Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee
Oral evidence: Biosecurity and animal welfare, HC 67
Tuesday 3 November 2026
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 3 November 2026.
Members present: Mr Alistair Carmichael (Chair); Sarah Bool; Charlie Dewhirst; Helena Dollimore; Sarah Dyke; Josh Newbury; Henry Tufnell.
Questions 1-73
Witnesses
I: Cat McLaughlin, Chief Animal Health and Welfare Adviser, National Farmers Union; Dr Gwen Rees, President, British Veterinary Association.
II: Abigail Seager, Chief Executive Officer, Veterinary Medicines Directorate; Richard Lewis, Chief Executive Officer, Animal and Plant Health Agency; Professor Dan Horton, Director of Science, The Pirbright Institute.
Written evidence from witnesses:
- British Veterinary Association
- British Veterinary Association
- British Veterinary Association
- British Veterinary Association
Witnesses: Cat McLaughlin and Dr Gwen Rees.
Cat McLaughlin: Thank you very much for the welcome and the invitation. My name is Cat McLaughlin. I am the chief policy adviser for animal health and welfare at the National Farmers Union.
Dr Rees: I am Dr Gwen Rees and I am president of the British Veterinary Association.
Dr Rees: The first thing to say is that it is obviously a worrying time to be a farm vet or a farmer. On the back of this year’s bluetongue outbreak, to have Shamonda now confirmed is an additional worry for everyone. There is still a lot of uncertainty—it is very new and was reported yesterday—but there is a feeling among vets that it was only a matter of time before we would be picking up Shamonda in the UK. We knew that it was in the Channel Islands and in Ireland. The fact that these cases have been picked up is perversely reassuring, in that the surveillance is doing what it should.
Cat McLaughlin: It is a concern for livestock keepers and farmers. In the NFU we have been trying to raise awareness about it for the last couple of months. I still think it will probably come as a nasty shock and surprise to an awful lot of farmers. I am sure some of them are not aware of it. The very fact that there is no easy treatment and no easy control mechanism will probably concern them as well, because it is just something else that they are going to have to try to deal with.
Cat McLaughlin: One of the things that we need to think about as well is the country’s capability to deal with a situation where we have several big exotic diseases all converging at once. As the NFU, we are very concerned that our capability just is not there to deal with it on several fronts.
Let me come to the impact of the bluetongue outbreak. Cat, let me start with you and ask the most general, broadest question. Tell us what the impact has been to the farmers financially and emotionally, to the animals in terms of animal welfare, and to the sector as a whole. Then, Gwen, we will maybe get your perspective from the profession’s point of view.
Cat McLaughlin: The impact is much wider than just confirmed premises. Farmers have faced animal deaths, severe disease, reproductive losses, milk and growth losses, extra labour, veterinary costs, and disruption to breeding and sales. We also, obviously, have some losses that will probably only be known at the next lambing and calving times. We have also had lots of farmers under severe emotional pressure and stress. I do not think that is something that we can ever forget. We have done various meetings around the countries, especially the hardest-hit areas, and the emotional turmoil that this has caused on farms has been really stark and quite distressing to see and hear.
In terms of the financial cost, the NFU does not have any big, average figures that we can give you. We have about half a dozen case studies, and I am happy to send any costs and information from those case studies to the Committee afterwards. But some of the financial losses have been substantial.
Cat McLaughlin: Absolutely true.
Dr Rees: When it comes to the animal health and welfare question, which as vets is one of the key things that we are thinking about, this year the clinical signs and mortality have appeared to be markedly more severe than in previous seasons. We have been seeing far sicker animals, and we have been seeing higher levels of death, particularly in sheep in the south-west, where the outbreak was at its worst. The situation escalated very rapidly in that area, which put a huge amount of pressure on both the private vets and the Government/APHA vets in that region to respond to what was a very rapidly evolving situation. It was very difficult. Vets were faced with a huge number of sick and dying animals, as were the farmers and keepers, and there was very little that vets could do in the face of that outbreak beyond supportive treatment. There is no direct treatment for this. You can support those animals and hope that they get through it, but that is a very difficult position to be in for a vet—and for a farmer as well.
It was a bit of a major animal welfare crisis at the time—and that was the acute phase, during the outbreak. As Cat has said, what we are now seeing as a big concern is what the impact and the implications will be next spring, in particular for fertility. It is known that it has affected fertility of rams significantly during breeding season, so we may well be looking at a lot of farms with very low numbers of lambs in the spring, which has a massive financial impact on those businesses. On the calving and lambing season more broadly, we are not quite sure what to expect, but it could be significant for a big number of farms.
Dr Rees: It is an important question. With regard to bluetongue and this specific outbreak, I do not think there was a shortage—that is my understanding—of private vets. They were working extremely hard under very difficult circumstances, but I do not think the changed demographic of the profession had a direct impact. When we talk about the broader disease preparedness picture in the UK, there are fewer farm vets now than there were, for example, in 2001 during the foot and mouth outbreak, and vets will have less experience, perhaps, of having worked in mixed or farm practice, so if we needed to draw on vets from across the profession, they may be less prepared than they had been. It is something that the BVA have been doing a lot of work on.
Dr Rees: It is a question we are asking this year as the BVA. One of our policy priorities this year is around disease resilience and preparedness, and what that looks like in the private veterinary sector outside of the initial Government response. I think there is a piece of work to do to ensure that vets understand what would be required of them and feel confident and capable to do it.
Dr Rees: I would hope so. You would have to ask them. I would not be able to answer for them, but I would hope so.
Cat McLaughlin: Yes. I am just wondering where to start answering that, because it was quite a broad question. In a disease outbreak, as you say, it comes down to understanding the risk, understanding what we are dealing with and then looking at the balance of public and private roles. I think for farmers, we would expect, and I think it is fair of us to expect, that the policies are right, surveillance systems are right and the services that we need to work with those policies are all there. Certainly, I would not expect farmers to end up having to pay or contribute to anything that is a public-good aspect of a disease outbreak.
Farmers themselves obviously have to take responsibility for the health and welfare of their animals, and that does mean looking after them, keeping track of their health and welfare, helping with the surveillance aspect of picking up diseases, obviously vaccination and some of those preventive health issues and farm biosecurity. That all comes under what a farmer can do to manage and maintain a good attitude and response to a disease risk.
When it comes to private vets, we have seen that there are some areas of the country where farm vets are short on the ground. The one thing that we have got going in our favour is that a lot of farmers now have a very preventive response with their private vet, so they have their private vet going on farm on a regular basis, doing lots of preventive work and a lot less of the firefighting work. That will probably help, because we can try to encourage farmers and vets to have that really strong working relationship when there is not a disease crisis. We can probably help with that type of thing.
Cat McLaughlin: Yes.
Dr Rees: This is, I think, the third year of BTV-3. In the first year it was largely contained, in the second year it was spreading, and I think there was an understanding that this year would be worse. However, it has been behaving in a slightly unpredictable way across Europe and it has done here, so the severity has, I think, taken some people by surprise. But it is not a surprise that it is worse this year, and the geographical spread is not a surprise.
There is a feeling among vets that some of what we have seen this year has resulted from the snapping out of the RZ last year. Those animals in the south-west and in Wales were vulnerable from that moment to spread of the disease. They were vulnerable anyway, but it will probably have accelerated the disease’s being at the door. So there is an extent to which it was predictable and predicted—that is why there were big pushes for vaccination last year—but there is also an extent to which the speed and severity have taken people by surprise.
Cat McLaughlin: I was working for the NFU back in 2006 to 2008, when we had bluetongue-8. The big difference that we have got to compare is the way that the policy was enacted. Bluetongue-8 was a lot more highly regulated. As Gwen said, we snapped out of out of zones quite quickly with bluetongue-3 this time, whereas bluetongue-8 was a lot more controlled, the vaccination programme was a lot more controlled—it was done with a regional roll-out. There were complete differences in how we responded to bluetongue-8, but I think for the farmers on the ground, the shock, the severity and the health and welfare aspects were fairly similar.
