Foreign Affairs Committee
Oral evidence: Russia, HC 568
Tuesday 10 November 2026
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 10 November 2026.
Members present: Sir John Whittingdale; Fleur Anderson; Alex Ballinger; Richard Foord; Abtisam Mohamed; Edward Morello; Jessica Toale.
In the absence of the Chair, Sir John Whittingdale took the Chair.
Questions 54-80
Witnesses
I: Vladimir Kara-Murza, Russian opposition politician, author and former political prisoner.
II: Gabrielius Landsbergis, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania; Marija Golubeva, former Minister of Internal Affairs of Latvia; and Grégoire Roos, Director of the Europe, Russia and Eurasia Programmes, Chatham House.
Witness: Vladimir Kara-Murza.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Thank you. Chair and members of the Committee, thank you for the kind invitation to appear before you. It is a true privilege. My name is Vladimir Kara-Murza. I am a Russian opposition politician, author, historian and former political prisoner. For many years, I had the honour of working with Boris Nemtsov, who was the leader of the democratic opposition in Russia and who was assassinated on Vladimir Putin’s orders 11 years ago, in February 2015.
I previously served as deputy leader of the People’s Freedom party, an opposition party in Russia. In April 2022, I was arrested for publicly speaking out against the war in Ukraine and was sentenced to 25 years in prison, in a strict regime penal colony, for “high treason”, which is what they call opposition to the Government in Putin’s Russia. The only reason that I am sitting before you today is that, two years ago, five democratic nations led by the US and Germany came together to organise what became the largest east-west prisoner exchange since the cold war. It freed 16 people from Putin’s modern-day gulag, and I was one of them, so I am privileged to be before you today and I am happy to answer all your questions.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Of course. I came into Russian politics 27 years ago this month, in November 1999, when I began working with Boris Nemtsov, who was at the time leader of the Union of Right Forces, a pro-democracy opposition party in Russia. In the early 2000s, I worked as his parliamentary assistant in the Russian State Duma. That was a time when Russia still had a real Parliament. In fact, the 1999 election was the last parliamentary election to date in Russia that was assessed by international observers, including the OSCE and the Council of Europe, as generally free, fair and democratic—the last time. I was 18 years old at the time. That was my first vote and for all intents and purposes it was my last, for now, because since then every single election in Russia has been a pre-staged farce.
I was myself a candidate for the Russian Parliament in the election of 2003, famously, or perhaps infamously, described by the head of the Council of Europe observation mission as “free but manifestly unfair”, meaning it was free in the sense that people like me could still be on the ballot as candidates—today that is totally unthinkable—but manifestly unfair in the sense that the results were of course pre-programmed in favour of Putin’s party by the use of administrative resources, media dominance and so on.
For many years, I had the honour of working with Boris Nemtsov to advance the Magnitsky sanctions, the targeted human rights sanctions regime which brought about visa bans and asset freezes against individuals—initially just in Russia, later extended globally—who are complicit in human rights violations and corruption. The first country where we had that done was the United States. In 2012, the US became the first country in the world to adopt the Magnitsky sanctions and today I am proud to say that 35 different countries and jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, have versions of the Magnitsky legislation on their books.
The principle behind the legislation was very simple: that those people who are violating the most basic principles of democracy in their own countries should not be afforded the benefits and privileges of democracy in the west. In the case of Russia, there was this astonishing double standard where you had the people—the officials, the oligarchs—around Putin who have destroyed all the basic vestiges of democracy in our country and yet would come to your country, to France and to many other western nations and would enjoy the benefits and privileges that democracies offer, because it was in the west that they had their villas, parked their yachts, had their bank accounts and so on. As I do not need to tell you, the UK has long been a particularly favoured destination for these Kremlin types, so it was really important to get the Magnitsky legislation enacted because it was a very important form of accountability for these human rights abuses.
Obviously the Kremlin did not like it so much and on two occasions, in 2015 and 2017, I was poisoned by an FSB death squad whose members were later identified in a groundbreaking media investigation, by name. The investigation was led by Bellingcat, a London-based investigative media outlet, along with Der Spiegel, a German magazine, and The Insider, an independent Russian investigative media outlet. That investigation was published in 2021, so I know the names of the people who poisoned me. I saw their faces on the photographs. Both times I was in a coma with multiple organ failure. Both times doctors told my wife that I had about a 5% chance to live. But I survived; here I am in front of you.
Then when Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, that same week as the invasion began, the Putin regime shut down what remained of the independent media in Russia. There wasn’t much left by then anyway, because independent media was one of the first targets when Putin came to power 27 years ago, but what remained, such as TV Rain or Echo of Moscow radio station, was shut down within a few days of the invasion.
Putin also rubberstamped a series of laws that made it a criminal offence not only to speak out against the war in Ukraine, but even to describe it as a war. You are supposed to call it a “special military operation”. Anyone who calls it a war is a criminal in the eyes of Putin’s state. I do not think George Orwell could have foreseen just how faithfully his dystopian reality would be recreated in Vladimir Putin’s Russia. We all remember the slogan on the Ministry of Truth: war is peace, freedom is slavery, ignorance is strength. That is literally the reality of Russia today.
They passed these laws in early March 2022. Then they waited for a few weeks, because for any dictatorship, for any authoritarian regime, it is much easier when political opponents just leave the country, because they do not have to deal with the arrests, the trials and the negative publicity. So they waited a few weeks before they started the arrests and many people did leave. But for many of my colleagues, and for me as well, it was always a question of principle that a politician has to remain in their country. Politics is not a profession you can do by Zoom. It was an ethical question for me above all, because I did not feel that I would have any right to call on my fellow Russian citizens to fight the Putin dictatorship if I did not do it myself. It does not work that way.
A second important consideration was that the main tool for Putin to stay in power is fear, as it is for so many other dictators. He wants to make people afraid. That is why we have more political prisoners in Russia today than there were in the whole of the USSR—15 different countries put together—in the mid-1980s. That is how bad the situation is. They make sure to publicise these trials and sentences because, for every one person who speaks out against the war and gets 11 years in prison, as my friend Lev Shlosberg, deputy leader of Yabloko, got, for example, 1,000 others will, in their view, keep quiet.
But, for many of us in the Russian opposition movement, it was a point of principle not to keep quiet and to stay in our own country, to show that we should not be afraid, because the only way to defeat fear is by leading by personal example, by showing people, “Here I am. I am not afraid.” So many of us stayed, and then they began the arrests later in the spring. I was arrested in April 2022 and sentenced the following year, as I mentioned earlier, to 25 years in a strict regime penal colony for so-called high treason.
My five counts of criminal offence were five public speeches that I had made: two against the war in Ukraine; one against political repression and political assassinations in Russia; one against the media censorship imposed by Putin’s Government; and one against the illegal way in which Putin overturned the presidential term limits to stay in power essentially for ever. Those were my five counts of criminal indictment—25 years.
I remember well that, on the day of my sentence, I was escorted by the police convoy from the courtroom down to the basement cells where they hold prisoners. The commanding officer turned to me and asked, “Let me get this right: did you just get 25 years in prison for five speeches?” I said, “Yes, I suppose I did.” He thought for a second and said, “Well, I hope they were at least good.” I said, “That’s probably not for me to judge.”
