Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Oral evidence: Inquiry into the Recommendations of the Infected Blood Inquiry (Stage 1), HC 113
Tuesday 3 November 2026
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 3 November 2026.
Members present: Lauren Edwards (in the Chair); Sam Carling; Peter Lamb; John Lamont; Luke Taylor.
In the absence of the Chair, Lauren Edwards was called to the Chair.
Questions 113 - 152
Witnesses
I: Dr Emma Ireton, Associate Professor in Law, Nottingham Trent University; Dr Rebecca McKee, Associate Director, Institute for Government; Professor Richard Kirkham, Senior Lecturer in Public Law, University of Sheffield.
Written evidence from witnesses:
Witnesses: Dr Emma Ireton, Dr Rebecca McKee and Professor Richard Kirkham.
Dr McKee: I am an associate director at the Institute for Government.
Dr Ireton: I am associate professor at Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University.
Professor Kirkham: I am a professor of public law at the School of Law, University of Sheffield.
Dr McKee: At the Institute for Government, we have an explainer where we track the number of ongoing inquiries and have some stats on recommendations. Pulling those from there, since 2005, we have tracked 63 inquiries—both statutory and non-statutory—that have been launched across the UK. Obviously, those are established by UK Government Ministers as well as those in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That compares with 41 in the previous 20 years before that. We are finding that there are more inquiries running. They are also running for longer.
What is interesting about that is that because there are more and they are running for longer, there are more consecutive inquiries happening at the same time. You can see a real increase in that. In January this year, there were 27 announced or ongoing public inquiries across the UK at one time. That is 27; we are at 22 at the moment. There have not been fewer than five ongoing at the same time since 1997, which is just a huge number of ongoing inquiries. Through the rest of this session, we can talk about some issues and why that happens.
That does not mean that the Government were jumping to launch an inquiry at the very first moment. There are also issues with inquiries not being launched and delays, which then lead to issues with how inquiries are set up, designed and then fed into the recommendations. On recommendations, in our explainer we have counted over 3,000. That is 3,175 recommendations from 54 inquiries. That is between 1990 and 2024. There is also a public tracker that Matt Lewsey, a former Cabinet Office civil servant, has put together online. That holds just under 2,000 recommendations. The tracker also says that 85% of those have been accepted in full or in part.
That is really interesting as well. There are a huge number of recommendations that have been made, a huge number that have been accepted, and very few that are then implemented. That is this implementation gap that we and others have talked about. The Thirlwall inquiry, which was recently published, looked at that in sharp relief. It looked at 29 earlier inquiries and found that around 300 recommendations of around 1,400 had been adopted. It is interesting to look at the link between recommendations, whether they are accepted, and whether they are implemented. We might talk a bit more about that.
Dr McKee: I do not have the breakdown in front of me. In the last few years, or 10 years, statutory has been the predominant model that Government have taken to launch. They can be different beasts, but often the issues we might discuss are actually very similar in terms of how they are set up, how they are conceived, the lack of clarity around their purpose, and how the public view them.
Dr McKee: Yes.
Dr McKee: In our report that we published last December, one of the things I was really keen to do was drill down. We talk about cost, time and lack of impact and how those are the problems. A lot of the time, we see that the solutions are aimed at those three core things but actually, we really wanted to drill down into what those drivers are that drive what is going on.
For example, we looked at how decisions to launch an inquiry are inherently political under our system. That just means you need to make sure that when they are being set up, Ministers who take that decision are well supported and there is good guidance. Our assessment is that they are not. Compared with other countries such as New Zealand, where there is far more guidance and support for Ministers when they are setting that up, we leave Ministers adrift to make that decision.
There is often no clear shared purpose about what an inquiry is meant to achieve, which can lead to delays in whether an inquiry will be set up. However, it can also lead to an inquiry being established under a certain form—a full statutory inquiry, for example—when actually that is not necessarily needed for the purpose. We can talk a bit more about that as well. That also just means that it is over-promising. Again, it means that sometimes you are launching an inquiry when another model might have worked better, or actually there are still recommendations from a previous inquiry that have not been implemented.
We then looked at some other drivers that link specifically to cost and lack of implementation: low trust, often meaning that Ministers feel like they should pull for a statutory inquiry; struggle to secure chairs that both the Government and the victims and survivors are happy with; limited knowledge sharing between inquiries about what works that is held at the Cabinet Office; and then risk around relying on precedent and not wanting to have risk, meaning there is a lack of innovation in the model. Again, that is why we are seeing inquiries taking longer as well as just more inquiries being called for.
Dr McKee: The most cited examples are the ones that the Lords Committee found, such as the Lakanal House inquiry recommendations that the Grenfell inquiry found could have prevented Grenfell from happening. Sir Brian Langstaff also said in his Infected Blood inquiry report that actually the decision to delay launching that inquiry itself caused compounding harm on the victims. There are a couple of examples that have been pulled out by previous investigations. I do not have anything new to add to that.
One thing I would add, though—I do not know if Emma might want to pick up on this—is that there is new evidence coming out of Nottingham Trent University looking at the impact on staff, particularly on maternity staff, of compounding reviews and inquiries on the culture and ways of working there. That is another angle that is quite interesting to look at.
Dr McKee: From studying public inquiries in a far more detailed way in the last few years, I am quite convinced that the whole system actually is not broken. We have published a lot of comparative work looking at New Zealand and Australia, looking at parliamentary committees of inquiry in Europe as well. We actually have a very good system in many ways, but some underlying drivers are the issues that need tackling. Some solutions that I and others have thought about are not huge, structural, burn it all down and start again solutions, they are just tackling some issues, particularly around how they are set up by Ministers and the guidance they have.