Chair: So as you see it, it was predictable and it was predicted, but somehow or another we still seemed to be caught by surprise. That is no criticism; it just feels like that is how it was, but it does lead on to questions around communication and messaging, and Sarah is going to lead that questioning.
Dr Rees: It is in a way, for many, the million-dollar question. There were some valiant efforts to communicate, particularly on vaccine uptake, prior to this season. There were some really good resources put together, and that messaging was there, but it did not penetrate, I suppose. It is partly the nature of communicating risk and discussing risk in uncertainty. Farmers and vets are always balancing risk and benefit, and it is very difficult sometimes to invest in a just-in-case when your margins are extremely tight. The vaccine is not cheap, and the decision to vaccinate just in case was an expensive one for farmers. Therefore, it was a hard sell. It is a difficult thing to say, “We don’t know that this will definitely be a problem, but if you want to protect yourself, you should vaccinate.” It was the same on the continent: vaccination rates increase massively after there has been a big, bad outbreak.
It is a very complex picture around communication. Vets did, I think, try very hard and find it frustrating, but also very much understood that the decision to vaccinate or not is one of many decisions that farmers are making every day, and they have to balance risk and uncertainty. In this case, I think there are a lot of farmers who wish they had vaccinated sooner.
Cat McLaughlin: I do not disagree with any of that. Uncertain local risk, cost, fertility concerns, timing and confidence were all things that farmers were having to try to manage and balance themselves. We are in interesting times with communications. A couple of years ago we were not having to battle some of the social media claims. There was some misinformation flying around as well, which all undermines confidence. But what we have done really well this year, I think, is the bluetongue hub, with the Ruminant Health & Welfare group. That was a collaboration of all of industry—AHDB, the vets, farming groups; everybody—all coalescing the messages so that there was one single place for information. To give Government lots of credit, they were firing their comms into that as well. It was a really good place. But still, a lot of farmers were having to think, “Can I afford this vaccine? Can I get hold of the vaccine?” We had all the supply issues as well. As Gwen says, it was really complicated.
Cat McLaughlin: I do not think you can put out the one truth enough, to be honest. I do not think we can say that misinformation was the sole cause or the sole problem, but as trusted organisations and trusted individuals—let’s face it, farm vets are recognised as trusted individuals for farmers—we need to have those grown-up conversations about what exactly vaccines do. They will not stop infection. They can prevent some of the problems and they can make it a less bad situation. The more that we can get that message out—there will always be misinformation; we will never be able to get rid of it totally—the better.
Dr Rees: I agree with all of that. We are in a different world now when it comes to vaccine scepticism, and that has perhaps changed people’s understanding of vaccines and what they do. We were dealing with a new vaccine, as well, with very little information, particularly last year, on efficacy and safety. We knew it was safe; it was licensed—well, it was allowed to be used in the UK. We have had an increasing picture of how effective the vaccine is, so we are fairly confident now, but when vets were first having these conversations with farmers, there was a lot more uncertainty about how valuable these vaccines would be, and perhaps that initial narrative is difficult to change. That will always be the case with new medications or vaccinations.
Again, it was a very complex picture. We are very confident now that vaccinating is absolutely the best thing that can be done, but sometimes you are trying to close the stable door after the horse has bolted. Trying to reverse a narrative that has already taken hold can be very difficult, and it can make that conversation between vets and farmers quite difficult.
Cat McLaughlin: The vaccination process was a lot more regulated and controlled. It started, the vaccine—it was a new vaccine as well—was released on a regional basis, and basically we rolled vaccine up the country. I am trying to remember; I basically followed it, doing lots of meetings around the country. We started off in the south-east and the east coast, and we gradually moved vaccine as we hit various trigger points. This was all done very much with the Government saying when the trigger points had been hit and then releasing licences for vaccine to be used by farmers in the new areas. Over the course of probably nine months to a year, the vaccine was gradually rolled out, and ultimately we got ahead of the disease with the vaccine campaign. So yes, it worked—it did what it needed to do—but it was also a very costly process for the Government and DEFRA.
Cat McLaughlin: We probably cannot answer for the policy, but it was probably the cost issue.
Dr Rees: There has been a slight legacy from what happened with the vaccination for BTV-8 that has impacted people’s decision whether to vaccinate this time. It was almost a victim of its own success. There was an element of pushing to vaccinate and people spending money to vaccinate, and then it was not a problem, partly because—
Sarah Bool: Because they were vaccinated.
Dr Rees: Partly, perhaps, yes. That is something that our members have been saying: when they are having these conversations and trying to talk about vaccinating, there is a feeling that, “Well, we spent a lot of money vaccinating last time and didn’t need to, perhaps.” That has been a tricky one to navigate. It ties in with those conversations about risk and uncertainty; they are really hard conversations to have.
Cat McLaughlin: It is the Ruminant Health & Welfare group website, and then all the industry groups and veterinary organisations amplify the same messages on our own websites and through our own newsletters and articles and so on.
Sarah Bool: We as a Committee want to try to help wherever we can to spread the correct information.
Chair: We are now going to look at test results and how they were communicated, and other aspects of communication.
Dr Rees: There was a time lag between cases being reported and the tests being submitted, so between suspicious cases and those cases being finally confirmed. What we had in August that changed in September was that in September APHA, or the Government, started reporting suspicious cases, and therefore we had a much better picture of what was happening locally at that time. Before then, the picture of confirmed cases was two to three weeks old by the time those cases were added to the map, which meant that communicating the risk in those areas, in an evolving situation that was changing almost daily, was very difficult. You are trying to communicate that the risk is very high and yet the map is not reflecting it because it is reflecting two to three weeks ago. It did take time, I think, to fully appreciate the scale and severity of what was happening in the south-west at the time because of that lag in confirming those submissions.
Dr Rees: No. Sorry, I should have been clearer. What happened is that the heat map that was published was updated to include suspected cases that had been submitted, and that was a huge step forward. I have vets still coming up and saying that that changed everything when it came to having those conversations with farmers and trying to show, “Look, this is what is happening.” It was much more real-time and much better at communicating what was happening now. Having that heat map has been a huge step forward for everyone.
Cat McLaughlin: As Gwen said, that heat map was really important. It comes back to how farmers are balancing and managing risk. Having those suspected cases mapped showed them the neighbourhood risk and put it into a different kind of quantity for them. But yes, on the delays that we were seeing in the peak, I had some farmers who were reporting that they were waiting a lot longer than three weeks for their test results to come in, certainly down in the south-west. That is a horrendous position for a farmer to be to be placed in. I get that there were reasons for it—again, it comes back to the ability to have this kind of surge capacity when needed—but if you as a farmer know that you have a problem, you have reported that problem and you are now left having to deal with the aftermath and still have no clear confirmation of what you are dealing with, it feels as if it becomes an even worse problem and, as I say, it all adds to that emotional stress.
I would like to think that we can review and take some lessons and think about exactly what happened and why there was that delay, and at what point in the process those delays started to be kicked into the system. It would be really good if we could come up with a different way of doing things that made it a more streamlined situation, and look at some of the barriers that built those delays into that reporting process, because it was not helpful at all.
Cat McLaughlin: From the NFU’s point of view, we are worried, because bluetongue could look like lots of other exotic diseases. You could end up with reporting fatigue kicking in, and farmers assuming that it is bluetongue, even though everything is notifiable—and we have been telling farmers and reminding them of their of their responsibilities. I just hope and pray that we are not missing things. Winter surveillance is coming up and I am crossing my fingers that that winter surveillance, which is done a lot less passively, shall we say, does not identify some other things that have slipped under the net.
Dr Rees: I agree. Vets have foot and mouth, in particular, at the front of their mind as a concern whenever they are looking at bluetongue. Even in those regions where vets were being called out and spending their entire day seeing sick animals with bluetongue, you have to remain vigilant for foot and mouth. It is a very difficult thing to differentiate between the two, and that is a very big responsibility being placed on that vet to report correctly, but also to identify any suspicion that it could be foot and mouth and not bluetongue in that scenario.