I was absolutely convinced, up until two and a bit years ago, that I was going to die in that Siberian prison. I was held in solitary confinement, of course, as the “most dangerous” political prisoners usually are in our country; Alexei Navalny was held in the same conditions, as were, back in Soviet times, people such as Vladimir Bukovsky, Natan Sharansky and others.
I was absolutely certain that that was going to be the end of my life. But then, one morning in August 2024, without any warning and without anybody telling me anything, I was taken from my prison cell in Omsk and first flown to Moscow and kept for a few days at the FSB prison in Lefortovo. A group of us were then driven to the Government airport and flown to Ankara, Türkiye, where that exchange happened on the tarmac of Ankara airport on 1 August 2024. Now I find myself in a strange situation where I never left Russia, but find myself outside it. This was, in effect, a forced expulsion, in the same way that it would happen back in the communist years.
What I dedicate my work to most of all now is international advocacy, first on behalf of political prisoners in Russia, because, as I mentioned, the situation is unbelievable. According to the Memorial human rights organisation, there are more than 5,800 politically motivated criminal cases in our country now. About 2,000 people have been verified and designated by name as political prisoners in accordance with the Council of Europe definition. For context, in 1987, during the Vienna Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the whole of the USSR—15 countries together—held about 750 known political prisoners, compared with more than 2,000 in Russia alone today.
It is important to stress that this is not only—“only”—about unlawful, arbitrary and politically motivated imprisonment; it is actually about life or death. Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, at least 69 political prisoners in Russia have died in custody, and 16 this year alone, in 2026. This is about saving human lives. What I dedicate my advocacy mostly to these days is making sure that democratic nations—western countries—pay attention to this issue, and that they advocate for people who are in prison only because they had the conscience to distinguish right from wrong and the courage to say it out loud. That is a crime in Putin’s Russia.
It is very important that the free world does not forget about those people and, more specifically, that they are not forgotten in any potential ceasefire agreement in Ukraine, even a provisional one. As you know, today in Abu Dhabi, there is the start of trilateral talks between the US, Russia and Ukraine on trying to find a potential ceasefire arrangement.
My colleagues and I want to make sure that any, even provisional, ceasefire arrangement includes a clause on the release of all the captives of this war. By that I mean Ukrainian civilian detainees, of whom there are thousands in Russian jails, stolen Ukrainian children, of whom there are thousands—nobody even knows the exact number—and Russian political prisoners, who are only deprived of their freedom because they spoke out against this war and this dictatorship.
In all the previous rounds of talks earlier this year, the media seemed to talk about all sorts of different things. They talked about sanctions, frozen assets, territories and rare earth minerals. God knows what else they talk about, but they do not seem to be talking about people. It is important to put human lives on the agenda.
I am grateful to the two leading inter-parliamentary organisations in Europe—the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, where of course you, Mr Chairman, are vice-president. Earlier this year, they both spoke out very clearly and forcefully in favour of this proposal. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution in January of this year, and the special representative on political prisoners for the OSCE PA issued a statement in July. Both of them called for the inclusion of a clause to release all the captives of this war—Ukrainians and Russians—whenever a provisional ceasefire agreement is signed.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: About a year ago, in November 2025, I received an official warning from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation that there is an active assassination order on my head from the Russian Government. Since then, I have been receiving them on a regular basis.
But I have to say, honestly, you cannot function, live and work if you constantly think about something like that, so I just put it on the back shelf. There is too much work to be done to think about those things. It is a sure road to paranoia if you live thinking about all those things, and I prefer not to. There is too much work to do.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: As I now know from looking back, from what my wife has told me and from what my friends and colleagues have been engaged in, these negotiations are usually conducted in secrecy until the very last moment. Whenever I am asked by journalists to comment on this or that proposal about a potential prisoner swap, I always say that there are some issues that like silence and this is definitely one of them.
I do not know any particular details. I do know that yes, from time to time we do hear in the media that there are discussions about another prisoner swap potentially being organised with Russia. It is very important that western democracies, western countries and countries that are based on support for the rule of law and human rights stand with those people who are imprisoned because they are defending the rule of law and human rights.
The most powerful message in our exchange two years ago was the fact that when the US and Germany were negotiating the exchange with Putin, they demanded the inclusion not just of their own citizens, but of us—of Russian political prisoners. Of the 16 people who were released from the Russian gulag, eight—that is half—were Germans or Americans, and the other eight, including myself, were Russian citizens—Russian political prisoners. They did not have to advocate for us, but they did. To me, that was a very powerful message of solidarity with and support for all those people in Russia who believe in a peaceful and democratic future for our country.
It was also a very powerful message that the free world knows who the real criminals are in today’s Russia—that the real criminals are those people in the Kremlin who are waging this war of aggression against Ukraine, not those of us who are imprisoned because they have opposed them publicly. It is imperative that democratic nations keep that issue at the centre of the agenda in any negotiations and contact they have with Putin’s regime, because nothing is more important than human life. That is what it is about.
In the last few weeks, we have seen very concerning actions by several western countries—for example, Canada and France. In August and September, they decided to remove sanctions from key Kremlin acolytes.
In the case of Canada, that was Chubais. In the case of France, they pushed it on the whole of the European Union; they removed sanctions from Usmanov and Fridman, who are central to Putin’s oligarchic system. They just removed sanctions from them, with nothing in return. Supposedly, there is some deal that a French company got somewhere in central Asia. There was a French citizen who was released in Azerbaijan, not even from Russia.
I was in France when that news broke and I remember giving media interviews. I said, “Well, first, it is just completely unfathomable that you would do something like this while this war rages on, while Ukrainian civilians are dying every single day from Russian bombs—you just go ahead and decide to remove sanctions from key Putin acolytes.” But then I also said, “Okay, if you had some secret national interest requirements that none of us know about and that is why you had to do this, you could at least have saved 100 Russian political prisoners from jail while you did it.” But they didn’t even think of that.
Thank you so much for this question. I want to ask each and every one of you to please keep the issue of Russian political prisoners on the agenda and to make sure that any potential negotiations with the Putin regime or any potential ceasefire deal in Ukraine include the requirement that people’s lives need to be safe.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Absolutely. This is one half of it. I am still learning a lot of this since I came out of prison—I was frankly shocked, in these past two years, by how the western political discourse in relation to Russia seems to be torn between two different extremes.
One extreme is, “Let’s go back to business as usual with Putin.” That is most visibly represented by parties like AfD in Germany or Marine Le Pen in France—the far right—and also some far left in France, like Mélenchon for example. They are just saying, “Let’s forget about this. Let’s forget about the war, the hundreds of thousands of victims, the political prisoners, the political assassinations. Let’s just pretend that none of this happened and go back to business as usual with Putin. Let’s buy gas again. Let’s trade again. Let’s meet and talk again.” Needless to say, that is completely unacceptable. “Let’s remove the sanctions”—that is completely unacceptable.
But there is another extreme, which in my view is equally unacceptable. That is the tendency on the part of some politicians in the west to try to vilify everybody who is Russian. The Putin dictatorship is, needless to say, an unelected, illegitimate dictatorship—it is not a duly elected Government; as I mentioned we have not had free elections in Russia for 27 years. That is not my opinion—it is the verdict of the OSCE and the Council of Europe. But there are people who try to vilify all of us and say, “All of these Russians, they are all evil. They are all imperialists. They are all war criminals.” That is both offensive and untrue.
