Defence Committee
Oral evidence: The work of the Secretary of State for Defence, HC 73
Tuesday 13 October 2026
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 13 October 2026.
Members present: Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi (Chair); Alex Baker; Lincoln Jopp; Mike Martin; Jesse Norman; Ian Roome; Michelle Scrogham; Fred Thomas; Derek Twigg.
Questions 1-81
Witnesses
I: Rt Hon Wes Streeting MP, Secretary of State for Defence; Jeremy Pocklington CB, Permanent Secretary, MOD; and Air Marshal Tim Jones CBE, Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Force Development).
Witnesses: Wes Streeting, Jeremy Pocklington and Air Marshal Tim Jones.
Q1 Chair: I call to order today’s House of Commons Defence Committee evidence session with the new Secretary of State. It is an absolute delight to have the right hon. Wes Streeting MP, the Secretary of State for Defence, for his first outing at the Defence Committee. It is a pleasure to have back with us Jeremy Pocklington, the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Defence. I also welcome back Air Marshal Tim Jones, who is the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Force Development).
Secretary of State, thank you very much for appearing before the Defence Committee. Formally, on behalf of the Committee, congratulations on your new post—it is not quite as new now as when you took charge.
Wes Streeting: It feels like a long time ago now.
Chair: A long time ago, back in July. You have now been in post for nearly three months. What is your initial assessment of the main challenges facing UK defence?
Wes Streeting: Fundamentally, this country and our allies in NATO face a threat of a kind we have not seen since the end of the cold war. I come into a Ministry of Defence that is well positioned to meet that challenge, because of the work that John Healey did on defence reform to modernise the shape of the Ministry of Defence and because of the way the national security strategy spells out very clearly for us what the threat environment is. The strategic defence review sets out how we need to respond to it and the defence investment plan sets out how we then make that happen. I have come in and inherited a Department with the right focus, moving in the right direction.
Where is my focus? What am I most worried about? First and foremost, spelling out my priorities is simple because, fundamentally, they are to make sure that this country can deter our enemies and, should deterrence fail, be able to fight and win. That means that to meet the challenge set out for us by NATO we need to strengthen our capability; strengthen our defence industrial base, effectively making sure that we can out-produce and out-innovate our adversaries; and strengthen our alliances.
In that context, we have the right plan and the right strategy, and we’ve got very capable people. One of the great privileges of being in this post is that I get to peer behind the classification curtain and see just how extraordinary those people and much of our capability really are. It is important to say that against a backdrop in which talking our country down is something of a national pastime, and that we can be self-confident enough in what we can do but also self-aware enough to know we need to step up several gears.
That brings me to my final point, which is about how the country—the Ministry of Defence, Government, industry and the public—need to be thinking. NATO says we need to be able to fight and win a war against our adversaries by 2030. That is not because NATO wants a war—quite the opposite. We do not seek conflict with Russia. We do not seek escalation. We do not seek to provoke Russia. But we know that every single day Russia is testing us and testing our allies.
We know—I feel very strongly about this personally—that the term “hybrid threats” offers a sanitised description of what are acts of sabotage, targeted assassinations and, effectively, state-backed terrorism. That is the world in which we live today: it is extremely uncertain. If we are serious, and if we set as our organising principle warfighting readiness, that means making some whole-of-Government and whole-of-society choices to make sure that we invest in our defence sufficiently, modernise our capability and are ready to fight the next war and not the last one. It also means thinking not just about broadening and deepening our defence industrial base but about strengthening resilience across British industry, so that we are in a place where we could sustain and win a war.
Finally, on alliances, we are extremely fortunate that we sit at the centre of one of the most successful alliances in the history of the world: the NATO alliance. That is important at a time when multilateralism has somewhat gone out of fashion, but one of our challenges as a country is to make sure that the same unity of purpose that we see driven through NATO on defence is read across to other areas, like economic co-operation.
These are interesting times, and it is a great privilege to be asked to take on this job. For all the challenges, I think there has never been a better time to join Defence, in terms of the investment, opportunity, innovation and opportunities for careers in defence in the broadest sense, but there are significant challenges and we have to be honest about them.
Q2 Chair: Secretary of State, I wanted to give you a couple of minutes to set the scene and explain the importance of your role to the wider public, because you are our Defence Secretary at a critical juncture in history, so how you communicate to the wider public, particularly via the national conversation that we have talked about, will be very important. On behalf of the Committee, I also place on the record my thanks to you for the secret and classified briefings, and to the wider Ministry of Defence team for their co-operation.
You talked about modernisation; can you explain any immediate changes that you have managed to implement since taking charge at the MOD?
Wes Streeting: When you come in as someone new, you want to make your mark, and there is always the temptation to come in and upend everything, but actually, I have inherited defence reform at an advanced stage, in terms of how the Ministry of Defence is modernising.
But there are things that we need to do, and that we are doing, to cohere the four strands of the Ministry of Defence and to make sure that we have joined-up leadership at the top of the organisation. The NAD group is absolutely central to dealing with the issues that have historically plagued the Ministry of Defence and its reputation: value for money, productivity, procurement, buying the right things, and distinguishing between the exquisite capabilities that we need to design and procure and the stuff that we can get off the shelf. That is one of the most important parts of defence reform, so it is about seeing that through.
If I may say, the one thing I have personally brought and will continue to bring to the Ministry of Defence is the focus on value for money, productivity and making sure that we spend taxpayers’ money wisely. There are lots of similarities and lots of differences between being Defence Secretary and being Health Secretary, but there is one fundamental difference. When I was Health Secretary, I was constantly asked why we were “just throwing more money at the health service,” and I constantly had to prove that we were modernising, innovating, balancing the books—which we did in the NHS for the first time in a decade—and focusing on productivity, where we smashed our targets.
In defence, the entire media conversation, and a lot of the conversation we have on the Floor of the House of Commons, is—not to put too fine a point on it—about asking for more money. That is really important, and long may it continue, I might say, ahead of the Budget and the spending review—I’m never going to complain about people batting for the Ministry of Defence—but I have to bring the focus on to making sure that the money going in is well spent, because I am acutely aware of the choices and trade-offs that imposes on other Government Departments and on the taxpayer.
I am also really convinced that, when you look at the Prime Minister’s overall vision for the country and some of his key priorities around reindustrialisation and opportunities for the next generation, the Ministry of Defence, led correctly, can also be a Ministry for growth and opportunity that can serve the economic and social benefits and impacts that the country needs, so that we are not just able to fight for our county but can build a country worth fighting for.
Q3 Chair: You touched on a range of issues in relation to defence spending. You will find Defence Committee members calling for not just more defence spending but making sure we have value for money. As you rightly pointed out, we want to ensure that defence reform addresses the capability gaps. In due course, Committee members will be drilling into the various facets, but I want to come in on value for money. As you rightly said when you took office, when you were Health Secretary you embarked on a bold programme of reform and modernisation, which is why you want to tackle wasteful procurement practices. In defence, we have unfortunately had perennial procurement problems. Can you give me any specific examples of where you have cut waste or are looking to do so to ensure value for money for the British taxpayer?
Wes Streeting: Some of it is held at a higher classification. Obviously, I have been in for a few months, so the first thing I will say is that I am not going to pretend that I have completely overhauled the way the Ministry of Defence approaches these things in the first few months; I will not claim credit for other people’s work. What I definitely want to do this afternoon is a bit of naming and praising, but I also want to take some responsibility for some decisions I have made since coming in.
On naming and praising—obviously, some of this is held at a higher classification—the way in which the Defence Nuclear Enterprise has organised itself to drive real productivity gains, working with industry as a good partner, but also challenging industry to make sure it delivers on time and with good value, has shown what is possible when you have the right leadership and the right focus on those things. What we are seeing in DNE is the most important part of what we are doing, in terms of our capability and industry partnership, and I think we will see more of that come through with the NAD group as well.
In terms of decisions that I have taken, and have taken some flack for, when I came in the finances for this fiscal year were off track, and we needed to make some savings to bring them into line and balance the books. I have taken decisions to stop doing some things this year. In some cases, they have been higher profile, and we have taken some criticism. I have taken those decisions unapologetically, mindful of the impact—I am not indifferent to it, by the way—because it was important for me to signal very early on that we cannot have a culture of overspending in the Ministry of Defence.
We are receiving more money. It has gone up significantly since Labour came into office. We are delivering the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the cold war, with more to come at the Budget and in the spending review, but that is not an excuse for overspending and overcommitting. I hope that some of the decisions I have taken, although they are not entirely popular—stopping doing things is never popular—have sent the right signal throughout the organisation and the armed forces that we will get greater resource and support, but that we also have a responsibility to live within our means.
Q4 Chair: You mentioned the Defence Nuclear Enterprise; I put it on the record on the Floor of the House that the Defence Committee unfortunately does not have sight of it, which is a major gap in parliamentary scrutiny. Your predecessors were talking about establishing a Committee to look at that, with linkages to the Defence Committee, and I hope you will take some steps on that very soon.
Wes Streeting: Yes, I can absolutely give you the assurance that I have been engaging with the Prime Minister on making sure we have appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the DNE, given how important it is to the country. We can get this right. The Intelligence and Security Committee shows that there are ways of having effective democratic oversight of highly secretive and sensitive work.
Q5 Chair: Good. We look forward to that taking shape very soon, because, as you rightly said, value for money is key.
Q6 Mike Martin: Thank you all for coming. Secretary of State, what personally would you like to achieve over the next year?
Wes Streeting: To gear-shift from strategising to delivery mode. For lots of reasons we are all familiar with, because it was highly visible, the necessary work around developing both the SDR and, particularly, the defence investment plan that followed took far longer than anyone involved in that process would have liked. It has meant that for some time—although, to be fair to my predecessors, there has been lots of really positive work going on, lots more money going into defence and lots more activity as a result—it has inevitably been the case that, when you are focusing on something as fundamental as a strategic defence review and then wrangling over the defence investment plan, that has consumed a lot of oxygen and focus.
For me, shifting into the implementation of the DIP is the most important thing. I pay particular tribute to my immediate predecessor Dan Jarvis for the heavy lifting he did to get the DIP over the line. But we need to shift from saying to doing.
Q7 Mike Martin: So it is about the implementation of the DIP. Are there any metrics you would like to put on that to judge yourself by over the next year?
Wes Streeting: The DIP sets it out. We have got just shy of £300 billion over the next four years. We need to show that that money is being well spent, that programmes are running to time and that, at the same time as we are doing all of that work domestically, we are also strengthening international alliances.
A personal priority for me, as well as for the Government, is supporting Ukraine. In the short time I have been in office, I have done a lot through the Ukraine Defence Contact Group, which I co-chair with Boris Pistorius of Germany, to mobilise support for Ukraine ahead of this winter. We have another UDCG shortly, in November. It is of critical importance to this country, as well as to Ukraine and our wider allies in Europe, that we see Ukraine through what will be a very difficult winter and make sure they can build on the extraordinary progress they have made this year.