Dr Rees: The change in reporting—
Henry Tufnell: In terms of private vets being able to do it—
Dr Rees: Yes—the move away from needing a confirmed diagnostic test in order to confirm disease and confirm on reporting. We understand why that decision was made. Given the extent to which bluetongue is now here, pragmatic decisions have to be made on reporting. It is not that the BVA necessarily disagree with that decision, but the decision was communicated at very short notice and without much consultation with the stakeholders. We were made aware maybe 36 hours before the changes happened that they would happen, and it was very difficult then to communicate that to vets who were suddenly very worried that the ball would be in their court around deciding whether this was foot and mouth or not. The communication was patchy and difficult in that time when the transition happened. We do not yet have good information on the impact that that change in reporting has had on the levels of reporting of disease. It was not necessarily the wrong decision, but perhaps it could have been communicated and consulted on better with the vets and the farmers.
Dr Rees: It would be interesting to see the impact that moving to online reporting has had on the number of cases being reported before coming to a firm conclusion. If it is a barrier to reporting, then that is something to take very seriously. If it helps with reporting, then again, that is a good thing. We would want to see some information about the impact before coming to a conclusion on that.
Cat McLaughlin: It comes back to that concept that we need to have confidence that, in in a disease outbreak, we have sufficient capacity in the reporting process, the Government vet networks and the labs to deal with we need to do. I hope that we do not end up doing this type of big policy change in the middle of an outbreak just to deal with lack of infrastructure. I would like to think that it had been done with a lot of thought, a lot of understanding, a lot of training and a lot of support for private vets and farmers so that they felt confident in what they were doing and it was not just a reaction: “We have no more—we can’t do this the way—we’re going to have to suddenly change overnight.”
Cat McLaughlin: Ultimately, animal health and welfare is a devolved policy area, as we all know, but exotic diseases do not respect those boundaries and borders. I always think that while I understand that devolved areas and devolved Administrations—Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland—have different policies, I do not think we are always very good at sharing some of the reasoning behind those different policies, or thinking about some of the farmers who farm either side of a border. That is where you start to get some difficulties coming into the system.
In terms of equity when it comes to paying for official tests, I would like to see a bit more of an equitable position across country borders. I hope I have not just shot the Welsh farmers in the foot because they would all end up having to pay for it as well, but we do need more of an equitable system. I would have liked to see English farmers in the same position as Welsh and Scottish farmers and having those tests supported.
Cat McLaughlin: No. Well, we now have the new lab capacity. We still have Pirbright, which is obviously the primary one, but they have opened up Moredun and—
Dr Rees: Weybridge.
Cat McLaughlin: They have Weybridge, but they were also allowing—I think it was Moredun in Scotland and one of the Welsh universities were going to start. You would need to check with DEFRA and APHA, but I think they were trying to add a bit more testing capacity to the system.
Dr Rees: When it comes to exotic disease control in the devolved nations, it is, as Cat says, a really difficult area because policy is devolved but the disease does not necessarily know that. It can create mixed messaging and it can create a feeling—perhaps in Wales farmers feel very glad and grateful that they are still able to test and get confirmation of disease. I mentioned earlier that there are implications of decisions that are made across borders on countries the other side of the border. With the snapping out of the RZ last year, that essentially meant that Wales had to become part of the RZ as well, and we may be looking at a very different picture of disease in Wales because of that decision that was not made in Wales. There is a feeling from vets in Wales and from our members that they are in control of some policy but not all policy, and it is a very difficult thing to navigate. Again, it comes down to that feeling of equitable policy decision making, which does not always translate into what happens on the ground.
Chair: Let us flip the telescope around. We are sitting here in Westminster with 20:20 hindsight, looking at what happened. Let us look at it from the on-farm perspective. You had a situation where, as you say, it was predicted but somehow or another we did not make the emotional connection about how bad it was going to be. It happens. It hit, and possibly there was an element of guilt in there about not knowing what was happening. You had a delay, where people were left still not knowing and not having that final element of certainty. Into that mix, you throw in a regulatory change, which surely has an impact on the relationship between the vet and the farmer. With hindsight, you are brewing the perfect storm here, aren’t you? I do not know that there is necessarily a question in that, but it does feel that we are seeing this as some sort of exercise in Government comms in the same way that you would say, “You should wear your seatbelts,” but it is an awful lot more involved than that. Charlie is going to look at the question of vaccine availability.
Dr Rees: It is a question that a lot of us have been asking ourselves. The trouble with vaccines is that it is such a complex supply chain and it is a very difficult thing to stockpile. They have a short shelf life, and it is very difficult to massively increase supply at short notice, which is what we saw this year. By the time the extent of the outbreak was realised and farmers and vets were clamouring to get the vaccine, there were delays in being able to get it. Having spoken to our vets and to the vaccine manufacturers and suppliers, a lot of what needs to happen is better predictability of the demand for vaccine. That is why it is going to be so important to push vaccination going forward—to get vet practices and farmers to get their orders in so that the manufacturers have the confidence that they will be sold if they come to the country and those animals have protection ahead of next season. Those would be my core messages on what we can do.
Cat McLaughlin: On the wider scale, in the NFU we are delighted that the VMD have started with their five-year vaccine strategy. That is a really good thing and a positive piece of work. This is one of the things: the pharmaceutical industry—I am not speaking for them, but from my perception—are trying their best to forecast what the demands will be, but every time they think, “We’re going to have to have a vaccine for such-and-such,” there is naturally that manufacturing time delay, and the disease will not sit and wait for the vaccine to be ready. We are always going to be running behind on something on the disease front, and that is one of the things that has happened with bluetongue-3. We were running behind the disease line.
We also have issues with pack sizes—there were lots of complaints that the pack sizes were not right. Smallholders, smaller farms and those up in remote areas did not necessarily want to buy the large 50-dose or 100-dose bottles. You then have all the regulatory issues and decisions about whether they spend the money—it is an expensive vaccine—and end up wasting it, or whether we end up making vets the only ones who can open it and distribute it among their clients. All those kinds of things come into it as well, and we need to have those discussions in peacetime about how we deal with some of those practical issues around vaccines.
Dr Rees: Yes. It is understandable, in a way, that that was happening. There was an element of “any port in a storm” as well when it was difficult to get hold of vaccine. But vaccines are not very stable and you have to have confidence in the cold chain to make sure that they are still going to work, so the risk of doing that is that you are paying for a vaccine that will not work anyway. There were a number of vet practices that were doing vaccine broach days, where smallholders could come and they would split a bottle at the practice, where the cold chain was more reliably kept. Certainly anecdotally from our members and vets, we heard that there was quite a bit of Facebook Marketplace and that kind of thing in the reselling of vaccines.
Cat McLaughlin: I think the VMD made the right call in issuing that notice. From the NFU’s point of view, we have been telling farmers for a long time what is legal practice and what is not legal practice, and I do not want to see any of my members inadvertently going into illegal practice because of something that they feel is a practical solution to a problem. I think it is something where we need to keep putting that message out there about what you can do as a farmer and what you cannot do.
Dr Rees: It is certainly my hope. It is something that I think we will all do everything we can to ensure becomes the case. A lot of the complexities we talked about, about communicating risk, still apply, and farmers do still have to make a judgment call on whether they accept the risks of vaccinating compared with the costs of vaccinating, but given what has happened this year, it will be a warning that makes the messaging and the conversation easier for vets to have as well. We have the heat maps, we have what has happened this year, and we can talk about the risk in a bit more of a certain way with our clients now.
Cat McLaughlin: Certainly in the NFU and among the farming organisations, I am very aware that our messaging is already, “Think about what you’re doing. Think about your vaccine timings.” It is not, “Think about whether you should vaccinate” but “Think about when.”
Charlie Dewhirst: As an observation, the concern will be that farms that have been financially impacted by a disease outbreak have less available cash and therefore are more reticent to spend it on early vaccines. We will have to wait and see, I suppose.
Chair: We have made the emotional connection now, so in many ways we have a bigger problem than we realise if we do not manage to get the message through next year. Surely the challenge now is right back to our early comments about what else is going to come down the track. How do we learn the lessons from bluetongue to make sure that when we are talking about managing risk, farmers genuinely understand the risk that they are managing? The people who chose not to vaccinate were not doing it out of any sense of capriciousness or whatever else; it would appear that they just did not really grasp the full implications of the risk that they were managing. Are there any lessons to be learned on that? Well, actually, lessons to be learned is the whole basis of the next set of questions, so Helena can lead us on that.