There has to be a middle way for western democracies to be able to, on the one hand, stand firm and stand on principle when it comes to dealing with Putin’s dictatorship and, for example, not remove sanctions from key Kremlin acolytes, while, on the other hand, maintaining a dialogue and a conversation with Russian society—with those people in Russia, and there are millions of them, who want this war to stop, who never wanted it in the first place, who oppose Putin’s dictatorship and who want Russia to become a normal, modern European country.
That dialogue is also important for the future, because Putin is not forever. Things will change and there will be that window of opportunity, I think, in quite a foreseeable future and we have to be ready for it.
There are successful examples of this. For example, since the beginning of this year, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has set up what they call a platform for dialogue with the Russian opposition, where they invite 15 representatives of the Russian pro-democracy forces—I am among them—to sit in this body that brings together ourselves, members of the Russian pro-democracy movement, and elected parliamentarians from 46 European countries. It is a very important forum where we can continue that conversation.
Sir John Whittingdale, who is chairing today and who is Vice-President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, kindly suggested doing something similar in the context of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly when we last met in the Hague during the July session. I hope something similar happens next year at the OSCE PA. It is very important, on the one hand, to stand firm against Putin and, on the other hand, to maintain a dialogue with Russian society. The two should not contradict each other.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Thank you so much for this question. The general rule of history is that in countries where Governments cannot be changed by the ballot box, they are changed in some other way. That is how it will happen in Russia. Of course, none of us knows what will happen in the future, but as a historian by background, it is important to look at the past models—the way it happened in Russia before.
One thing we know from the modern history of Russia is that major political changes in our country usually happen in a snap of the fingers—suddenly, swiftly and completely unexpectedly. That was how the tsarist regime collapsed in three days in March 1917. It was how the Communist regime collapsed, also in three days, in August 1991. I would venture that the next time there is a political change in Russia, it will be the exact same way. None of us will know even a few days ahead of time.
We also know, however, that this window of opportunity will not only open suddenly, but that it will be very brief—by definition, these windows of historical opportunity are. Besides the immediate task of advocating for and saving the lives of Russian political prisoners, an equally important task— both for the pro-democracy opposition in Russia and our friends and partners in the free world—is to start preparing for that day after Putin. However his end comes, we know it will not be too far away—even because, for example, he is already several years past the average male life expectancy in Russia. I always say that I wish Mr Putin a long life and very good health, because I want him to spend as much time in prison as possible, to be held accountable for all the crimes he has committed both against our own people and against citizens of other countries. However it happens, I think it will be in the very foreseeable future that that moment of change in Russia will come, and we have to be ready.
The problem with previous times—for example, I can remember the 1990s, which was the last time that Russia had an opening for democratic change. In my view, it did not succeed because so many mistakes were made out of complete unpreparedness. Everybody thought the Soviet regime was going to be there forever, and it was gone in three days. Nobody knew what to do. We do not have the right to find ourselves in the same situation.
Whenever we speak about Russia, it is important to remember that what happens in Russia affects everyone, as the world has seen in the worst possible way in the last four and a half years. Russia is the largest country in Europe—it is the largest country in the world. There is always this clear linkage in Russia between repression at home and aggression abroad. A Government who do not respect the rights of their own people will not respect the borders of other countries. Mr Putin has shown that very visibly in the last 27 years. If we are serious about long-term peace and security in Europe—if we still believe in that Europe-whole freedom and peace—the only way it will ever happen is with a reliably democratic Russia as part of that greater Europe. If we do not want to miss that chance, we have to prepare for it now.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: I do not think he is, because that man does not trust anybody. He is paranoid. He does not trust even his closest acolytes. There is a reason why the first foreign film that was banned in Putin’s Russia was the British comedy, “The Death of Stalin”. That was 10 years ago, in 2016. He saw his own future. When Stalin was not even dead yet—he was just lying on the floor in his dacha in Kuntsevo—his close acolytes started fighting among themselves and plotting what the future would be. Putin saw it, and the film was banned. In closed dictatorships like Russia, it is important to watch what the regimes do, because they tell us what they are afraid of.
So I do not think he is preparing a successor, but even if we assume that he is, it is not possible in personalist dictatorships. In dictatorships like Communist China or theocratic Iran—ideological dictatorships—one leader can come after another, and the ideological base of a dictatorship stays. Putin’s Russia is not an ideological dictatorship. There is no ideology; it is all about power and money. For Putin, it is all about keeping power because he knows that that is the best guarantee of his life, frankly, after all the crimes he has committed.
In a personalistic dictatorship, the regime does not survive the disappearance of the person. Once Putin is gone, one way or another, it will be chaotic and messy, and it will not be pleasant. A window of opportunity sounds like a grand phrase. It is not going to look pleasant, but it will be a window of opportunity. We will have a window in those short few months to shape the future direction of Russia. If we want that direction to be towards democracy and responsible and civilised behaviour in the international arena, I believe it is very important to work on the road map for the post-Putin transition now, because when the time comes, we will not have time to do it.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Again, referring back to the comedy, “The Death of Stalin”, in these dictatorships—closed totalitarian regimes—the people at the top usually hate each other more than they hate us, the political opponents. That is why there is all this infighting straight away. I remember watching the televised meeting of the security council two days before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. You can see by the facial expressions of these people—Putin’s closest circle—that most of them did not know that the war was about to happen. They are supposed to be the top leadership.
I am sure that they hate each other more than they hate us. I am sure that many of them hate Putin for, if nothing else, the fact that it was because of him that they lost access to the coveted western assets when the really big-scale sanctions were introduced after 2022. I think a lot of them want to return to some sort of normality. It is important that the western world have clear conditions for that return to normality.
I do believe that there should be a way out of sanctions for some of these people, but it should be very clearly and explicitly conditioned—for example, public opposition to the war. That is why it was so enraging to see the decision by France recently to push for the removal of European Union sanctions on Fridman and Usmanov. They have done nothing to distance themselves from the Putin regime. Moreover, Usmanov is directly involved in financing the Russian military-industrial complex while the war in Ukraine continues. So that was completely the wrong signal to send. There should be a way back for some of these people, but only on very clear conditions of rupturing with the regime, the dictatorship and the war.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Thank you so much for this question. Sometimes, the most important support is actually in words. I think it is important to get the messaging right when we talk about western discourse and Russia. When I was in prison, I had a small radio attached to the wall of my cell which would be switched on by the guards at 5 o’clock in the morning with a wake-up call, and they would only switch it off at 9 o’clock in the evening at lights out. I had no control over it, so the whole day I was just exposed to this Kremlin propaganda.
One of their favourite narratives was to take a statement from some western politician or another who was not careful with his or her language in making the distinction between the Putin dictatorship and Russia as a nation and a society. They would give the impression of saying that all Russians are evil—as I mentioned earlier, that discourse is out there unfortunately. The Kremlin propaganda would love this. They would take that and amplify it, and they would say, “Here we go—we told you this. They are all hating all of you.”