Q8 Mike Martin: As you know, the DIP is in two parts: there is the bit covered by the current spending review, and then another spending review is slated for next autumn, which will do the bit from 2030. You will also know that two thirds of the money in the DIP is in that bit beyond 2030. Can you speak a bit about your personal ambitions for that second bit of the DIP, which is currently unfunded?
Wes Streeting: This is one of the tensions, to go back to what I was just saying about strategising and planning versus delivery and doing. Obviously, it is my responsibility—
Mike Martin: It is a huge bit of strategy.
Wes Streeting: It is, yes. It is my responsibility. Without walking straight into the set of inevitable questions I am about to get around the spending review, it is my responsibility to put the best possible case forward to the Treasury for the spending review, to make sure that we make it as easy as possible for the Chancellor to say yes.
This goes back to the point I was making with you, Chair, about sending the right signals internally very early on. It would be very easy—and, indeed, extremely complacent and irresponsible—to assume that we can just send John Healey’s resignation letter into the spending review process as our submission and say, “Well, this is what you said and this is what we expect you to fund.” We know the Chancellor wants to spend more on defence. We know that is one of the big reasons why the Prime Minister appointed him. We none the less have to put forward the best possible case to justify that investment and to make sure we are well on our way on the path to 3.5%, which the Chancellor will set out.
Chair: Derek Twigg is going to come on to all these issues in terms of defence spending.
Q9 Mike Martin: Sorry to bring this up, because you are only just in post, but you mentioned resignations. If the second bit of the DIP is not fully funded as per the document in the DIP, will you be offering your resignation?
Wes Streeting: I am not sure if there is a precedent for this in British politics, but I managed to achieve front pages in my first week setting out the conditions in which I would resign from the job I had just been given. I would rather not repeat those front pages today, but suffice it to say that I stand by everything I have said previously. One of the reasons I said what I said in my first week so confidently is that I have absolutely no doubt about this Prime Minister and this Chancellor’s commitment to funding defence and to making sure we get what we need when we need it, but I also have a responsibility to make sure that I make it as easy as possible for them to say yes.
Q10 Derek Twigg: To follow on from that and clarify your position exactly, John Healey’s resignation letter said that the DIP funding settlement was insufficient. You posted: “Every word of warning here needs to be heeded.” Do you still think it is insufficient?
Wes Streeting: To be fair—this goes back to the point I made about Dan Jarvis, who did a lot of heavy lifting to get the DIP over the line and unlocked extra resource—
Derek Twigg: You can tell us it is going to take us to 2.7% by 2030. We have not committed to anything above that at the moment.
Wes Streeting: It takes us to 2.7% next year.
Q11 Derek Twigg: Where is the commitment after 2.7%?
Wes Streeting: That will be set out at the spending review.
Derek Twigg: That is what I am saying—there is no commitment currently.
Wes Streeting: But to be fair, Derek, if we go back through, Dan got the DIP over the line and got it out the door. There was a £4.7 billion gap, which needs to be plugged at this Budget for the immediate term. John—sorry, I am being far too familiar—the Chancellor has already said that he will plug that gap at the Budget and he has indicated that there will be more to come at the spending review. I understand what you are saying, which is that, so far, we can only see a line of sight to 2.7% next year, but given that it was 2.3% when Labour came to office and by next year it will be 2.7%, we can see a really clear trajectory that puts us well on the way to 3% and on the way to 3.5%.
Q12 Derek Twigg: Well, we don’t, because we have not got any commitment or confirmation yet. If you can point me to a commitment or confirmation that it will be at 3% by 2030, please share it with the Committee now.
Wes Streeting: But we would not normally, and we do not normally, set out ahead of spending reviews what the control totals will be.
Derek Twigg: That is my point. There is not any commitment as of today of getting to 3% by 2030. Unless you can share something we have not seen with us today, I fail to see where that is.
Wes Streeting: My argument would be that, from the choices that Labour has already made in Government through to how strongly the Chancellor felt about this as a matter of principle and through to the public statements of commitment that there will be more to come at the Budget and more to come at the spending review, I feel confident that we will get there, but I am not complacent and we need to put our best foot forward.
Q13 Derek Twigg: So we are relying on your confidence at the moment. You are on record that you are confident we will be at minimum 3% by 2030. Is that what you are saying?
Wes Streeting: I am looking for a mutual defence pact with this Committee. You can rely on my confidence, but I also rely on your advocacy, and I rely on colleagues across Parliament and the public. Honestly, Derek, I genuinely think that we will get to where we need to be, but we have to put our best foot forward as well. It is not reasonable to expect the Chancellor to make big spending commitments outside a fiscal event given where we have been as a country in the recent past, where the economy has tanked and the borrowing costs have gone up as a result.
Q14 Derek Twigg: We have heard similar commitments previously and we have not got there. I am pleased that you feel you are confident. Let’s hope that proves right. I am not going to ask about the spending review because you will just say, “It’s not for me, it’s for the Chancellor”, but I am going to ask this question. The Financial Times reported in August that the Chancellor would not use the October Budget to commit to the 3%, but that the decisions about the future of defence spending will be deferred until next year’s spending review. Is that your understanding?
Wes Streeting: I don’t think the Chancellor was ever going to set out 3% in the Budget; it was always the spending review.
Q15 Derek Twigg: That’s fine; it was just to be clear. Again, you will come back to me and say, “We haven’t actually set a date for the spending review,” but the report is that it was going to be in the spring, but it will now be delayed to the autumn, which is around about a year’s time. Based on our and NATO’s intelligence, there will possibly be a Russian attack on NATO or a NATO country by 2030. Do you think that year’s gap is showing sufficient speed to up defence spending to meet that threatened potential attack by Russia in 2030?
Wes Streeting: Given that we are already experiencing increased investment in defence, and we are on the upward trajectory, it does not stop us from doing anything now. This in some ways comes back to the line of questioning or the tension I identified in response to Mike, which is that we absolutely need to plan for the medium term. We have to make the case at the spending review and win the resources that we need, but we also have to crack on with delivering now. This is part of my anxiety in a way about the debate always being about what is going to happen at the spending review. We also have to focus on making sure that we spend what we already have.
Q16 Derek Twigg: John Healey said in his resignation letter: “The extra support is backloaded when the pressure of operations and imperative to speed up readiness to fight is in the first two years and it rises to just 2.68% of GDP”—it is obviously 2.7%—“in 2030.” What do you make of that comment, given what you have just said?
Wes Streeting: Extra funding was won by Dan Jarvis during the DIP process, and we will be getting—
Derek Twigg: But it is still backloaded.
Wes Streeting: We will get the £4.7 billion at the Budget. I will bring in the permanent secretary, because he was party to those discussions.
Q17 Derek Twigg: So are you saying that it is no longer backloaded? I missed that, if that is the case.
Jeremy Pocklington: The specific point about—
Derek Twigg: Is it backloaded or not?
Jeremy Pocklington: The additional resource—
Derek Twigg: Sorry, can I interrupt, because I want to get a straight answer for the Committee. Is it backloaded or not?
Jeremy Pocklington: Additional resource DEL was given to the Department between the time of John Healey’s resignation and Dan Jarvis settling the DIP.
Q18 Derek Twigg: Can you remind the Committee how much that was?
Jeremy Pocklington: That included a £500 million modernisation fund and additional changes to our spending power that gave the Ministry of Defence more RDEL than previously. I am in an unusual—the first position in time—
Chair: Before we get into RDEL and CDEL, Mr Twigg is asking a question about backloading. It would be good to get an answer to that, please.
Jeremy Pocklington: The overall departmental spending is on a rising profile, so by the end of this Parliament it will be 27% higher in real terms than at the start—
Chair: We have very limited time—we have only two hours to drill into these facts. Can we get the answer to Mr Twigg’s question?
Q19 Derek Twigg: Is it backloaded? Can you tell the Committee?
Jeremy Pocklington: I am keen to help the Committee. I can read out what our spending totals are for each year—
Q20 Derek Twigg: I am asking a specific question: is it backloaded?
Jeremy Pocklington: I am not sure I understand the definition—
Derek Twigg: Well, your previous Secretary of State said it was.
Jeremy Pocklington: What I am saying is—
Derek Twigg: It is in his letter.
Jeremy Pocklington: We received additional support between the time between the time of John Healey’s resignation and Dan Jarvis that meant that the spending power of the Department has actually increased by £15 billion. It was a lower amount at the time that John Healey resigned. We do have additional support, including, in particular, additional support for RDEL for readiness—
Q21 Derek Twigg: I will ask you one final time, Mr Pocklington. Do you agree with your previous Secretary of State that it is backloaded?
Jeremy Pocklington: I think the settlement had changed. There is not more that I can give to the Committee. The settlement had changed after John Healey resigned and Dan Jarvis—
Q22 Derek Twigg: Time is running out, so can I go to another question for the Secretary of State? Do you think that it is acceptable that we have to wait until possibly next autumn, assuming your confidence is borne out, for the decision on reaching the 3% to be taken? Is that acceptable given the urgency of the need for us to become war-ready, rearm, increase our capabilities and fund the armed forces in a better way? Given the threat, do you think it is okay to wait until next autumn?
Wes Streeting: First, it doesn’t stop us doing things now, it does not stop us doing things next year and it does not stop us planning, with some assumptions that defence spending will continue to rise. I do not think it needs to slow us down or stop us from doing anything. I do not know when the spending review is going to be.
Q23 Derek Twigg: Are you going to be spending money you have not got, then?
Wes Streeting: No, because we know what we have got for this year. We know what we will get for the next year—
Derek Twigg: You are missing the point. The spending review may be in autumn, although it could be spring; let us say that is in the autumn. You are telling us that you will not know exactly what you have got to spend up to 2030 until then.
Wes Streeting: The Budget will set out—
Q24 Derek Twigg: Is it acceptable to wait for nearly a year for that decision to be taken? It is a simple question. Yes or no?
Wes Streeting: I think we can live with that. We can absolutely live with that. We have got the resources we need for this year. The Budget will set out next year, and we can make some confident assumptions that defence spending will continue to rise, and plan on that basis, which gives me the confidence to do what we need to do to be ready.
Q25 Chair: But Secretary of State, I think what Mr Twigg is saying is that the threats are here and now. It seems palpable to many of us that we are not meeting the moment, and that is why there is a sense of exasperation. I highlighted to the previous Prime Minister the fact that it was he himself who stated that we needed to be able to deter, or a NATO nation may well be attacked by Russia by 2030, and that is not what is being done. Even the new Prime Minister has not charted out the path to reach 3% by 2030. As Mr Twigg has already stated, you cannot spend money that has not been allocated to you.
You have also stated that the funding that you are looking for will be given in due course, but it needs to be allocated now for you to make preparations. Don’t you think that there is a lack of urgency with respect to defence spending?
