Constitution Committee
Corrected oral evidence: The UK’s constitutional safeguards
Wednesday 4 November 2026
11.30 am
Members present: Lord Strathclyde (The Chair); Lord Bellamy; Lord Bichard; Lord Burnett of Maldon; Lord Cryer; Lord Griffiths of Burry Port; Baroness Hamwee; Lord Jones of Penybont; Baroness Laing of Elderslie; Lord Murphy of Torfaen; Lord Waldegrave of North Hill.
Evidence Session No. 9 Heard in Public Questions 88 - 98
Witness
Daniel Greenberg CB, Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Daniel Greenberg.
Before we begin, I should state that, under the principle of exclusive cognisance, the House of Lords avoids commenting on the internal affairs of the House of Commons. We will therefore not discuss individual cases in relation to Mr Greenberg’s role as Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards or Commons rules and processes more generally. Instead, our questions will focus on the rules of ethics, codes of conduct and leadership by parliamentarians generally. I remind Members to declare an interest relevant to this inquiry or today’s meeting the first time they speak, and I have no relevant interests of my own to declare.
Mr Greenberg, thank you very much for coming along. I think you have the gist of what we are looking for. Is the maintenance of high ethical standards among those in public life important for protecting our constitutional democracy? In other words, is that a key pillar that supports the constitutional democracy that we have built up and created over many years?
Daniel Greenberg: Chair, thank you for having me. I looked at the terms of reference of your inquiry and started thinking slightly backwards from the top by asking myself what we are safeguarding against. If we are safeguarding the constitution, what are we making it safe against? It seemed to me that there are two kinds of threats to the constitution; you have already looked quite extensively at one of them and I think you are inviting me to help you look at another one.
I should say that, broadly, there are two kinds. There are what you might call physical or confrontational threats—attacks on the constitution that are set out in that form. Those could subdivide; they could be external or internal. You could have external threats, such as a war or attack, or internal, in the form of disobedience, rioting or whatever you like. That is one sort of threat.
Then, for present purposes, there are what we might call systemic and incremental threats, with the constitution just eroding—just fundamental principles of the constitution degrading, so that at some point, do we cease to be a liberal democracy? Do we suddenly turn around and look at ourselves and say, “We are not quite sure how it happened or who attacked us, but many of the core principles of the constitution that we would have identified appear no longer to be safe or present”.
I wanted to focus on how you might identify the concept of safeguards against that systemic, incremental challenge. To do that, I went another step and asked myself, “What is the core feature of the constitution? What are we?” In our unwritten constitution, we are a liberal democracy that governs by consent. That word “consent”, which we hear all around us in Parliament, is, if not the, definitely a fundamental principle of our constitution. We govern by consent. We are not a dictatorship or an authoritarian regime. We are a liberal democracy that depends on consent of the people.
Then I go one stage further that finally brings me to answering your question, Chair, because I say, “What does consent rest on?” The answer to that is trust. I consent to be governed by the institutions, even when things go not the way I would have liked, but because I have trust in the overall system. I voted this way in this election and it did not get the result I wanted, but I still carry on, pay my taxes happily and participate in the in the system happily because I trust the system. Maybe it will go a different way another time.
I am slightly trespassing on stuff that is not for me but, when I am doing outreach, I often talk to students and others about what Parliament is for. We get on to the idea that Parliament is a place to talk. I say, ”No. There’s no shortage of other places where people can talk”. Indeed, that is one of the problems today; everybody’s shouting at each other on social media all the time. Parliament is a place where we listen and, fundamentally, so much of our procedures in this place are to ensure that the voices of minorities—the people who lost the election, so to speak—are protected and heard. That is incredibly fundamental to trust.
But, coming back to my preserve as one of the safeguards, people will trust you as a political class if they see that you are holding yourselves to standards that encourage trust.
The Chair: You say that the core of trust is consent. Consent relies on trust in the institutions, but the institutions themselves are made up of people.
Daniel Greenberg: Exactly so, Chair.
The Chair: That is where you essentially come in as a safeguarder of those standards and ethics of the people that make up the institution of Parliament.
