13
Examination of witness
Dermot Nesbitt.
Q76 The Chair: Good morning and welcome to the public meeting of the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee. We are today holding our sixth public evidence session of our inquiry on Article 2 of the protocol and Windsor Framework, which is the so-called non-diminution of rights provision. We are joined this morning by Dermot Nesbitt, who was the lead negotiator for the Ulster Unionist Party to the multiparty negotiations regarding human rights and equality that led to the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday agreement. We are concerned in particular today with the rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity chapter—the RSEO chapter of the agreement—which is referenced explicitly in Article 2(1) of the protocol/Windsor Framework.
You are very welcome, Mr Nesbitt, and we very much look forward to your evidence. The first time you speak, perhaps you would briefly introduce yourself. Today’s meeting is being broadcast and a verbatim transcript will be taken for subsequent publication. It will be sent to you to check for accuracy. I refer to the register of members’ interests as published on the committee’s website. I am going to start the session now by asking the first question. What was the starting point for the negotiations on equality and human rights provisions during the multiparty talks, and how did this relate to the six rights listed in the Downing Street declaration of 1993?
Dermot Nesbitt: Good morning again. What was the starting point? I had been involved in rights and equality before the talks and I was very conscious of the developments that were occurring in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I was conscious of the Dublin forum that the Irish Government proposed on their documentation, and that led me to the starting point.
The starting point is from a European point of view, and this is where I believe it is very important, because we are part of Europe. You go back to the Treaty of Versailles, where there were many countries newly formed after the First World War. Those new countries comprised some with minorities. I will give a quotation from the emeritus professor of Irish studies, Brian Walker at Queen’s. He said that some of those countries had majorities where they agreed with the changes and others had minorities where they did not agree. He said that this was common to the Northern Ireland problem. I say at the very outset that Northern Ireland was not, and is not, unique, although it is often treated as unique, as we will see in our discussion.
That was the First World War. Roll forward to the end of the Second World War and you come to 1989, with the demise of the USSR. You now have the Russian Federation. That created a lot more countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary. These were all now separate countries. The Council of Europe, a very important international body and home of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the European Court of Human Rights, decided that it had to act, because it was mindful of what happened at the end of the First World War with minorities and did not want the same to happen. I quoted what it said in paragraph 6 [See written submission, 8 July 2026], where it brought together the members of the Council of Europe and “agreed that the national minorities which the upheavals of history have established in Europe had to be protected and respected as a contribution to peace and stability”. That led to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. That was a very important framework.
As I say that, I am mindful of having read the transcript [8 July meeting], where you asked at the end for the members to read my submission, and Mark Durkan said, “I imagine that the framework convention features in it”. Yes, it does. Therefore, he and others were conscious that that was something I mentioned a lot, because it was and is important.
From my background point of view, I was the lead person on rights and equality. As I indicate, I have been involved in politics for over 50 years. I have held a very moderate view from way back in the 1970s, when I believed nationalists and unionists had to work together in a Government so as the community could support the Government.
Moving forward, I am trying, and I will try in this submission, orally as well as in what is written, to be objective and evidence-based, as you will see from my first quotation, which goes way back to September 1996, when the forum was established with the talks. I said that, were all participants in the talks to abide by international consensus on how to solve our problems, we would make progress. Indeed, I said that these principles have been derived from international human rights law. What does it do? It balances majority rights and secure borders with minority rights. Everyone should feel communally together within the community. That was my aim at the beginning of the talks.
From a European point of view and from a Dublin forum point of view in their documentation, it led me to be very clear. There is a saying that, if you are sailing in a boat, unless you know which port you are going to, no wind is favourable. I was very conscious of what I wished to achieve: rights and equality of opportunity, based on international standards, as established by the Council of Europe.
The Chair: Can I ask you a supplementary question, Mr Nesbitt? When these negotiations took place, the background to the negotiations was the Troubles. The talks were a resolution of the Troubles. How far was the conversation about rights that took place brought about by the Troubles? How far was it rather an attempt to ensure that what were regarded as internationally secured rights continued in Northern Ireland?
Dermot Nesbitt: A way had to be found to eliminate the Troubles. It was a sectarian conflict, basically. When I say sectarian, I do not mean all Catholics are nationalists, or all Protestants are unionists, but it was primarily a sectarian conflict. We had to find a way to have a community that was at ease with itself and there had to be standards. The only way you could probably get acceptable standards to all is to go to what was, as I keep saying, international consensus as to a way forward. Rights were important in a way forward. I viewed it, in terms of the contribution I had to make, that I had to secure certain positions on rights, which, as we see, took a little while to get.
