional protection for the mainstream news. I think that has not adequately been done because the definition is so wide, it is not actually tethering quality journalism that is produced according to ethical standards of journalism adequately. One of the obvious solutions is to resolve that by saying that we are going to limit this to those already regulated, like broadcasters, or those regulated by a Leveson-approved press regulator. But then we are going to get into discussions about press regulation in this country. But as a result, in my view, that provision will not be effective because it is too broad and it will lead to more protected, sensationalist content that, frankly, the public do not need. So I have serious concerns about that.

In terms of your question about journalistic content, the difficulty here is that any definition of journalistic content should be tethered to ethical processes of journalism. You look at how journalism is produced, and you can look at journalistic standards that we have in this country by the various regulatory bodies that exist. You can also look at how courts have interpreted responsible journalism—for example, under the Reynolds defence for responsible journalism, now under the Defamation Act and the protection for public interest journalism.

So there are mechanisms by which you can, for example, define journalism in a more meaningful way than Ofcom has done. With that said, are we now expecting the platform to make decisions quickly, and likely by AI moderation, which on big platforms is now increasingly done by large language models? How closely can platforms realistically, in making these decisions, analyse that sort of thing? We need to define journalism writ large. I think we need to be looking at it by asking: where in these categories of content is journalism likely to be overmoderated? We know it is the dangerous organisations and individuals category and the incitement category where a lot of journalism is overmoderated. Looking at those specific categories, how do we ensure that actual reporting is protected?  

  1.        Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay: I want to move on to the Online Safety Act’s complaints procedures. Can you both tell me: what is your assessment of whether those procedures provide effective redress for users whose content is restricted or who experience harm online, or do you believe that alternative routes to redress are needed?

Maya Thomas: To start, when content is wrongfully restricted, which, as we have seen with the Online Safety Act, happens all too often, the damage has already been done in a lot of cases, especially when it comes to journalistic content or content that responds to a particular event that has been happening. When content gets taken down and reinstated, we have seen that its ability to go viral or to have a wider reach decreases significantly. That is just important to highlight. It also means that, basically, the goal should be to not have content be wrongfully restricted in the first place, as I think we can all agree.

What is concerning about the Online Safety Act is that, because of this duty of care that has been imposed on platforms and because of the incredible, astronomical fines that large and small platforms face, we have seen that platforms are basically incentivised to overzealously take content down. That is the first part.

As regards the complaints procedures, the OSA sets out different complaints procedures for different types of content. What we find quite concerning about that is that the OSA does not treat all content in the same way. For example, this category of content of democratic importance is something that we find concerning because it makes a value judgment on what is considered democratically important when really the thing that determines the democratic importance of content is its ability to be out there in a free information environment.

For the appeals process, we think at the moment that Ofcom’s guidance around that is not strong enough. We would suggest something along the lines of the Santa Clara principles on content moderation. Those set out that platforms should disclose when a state actor is involved, give details if the decision was made by an algorithm or by a human moderator, and give info about whether something was flagged by AI or any other type of algorithm. So we basically think it is important to have as much transparency as possible for the person who created the content. 

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt: I will just make a few precise interventions here. The first is that I do not think the Online Safety Act should be amended to allow individuals to make complaints directly to Ofcom. I think that would overwhelm the regulator, and it needs to focus on regulating processes and not individual complaints. So that is not a viable solution.

First, the Online Safety Act currently mandates that platforms have processes in place for users to make complaints to platforms. I am unaware right now of any Ofcom enforcement or oversight of those provisions. So that is absolutely the first step because that already exists in the Online Safety Act. Ofcom should be doing that. We need information from platforms on how those processes are working. Obviously, Ofcom is waging its own battles with some of the platforms, as we have seen with the recent High Court judgment here. But as a first step, we need that information coming from platforms to Ofcom, and Ofcom’s assessment on that, given that that is already required.

I will add only that the Online Safety Act does not require that platforms have processes in place to allow non-users to make complaints, and that is an area for amendment. Users should not have to sign up for a platform and give over a lot of personal data in order to make complaints regarding content that they can see. I can go on YouTube and many other platforms to view content and I see problematic content, but then it is not possible for me to make a complaint without registering and going through a lot of processes. So that is an area that could be changed.

Of course, I am sure that everyone here is aware that the Digital Services Act has taken an alternative approach, so platforms are required to post statements of reasons under Article 17. The problem with that is that we now have this database through the DSA where platforms are posting statements of reasons but they do not actually have reasons. It is very minimal information. I should add that I am going to Europe in December to a workshop at the Weizenbaum Institute to analyse this process so I will have more information on it then. But another step that should be taken is to see how these processes are working in Europe, because it has taken a different approach, and to assess whether we want to implement those same processes here. So there are avenues to understand and get that information. As I say, I hope I will have more information on that in the new year.