Daniel Greenberg: Yes, absolutely. The points at which I and the safeguards that are related to standards become important are the points at which there is a risk to trust. If I am talking to groups outside the United Kingdom, they often start by referring to scandals that we have had. As you reminded us, Chair, we are not going to discuss any cases, but I always say, “In principle, scandals are great. I am not bothered about scandals; it is how you react to scandals”. Certainly, in this place, my role, my job, is the phoenix that rose from the ashes of a particular parliamentary scandal. We learned from it.
We have other aspects. IPSA is a reaction. So many parts of our standards system are reactions to things that went wrong. That is valuable, because one of the things that I bring as an independent operational part of the system is that I allow you, as a group, to suffer a setback and then say to me, “Right, how are we going to restore trust or maintain it?”
Look at some of the things that could be thought to have damaged trust in constitutional institutions, generally—the Horizon scandal, for example. In my view, the Horizon scandal has done enormous damage to the rule of law. If we look at Covid, I was then advising the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, and we produced a special report back in 2021 about rule of law themes from the Covid regulations. There have been some things that have damaged trust but, by looking to the standards regime and being able to say to the public, ”Okay, things do go wrong, but this is what we do about it. This is how we are helping parliamentarians to hold themselves to account to high standards”, I can help you to maintain and restore the kind of trust that is essential to consent. Does that make sense?
The Chair: That makes a lot of sense. What I find interesting about this whole debate is the following. How long have we had a parliamentary commissioner for—something like 30 years? What has changed over the years that meant that suddenly Parliament needed a parliamentary commissioner like you to keep the standards and ethics in place? Is it societal change? Is it expectations by the public? I like the way in which you have said that scandals, in a way, are strengthening and affirming. But is it that we did not have scandals before or that we did but just kept them quiet? What has changed, if anything?
Daniel Greenberg: Societal expectations, to which you refer, Chair, are a big part of this. That is a positive thing. There is a report that I know the committee will be very familiar with by the Constitution Unit in UCL. It was a report on public attitudes and responses as part of its “Democracy in the UK after Brexit” project. In its report from November 2023—the committee will have seen this—page 6 has a fantastic list of phrases that the public have said about what they expect and what they feel about what they are given.
I do not offer this as empirical evidence because I do not think anybody did this study, but I think it is very different from what you would have had 30 or 40 years before. This is something I may want to come back to, depending on what the committee asks me later, but I think people’s expectations are partly driven by the regulatory field generally, which is expanding.
Think how many regulators there were in professions, in trades, with the kind of micro-brief that regulators have today. When the public look at Parliament and at politicians, they see that you are a profession. You are not necessarily all a paid profession, but you are professing to be experts in public policy, and I think the public expect different things of professions and standards of professions today than they might once have done.
Daniel Greenberg: If I may say so, I think the distinction that you draw at the end between encouraging and enforcing is key here. I very much take your injunction, Chair, that we must look at Parliament as a whole, but perhaps I can speak from my personal experience. When I arrived to start my role as Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards in the Commons, I saw the job as not about enforcement primarily but about supporting good conduct, supporting the best.
I started to publish advice notes. I use the word “publish” there because I was not just giving advice notes to Members of Parliament; I was publishing them to the world. You have got this openness and accountability constantly, so that the standards you set for yourselves you are sharing with the public, in an open way.
The most important thing that standards officials can do, in the same way as regulators outside this place, is to encourage, empower and support good practice. For that, I think codes of conduct are fantastic because they make clear what you demand of yourselves. They allow you to express aspirational principles, not just rules that people have got to avoid getting wrong. So when it comes to encouragement, I firmly believe that, yes, codes of conduct are very good.
I would also say, again, from a purely general perspective, that a lot of what I do as one of the standards enforcers in Parliament is not about public investigations. It is sometimes about public rectification: agreeing with somebody that something has gone wrong and that we need to work out how are we going to put it right. That gives a very powerful message about the engagement of politicians in the good—how much they want to get things right. Under our processes, I also sometimes have purely private conversations with Members of Parliament. Again, that is not enforcement; that would be wrong as enforcement needs to be open. It is empowering, assisting and supporting.