Dr Rees: It has to be planned for as a serious recurring risk. It is difficult to comment on whether Government will or will not change the classifications of disease, but we saw in the Netherlands, for example, massive outbreak followed by a very small handful of cases, I believe, this season. It is not necessarily something that has to be endemic and here every year, but the risk will not go away, so it is a serious recurring risk and needs to be managed in that way.
Dr Rees: Yes. I think we are in the situation now that they were in following their large outbreak, and that, it seems, did really motivate uptake of vaccine. Through probably a combination of immunity from previous infection in animals that had been infected and then developed immunity, and an increase in vaccine uptake and coverage, they now seem to have a good level of herd and flock immunity in the country, which seems to have had a very positive impact on disease levels there. The main message to come from that is: go hard on vaccine now, which is what they did, and hopefully we will then see a similar picture to what has happened there.
Cat McLaughlin: Ultimately, farmers trust their vets; that is still a very strong trusted partnership. Farmers will trust other farmers. One of the things that we in the NFU have done this time, which we maybe had not done as much, is get a lot of our messaging out through case studies. As I say, it was about six or seven case studies; again, I can send you written details of them afterwards if that would help. Each case study led with a different policy message and policy advice, and tried to show our advice to farmers through another farmer’s eyes.
There are different ways that we can get messages out to farmers. I still do not think that the Government relying on gov.uk is the best way to do things, and yet I have to say that I sit on the on the Government core group for bluetongue and exotic disease, and the communications team that come into that from DEFRA have been fantastic. They have embraced industry sharing of information. They have embraced Ruminant Health & Welfare and the bluetongue hub. They have tried to make things better, but the Government website is still quite a hard maze for genuine farmers to find their way around.
All the things we are doing—the webinars, the face-to-face meetings, the newsletters, the text messages, the social media—are really important. Different people will find things out in different ways. But it comes back to the point that we need one core message and to all amplify the same message. If we can get that right, then that will probably help.
Dr Rees: Specifically distance travelled?
Helena Dollimore: A reasonable distance to travel for emergency vet cover.
Dr Rees: It sounds like you are talking specifically about companion animal emergency cover in this case.
Helena Dollimore: Yes.
Dr Rees: Yes, the demographic and make-up of veterinary provision and practice has changed significantly. Putting a specific mileage or time on what is considered reasonable is, I think, very difficult, because in remote and rural areas you will have one practice covering a huge area, and that is the only way that you can have a sustainable model in the current set-up for veterinary provision. If you were to bring in strict limits, I think that would sometimes be very difficult to enforce or would make practices in the highlands and islands or rural Wales, for example, unsustainable because they have to cover wider areas. It is a very complex picture, and it is not something that we would specifically be calling for. There is clinical judgment, and having that judgment of what is reasonable in your context is vital. That is part of a vet’s role.
Dr Rees: Again, it is context specific, I guess. One thing that the hopeful reform of the Veterinary Surgeons Act will allow for is regulation of the business rather than the vets. I suppose in that scenario the business would have to justify that it was a reasonable distance. Perhaps we can follow up with some more evidence in writing if you would like something specific on that. I had not prepared anything specifically for today.
Helena Dollimore: Sure. Thank you.
Chair: It is almost like running a veterinary practice is a difficult thing to do—who knew? Thank you both for your attendance and your evidence today. It has been enormously insightful and very helpful to the Committee. We are going to pause proceedings briefly while we bring in the next panel, but thank you, and this is a matter in which we will remain engaged, so any developments that you think we should know about, we are in the market for hearing them.
Witnesses: Abigail Seager, Richard Lewis and Professor Dan Horton.
Abigail Seager: Good morning, and thanks for having me here. I am Abi Seager, and I am the chief executive of the Veterinary Medicines Directorate.
Richard Lewis: Bore da—good morning. I am Richard Lewis. I am the chief executive of the Animal and Plant Health Agency.
Professor Horton: I am Dan Horton. I am director of science at the Pirbright Institute.
Chair: Thank you for your attendance and your assistance this morning. We will doubtless come to some of this later, but just right at the top of the session, it is apparent to us from the evidence that has been submitted to the Committee that all the people who work in your various organisations really put in a shift to tackle this. We have heard quite remarkable stories of people being re-tasked, spending overtime and the rest of it. I think it is important that they hear from the Committee that that is understood and appreciated. I hope that you will take our thanks back to them for that.
We are going to cover some of the same territory that we covered with the previous panel. Sarah will lead the questions on the response.
Richard Lewis: I would characterise it in two different ways. To associate myself with the comments that the Chair made already, it was a humbling experience to see how hard colleagues at APHA worked during this outbreak. I spent time with colleagues right across the country. It was most impactful spending time with colleagues in Devon, and in Exeter specifically, who were taking calls in the early dawn—summer dawn, that is—and beyond midnight on the same day, working seven days a week, trying to respond. I will say first that the response of colleagues at APHA—and dare I say at DEFRA, too, and my partner organisations—was extraordinary.
But I did say my characterisation was twofold, and the second way I would characterise the response is that, as an agency—and referencing the NAO report specifically—we were structured in a way that faced the threats of the past. We are in a process of restructure and transformation, not as a result of the bluetongue virus that we have seen exposure to this summer, but since before that. I will give you a brief example of why that is and how that might have impacted our response this year.
In the years 2015 to 2020—six years inclusive—there were 57 reports of exotic disease outbreaks in GB. In the six years after that, we are getting on for 5,000 reports—not quite, but not far off. Previously, you would have a member of APHA staff doing a day job and then being asked to pivot across to deal with an exotic disease outbreak. When it was 57 across six years, you could do that and then return to your day job and find that there may be a small backlog but be able to clear that in a reasonable amount of time.
With the explosion of work that has happened, we are seeing colleagues at APHA who are almost exclusively pivoted now towards dealing with exotic disease outbreak. That has hindered our ability to deal with the bluetongue virus cases this year, because we are not funded at APHA to deal with exotic disease outbreak. Back when there was a small number of cases, we would go to Treasury annually to say, “These rare events have happened,” and, through our colleagues at DEFRA, we would get a sum of money, which would not cover all of our costs, but would cover some of the costs. That model, or the way that we are structured now, ignores the reality of our situation rather than faces into it.
The restructure that we have undertaken before and in the midst of this outbreak is there to address the continuum issue that we have between business as usual, which is the work that we would do in any case, and outbreak. We are asking the same people to do those two jobs, and that is unfair over the long term. Our Bridge to Better programme, which we may speak more about later, is designed to address that very issue.
Richard Lewis: I can see the case for it not being a notifiable disease having a positive impact on some aspects of our work, but that is a policy decision that DEFRA would need to make. There may be trade implications as well: because it is notifiable, and it is not just in this country but beyond the borders of this country, we still have a duty to report that into the World Organisation for Animal Health, for example. There are wider considerations than my own agency in that regard. That would be a question for policy to consider, and there are implications beyond that for trade.
Professor Horton: As you are probably aware, the Pirbright Institute is not a Government agency but an independent company and charity, and we are primarily funded by UK Research and Innovation. We have a mandate on behalf of DEFRA as a national reference laboratory for nine diseases, and bluetongue is one of them. In this context, we took the lead on the diagnostic testing.
First, just to acknowledge the impact of this, I am a vet myself, and to watch it unfold has been really difficult. In the context of the suffering of the animals and the impact it has had on farmers and vets, including some of my friends who have been out in the field, it has been a horrible outbreak, but I have also seen some good things. I have seen science, evidence and data used to help inform decisions, and I have seen people step up, as the Chair kindly gave tribute. I would like to also give tribute to my colleagues who have been working hard and sometimes working in high containment. That takes a particular set of skills and resilience.