I think it is really important to find the right messaging. On the one hand, you should be firm against the Putin dictatorship, and you should not go back to business as usual while this regime is in power, while the war is going on and while political prisoners remain in Russian jails. On the other hand, you should send the message to Russian society—to Russian citizens—that there is a normal future for Russia. There is a road for returning Russia back to Europe and the international civilised community when there is genuine change—when this war is over, when Russia is back to its internationally recognised borders of 1991, when the political prisoners our out and when democratic elections are held. It is important to hold out that image of the future.
I would start with moral support. There are many ways of providing practical support. There is a variety of civil society groups and independent media outlets in exile operated by Russians that democratic nations can support, and there are many people you can go to for expert advice on good people and organisations to support. Then there are institutionalised formats for dialogue. I would like to thank all of you for the fact that, just a few months ago, the House of Commons—or, actually, the British Parliament as a whole—created an APPG on Russian democracy. That cross-party group was set up with precisely this goal: to maintain a conversation with pro-democracy Russians. I have already mentioned the Council of Europe platform, and hopefully soon it will be at the OSCE PA. That is important.
Finally, and most importantly, please advocate for political prisoners. Irwin Cotler, a great human rights advocate and former Attorney General of Canada, who over the years represented many prisoners of conscience, including Nelson Mandela, once wrote that the worst nightmare for a political prisoner is to be forgotten. I would often quote his words, but I am not sure I really understood them until I ended up in prison myself. When a dictatorship imprisons a political opponent, the goal is not just to jail or punish that person. It is also to isolate and demoralise them—to make them feel forgotten and alone. It is very important that the free world stands in public solidarity with political prisoners in Russia. It is very important that all those political prisoners never, for a second, feel forgotten by the world.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: The orange revolution in Ukraine was in 2004, and before that there was the rose revolution in Georgia. Putin was paranoid about that and was afraid of something similar in Russia.
A colour revolution in Russia almost happened in December 2011, after a patently rigged parliamentary election—Putin’s party just stole the vote and announced its victory when everybody knew it lost. There were mass demonstrations in Moscow, St Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk—all over the country—involving hundreds of thousands of people. The colour was white, by the way. Every revolution has to have a colour, and ours was supposed to be white. It was called the snow revolution by the media.
For different reasons, the regime was able to regroup and crack down. The culmination of the crackdown came in May 2012, when hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Bolotnaya square, just across the road from the Kremlin, and Putin’s riot police just went all in smashing people with batons and using water cannon. There were hundreds of arrests. They drowned that potential democratic revolution in violence.
Today, Russia is a fully fledged totalitarian dictatorship. There are no independent media, no political competition and no opportunities to speak out. Anybody who speaks out goes to prison immediately, and that is the best case. Just as a fact for you, the average sentence for a political prisoner in Russia today is 11 years. That is the average, so there are many much longer sentences. The average prison sentence for murder in Russia is nine years, so if you kill someone, you get nine years in prison, but if you write social media posts against the war in Ukraine, you get 11. Naturally, in conditions like that, people are afraid. They are afraid to go out. That would be the case in any country with a similarly harsh dictatorial regime.
But what gives me hope and optimism for the future of my country is looking at the young generation—the young people. Six weeks ago, we had a so-called parliamentary election; it was a total farce, as you know. Putin felt so confident at the beginning of the campaign that he had control of everything: the administrative machine, the media, the propaganda—everything, including the electoral commissions of course. He felt confident enough to play a game of democracy and allow Yabloko, which is the last opposition party remaining in Russia, on the ballot. I do now know if there are Liberal Democrats present—
Richard Foord: indicated assent.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: It is your sister party in the Liberal International. It is the last opposition party in Russia and the only party that is against the war in Ukraine. Putin thought, “Why not allow them on the ballot, announce they got 1% and say, ‘Oh, you see—everybody in Russia supports the war.’” So they registered it for the ballot in late July, and then something went really wrong, because in the space of just a few days, that small opposition party exploded on social media, overtaking all the pro-Kremlin parties together in terms of subscribers. They got millions of views on TikTok videos—I am not even sure what TikTok is; my kids are on it, but I am not too certain. All the major figures of Russia’s famously fragmented opposition came together in support of Yabloko. Leaked closed polling from Kremlin-connected companies—with all the caveats about the unreliability of polling in authoritarian societies, but nevertheless—showed Yabloko to have double-digit support and to be in second place, only after Putin’s United Russia.
The Kremlin panicked and hastily convened a session of the Supreme Court in August that took Yabloko off the ballot under patently absurd legal pretexts, one of which was that, by publishing a photo of the Hiroshima bombing on its website, Yabloko had violated the intellectual property rights of the United States army—that is not a joke. They took them off, and the election was held with only pro-war and pro-Putin parties. Of course, Putin keeps saying that everybody supports him and his war. I do not know if many people will believe him now because actions always speak louder than words.
What was very important to me was that, on the day when the Supreme Court held that hearing to take Yabloko off the ballot, I was watching videos and livestreams from Moscow, and there were thousands of kids around the Supreme Court building who came there, unafraid, showing their face, chanting anti-war slogans, singing and laughing in the faces of the riot police in full gear standing outside the court building. I was looking at these children, who are the age of my children—late teens and early 20s—who chose to be free people in what is today a very unfree country, and I could not help thinking that these kids are the future of the Russia and the ageing dictator in the Kremlin is not.
Chair: That is a good note on which to say thank you very much for coming to give evidence.
Vladimir Kara-Murza: Thank you so much for the invitation.
Chair: Thank you also for what you are doing, and your courage.
Witnesses: Gabrielius Landsbergis, Marija Golubeva and Grégoire Roos.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: Good morning from California. My name is Gabrielius Landsbergis. I am a former Foreign Minister of Lithuania from 2020 to 2024. Currently, I am a visiting fellow at Stanford University in the United States.
Marija Golubeva: Hello. I am Marija Golubeva. I am the former Minister of the Interior of Latvia and currently a Richard von Weizsäcker fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.
Grégoire Roos: Good afternoon. My name is Grégoire Roos. I am the director of the Europe programme and the Russia and Eurasia programme at Chatham House and a non-resident fellow at the Columbia Centre on Global Energy Policy in New York.
Marija Golubeva: I still find the description “hybrid warfare” useful, even though I do notice the criticism that it makes the activities appear less dangerous than they actually are. The reason we need to distinguish between hybrid or sub-threshold warfare and conventional warfare is that we need to react to it in different ways. It does not mean that we do not need to react to or deter it, but the approach is different than with conventional warfare, which is why I think this term still holds.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: From a political standpoint, the term allowed us not to seek the proper reaction that would, in turn, allow us to deter. For more than three years—four years, probably—we have all been witnessing Russian acts of terrorism, I would call them, inside our countries, and the only things that came out of that from our capitals were strongly worded letters of concern, which are clearly not enough to make sure that Russia does not do it again.