When you come to enforcement, how good is a code of conduct for enforcing? I suppose it depends there what you are trying to achieve with your enforcement. I would say this quite bluntly: if you are trying to stop a piece of behaviour by a particular person, it may work. If you are trying to address the reputational damage done by a particular piece of bad conduct, I do not think that is within the power of a code of conduct.
I have a simple question. Would you consider the parliamentary standards system, of which you are a very important part, to be a constitutional safeguard? In other words, are you a constitutional safeguard?
Daniel Greenberg: Again, I am tempted just to say yes, and perhaps with a bit more justification this time. I do not just want to repeat things that I have already said. Perhaps what I can add is this: I have mentioned our unwritten constitution. That will be very much on your minds. When you are thinking about constitutional safeguards, you will all be constantly thinking about the nature of our constitution, the fact that it is unwritten, and that that is very much part of it.
Being unwritten, I think it has an elasticity that allows—perhaps, this is slightly overdoing it—almost anybody who wants to be part of the safeguarding mechanism to be able to do that; that is, anybody who wants to come to their role and say, “Look, I am committed to parliamentary democracy. I believe in it passionately. I want to help maintain it, and maintain the core principles that underpin it”.
So I will take your question, turn it back to myself and frame it in the way that I have been talking to you about today. Do I, in my role—and do I think that all standards officials of Parliament in their roles—have opportunities for improving trust? I think we do.
Let me give an example that I have not mentioned. I have talked about my outreach work. Why do I do outreach work? What has that got to do with standards? Here is one of the things it has to do with standards, very powerfully. If any of you walk into a university and you say to the students, “The vast majority of Members of the House of Commons and Members of the House of Lords are deeply committed to standards and ethics, and we are all great”, you are likely to be treated with an element of scepticism. When I walk in and say that, which I do, I am treated seriously. That is because I am independent; I am operationally independent. Nobody is paying me to go and say that. When I want to offer constructive criticism of the institution, I do so, and people will see that as well.
I can very powerfully support trust by ensuring that the picture that members of the public see is not only the very destructive elements that you have talked about—the openly destructive, aggressive social media content—but nor is it simply you being left to yourselves, if I can put it like that, to protect yourselves.
I can be a voice that says that, actually, we are doing pretty well in some very key ways—in some of the ways that were mentioned in the last question. We are supporting people, committing to repairing breaches, ensuring that their behaviour going forward meets the highest standards.
This is where I believe I am supporting trust, and that, fundamentally, is a constitutional safeguard, for the reasons I gave at the beginning. Is that fair?
Lord Murphy of Torfaen: Extremely fair.
Daniel Greenberg: I think, Chair, that this was one of the things that Lord Bichard was referring to when he drew a distinction between encouragement and enforcement. The code of conduct in our House contains, effectively, two parts. There are rules and the rules are hard and fast. They have to be. If a Member of Parliament receives a gift, she or he has to know that either it is registrable or it is not registrable; there has to be clarity and certainty. So we do have to have rules about the kind of thing that lends itself to rules. But the code is predicated expressly on the Nolan principles which, if I just perhaps remind us, are constitutional safeguards. I constantly say to visitors from other jurisdictions that openness is no more important than any other Nolan principle but if you have not got it, you cannot begin with the rest. We have mentioned scandals and I often say to university students and others that one of the reasons why scandals are great is that you know about them and we are not covering stuff up. If you know that something has been aired and become public, you know you are in an institution that holds itself to account.
Then we have honesty and integrity, which are broad concepts, but again, they are very much “know it when you see it” concepts, in terms of your question. Can you write down a rule for what integrity means? How do you get 25% on integrity? You cannot do that. But do you know what it looks like? You do. Do you know failures of integrity when you see them? You do.
Then you have selflessness, objectivity and, finally, leadership. Those are not binary. They are not benchmarked against percentages, but they permeate our code expressly and when I am investigating a breach, I am told by the code to bear those in mind. As I say, everything else I do with Members always comes back to a Nolan principle, because then I can say, “I am not inventing this. This is not some figment of my imagination. Let’s sit down together and test it. Do we think this is honest? Do we think this shows integrity?”