There have been bottlenecks in the process of testing, not just in the lab—we will explore those, hopefully, a bit more—but in the process from suspicion of disease through to confirmation. Regardless of the impact they may or may not have had on the ability to control the disease, they do have an impact on the farmers and vets. I know what it is like: if you have taken a sample and you are waiting for a test result and it takes longer than you are expecting, that has a negative impact emotionally, and I completely get that. I am sorry that people have had to go through that.
Professor Horton: I will hand over to Richard to start with the front end of it and then I can talk a bit about our role in that.
Richard Lewis: Any chief executive would be foolish to assert absolute confidence that nothing will be missed by the processes that we have, but I am reassured of the work that our colleagues at APHA have done to differentiate between those two things. First, the testing regime has started, and of course that is a matter for Dan at the Pirbright Institute, but there are some clinical signs that are different between the two diseases. Therefore, with more practice and vets seeing more cases, we have seen confidence rise in being able to diagnose properly for the disease that they have. We have had experts on the end of the phone to speak to any vet who has wished to do that to ensure that what that they are seeing is what they think it is. Vets in the field are not completely on their own.
Alongside that, we had an online reporting system that was stood up earlier this year. That had a number of ramps that you would run if you started reporting clinical signs that were more akin to foot and mouth. We have stress-tested that system. One of our senior colleagues at APHA put a mock report on and started to tick the boxes that were more foot and mouth related for the clinical signs, just to check whether the system we had was working. He had a phone call within 10 minutes from one of our vets. I am reassured, therefore, that the systems and processes that we put in place mitigate the risk of that.
As I started by saying, you cannot assert complete confidence in any system. It is important that we remain vigilant to this. Of course, if we keep simply blood sampling and testing for gluten, we will overwhelm labs with the number of samples. That in itself produces risk that something may be missed in among so many thousands of tests. There is a balance—a tension—between clinical signs reporting and blood testing. I think we struck that balance reasonably well this year, but undoubtedly there will be lessons that we will need to learn in our learning the lessons exercise, the full-day event that we have on 17 November at APHA, which has a whole host of partners invited to it.
Professor Horton: The Pirbright Institute, as you will have probably read in the response to your queries, did what we call an all-institute response, so everyone suitably trained in every facility that was available was put towards the bluetongue outbreak. To do that, we have to stop some things. The things we do not stop are statutory responsibilities for the other notifiable diseases that we have responsibility for. Just to reassure you, there is still someone on call 24 hours a day for foot and mouth, and they come out in the middle of the night if necessary to do the testing for that. We can and have done notifiable disease investigations for foot and mouth during this period.
African swine fever is another one for which we are a national reference laboratory, and over the same period as the bluetongue outbreak we have been doing African swine fever surveillance, as we do all the time in wild boar, for example, and unexpected deaths in domestic pigs. As a laboratory, we maintain capability for the other notifiables while weathering the storm that we have.
Richard Lewis: It has become apparent that a diversity of voices is important in getting messages to the farming community. Relying solely on Government to do that, whether through gov.uk, as we heard about earlier, or via the emails and text messages that we send, would be an error. Through gov.uk, emails to around 150,000 registered keepers and SMS messages to more people than that running from very early this year, and indeed last year, on the importance of vaccination, I think Government played a significant role—we heard some of the evidence earlier—in communicating the needs.
The diversity of voices point is an important one. We amplified the voice of things such as #BattleBluetongue, which is a very good industry-led initiative. We did a significant amount, but I don’t think you can ever overcommunicate on issues such as the risk and the importance of vaccination. I will not rely on hope, but I hope that the virus has done our work for us for next year on the need for vaccination. I was on a farm in Devon earlier this summer with a farmer who had vaccinated, albeit late, and the other farmers in attendance at that meeting told me that some of them had already ordered the vaccines for next year.
Our work will be important in the year after as well. This is a multi-season event that we need to be thinking of, not just for next summer and potentially a huge increase in vaccine uptake, which I hope to see, but for the year after if the problem does not materialise in the way that it has this summer.
Chair: Or the next disease, whatever that is.
Richard Lewis: Absolutely.
Abigail Seager: This is why it is really important that we do the lessons learned that Richard was referring to. The theme that you heard in the first session, which I will certainly reiterate, is the real importance of communications and the importance of finding the forum where they are heard. We heard that farmers trust farmers and farmers trust vets and vets trust vets, and that maybe gov.uk, albeit a channel that we use, could be amplified through other mechanisms. We certainly need to learn that lesson and take that back and iterate what we have done this year for future years. I am happy to talk about our vaccine strategy in due course, but it is really dependent on the uptake of vaccination as a principle, and the communications on that will be absolutely key.
Richard Lewis: It is worth differentiating between two different things that were stood up. There is the national disease control centre, which is the recognised way that you would deal with an outbreak such as this. That was stood up earlier—not significantly earlier—and is a DEFRA-led response to the virus. In APHA, we stood up a gold group, as you recognised, shortly after that. That was to do a slightly different thing. It was an internally focused meeting that we had as a gold group, because I recognised that as well as responding to bluetongue across the country, we had a whole host of other responsibilities that we needed to ensure that we kept undertaking, whether that is TB testing or animal by-product inspection work. That was a means of ensuring that, while we were responding effectively to bluetongue, we were also able to shift resources to deal with other things as and when required.
The national disease control centre is the recognised means through which you would run a command centre for an outbreak such as this. The gold group was a slightly different function, which is an internally focused meeting, and it was only at that point that it became clear that the other parts of our agency needed the support to keep business-as-usual work up and running. As I mentioned earlier, there is a tension between business as usual and outbreak, and having to pivot between those two things.
Richard Lewis: There is always room for improvement. I think part of the lessons that we will learn is the way that NDCC—the national disease control centre—is stood up in future. It has worked well in the past when a new virus emerges: the CVO chairs a meeting that goes from an amber call to a red call on confirmation of a disease, and then the system kicks in thereafter. That has worked well in previous years, when exotic disease has been rare. It is now business as usual for us and it is continuous, and so standing up and standing down the NDCC requires further thought. I have discussed that with the CVO. She is in agreement that we should probably tease that out in the lessons learned in the middle of November.
Richard Lewis: It can always be better. I dare say there are aspects of the way we communicated that were already touched upon, and the way that we moved from blood sampling and testing to clinical signs, that we definitely could have improved upon. I am pleased to say that the gold group that we held internally had representatives not just from DEFRA but the Scottish CVO and the Welsh CVO, so we ensured that through APHA—and through DEFRA, as well—there was a GB-wide response to this. But certainly there are improvements that we can make in the speed of decision making. That is clear.
Abigail Seager: The work with the manufacturers to get the vaccine authorised within GB for bluetongue happened over a number of years. We did that through a number of different mechanisms: first, with the schedule 4 release for emergency use in 2024, and then in 2025 with the provisional marketing authorisations for the three products. Manufacturers, as we heard, will provide stocks but they do not want to waste those stocks. If there is not enough uptake, they will remove those stocks from the GB marketplace and place them elsewhere. They are trying to match supply to demand, and it is the theme that will come out in the vaccine strategy as a really important element that we face into.
This summer there was insufficient demand for the stocks to be maintained within GB to be able to respond in July. However, we were able to rapidly put in place the alternative, which is to bring in products from the EU. I was really pleased with the response of my team; similar to what Rich and others have said, we really did a tremendous effort over the course of the summer. Nearly 5 million doses were brought in in a very short period once the extent of the demand was realised, and then we worked with the manufacturers to say, “Here is the demand that we now have; how can we ensure that supply can meet that?” We know that there will be another 5 million to 6 million doses brought in between a couple of months ago and April, so that we have sufficient supply going forward.
It was a live lessons-learned that feeds into the vaccine strategy work that we have been looking at anyway, and it really highlighted the importance of active communication between the demand from the sectors and the supply from the manufacturers so that we can meet that in a level way.
Abigail Seager: It is one of the four pillars of the vaccine strategy and it is a really important one. I think this experience with bluetongue has been a good live example to test some of the ways in which we can communicate. Over the course of the summer we have been having one-to-ones with the manufacturers and weekly check-ins on the forecast between demand and supply.