For example, we have recommended that we have a framework of inquiries that is not hierarchical, as statutory or non-statutory are perceived, but that actually really targets the type of inquiry, whether it is forensic or policy learning, and ensuring that that is discussed up front. There is a role for PACAC or the Commons to scrutinise those decisions, which at the moment happen incredibly non-transparently.
I have lost my train of thought there. It does not need to be completely redesigned. We also have thoughts on the oversight mechanism that needs to happen. Again, none of that needs any major new legislation. There are slightly different roles that Parliament, the Government and implementation monitors might play in the system. Relatively speaking, these are all tweaks to the system. There do not need to be massive new organisations, legislation, oversight and architecture put over things. We have a lot of information now about what we think does not work and what those drivers are. The solutions are things that we could pick up and run with relatively swiftly.
Chair: That is very helpful. It sounds like we do not have to throw out the baby with the bath water—
Luke Taylor: Is it worth me coming in with question 10 at this point? We picked up a couple of the points there about the function of—
Dr Ireton: Yes. In order to answer these questions, you need to understand the underpinning problems that are happening. In the simplest terms, addressing a matter of public concern is a responsibility of Government with Parliament holding them to account. One of the big problems we have is that there started to be this acceptance of this idea that somehow the public inquiry is the resolution to the problem. It is not. It is the Government’s task to address a matter of public concern.
It may well be that convening a public inquiry is an important part of that role because the role of the public inquiry is to find facts, analyse those facts, and make recommendations to inform the Government’s response to the matter of public concern. It informs Government policy decisions, institutional changes and organisational changes in societal behaviours. However, public inquiries do not have the power to deliver change.
This criticism of inquiries is increasingly that they are not delivering. There could be excellent inquiries, but if the Government then see it as a completely separate thing whether they do anything about the problem, that is where they are falling down. No Government discharge their responsibility to address a matter of public concern simply by convening a public inquiry, but that has almost become the accepted understanding.
There is nothing about implementation in the Inquiries Act because the inquiry’s role is not to implement. That is the role of Government. It is to inquire. It is not the Act: we have had two Select Committees that have found the legislation is good legislation. The framework is fine. It is not very different from that in other jurisdictions. The problem is how we are using it here. Over the last few years, it has been getting worse because we are getting this disconnect between expecting inquiries to solve everything as if that has nothing to do with Government. It is the Government’s role to address this and Parliament’s role to scrutinise. It is falling down. It is the Government and Parliament that are falling down.
Dr Ireton: Absolutely. Too often when they are announced, they are announced as if they have achieved something, they have done something, “We have found the money and we’re convening an inquiry” and leave it at that. That is just the first stage of the process. That is to inform what they are then responsible for doing. We have this disconnect somehow and it is increasing. It is becoming the accepted norm, whereas in the past and elsewhere, it is understood that this is all part of the Government’s response and the Government are responsible for addressing these matters.
Dr Ireton: There is no clear understanding or articulation from the very beginning about what an inquiry is, what it is for, what it is not for, what it can deliver and what it cannot. Also, in this country and in other jurisdictions, inquiries have always been used in slightly different ways depending on the subject matter. The analogy I use is shipping disasters. Say there is a shipping disaster, sometimes you need a very forensic inquiry because you need to understand what happened on the day, who was supposed to be in charge, who failed, the reason for that disaster. You need very detailed answers. There may be other circumstances, for example, where there have been a series of shipping disasters, and the matter of public concern you want to address is why are these all happening. Then you are looking at the systemic failure, the failure in policy and regulation and so forth. That is a different sort of inquiry. Sometimes there are inquiries—more so elsewhere but we have a few—that are more the truth-telling inquiry where the state is acknowledging historic wrongs and holding up its hands. It is about correcting the historic record.
All inquiries have elements of those things, but generally there is an emphasis. The Government need to be clear from the outset why they are convening an inquiry and what its purpose is. In order for the Government to address the matter of public concern, does it need that forensic detail and answers? Does it need to understand the failings in the checks and balances, or is it about correcting the historic narrative and allowing voices to be heard?
We need clarity from the beginning because that then influences what the most appropriate model, scale, timescale, resourcing and so forth are. That needs to be transparent because how can Parliament scrutinise that decision if it is not articulated, if that information is not there? That also needs to be communicated to the chair because if the Minister has in mind that what they need is either very forensic detail or actually, no, we are focusing on the systemic failures, the chair needs to understand that as they set up and set the design and process of the inquiry. There is just a fog where inquiries are convened. How can there be effective scrutiny of the model, purpose and terms of reference if it is not clear why it has been set up in the first place?
Dr Ireton: To fully answer your question, guidance would be helpful. There is no reason why there should not be guidance. There is guidance in Scotland now, there is guidance in New Zealand and elsewhere. There should be guidance, not rigid criteria because it is at the Minister’s discretion. However, there should be guidance about the different roles that an inquiry can play, how you identify that core purpose, and the different sorts of models because sometimes different models are more appropriate than others. That guidance should be available and should be used to both inform and scrutinise the decision.
Dr Ireton: At this stage of the process, it has a role in ensuring that guidance is developed and scrutinising the guidance, that there is open and transparent communication in the first place because that simply is not there, and then in actively scrutinising. It should play a more proactive role where there are calls for an inquiry because often that is falling on survivors, the bereaved and so forth to get momentum. That should be something that Parliament is actively involved in as well. As I say, it should be scrutinising the model, the choice and so forth of the decisions that are being made.
Chair: That is helpful clarity around the need to move away from that one-size-fits-all model and perhaps a perceived gold standard of public inquiries.