Daniel Greenberg: There have to be teeth, and the code I enforce does have teeth. We do not need to look at particular cases but I can say there have been public cases, as you all know, where people have been sanctioned by my House and by your House. As a principle, I have no difficulty in agreeing with you that ultimately, when support fails and when encouragement fails, the institution has to be shown to have self-regulatory teeth.
Lord Bichard: Do you think we have enough accountability in the system?
Daniel Greenberg: I am going to duck that, if I may. I am not going to give you an opinion on that, and I will tell you why. I believe that self-regulation of Parliament, in both Houses, is a fundamental constitutional principle. Coming here today, I want to give you every support I can in helping you to decide for yourselves whether the balance is right or whether there needs to be more accountability. I do not want to tell you the answer, partly because I do not know it, but, more importantly, because it is not for me to give you that answer.
I would just say one thing, though. Lord Bichard used the phrase “not even statutory”. I would encourage pause for thought on that. Again, I am not going to tell you whether we should have more statutory interference in parliamentary process or less; that is for you. But I do not accept the premise behind “not even” and that statutory is necessarily more effective or more draconian. The principle of self-regulation is so endemic to the way our Parliament works constitutionally that there should not be an assumption that statutory would definitely be better in all respects.
Lord Bichard: It does not give it more authority?
Daniel Greenberg: It gives it different authority. Sorry, I do not want to take us down lines you do not want to go down, Chair. Let me put it like this: it could be seen to elevate the authority of the code. It could also be seen to delegate the authority of the code. It could be seen as Parliament not being capable. I am not saying that is necessarily how you take it, but you have to look at it in the round. I think there are different ways of seeing it.
Daniel Greenberg: I will make two points, if I may. When I was appointed, someone who was interviewing me asked, “Is your Judaism going to make any difference to your role as Parliamentary Commissioner?” I said, “I hope not because I have been appointed as a commissioner for standards. I have not been appointed with any reference to my religion at all”. I hope that has been the case and I certainly think the important preface to my reply is that, as an official of Parliament, all standards officials of Parliament are here to serve Parliament in an absolutely value-neutral way.
Lord Griffiths of Burry Port: Let me just be brave enough to come back a little. I am not asking that you should apply your religion. I am thinking more that you have been very strong on the facilitating role—helping people to come out of a scandal, encouraging people and so on—which I think is absolutely fine. But you have shown, from stuff I know from when I lived not far from you, a capacity when a line was crossed to call out the danger of people doing certain things. There must be such a line here also, so the facilitating role does not cover every conceivable infraction. Is it part of your role, therefore, to help people see those instances where people may have crossed that line?
Daniel Greenberg: Yes, absolutely. I get Lord Bichard’s point about the importance of the system having teeth—my words, not yours—being robust and not just being about saying nice things. If I may, let me take your question and slightly turn it round. I think the principles that I apply to more general concerns that I might become involved in are the Nolan principles. In fact, I gave a talk a few weeks ago, which I hope to publish in this year’s annual report, called “Between love and law”. It took Lord Atkin’s comment in Donoghue v Stevenson—the snail in the ginger beer bottle case. He said in 1932 that the Bible says love your neighbour, and in law that becomes do not injure your neighbour. The question I asked myself, which I hope is helpful as part of the answer to your question, Lord Griffiths, is whether there was a tessellation between biblical morality and law in 1932 that does not exist today. I think the answer is that there absolutely was.
Somebody used the word “secular” already; I do not know whether it was you. There is a huge part of the United Kingdom population that does not necessarily adhere to any purely religious morality. When the law tries to bash people around the head and tell them to be moral, it generally does not do very well. But there is a rising set of ethical standards, which I think the Nolan principles match very well, in honesty, integrity, openness and accountability. These are serviceable ethical principles that are capable of going beyond this place.
Lord Griffiths of Burry Port: Lord Atkin quoted the good Samaritan. He said that it was a duty of care. He left theology to theologians, but he wanted to underpin the common law, did he not, with this concept of duty of care?
