Financial Services Regulation Committee

Uncorrected oral evidence: Regulatory sandboxes in financial services

Wednesday 11 November 2026

11.35 am

 

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Members present: Baroness Noakes (The Chair); Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted; Lord Davies of Brixton; Baroness Donaghy; Lord Eatwell; Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach; Lord Hill of Oareford; Lord Hollick; Lord Lilley; Lord Smith of Kelvin; Lord Turnbull; Lord Vaux of Harrowden.

Evidence Session No. 5 Heard in Public Questions 52 - 63

 

Witnesses

Michael Moore, CEO, UK Private Capital; Dr Andrew Henderson, Partner, Goodwin; Leo Ringer, Co-Founder and Partner, Form Ventures.

 

 USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT

  1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and webcast on www.parliamentlive.tv.
  2. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct the record. If in doubt as to the propriety of using the transcript, please contact the Clerk of the Committee.
  3. Members and witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Clerk of the Committee within 14 days of receipt.

Examination of witnesses

Michael Moore, Dr Andrew Henderson and Leo Ringer.

  1.             The Chair: Welcome to today’s meeting, which is the fifth oral session as part of the committee’s inquiry into regulatory sandboxes. I thank Mr Moore, Dr Henderson and Mr Ringer for attending this evidence session. This session is open to the public. It is broadcast live and is subsequently accessible via the parliamentary website. A verbatim transcript will be taken of the evidence, which will also be put on the parliamentary website.

Could you briefly introduce yourselves for the record and then we will move into questions? We will start with Mr Ringer.

Leo Ringer: Good afternoon. Thank you for having us. I founded and run a venture capital fund called Form. We invest at the very early stage in start-ups in regulated markets in financial services.

Michael Moore: I am chief executive of UK Private Capital. We are the trade body for venture capital firms, private equity firms and private credit firms.

Dr Andrew Henderson: I am a partner in the international law firm of Goodwin Proctor, based in London. Goodwin is headquartered in Boston with offices on the east and west coasts, including a strong northern California presence, as well as in Europe and Asia. I have over 25 years’ experience as a financial services regulatory lawyer working in and around the City, with a four-year stint in the Middle East. In keeping with our firm’s practice profile, a major part of my practice is advising investors in and founders of technology-enabled businesses, especially those in financial services.

  1.             The Chair: We are trying to explore the relevance or the pluses and minuses of regulatory sandboxes in financial services and their interaction with the private capital markets. Are they important or are they not important? It would be helpful if we could start with your initial views. We will start with Dr Henderson.

Dr Andrew Henderson: As an adviser, we have found them useful. There are two aspects to that. The first is that, practically speaking, they offer up a useful environment, not only for the entrants into the sandbox to test their technologies or products but for them to test their understanding of the regulatory system, which is important. More generally, there is a certain kudos attached to the regulatory sandbox and often we have had clients who probably were not natural candidates for the sandbox, were sufficiently well developed, but chose to go into the sandbox because they felt that would give them a commercial advantage, particularly where they were looking to raise funds for their business.

Michael Moore: Sandboxes are hugely important and they have evolved a lot over the last decade or so since being introduced. Different types of sandboxes have different purposes. If a particular firm has a product or service that does not fit neatly within the existing regulation, having a sandbox where you have the space and the regulatory blessing to experiment and learn together is good. If you are at the early stages of a new technology, having a safe regulatory space where one can experiment and keep the regulator assured that you are heading in the right direction and you can learn from the developments as you go is also good. When technologies develop into a clearer form, are not always mature but are at reasonably advanced stage, to be able to test what that means for a particular sector is also good. We have also seen more recently—the committee had the FCA here earlier—regulators themselves being able to test their policy-making and create a space where, outside the normal boundaries, they can explore how they develop that policy, which also serves a purpose. There are three or four quite distinct types of sandboxes that have emerged and all of them are useful.

Primarily, our firms are looking at how sandboxes help the companies into which they invest, but the last one, the regulatory sandbox—PISCES would be a good example of that—works at an industry level. All together, they have done well to give the UK competitive advantage and they help us to stay at the forefront of innovative technology and innovative regulation.

The Chair: You say they are hugely important but not every fintech goes through the sandbox, partly because they have to apply and not everybody applies and if they apply not everybody is accepted. How important is it for those who do not go through it?

Michael Moore: You will hear from Leo Ringer shortly and I defer to his greater expertise in and lived experience of this. When you start out with a sandbox idea, particularly an innovative firm wanting to test what its product or service is going to look like, you may be offering that particular firm some advantage, but that assumes that at the end of the process you will have a successful outcome and that that will unlock the door and it will get first mover advantage.

Back in the day that might have been an issue that gave preferential treatment. There might still be an element of that. Again, others will be better placed to judge that, but with a more mature suite of sandboxes you have people who put ideas through them, or others might not have the opportunity but will observe and they can take advantage of what the regulatory outcomes are. If those have opened things up and made the UK more innovative as a regulatory environment, that is good for everybody.

The Chair: Mr Ringer, your lived experience?

Leo Ringer: We have invested in just shy of a dozen fintechs in the UK, very early-stage companies. It could be two co-founders with an idea or it could be a small team at the very earliest stages of building a product, but almost always pre-authorisation, so they have not yet been through the FCA process. Building on the comments, which I endorse, maybe in the early days of the FCA regulatory sandbox—probably 10 years ago now but certainly when we began investing in 2018-19—it was a cohort model. Firms would apply and every six months be assessed and selected and then a group of 20 or so would progress through a structured programme.