Of course, in addition to the statements of reasons, the Digital Services Act has set up bodies that can hear objections from users, and these bodies can make decisions as to whether the platforms made the correct moderation decision or not. The problem that they have had—I recently heard from some of them which are running these—is that they lack enforcement powers. So a key question there is: if this country were to set up a similar system—and there could be many benefits to that—how effective would that be, and what enforcement powers would be necessary with regard to those bodies and platforms, and so forth? I should say that Impress, one of the press regulators in this country has set up one of these bodies under the Digital Services Act, which I think is operating out of Ireland. So there are people with expertise in this area here as well.

  1.        Lord Tarassenko: I have a question which I think you have already answered, so I think I know what the answer is, but let us hear it again and then I will have a follow-up. The question is: what is your assessment of whether the age-assurance duties under the Online Safety Act have struck the right balance—an acceptable balance—between protecting children online and safeguarding adults’ privacy and access to lawful content? I think you probably answered that right at the beginning.

Maya Thomas: Yes, I think so. If you want to start with the follow-up, that might be helpful.

  1.        Lord Tarassenko: Yes, let us go for the follow-up. I think the language that was used early on to talk about false positives and false negatives is quite helpful. I have spent a lot of my career designing systems, but you can minimise false positives only if you increase false negatives and, vice versa, you can only minimise false negatives if you increase false positives. Therefore, based simply on these principles, I argue that if you want to maximise children’s safety you may have to reduce adults’ privacy and freedom of expression. In fact, you cannot do one without doing the other. Who sets where the bar is between those two? In terms of the general public, I would say that there are many parents and grandparents who would be prepared to give up some privacy and rights to freedom of expression if they could guarantee that their children or grandchildren would be safer online. As a result, I argue that we should be able to give up some freedom of expression to make our children safer.

Maya Thomas: I very much see the logic of that argument; unfortunately, I just disagree with the outcome. I do not think it is necessarily the case that we need to sacrifice privacy in order to keep children safer.

  1.        Lord Tarassenko: Take age assurance, for example: knowing that children under the age of 16 will not reach this material will surely make it safer for them.

Maya Thomas: Theoretically, in an abstract world, yes, but unfortunately, what we have seen with the Australia social media ban, for example, is that implementing age assurance does not mean that children are no longer on platforms. What a system like that ends up doing is giving the parents—or the grandparents, like you said—a false sense of security that their child is not on the platform. We know that children get around regulations all the time. Children break rules. Children are tech-savvy; they will figure it out. An online safety regime that relies purely on something like age-gating, when we have no evidence that it works efficiently enough, does not actually keep children safe. What it does is introduce some serious privacy risks.

A lot of the general public might not be aware of what exactly it means to give up data as sensitive as your face, as a passport or ID photo. Biometric face scans, which are currently used under the Online Safety Act and which a lot of platforms choose to use to comply with the Online Safety Act, come with serious risks of data abuse. In the age of generative AI and deepfakes, I definitely do not want some random third-party company having a fully accurate biometric scan of my face. A passport is incredibly sensitive information that we would not ask random people on the street to show when they want to pick up a newspaper, for example. If that falls into the wrong hands, you are looking at fraud and identity theft—really serious issues.

We have already seen this happen; this is not theoretical. Last year, there was a massive data breach at a platform called Discord, a major social media platform, in which the data used for age verification of over 70,000 users was leaked. We have seen a lot of instances of this kind of data being sold on the dark web.

Theoretically, if it was an abstract question of whether we sacrifice a little bit to keep children safe then we can have discussions about that but, practically speaking, it is really not that simple, unfortunately. Setting it up as an either/or question is setting adults up for privacy infringements and setting children up for being unsafe online.

  1.        Lord Tarassenko: Looking at numbers, I agree with you that it has not worked for 100% of kids in Australia, but what if it works even for 30% of kids and it means that 1% or 2% of the adults object to their privacy or their freedom of expression being affected. I agree that there are problems with implementation of the ban but over time, as we learn how to do it better, surely that percentage of children who are kept safe is going to grow. The fact that there was a leakage of 7,000 sets of information for Discord is a problem, because that was not implemented properly. I have shared my digital passport photo in order to be able to do certain things. If it is used for a deepfake I will have the ability to go and get redress for that.

What I am saying is that we have to give these new measures a chance in order to make our children safer, otherwise the harms that we heard about in the first session against girls will just continue to grow. Unless we take action, the trend is just going to be upwards.

Maya Thomas: I am very much with you on the need to take action. I am also with you that it is sometimes necessary to give your ID for stuff. I opened a banking app a few weeks ago; I submitted my passport for that. The difference is that I also could have gone into a physical branch and done it. The really nefarious part of age verification as it stands now is its mandatory nature. This is mandatory age verification to access lawful content that, as Big Brother Watch has researched, a lot of the time is not harmful for children.