Wes Streeting: No, I don’t, because we have already got the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the end of the cold war—in the space of not even two-and-a-half years, from 2.3% when we came in, to 2.7% next year. We have a stated commitment from the Chancellor to give us—
Q26 Chair: It is 2.7% by the end of the Parliament. I don’t think it is 2.7% by next year.
Wes Streeting: No, in 2027-28, we will be spending 2.7%.
Chair: By the end of 2028.
Derek Twigg: That is all we are committed to—2.7%. Not 3%.
Wes Streeting: Sure, and I understand. I think where we are at odds is that there is nothing to stop us making reasonable planning assumptions on the basis that the spending review will chart a further increase in defence spending because the Chancellor has told us that is what he intends to do.
Q27 Chair: But Secretary of State, how can we can go about taking reasonable steps when the funding is not there? You also intimated that we have to wait until the spending review. The spending review has now been kicked into the long grass again, until next autumn.
Let us also remind ourselves that the previous Prime Minister, Sir Keir Starmer, came into the Chamber—you may well have been there for that statement, as was I—and overnight we went to a 0.2% increase, without the need for a CSR or a Budget. He simply came in, made a statement that we were increasing defence spending by 0.2% by taking the funding from international development. He did not wait around for a Budget or a spending review. Do you not think, given the urgency, that we can make a statement and that that is exactly what the Prime Minister and Chancellor should be doing?
Wes Streeting: But crucially, Tan, what Prime Minister Keir Starmer did when he made that choice was to set out the increase in defence funding and how it was going to be paid for simultaneously—
Chair: Without a spending review.
Wes Streeting: Outside a major fiscal event, but still explaining how it would be paid for. We have had very bitter recent experience of a former Prime Minister making unfunded commitments to spend more, tax less and borrow more, all simultaneously, and it led to enormous loss of confidence and people’s mortgages going up, and a level of fundamental loss of confidence in Britain among investors that this country is still recovering from.
Chair: That was done at a fiscal event, in a Budget.
Wes Streeting: Where I would absolutely defend the Chancellor is that he wants to spend more on defence—we know this. He says he will do more at the Budget. He says he will do more at the spending review. He also has to show how he pays for it.
Our debt-to-GDP ratio is somewhere around 100%. The amount we are spending as a state just on servicing debt interest is about one in every 10 taxpayer pounds. If we go out making unfunded commitments, and the markets choose to price that risk in, the cost of borrowing goes up and we have less to spend on our priorities, before we have even done anything.
Q28 Chair: I don’t think the Defence Committee is advocating for unfunded spending commitments, but the Committee was recently in Denmark which has gone, amazingly, from a 1.3% spend of GDP on defence to 4.99% within four years. Germany is saying it is going to have the largest conventional land force in the continent. Within four years they will be spending the same as the UK and France. And here we are, just kind of trundling along.
Wes Streeting: And in those cases, Chair, look at the cost of borrowing in those countries. We are not comparing like with like. I wish we were, but that is one of the reasons why they have got a bit more headroom than us to make those choices. Given the constraints we are operating under, I would just say—and believe me I am not remotely complacent about this; I cheered John Healey on when he made his principled resignation, I felt just as uncomfortable as he did about where we were on defence spending, and I would not have accepted the Prime Minister’s offer to take on this role if I did not believe he was also committed to funding—that we have got to make sure we understand the economic and fiscal context we are in and give the Chancellor the time and space he needs to give us what we need while showing how to pay for it.
Today’s IMF numbers are particularly encouraging—relatively as well—but they do not show the benign conditions we want to be in. We have a responsibility collectively, Parliament and Government, to think about that context, otherwise our taxpayers, our citizens, our constituents and the state pay a heavy price if we are not disciplined with the finances.
Chair: We look forward to your confidence being rewarded.
Q29 Lincoln Jopp: Secretary of State, you said you wanted a defence pact with this Committee—that we would advocate for higher defence expenditure. No doubt you will be aware that this Committee has been calling for 3% by 2030 for quite some time. You also said that you wanted the public to be calling for that.
In the strategic defence review, there was a call for the beginning of a national conversation. When the Committee was in Norway, we heard that their Prime Minister, regardless of what speech he is making, will always refer to the threat that his country is under. We here are not having that conversation nationally and the Prime Minister rather foolishly said that national security cannot come at the expense of social security, a position I was happy to hear him row back on yesterday. Do you see part of your role as an advocate for defence to be louder in that conversation at a national level, so that the public come to realise just how much money we need to spend on defence and potentially some of the difficult trade-offs that we are going to have to make?
Wes Streeting: Yes. One of the reasons why the Prime Minister asked me to take on this responsibility is to make sure that we communicate effectively the kind of threat environment we are in, and to ensure that we have a country that is alert but not alarmed. In terms of the Prime Minister’s position, he has, on multiple occasions since he took office, talked about the kind of threat environment we are operating in, and in a number of ways—from hosting President Zelensky down in Portsmouth through to the two-and-a-half hours he spent on the Floor of the House of Commons yesterday talking about some of the hybrid threats that we are experiencing as a country. In the spirit of hope and optimism that the Prime Minister is bringing and for which I think the country is crying out, there is an absolute recognition from the Prime Minister down, throughout the entire Government, that hope is built on the bedrock of security.
If you have hope and opportunity on one hand and security on the other— as Defence Secretary I am very much into the security part of the argument, but I also think that, through the way we invest in defence, we can show how we are strengthening opportunity in this country and building hope through growth in every postcode and defence industry and so on. I think that will be part of maintaining public support—showing we’re backing Britain by buying British and the other ways in which we can demonstrate real impact for our country.
Q30 Jesse Norman: To pick up on a point you just raised, Secretary of State, hope is not a strategy. Hope is not based on security; confidence is based on security. That is what we are seeking from you. It was a great disappointment that the last Prime Minister talked about the need for a national conversation and then did nothing to promote one. Anything you and the current Prime Minister can do will be welcome.
When you said that you have confidence in the Chancellor and the Prime Minister, you also said that you are taking decisions now, at the MOD, that reflect that confidence—that is to say that you are anticipating future spending increases in the plans you are making now. Could you elaborate a little bit more on that, because obviously that is quite an important defence to the idea that you only ever spend money when you get formal authorisation from the Treasury?
Wes Streeting: On one level, just by the nature of what we do in defence we commit to a lot of programmes that are long-term. That demonstrates that just because we operate in annual budget and three-year spending review cycles does not mean that we do not have a view on the longer term. We see that reflected in everything—
Q31 Jesse Norman: Right, but you are doing more as a result of your increased confidence in the Chancellor and the Prime Minister in respect of getting from 2.7% to 3%. That is the key point.
Wes Streeting: Well, we live within our means for now, but we plan in the context of the SDR and the DIP for the future.
Jesse Norman: On 3%.
Wes Streeting: I will not be drawn on any specific percentages.
Q32 Fred Thomas: Secretary of State, I am not going to ask you how much money defence has to spend, but about an element of spending more within your control. In one of your previous responses you mentioned buying British, which ties into the agenda you have laid out this afternoon around using defence as an engine for growth. I think it is fair to say that there has been a somewhat confused position from the Government in recent years, which clearly predates you taking up this role, so it would be interesting to hear your thoughts on the direction you intend to take the Department.
For context, in the Labour manifesto, which you and I stood on, we said we wanted to buy British. We said that over and over again, but then the language slightly changed within the MOD, during the previous Administration. For example, earlier in 2026, one of your junior Ministers made a pre-prepared speech to the whole defence industry—not an offhand comment—and said, “For avoidance of doubt, if you’ve got a British postcode, you are a British company." I was very confused by that. We have new leadership, with a new Prime Minister and a new Secretary of State for Defence. Could you clarify what you think of as a British company, how you would tell industry what British means to you, and how you are going to take this forward?
Wes Streeting: I did a good session with the Lords industry Committee this morning and this came up. The legal definition of a British business is as simple as having an address in this country. I think we would all agree that that is not sufficient and would not constitute buying British in so far as the spirit of the manifesto we stood on. I suspect that spirit is shared across this entire Committee, regardless of political party.
There are a number of ways in which we can measure impact in Britain—jobs, growth, where the IP is held. Ownership can be one of those. For me, fundamentally, over and above everything else, in terms of backing Britain and buying British it is about the impact on jobs, opportunities and growth in this country. There are plenty of examples of companies we procure from that are American, Italian or from other countries, and that are creating jobs here in Britain, and I would consider that to be backing Britain by buying British.
Q33 Fred Thomas: Inevitably, a balance needs to be struck between wanting Government Departments to buy from British companies and support British IP, as most people would probably like, and, as you have alluded to, making sure that Government Departments are efficient and getting the best value for taxpayer money. Realistically, that will not always be British. Previous questions have alluded to the urgent sense of needing to make sure we are ready for any action that needs to be taken. How do you see that quite difficult balance? I don’t think there are any easy answers, but I just wanted to hear what you think.
Wes Streeting: There are going to be questions of judgment in all this; it is not as simple as just running things through a spreadsheet and getting a mathematical answer. There are a whole range of factors we will want to take into account at various points. Timing might matter. Where those jobs are created might matter, even when we are talking about competition within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Our starting point as the MOD is really good: the overwhelming majority of defence spending stays here at home. In terms of our footprint and the Prime Minister’s ambitions for growth in every postcode, other Government Departments see our starting point as way beyond their wildest dreams compared with theirs, so we start from a good place.
But I was saying to the Lords this morning that we cannot be complacent. For example, defence spending per head in the north-east of England versus in the south-east of England is wildly different. We could be doing better in Wales. Northern Ireland, despite its defence industrial heritage, is still much lower. There is no room for complacency.
You draw out some of the tensions we’ve got, because the whole argument for competition is that you inspire innovation, you force down prices and people have to have that competitive edge, so it is good for industry. In a world in which I am regularly lobbied to do direct awards or UK-only competitions in the spirit of buying British, I have to weigh up some of the risks as well and make sure that we see these things in balance, rather than simply as black-and-white choices. We are not doing too badly so far—we have a good starting point—but we do take into account some of those wider issues.
Jeremy Pocklington: Should I say a little bit about some of the work we have under way to really cement this policy? The first thing we are doing is working with industry right now to come up with a practical and transparent definition that does exactly what the Defence Secretary has said, so it is focused not just on the address but on the benefits, the jobs and the impact on the defence industrial base that comes from that.
Secondly, we are also undertaking the detailed mapping of different capabilities across the country, so that we have really good knowledge in the Department. We will all agree that having a strong industrial base does not run against military capability but actually cements it. It is essential for national security, and events of the last couple of years have really shown that for all of us. We need to grow that industrial base for our national security.
Thirdly, this will then relay into the decisions we make as we implement the defence investment plan. We have begun, but there is a lot more to do over the next couple of years.