As an investor, one of the big risks we are underwriting when we look at a company is whether the company can get authorised. The technology might be there, the team might be compelling, there is a business model, and the FCA has a very privileged position of deciding who gets to trade in the market. The default is you are not allowed to unless you are authorised if you are doing a regulated activity. We are trying to assess: if we fund a company for, say, two years, which is typical in the market—it can be less—can the company usually get through authorisation in that timeframe? If it cannot, it is a big challenge for it to raise further capital.

The sandbox in its earliest incarnation, the cohort-based model, was a signal to us that a company had the wherewithal to be selected by the regulator, to be diligenced, and it was going to have some degree of interaction at early stages. That is versus a company—to your question about those that did not get in—perhaps had it applied, had it been found wanting in some way, that could be a signal that its regulatory maturity was not there. Maybe six, seven, eight years ago there was a potential for adverse selection for the companies that did not get in.

The process then changed, I cannot remember exactly when, to being open on a continual basis, so there was no longer a cohort model and that meant that there was less of, “Are you in it or not?” The flipside of that is that there was less of a positive signal for those that were in it because there was less kudos and less of a sense of being in the next wave of companies that might break out. That is a challenge for the regulator to balance. The more selective it is the more of a signal it sends, but the more exclusionary, potentially, it is accused of being.

  1.             Lord Eatwell: That is most interesting. The reason I say that is that we have had a group of people from fintech companies giving evidence here, who were very negative about sandboxes and they saw them as part of what is now the financial establishment as opposed to supporting the more disruptive. Perhaps Mr Moore’s notion of maturity is something that they were thinking about. They argued that one of the aspects of the sandboxes these days was how very expensive it was to apply and to enter the sandbox and that the funds were better spent simply preparing their materials for authorisation rather than on this more exploratory thing.

I understand that the whole idea of the sandbox was to reduce the regulatory risk, to which Mr Ringer referred—will they get authorisation?—and of course it is an information service for the regulator, but what about this observation that it has become a haven for major companies which can afford it? NatWest was mentioned several times as a major company that could afford to go into the sandbox as opposed to really serving the disruptors, which is what the sandbox idea was initially focused on. Mr Ringer, could you take that up?

Leo Ringer: I agree with most of that and what they said. I fund disruptive new entrants—new, small challengers, typically without the resources, although they are raising reasonable sums of capital. I think there is a tension there between the idea that they have no resources and that they have enough. With the finite resources we have—and time, which is the crucial factor for most early-stage companies—the judgment is whether the investment in joining the sandbox worth it in what the company will get in return versus what it can spend those resources doing otherwise, which could be just building a normal application. I think this goes back to one of the things that have plagued the sandboxes over the years, which is: what is it for specifically versus what the people think it is for in a general sense?

One thing that has definitely been true is that the sandbox gives a sense that the FCA is pro-innovation and that has been helpful around the world and it has been a general feeling, but when you drill down into it there are a couple of things that a start-up might find useful. One is: does it give us a head start on being authorised? I think that has always been slightly misunderstood. You cannot go into the sandbox and do things that you would need a licence for otherwise, just because you are in a sandbox. There can be waivers but normally the FCA would say a company still needs to be authorised, and I think companies misunderstand that.

Secondly, you may be unclear as to whether your technology complies with existing rules and that, for me, is probably answered by advisers who can give a sense of that, and maybe the six months in the investment team in dialogue with the FCA, not in all cases but in some cases. Then there is the hope that in some cases you might know your technology is at the edge of the rules or in a grey area and you want the regulator to either change the rules because you have thought of something new or flex or accommodate you in a different way. That is the hardest bucket of progress because that is where I think the regulator is less minded to go. It is more about testing ideas and getting information than it is about a real willingness to change the law or change the rules.

If a start-up was making a judgment about which of those three or four things might be valuable and whether it is worth its time, if it is, the start-ups could in theory invest a lot of resources in pursuing a sandbox—but, to be blunt about it, of the 10 or so we fund, none of them has made the decision to go through the sandbox. We followed many other companies that have and looked at many and discussed it with them but none of them has made the judgment, in our experience, because that value trade-off has not quite fallen on the right side of the line.

Dr Andrew Henderson: Certainly, for those of our clients who are very confident in their proposition, particularly those who have already had funding, the sense was that they felt good enough to go for a full authorisation rather than go through the training wheels of the sandbox. The other point worth noting is that since the sandbox the FCA itself has opened up other avenues for new starters. If you think about the small innovative banks, for example, there are some new entrants which already give good regulatory services outside of the sandbox. That has also been a factor, with people seeing they can still get perhaps not quite the level of attention that they do in the sandbox, and arguably that is what people are paying for, but if you acknowledge that you are new in industry you will get a sympathetic ear from the FCA. It will still expect you to adhere to its standards but the differentiation that the sandbox once offered has been somewhat dissipated.

Lord Eatwell: Is it right, Mr Moore, that maturity means that if we were in the United States we would say it has become part of the deep state? Has the sandbox moved away from its initial target of the disruptors to just backing up the establishment in developing its ideas?

Michael Moore: Absent a proper study, I am slightly nervous of declaring definitively that it is one thing or the other. I am also not necessarily in a conspiratorial mood this morning. I will go back to my high-level distinction between them. I do not think there is any question that for a small fintech up against the mighty high street banks or other financial institutions, it is always slightly one-sided and for the bigger institutions which wish to test things through the regulatory sandbox, that will be more straightforward. To Leo’s point, every pound of what a start-up company spends must be thought about carefully. You do not want to waste time on things, but I think we need to be wary of exactly that worry—that the disruptors are not so much crowded out but it is not such a distinctive place for them to go and get something valuable in return.