Professor Kirkham: I was struck by Rebecca’s statistics. We see the increase in inquiries over a period of time. I would just like to add that there is a context here, which is that in the rest of the administrative justice system you see other patterns that are not so dissimilar. I look at the complaints branch and we have various complaints processes set up all over the place. It is also seeing an ever-increasing number of complaints going through its processes. That is a different aspect of administrative justice, but it just indicates perhaps a change of public expectations and perhaps a decrease in trust in politicians and the political process to arrive at solutions. Also in the background, these are years of austerity, right? We have increasing strain being put on the system and we have a lot of that playing out.
It was also fascinating to hear that discussion about the general frustrations with the inability or underuse of the inquiry system and how it could be made more effective. The tools are there already. Again, that is a familiar pattern with the administrative justice system over many years. I know this Committee looks at the ombudsman quite a lot and you can see similar narratives that the institution could be used more, it could be used more intelligently, it could be given greater powers but there is an inherent reluctance in our system to do that. We are constantly in this process of trying to put pressure on the Government to work the system better.
I echo what was just said. Yes, unfortunately part of your role is to be that pressuriser. I understand the Cabinet manual is being rewritten. This could be a moment to inject some of that harder, more stringent role and expectation of the inquiry process in there, making more of the Cabinet Office unit, which seems to be one of the solutions we have to go with now. Put pressure on that to make it work.
Dr McKee: It is quite a complex context. As Richard was saying, there are obviously things going on in society and we are seeing more failures happening in general. There is increasing demand on other bits of the wider system, the ombud system as well. The key thing when we looked at ministerial decision making is really just this lack of transparency about how those decisions are being made. That just feeds into concern that these decisions are being made without much thinking about the trade-offs and what other models would work.
It is difficult to really get a view into what is going on there, but it is quite clear that there is not a very good framework of options. There really is not any good guidance available, and there really is not any good evidence of what works and the lesson learning. There are wider issues going on that are all feeding into this, but the area that we really thought it was important to home in on was that ministerial decision making. It is quite clear that decisions are being rushed, they are being pushed then rushed, or they are being designed poorly so that inquiries are going on for years and years when maybe they would not need to.
Dr McKee: They are interconnected. The decision of whether to hold an inquiry and then the decision about the form and function of the inquiry; the decision the Ministers take at the beginning. Issues with them both are leading to the situation we have now, with more inquiries being announced but more inquiries ongoing at the same time.
Dr Ireton: Yes. The Lampard inquiry from the very outset looked at ensuring that the work it does maximises the chances of bringing about change, which is really important. It wanted research done on what makes recommendations more implementable and then on the processes of oversight, scrutiny and so forth.
There is a lot an inquiry can do during its process to increase the likelihood of implementation. A lot of the themes that came out there were for an inquiry to think about recommendations and implementation from the very beginning. Sometimes you will see inquiries run, they do the inquiry and then at the end they think, “Right, now what recommendations are we going to make?” You can see that it works better when as they are actually gathering evidence, they are thinking about, where is this going? What recommendations is this likely to lead to? How might this be implemented?
It also requires testing those draft recommendations as you go. Are they realistic? Are they practical? They must talk to those who will ultimately end up implementing those recommendations to ensure that they work and are coherent, and they are aware of what is happening elsewhere. For example, we have an awful lot of inquiries looking at changing the health service. However, the risk is that the NHS is just battered left, right and centre with recommendations that do not always coincide, take all other budgets into account and so forth. We must take that into account when thinking about making recommendations.
Dr Ireton: No, the inquiry chair needs to make sure as they are working that what they are recommending is realistic. There is no point in making a recommendation that actually would never be feasible and could never happen. It is about engaging with policymakers and those who are going to be responsible for implementation throughout the inquiry, rather than treating it as a tag-on at the end when the recommendations are produced and then somebody says, “Well that’s not possible. That can’t work.” Does that answer your question?
Dr Ireton: You do not understand how that has happened?
Dr Ireton: What might happen in practice is that an inquiry is working in isolation. One of the other challenges we have with inquiries and improving inquiries is that they are ad hoc. We have no central evidence base of what has happened on past inquiries, what has worked well, what has worked less well, and what we can learn from that. What is happening is each inquiry is starting from a blank sheet, and some do a better job at it than others.
Dr Ireton: There is no central co-ordination. There is no central learning.
Dr McKee: I would like to just quickly add something on the back of Emma’s point there. That point is really important about the lack of central co-ordination. Sir Brian Langstaff published his final letter earlier this year, which had an appendix with lessons and reflections in it. Even he said that these are really applicable only to an inquiry such as this and there will be different challenges. We just do not have any part of Government that is doing that systematically or doing it well and feeding those lessons back into the system. That is a really important gap.
On the design of recommendations, they need to be tested. As Emma said, they cannot be created in a vacuum. You see that chairs will take their role however they want to take it, and they can sometimes be designed by taking all that information, feeding it in and putting recommendations back out, which are then for Government or others to consider. Other chairs have taken a different model. For example, the Mid Staffordshire and Bristol inquiries had expert seminars that were there to test and address some recommendations earlier on.
One quite interesting area is that health policy itself is quite good at doing soft systems testing to check, if I pull a lever here in this system what happens to this thing over here? That actually does not happen in inquiries. Because of the structure, the ways of working, and as Emma said, the ad hoc nature of inquiries, they are not being asked to really wrestle with what is going on. How does that impact a budget? How are there compounding recommendations, other inquiries or other things going on in these settings?
Sometimes it might be that an inquiry—for example, the covid inquiry— has taken four years or two years to get to this evidence session on this module. In that time improvements have been made, but the terms of reference of the inquiry are very much about what went wrong. The inquiry itself cannot necessarily deal with or pick up on some good practice that has been happening as well.
It is the ad hoc nature that feeds into it, but it is also that inquiries need to be tested and they cannot be created in a vacuum. They also need to be measurable. They cannot be something that can just be ticked off and you say, “Yes, accepted. Done.” What is the outcome you are actually trying to achieve? How can you say that the change has actually happened that can then be independently checked as well? Thirdly, they really need to take account of the people in the system: frontline staff, the organisations that are under review. It is really important to think about how all these recommendations are piling up and the burden is piling up on those people in those organisations.