Finally, as you have alluded to, it may not always be right to buy British, and we need to be open to that possibility, although I note that in the last available numbers 86% of our defence spending with industry was for work taking place in the UK. The significant majority is UK-based, but it will not be all. We are also refreshing our offsets policy, so that when we need to buy from abroad we are also building the industrial base in this country.
Q34 Fred Thomas: Secretary of State, you have obviously followed defence for a long time, but you have been very plugged into health in opposition and then in government for quite a few years. Speaking of buying British, what has been your impression of British industry and the British defence technology innovators you have had the chance to meet in the last three months since taking up the role?
Wes Streeting: I think we start from a position of relative strength. I do not just mean in terms of our primes; some of the biggest opportunities for this country are some of the SMEs that are pushing the frontier of defence innovation. We should actively try to keep those companies and scale them here in Britain.
We have a general problem across the economy: we are really good at start-ups, but often when it comes to scaling up the investment environment means that people ship out, often to the United States. That plays directly into the conversation on AI that we are having across Government and wider society.
If I look at Brakestop, for example, and the way in which that programme operated—the number of companies that expressed an interest, the numbers that made it into the active competition and those that made it through to the final—that is an outstanding SME success story, even for those companies that did not ultimately prevail. Everyone learned something through that process, and those companies will be back in the future.
We talk ourselves down as Britain a bit too much at the moment, and that applies beyond defence as well. We are second only to the US and China when it comes to AI, for example. We have to make sure that we continue to punch above our weight in the world, and draw on that innovation in the defence context.
Q35 Alex Baker: This morning I was on the phone to a contractor who lost out on a bid to one from overseas. They were going to manufacture in the UK; the overseas bid was 53% cheaper. I do not know where in the world that is, but I would be sceptical of the quality you are going to get if it is 53% cheaper. How can British businesses compete in that landscape?
Wes Streeting: This is why we are currently in the process of updating our social value guidelines. It is not just about measuring the economic and social impact of buying British on jobs, opportunities and growth here in Britain; it is also about casting our beady eye over supply chain ethics and making sure that we have fair competition. I do not know the details of the particular procurement you mention, but my instincts are immediately to be sceptical about which country and what that is.
Q36 Alex Baker: In the tendering process, it seems cost wins a lot of the time over sovereignty. You talk a good talk on backing British, but when push comes to shove, cost wins over and over again. How are you going to embed sovereignty into the tender documents?
Wes Streeting: This is where having an ally in the Chancellor is really important. If you take the Project Euston announcement that the Chancellor and I made during the Labour party conference week, we chose a UK-only procurement for that. That was because it was of such an order of magnitude—probably worth around £6 billion in the end—that being agnostic about that amount of taxpayer money going overseas did not feel right to me. Conventionally—I do not cast any aspersions on previous Chancellors—the Treasury institutional view would certainly have been, “What are you playing at? Big procurement? Then go to global competition.” Political leadership really matters in that sort of space.
The final thing I would say about sovereignty is that we are going to have to have quite a nuanced focus on sovereign capability, sovereignty full stop, and control, particularly in the world of AI and where some of the most powerful frontier models are not British and we are going to rely on other countries. In a defence context, there are obviously enormous opportunities with AI, but there are enormous risks. Whether it is AI or other forms of technology, we need to make sure that we have control over our capability and that we are not dependent on others. Working, partnering and procuring with others is all great—we do a lot of that, and long may that continue—but these concepts of sovereignty, sovereign capability and control are going to become more relevant in the coming years.
Jesse Norman: To follow up on that very important point, Secretary of State, you rightly stressed the importance of supply chains. Ultimately, at some level, war is always a contest between supply chains. When you evaluate domestic capability according to the perm sec’s new rules, do you evaluate it in the context of scenario planning? Of course, we discovered in the financial crisis that if something hits the whole system, it just seizes up. We have got to have some mechanism by which we know, when we pull the ripcord, on key technologies, key capabilities or key munitions—whatever it might be—we can develop what we need, fast.
Wes Streeting: I 100% agree. I was reassured that we do some of the wargaming and exercising we do in the Ministry of Defence with industry as well. That is really good practice, but we have to go a bit further. Just as we need to think about broadening and deepening our defence industrial base to make sure that we have warfighting capacity and capability within the defence industry, we also need to look across the whole of the economy and, from a national resilience point of view, across public services.
For example, as Defence Secretary I do not feel remotely agnostic about the future of Britain’s steel industry, the automotive industry and a whole bunch of other industries whose day-to-day work now might have nothing to do with defence but, should this country find itself at war, we would want them to switch production from civilian everyday use into defence production and warfighting. If we start to look at our wider industrial base through that lens, it lends itself to different strategic choices. We need to do the same exercise with NATO allies. If we start to think more in those sorts of terms, we will be in a better place.
Finally, there were obviously CBRN threats that concerned me when I was the Health and Social Care Secretary, and I was sighted on things at a higher classification in that role. One of the best innovations in that area was the resilience committee of the National Security Council, which allowed domestic Government Departments that would not normally find themselves around the Cobra table to have that conversation. We should be thinking about warfighting in 2030 through an NHS lens, through a logistics lens and so on—look at Ukraine.
Q37 Mike Martin: To pick up on the theme of procurement and industry, what changes do you want to bring about to the way we procure kit?
Wes Streeting: The MOD does not have a great reputation on this, but even I was shocked when I saw how long it takes to get from the design, and what it is you want to buy, to contracting. For major platforms that takes six years. For systems like sensors, radars and so on, it takes three years. That is an extraordinary length of time just to get a contract agreed. It makes some of the worst bits of my last job look remarkably efficient.
Mike Martin: What are you going to do that is different, though?
Wes Streeting: The NAD group is already beginning to make a real impact. In terms of the impact of that reform, we have now gone down to just under five years on major platforms, and that is just since the SDR. For pace-setting modular upgrades—the systems I mentioned—the time has gone from three years to one year, and we want to be able to do off-the-shelf within three months. With the introduction of the NAD group, the system is now wired to do precisely that.
The NAD group is still fairly nascent—was it January this year that it was stood up?
Jeremy Pocklington indicated assent.
Wes Streeting: Rupert Pearce has been in as the National Armaments Director for a year now, but it is my job to keep my beady eye on it, to make sure it is working in practice and to give Rupert the backing that he needs with Jeremy. I have to say—I think you all know this through your previous engagements—in terms of ministerial leadership, Luke Pollard is outstanding and has driven a lot of the focus on this.
Jeremy Pocklington: If I may add to what the Secretary of State said, first of all it is about segmenting procurement more effectively. That is one of the overwhelming lessons from Ukraine: you do not need to procure drones—low-value kit—in the same way that you procure ships and planes, so we need to have different systems that enable us to go after things more quickly.
The second thing is to clarify accountabilities in defence. It is a large and complex enterprise, so the thing about defence reform is that it clarifies and simplifies accountability. Simplicity has been my mantra as we have moved to implementation.
The third thing to highlight is the shift in responsibility for the invest budget from MSHQ to the National Armaments Director, with a system of problem statements, whereby we now have the armed forces setting out clearly the problem statement, their capabilities and the gap they have, and that enables the NAD group to engage industry to identify more innovative solutions to the problem statement.
Wes Streeting: It is a bit about how you square that circle. In that environment where you are doing more buying British, and being more open to things like direct awards or UK-only competitions, by having the approach of setting out problem statements for industry to get its teeth into, you start to inspire a bit of competition, and also some collaboration. You really drive innovation at that stage, which is part of mitigating against the risk of driving up costs.
Q38 Mike Martin: There has been progress, definitely, and that is great to see, but six years to five years is—you know? What would you like to see? Will you continue to drive those timescales down? Are they going to get better? In a year’s time, what do you want those timescales to be?
Wes Streeting: I am hesitant about setting new targets unilaterally in front of a Committee, but we want to continue to accelerate. Ultimately, we want to get that from six years to two years, recognising that for major platforms it is complicated, so we have to be realistic.
Chair: Let us now delve into the defence investment plan.
Q39 Ian Roome: Welcome to Defence, from one 10-year plan to the next. Lord Robertson, on the SDR, said: “we built the strategic defence review based on an assessment of 10 years—that was our assessment at the time of when a peer opponent might challenge the United Kingdom. That timeframe has clearly now been accelerated. Quite simply, we are running out of years.” He said that moving from the SDR to the DIP “dismayed” the UK’s allies. General Barrons said that the delay in its production had “depleted the industrial base” and dismayed our allies. Our concern is with that criticism—with that critique—by two of the reviewers of the SDR. How will you rebuild confidence in UK defence?
Wes Streeting: Crucially, I absolutely accept the wrangling over the DIP taking far too long, and that that has caused wider uncertainty and concern among industry and allies. I think that we now have greater certainty about the level of ambition and intent of this Government and Chancellor. Since taking office, from the conversations that I have been having with allies, whether in NATO, the United States, across Europe or further afield, I think that people can see the seriousness of our intent. That is important, particularly in the context of the push for higher spending, sometimes being perceived by the public as being driven by Washington.
It is absolutely true that President Trump and his Administration have urged Britain and our European allies to do more and to take greater responsibility for our own defence and the defence of our continent—they are right to do so, and it is in our national self-interest to do so—but I do not feel that we are doing what we are doing because of external pressure; we are doing it because it is the right thing to do. I think it is for Britain and Europe to be out of this defensive crouch about defence spending and to lean in actively to spending more, to doing more and to strengthening European NATO. That is the message that I will be conveying. I speak and engage fairly regularly with my US counterpart, Pete Hegseth, and that is the message I will be able to relay directly when I visit Washington this week.
Q40 Ian Roome: The DIP says that the MOD will be required to provide an annual delivery update to Parliament each summer, with the first of those expected in July 2027. What can we expect to see in the first report to Parliament?
Wes Streeting: This is a good time for you to help to shape it—it will be the first one. In terms of how you want us to set out that reporting to Parliament, there is a good opportunity for the Defence Committee to shape with us the contents, so that we provide useful, transparent information and accountability to Parliament. That is important from two perspectives: to show the impact that we are having and also to demonstrate what more needs to be done. Making the case for greater defence spending is an ongoing process. Public support is high, but we cannot take it for granted.
Q41 Ian Roome: Effective parliamentary scrutiny relies on transparency, yet the DIP omits much of the detail that was routinely shared in the old equipment plan. The equipment plan set out a 10-year strategic view and forward spending. Obviously, as Mike alluded to earlier, the DIP goes only to the next three or four years. How can it be justified that we are not seeing the actual detail and costings like we did in the old equipment plan?
Wes Streeting: There is a balance to be struck in this area, for reasons I know the Committee is sympathetic to, of being accountable to Parliament and open with the public, but also not providing information voluntarily and avoidably that is useful to those who would do us harm.