When you get to the technologies that are being tested through different types of sandboxes, the digital security sandbox, the AI supercharged sandbox, that is serving a broader set of purposes for the regulator and the industries learning what works and what will be tolerable within the existing regulatory framework. That is an evolution; that is a new area that people are looking at, and from that perspective it will always have a value as new technologies come along. Right now, when we are facing such change in what tech can do—AI, quantum and the like—all of this will be ever more important. I think we should encourage it but we must make sure, if I might say to our friends at the FCA, that they do not use the sandbox as an alternative to just getting on and regulating and making clear decisions and trying to take risk out of the system at the expense of innovation.

  1.             Lord Hollick: Mr Ringer, two years ago you told a Lords committee that regulators sometimes lack the incentives or the resources to understand and enable new technologies. Have things improved over the last two years?

Leo Ringer: I think they have improved a bit. There is a wider sense within Whitehall that regulators doing innovation well is important as a corollary to their role in safeguarding consumers from harm. We were interested in the creation of the Regulatory Innovation Office, which is a new office within government that is focused on exactly this question of how in regulated markets you get the regulators to understand and enable disruptive innovators to come through into that market. You see bits of work within Whitehall to do that. For example, that office helped fund the creation of a sandbox in the food sector for cell-cultivated proteins, another market that we invest in, which I do not think would have happened otherwise. You have seen a spread from that in the last couple of years.

My point was that I think we are still in a place where, to the FCA’s credit, it does a lot on innovation, including sandboxes, but I do not think that it has the incentive to take as much risk as a VC would want it to take on new technology. It is focused primarily on protecting consumers from harm and even though it has secondary objectives on competition and growth, it does not rise to the same level. When there is a choice to be made between harm protection and engaging in innovation, that choice is often made the other way around. I think we have seen improvements.

My view is that is a call for Ministers to make, where they need to say to regulators, “We are willing for you to take a certain amount of risk in pursuit of growth and innovation and you will not be hauled in front of a parliamentary committee to answer if anything goes wrong”, but until that happens it is for the FCA chief executive to say to a committee that he needs a metric for tolerable failure, because start-ups, the world I invest in, are highly risky. A lot of these companies do fail and we cannot contain all the risks, and I think we can be grown-up about that, but the regulator is in a position where it is very sensitive to any kind of harm but also being pushed to take risk, and I sympathise with that. That is where my comments came from and the sandbox is part of the infrastructure you need to try to do that in because it allows a regulator to learn, but the balance is still not quite there.

Lord Hollick: Do you agree with that, Mr Moore?

Michael Moore: Yes. I think that hits on the point. It is not often that we would be hugely sympathetic to regulators but when it is not clear what counts as tolerable risk, where the boundary for regulating for growth ends and you revert to the primary aim to maintain financial stability and/or protect consumers against harm, that is a difficult position to be in. One would imagine, just on a psychological basis, that you would default to where there is least risk and you are most comfortable and that is starting to take risk out of the system.

I know that legislation was announced that envisages regulating for growth and bringing in some new ideas in this space. The legislation has not been published yet, if I am accurate in that. That will be an interesting moment of truth. Will the Government and Parliament give the regulators a higher expectation of delivering on innovation and growth but also the cover that enables them to do so while remaining professional but without them being judged ill when things do not go right?

Dr Andrew Henderson: I was going to say I had nothing to add, but I think this is a very important point. We deal with venture capital funds but also private equity funds, which is a different mindset. It is accepted that venture capital funds’ investments will fail because a smaller ticket is being sought. It is about trying as much as possible not to import that entirely wholesale because it is a regulatory authority but at least being able to inject some of that: that failure does not necessarily mean failure in an absolute sense. That would be positive.

  1.             Lord Lilley: As far as I could judge from the companies which had rejected the idea of entering sandboxes, they hoped the sandbox might be a way of getting authorisation for what they wanted to do. They discovered when they looked into it that it was a very expensive process, that it did not give you authorisation and at the end of it you had to apply for authorisation so it doubled the cost. It then emerged that authorisation is quite a costly and lengthy process and that sometimes you have to wait for a while but when it happens we were told the officers from the FCA who handle it are rather good. It is not quite clear to me why you need a sandbox if you have a process of an officer from the FCA going through the company and saying, “This is what you plan to do. That is allowed and that is not allowed. If you are only going to do the things that are allowed, we will authorise you.” Why do you need two processes? That leads me to what I originally thought sandboxes were about, which is about the regulator discovering whether it has to change its rules to allow things that are new and novel but not criminal and not designed to defraud people. Which is it?

Michael Moore: I think you have elegantly set out the dilemma and the risks attached to processes. It should be the original concept, which is about encouraging innovation and enabling, in a safe space, the regulator and the firm with the innovative idea to work out together what is going on, rather than come up with something that is very innovative and would be an automatic no based on culture and experience prior to that.

Lord Lilley: Why should something very innovative be an automatic no?

Michael Moore: That is just our experience of regulators down the years probably anywhere in the world. Again, I am trying to be open-minded and fair to them. They have a book of regulations and experience of what they do that will inform how they approach the next thing that comes before them. If you are at a moment in time, as we were a decade ago with challenger banks, as we are now with other technological developments, where essentially the old book will not do, you need some space to do it. But if it becomes, to your first point, that the people concerned are basically going through an elaborate process that looks like authorisation by a longer, slower track, that is not smart.