It is easy to talk about people who are concerned about privacy as if they are sort of nerdy, basement-dwelling types. Privacy is often seen as something that most people do not care about very strongly. One reason for that is because we have not looked at the many ways in which privacy affects people and the many people affected by having their online anonymity taken away. Having mandatory age verification on platforms chills the speech of dissidents, campaigners and lots of people who have legitimate reasons to want to remain anonymous online. Domestic abuse survivors often do not want their identity to be out online and will be scared to upload sensitive information like that.

It is definitely a tricky conversation. Fundamentally, freedom of speech, privacy and children’s safety are all rights. Children have the right to be safe in the online world as well as in the offline world. That is very important, but it also means that we need to consider what the most proportionate way of doing that is. As I mentioned, two-thirds of parents do not use parental controls on their children’s devices. There are a lot of situations where platforms could do more by their design to keep children safe. There are a lot of way more proportionate measures to do this, rather than just slapping age verification on everybody and forcing everybody to potentially be the victim of a deepfake or something as horrific as deepfake pornography.

Lord Tarassenko: Thank you for engaging with the question.

  1.        The Chair: I think we are going to have to move on. There is a similar feel, perhaps, in the next question, because this committee is not just talking about the Online Safety Act and whether it has been a success; we are seeking to find ways to improve it. We have heard many calls to strengthen platforms’ duties, which we are talking about again today, to mitigate the risks identified in the risk assessments, including through a broader statutory duty of care. What implications do you believe that would have for freedom of expression and privacy, and what safeguards would you suggest? We are really up against the time now, so if you could keep your answers very concise, that would be a help.

Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt: Thank you for that question. I had the benefit of reading some of the evidence that was taken recently when this was discussed, I believe, on a panel with Lorna Woods and others. I am largely in agreement with what was said there. A larger duty of care, if implemented properly, would be okay so long as, again, we take freedom of expression into account at a really nuanced level. When platforms, for example, assess risks of harms they need to decide what mitigation measures they are going to take to reduce those risks. That is where meaningful freedom of expression consideration needs to be engaged, specifically looking at, “These are the three potential mitigation options we have. Here’s one which will achieve these objectives with this risk to free speech. Here’s another option which could achieve these objectives to a lesser extent, with less implications for free speech”, and so on. That is precisely where freedom of expression needs to be taken into account. It cannot be an overarching duty to take into account freedom of expression, with platforms and Ofcom hand waving towards it but not actually meaningfully engaging in it.

Maya Thomas:​ The problem is that platforms, in order to uphold their duty of care, end up overzealously taking content down. It is much easier to overmoderate than it is to meaningfully take freedom of expression into account.

  1.        The Chair:​ That is the second time you have said that, and it is in direct contravention of what we heard earlier. We heard earlier that not taking content down is a position that the platforms are in, and that many thousands, if not millions, of people are affected by content that is not taken down quickly. You are perfectly at liberty to say that, but it really does not chime with the evidence we have heard elsewhere. 

​​Maya Thomas:​ I am happy to clarify. When I talk about content being taken down and content being censored, I am talking about age gating. Content that is being restricted is maybe a more accurate way of phrasing that, if that helps. In order to uphold their duty of care, platforms overmoderate a lot of content. I am very happy to send the committee a report in which we did two years of research looking at the types of content that were wrongfully restricted in the Online Safety Act.

It is also worth mentioning that something like a duty of care takes a lot of effort for platforms. We talk a lot about how we want to fight big tech and that big tech is committing these horrible harms to children and adults in this country. But, unfortunately, the Online Safety Act, which requires platforms to submit over 100 pages of Ofcom paperwork, is not something that smaller platforms are able to work with. We found that, after the Online Safety Act came into force, on just one forum-hosting platform alone, 300 smaller platforms just instantly shut down because they could not deal with the regulatory burden. We are actually entrenching big tech by creating these laws and rules that only a platform with the resources of big tech can keep up with and that smaller forums, like Dads with Kids, which was a small, local-run forum for single fathers, or London Fixed Gear and Single-Speed, which is a cycling forum, cannot keep up with.  

  1.        ​The Chair:​ Are you saying that they closed down because of the burden of regulation?

​Maya Thomas:​ They closed down.

The Chair:​ Size is already taken into account in terms of the platforms that Ofcom is dealing with; and there are criticisms around that too, because there can be harm in small platforms in the way there can be in large ones. I understand your point. There are some points of disagreement. Let us move on. Our next question is from Lord Holmes. ​​ 

  1.        Lord Holmes of Richmond:​ Thank you very much, Chair. Would you support Ofcom being given powers to require greater use of proactive technologies to identify illegal content? What safeguards would need to be in place to protect user rights adequately? 