Dr Ireton: That is a separate point and it is more complicated than that. Whether it should be a single chair or a panel will very much depend on the public inquiry itself, the subject matter, the core purpose and what the inquiry is for. That alone does not directly impact on this in terms of the recommendations and so forth.
Dr Ireton: It is not that they are being allowed. A panel would not make any difference. They are listening to the evidence, and they are making the recommendations on the evidence. Inquiries are doing their best to make the best-informed recommendations they can. There are lessons to be learned. The purpose of producing the report for Lampard was that Lampard was basically saying we need to learn from other inquiries. What is best practice? What can we do to make our recommendations as good as we can and as implementable as possible? It is a very good thing that the inquiry is learning from previous inquiries.
The other side you have to remember is Government Departments’ and public bodies’ engagement with public inquiries. At huge public expense, they have representatives there every day of the inquiry listening to the evidence and learning. That role should not be simply to defend the position of the Government Department or the bodies. They should be engaging with the process as a learning process. They should be learning as it goes on. They should be inputting and informing the inquiry.
I am not blaming the inquiries. The inquiries get the best evidence and make the best recommendations they can. They should definitely be taking from the research and the best practice from past inquiries to maximise the strength of the recommendations. However, there is also a lot to be done by the Government, the sponsoring Departments, and the public bodies engaging with it. Again, there is this thing that has developed over a few years where they are almost passively sitting back. There is a confusion. They are treating them almost as if they were a court.
The purpose of the inquiry is to learn lessons so they can do their jobs better and bring about change and improvement. They are not there to passively wait for the recommendations and then decide what, if anything, they are going to do about it. They should be engaging with the process throughout, and assisting the inquiry in making the best recommendations possible that can be implemented as effectively and quickly as possible once the inquiry completes. They should be doing that, as opposed to starting that thinking, “Once it’s completed” and then coming up with reasons why things cannot be implemented.
Professor Kirkham: I just find it fascinating. It is 2026. We have been discussing inquiries I suspect for about the best part of 70-80 years, and we are still having these sorts of discussions now. Maybe it is just that we are in a learning process and we are getting there now, but it is fascinating that it is all so ad hoc. It seems that the inquiries themselves are doing the learning from their predecessors. Yes, there needs to be this central point of knowledge and guidance in the system.
There are other players out there that are good at writing recommendations and that have experience, from the National Audit Office, for instance. I was looking at the work of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body. It has quite a lot of constructive guidance on how to do this sort of work. I do not know whether it is a matter of having a panel or just having a standing advisory board to an inquiry or something such as that, which might help to add this wisdom. I find it fascinating that it is so ad hoc.
Dr Ireton: It is putting that mindset back to what inquiries are, which is learning to inform change by others. It has almost become this attitude of, “Let’s step back and just see whether the inquiry can solve this.” It does not have the power to change.
Dr Ireton: Change in inquiries is all the way through the life cycle of the inquiry. There is no guidance from the very beginning for Ministers. There is no clarity from the very beginning on what they are and what they are meant to do. It is all the way through. For inquiry chairs, often it is the first time they have been involved in a public inquiry. There is no induction, there is no explanation. Sometimes they can default to what they know well. We often see inquiries run quite like a court because we have a judicial chair. They need to accept that this is a very different body and a very different role. This has to run in a very different way; you cannot just default to what you are familiar with.
There needs to be a mindset change all the way through. There needs to be a mindset change about engaging with survivors and participants. We may come back to that later. Nearly every time an inquiry is announced it talks about putting the needs and interests of survivors and the bereaved at the heart of the process. Nobody knows what is meant by that. It is often a tick-box exercise. Where there is communication it often involves just talking at them, as opposed to listening to them and actually being informed by them. That has to change as well. We are talking about improving inquiries and so forth but we need to recognise that the biggest problem is the lack of implementation at the end, as if that has nothing to do with the Government’s reason for convening the inquiry in the first place.
Dr Ireton: That is really important. Government’s role is to address the matter of public concern. Parliament’s role is to scrutinise. At the moment there are gaps in the knowledge. Neither is doing that job well but that is because there are gaps in the knowledge.
The first gap is that there is no scrutiny of what is happening on the ground. For effective monitoring, you have to have top-down oversight but also bottom-up scrutiny. If you have a body—whether that is a parliamentary Committee or someone else—that is just asking for self-reported information about implementation, it actually does more harm than good because you are just amplifying an organisation saying, “No, it’s great. We’ve done half of them.” That is just then reported back by the parliamentary Committee. You need bottom-up scrutiny. You need somebody who understands the technical detail and the actual practical implications of implementation to report directly to Parliament. Then Parliament can scrutinise the actions of Government. It also needs to report to Government, so the Government know what is going on.
The first gap is that information we currently do not have. By introducing implementation monitors, Australia has addressed that gap because it sends somebody in who is specifically employed for an individual inquiry. Their job is to follow that inquiry for maybe three or four years and not be told what is happening but check and see what is happening in terms of implementation and verify it. They report directly to Parliament and then Parliament has the information it needs to hold the Government to account.
The other gap is this system-wide learning, which is a different thing. Sometimes the two get conflated. We need a dedicated unit or body that tracks recommendations, implementation and failures across all inquiries, inquests, reviews, and so forth. That is about tracking it and seeing what is changing and improving. The role of that is to prevent this recurrence and the fact that we will have another inquiry in the future on the same matter.