The semantics of the wording allowed us to say that a reaction or retaliation—some sort of deterrent action—was not required because it was just hybrid. The question was, “Is there any sort of threshold that, once passed, would force us to do something differently?” If we were to change the wording, for example, to “terrorist action” or “warfare against NATO countries”, certain actions would be triggered. I was advocating in the past, and I still am, for different wording that would allow us to formulate some sort of action that would, in turn, build up deterrence.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: I use the term “war”, because we have been there in the past: after the 11 September 2001 attack against the United States, nobody thought to call it a hybrid attack and issue some letter to al-Qaeda; it was a war declared against the United States, and we all rose up and did what was necessary at the time. Now, because the adversary is seemingly, in the eyes of many European nations at least, a stronger one—a nuclear country and part of the United Nations Security Council—we forbid ourselves from treating Russia the way we would treat a non-nuclear country doing these sorts of things. When Iran does something in the middle east, we do not call them hybrid attacks. It is an attack. If its drone flies over Saudi Arabia and slashes into a building, it is an attack. It is an act of war. It is not a hybrid attack. In our case, it is treated differently.
Grégoire Roos: I think it is the easiest toolbox at the disposal of Russia, simply because it offers a very welcome and useful threshold that enables Russia not to walk on the terrain of state terrorism. If we look at hybrid activity, they actually seek to impose—what? Costs, testing of thresholds—whether we look at Italy, Ireland or France—and exploiting uncertainty about the responsibility, and therefore the response. It is still very difficult to attribute a hybrid attack, especially when it is of a cyber nature. It has become extremely easy now—I would give the example of France and Germany—for Russia to hire locals, so they do not even need to send their agents any more. That makes it very difficult to trace the attack back to Russia.
It is a very concrete example that helps Russia to destabilise countries that are already on the verge of civil unrest. In France, for instance, they hired locals to tag the Shoah memorial in Paris and a few days later the heads of beheaded pigs were dispersed in front of mosques. Of course, the second stage was to use social media to attribute—falsely, obviously—the attack in both cases to the far right. Of course, that further stirred the resentment within French society and increased social instability. That is what makes it difficult and I am not sure that calling it “terrorism” would help, simply because in most cases citizens say, “We want to see the evidence. It’s not clear that it was Russia.”
For instance, after the supermarkets were hacked a few weeks ago in some European countries, many said that it was Russia. Now it would seem, at least judging from what the French authorities stated yesterday, that the attack might have come from Iran. Attributing responsibility is very difficult. That is why Russia is likely to accelerate resorting to hybrid attacks. I think these operations are strategically attractive exactly for that reason. I would say that the cumulative effect on infrastructure, operators, insurance, investment and political confidence can be significant. It has maximum impact at a very low cost.
I see this growing in a wide variety of forms, even in countries that until now have been seen as being relatively close strategically to Russia. My last example will be the riots in Milan a few weeks ago. Look at the public comments of the Defence Minister of Italy, who cannot be associated, let’s say, with very anti-Russian politicians in Italy, as he comes from President Meloni’s party. He said that it is very likely that the riots were triggered, or at least fuelled, by Russia's disinformation campaigns online. So I see this accelerating across the continent and not just on the traditional targets of Russia, namely Britain, Germany and France.
Grégoire Roos: All of that at the same time—absolutely. The idea is to, first of all, increase anxiety within European populations and underline that their Governments are unable to ensure basic security. Then, it is to show that with a very easy toolbox you can destabilise an entire country. The third is to multiply what I would call mini-battlefronts that would lead, if not force, our countries in Europe to focus on domestic security and convince citizens that they should focus on security at home, rather than focusing on security abroad, namely with Ukraine. The target is of a psychological nature, and in terms of stakeholders, it is both Governments and public opinions.
Marija Golubeva: I would say that, first of all, Russia views the war in Ukraine not as a war of aggression by Russia, but as a war with NATO where Ukraine is only seen as a proxy and a piece of land that should be returned to the fold of the empire—and also, importantly, the battleground with NATO and the west. From that perspective, the objectives of Russia’s hybrid warfare can be seen as breaking up NATO, weakening the European Union, getting back to business as usual—the status quo of selling Russian fossil fuels and gas to the west, especially Europe—and ultimately, establishing its influence in the so-called post-Soviet space, which includes part of the European Union and NATO.
We do not know how much research underlies it, but there was a publication by The Washington Post, if I am not mistaken, that said that in one of the meetings with his Government agencies, Putin expressed a wish that NATO and the EU should be broken in 2026. We can take that with a pinch of salt, but most hybrid attacks that have been officially attributed to Russia have definitely targeted energy or military infrastructure, cables and pipelines, or railways or other transport hubs. Basically, the tissue that holds Europe together is under particular attack. Undermining the interconnectedness of Europe, be it within the EU or within NATO, is very high on Russia’s agenda in the hybrid war.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: I would say there are two reasons for it. One is very practical: it limits our ability to help Ukraine. That is what Marija said as well; if they attack Starlink in Poland, or the railways that bring weapons over to Ukraine, that is a clear attempt at hindering our attempts to help Ukraine.
The second point that is important in Putin’s mind is creating leverage. That is about putting us in a state where we would look differently at requests and demands during some sort of negotiation and back channels. They would say, “We have attacked these objects. We have that ability. You do not have the ability to respond.” As I mentioned, in four years we did not find a way to respond. They would say, “We are going to escalate unless you either stop financing Ukraine or agree to Ukrainian land concessions.” It would put us in a weaker negotiating position vis-à-vis Ukraine when the time comes for that.
At least in the Baltics—in my own country—we have seen elements of that. Even when Governments put on a brave face, they do not always feel very confident about what to do if Russia escalates. NATO does not have a protocol for what would happen if, for example, a Russian drone hit an energy substation or LNG terminal. Would that fall under article 5, so we would go ahead and attack Kaliningrad, or would we again say that it is one of those very efficient and damaging hybrid attacks that we are not going to respond to? The fear of that possibility creates leverage in Russian hands, where this or that Government might be much more easily convinced to do what Russia asks in the case of assisting Ukraine or something like that.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: My personal view is that any attempts to reach out to Russia—Putin, his entourage and his Government—are now reading like signs of weakness. He now has a plan, and the plan is not to break Ukraine at the frontline, as that has not been successful so far, but to break our will to support Ukraine and, with that, Ukraine’s willingness or ability to resist. That is their major plan; they are betting that we are the weak link.
With all the calls to Putin and all the attempts to negotiate, he believes this is going the right way. What we should be discussing is how we, as the European Union, are going to get another tranche of €90 billion for Ukraine, or however many billions are needed to defend from 2028. Instead of discussing that, we are discussing how to approach Putin and deconflict the situation, and my opinion is that he likes that.
Grégoire Roos: Very briefly, I think there is a difference between reaching out and leaving the door open, and I think that leaving the door open is crucial. Secondly, we should not forget that there are more than two parties at the table—obviously, there are three parties with Ukraine, but the US is still there. It is crucial that Europe keeps demonstrating to the current Administration and President Trump that Europe is open to sitting at the table, even if it goes nowhere.
As long as the US is still on board, the level of deterrence will remain relatively credible. If it happens that there are things that Europe really does not want to negotiate or talk about, it might just weaken our position vis-à-vis the White House. It is a difficult balance to strike, but leaving the door open and showing that Europe is inclined to talk to Russia, if Russia is serious about talking, should not be excluded.