Daniel Greenberg: I do not think that does him justice, if I may say so. I think his point was that you do not need to have a religiously—
Lord Griffiths of Burry Port: I agree with that. He left theology to the theologians, definitely.
Daniel Greenberg: Exactly. The point I am making is that the ethics that underpin the standards of this place—the Nolan principles—are very serviceable beyond this place. It goes back to something you asked, Chair, about public expectations. Again, the public expectations that might once upon a time have been expressed in moral tones, perhaps even religiously inspired moral tones, today are expressed in more neutral, secular terms. I think the Nolan principles are very apt for expressing those aspirations of the people and for meeting those aspirations. I am not sure that I have fully answered your question, but I hope that I have helped a little.
Lord Griffiths of Burry Port: If you were to admit that you were going to call out the bad boys and girls, you would give yourself a pretty impossible job. Politics is the art of the possible. We are all doing deals, trying to network and do this, that and the other. It seems to me, from what you have said, that your job is to stand above all that and help us, when things go wrong, to see that we might be better at putting them right. But there will be the hard cases.
Daniel Greenberg: You are inviting me here to go slightly outside the standards regime, which is fine; I am happy to put my slightly broader experience at the behest of the committee. You are touching on legislation in particular. Obviously, I have spent some time on this.
Perhaps the committee will forgive me if I remind you that I came before your predecessor committee in 2018, during your inquiry into the legislative process. Following that, my next editorial for the Statute Law Review was called “The Myth of Line-by-Line Scrutiny”, inviting you to test yourselves. Sometimes, the assumption is that the Government’s majority is always matched by the role of the House of Lords, in particular in scrutinising legislation. I was encouraging you to think about cases where that has not necessarily been as full as you might have liked.
I will put it like this and then leave it to you to press me in particular directions if you want. I touched on this when I talked about how procedure ensures that minority voices are heard and are influential: I think that Parliament is able to act as a constitutional safeguard in that respect, but there are two specific examples of ways in which you might profitably consider whether you are fulfilling that ability.
I will give you one broad example about engagement. I often remind Members at the other end of the Corridor that, in the same way that the opposite of love is not hate but indifference, the opposite of trust is not suspicion but disengagement. When young people think that, if they want to change policy on the economy, ecology or foreign policy, they are better off sitting down on motorways and bringing traffic to a standstill than by coming here or going to their local councils or wherever, we have serious trouble in respect of the constitutional safeguards that we are talking about this morning.
Are there more opportunities for engagement in the legislative process that would enhance that constitutional safeguard aspect of not just this House but both Houses of Parliament, in the face of a strong majority, to ensure that we do not tip from parliamentary democracy into parliamentary dictatorship? I think there are opportunities.
I have not said anything at all provocative yet, Chair, so perhaps you will permit me to say one mildly provocative thing, which is this: I think that Parliament sometimes confuses engagement with allowing people to watch what we are doing. Watching from a gallery is not engaging with the process. In some ways, it accentuates that you are not part of the process. For example, third sector organisations that have policy issues to raise could be given more direct ways of engagement. I sense that I have achieved my aim. I just leave that thought with you as part of my answer. Is Parliament a constitutional safeguard in that respect? Yes it is. Are there ways in which you could enhance that? I think there are.
The other example I would offer in that respect is on the benchmarking or testing of legislation. We have a strong Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, on which I served as a lawyer for many years. Are there ways that you could enhance that or apply that kind of scrutiny? It is powerful scrutiny. Many members of this committee will have personal knowledge as Ministers that the reports of that committee are seriously influential. They have no power, but they have serious influence. Are there increased opportunities for that? There might be.
Lord Cryer: I shall be brief. I am interested in what you have said. When it comes to scrutiny, you could argue that the ability of the House of Commons to scrutinise any Executive has been reduced for, probably, 40 or 50 years. In particular, the Jopling report in 1994 cut down a fair bit of scrutiny, then about four or five years later, the Blair Government introduced timetabling. That might have been a sensible thing to do, but it is difficult to conclude anything other than that it reduced scrutiny. It hands more power to the Speaker, because the Speaker selects amendments. Back-Bench MPs now have very little role in selecting amendments and scrutinising Bills, particularly when you have a big majority. That role is still very much with the House of Lords but, in the House of Commons, it has been reduced.