One of the reasons we are getting so many more inquiries is because we are just inquiring into the same thing time and time again. There is no implementation. There are currently five sets of recommendations from inquiries into failings in maternity care. There is no time to actually implement and change anything, and then things are going wrong. They are all reporting the same failures. It is all the same lessons. Nothing is being implemented, and then something goes wrong again and we just have another inquiry. It is not solving anything. We would have fewer inquiries if we actually implemented and solved the matters that the previous inquiries inquired into. You need some form of independent scrutiny bottom up. You definitely need some systemic thematic learning.
Another problem is that we get an abrupt loss or break in knowledge between an inquiry and those overseeing it. You have the chair, the inquiry team and so forth, who have spent years and know these matters inside out. That goes into the report and the recommendations. It is then overseen by a whole new set of people who are new to it, who do not necessarily know the right questions or whom to call in and so forth. You need to bridge that gap between the two.
Implementation monitors bridge that gap in knowledge. There are occasions when a chair might be available and might have the time. There are reasons sometimes why that is appropriate or not appropriate, but that can bring that continuity of knowledge. However, you need to address that complete break. Otherwise, you are having a complete conversation in isolation with bodies that are saying, “Yes, it’s going great. We’re implementing everything.” That body of knowledge is not there to actually question, test and push back on that.
It remains the job of Government to address the matter of public concern and Parliament to scrutinise that, but you need to fill that gap. In order to do that task effectively, you need to be getting accurate bottom-up information. You need to be able to have that overview so you can track if there are trends or recurring patterns and failures. That is where the gaps are at the moment. There are various ways.
It is really interesting that when you look at inquiries and what groups of survivors and the bereaved are doing, they are at the moment trying to fill those gaps that have been left by Government and Parliament. They are stepping in to try to fill that patchwork to make things happen, but that is not right. They are doing that because the job is not being done elsewhere.
I do not know if you want to talk about them but there are various suggestions for how it might be addressed in terms of oversight and scrutiny. There is not at all a one-size-fits-all model. The model is that for every inquiry, whether statutory or non-statutory, there should be someone assigned to oversee. There should be a form of scrutiny to give that oversight body the information it needs, and then to one side you need the thematic learning. It will change depending on the subject matter and which parliamentary Committee, body or scrutiniser is appropriate. However, it should always be the case that you have oversight and scrutiny.
Dr McKee: I will add to that. We are quite aligned on this, but I have used the phrase, “Accountability architecture” quite a bit recently because one of the issues we have talked about is that inquiries are ad hoc. We often talk about there being a patchwork of how inquiries are working and being implemented and monitored. That obviously has negative connotations. It obviously is not working at the moment, but it can mean that you then sometimes want to reach for a one-size-fits-all solution that we think will encompass and solve all the issues.
From really delving into what the underlying drivers are, it actually just needs much more structure around the non-one-size-fits-all approach. No single institution can do everything, but there could be a clear allocation of complementary functions, which we recommend is held together by an implementation plan for each inquiry.
We have recommended that when an inquiry ends, or at the final portion of an inquiry, an implementation plan is agreed to before the inquiry closes. That should have in it the ownership of different recommendations, how these will all work together, the implementation monitor’s role, a timeline, minimum standards and how Parliament might engage with that as well. There is a role for Parliament to then scrutinise and look at those plans and whether they feel sensible. It is the guardian of that system rather than playing the role of doing all that work itself.
Within that wider accountability architecture there is obviously a role for Government, who owns the response and the delivery. Yvette Cooper recently announced the DHSC recommendations hub, which is an interesting model. There is a role for Government there. There is a role for a tracker. There are a few different trackers that have appeared recently. As Emma was saying, we should have that comprehensive public record that the public, the Government, inquiry chairs and others can look at to see these trends and repeated failures.
Parliament can play the very important role of democratic accountability, summoning Ministers and keeping political attention. There are then the inquiry-specific experts. We talked about implementation monitors. These are technical or policy experts who may have been, for example, involved in some way in the inquiry earlier. They really know the detail but importantly really know the area in which the recommendations are being targeted. That could be a role for the NAO, for example, if the inquiry is talking about value for money, or a role for individual parliamentary Committees. For example, the work the Housing Committee has done on Grenfell and some work that the Health Committee did, I think in 2013, looking into inquiries.
Of course, there is then the work that inquiries themselves can do. Interim reports have proved quite successful for some inquiries. However, the role of Parliament or maybe a specific role for PACAC is to then scrutinise and look at those plans and then play the backstop role. An implementation monitor, for example, might be able to say, “I’m getting absolutely nowhere. I’m nearing the end of my term. Here are some specific issues,” and pull a lever. That then gets escalated, rather than Parliament, which has a huge number of competing priorities and a set amount of time, playing the role of monitoring and doing that bottom-up scrutiny across all inquiries, as Emma said. If you can set this out in a plan, it just gives a lot more confidence about what is going to happen next. It helps to bridge the break between what happens when an inquiry closes and what happens afterwards.
It is just useful to think that it is not the right thing to lean towards one solution for absolutely everything. Inquiries can actually have different structures that sit around the oversight, but they need to be brought together in a plan. There is then a role for Parliament as a backstop for when those plans do not work.
Dr McKee: Some challenges are specifically resource challenges. At the Institute for Government we do a lot of work with Select Committees. We facilitate sessions to help them think about their work programmes and ways of working that are effective and impactful. There is an awful lot of work that Committees are already doing. If you look at the core tasks, there is a wide range of things. We actually recommended in an earlier 2017 report that a public inquiry should be added on as a core task, but that is when we were looking at far fewer public inquiries ongoing at the same time. We no longer think that is the case.
One of the other issues, which should not be underestimated, is that when the system is not working in the way that it should, there are huge issues with a lack of trust. That is all the way through the ombuds system and inquest system, to lack of trust in Government and breakdown of relationships. The issue in supplanting all the monitoring and oversight job to Parliament or PACAC is that you just redirect that mistrust that the public might have. That could be quite dangerous.