Back to the spirit of my first answer, we might want to think through what the public report to Parliament looks like, but also what the briefings to this Committee and the Public Accounts Committee look like so that we get the balance right between being as open and transparent with Parliament and the public as it is responsible to be, and also making sure that, where we cannot show as much as everyone might like, we can provide assurance to the Committee, on their behalf, and give you space to scrutinise and challenge in a way that is constructive and helpful without publishing information we would not want to be in the public domain.
Jeremy Pocklington: There is a balance between giving certainty to the armed forces and industry about our direction, and also retaining some flexibility, particularly in the later years, to respond to the evolving threat landscape and changes in technology.
One reason why we made a very conscious decision not to reproduce the old equipment plan is because the pace of change is faster than it has ever been historically. Setting out now in detail exactly what we need to spend our money on in years seven, eight, nine and 10 would not be sensible. The pace of change is so fast.
No one in this room knows what types of drones will be the most appropriate ones to buy. What we need to do now is to build the market, the industrial base and the innovation system so that we can move quickly as the years progress. There is a balance to be struck between providing certainty where we can, but taking a different approach.
Finally, in comparison to the old equipment plans, we also made a very conscious decision to look across the whole of the defence budget in the investment plan. The equipment plan did not do that. We are trying to set out a more holistic picture across the entirety of our budget, recognising that all parts of the enterprise need to work together to support the war fighter.
Q42 Ian Roome: Maybe this question is for both of you—
Wes Streeting: Feel free to pick on Tim as well.
Ian Roome: Guest commentary from RUSI said that the DIP should be “judged not only by whether it allocates enough money, but also by whether it helps Parliament, the Treasury, the services and the public see how money becomes capacity—and whether that capacity becomes military power.” How do you think the DIP should be judged, and do you agree with the commentary that we received from RUSI?
Wes Streeting: I think that is a good summary. In some ways it bridges between the argument for more money and the argument I have been making about making sure that that money is well spent. Spending more money badly on defence is not what any of us want to see; it would not be virtuous. It does need to translate into warfighting capability. Sometimes that has meant choices have not always gone down as well as we would have liked, but that is because we have got to keep that focus on capability.
Q43 Ian Roome: Can you confirm whether you made a decision recently to take money—over a billion quid—from the defence housing budget?
Wes Streeting: My predecessor took that decision. The amount being spent on defence housing is unchanged, but I concede that the profile of that spend—back to Mr Twigg’s earlier question—is more backloaded than it would have been. That is not stopping us from making a big difference on defence housing. Is it as fast as we would all like to see? No. You cannot pretend that, by backloading, you are still able to deliver the same as you would have done earlier on. It will improve year on year, but a choice was made to focus on capability over housing at that point in the process.
Q44 Ian Roome: I would say, Secretary of State, that our personnel are the best capability that we can have. As someone with a large garrison in their constituency, with poor defence housing in some areas, I think that is a priority that you should revisit. You have no capability without the personnel to operate it.
Wes Streeting: I absolutely take that on the chin. I think a lot about the responsibility that I personally, and we as the state, have to people who serve, their families and people who have served previously. When I see the condition of some of our defence housing, it is up there with some of my worst constituency casework. I expect a lot better for those families who make enormous sacrifices and experience a lot of disruption for what they do. I am not comfortable with that choice, and I am not going to add insult to injury by pretending that rephasing does not mean that we will not be able to do as much as we would otherwise have done on the previous phasing.
There will be year-on-year improvement, and already, since coming in, we have brought 36,000 military homes back into public ownership, delivering significant upgrades. I am keen to see what more we can do to leverage in investment in that area, because I understand the choice, but I do not think any of us ought to be comfortable with it.
Jeremy Pocklington: It was a very difficult decision in the final stages of the defence investment plan that the Secretary of State’s predecessor had to take. I would emphasise that we are still getting on and delivering. We are going to refurbish 1,000 homes this year and move another 1,000 homes from void unavailable to void available. It is a technical change, but it will release more homes through the hard work of the Defence Infrastructure Organisation. Obviously we would all like to get on with this as quickly as we can.
Q45 Jesse Norman: Secretary of State, you have talked rightly about the importance of boosting the defence industrial base. Are you aware of the yawning gap that still exists between the speed of procurement through Kindred and the speed of procurement through MOD, often for similar kinds of weapons systems? What is the way of getting past that? We really need to move the entire procurement process, for systems that we can, much more towards a Kindred-type system.
Wes Streeting: I do not disagree. There is definitely more to do.
Q46 Jesse Norman: Could you elaborate a little on that possibly? What are the kinds of things you would like to do, or the kinds of systems you would like to see brought under a Kindred approach? What do you do about tens of thousands of people thinking about alternative ways of procuring?
Wes Streeting: What would you prioritise?
Jesse Norman: Well, you ask the MP for Hereford what he would prioritise. Let us talk about that for a second. I would prioritise technologies that we know are going to be essential, even if we do not know exactly what. We are talking about munitions, drones and systems of delivery that fall short of platforms. I would be looking for a 300% acceleration in the speed at which we deliver those. I think that is absolutely doable for many of these systems. I would be looking for a further investment in the way in which we finance these things. At the moment, we provide inadequate domestic demand for these systems, and then we are surprised when these players go to Norway, Scandi, America and the Gulf. We do not have enough patient capital, so we force them into the hands of VCs, who are often very demanding. They get hooked on cash and then cannot build fast enough, and that puts them on a treadmill. There is a whole series of things—this is a bigger conversation.
Wes Streeting: I do not disagree with what you said about the investment environment. We have a defence investment summit coming up before Christmas—it will take place on 1 December. The intention is to make sure that, ready for that, we have an order book of investible propositions and that the right people—domestic and international investors—are gathered so that we can look at what more we can do to leverage in the support that we need. It would be worth our having a longer conversation ahead of that.
Q47 Jesse Norman: I would be grateful for that. Maybe the perm sec can talk a bit about patient capital, which is the other part of the equation.
Jeremy Pocklington: I was not actually going to come in on that point. The thing I was going to highlight, in terms of learning the lessons from Kindred, which I think we would very strongly agree on, is that we think that UK Defence Innovation is going to have an important role in being able to procure very quickly right at the edge of innovation, with the ringfenced budget of £400 million that we will be establishing. That will enable it to move quickly and be free of controls. It will be many of the same people—people with the skills and experience from Kindred—working in that part of the Department to make sure we really are learning the lessons. We can move very quickly in certain circumstances, and we need to expand the range of circumstances in which we are able to do that.
Q48 Jesse Norman: Right, but the obvious further pushback is that if you are constantly buying through a farmers’ market of competitions, you are not necessarily growing domestic in-depth capability. Put it this way: if we were car manufacturing, we might decide that we want a Mercedes-Benz and a BMW of drones. We are not doing that at the moment. Why not?
Jeremy Pocklington: Ultimately, what the right industrial strategy is around the drone sector is a really important question. My own view is that I am not sure the market is developed enough to reach a very clear view on that. We need to do more to continue to develop the excellent companies that we have. We obviously have the Uncrewed Systems Centre in Swindon, which will be able to play a leading role in this.
On your wider point about financing, we also need to ensure that we have adequate financing for the supply chain into these companies. There is obviously a role for different forms of capital, and there may also be a role for the state in that to make sure we are building that ecosystem so that we can really build a sector that can innovate and has sufficient agility.
Q49 Jesse Norman: Secretary of State, what is the timing for the Type 45 replacement?
Wes Streeting: I believe it is early 2030s. Is that right, Tim?
Air Marshal Tim Jones: I can speak to that. As you know, the Type 45s are due to start going out of service from 2035. At the moment, we have started investment in a hybrid Navy alternative for that. You probably heard the First Sea Lord talking quite passionately about his vision for a hybrid Navy. The early investment that we are doing is to get those projects up and running so that, by the time the Type 45 starts going out of service, we have a hybrid replacement for that capability coming into service.
Jesse Norman: So a hybrid Navy by the early 2030s is what you are saying. Is that right?
Air Marshal Tim Jones: There will be a hybrid Navy solution that comes in over time, and that will begin to come in in the 2030s as the Type 45 goes out of service.
Q50 Jesse Norman: Will you extend the life of the current Type 45s?
Air Marshal Tim Jones: We don’t want to extend the Type 45. Rather than extending older platforms that cost a lot of money to run, we would rather spend the money focusing on new technology. That is what the First Sea Lord wants, and that is what we are aiming to do.
Q51 Jesse Norman: What is your estimate of the amount of money that has been saved by taking this approach to be deployed on the hybrid Navy?
Air Marshal Tim Jones: Saved in comparison with—
Jesse Norman: In comparison with the previous regime, which was Type 45 and its successor platforms.
Air Marshal Tim Jones: It is undoubtedly a more cost-effective approach, but that is not why the First Sea Lord is pursuing it—
Jesse Norman: Sure. I just wonder how much you think is available to be spent on it.
Air Marshal Tim Jones: The defence investment plan sets out our initial investment. There will be more money to follow after that initial spending period. We have £1.5 billion in this Parliament set aside for initiating hybrid Navy projects, and that project team is standing up now.
Q52 Jesse Norman: But there is a possibility of a shortfall of capability before the hybrid Navy is fully established, right?
Air Marshal Tim Jones: We have almost 10 years to get the Type 45 replacement up and running. We are in a world where we are seeing innovation moving quickly and the market being disrupted by start-ups and new tech companies. We were just talking about how we reduce the procurement timelines. The sorts of companies that are coming on to the market now are not offering us procurement timelines that go on for decades; they are offering us far quicker turnaround timelines in order to bring new capability in.
Q53 Jesse Norman: The Type 45 was a well-established air defence platform. I just want you to give me some reassurance that we will have adequate capability to cover that gap and more by the time it is retired.
Air Marshal Tim Jones: We will.
Jesse Norman: You are saying that we will.
Air Marshal Tim Jones: We will have air defence capability for maritime—
Jesse Norman: Comparable or better?
Air Marshal Tim Jones: It should be better, because new technology will come online, and the aim is to do that in a more effective way. As to when the transition happens in detail, that is what we are working through at the moment. We do not want to extend Type 45. It is clearly an option, but it is not part of our plan. We want to focus our money on investing in new technology and bringing that online as soon as possible.
Q54 Alex Baker: Secretary of State, it will not surprise you to hear that I want to come on to defence finance, but I want to pick up on another case study first.
Evolve Dynamics is a drone manufacturer that is not in my constituency, but it employs people from my patch. It has been making small surveillance drones that were part of the battlegroup ISR programme. It won that work and delivered 245 drones successfully in August. It was told that the Army loved the product, and was told to ramp up because they wanted up to another 1,000 of these products.
Going into the DIP, everything was good. They were told to grow their business and work out how they could deliver up to 1,000. Two weeks after the DIP, they were told that the programme was frozen and were then left to work things out, because of budget constraints. Do you recognise how difficult it is for a British company to have gone through the process of ramping up and then been told to stop?