Lord Lilley: We were told—and I do not know whether it was Michael or someone else who said it—that in the sandbox you cannot trade except if there is a waiver. Originally when I was trying to find out what a sandbox was, without a great deal of success, I thought I had success from someone who said it is quite simply that you apply and you are then allowed to operate your system in real time and with real clients but you have to have an insurance policy to be able to reimburse them if things have gone wrong and it turns out that your customers have somehow been damaged. Again, that does not seem much of a sandbox. You could just do that anyway.

Leo Ringer: I think this goes back to my point about there being a lot of specific different things that are contained even within the regulatory sandbox, which is one of the several sandboxes because there is AI supercharged, stablecoin, digital security. In the regulatory sandbox, one of the tools that the FCA can use is a restricted permission to do something on a limited basis, which is essentially a temporary permission, but I do not really know of any examples where that has happened. I do not know whether that is ever used. The next thing you might get is a no enforcement letter. You come along and say, “We are innovative disruptive. We have come up with a new thing. We think it is okay. We are in the sandbox”. The FCA says, “Well, we can tell you that we would not enforce on you if something goes wrong but we are not providing you safe harbour from consumer claims”—to your point about insurance and where the liability sits—“so it is caveat emptor but from our perspective it is okay”, which for a start-up is an intolerable risk or an avoidable risk.

Michael Moore: Switched it to somebody else.

Leo Ringer: Yes, exactly. Then there is the bit that I agree should be the focus, which is: this is innovative and disruptive. The existing rulebook is written in the rear-view mirror, it is written about the world as it exists and cannot pre-empt innovation, but does the existing rulebook make sense in the context of this new innovation? That is a thing that I personally think the sandbox should be focused on but it is the bit where the FCA has the least appetite because it is essentially the most significant where it might have to go away and look at the credit information rules or the lending rules and say, “We need to rethink this”.

I think this is where structure comes in because the sandbox happens within the innovation team and then there is a policy team at the FCA asking themselves questions like this most of the time anyway: “Should we change the rules around, say, credit information?” There has been since 2019 a long-winded study into that market of how we rewrite the rules for credit referencing when you get a credit check, which is finally getting to remedy seven years later and there might be some policy, but that is nothing to do with a sandbox. That is the policy team at the FCA doing its reform.

For me, there should be a far greater connection between the learning that happens in the sandbox and what the FCA then does with its policy afterwards, but I do not think we can expect that all to happen within the sandbox. The sandbox is almost an information funnel into the FCA to then feed into other work. I do not see evidence that that pipeline works particularly well but that might just be my perspective.

Lord Lilley: Are there any examples of the FCA using a sandbox, discovering that its regulations need to be changed and changing them?

Dr Andrew Henderson: I can give you an example. What sometimes worries me, and I see this often, is that the terms “fintech” and “sandbox” are very broadly defined. There is a broad difference between someone who wishes to issue securities via innovative technology and somebody who has a payment services app that they wish to test. My experience with a particular client was that they approached the FCA about the sandbox—this was in the earlier days—and they were accepted into the cohort. They understood that they had to become authorised but they would be given some more leeway. They understood that they would have to comply with rules on how you offer. They understood that they had to have their proper business in place. To the point around it being two authorisations, that is not technically correct. They were authorised with limitations and then at the conclusion of the testing period those limitations would be removed.

It is not as simple as a negative process, where you would need to be able to persuade the FCA that the business had worked. In that case, there was not the commercial appetite for it, so that was where we looked at the process and we thought it worked well. They had advisers on board, and we were advising, and the FCA were very co-operative. It was the one and only time that FCA officials came to the client’s office to hear what they were planning to do. I think that is something one needs to be slightly careful with, that they are all painted with the same brush, because these are very different kinds of businesses that will often be looking at the same processes. The perception may be that there have been three processes, it was quite expensive and it is quite possible the product might have change and the business may have changed in response.

To the second point, what we were looking at, at the time, was the first day of issuance of equities on a blockchain, which had never been done before and I do not think it has been done since, certainly not in the United Kingdom. A big part of that was being able to persuade the FCA that this is how we would classify these instruments, for example, this is where it all worked, but also to look at those aspects where perhaps the regulation did not quite fit and that would then inform its policy going forward.

What struck me was there was great curiosity on the part of the FCA, so it was studying this as much as anything else because it was seen as being a pilot programme in a sense. It is very fact-specific but certainly my experience is that there has been engagement and arguably some of those early lessons are then fed into later legislation, if you look at the approach to blockchain-enabled securities trading, and arguably some of those ideas were first sown a few years ago.

Lord Lilley: You mentioned a cohort, that if there is a cohort you can have a sandbox. Is that normal? Normally if someone comes up with a new product, it would be odd if 20 people came up with a new product at the same time. Why is there anyone else around to go into the sandbox with you?

Leo Ringer: Originally the sandbox incarnation was non-thematic so it was not, “You have to be doing this, that or the other” but it was just, “You are innovative and welcome to the club and we will go through this process.” As that time-based cohort thing has fallen away, it has been replaced by more of a thematic focus. At the moment you have the digital securities sandbox, which is about, as I understand it, the market infrastructure. Then you have the stablecoin sandbox, which has four firms in it. That is about who will get to issue a pound-denominated stablecoin. The FCA has said, and I think admirably, that there are market-wide issues such as digital securities where we need to look at that issue in the round and bring in a bunch of players which are doing retail and wholesale and have a think about it together. That seems to be a good way of thinking about things because it is much more attached to this question of what is the policy environment and what does the regulator need to say to make this work, rather than the previous iteration, which was cohort-based but nothing to do with what any individual firm was doing, so it is harder to learn those lessons.