There is a very important role for PACAC and Parliament to play, homing in on the scrutiny role that Parliament does so well, which is really the role it can play in order to help to fix this system. However, that sits alongside complementary functions. It might sit with implementation monitors, for example, with some of this other accountability architecture. The role it can most strongly play is in scrutinising some early decisions, potentially scrutinising some plans, and as I said, acting as a backstop so that there is a democratic oversight.
Dr Ireton: There is a wider problem. This is something that my colleagues are looking into, in terms of the NHS. If you are going to scrutinise behaviour and make recommendations, you need to then allow time and resource to make those changes. That research is showing that you will get the same body of people who are being constantly taken off their jobs, as it were, and put through these scrutiny processes from one inquiry to the next, which is creating very defensive organisations. They do not have the time and resources to implement those changes before the next round and the next round.
It is about prioritising implementation and the actual change, rather than focusing all the energy on just repeated scrutiny. Once those lessons have been learned, a lot of that time would be better spent implementing the changes rather than taking staff off again to scrutinise again.
Professor Kirkham: There are just similar themes going on. The ombudsman sector itself could be part of the solution. It has some requisite skillsets, but you have to be willing to empower that institution to be able to take on some roles and perhaps contribute around the edges of this. We can find some examples around the world where the ombudsman helps. This Committee will well know that comparatively, other institutions around the world have their own initiative and powers of investigation. Some issues that might come up in an inquiry, an ombudsman might be able to actually proactively get on top of at an early stage and take some heat off this ad hoc process.
I have found a couple of examples from Canada, where an ombudsman has been used as part of this monitoring process. In Manitoba it is a permanent role, which is just the equivalent of our coroner’s process. The inquiries or the inquest will make recommendations, and you have the ombudsman with a standing role to go in and investigate and report on that stuff.
There was a report in Quebec on a major issue regarding concerns about the relationship between indigenous populations and public services, and all sorts of problems and discriminations. A big inquiry was set up, which had many of the things we have been talking about here. It identified the lack of follow-up on previous recommendations. If you give full ownership to the Government, these things tend to disappear. The solution there was to ask the Quebec ombudsman to act as the monitor. In certain scenarios you might have an existing institution—we have had reference to the National Audit Office—being used as that monitor, as that body of wisdom that can use its powers to get involved.
The trouble in this country though is when you look at my example from the Quebec ombudsman, that again was an ombudsman with quite a lot of powers. It had its own initiative; it could activate this work. It received an extra budget with which to do this. It has done a couple of follow-up reports, and those follow-up reports have made recommendations of their own. There are bits of the system that could be used to help out, but they are all struggling under the same problem, which is that if they are not given sufficient powers, autonomy or budget, it is quite difficult. You are going to get these similar patterns occurring, or recommendations get lost.
Dr Ireton: Inquiries face frustration when engaging with the defensive behaviour of Government Departments. We talked about a mindset change. The Government need to accept that this is a learning process and work with the inquiry because the whole point is to learn from the inquiry so that they can address what they need to address. That is a major part. In terms of watering down, I do not see that as an issue. The inquiry is independent; it is looking at the facts and the evidence base and making recommendations. It can take evidence from people and test their thinking as to the practicalities, reasonableness and manageability of those recommendations, but they are the inquiry’s recommendations. I do not think there is an issue in terms of watering down: the inquiry is definitely independent and that independence must be respected.
Dr Ireton: Inquiries are all done in a public sphere; they are open and transparent. They take evidence from everybody across the board, and that informs their recommendations.
Dr Ireton: It is better than nothing; it is a start, in that you are getting inquiry reports and recommendations, and in the past those would be hard to find. But what we need is more transparency, and independent scrutiny. For example, there is a government dashboard about the covid inquiry and where it is on implementation. I have mentioned people stepping in to fill the gap: the bereaved families are running their own dashboard in terms of how they perceive implementation, and the two are very different. The government one has no element of independent scrutiny; it is just self-reporting data. In an ideal world it should include the terms of reference, reports, responses to the recommendations, and implementation plans. That is another place where people are stepping in to fill the gap: inquiries are increasingly asking people to produce implementation plans because there is no central requirement to do it.
There should also be the reports of the implementation monitors, so you have that independent scrutiny; otherwise you are just amplifying the self-reported data on that central dashboard. In an ideal world you would also want to include thematic analysis in terms of tracking across the board.
It is a first step, but in terms of transparency more needs to be done. So much is being invested in these inquiries to produce this knowledge and data as to how we can improve things, and it is just being put on file and sent off to the national archive. It needs to be used and scrutinised and made publicly available.
Dr Ireton: There is disagreement over the extent to which there has been effective implementation. You do not want tick-box implementation; you need scrutiny of whether it is real implementation, whether it is delivering what was intended, the changes and so forth. There can be quite a difference between self-reported changes and what is happening on the ground. That is why I am saying that in order for there to be effective oversight, you need accurate scrutiny to feed into it.
Dr Ireton: When recommendations are accepted there should generally be an implementation plan and an indication of when the recommendations are going to happen, and that should be scrutinised. In Australia, implementation monitors are usually appointed for around three or four years. That is one method, but there are others; a body could be used for scrutiny, or other methods depending on the inquiry, but there should be some form of scrutiny to track implementation through. When you have that scrutiny, you find that it works side by side with the implementation plan and keeps the momentum going. You are talking about a discrete period of time; in terms of tracking themes, that should be open-ended across inquiries, inquests and so forth. Where recommendations were not accepted and remain a live issue, for example, or where they were not delivered, they should continue to be tracked.