We want to get to a model where we do not have to be quite so reactive in an emergency and where we can forecast what the demand will be in advance so that vaccinations can be done over the course of the year in advance of there being a problem. It has tested some of the communication channels, which have been stood up really quickly and have worked well, but I anticipate not needing to utilise quite so much of an emergency response going forward.
Abigail Seager: That was due to manufacturers wanting to make sure there was limited wastage of their products. They have a shelf life they have to consider, as well as the demand within GB at that time. If we see a continuation of a demand that is not quantifiable from GB farmers and vets, of course that could be a risk. That is what we want to try to avoid by making sure that we have a better communication channel to ensure that supply and demand is well understood by all parties.
Abigail Seager: In normal times, outside of the outbreak, we would not be having communication with manufacturers about what we anticipate demand to be. That does not routinely happen, but it is part of what the strategy looks at going forward so that we can better profile what that demand should look like.
Abigail Seager: On the pack sizes, the priority in August and September was to make sure there was some stock coming back in. We acknowledge that that means you do not get all the pack sizes that may be useful. What we were able to do in a pragmatic way to mitigate that was advise vets that they could administer the vaccines to animals belonging to different owners once they had broached a single bottle and, if necessary in exceptional circumstances, the vet could decant some of that product into a smaller vessel for a specific use.
That is the pragmatic way we deal with a shortage of a particular pack size. Pack size shortages are quite common. Again, it is led by the demand to the manufacturing sector about what they think they should be supplying. There is clearly a lesson there about understanding how we better communicate what we expect to be needed.
Abigail Seager: Indeed. Yes, absolutely.
Abigail Seager: The vaccine itself has a duration of immunity of 12 months—
Professor Horton: No, no.
Abigail Seager: Vaccination schedules and vaccination policy are DEFRA aspects rather than vaccine, which is with the VMD. I think we need to understand if additional information is required to help communicate the message. It was really helpful to hear from the first panel what has landed well as a message and what more is needed to communicate the risks or even communicate vaccination requirements.
Abigail Seager: The products that we currently have available are under the provisional marketing authorisation route, which means that there are elements that the manufacturers still need to generate the data for to make them full marketing authorisations, at which point all the data that you would normally expect to see on a product would be listed.
Abigail Seager: Indeed, but we need to make sure that the information we publish is known scientific fact. Of course, exactly as you have said, we will not wait. That is the idea of having the provisional marketing authorisation where we know there is a need for the product and we can be assured of the safety, and yet there will be further developments in the data package that are required to make it a full marketing authorisation. We will not wait for that when we have such a situation that we need to address.
Abigail Seager: I think what we have is a system that is led by the manufacturers for what they want to market and what they will bring to us to license. It has been really helpful in the work that we have been doing with the vaccine strategy to understand from those sectors what their needs are and to open the communication channels between the species sectors and the manufacturers so that the requirements are better understood. That would then ensure the sales that the manufacturers need.
Richard Lewis: Chronologically it is probably best starting with Dan, and then perhaps I can come on the delays at APHA.
Chair: Hospital pass!
Professor Horton: Thank you very much, Rich. To reiterate the scale, the first case was 10 July, and then the submissions to our laboratory were in the region of 100 a week for the next two weeks. In the last week in July they went up fourfold, so we were getting 150 a day. That is when we instigated the whole-institute responses I told you about, with five times the number of staff working overtime and weekends and so on—thank you very much to them.
We would normally endeavour to do tests—certainly the first one—in 24 to 48 hours. Our standard test turnaround time is five days, and right at the beginning of August it became apparent that that was going to be a struggle. I will give the full reasons why in a minute. We told DEFRA, the main customer, that we were more likely to meet a 10 to 12-day turnaround time on those, and the overwhelming majority were within that period in the laboratory. By the end of August we had cleared our backlog and the bottlenecks went elsewhere, which we can maybe explore in a minute.
Let me turn to the reasons for the bottlenecks—this is the important bit, I guess, and why we need to think about lessons learned. One of them is that, as we have heard, private vets were able to sample for bluetongue. This was implemented at the end of last year, for good reasons, but it meant that rather than having one submission with lots of samples, we had lots of individual submissions—crates fully of Jiffy bags, all with three samples in, all with individual submission forms. We estimated that 40% of those submission forms lacked information that we needed to be able to test and then report them to APHA. Again, that is nobody’s fault. I have been there filling out long forms in the dark, in the rain—well, there wasn’t much rain, but in the dark—and it is not easy. That is one of the reasons. It was just a simple process that we have not had before of huge numbers of samples coming through the door.
Professor Horton: Possibly an unintended consequence of what I think was a good decision in the autumn.
The other thing we did was to prioritise submissions from pre-movement testing. These are the ones where information can be very useful for disease control. We obviously cannot do anything about the midges moving locally—they can travel up to 3 km and much further in blown wind—but we can help stop people moving infecting animals across borders. We would prioritise those submissions and aim to do those with three days, but prioritising them meant adding to the bottleneck.
The last thing is just the ramp-up time. We did not actually exceed our stated testing capacity. At full ramp-up we can do 10,000 individual PCR tests a week. We did not actually get to that because of the bottlenecks at the beginning with all the submissions coming in. Then we reported them on to APHA—
Richard Lewis: That is across to us in our VENDU team.
Chair: Sorry, give me that again.
Richard Lewis: VENDU—the Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Diseases Unit. It is a small group of five or so highly trained vets. We flex resource in and out of that team. The bottleneck that we have is part of the transformation that we have already started to put in place, and that is a vet—a highly skilled individual—receiving a positive result, a report from a farm, into the team, and thereafter spending all their time, or nearly all their time, on administrative tasks, checking various databases and spreadsheets to make sure the information they received is correct. The certificate they provide to confirm disease is one of the most important tasks they will undertake, so the information contained therein is very important.
The fact that they have to check across several databases slows them down significantly, so the bottleneck that we had was not enough capacity of veterinary surgeons within that team to confirm disease. It is usually the case that the CVO will confirm disease, of course, but on a scale like this it is unrealistic, so the CVO—for DEFRA, at least; the scale perhaps is slightly different in the other countries—will delegate the responsibility to vets in the VENDU team. The bottlenecks that we have there are the number of cases that are coming in in a very short period versus the number of experts we have in that team.
As I say, the transformation work that we have under way is on digitising end-to-end disease management. It is a paper-based system. If I can give you a small example, when an exotic notifiable disease case comes in, a vet in the field will fill out, on paper, a 40-page form. All the information is relevant, and there are lots of free text boxes. They will then return to the hotel room that they are staying in—or home, if they are lucky—type up that form and then submit it to the VENDU team, who do a whole host of other work. If you multiply 40 pages by thousands of cases, you are into tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of pieces of paper that our vets have to manage. Digitising that has been a priority for some time. I am delighted to say that later this month we will test an online digital system for the AI season, which means that the problem on this particular issue will largely go away in future, but over the course of the summer this was an issue for us.
Richard Lewis: Absolutely, yes, that will be automated. That automation starts later this month with support from a digital fund that DEFRA has provided for us. Digitisation has been the priority for us. That was one of the issues we faced in bottlenecking in the summer.
Chair: Another step in the onward march of artificial intelligence.
Richard Lewis: Absolutely, yes.
Richard Lewis: That is a policy question. It would facilitate our work significantly if it were reclassified, of course, so it would assist. I appreciate that there will be policy considerations beyond my control.
Chair: Dan, you are doing the sharp-end work here.
Professor Horton: As Rich says, it is named on the Specified Animal Pathogens Order under the Animal Health Act, for reasons of the nature of the virus and the threat that it may pose. Whether it is on that would be a policy and then a legal change, so I won’t cover that specifically.
On the impact that has on our ability to use other labs, that is a very important thing that I would like to discuss and present some evidence to you on. Biosafety is one aspect of it. Any laboratory that wanted to test would need to do so inside a facility that was licensed by the Health and Safety Executive to do that, and then there are various transport regulations that HSE also regulates.