Q77 Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: Dermot, you are very welcome. At this stage, I would say that I served with Dermot on Down District Council and then as Assembly Members for South Down in the Northern Ireland Assembly. That is a few years ago.
Moving on to my question, what viewpoints concerning equality and human rights did you present to the negotiations on behalf of your party? How did these relate to the conflict; to other types of rights, such as those for the disabled and gender rights; to other things that are specified in the Downing Street declaration and RSEO; and to the future of Northern Ireland and north-south or east-west relations?
Dermot Nesbitt: Good morning. That is a four-point question. There is nothing like making it complicated at the start. I smile though. We know each other very well. I will take the first part of your question and then the other supplementary parts. I led, as you see in paragraph 9—and it is important that it is the Dublin forum. This is not a unionist forum. This is a forum that was created at the time of the 1996 elections in Northern Ireland.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: Of which I was a member.
Dermot Nesbitt: Yes. As I comment in paragraph 9, Professors Boyle, Campbell and Hadden made it very clear that the fundamental rights are determined by international agreement. There is an obligation there for all states. It is not a matter of bargaining, so we do not bargain. They are there, they are clear and they should be dealt with. Asbjorn Eide—and this is why I view the framework convention as very important—said then that it was the first significant hard law dealing with human rights of minorities.
I look at what Professor Monica McWilliams said, as I read the transcript [8 July]. She said, “probably the biggest mistake that we made in the Good Friday agreement was that we did not establish a validation committee”. She gave an example where Colombia was overseen by the United Nations, whereas here this framework convention was overseen by the Council of Europe. As you see in the footnote, each member state that ratified that framework convention—and that is why I viewed it as very important—was subject to monitoring by the monitoring committee of the Council of Europe every few years, so it was being validated by a respected international body.
I made it clear as well in the talks that, as stated by Professors Boyle, Campbell and Hadden in paragraph 10, we should incorporate a major provision of the framework convention for national minorities into a Bill of Rights. Also in the talks, I was very conscious of something—I am sorry I was not doing it last week with Mark Durkan, because Mark would have remembered. During the talks, I vividly remember him saying to me, “Dermot, I never want to hear you mentioning ‘minority’ again”. He did not like the word “minority” because it made him feel that they were somewhat less important. That is why I say, in paragraph 11 onwards, that minorities display a distinctive cultural, linguistic, educational and religious dimension. They have an identity that they wish to preserve. That is something that is common not just in Northern Ireland, but throughout Europe.
I gave one example there of the Celtic Romansh in Switzerland. This is a point I tried to get across. They did not view themselves as somehow inferior because they were a minority. They just viewed themselves as a smaller one of four. The others were French, German and Italian. Michael Breisky, who was the Austrian ambassador to Dublin, made very pertinent comments that protection of minorities must be based on international consensus. We have to break down the barriers and the sense of being superior or being inferior. That was intrinsically important within the human rights concept that I viewed right back since the 1970s, where unionism and nationalism must be viewed each with respect of each other and each of equal importance. That was one of the key things I tried to convey in the rights process.
If I can continue, as you see, the United Kingdom and Irish Government viewed treatment and equality of opportunity as very important, but they were reticent initially to recognise international law fundamentally, because they talked about having regard for international law. My position was summarised in a statement I made that they have to accept the framework convention, we should ratify it—because I viewed it as important—and it is the European model for solving problems. What better body than the Council of Europe., We have minorities and of course they have their own particular characteristics, but the principles that apply to them all are not unique? Eventually, the UK ratified the framework convention in January 1998.
The Chair: Forgive me for interrupting you, Mr Nesbitt. Can I bring in Lord Thomas of Gresford?
Lord Thomas of Gresford: Did you ever think at any time that you were promulgating rights enforceable by individuals in those bulleted points, or did you think you were setting out principles from which enforceable rights could be drawn?
Dermot Nesbitt: I was doing the latter, setting out principles, but I also had to give examples of rights. The framework convention is, as Asbjorn Eide said, the most important volume of rights dealing with minorities ever to have been derived. I give an example at the end of the annexe on the 30 rights that are possible, but they were the principles of rights.