Dr Ireton: Learning across them all would need a dedicated team—sitting within the National Audit Office or somewhere else—with the job of tracking information across inquiries. That is seen as an extra expense, but it seems extraordinary not to have something taking that learning on. We are leaking £1.5 billion into finding information: it is extraordinary that there is no capacity to do anything with it, to learn from it and take it forward. It should pay for itself multiple times over, because if you are learning lessons and inquiries are not being repeated, you will save huge amounts of money. There should be a dedicated team whose role is to do that and retain that organisational knowledge. If you try to do that within a parliamentary Committee or the civil service, people leave, they move on to different roles and so on, so there should be a dedicated unit.
Professor Kirkham: Absolutely; my ideal academic scenario would be a dedicated body. An interim solution may be to use a body that already exists. You need one that not only has the incentive to draw together those lessons but can act as a fire alarm for you guys when the monitoring team is struggling. I do not know exactly what the answer is, but you need an autonomous body to raise the alarm with you.
I agree that there is a limit on what any Committee in Parliament can do; you are always going to have other things to get involved with, and your own resource constraints. Your team is changing all the time so institutional knowledge is lost, and perhaps you find other things more interesting as well. But you are brilliant at doing that scrutiny. Somewhere in the system you need a dedicated team—I like that phrase—learning and raising the fire alarm.
Chair: For our final questions, we are going to dig a little more into the role of Parliament in the accountability framework.
Dr McKee: There are two things I have already set out: first, there is an important role for PACAC to play in scrutinising the early decisions that are made, alongside an open and transparent guidance framework about how decision making is happening so that it can scrutinise those decisions. How a decision is made is as important as who is making it. As we have already been discussing, Ministers need to be able to explain why an inquiry has been set up, its purpose, and the format. There is a very important role for parliamentary scrutiny early on, because such decisions are often seemingly made from the outside without much consideration of trade-offs. Secondly, as I mentioned, when implementation plans go wrong with implementation monitors, PACAC can act as a backstop in pulling that lever.
We have not yet talked about the language that is used. Terms such as, “Leaving no stone unturned” and, “Getting to the truth” are damaging, because they set completely the wrong expectations around what an inquiry is and what it can do, including the speed of decisions, the cost, and the impact of trade-offs. Ministers are using such terms less now because they have been called out about it, but it is important to get in and scrutinise what is going on there.
In terms of recommendations and what happens after an inquiry has finished, departmental Select Committees have already been filling that role. I recall a statistic in our 2017 report that only six out of 64 inquiries—I will correct that if it is wrong—had been given a full follow-up by Select Committees. That is a very small number, but there are instances of where it has been done and done well.
One of the issues with public inquiries that Government find difficult is that they can often be cross-cutting; Select Committees have flexible ways of working, whether through guesting, joint inquiries or one-off evidence sessions, for example. They can look across and work together, so there is a role for departmental Select Committees to engage and pick up on any issues.
There are some distinct roles, but I strongly feel that there needs to be far more scrutiny of ministerial decisions at the outset when an inquiry is established, because getting that wrong sets everything else off in the wrong direction. The covid inquiry is one example. Under the second of its aims—what the inquiry is supposed to achieve and the terms of reference—there are 36 sub-clauses. That inquiry was first announced in May 2021, and it will finish reporting at some point next year; there are multiple different modules and recommendations that are now years on from when an incident happened. Changes are delayed or no longer relevant, but people are re-traumatised throughout the process. I have pulled out that inquiry, but it is not the only one. It is important to scrutinise what is happening when an inquiry is set up and ensure that it is focused.
Dr Ireton: I agree with a lot of that. It is important to clarify the role of inquiries and what they can and cannot deliver every step of the way. We need to push back on statements that they are there to deliver justice, leave no stone unturned and so forth, and make clear that it is the responsibility of the Government, not the public inquiry, to address matters of public concern. We are losing that message. We should be making sure that a core purpose is identified when the decision is made. That core purpose should be scrutinised as to whether it is an appropriate choice, and whether the model that is being chosen and the terms of reference are suitable and aligned with that core purpose. We should be pushing for the development of guidance that is made publicly available so that everybody understands the core purpose, the different models and their various strengths. We should be scrutinising decisions to hold or not hold inquiries, making sure adequate reasons are given with adequate transparency.
There should be proactive engagement with calls for inquiries; that should not be left to the survivors and the bereaved. We should be scrutinising responses and making sure they are timely; I am not convinced by a delay of six months for a response. A previous Select Committee suggested three months if the Government and Departments have been engaging with an inquiry; why does it take six months before you get a response as to whether they are accepting recommendations or not? Why is there such pressure on inquiries to move quickly?
One thing we have not mentioned is that responsibility for addressing a matter of public concern does not end with a change of Government. Far too often when people say, “There has been no progress,” the answer is that it was the previous Administration’s inquiry. That may be so, but the matter of public concern continues, and Government responsibility continues as well. Of course, it is fine to change priorities and address the matter differently, but if a subsequent Government are not going to continue with accepted recommendations or the process that has previously been agreed, they should be required to be open and transparent about what the change is going to achieve and how they are still going to address that matter of public concern. Their responsibility continues even if the way they do it does not.
In terms of oversight and parliamentary oversight, it is important to remember that the oversight and scrutiny is of Government actions; in order to scrutinise the implementation and what other bodies are doing, you need expertise and someone on the ground to report back. I do not think a parliamentary Committee is well placed to do that particular scrutiny, but it is absolutely suited to scrutinising the actions of Government.
Dr McKee: Picking up on what Emma said about early guidance and the power of the Select Committee in scrutinising ministerial decisions, it was interesting that the ministerial code has been updated so that Ministers are required to consult the Cabinet Office before establishing an inquiry. That is very welcome; in February last year, PACAC heard in an evidence session that the Cabinet Office was not consulted over the grooming gangs inquiry at all. It is very useful to be able to look at what Government say they are doing on paper, but what is happening in practice? Again, that helps ensure that solutions are directed to the right place; if something is not working, why is that, and what needs to change?