Wes Streeting: Yes. I spent a lot of time this morning in front of the House of Lords Committee talking about the importance of this being a partnership with business and industry. What you just described is not an example of us being a good partner. It is bad enough when we, or our partners on the other side of the equation for that matter, shift timescales, rephase and all the rest of it, but it is a different order of challenge if you are one of our primes making that adjustment, or one of our SMEs. We have to be a better customer and partner, particularly to the SME sector.
There is another thing that Luke and I in particular feel strongly about, but it is true across the Defence team, particularly for Lord Coaker with the international engagement he does. I also want to make sure that we are a champion for exports, and that we support with exporting. I would be grateful if you could send me further details of that particular case study.
Q55 Alex Baker: Your office has the details. My frustration is particularly because the Army wants these products. This is not a case of the Army or MOD not liking the product; the Army is asking for it, but they have been told to freeze. These guys have employed extra people and worked out how to produce this stuff, and suddenly those people do not have jobs. I would be really grateful if you could look into that case study and see if there is anything you can do.
I will now come on to defence finance and the defence, security and resilience bank. You obviously joined my campaign to advocate for the UK to join the defence, security and resilience bank. What was it about the case for the DSRB that made you want to give it your public support?
Wes Streeting: An excellent way to put that question in the middle of the Chancellor’s live decision-making process on this issue.
The DSRB offers a number of opportunities in terms of supporting access to finance for the defence sector, particularly if, in terms of the rate of borrowing, it can be lower cost. It is interesting in terms of the geopolitics of the offer and Mark Carney’s leadership as well, which we very much respect.
This was not your question, but I can sense where the next question will go. I am working closely with the Chancellor on this and caught up with him only last night in anticipation of your question, which I knew would come without you telling me.
The Chancellor is keen to see whether we can get the DSRB and the multilateral defence mechanism in alignment and working together, and whether that would be of greater benefit to the UK, our partners in the MDM and to the DSRB initiative. But that is very much a live conversation that is led by the Chancellor.
Q56 Alex Baker: I slightly regret that we cannot just have a conversation about the merits of the DSRB without it always being drawn back to the MDM. We finally got the Treasury to acknowledge that these are very different products; they do different things. I believe there are some really quick wins when it comes to defence finance. Ultimately, as much as we are having this debate about percentages of GDP, from an industrial capacity perspective we will not be able to spend that money unless, for example, the SMEs in my patch can actually get money from the banks to increase their capacity to answer that call. What is it about this MDM-DSRB conversation? The joint procurement piece is a very complicated thing to do in practice. How do you think that is all going to play out?
Wes Streeting: From the Chancellor’s perspective—I am taking the risk of speaking for the Chancellor, which is potentially career ending if you get it wrong—I think what he is trying to explore is whether the whole could be greater than the sum of its parts in relation to both the DSRB initiative and the MDM, and how that plays into the wider strategic strength of NATO itself.
When he was Defence Secretary, the Chancellor was a big champion of the principle of NATO first. In the spirit of what I said in my opening remarks about trying to make sure that healthy competition among friends does not become self-defeating protectionism, the more we can align a shared economic outlook and shared approach to financing and procurement as allies—as well as on military co-operation—the stronger we will be on military co-operation, and the stronger our deterrence, capability and collective defence industrial base will be.
There is potentially a big prize if those things could be brought together and cohered. But obviously it is not entirely straightforward because they are different initiatives and slightly different configurations of countries are involved in those conversations. They are not decisions that are owned solely by Canada in the case of the DSRB or the MDM in the case of the UK, so that is very much a live conversation. You will have seen what the Chancellor said publicly about his conversations with his Canadian counterpart.
Q57 Alex Baker: On NATO first, have you looked at the NATO Support and Procurement Agency? Do you see any benefit in the fact that we could use that more fully?
Wes Streeting: My sense is that we are not making great use of it at the moment. In common with what we are doing across the rest of procurement and the integrated force model we are building, and how that then translates into the problem statement rather than the status quo that we have had on procurement, I am keen to make sure we are playing the NATO procurement route into that too.
There is another thing I am struck by, which I feel particularly acutely in the work I do with and on behalf of Ukraine to try to meet its requirements. It is a live case study of how we are often fishing in the same pool for the same stuff, and if we are not careful, we are going to end up driving up costs and not broadening our industrial base, individually and collectively, in the way that we need to. The more we can have a coherent approach as NATO members to understanding our requirements and procuring together more effectively, the more that will also help us to send the right demand signals into industry, now and for the longer term.
Q58 Alex Baker: But also, through the NSPA, you can procure things without doing joint procurement. You can procure single source, and you do not pay VAT. In terms of a quick win, that is taking 20% off the cost of a product. I have never got the MOD to really give me an answer on why they do not do that.
Wes Streeting: Jeremy, do you want to say anything about what has happened historically?
Jeremy Pocklington: Single source has an important role to play. It is regulated, and about half our spend comes through that. However, historically, there has been a desire to use competition where possible. I think we are looking afresh at the boundary and at exactly how to get this right, so we are seeking to be more open-minded than we have been historically on this issue.
Q59 Mike Martin: On the hybrid Navy, you mentioned that £1.5 billion has been allocated to the development of that concept, which is really vital because it will replace our Destroyers by 2030. As we have discussed, beyond 2030 we will be relying on the new spending round. Do you think that £1.5 billion is enough to effectively do the early stages of bringing into work five classes of ship?
Air Marshal Tim Jones: It is a start, but it is not going to be the limit of our investment in the hybrid Navy. I go back to the point I was making earlier on: the market has been completely disrupted by the kinds of company, industry and technology that we are seeing come online.
As we stand up the team to look at the hybrid Navy, which we are doing now, and as we look at the detail and engage with industry, the kind of investment we need to make will become far clearer, and that will be a matter for how we prioritise our future spend. It is a start, but I do not think we see it, by any means, as the limit of our investment. It is what we decided and judged was enough to get us going.
We are already almost on contract for an uncrewed surface vessel; the competition is in the final stages, and the results of that will be announced soon. That vessel will be in the water next year, so we are getting on with it.
We will learn more about how these technologies are fielded. We are at the cutting edge of this, and we are seeing an explosion of industrial energy around it. It is about harnessing how industry are engaging with this, as well as the new levels of competition and, frankly, the appetite for private investment in this area, such as research and so on. As we learn more over the coming months about how that is coming together, we will know more about how we will then need to prioritise our funding going forward.
Jeremy Pocklington: May I emphasise that this is on top of the fact that we are still investing and constructing two different classes of frigate in this country and three classes of submarine right now? This is in addition to the huge investment that is under way. Obviously, we would all like it to be quicker.
Q60 Mike Martin: It is a new concept, and it is the first time we have done it. Would you consider it a risk, Secretary of State?
Wes Streeting: Innovation always involves some degree of risk. One of the things I said to the House of Lords Committee this morning was that, politically, we need to be more comfortable than we sometimes are with carrying risk.
In any successful innovation, there are a whole bunch of stories of failure before you get to the success. What we actually need to do is go much more quickly through those rounds of failure before getting to success. Politically, we must then own that and be comfortable with it. In politics, we do not always lend ourselves to leaning into that culture of innovation, so we become risk averse, drive up cost and reduce capability.
In that spirit, what the First Sea Lord is championing in the hybrid Navy concept is—I am sometimes in danger of over-claiming—genuinely world-leading. I have been struck in the last few months by the number of conversations that I have had with counterparts who are actively interested in tracking what we are doing because they see the potential benefits, so if we get this right—I think there are grounds for confidence—we will not only have a novel and groundbreaking capability here in Britain; we will have a great export opportunity as well.
Chair: I note that we have less than half an hour left and there is still quite a lot of ground to cover, so I ask Members to keep their questions as concise as possible, and could the responses be likewise concise?
Q61 Fred Thomas: I have a question, Secretary of State, about defence reform. You have come into a live process. You have earned a reputation, from running the Health Department, as someone who is a fairly radical reformer yourself, given your success there. But you have come into Defence and there is already something under way, which you alluded to earlier. You mentioned wanting to cohere a bit more. Can you give us a sense of your view of defence reform, what kind of tweaks you might make during your leadership and what you see as the likely delivered benefits of it in the coming years?
Wes Streeting: I think my job is to get it motoring and to make sure that we are using the new structures and new ways of working to deliver the outcomes that we want to see. There is still a bit, at this stage in the process, in some places, of the worst of all worlds—still doing the old way of working and shoehorning it into the new model. That is not really going to work. And there are some cultural challenges.
If I think about the combination between the integrated force model approach that MSHQ is driving and how that relates to the NAD group in terms of problem statements and going out to industry on that basis, that is not just an operational change. It is a big cultural change that not everyone will be comfortable with, because there will be a lot of people who are used to specifying what they want and sticking with the tried and trusted and will find themselves instead having to present their requirements in a different way. So it is a big change operationally and culturally.
I do think that overall it is the right change. Of all the features of defence reform, the one that I am probably keeping my eye on most closely is the NAD group, just because of the size and scale and the opportunity of it. I think it’s really exciting, but we have to pull it off and it has to deliver tangible results.
If you look back at the Lords Committee hearing this morning, I think you will see that we have the right leadership in place, but we also have to make sure that carries down throughout. I certainly feel that, across the leadership of the Department and the leadership of our armed forces, people are bought into this, but that has to cascade right the way down through the four branches—
Q62 Fred Thomas: It always concerns me greatly when I see how much time Secretaries of State have to spend in Parliament giving evidence to millions of different Committees. You mentioned your counterpart, Pete Hegseth, earlier. I wonder how much time he has to spend in Congress giving this kind of—
Wes Streeting: I will ask him on Thursday.
Fred Thomas: Yes, be sure to ask him. I just have another quick question, on culture. A lot of defence reform is structural changes, but you have alluded to the cultural shift that that is trying to get after. We had in front of this Committee the previous CDS, Admiral Tony Radakin—a very impressive and hugely respected character, and quite rightly—and he spoke to us about defence reform at some length and about cultural shifts. He then moved on from the role, and for his first speech promptly gives a very frank and honest speech where he says, in his own language, “I failed to shift the culture. We couldn’t do enough.” And he had years to attempt it, so there is something very deeply ingrained that needs shifting. Have you noticed that yourself? What is your sense of that?
Wes Streeting: With any part of Whitehall, you will find lots of people admiring the problems, but feeling unable to bring about the change that they want to see.
When I was driving the modernisation and reform that we were doing at Health, I felt that we were at the head of the pack, actually. The NHS England decision was very big, very visible and very radical. I came into the Ministry of Defence acutely aware that John Healey had started defence reform a year earlier and that it is a lot further down the track. I have inherited something that is at more of an advanced stage than what the Health Secretary has inherited from me.