It is called a framework convention. The reason it is called a framework convention is that it lays out the framework of how you deal with it, but it allows each individual state to decide how it applies. It allows each individual member to decide whether they wish to be part of a minority. You do not have to be a nationalist minority. In fact, now Ulster Scots are recognised as a national minority as well in the framework convention. You do not have to be an Ulster Scot unless you want to be. You do not have to be a nationalist unless you want to be. You choose. I am laying down principles that are to be applied through law and application in Northern Ireland.
Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee: I think the Chair stopped you. You were about to say that the framework convention was adopted by the UK Government. Remind me, did the Republic of Ireland ever adopt the framework convention on national minorities?
Dermot Nesbitt: Yes, it did. It gave a commitment where it said that it will proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the Council of Europe. That is in the section that you are dealing with. It gives a commitment to do that. When it actually gave that commitment, as part of the monitoring process, it said that, in dealing with states, it will abide by the principles of international law. Northern Ireland is another state. It is recognised in international law as part of the United Kingdom. Eventually, therefore, the United Kingdom said it would implement international regulations or international law as necessary to ensure its obligations are met.
I notice the words that the Belfast agreement is a political text, not a legal text, but there is the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which is the legal text. For example, it says in Schedule 2 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998 “observing and implementing international obligations”. That is an accepted matter. They will observe and implement international obligations. The Irish Government gave the same commitment to do so. That is why—as we may deal with one of my greatest disappointments—as a moderate unionist throughout my life and one who wrote about recognising territorial integrity, I find it extremely difficult to accept the protocol with respect to the contribution that Leo Varadkar made. He was breaching international law.
The Chair: You will have to forgive me for interrupting you, but I want to be sure that we have the questions from members of the committee, which is the purpose of the meeting.
Q78 Lord Dodds of Duncairn: It is good to see you, Dermot. In terms of the emphasis you placed on the framework convention on minorities then, and even today, and the final outcome of the RSEO chapter of the Belfast agreement, how satisfied were you and are you that that adequately took cognisance and recognised your emphasis on the convention? At the end of the day, the chapter was written and agreed. How satisfied were you at the time that all the issues that you raised about the framework were reflected in that chapter?
Dermot Nesbitt: I was somewhat satisfied. Those rights were mentioned, the six or eight in that section, but it also said in that section that the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission that would be established would deal with international law and look at rights supplementary to the European convention to form a Bill of Rights. That is where I was agreeing with the Dublin forum that the framework convention should form the basis for consideration of a Bill of Rights. I was somewhat satisfied as to the rights that were actually mentioned in the agreement, but also the implementation required the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission to carry it through to its conclusion, which regrettably did not happen.
The Chair: We have a related question from Baroness Goudie.
Baroness Goudie: Good morning. How are you? Did you foresee that the rights would ultimately include the rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity and that the chapter would be enforced into the Belfast/Good Friday agreement as a political text and not as a legal text? How do you feel about that?
Dermot Nesbitt: As I said a moment ago, yes, it was a political text, but that was translated into a legal text by the Northern Ireland Act 1998. You have Article 69, which talks about the Northern Ireland human rights. You have Article 75, which talks about the Equality Commission. You have listed the various bodies, including the North South Ministerial Council and the Assembly of Northern Ireland, and how it is formed and constituted. All of that is in law to reflect and to mirror the Good Friday/Belfast agreement. While I accept it is not a legal document, I emphasise that there is a complementary legal document that reflects the key ingredients of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement.
Lord Dodds of Duncairn: How would you assess the success or otherwise of the implementation of the RSEO chapter of the Belfast agreement? Has it worked out differently in practice from what you envisaged in 1998?
Dermot Nesbitt: To some extent, yes. To another extent, no. Yes, we have had the Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission. The Equality Commission is doing its job. People can go to it. If the Equality Commission thinks it valid, it will take its case for lack of equality of opportunity. That equality of opportunity is right across the spectrum.
What is important is that the persons and institutions that are involved need to implement what was agreed. As I said earlier, my biggest concern, and annoyance I would even say, was that a fundamental principle of international law, which I referred to at the very beginning, in 1996, of respect for territorial integrity, was not respected by the then Taoiseach Leo Varadkar. It takes a balance. We have to have compromises: minority rights, majority rights, respect for territorial integrity.
That balance did not materialise. I never thought for one minute, when I referred to territorial integrity in 1998, that somehow it would be fundamentally breached, because integrity means whole and undivided, which is not the position at the moment. I never thought that that would have happened, but it has happened and I am extremely disappointed.
The Chair: Presumably, what you were thinking then was predicated on the assumption that the United Kingdom would remain a member of the European Union.