Professor Kirkham: I would add that the Cabinet Office Inquiries Unit seems to be the only game in town at the moment, so we should be scrutinising the work of that outfit and trying to put pressure on it to raise its standards.
Dr McKee: Parliament itself is useful as a focus point, but Select Committees importantly exist beyond the Government cycles. Membership changes, but there is continuity in the clerks and the existence of institutional memory, so it is a useful point for the public to look to. This Select Committee continues to exist and can—if it wants—pick up and scrutinise decisions. It also has the power to call for people, papers and records: other parts of the accountability architecture do not necessarily have that power. Giving those powers to the implementation monitors might be something to consider, but that would require legislative change.
The other important thing is being able to have Ministers in front of you. The infected blood inquiry was the first inquiry where Ministers gave evidence around the delivery of the compensation scheme. Select Committees can do that by default, if they wish, and that power should not be underestimated. For example, I pointed out earlier that Select Committees have an incredibly powerful tool in being able to reveal how decision making happens in Government. People who are publicly visible will also look to Committees to provide that scrutiny as and when; that needs to be deployed in the right way, because if Committees take on the whole of the monitoring role, it will be diluted and that risks a breakdown in public trust. The scrutiny that Committees can provide is incredibly important when it is used at the right time.
Dr Ireton: That power to be able to question Ministers is very important. The pushback of suggestions about other independent bodies that could deal with this causes some disquiet, because a parliamentary Committee is the appropriate forum to call in Ministers. There is a distinction with implementation monitors: their powers are very much directed at implementation on the ground, asking organisations what they are doing and so forth. That would not involve scrutinising the actions of Ministers, which is appropriately within the role of Parliament.
Professor Kirkham: The high bar would be, “You aren’t implementing recommendations,” or, “The explanation you’ve given for not implementing recommendations is no good.” A Select Committee must absolutely be the place where that should and can be done.
Dr Ireton: That is a huge question. It is about recognising the difference, as you say, between burden and involvement. Too often the burden falls on them because they are plugging the gaps between things that are not currently being done by the Government and by Parliament; they feel that if they do not, then change will not come. That absolutely needs to be addressed through people fulfilling their roles and responsibilities as they should.
A lot of work has to be done on better engagement, including active listening and involving victims and their families. At the very beginning it starts going wrong through a lack of clarity about what a public inquiry is and who it is for, and messages about it being for the participants and getting them answers. Sometimes promises are made that the inquiry cannot deliver. It is about getting that right, engaging with victims early, genuinely listening and involving them in informing the design of the process, while being clear where the boundaries are; an inquiry has to remain independent, but it has expertise that cannot be found elsewhere. That should be taken into account and should absolutely form part of it, but it is simply not happening at the moment. There is a lot of work to be done.
Dr McKee: The role they can play and reducing their burden are two things with separate solutions. There are some interesting methods of trauma-informed working—not only in the UK but in other countries—that fall very much on the design or the work of the inquiry as it is running. In terms of the burden, families and victim-survivors have become monitors by default. We need to fix that now: the state has to take over the burden of tracking and following up, so that families can have a voice without having to be the monitors. The most important thing is to be honest about what inquiries can do and what an inquiry will achieve, to have a clear purpose and to set realistic expectations.
Dr Ireton: Research indicates that if there are fewer recommendations, they have more chance of implementation; but I can understand that if things are found that need changing, inquiries can be reluctant to leave those out of their recommendations. If a proper dedicated unit tracked through the learning, inquiries would not feel that those learnings were going to be lost; they would form part of the learning picture. Maybe inquiries would then be more comfortable in focusing on the key recommendations to bring about change. It is something that needs to be addressed in the whole.
Dr McKee: Volume is not the same as quality; we need to dig into this point about the quality of recommendations and how they are formed. Before I came here, I had a look at the last three inquiries established by the UK Government. Between them, they made 142 recommendations. Some inquiries make no recommendations, but the effect of this volume of recommendations is that the Government are failing to prioritise. Acceptance is becoming a formality, and we are seeing an implementation gap. Monitoring then becomes difficult and even unimaginable; as we were discussing, that goes back to the start of an inquiry.
Dr McKee: It is quite mixed. Of the ones I have looked at, it is down to the length and complexity of the inquiry; having a very broad range of things to look at and a longer inquiry means that inevitably you are likely to have far more recommendations that touch across all those things. It also sets you up at a higher risk of those recommendations docking into different bits of the system without being able to do the soft systems testing that I was talking about. That creates a wider problem.
Dr Ireton: Yes, it is mixed: it can come down to the chair as well. It can partly be addressed by greater clarity from the beginning about the core purpose, the focus, and the reason why the inquiry is being convened. A lot of this is about improving the focus and effectiveness of inquiries; there is no question that the cost of inquiries can be cut very dramatically. We can still make sure that we have inquiries when we need inquiries, but they can be focused, efficient and for very clear purposes.
Professor Kirkham: I want to emphasise that a standing institution should be looking at your question on an ongoing basis.
Chair: If I take away a central message from this session, it will be that if the Government and Parliament want to show that they care when things go wrong, and care about making sure it does not happen again, they need to be more focused on implementation rather than the politics of being seen to be doing something and conducting an inquiry, as valuable as that might be. You have all three made helpful suggestions about how Parliament can be better about holding Government to account and how Government can be better about demonstrating its care in that way.
Thank you all very much for coming along today and thank you for your time. That concludes today’s evidence session. Dr McKee, you said you would send me the information about the statutory and non-statutory split, but one of my clerks has found a very helpful graph from the Institute for Government that clearly shows the trends since 1990, so you will not need to provide that. I thank you for your willingness to do so.