On statutory instruments, I agree with what you are saying but, at the same time, the amount of secondary legislation passing through this place is enormously greater than it was in, say, the 1970s. I cannot remember the figures and I do not have them in front of me but, every year, for a number of years, the number of statutory instruments went up by a phenomenal amount. On both those fronts, where you have scrutiny of primary legislation reduced in the House of Commons and the explosion in secondary legislation, you could argue that the House of Commons is far less powerful than it used to be.
Daniel Greenberg: Let me just strengthen your question as follows, if I may, before I refuse to answer it. What about quasi legislation and guidance? In the JCSI special report from Covid, which I mentioned, one of the things we drew attention to, which is very much a constitutional safeguard area, is Ministers thinking, “Let us not even legislate by subordinate legislation. Let us produce guidance and say that we expect it to be followed”. In constitutional safeguard terms, that is pretty seriously dangerous.
I absolutely accept—and I think everybody would—that all sorts of developments in legislative practice have changed the nature of the challenge of effective scrutiny. As I say, one of the times I was before you, I went away and wrote about the myth of line-by-line scrutiny. But here is the reason I will not answer your question as to exactly what I think the answer is: as I have said a number of times, this is for Parliament. You have lots of opportunities for yourself to work out how you as Parliament enhance scrutiny of legislation so that you become a more effective constitutional safeguard. I cannot tell you the answer. As I said, I can work with you, and I have talked about guidance, engagement opportunities and the third sector. There are lots of practical ways in which you could enhance engagement, which would be enhancing accountability of the legislature to the public. I do not imagine you will regard it as part of the report of this inquiry to go into specifics, but I hope, Chair, that you will encourage a line of thought to develop out of this, because lack of scrutiny clearly parallels lack of trust, and everything then follows that we have already said.
Daniel Greenberg: It is interesting, because there is less interest in constitutional matters in some ways, and more interest in other ways, than there once was: there is perhaps more interest in what you might call politics and perhaps less interest in constitution. I do not think it is any more the case, but I remember when there was an annual debate in this House by Lord Renton and Lord Simon of Glaisdale about the quality of legislation.
The Chair: I remember it very well.
Daniel Greenberg: Now, obviously, it rested in large part on those two, their experience, the Renton report and all the rest of it. I had to brief Ministers for it on more than one occasion, and it was a really important constitutional safeguard event, because it was an update on how we were doing on scrutiny and quality—how was the pressure? I believe that you do not have that any more.
The Chair: No.
Daniel Greenberg: That would be an example. I will just say this—and this appears to be going off on even more of a tangent than your question is, but I think it is not. I sense an underlying change, since I started in what was then the Lord Chancellor’s Department decades ago, in the process and pace of policy-making. That is relevant to your question, Chair, because you did not need to have parliamentarians who had individual expertise. Many Ministers who were handling constitutional issues might not be themselves constitutional experts, but they were taking part in a process that inevitably involved all the experts—people with great expertise from inside and outside Parliament. I have talked about the Constitution Unit, and there are other very valuable pockets of great expertise on constitutional matters available, but I sense that the pace is such that you do not get the same challenges and care in building up the policy. It is not the lack of knowledge of particular people that is the problem but the lack of interest on part of the institution. Does that make any sense?
The Chair: Yes. Lady Laing, you have a question.
Daniel Greenberg: I cannot get my head around that.
Baroness Laing of Elderslie: I am going to be controversial here: it is well known among anyone who has ever been a Whip in the House of Commons that it is really difficult to get people to sit on those committees and stay there to do the line-by-line scrutiny of legislation. I wonder whether you have observed the following. You said there is a big difference from, say, 30 years ago. Is part of that difference the pressure on Members of Parliament to be doing other things, such as being in their constituencies in order to garner votes for the next election, rather than being in Parliament?