Dermot Nesbitt: I am conscious that there were beneficial aspects of the European Union. On my point of view on rights and the element that I was dealing with, I was dealing with rights that are enshrined in international law. Those are implemented whether or not you are in the European Union. You are in the Council of Europe. The United Kingdom Government ratified the framework convention that would ensure their international obligations were met. The Irish Government did the same. There is not a prerequisite that you need to be a member of the European Union to implement those rights. Therefore I do not believe that the part that you are talking about—Article 2 of the protocol—is relevant.
The Chair: You did not think that membership of the European Union in some way would underpin the rights of which you were speaking.
Dermot Nesbitt: No, I was not conscious that the European Union would underpin the rights. What underpinned the rights was the monitoring procedure of the Council of Europe. In fact, the sixth monitoring procedure of the United Kingdom is under way now. It has to give an account of how it is implementing that. The account is to the Council of Europe, not to the European Union. That happens whether or not we are in the European Union.
The Chair: Bearing in mind your focus upon the Council of Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights, what account did you give to subsidiarity under the European Convention on Human Rights, which is quite a significant feature, and jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights?
Dermot Nesbitt: You are asking me a legal question and I am not a lawyer. I am not sure what the answer would be for that. All I know is that, in law, it actually says, in the 1998 agreement or the 1998 Act, that the Secretary of State would request the Human Rights Commission to draw up a Bill of Rights to supplement the European Convention on Human Rights based on international agreements. That was what I was focused on and what was in the Belfast agreement. On your legal part—and I know you are a lawyer and I am not—I probably cannot answer that question specifically.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: As a supplementary to your question, in discussing and negotiating that section on behalf of the Ulster Unionist Party, what was your lodestar, guiding principle or driving force in terms of rights? Was it the ECHR or something else?
Dermot Nesbitt: I am sorry to come back to it. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was my guiding principle. Asbjorn Eide said, “it contains much more detailed provisions on such protection than any other international instrument”. That is some standard; that is some standard to follow. Therefore that was my guiding principle. Having got the framework convention, I wanted the UK and Irish Government to ratify it and I wanted them, in turn, to implement it.
Q79 Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard: Thank you, Dermot, for that. You partly touched on my question in answer to your last one. I am wondering what role you have seen the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and the Human Rights Commission play in protecting and promoting the rights and equalities in Northern Ireland. Has that been positive?
Also, you had started to answer a question earlier around your points 39 and 40 of the submission. You have mentioned the Leo Varadkar quote a few times. You said that both the UK and Irish Governments are breaching international law due to the protocol/Windsor Framework and particular commitments provided in the Belfast agreement. Could you expand on that a little please?
Dermot Nesbitt: Could I expand a little on precisely what?
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard: Could you expand on your comments that were added in your submission around the Leo Varadkar comment, which indicated that the UK and Irish Governments were both in breach of the Belfast agreement around the protocol/Windsor Framework.
Dermot Nesbitt: That is an interesting one. As I say in paragraph 35, Leo Varadkar said, “To the nationalist people in Northern Ireland”. That is a national minority. He is addressing them. He says, “I want to assure you that we have protected your interests throughout these negotiations … There will be no hard border”. It is a very interesting small point, but he said, “There will be no hard border on our island”. That was agreed and ratified.
As you see from Lord Jonathan Caine, they had a debate in the House of Lords in 2021. He said of the document that was agreed, “At a meeting the following day in the Cabinet Room, I stated that the document had every hallmark of having been drafted in Dublin, at which point one very, very senior official replied, ‘That’s because it largely was’”. It is very sad that they wrote something that breaches international law and that the UK Government supported that.
What is also important—dare I use the word “hypocritical”? That is a strong word. The European Union was a very strong advocate for the protocol and for breaching territorial integrity. Yet, as I deal with in paragraphs 40 onwards, when it came to countries wishing to join the European Union with the demise of the USSR; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, the European Union stepped up and called for a stability pact to be implemented.
As you see, paragraph 41 lists all the international treaties that deal with it. Then it said what these principles were: refraining from the threat or use of force, inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity of states and respect for internationally recognised frontiers. It was conscious that there were minority conflicts and it wanted the territorial integrity of states to be recognised by countries that were hoping to join the European Union. The Secretary of State was asked, as I say in paragraph 43—
The Chair: On that, there is a correction, is there not? It should be Douglas Hurd, not Douglas Hogg.