Marija Golubeva: Yes, I think NATO needs to define a framework for classifying or categorising different levels of escalation. That does not necessarily mean one red line; it means the rungs of the escalation ladder. That way, we know for sure what we interpret as a major escalation and how we define levels of escalation, and we have a common understanding of what we do in the case of each of those. That is not what we have at the moment. In some areas, there is individual work being done by members of NATO to deter Russia, such as through forward cyber-posture, or the so-called sovereign cyber-effects.
We do not even know what the others are doing because NATO doctrine says that member states need not disclose to our allies what cyber-operations they are undertaking. For example, if there is a certain level of escalation and the UK, the Netherlands or any other country with cyber-capabilities decides to strike some infrastructure object in Russia, the others may not know what, how or which ally did it. That means creating grey areas or blind spots in escalation that might be dangerous for all of us. It would make much more sense that we speak to each other about our deterrence vocabulary and measures and how we define the rungs in the escalation ladder, along with when and how we will act. I am not suggesting that we can do that with the whole of NATO and the whole European Union because there are different levels of trust between different militaries and intelligence institutions. However, there should be some variable geometry, some coalition of the willing, including, I hope, the UK, where that would be possible.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: I have a sense that there are a couple of different versions of ambiguity. One is that we currently say, “We might act or we might not,” and our track record shows that we are basically choosing not to act. However, if you take the cases where a particular country has been targeted with a specific terrorist attack or state attack—for example, Grégoire mentioned the refrigerators in Europe and the French reaction—the ambiguity is usually a bit different. First, there is clarity, for example. As far as I have seen, the French response is that there will be a response and a retaliation: “We know it is you and there is going to be a retaliation, but we are not going to tell you when and how. We are leaving that to ourselves to decide.”
The point is that it is a different sort of approach where you are able to attribute the attack to Russia—and that has been a fact in many cases. For example, there is the arson attempt at an IKEA shopping mall in Lithuania three years ago. That attempt to burn down the building was clearly attributed to the Russian GRU intelligence service. In effect, Lithuania may be unable to issue that sort of threat back to Russia on its own because of an inability to control the escalation, but that is what NATO is for. Imagine NATO saying, “This has been attributed and there will be a response via the method of our choosing at the time of our choosing.” I believe that would start creating certain levels of deterrence.
Grégoire Roos: Yes, very much so. Building on what Gabrielius and Marija said, the best coalition I can see at this stage is the E3—London, Berlin and Paris—working together to co-ordinate their response strategy. We then stumble on to the main challenge ahead, which is that we might see a significant political shift in Paris and, to some extent and in the slightly longer run, in Berlin. That makes the prospect slightly blurrier for London. However, I still believe there should be more co-ordination between the three countries.
The second aspect, which we tend to underestimate, is that it is much more challenging for Britain and Germany to make decisions overnight on retaliation than it is for the French President or the American President, who do not really need the Parliament. That means that any political shift in those countries might slow down the response.
The third aspect is that there is greater need now, in spite of the challenges it poses in terms of declassification, to show more—I am careful about using the word “openness” when it comes to classified information and intelligence, but at least pédagogie. Because just saying, “Our intelligence services have told us that it is Russia,” is not enough any more for many voters. If we still commit to the rules of democracy, as I know we do, we need to have the majority not just of voters but of the population behind retaliatory measures.
I have had those discussions time and again with ordinary citizens in public discussions and online panels, and of course with Members of Parliament such as you. The attempt is to be more open in explaining why retaliation matters and that we are not targeting any country. As I mentioned, the country that seems to be behind the attacks on supermarkets in France is Iran. We cannot exclude that Iran and Russia somehow co-ordinated. It serves the interests of both countries, to be honest.
The point is to make a choice not to involve citizens in the decision, I would say, but to make it clearer and, in a way, share all the available information. By the way, Alice Weidel, the head of the Alternative for Germany, said in the interview she gave to The Economist that, as a Member of the German Parliament, she had not thus far been shown the evidence that Russia was behind the drone attack on Leipzig airport. Of course, that has resonated with voters way beyond the circle of AfD supporters. That needs to be addressed, especially in countries where Parliament is necessary.
Grégoire Roos: That’s the £1 billion question. I think Governments should publish sufficient evidence to explain major attribution decisions, without compromising sources or ongoing investigations, because we are not just talking about intelligence reports. There are ongoing investigations or intelligence partnerships, as Marija hinted. In many cases, the intelligence does not come from the country’s own intelligence services.
That is one thing. The second is that rapid statements are valuable only when the evidential threshold is sound. That is not always the case. We saw that with the supermarkets, when it was said, “It’s Russia”, and a few days later the Foreign Affairs Ministry announced it was Iran. Many people, especially circles of politicians and voters who are reluctant to stay committed to supporting Ukraine, have said, “You see! Russia is the scapegoat.” An unnecessary argument is given to those groups of people.
We have seen the general effect on public trust, especially in Germany, France and, increasingly, Poland, of overclaiming—that Pavlovian reflex that anything that happens is due to Russia. As a concrete example, the UK National Centre for Information Defence should be subject to clear parliamentary and statutory scrutiny, obviously with boundaries that protect lawful speech and political disagreement.
That is a work of learning by doing, involving as much as possible groups of citizens to better evaluate what could lead citizens to trust—the word “trust” is the most important—that, when the Government say it is Russia or Iran, there is no question but that it is indeed Russia or Iran. I think that in some European countries the judgment of the Government is too often called into question.
Marija Golubeva: There are two aspects to it. One is that the UK has very high Government expertise in strategic communications. That should be applied to every single case where there is an issue of possible attribution of hybrid attacks to any hostile state, be it Russia or some other hostile state. It is quite clear that, at the moment, the gap between incidents and attribution is exploited to poison large language models—which is AI used by everybody—with conflicting versions of what just happened. For example, after drones closed the airports of Copenhagen, Warsaw and Munich in autumn 2025, lots of ghost websites popped up immediately after the incident claiming various versions of what just happened, some claiming Ukrainian false flags and some giving other explanations. There was a YouTube video about a possible cover-up of aliens in Copenhagen. The point is simply to confuse the public and breed distrust in any public messages about what just happened. If a Government fail to attribute for a long time, or if they give an attribution that turns out to be wrong, it massively amplifies distrust, which is to be avoided at all costs. It is tricky but, unfortunately, that is the world we live in. There is a wonderful publication, by a Spanish group called Alto Intelligence, about that poisoning of LLMs and the exploitation of the attribution gap.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: I was not critical of the coalition of the willing as a principle. I was critical of what the coalition of the willing has been able to achieve. There has been quite a lot of noise and publicity around the creation of the concept. I think it is a great concept, especially if the bigger institutions are unable to move because of the different interests of the countries within. The coalition of the willing is really the method for how to go forward. There was a lot of expectation in Ukraine that the coalition of the willing to which you refer would be useful for Ukraine’s cause. The initial proposals were quite ambitious, such as sending western troops over to Ukraine to stabilise the situation and to relieve some of the Ukrainians stationed in the western part of Ukraine, but nothing materialised out of it. There were a bunch of meetings—I do not remember now, but it was five or six high-level summits with leaders—but nothing really came out of it.