I think that is a great opportunity for defence, but it is now sitting in a wider Government programme, which the First Secretary has been setting out, of changing the way that the Government take decisions, strengthening democratic control and accountability, and stripping back layers of Whitehall bureaucracy, arm’s length bodies and opportunities for pointless judicial reviews that just cost time and money, and make lawyers wealthier. I feel that we are now swimming with the tide rather than against it.
On the point about culture, though, I think that we have to be more adventurous and be prepared to take some risks. We definitely need to speed up decision making, and try to short-circuit clearance processes as best we can.
The final thing I would say on culture, which is markedly different from that of the Department of State that I led before and the public services that it was responsible for, is that I am acutely aware that I am working in a far more male environment than I did in Health and Social Care.
There are some real strengths in terms of the chain of command and the professionalism that the military bring, and co-locating the military and civilian personnel on civil servants has strengthened the Department of State. However, there are also real behavioural challenges in terms of sexism, misogyny and the wider issues that we face, which we need to grip and take seriously, and not see as a box-ticking exercise.
Chair: Thank you very much. We will come back to that later.
Q63 Michelle Scrogham: Secretary of State, I really welcomed your words earlier about more accurately naming the grey zone or hybrid threats as state-sponsored terrorism. With Russia escalating its attacks throughout Europe, I just wondered how the MOD is prioritising and assessing the future threats, and its reactions to them.
Wes Streeting: It is a major focus of the Department of State, of defence intelligence, of our intelligence and security services, and of the work we are doing across our armed forces to anticipate potential threats, and to deter, to detect and, should deterrence fail, to be ready to defeat. We are not doing this on our own—that is one of the other things that I feel extremely assured of when I have been with international counterparts, either bilaterally or in formats such as JEF. We are all confronting the same challenges. We have the same picture of the nature of the threat, and we have the same resolve. And the collective security in the principle as well as the practice of article 5, which underpins NATO, remains absolutely unshakeable.
Q64 Michelle Scrogham: Specifically, what is your assessment of the threat around drones for our national infrastructure and our airbases, and obviously I will mention the shipyards as well?
Wes Streeting: We cannot be remotely complacent. We are putting £790 million into integrated air and missile defence to modernise some of our older systems—obviously, we have to take a layered approach—but as we have seen in the war in Ukraine, drone technology presents a new threat. Those are relatively low-cost, high-impact devices; I am sure that my Russian counterpart could convey far more powerfully the impact that fairly low-cost Ukrainian drones, for example, have had on very expensive platforms. It is in that context that we—not just as the UK, but with our allies—are actively working on developing effective defences against drone warfare.
Q65 Michelle Scrogham: To touch on ballistic missiles, we have heard a lot about iron domes or shields in the media recently.
Wes Streeting: I think Luke Pollard called it an iron sieve.
Michelle Scrogham: Yes. The Committee heard that it would cost £1 billion per city to cover what we need to. I am interested to hear it reported that Faslane is getting ballistic shelters. Are you looking at rolling that out in other areas?
Wes Streeting: There is a danger of my being dragged into a level of operational security detail that I would not want to share in this format.
Michelle Scrogham: It is public knowledge. It is in the UK Defence Journal.
Wes Streeting: There is a difference between what others report and what we are willing to say. Given the spirit in which we engage with this Committee, first, I would always be happy to try to share with the Committee in a closed format as much as we can of that which we would not want to share in an open session. Given your constituency interest in this, I can reassure you that the security of our nuclear deterrent and the enterprise that underpins it is obviously of the highest importance to us. I would be very happy to make sure that we properly brief you as the Member of Parliament for Barrow.
Q66 Lincoln Jopp: We are going to switch targets, Secretary of State, to focus on the letter about the Northern Ireland troubles Bill amendments that you sent to the Chair yesterday, in which you referenced the fact that inquests and inquiries will be prohibited unless they are viewed as “essential”. The joint framework explicitly guarantees that the nine inquests that were previously put on pause, including Loughgall, will be automatically restarted. Does what you have written in these amendments trump that, or will the interpretation of “essential” be, “Well yes, because we have committed to it in the framework”?
Wes Streeting: In terms of those particular inquests, there is just not a way of circumventing that particular issue that is consistent with our treaty obligations. With the amendments we have laid, we have got to a place where it deals with some of the fundamental concerns that I as a Member of Parliament, let alone colleagues, had. We are in a much stronger place, to the extent that Sinn Féin have condemned the amendments and the Bill as a “Veterans Charter”. As far as I am concerned, that is the highest plaudit possible, and I am absolutely delighted that that is where we have got to.
We have worked intensively with the Northern Ireland Secretary and his team to get the Bill to a much better place where it deals with what I think is my personal moral obligation to people who have served: to make sure that we are not constantly rinsing and repeating, that they are not lying awake with anxiety about hearing a knock at the door or a telephone call, that the actions of the British military who served in Op Banner are not in any way considered equivalent to the terrorist activity of paramilitaries, that people are given the right to seek anonymity and that the presumption is that veterans will not be called to Northern Ireland to give evidence, but can do so at home. That, as well as compelling new evidence, provides the most robust protections possible.
The final thing I would say in relation to the treaty obligations we are under is that we should not see this as a one-way benefit, as it were. Obviously, the Irish Government have a particular political perspective, and those who are republican in their political outlook have a particular interest, but the interest I have in this is also about making sure that victims have answers and recognising that many of those victims were British service personnel and their families, and they deserve answers. That sometimes gets lost because some of the other voices are louder.
I am not saying this to be ingratiating or party political about it, but I want to place on record that I am genuinely thankful to Chris Bryant for the way he has approached this as Northern Ireland Secretary. He has a range of considerations to balance. The way I approached this with Calvin Bailey was to see my job as being solely to champion the interests of our veterans and their families and think through the consequences of the choices we make as Members of Parliament today for the future for people who are serving today and people who serve in the future and giving them the certainty that, as they have our backs as a country, their Government have their backs now and in the future. That is the spirit in which I approached it as Defence Secretary.
Q67 Lincoln Jopp: We will have more time to debate these things next week. It still hangs on a very subjective judgment of what is essential and in whose view, but we will leave that one there. On Lord Justice Haddon-Cave’s inquiry, he said recently that a number of the SAS operators who have been called to give evidence have exercised their right to silence. Given what has happened in Northern Ireland, can you really blame them?
Wes Streeting: No. That is their right and I am not going to criticise anyone who exercises that right. More generally, what is my impression? I do not want to prejudge what the inquiry is going to say. It was commissioned by one of my predecessors and concerns some very serious allegations of wrongdoing. In the conversations I have had—with special forces specifically, but it applies right across our armed forces—first, no one seeks immunity. Everyone agrees that we should hold ourselves and each other to the highest standards and that people ought to bring ethics, professional integrity and the highest level of professionalism to these roles, and people seek to do that. Where people are guilty of illegal action in whatever theatre, no one is asking for immunity.
I think where the concern lies, and I would echo that concern, is the risk that the actions of a few are used to smear the integrity and the honour of the many. Special forces do not ask for special treatment. What they do expect is that Governments who send them into difficult operations to act in the interests of this country stand with them and not leave them exposed. That is the responsibility I feel today—to stand up not just for the people I send into operations, but for those who went into operations on behalf of my predecessors.
Q68 Lincoln Jopp: Yes, but you have also said that you will not stop the automaticity of the Loughgall inquest. That is exactly what you have just said: you could not guarantee that Loughgall will not go ahead. Having the back of the special forces who did that, however many years ago that was, has been played out at Haddon-Cave.
Wes Streeting: I am not going to pretend that the amendments do things that they do not. It is a Northern Ireland Bill, but it is hugely consequential for the framework we think about for the future. I genuinely think it offers better protections than the status quo. It is a significant improvement on where we are today. If it were not, I would not support it.
Chair: No doubt this will be debated at considerable length in the main Chamber as well.
Q69 Mike Martin: Can you tell us about the timeframe and contents of the defence readiness Bill, which we were meant to have in this Parliament, but disappointingly was not in the King’s Speech?
Wes Streeting: It was obviously one of the recommendations of the strategic defence review. It is one that the Government accept and we are actively working on. I have to be a bit careful what I say, because we never ever make announcements on behalf of His Majesty about what is in his Speech, and almost as terrifying as falling foul of the Palace is falling foul of business managers. Recognising that I have to work with and through colleagues, I can tell you that we are actively working on the defence readiness Bill. I think it is an important piece of legislation that we will need to pass, not least given the threat environment that we face, and I would want that to be introduced to Parliament as soon as possible.
Q70 Mike Martin: What is in it?
Wes Streeting: In the spirit of readiness, it does not take us, and will not take us, as far as the legal framework we would need to be in, in the event that we are at war, but it is everything leading up to it. One of the things I anticipate that the Committee will be interested in is the role the Committee can play. I am keen to try to provide an opportunity for scrutiny of measures in the Bill sooner rather than later. It is something we are actively working on, so people are free to make representations to the Department any time they like—
Q71 Mike Martin: Pre-legislative scrutiny?
Wes Streeting: That is definitely something that is for business managers to decide with us, but I can tell you that I am instinctively in favour of pre-legislative scrutiny, as long as it does not slow up getting the Bill through. I actually think that pre-legislative scrutiny would be really beneficial in terms of helping both Houses to understand why we might need to put certain measures in the Bill, but I think it is a massive opportunity in the context of the national conversation. I am instinctively in favour, but I recognise that business managers have a really difficult job to do in balancing all the competing demands for Bills, and pre-legislative scrutiny feeds into that. Hopefully that public acknowledgment of the fiendish dilemmas they face will make them more amenable to my request for a Bill.
Q72 Chair: Secretary of State, you will know that this Committee takes the issue of women in the armed forces extremely seriously, whether through the groundbreaking 2021 Committee inquiry report that was published or our regular sessions within the Committee. You know that we have exchanged correspondence on this where you have acknowledged that your initial impression is that culture and behaviour remain a major challenge in our armed forces.
You will also be aware of the BBC reporting by Sima Kotecha and the team of some very harrowing testimonies from our youngest female soldiers at AFC Harrogate—the Committee also recently visited there. You will also be aware that the Armed Forces Commissioner has stated that she would like to conduct an investigation. However, many victims might not be as confident or as willing to be as open with another serving member of the military. Given that we are dealing with young people, do you think that sort of investigation is sufficient? Should we not have an independent inquiry on this?
Wes Streeting: First, as I outlined to the Committee—in the interests of time, I will not repeat it all, because it is stuff I have already shared and you already know—there is a lot of work being done on raising our standards and a particular focus on sexism and misogyny, but there is more to do. I definitely want to bring in some external scrutiny of the programme of work that is under way. I have a plan in the pipeline and hope to make an announcement on this in the not-too-distant future, because we need some independent assurance that the things we are doing are right and are having real impact, and that we are walking the talk when it comes to this.