I think the cohorts have evolved into thematic and that is what you see now. In my mind that leaves a bit of a question about what the core regulatory sandbox is for if the FCA is starting to peel off other thematic sandboxes as and when it sees the need.

  1.             Lord Turnbull: When I first encountered this it seemed as though the proposition was that there was a preferred approach, a chosen method, by which the regulator could promote innovation. The evidence we have had from several people, including yourselves, is maybe we should be looking more at a suite of approaches that the regulator uses, sandboxes being one of them. Indeed, what is happening is there is no such thing as “the sandbox”. There is a proliferation of sandboxes and no doubt there will be new types of sandboxes, so we need a more eclectic approach. The regulator thinks there are various ways in which we can promote innovation and the sandboxes are “useful”. That phrase has come up. Useful can mean useful or it can mean useful, something which is more generalised, and sandboxes have a place in it but they are not the be-all and end-all of the regulator’s approach on innovation.

Leo Ringer: I agree and, to be fair to the FCA, there is a suite, to a degree. It has innovation services, it has a place to go for more informal guidance and a steer that is not the regulatory sandbox, which is case officers who do a lightweight consulting-style offer, which I think is important. Then you get the regulatory sandbox and then the other thematic sandboxes. Going back 10 years, when there was a question around why we have not had any new banks in the UK for, I think it was, 100 years since we had a new banking licence, the FCA and the PRA created the joint New Bank Start-up Unit, which was a focused bit of work to ask how we essentially bring a new bank to market in the UK, and that was not a sandbox. It was just the regulator doing its job to try to think about market and competition.

I do not think we need to label everything as a sandbox. We have probably gone too far on that. Other regulators have started doing things and everyone is calling it a sandbox, but not only are they in different sectors, they are doing different things within them. As an investor and for the start-ups we work with, there is now quite a confusing panoply of things that are all called the same word, sandbox, but mean different things. It is about being more selective about when we use the term “sandbox” and being much clearer about what we are trying to achieve in it within a broader suite.

This goes back to my point about how the FCA’s broader policy-making must all sit within the core functions of what the regulator does. I have a slight concern that all the innovation happens somewhere down the corridor in a dusty room while the rest of the regulator gets on with its job, when those things should really be just a high-performing regulator doing innovation very well as part of its day-to-day job, in my view.

Michael Moore: I will step one level back out from the immediate focus on the sandbox to show how it matters that the UK remains globally competitive in this area. The UK is the second-largest ecosystem of private capital anywhere in the world outside North America, and for VC specifically the third-largest ecosystem, and we have been hugely successful over the years. Last year there was £8 billion of VC investment in the UK and financial insurance investment is one of the top categories where we do that. We, as an industry, have London and the whole of the UK as a great base from which to do the investing.

The prize for the UK is how much of the capital that is managed is deployed in the UK. When you think about the brilliant science and innovation that we have coming out of our universities, the technology companies that are emerging, you then need to be able to get them to get to market. What we need to be able to scale and become the elusive globally successful business that we can host here in the UK is a very slick, agile regulatory system. For all the complexity and changing balance over time, it matters that the UK remains a competitive place for the regulation and we should aspire to be world-leading in that area.

It is easy to blur them all together but that is why as different bits of the sandbox have evolved, it matters that we do not lose sight of why it is significant for us; otherwise, the global investors who provide 85% of the capital that we manage here in the UK will say, “That is great. We will still have it managed there but we will invest it in a more appropriate market on the continent or in the Middle East” or wherever it may be.

Lord Turnbull: The regulator should be prepared to back something which is not a sandbox but is still—

Michael Moore: The regulator has an important job. It has to ensure that none of its primary objectives around financial stability, making the system work, looking after consumers, are undermined but it also has to look at the potential. We have a great track record in the UK, down the centuries but particularly in the last 10 or 15 years in what is happening. There is a moment in time right now. The scientific potential of the UK is unprecedented in the last 20 or 30 years. Before that moment passes, we must make sure that all the component parts are together. For us, that regulatory competitiveness without it diluting standards is essential.

  1.             Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach: Dr Henderson, why do firms come to seek your advice and do they ask different questions in different jurisdictions? I was impressed by the evidence we heard the last time we met that sandboxes virtually do not exist in America, but we know that for start-ups and markets and getting things going, the US is clearly in a strong position. I wonder to what extent the regulators are building up something here as an extra layer of regulation, which I can see had enormous appeal when it started because even the regulators were uninformed about where they were, but the way it is going on we are building almost a carbuncle, despite what you said when you introduced it.

Dr Andrew Henderson: To the point about what people seek advice for, much depends on the sophistication of the person seeking the advice. An interesting feature of many of the fintechs is that they often have—particularly those in the role of the chair appointment—people who are seasoned veterans of the City. We deal with very innovative payment and escrow solutions, but the chair, not the founder, is a former City banker. When he approaches me, he is seeking validation and confirmation of what he understands the position to be, sometimes guidance on some of the thorny issues that might arise, particularly those that might relate to solvency. You tread a very fine line with a lot of the start-ups between being a going concern and suddenly becoming a gone concern. That will be a combination of just needing black-letter law advice, although now with the advent of artificial intelligence most of our clients know or think they know the answer.