My criticism is about how to transform the coalition of the willing into a coalition of the doing so that, instead of just wishing for something to happen, the countries would be willing to take responsibility and change the reality either in Ukraine or by placing greater pressure on Russia, and so on. I believe that the coalition of the willing is an effective model, as I mentioned, because the bigger institutions are not willing to move.
I also have a sense, and I witnessed this during my time as a Minister, that in many cases smaller countries in the European Union and the European continent are unable to move on their own because of their relatively small size, but they would be members of a coalition of the willing if the bigger countries assembled. That means that if the E3 or the E6 did something, the Nordic countries, the Baltic countries and maybe even countries in central and eastern Europe would join in support. Instead of having a coalition of the six, you would then have a coalition of the willing of 15, which would be a significant instrument in foreign relations, defence policy and whatnot. That is probably the point of my criticism, if that makes sense.
Grégoire Roos: Thank you very much. I will be extremely brief, as Gabrielius has said quite a lot already. We need to be fair to the coalition, and especially to the hard work of then Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, and later on President Macron. We tend to forget that had it not been for the hard diplomatic efforts of the coalition of the willing, Europe—the EU and the UK—would not have managed to convince the US to somehow synchronise their sanction packages with that of the EU plus UK, before the war against Iran started earlier this year. We forget that before the war in the middle east started, the impact of those synchronised sanctions started to bear fruit. Had it not been for that war, I am not sure we would look back on the coalition of the willing in the same way we do now. But it is true that from a mere military standpoint the impact is extremely limited.
Making the coalition of the willing something that is not NATO—although most members are, with the exception of Australia, which is an observer—has somehow helped to neutralise the Russian narrative according to which, “It’s us versus NATO, and NATO is threatening our security.” Well, no, not without the Americans. It is not NATO branded. It is under the leadership of two countries: the UK and France. In terms of political signalling, then, it has been helpful. Of course, from a Ukrainian perspective it is far from enough. I think Gabrielius is right—it is far from enough, but it has achieved more politically than we think.
There are three parts to my questions; I do not know who wants to take them first. First, previous negotiation efforts have not stopped the conflict in Ukraine, but has anything fundamentally changed on the battlefield or in the political calculations, given the risks and the damage caused in Russia, that would make the current trilateral talks more likely to produce substantive progress? Can we see some hope there? What has changed?
Secondly, President Trump famously kept saying during his election campaign that he would solve all this within 24 hours. That has not happened. His attempt at an energy ceasefire fell apart, but the First Lady’s brokered ceasefire at Oleshky did help to provide some relief. Something happened there, so what can we learn from the different tactics being used now? What could break through?
Thirdly, what forms of security guarantees would be the most credible and sustainable? I am talking about long-term funding and long-term security guarantees. We have talked about what NATO could do and the possibilities there, but how would that happen? Rather than asking you three questions and getting three answers, I hope it is okay to ask three questions all at once.
Grégoire Roos: I will take that briefly, because I know that Marija will have a lot to say, and you have covered the question extensively.
I think there are five tests of any security guarantee in the context of a ceasefire. The first, and obviously the most important, is the preservation of Ukraine’s army. We have seen Russia coming back time and again saying that this is, supposedly, a red line: “We want a reduced Ukrainian army.” A guarantee that would sharply limit Ukrainian troop numbers or missiles, or even Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, which is now part of the European defence industrial capacity, could significantly weaken the country it is meant to protect. That is the first test.
The second is what I would call automaticity against authority: who determines, after a ceasefire, that a violation has occurred? That could be the role of the coalition of the willing, a smaller or larger group, but there needs to be clarity as to who determines that a violation has occurred. The second aspect of that—we covered it earlier in our discussion—is whether a response requires consensus, a parliamentary vote or even a US presidential decision, should the US be on board, as hopefully they are.
The third test is the need to clarify the instruments that the guarantors, whoever they are, would provide. Are we talking only about intelligence, or about weapons, air defence, humanitarian aid and financial aid? Are we talking about some of that or all of that? Those are very different commitments, which will, of course, resonate very differently with the electorate. Just looking at the shift in the narrative of Madame Le Pen, for instance, some of those commitments would seem admissible and others would not. That would be the third test.
The fourth test would be the timescale—the time horizon—for the guarantors of that security. Are the obligations binding for a couple of years, or durable across a much longer period, which would mean going across very different political majorities and budgets? In all honesty, the only country that has, for now, demonstrated extraordinary resilience irrespective of who is in power is the United Kingdom. Germany is not that stable, and with France we will only know in a few months from now, and there is no guarantee that the Parliament will be dominated by the same political majority or party as the President’s. There is also, of course, the question of how you renew those cycles—who decides?
The last test is enforcement against reversibility. How quickly can sanctions be lifted, and how quickly can they be reimposed and renewed in the case of a violation? What happens if Russia attacks, even indirectly? That is why hybrid attacks are so important: you can remain under the threshold by using sabotage that is difficult to trace back to you, drones or even proxies—the whole toolbox. How quick would it be to reimpose sanctions, and on what kind of scale?
Grégoire Roos: It is most probably the agenda of Russia, for sure. But yes, part of those points will obviously be discussed. The easiest ones are sanctions. I am not sure whether we are into the details of timescales, but sanctions will be included, for sure, and talk on what sectors and the instruments—what kind of support would seem acceptable from a Russian perspective. I can already give you the answer: humanitarian support and some form of financial support. It will be even more acceptable if it does not come from frozen assets. When it comes to air defence and weapon delivery, that will obviously be a stumbling stone.
Previous summits have been full of surprises—in most cases because nothing came out of them—but we will see. There have been over the past few weeks some indications—you have referred to one of them—that the Russians would be open to some form of time-limited agreements, mostly focused on children or anything of a humanitarian nature. Yesterday, Russia targeted a rehabilitation centre for handicapped children. What I see on the battlefield tends to contradict what I hear from the Kremlin spokesperson or Minister Lavrov.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: It is important to note, first, that there is no visible change in Putin’s stance when it comes to being willing to cease fire or to look for a diplomatic solution to the war he started. I fully agree with what Grégoire just said: there is no indication. Every single day just shows us that he is very much willing to continue the war.
We have to try at least to ask about the political set-up around Putin that motivates him either to continue or to cease. I believe that the environment that supports him, and that mandates him, in a way—his surrounding people from the security services, from the military, from the business environment—is seeking a plan from him. They want to know that he knows how to achieve his goals. Whenever it seems that he does not have a way to end the war, or to capture the whole of Ukraine, or to make sure that Russia is victorious, that is where some of the shakes are starting to happen. We have started to hear that there are people in the Kremlin who are not happy with the way things are being handled.
Currently, I have a sense that they believe Putin has a plan, and his plan revolves around, as I mentioned, the western inability to support Ukraine. The Ukrainian ability to fight hangs, in most cases, on our ability to finance them. There are very important bilateral cases—Germany, Norway and other countries are now among the top financial supporters bilaterally—but that is nowhere near what is actually required for Ukraine. Just for the remainder of this year, Ukraine requires roughly €70 billion, additionally, to cover its budget deficit. For next year, Ukraine still has a €45 billion European loan, but as President Zelensky alluded to, it will most likely run short of supplying Ukraine militarily for the whole year. Russians know these numbers—they are able to get that information, either from public sources or otherwise—and they understand that without the money and the support, Ukraine would not be able to continue fighting. It is not just that morale would suffer; it is how war works: it has to be funded. If it is not funded, there is no way of fighting.