Daniel Greenberg: If I may, I will turn your question back on you. I think your question proves the opposite. When I had the pleasure of serving with you on Private Bill Committees, what I saw was that Members came in—I would not say “bored”—expecting not to be really needed very much. As soon as I made it clear that there was, in some cases, a constitutional implication or, sometimes, human rights implications, and that there was something under the surface that did engage, I never had any lack of response from you or the fellow Members serving. In a way, that sort of proves my point in my answer to the earlier question: Members of both Houses are very anxious to be used as constitutional safeguards, but we sometimes have to show them how they can be used. You could ask yourselves more generally, as part of this inquiry, how Parliament as a whole could be used more effectively.
Baroness Laing of Elderslie: I wonder if you have possibly identified there a practical step that could be taken. Would you consider, perhaps, that there could be professional advisers to committees for Public Bills as there are on Private Bills?
Daniel Greenberg: That is a highly stimulating suggestion that you will doubtless wish to decide about.
Then there is the subsidiary question, which I should not really ask, but I will. If you look back over history, some of our greatest leaders have not always been those who would pass every one of the Nolan tests. I am not going to mention any particular party. One could mention Churchill and Lloyd George. Churchill once said to a young rating, who wrote me a letter about this, “I’ve told many lies for my country, young man, and I will tell many more.” It is difficult to run an effective system with pious values all the time, is it not? That is a subsidiary question. The real question is: is not the real problem with trust that we are not delivering what people expect?
Daniel Greenberg: Again, without wanting to be unhelpful, the judgment on that is much more for you than it is for me. I would say only two things about it. What you say accentuates the importance of explaining what one is doing. I talked about policy-making. Part of the value in a slow and open process for making policy is that you are more likely to bring people with you, even if not all the outcomes are those that they will necessarily welcome, or they might wish you had done more on something. But if they can understand some of the competing policy issues that have contributed to the legislation or the policy, whichever it is, you are more likely to take them with you if you explain. Are you doing everything that you could to explain? I do not know, but one can always do more. It was a Modernisation Committee about 30 years ago that introduced Explanatory Notes for legislation under Christopher Jenkins, the First Parliamentary Counsel, whom many of you remember. I am not sure we have done anything since then. Things have moved on a little bit—social media and so on. Could you be thinking more about explaining? Yes, you could.
Secondly—I sense I can get away with one more provocative comment because I will shortly be out of the door and safe—could you be doing better at listening? There is an issue here. The mismatch that you describe, which I am not going to comment on because it is not for me, between expectations and delivery is partly about explanation. It could be that one of the things that has changed in my time over nearly 40 years here is the way in which Ministers and others with authority and power are spoken to regarding the opportunity to access them. How well are you as an institution really listening to people’s aspirations and expectations? I genuinely phrase that as a question because it is genuinely that.
The Chair: Lady Hamwee, has your question been answered?
Going back to vulnerabilities in the legislative process and the constitutional impact of them, you mentioned engagement. That did not disturb me at all. It had resonances with the discussion we had before you joined the meeting when we were talking about inquiries. Do you have ideas about more direct engagement that we should be thinking about, in the context of constitutional vulnerabilities and trust being part of the whole picture?
Daniel Greenberg: On the first part, absolutely, I agree. I have a school visit tomorrow, which I am looking forward to very much. Yes, I find that students at school are interested in politics and can be made to be interested in the constitution. I agree with you that they have a very sound grasp of things like accountability and integrity.
Baroness Hamwee: They bring you down to earth in asking questions like, “What is the shift system in Parliament?”
Daniel Greenberg: They certainly bring you down to earth in reminding you that these things matter to people. They very much matter to young people as well. On engagement and whether I have specific examples, I have skirted around it but, since you are demanding something practical, this is an example I throw out. There are lots of reasons against it or for it. Perhaps it is something to think about, but why could not third-sector organisations table their own amendments in either House? They could not move them because they are not there, but perhaps they could table them and feel that they had a place by being able to express their expectations directly—I go back to the previous question—and not go through a Peer or a Member. There are reasons why that might be a bad idea but there might be reasons why it is a good idea. You ask for a practical example. I have given you one.
The Chair: You can leave that with us as a useful suggestion. We have reached 12.30 pm and the end of our evidence-taking session. It just leaves me to say thank you very much indeed for taking part in today’s session. I now draw this public evidence session to a close.