What they are really looking for is judgment. It is the judgment piece that becomes important. Even explaining how this should be presented to the regulator is important. It has a set of priorities, those that are written into legislation, yes, but it is what that means to it, one of those being that it must appear before a committee, like we do, and answer questions. It can be difficult. It is a blend of those services that we offer.

The point about the United Sates is an interesting one. I have colleagues who do what I do on the other side of the Atlantic and it strikes me that the manner in which the SEC regulates is very strict. It may say that there is a slightly lower bar to entry and it relies very heavily on disclosure, but also if people get things wrong, it has a tendency to come down very hard on them. The result is that, as an example, one of our venture fund clients was looking to raise capital in the United Kingdom versus the US. In the UK it is fairly straightforward in how you explain things to regulators. In the US it becomes a lot more complex because they sometimes find themselves tripping up and having to assume some kind of regulatory status that would not be the case if you are operating cross-border into the UK.

The key issue is the economic infrastructure, the ecosystem, which is a very big aspect in the technology world. If you contrast the venture fund managers with the private equity fund managers, the private equity fund managers will tend to raise capital far more globally. A lot of the US-based venture capital managers will just be raising in the United States because it is such a huge, vast market. I am not sure that the regulation necessarily plays a role but, if anything, our experience with the FCA is probably net positive versus with the SEC, but you still face the economic reality that the United States is a big place.

Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach: Do you envisage that sandboxes will almost become like needing a driving licence to drive a car?

Dr Andrew Henderson: Yes, but it is more like the learner licence. That is the basic concept. It is a question of being able to demonstrate your credentials as the driver that you are then allowed to graduate up to the full licence. I think that comes back to the point about it not being two processes but one continuous process, but sometimes that final removal of limitations is quite a high hurdle to have to cross.

  1.             Lord Davies of Brixton: A large part of this study is about innovation. It begins and ends with innovation, in my view, and I can see how sandboxes are part of the architecture of innovation. Innovation happens all the time—it always has happened and it will happen anyway—but there are various routes, and sandboxes are one particular way of bringing innovation forward. What I am not so clear about is: does it actually encourage innovation? Is it possible to say that because sandboxes are there, innovations happen that would not otherwise exist?

Leo Ringer: It is a tough question. In a small number of specific cases, the answer can be yes. Sandboxes are at their best, including in a fintech context, when there is a specific, maybe thematic new technology—blockchain, whatever it might be—that it is pretty clear will struggle to chime with existing rules as they stand. If you want that economic activity to happen in the UK, the regulator will have to grip this issue and say, “Do we flex or rewrite the rules to accommodate this new technology and therefore have that activity in the UK, or do we for whatever reason—which could be a good reason if we think it is too risky, or a bad reason if it is difficult to change the law and parliamentary time is scarce—forgo that opportunity and see that activity go and happen elsewhere?” That is the choice in a lot of these breakout technologies.

I mentioned the food regulator and cell-cultivated proteins, which is designing novel proteins in a lab and proliferating them. It has taken ages for the UK regulator to get its act in gear and create a regime that is attractive to those innovators to come to the UK. Singapore has its act together, the US has its act together, and they are probably now years ahead of the UK. If I am a VC or a start-up, where do I do that? I will probably not choose the UK. In those time-limited decisions about where to locate activity, can I see that this regulator has the infrastructure to deal with my new technology? A sandbox can be an important part of that as both a signal and a way of getting the rules rewritten.

Sandboxes, at their weakest, are an extra layer, a parking bay for difficult cases that the regulator is not sure how to deal with, a bit of extra process, or window dressing that innovation is happening. It would be better in those instances to just have the normal authorisations regime, which is fairly clear. There are threshold conditions and it is clear what you need to do. You can get good or bad case officers, but the FCA has KPIs on this and it has objectives. That would be better than making everything a sandbox, because that obscures the clarity of the authorisations process.

One point to add is that the FCA has acknowledged this and it is consulting on a new system—provisional authorisation, I think it is called—that is completely separate from the sandbox. It is a new regime where you would get pre-approval, essentially, to do what you are doing, and then after a period of time and a bit more scrutiny, you would get full approval. This will need a legal change and is being consulted on now. In my mind, that is a better way of dealing with getting companies authorised than putting everything into a sandbox. That is not about authorisation; it is about policy, design and regulatory experimentation.

Dr Andrew Henderson: I will add an important point. The thing about innovation is that it is not always necessarily equated with entrepreneurship. Often, it is the more straightforward financial services business, such as raising capital, managing that capital and investing wisely, that requires the most attention from the regulator. More general regimes such as provisional authorisation are very positive because you do not have to be able to demonstrate that you have something that is necessarily innovative, but you are nevertheless an entrepreneur.

Michael Moore: I draw a distinction between this and what you might call foundational regulation, which is absolutely critical to attracting capital to the UK in the first place. If you are sitting in Singapore, Boston, Palo Alto or wherever, and you are thinking of deploying capital to be managed in the UK, you want world-class standards that are applied predictably and proportionately. You want to know that the regulation around the firms and so on is appropriate to your needs but will not constrain or trap you if you wish to move people, ideas or capital around.

You then get into what we have been dwelling on today, which is applied regulation, and the difference between what it might be in the sphere of drugs and medicine versus what happens in fintech, which is the focus here today, is hugely significant. I do not think it is likely to be an attractor unless you are being genuinely innovative and you are right at the front end of global regulation, but it can be a blocker. If you get it wrong and it is established that you are no longer competitive and others are doing it more appropriately or more easily, you could put the capital to work through a London-led team but you will be looking to invest in another jurisdiction, on the continent or elsewhere.