However, there are other aspects. There is security. Bluetongue is on schedule 5 to the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which means that there are additional appropriate security measures—I believe that is the term—that need to be implemented, which are at the discretion of a local counter-terrorism security adviser. Possibly one of the most intensive is the quality assurance process. There are good reasons that those are in place, because when it is a first case of rabies or foot and mouth, or when we have to tell the chief veterinary officer that there is a case, we have to be very sure that we are right. The consequence of that is a very thorough quality assurance process. We are accredited to international standards by the UK Accreditation Service. So any laboratory that wants to take this on would need to do the biosafety, the security and quality assurance, and then there is the logistics and data management.
Richard has alluded to this, but at the moment it is very important that Pirbright becomes part of the Bridge to Better programme. We are working very closely with them on that, because our computer systems need to talk to APHA’s. It is difficult enough when you have publicly funded institutions that are trying to talk to each other, but it is even more so when you are dealing with private laboratories that have different computer systems. I am not complaining; this is just the way it is.
We have been discussing this. There is a group called the Disease Emergency Response Committee. It is APHA-chaired, but involves DEFRA and others from the devolveds. Can we try to facilitate other labs becoming official laboratories? They would need to be designated still. There are two that are for bluetongue. I will get to the answer to your question. It is not my news to share which two they are, but we should be finding out. They may well be happy to share that and we can follow up in writing, if that is okay, but it would help with regionalisation. We are working very closely with them, and have been for some time, to help bring them up to the standard. As a national ref lab, we still have a mandate to oversee that, so it is not resource negative for Government, because we basically have to help them and oversee them.
The final thing, just anecdotally, is that we have had other laboratories contact us expressing an interest. We have directed them to the appropriate place to put that expression of interest forward, but they have decided not to follow up on that, because it is not financially viable to do it.
Richard Lewis: In addition to that, I think the symbiotic nature of the relationship between our labs is important. We are not the reference lab for bluetongue, as you have heard today, but we stood up our own capability to ensure that we were able to help Pirbright. I know it would do the same for us in reverse, should it ever occur.
Anecdotally, on the regional labs, when we are having conversations during the peak of an outbreak and we ask them how many people they might be able to dedicate to this work, the answer sometimes is two or three people. Not all of them are on bluetongue. We have 1,000 scientists working at APHA, and a significant number at Pirbright, so we do scale particularly well. I think the time for the conversation with smaller labs that may wish to add to the national effort is now, after the outbreak, when we can spend more time devoted to that, because an amalgamation of many small labs will make a material difference.
Richard Lewis: That is a matter for policy. I am not sure whether they are doing that or not.
Chair: Policy would presumably ask you.
Richard Lewis: I would welcome a reclassification, but I accept that there will be policy implications that perhaps I don’t understand.
Richard Lewis: Yes.
Richard Lewis: I can’t shed any light on why that would have been the case. Was the question specifically on the amount of money it spends on testing?
We have been warned that a greater reliance on clinical confirmation in areas without a high bluetongue virus prevalence carries risk. Dan, Richard, Abi even, how do you characterise these risks and how significant are they?
Richard Lewis: There is certainly risk there in clinical confirmation. It may be that you are confirming something that it isn’t, of course, or a different serotype from the one that you think that it is, missing mild cases, which may be atypical in nature. There are clear risks that we are aware of with clinical confirmation as opposed to lab testing but, as I mentioned earlier, overwhelming a lab with so many samples also carries its risks. There needs to be a balance between understanding the nature of an outbreak in a localised area and what additional sampling provides in information that you may need. That balance is one that is managed live regularly.
There are a number of things you can do to mitigate that risk. You can undertake targeted testing. You can report any doubts at all, and we saw that in the course of the summer—I hope I have reassured the Committee that we did our own stress-testing of the system to make sure that that was the case. You can perhaps have triggers for retesting, if that is an issue as well. I am not sure if Dan has anything to add, but it does free up your resource to report on clinical signs when there is so much disease in one area that it is not telling you a great deal more about the spread.
Professor Horton: Only that no vet wants to be the one that misses foot and mouth. We heard a bit about risk aversion and risk appetite—the two different things that play into that—in decisions about vaccination. On the face of it, certainly, the decision to move to clinical diagnosis for bluetongue has been a good thing; it was welcomed by the Pirbright Institute. In the simple situation where you have a farm next to a farm that already has bluetongue confirmed and you have bluetongue signs and no signs of any other notifiable disease, you can see it will be a clear decision. I am reassured, from our reference laboratory perspective and from what I know of the process of that clinical diagnosis and how everything was painstakingly developed, that we have mitigated as much as we can the risks of missing other things.
Chair: Thank you for that. We will move on to some questions on the lessons that we can learn and our resilience to animal diseases.
Professor Horton: It is theoretically possible in that we have a vaccine. Vector-borne diseases such as bluetongue are notoriously difficult to control, but we do have a vaccine for this. It is a vector-borne disease and there is a so-called vector low period, which usually starts in late December, when in theory we do not have circulation and we should be able to get ahead of it. We have proof of principle with BTV-8, the 2007 outbreak that we were able to control. There is good evidence from near neighbours in Europe, where comprehensive vaccination campaigns have at least significantly reduced the impact of it.
Practically it will be quite a challenge, for all the reasons I think we have touched on today, but the decision on whether it becomes endemic or not is, as we have heard, a policy decision. It is not over for us already—put it that way. Our submissions are still twice what they would be. We are dealing with germplasm for breeding testing and we are preparing for winter surveillance, so we are not resting on our laurels at all.
Richard Lewis: We have seen in Europe, as Dan mentioned, that a comprehensive vaccine programme does manage the disease. There is a difference, of course, between the detection of the disease in this country and the fact that the disease may be just circulating without our knowledge. We only know what we know, and we encourage farmers, therefore, to keep reporting. It is notifiable and it provides us with the information that we need to manage future years as well.
Abigail Seager: Very well said by both my co-witnesses.
Richard Lewis: I will start by acknowledging that a whole-industry response is required and we play a very important part in it. Vaccination, as we have heard already, is the route out of the number of cases that we have seen this year.
On lessons by next year, we would make an error at APHA if we focused on simply preparing for another serotype or the same serotype. I think the lesson that we need to learn more than anything is the ability to respond at scale and quickly. That is disease agnostic; it can be anything. It means surging large numbers of people at short notice to respond to a thing, whatever that thing may be. That is the major lesson for us: the flex of resources as quickly as possible to deal with whatever the threat is. There are other lessons in terms of communication that were mentioned earlier, but that is the key takeaway for me.
As I mentioned, on 17 November APHA is holding its internal lessons-learned. We will then have one with the three Governments of GB, and then towards the end of that day, industry, the NFU, the Tenant Farmers Association and others will be with us to provide a response from the frontline on what they think we should do.
Richard Lewis: Absolutely. DEFRA has also held two internal reviews already. If it has done anything, it has reinforced the need to invest in Bridge to Better, which is our transformation programme. Nobody would have wished to go through what we did this summer, but if it has done anything for us, it has further strengthened the case for transformation of the agency. That means digitisation, a permanent outbreak team and a whole host of other things that we are planning, but making sure that we are structured for the threats of today as opposed to the threats of yesterday.
Richard Lewis: It will depend on what happens next summer. That doesn’t answer your question. Generically, I think what I would do is work with policy colleagues to make sure the decision to move from testing to clinical signs happens at an appropriate time. That may be earlier in the season than it happened this year, but it will be dependent on what we face next year, of course. That would mean that our vets are freed up to undertake other important work—and of course respond to bluetongue as well—and that Pirbright may not be receiving the number of samples that it did this summer and therefore both our agencies provide responses more quickly.
I will limit myself to that, because we are not sure what we will face next year. We have epidemiologists working on this already, of course, but we could not have predicted this year. The vector did not change, the animal did not change, but what did change was the climate around. Whether heat stress and other things significantly impacted animals’ ability to deal with these symptoms is not known. That is something that we will keep under review.
Professor Horton: We are now feeding into the lessons-learned process. To reassure you, we already have things like the high number of submissions in hand, so that would not happen again in the same way.