On AFC Harrogate—I welcome the fact that the Committee has visited—the tragedy is that you have an institution that provides enormous opportunity and makes transformational difference to the life chances of young people from a wide range of backgrounds, particularly under-represented working-class backgrounds. That should be a transformational experience, and for the vast majority of young people who go through it is, but that cannot be used as an excuse to tolerate the sorts of experiences that have been reported—
Chair: And the misogyny and the sexual violence.
Wes Streeting—which I find profoundly shocking. More than that, all who have taken an interest in this issue for a long time know that what is reported is often only a fraction of the reality. To your point, Chair, about taboo or not wanting to come forward, often it is the victim that feels this burden of responsibility and thinks that if she—often, it is she—comes forward, that can have devastating consequences. Often, the victim is put into this position of feeling like they are the one with responsibility to the perpetrator, rather than being in an environment where they can come forward and be supported, and it can be addressed and dealt with.
Q73 Chair: Given that context, would an independent inquiry not be more appropriate, rather than merely an investigation by the Armed Forces Commissioner? That is the key point.
Wes Streeting: I am looking at what more we can do on external scrutiny. I will come back to you on that. We have commissioned a whole-force safeguarding review, which includes subject matter experts as well as people who have military experience. I will come back to you specifically on external challenge.
Chair: Thank you very much; I look forward to that correspondence.
Q74 Michelle Scrogham: On the previous question, when we visited, I am afraid that I left fairly unconvinced that they had a grip of the actual issue. When you are talking about the different backgrounds coming in, there seemed to be an awful lot of weight put on that as part of the problem, yet we find that a lot of the investigations focused on people higher up the ranks rather than fellow cadets in there. The culture needs addressing, as you said earlier. I was pleased to hear those words, but my concern is that it is not being taken seriously enough, and that some of those things were being brushed off and dismissed as a cultural problem within society rather than a problem within the academy itself.
Wes Streeting: Speaking as someone who comes from a very working-class background, despite appearances and accent today, we cannot tolerate this tyranny of low expectations that says because someone is from a working-class background or they have hardships in life, somehow we accept lower standards. If we are serious about transforming the life chances and opportunities of these young people coming through, that is of course about their literacy, numeracy, how they present and the career opportunities we can provide, but it is also about behaviour and how people interact with each other. If you think about the sorts of roles we might ask them to take on if they have a successful career in the military or the wider defence industry, they carry great responsibility, where they are working in close proximity to others and they have to have each other’s backs.
For me, this is fundamentally a moral issue about how we treat people in our society and make sure that we have consistent standards for everyone, but this is also about the performance of our military and having strong, coherent teams that can operate in the most challenging contexts and environments. If you cannot keep your hands to yourself, and if you cannot take responsibility for your actions at this stage in your life and career, we cannot take the risk of putting you into a far more challenging and dangerous environment.
I have a lot of love for the mission of AFC Harrogate, and I want to see that mission replicated elsewhere, but that has got to come with some tough love. I am all up for the armed forces transforming life opportunities for people—and we do. We can tell that story much more effectively about the guys who come in unable to write or add up and whose lives are completely transformed by careers in the military. It is remarkable and we should be really proud of it, but we must not allow the tyranny of low expectations just because of where someone has come from.
Q75 Michelle Scrogham: My concern was more about the leaders rather than the people coming through at a younger age.
Wes Streeting: We have to take that seriously as well. If I may say, I know it is not always comfortable for people, and people might point to a whole range of impressive things that people have done in their careers, but high-profile examples of people being held to account for their conduct is really important—because culture is set from the top.
You may well be highly decorated, and you may well have served this country tremendously in a whole range of avenues, but if your conduct has fallen short of the standards that we expect, it is no use complaining about it or expecting special treatment. We have to have consistent standards and that has to be set at the top.
Q76 Lincoln Jopp: The Prime Minister said yesterday that when he met President Trump, he discussed the Falkland Islands with him. Do we know whether the Prime Minister discussed the Chagos islands with him? If he did, what was said? Now that you have been inducted into the cosa nostra at the MOD, have you been able to work out what the hell the National Security Adviser is up to trying to get rid of it?
Wes Streeting: First, I don’t think it is a fair characterisation of the poor National Security Adviser that he is trying to get rid of the Chagos islands—quite the opposite.
As someone who sat around the Cabinet table as Health Secretary, and so was part of the conversation on Chagos from that perspective, I came into this role being immediately read far more into the detail on what is going on and what is driving it.
I can assure you that, in the first cross-Government meeting I attended on this, I was as difficult and uncompromising and as big an—I won’t use unparliamentary language—as I could possibly be, to interrogate all of the arguments we often have in the Chamber and in public about why we are engaged in this negotiation.
I can absolutely assure you that I have come to the same conclusion as Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, Rishi Sunak, Keir Starmer and now Andy Burnham, which is that the unique and extremely valuable capability that our base at Diego Garcia provides us and the United States is of such high value that the legal uncertainty around the Chagos islands is not worth carrying. It is therefore in our national interest, as well as the interest of our collective security with the United States, to have a settled legal position through negotiation.
That negotiation and any deal have to carry the support of this Government, the Government of Mauritius and the President of the United States. At the moment, it does not carry the support of the President of the United States of America. Therefore, the deal is not good enough. We have to work through it to get to a settled position. That is why every Prime Minister since Boris Johnson has been trying to sort this, because the risk we are carrying is not worth it, set against the capability that is put at risk.
Q77 Lincoln Jopp: You missed out one person in your list, of course; Lord Cameron killed it as a negotiation when he was Foreign Secretary.
Wes Streeting: I am always happy to speak to former Prime Ministers, and I would be very happy to talk to David Cameron about it. I am not sure that is an entirely fair characterisation of where the Chagos process got to.
Q78 Jesse Norman: We obviously have significant interests across the Gulf. We have had a long historical footprint there. It is under an enormous amount of strain. What is our current strategy and objective in relation to defence of UK interests in the Gulf?
Wes Streeting: First, being a reliable partner and ally. Whether it is on defence exports or mutual defence assistance, we are actively engaged in the Gulf. We have seen that particularly brought to light by the appalling events in Saudi Arabia in recent days. Houthi escalation prior to the attack on airports was completely unacceptable, but to attack civilian infrastructure in this way, with the numbers of casualties we are seeing, is contemptible. I am proud of the fact that this country has stepped up when our ally has called, with air-to-air refuelling support and with ground-based air defences, and we are looking at what more we can do to assist Saudi Arabia.
Ultimately, we know that, whether it is the Strait of Hormuz or the risk surrounding Bab al-Mandab, and the impact that both those things are having on the global economy and on maritime freedom, there are not military solutions to those conflicts. There does need to be a negotiated end. We are supporting the diplomatic track, but we are also doing everything we can to stand with our allies who are under attack.
Q79 Jesse Norman: How do you trade that off with the escalating demands being made on us in relation to Ukraine and to NATO?
Wes Streeting: In some ways, it has not been too much of a wrestle in terms of the capability that we have provided to Saudi Arabia, for example, and in some of the work that we are planning with the multinational military mission in the event we have an environment in which the MMM can operate in the Strait of Hormuz. However, there are some trade-offs and things that we would like to do that sometimes we cannot agree to, because we might put our national interests at risk or stretch ourselves too thinly in terms of our own continent and interests, and our partners understand that. You are right to say that there are those choices and trade-offs from time to time, depending on the sorts of requirements and capability we are asked to provide.
Q80 Derek Twigg: Turning to Ukraine for a moment, obviously her defence ability has been severely and detrimentally impacted by the lack of Patriot missiles. We have seen the consequences just in recent days and weeks of the dwindling air defence capacity. What are we doing as a country to try to source more Patriot missiles but also, in particular, to find alternatives and develop new interceptors, to give Ukraine that greater assurance and ability to defend itself, not least in the coming winter onslaught that we will see?
Wes Streeting: In the last meeting of the UDCG that I chaired, we announced a £100 million contribution to PURL to support delivery of Patriot missiles and other air defence equipment before winter. We are also working with allies across the UDCG to mobilise support. I will not pretend we are yet where we want to be, and you will have seen that President Zelensky is always at pains to thank allies for support while also bluntly pointing out that they need more assistance, so we are doing our best to accelerate. Obviously, you will have seen the very early announcement the Prime Minister made around sharing our IP and permissions on components for the French-made SCALP missile that will support plans for local assembly and production in Ukraine.
We are also working with France and Italy on Stratus, which is the Storm Shadow successor. Ultimately, we are all in the same space at the moment: looking at what we have across Ukraine’s allies and at what level of risk those countries are willing to carry when thinking about what more they can provide to Ukraine; how we can up production, but also what more we can do to accelerate the pace of development of low-cost, high effectors.
Q81 Derek Twigg: I will put to you a difficult question, because it is a matter of what you believe to be the case, and what we should know: are we really saying that we cannot make a significant difference to Ukraine’s defence in the next few months, and it is going to have to basically take it?
Wes Streeting: I would not go that far. I would just say there is a lot of work to do ahead of the next UDCG. I was keen for that meeting to be in person because one reason the UDCG has been effective is that it is a forcing mechanism. If we have something coming up in the calendar, whether swotting up for a Select Committee or not wanting to look embarrassed in front of our counterparts at a meeting about support for Ukraine, at an in-person meeting you can literally eyeball people. We are having an in-person meeting precisely to do that.
Between me, Boris Pistorius and Mark Rutte and those allies who are really stepping up to support Ukraine, we are once again doing the loop around the UDCG. We all have fiscal constraints. We are all operating with a level of risk in the current threat environment that we would rather not be facing, so it is requiring people to compromise and to go a bit further than they might like, but it is absolutely worth it and our support for Ukraine is resolute.
The other argument I am at pains to make publicly as often as possible domestically, given that support for Ukraine remains high here when it is not so high in some of Ukraine’s other ally countries, is that, yes, we are supporting Ukraine and a set of principles that we subscribe to—freedom, democracy, self-determination—but no one in Britain should be in any doubt that the support we are providing Ukraine is also in our national self-interest, so we will do whatever we can as fast as we can for as long as it takes.
Chair: Secretary of State, I am very grateful to your good self, to the permanent secretary and to the air marshal for what has been a fascinating and thought-provoking discussion. Thank you also for allowing us to slightly overrun in order to get a whole host of questions in.
Wes Streeting: That is only because the clock is behind me. I have no idea what time it is or how late I am.
Chair: It is only quarter past, don’t worry.
Wes Streeting: But seriously, Chair, I have a lot of respect for you, and for every member of this Committee. I really look forward to working with you and will make sure that we have acceptable intervals between my appearances before the Committee. I have a ministerial team who enjoy coming here as well, so I am very happy to engage.
Chair: Thank you very much for that undertaking. With that, I call to order this Defence Committee evidence session.