  1.             Lord Hill of Oareford: Do we not think there is an irony that an approach that is supposed to accelerate, simplify and clarify regulation ends up being manageable only with legal advice?

Michael Moore: That is an irony that might be more widely applied.

Lord Hill of Oareford: What I am getting at—I am sorry, this is a statement rather than a question—is that something that started out quite simple has become bureaucratised and extended. We had one sandbox and we now have however many we have, six or seven. We all sit here struggling, still, to comprehend the core benefits that derive from sandboxes, and then we end up with a situation, with no disrespect to Dr Henderson, where he has a profitable business line out of advising people how to negotiate the bureaucracy of the sandbox. It feels to me that we need to ask—and I think Mr Ringer was getting there at the end, I think you were proposing some ways that we ought to reconfigure how we think about it, stripping away this complexity to something more simple, so that you end up with a firm going through it and being able to leave the sandbox and become a successful business. I am sorry, it is partly my frustration. I started out as someone who was extremely enthusiastic about sandboxes and the more evidence we hear, the more I am questioning what the core purpose of them, simply expressed, is.

Michael Moore: I am not here to defend the regulator or anything else, and I am not disputing the analysis. There might be bits that we have to revisit and that is why this inquiry is very welcome, because it is putting a spotlight on the core issues.

There is a difference between a product sandbox, a technology sandbox and a regulatory sandbox where we are testing out how we might regulate a new part of financial services or whatever. You can put this into distinct categories. I do not mean having that formally codified, but the FCA, the Government and others bringing forward, “This is what we want to do”, to me and to our industry, would be a brilliant thing to pitch to the world and say, “Come to the UK. The applied regulation will be fit for purpose for this.”

I would love to imagine a world where advisers are not always needed. However, I imagine that even when it was relatively straightforward, right back at the beginning when it was all new, there were as many advisers in that space as there would be now, and rightly so. You cannot possibly, when you are building a new firm or a portfolio company within a fund, have the bandwidth or the depth of knowledge that will be required.

Lord Hill of Oareford: Maybe. Mr Ringer, sorry, I just want to go back. You have been asked about this a bit. You said right at the beginning that the third most difficult category would be where rule changes were made as a result of something having gone through a sandbox. Dr Henderson, you said there was one case you could think of where, arguably—I think that was the word you used—a couple of years later, there was some reflection and it changed in legislation. Can you, Mr Ringer, think of any examples where regulation was changed as a result of someone going through it, in your difficult third category?

Leo Ringer: Yes, exactly. Just before that, on your point about the bureaucracy, to be fair to the FCA, the sandbox was so lauded and has been so cited over the last 10 years as the shining example of regulatory innovation because there has not been much else to point at. Whenever a report gets written and they say, “Let us put in an example of when a regulator has done innovation well,” they put in the sandbox. It has got to this mythical status where it has been seen by lots of people to do all these things, but it is a fairly narrow tool in what should be a much bigger toolbox.

On one hand, I completely agree that it has become more than it should have been, but on the other I think that is a function of the lack of broader thinking about how to do regulatory innovation, and cramming everything into this. It is also partly because it is much easier for a regulator to create a new project, a sandbox, than it is to stare hard at a rulebook and say, “Do we need to re-legislate this?” and take the risk that goes along with changing rules.

One example early on was that a crop of companies came through wanting to do crowdfunding and crowdlending in the mid-2010s, and a lot of them ended up in the sandbox. It became apparent to the FCA that it would have to design new rules to figure out how to accommodate crowdfunding and crowdlending because they did not fit naturally within the existing rule set, and I think it then reflected and created a separate regime.

In my mind, a lot of the answer might be, counterintuitively, more regulation. It might be saying, “This technology has come forward. It does not fit with everything else we have defined”. It is not about deregulation because otherwise that activity remains prohibited. We need to create a new regulatory pathway for that technology. It might mean writing new rules and having new legislation, but otherwise that activity cannot happen. We have this framing—and we get it a lot from central government—around the need to deregulate. But a lot of the start-ups we invest in are saying, “Please build more regulatory infrastructure because otherwise we cannot do what we have just come up with”. That distinction often gets lost in an environment where regulation is seen as bad and deregulation is seen as the objective.

Dr Andrew Henderson: There is a paradox there. One of the reasons that people come to people like me for advice is because the rules are not clear. I am not saying you should make more rules. We like the status quo.

  1.             Baroness Donaghy: I can understand, going back to what Dr Henderson said earlier, that the kudos of going into a regulatory sandbox was then seen to give commercial advantage. Would you say that that was the case now?

Also, what would you change to increase support for innovation and investment in UK financial services? I take Mr Ringer’s point that there needs to be a correlation between the learning that has taken place within sandboxes and any appropriate changes that might take place at the policy level, and that it was frustrating because that was not apparent. It was not obviously happening. What other issues would you all change to improve that innovation?

Dr Henderson, do you think it is still the case that people will enter a sandbox to give themselves some kudos?

Dr Andrew Henderson: No, not any more. If they come to us, there must be a genuine use case. Often you say, “You are in good enough shape to enter into the conventional process”. It is important to reiterate the point that where the FCA, in a sense, is innovating is by being more accommodating to new entrants and more accepting of them. That has been a change.

Leo Ringer: On the point about whether there is any kudos, in the thematic sandboxes it can still be the case that there is. The general regulatory sandbox, the cohort model, has probably lost the kudos it had earlier.