​​Maya Thomas:​ We are not keen on Ofcom requiring platforms to use one specific technology, mainly because a lot of platforms already have different ways in which they try to keep their users safe. For instance, if Ofcom were to require something that would break end-to-end encryption, we would have a very big problem with that because we see end-to-end encryption as a safety tool. If Ofcom were to require something like hash matching for open source content, we would—theoretically—absolutely stand behind that. The issue is that asking Ofcom to pinpoint one particular type of technology is a slippery slope, if that makes sense.​

  1.        ​​Lord Holmes of Richmond:​ Would you rather not have any proactive technology? You have mentioned hash matching, but from what you are saying about a slippery slope, would your position be that you would rather not use any of those proactive technologies?

​​Maya Thomas:​ No, not at all. I think it is up to the platforms to identify what type of technology works best for their users. A platform that offers end-to-end encrypted messages, but also offers open source images, could use something like hash matching on those open source images. That platform, because they have opted to use end-to-end encryption, would not choose to use something like client-side scanning, which would break that. It is up to platforms to determine how exactly they want to do that. Ofcom’s role in this is requiring platforms to do their utmost to keep their users safe. 

​Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt:​ I agree with that point. It is hard to answer that question when we do not know what proactive technology we are talking about specifically. I would reiterate that if Ofcom is going to require platforms to use proactive technologies, that needs to be made publicly available, so that everyone here and those in civic society can be aware and engage with any comments that they have with regard to that requirement. As technology develops, there are going to be new proactive technologies that might be useful. Should Ofcom require the platforms to utilise some of those? Sure, but we need to have guardrails in place to make sure those are publicly available and that we are considering privacy and freedom of expression, as we have talked about here.

There are the proactive technology provisions in the Online Safety Act. But there are also provisions within Section 10 itself, where Ofcom can require platforms to engage in better design and systems functionality requirements, and that has been underutilised. I do not want that to be left off the table here because, again, these are existing provisions within the Online Safety Act, which, in my view, Ofcom has not adequately dealt with and made use of in its guidance, and some of that can be used to, for example, help better detect illegal content. This would be a great example to help platforms detect ambiguous threats. Therefore, a comment like “I wish someone would throw acid on you” might not be strictly illegal or criminal content, but you could have a design functionality in place where a message pops up to the user before they post it, or right after they post, that says, “Given what you have said, we actually need you to clarify the intention and the meaning behind your post. Do you actually want to say this? Here is how you could alter your post to make sure that it is conforming”.

These are ways that you can educate users within the design of the platform, which can actually help moderators make better moderation decisions to protect safety and expression. I do not want us to lose sight of those, because they exist in the Online Safety Act regime in addition to the proactive technology point.

  1.        Lord Holmes of Richmond: Is it your view that, more generally, Ofcom has not used existing powers available it?

​​Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt:​ Yes, and this would be a good example. In my view, Ofcom has approached this provision regarding design and functionality by asking to what extent platforms are assessing risks of the design functions on their system. But you could ask what kinds of systems design platforms could use to help them make better moderation decisions. It has not asked that question, and that is a really important question to ask to protect safety and help detect illegal content while also protecting expression.

  1.        ​​​Baroness Fleet:​ You have both said quite a bit about changes to the Online Safety Act, and Maya said right at the beginning that it should be repealed. But given that is not on the cards at the moment, I just wondered what approach you think Ofcom should take to make the greatest practical difference to protecting users’ rights and privacy? What do you think Ofcom could do without extending the Act?

Maya Thomas: Unfortunately, my answer to this will not be very satisfying. Ofcom can tinker around the edges; that is the power it has. It can fix a bit of guidance here and a bit of guidance there, but unfortunately no amount of Ofcom tinkering is going to fix the Online Safety Act. That is my short and brief answer.

​Ricki-Lee Gerbrandt:​ Briefly, three things come to mind. The first is for Ofcom to actually start regulating, and I want to acknowledge that Ofcom has faced difficulties based on getting information from platforms. I appreciate that it has had a path to try to get platform compliance. But at the same time, it has been very slow, and there are existing ways that Ofcom could simply just start regulating and actually look at whether platforms are doing what they are meant to be doing.

For step 2, it can improve its codes and guidance by taking a more nuanced approach to these issues to require platforms to make better moderation decisions. In terms of amendment, part of the problem is the criminal law backbone of the Online Safety Act. That is why I would be supportive of an overarching duty of care, which requires platforms to assess risks in a more comprehensive manner, with the very important caveat that, again, freedom of expression is taken into account at every level of that. We know that certain categories of content, like hate speech, are ripe for overmoderation and the removal of legitimate criticism. Therefore, particular attention needs to be paid when platforms are making decisions about reducing harms in those categories of content. ​

​​​The Chair:​ Thank you both. I am sorry we have run over, but only by five minutes, which is not bad by our standards. Thank you very much for coming today.