Morale is also important, which is why they are targeting the energy infrastructure. We are entering one of the most difficult winters—probably the most difficult winter—for Ukraine. Their hope is that Ukraine will re-emerge next spring in a much weaker situation than they are currently in. That is why Russians are able to forgive certain losses on the frontline, which are limited and more in a tactical nature than strategic. Their hope is that the strategic failure will come not on the frontline but in the capitals—not in Kyiv but in the western capitals, where people should be figuring out the financing. I have a sense that Putin is unwilling to settle for anything of substance because he has a plan, and that plan is supported by the people around him, who mandate him and have the ability to pressure him into either changing something or not.
I will make one brief point about the security guarantees. We have spoken a little about the coalition of the willing. I have always been of the opinion that in order to make sure that there is not a third iteration of the war, even if the war is settled somehow, Ukraine has to become part of the European—and hopefully transatlantic—security architecture, meaning that it becomes part of NATO. That is the only stable way to make Ukraine safe. But given how things are set currently, it is very difficult to hope for that, so what would be option B, or plan B? This is where the United Kingdom could play a big role, at least in the interim period, through the organisation called JEF, which currently plays a limited role but is extremely well positioned not to undermine NATO but to be in the middle ground, offering additional elements of security for the countries that need it while still keeping NATO intact. It is not fracturing NATO.
Think of JEF as the organisation that could encompass not just the Baltics, the Nordics and the Netherlands but also include Poland and maybe even Germany, going as far as inviting Ukraine. That would create a sort of northern/central-European quasi-NATO organisation that is led by European countries—first and foremost by the United Kingdom—which could offer some sort of an umbrella to Ukraine and start to drag it closer into the European security architecture.
Marija Golubeva: I want to apply another timeline: the European multi-annual framework or budget timeline, because much of the aid to Ukraine comes from Europe. The French election will be crucial, because if Madame Le Pen wins, there will most likely be a reduction in funding for aid for Ukraine. If some more centrist candidate wins, that might actually be a lease of life for Europe’s continued support for Ukraine, which might prove crucial for the outcome of the war and for European security thereafter.
It is also very important to note that I do not think that we have to expect any serious breakthroughs from the negotiations, either in Abu Dhabi or anywhere else, for as long as Russia feels that it can afford to continue the war, because the war has become a very good systemic support for Mr Putin and the security institutions’ power in Russia. It has been integrated in the machinery of state, so to speak, to keep down any dissent. War is convenient, and only when Russia is really no longer capable of providing for war materially will it perhaps seriously consider a ceasefire.
Marija Golubeva: The allies that are still keen to improve the security of Europe for the next few years should by no means desist from supporting Ukraine and building a stronger European security architecture.
I quite agree with what Mr Landsbergis said about the Joint Expeditionary Force. I also think that various other geometries of coalitions of the willing, including the Nordic and Baltic states, and hopefully Poland, unless there is a very isolationist coalition in Poland after the next election, would be very useful for Europe to feel stronger and to actually be stronger, also vis-à-vis hybrid threats. The Joint Expeditionary Force could also be the basis, for example, of a joint intelligence sharing and fusing centre, which would allow us to anticipate the incoming threats and not just react to the ones that have already struck us.
Grégoire Roos: Judging by all the exchanges I have had with Members of Parliament in France and Brussels of Madame Le Pen’s party and close associates of hers, I am not sure that they really know and understand Ukraine. I make a distinction between the AfD’s position towards Russia and Ukraine and the National Rally’s position towards Russia and Ukraine. Polls indicate clearly that, even among the voters of Madame Le Pen, the majority understand who is the aggressor and who is the aggressed one. Of course, if you go deeper into the details of whether Ukraine should join the EU, that leads to a much more polarised landscape, but when it stays at the level of deciding whether Europe, including France, should commit to supporting Ukraine, there is still some kind of consensus.
If Madame Le Pen is elected—and for that she does not need Parliament—I expect the negotiation of a reduction of France’s contribution to the EU. I guess that would be France’s “I want my money back” moment. In that case, it is not impossible that we would see a negotiation between the Commission and Paris that agreed to a reduction of the contribution provided that France did not block a renewal of financial support to Ukraine. The only thing that President Le Pen would be interested in is showing the voters and the French taxpayer that France will send less money to Brussels. What Brussels does with the money is politically less of a vote-winner.
The UK is a different country on a different planet, for the simple reason that, of all countries in Europe, without the UK—of course, with the exception of the US—I am not sure that Ukraine would have stood. The dedication of the UK, which has cut across party lines, has been outstanding, in terms of not just financial support but military capability support and intelligence support.
This is unlikely to happen, but should France under a Le Pen presidency decide to cut all support, what would be cut? Intelligence? That is actually cheap to provide. Money? France has not sent so much money in comparison with what London and Berlin have sent. Military equipment? Perhaps, but there is the UK, and the Netherlands has given a bit; Ukraine will not be on its own. I think the UK will keep standing up for Ukraine. We can just look at the polls: even among supporters of Mr Farage, there is no consensus around stopping supporting Ukraine.
Germany is a middle-ground problem. At this stage, we can expect the coalition to ask more from the Ukrainians, especially in buying German military equipment—that is something that Foreign and Defence Ministers have already said—but for now, I rule out Germany, at least under a CDU-led coalition, stopping supporting Ukraine. That means that, in the wildest scenario, the UK might be on its own. One might argue that it would not be for the first time in history, and in the past it prevailed, but this time more coalitions will be necessary.
Italy is an important ally. It is really interesting to see the shift in the strategic thinking of Giorgia Meloni. From the speech she delivered in the Senate two weeks ago it is clear that Italy is standing behind Ukraine and recognises the leadership of the E3 to negotiate in the name of Europe. The question is: how much money? Gabrielius has pointed out that perhaps, in the short term, the most burning point is how much and how fast Europe can sustain its financial support. In the most difficult scenario, European debt will need to be discussed. I am not saying that is a likely scenario, but it will need to be discussed, and in that case, Germany will have to be on board. I would identify the difference between France and Germany. A Le Pen presidency would not mean the end of French support and, indeed, the Joint Expeditionary Force would be the ideal infrastructure that could deliver where the coalition of the willing has failed to.
Chair: We probably need to wrap up.
Gabrielius Landsbergis: Just briefly, I have two sentences to add to what Grégoire said. The biggest threat from a French election next year, if there is radical change of Government, is, in my view, the money that the French Government devotes to the European Commission in order for it to be used to support Ukraine. That is the biggest risk. That is why my strongest hope is that Europeans will find a solution for that before the election, and not risk a very long conversation after the election. That takes me back to my previous point about the leverages and Putin’s plans. For him, the plan works if he knows that we will not be able to figure out the money. If we tell them that at least for two or three years—my hope would be for five years—we have a plan for how to support Ukraine, that will change his calculations. That could force him to think about this differently and maybe be more open to some sort of diplomatic solution.
Chair: Can I thank all three of you very much for joining us? If you have any further thoughts, please let us know. We will continue to monitor what is happening, so I am sure we will be back in touch.