There are four firms in the stablecoin sandbox. For your stablecoin to be used or eligible for experimentation within a digital security sandbox, you have to have gone through the stablecoin sandbox. As I understand it, quite specifically if you are trying to raise money to build a company doing a stablecoin and you are not in the stablecoin sandbox, it seems quite hard to convince investors that you will have much traction in the UK because your security will not be in the new test environment. There are examples where the regulator has said, “Here is a group we will work with on this”, and you need to be in that club, to a degree. Those are the thematic ones as opposed to the regulatory sandbox.

My first idea for how the FCA could do this better is to potentially pare back the sandbox terminology—strip it back to what is actually on offer here. You can see that it is trying to articulate that with innovation services, but my point is that sandboxes have become all things to all people.

There are three blockers, fundamentally, and this applies across other regulators as well, the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Food Standards Agency.

One is resources. It is a strange thing for someone to say that maybe the regulators need more funding or more resources, but hiring the people who can really get to grips with the technology—it might be computational biologists for the Food Standards Agency, it might be serious AI professionals who cost £500,000 in salary at the FCA to go toe-to-toe with the technologists—is a resourcing question. I think a lot of regulators just do not have the resources to stay abreast of the regulation and then to draw the difficult conclusions about what that means for the rulebook. Resourcing is one.

The second is the point I made at the start around risk appetite and risk-taking. Again, I do not think that is something the FCA can decide itself. It needs ministerial sponsorship and oversight. It needs a good letter from the City Minister saying, “We are happy for you to go a bit further”.

The third is probably even harder than knowing whether the rules are deficient: it is getting them changed and changing statute. The FCA has more flexibility than other regulators to change its own rules, but I do not need to tell this group that whenever it comes to a changing of the law, the parliamentary time and the difficulty of the drafting, it can be incredibly difficult to get a simple thing. The MHRA, the healthcare regulator, has had a wishlist from the Department of Health for the last three or four years of things that it would love the rulebook to say differently so that it can regulate better, but there is no parliamentary time. It is not always the regulator’s fault.

Resourcing, risk-taking and rule-making are, for me, the three. They need to come together.

  1.             Lord Smith of Kelvin: I am interested in whether we can learn from other jurisdictions about innovation and investment. In earlier evidence you said that Singapore is way ahead of us now. What are all these other jurisdictions doing that we can learn from and change?

Leo Ringer: The jurisdiction I admire most is Estonia. It has a very innovative approach to regulatory sandboxing, to use that term. In fact, the strapline of the unit is, “Making illegal things legal”, which is obviously a little bit tongue in cheek. The point is that it starts with a question: “This is an interesting technology. How do we change the rulebook to make sure that this activity can happen here?” There is a whole team in government that almost faces off the rest of government to go around saying, “Your rules are in the way”, and then has legislative power to change the law. Our Regulatory Innovation Office, the new thing I mentioned earlier, is a prototype of that, but the Estonians have really gripped this and they are operating within EU law, which is quite difficult.

Singapore has done it for food in particular and for financial services to a degree. To the FCA’s credit, the Singaporeans saw what the FCA had done and built on that. They iterated it and they improved it. The distinction is that they have had much more of an active role in shaping rules as they emerge, rather than being a concierge between themselves and the business community.

Dr Andrew Henderson: A place such as Estonia is a lot more focused on fintech as it has—not quite carved a niche but certainly a lot of our European clients have said, “That was our springboard”. I am thinking of Revolut Bank. I am not sure if it was originally regulated but once it grew, it volunteered to be regulated in France, notwithstanding that it had a European passport, because it felt that being subject to the French regulators would increase the positive perception.

It is worth mentioning that I had experience in the Middle East and that included advising regulatory authorities and Governments, particularly in the financial free zones. An advantage that they have is that they do not have the inconvenience of democratic processes. They can make rules very quickly. In one case I was called on a Monday, with the chairman of the regulator having a concern with what he had seen in the newspaper, and literally within a week new rules had been made. I cannot talk to the quality of those rules, but again they have that flexibility and often these smaller issues have a greater focus.

The thing one must never lose sight of is the broader ecosystem. A lot of more mature clients, even those which start in places such as Estonia, might say, “We now need to migrate to a bigger, recognised financial centre”, and I still think that is where a place such as London has a big advantage over a lot of these smaller places in sunny parts of the world. There is the infrastructure here.

Michael Moore: I defer to the greater expertise of my two colleagues here but just to reinforce a core point: we have a great set-up in the UK. We have the capital, the innovation and a world-class regulator. We just have to make sure that all this remains fit for purpose and adapts to the pace and the requirements of the innovation at the moment, where the UK has a real opportunity to make big changes that will make us globally significant into the next 20 or 30 years.

The Chair: The final question goes to Lord Davies.

  1.             Lord Davies of Brixton: I am afraid I cannot remember where I saw it, but I read this morning a speech from someone at a meeting saying that where the UK fails is scale-up. Are you saying they are wrong?

Michael Moore: You are inviting me into an entirely different topic. It is, I am afraid, the reality that while we have the great science, the innovation and the technology businesses, we get to a certain size of business and we are overly dependent on United States capital to enable businesses to move to the next level. At that point, you often will lose those brilliant businesses to an American base and then they use that market to develop. Our pension industry could make a big difference, though. We are on its case.

The Chair: That is a slightly different issue. We are out of time. Thank you very much for the time you have given the committee this morning. It has been very interesting to hear your practical perspectives of venture capital and investing in new businesses. That has been a great addition to our knowledge gained as part of this investigation. Thank you very much.