The other thing to flag—I am sorry, I did not emphasise it enough earlier—is that the APHA Weybridge laboratory is an official laboratory for bluetongue, so although it is a Government agency, it is already an example of using another laboratory. It worked very well this year, and I think we would do that more, and more quickly—with the consent of APHA, of course. APHA staff also came to work at Pirbright, particularly to deal with the bottleneck at the beginning, because they are very experienced at dealing with the submissions. That worked very well, so I think we would do more of that.
The other general point I would like to make is that the only thing I can just about guarantee is that the challenge of the next outbreak, whether it is bluetongue or something else, will be different. That is the thing. With these diseases—avian influenza, zoonotic, wild birds, bluetongue, midges, ruminants—at the level we are at, they are almost as different as they could be in the ways that we need to approach them.
There is no one solution to that, but there are two things that help. One of them is having a cadre of scientists and people interested in this, so investment broadly in UK science. We are 1% of the world’s population but still publish 12% of the most highly cited papers. This is the reason why we are an international reference laboratory for many diseases, so investing in that is key. The other is the international focus. These are global problems. The foot and mouth situations that we referenced earlier, and the strains that are emerging, are unprecedented. Strengthening veterinary services is a joint effort globally, so we work internationally, and that is a fundamental prerequisite for our ability to do our job as a national lab.
Richard Lewis: We are dealing with that currently. Over the course of the summer, of course we had bluetongue, we had yellow-legged hornets, we had plant diseases; across a whole host of areas we are dealing with multiple threats. Shamonda virus, which you mentioned earlier, first appeared in Africa in the 1960s. We are seeing diseases and viruses moving their way slowly north towards the UK, so the Bridge to Better plan, which I have mentioned several times, is partly designed to ensure that we are able to deal with multiple outbreaks at once. Foot and mouth on the scale of 2001 would provide a challenge to any Government, of course, and we hope never to return to a crisis such as that, but preparing for it will be vital.
Richard Lewis: I will talk about the impact on colleagues in APHA, but I want to preface my comments by recognising the impact this has had on our farming communities. I know Dan made those comments earlier too. I was on a farm in Devon earlier this summer and the farmer told me he dreaded getting on his quad bike in the morning because of what he would find in the fields. The main impact of this is on our farming communities—I want to make that clear.
However, we have seen from the internal questionnaires that we do that the impact on our colleagues at APHA of dealing with multiple outbreaks all at once is profound. We are asking them to undertake two jobs: the job that they are paid to do and then outbreak as well. There are many hundreds of people dealing with outbreak at any one point.
We have put together the Bridge to Better programme. When I was appointed in June 2025, I undertook 100 days of listening before taking any strategic decisions about the future of APHA. The one issue that people kept coming back to was this outbreak versus business as usual issue. The Bridge to Better programme has been set up to resolve that very issue and work is well under way.
On what we need over the months to come, I already have a cast-iron commitment from policy colleagues at DEFRA that they are supporting the transformation that we have. There is pressure across Government when it comes to money, of course. The transformation programme will derive efficiencies, but the point is to make sure that we provide a better service to our farming communities and that we ensure the resilience of our colleagues as well. Over the months to come, it is the continued support that I have had from DEFRA towards the programme; the digitalisation for AI season, which has already started, but we are getting there for November for the digital solution; and the continued support to make sure that we move beyond what some would consider a minimal viable product to something that is truly transformational of the agency.
The focus over the course of the winter will be that, putting technology in the hands of our vets in the fields and, beyond that, setting up permanent capabilities. The VENDU team that I mentioned, for example, on paper are nine-to-five Monday to Friday. They work seven days a week on rotas. We need to recognise, as an agency, that we should structure ourselves for a seven-day-a-week approach—not having people doing so at weekends on call or through overtime, but making sure that we are structured in that way so that we can deal seven days a week with the problems that we face.
You have touched on issues around workforce and staff wellbeing. We know that in some key roles you have vacancy rates sitting somewhere around 20%. It is clearly an issue not purely of resource, but of being able to recruit the right people. We have heard that across the board—look at vets, for example—there is a shortage in pretty much every sector, and attracting them into Government is difficult. We spoke to your predecessor about that when we visited last year and we heard some of the plans that were in place to try to begin to address that. What progress have you made and what challenges still remain?
Richard Lewis: Significant progress. You are correct: we had vacancy rates for vets that were running at 20%. We have recently won a Civil Service Commissioners’ award for the work that we have done to attract vets at APHA. The vacancy rate is now down to a manageable 6%. It will never be at zero because people transition in and out of organisations, of course, but I must commend the work of colleagues at APHA and DEFRA that have brought that figure down to something that means that the vacancies across the country—in all three nations of GB that we administer and serve—are much lower than they were. There remains an issue of vets being employed in more rural and remote areas of the country, but the plans that we have in place have drastically dropped that number, I am pleased to say.
Abigail Seager: I think that is a question for Richard, actually.
Richard Lewis: The vaccine trial is commercially sensitive at the moment, but the challenge phase is now completed at APHA, so the vaccine has been provided to animals at APHA over the course of the summer. Those results are currently being analysed. I do not have the results at this stage. As I say, they are still commercially sensitive because of the role of pharmaceutical companies in that work. So far, the results seem promising, but as soon as I have more information that I am able to share publicly I will be more than happy to write to the Committee with those findings.
Richard Lewis: Epidemiologists at APHA are working on this as we speak to make sure that we have a good understanding of the scale of what happened. We have had two detections, as you have mentioned, in mainland GB already. We are offering free sampling to make sure that we get a better understanding of the scale of the problem that we face. It is far too early to say at the moment. I did meet with my counterpart at UKHSA yesterday. The risk to humans is very low, but of course this is an emerging picture and it is something that we will see over the months to come, I am sure.
Abigail Seager: There isn’t a vaccine or antivirals for Shamonda. However, if manufacturers take up that challenge, we have learned through the work we have been doing on bluetongue over the years how we can rapidly assess and bring an emergency product to the market, and then a provisional product, the end point being a full marketing authorisation over the course of time. That has been well tested now through the bluetongue response.
Abigail Seager: I am not able to say, I am afraid, but when we are facing into something that is deemed to be so serious that we need to have an emergency response to it, the need to produce something rapidly is well understood. However, of course, the creation and manufacture of a vaccine is very complicated and will take time. That is the understanding we have to have with any disease responses: vaccination is the route out, but it takes time to get there.
Richard Lewis: We plan for any emerging risks that may be approaching GB. As I mentioned earlier, the number of risks we face has moved steadily north over the years, not just at our borders now but actively in the country. The surveillance we do with international colleagues to understand the threats they are facing ensures that we are better prepared for the threats that we will face in the future. Specifically on mosquitos, I am very aware that I have a vet and a scientist sat to my left who will provide a more cogent response than I could. I can respond in writing on any work that we are doing at APHA specifically on mosquito-borne viruses, but I wonder if Dan has something to add.
Professor Horton: I concur with what Richard said about our preparedness. It is surprisingly difficult, as you are probably aware, to prove the links between weather and climate and emerging diseases. It is suspected, but there are always confounding factors. The exception, of course, is vector-borne diseases, where viruses have to, as part of their lifecycle, get into an insect. It is not only the fact that climate change or climate effects can allow mosquitos and other insects to get to new areas that they were not in before, as you alluded to, but we have very good evidence from laboratory studies on the impact of temperature changes. Even for bluetongue, we had midges already that could transmit it, but a small change in temperature can have a massive impact on how quickly the virus can replicate in the midges. Twenty days would have been average for bluetongue, and it has shortened to three days.
We are alert for new diseases, such as West Nile virus, which is a threat—we have laboratory contingency plans that are maintained and tested for diseases like that—but also for the increased impact of diseases that we know about already. Bluetongue this summer is a good example of that: the weather conditions conspired, with mild overwintering, which climate can have an effect on, and then extreme heat. Yes, we are alert—that is the short answer.
Helena Dollimore: You are across it. Good.
Chair: That is a good note to end on. Thank you for your attendance here. We are very much approaching this, I hope, from the point of view of how we can learn lessons and do things better in the future, and in that respect the evidence that you have given us today is enormously helpful. We could probably carry on down different rabbit holes all day, but we have limited time—in fact, we have overrun it—and for now we conclude our proceedings.