Dermot Nesbitt: Sorry, yes. You are quite correct[1]; it is one of these typographical things. He said that part of this was to resolve problems especially concerning frontiers and minorities. There were Russians in Estonia and what have you. Here was the European Union wanting to respect the territorial integrity when it comes to countries joining the European Union and being in the European Union. If you are not in the European Union, so Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, we can breach the territorial integrity of the state. As we know today, hardly a week passes in the news that international law is not mentioned with the USA, Venezuela, Greenland, Gaza Strip and Ukraine. There was a quote from Yvette Cooper. I think I got her name right, Chair.
The Chair: I think we have got the point, Mr Nesbitt. Can I bring in Lord Thomas? Then I am going to ask Lord Elliott to go back to the original question.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: Was Mr Varadkar doing no more than giving assurance to the nationalist community in Northern Ireland that the border would remain open? I do not see that there is a great breach of international law in what he said. He was simply giving an assurance, was he not?
Dermot Nesbitt: You say he was giving an assurance and there is no breach of international law. As a very important committee of the House of Lords said, there are many acts from the European Union that are applied to Northern Ireland that Westminster and Stormont have no say in. It breaches territorial integrity of the United Kingdom.
As regards the hard border, as I mentioned quite clearly, there is no problem. The border is quite open. We have a common travel area. Of course, there are slight problems at the moment, but the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has said that he will address that. That is an open border.
As you notice, I have said that Niall Cody gave evidence in May 2017 to the Oireachtas where he said that less than 2% of goods would be physically checked, the vast majority would be checked in warehouses and it was being managed entirely electronically. I quote: “we are not looking for sites for customs posts”. The border would have remained technically open as it was, whether or not we were within the European Union, but, no, that did not buy into Leo Varadkar—
The Chair: I want to move on because we have very little time left. Can we go back to your original planned question?
Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard: Dermot, my original question was around the Equality Commission and the Human Rights Commission, and what role they have played since their establishment. In your view, has it been positive?
Dermot Nesbitt: Yes, it generally has been positive. I was a member of the Equality Commission, so I do not make too much of a comment because there were various discussions we had. It is positive in one sense of the Human Rights Commission monitoring the law, but it has not been positive in not devising a Bill of Rights. As I tried to indicate, it refused to take a narrow view. As Tom Hadden rightly said, initially, under Bryce Dickson, it had a whole lot of sub-committees on various interests. Of course, it wanted maximum rights. As Tom Hadden rightly said as well, the United Kingdom Government said that it did not stick to the remit of a Bill of Rights.
He went on to say that Professor Monica McWilliams did not learn from that, which I find quite disturbing. She said, “We’re not going to do a mere tick box”. That is disrespectful to the two referenda held in Ireland and Northern Ireland on 22 May that endorsed the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, which had in it a Bill of Rights to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, building on the European Convention on Human Rights. It has been successful, yes, but on other occasions, particularly in the non-formation of a Bill of Rights, it was not successful.
The Chair: We will come back to a Bill of Rights at the end.
Q80 Baroness Ludford: I wanted to be clear in my own mind about what you think the significance was of the UK vote to leave the EU for the RSEO chapter of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. You said in your written submission in paragraph 40—and you have been discussing some of this—that both the UK and Irish Governments breached international law, and particularly commitments provided in the Belfast agreement, when they agreed the protocol and the Windsor Framework.
Then, during your answer today, you referred to Article 2 of the protocol not being relevant because—this is in paragraph 70 of your submission—the Belfast agreement “is a stand-alone international agreement, and its central reconciliation elements will be sustained into the future, notwithstanding the UK’s withdrawal from the EU”. On the one hand you say that Article 2 of the protocol is irrelevant, but on the other hand you have said that it is a breach of international law. It is probably just me, but I was struggling to put all that together.
Dermot Nesbitt: I put Article 2. I see Article 2, but I say it is not relevant because what really is relevant is implementation of the Good Friday agreement through the Northern Ireland Act—it is statute there and what has to be done—and implementation of the framework convention and monitoring through the Council of Europe. Those are the key things.
As I mentioned, I accept that the European Union says that the European market is important and needs to be protected. I also say at the very end, I think in the last paragraph, that you could have a European harmonisation Act UK. In other words, companies that want to trade with Europe would have to subscribe to that particular law. Therefore, you would have a law for those that want to trade.
What we have now is a law that applies to all of Northern Ireland, whether or not you are trading, and all the other companies that might not be trading with Europe. We have lots of documentation complications because of the border between GB and Northern Ireland. Therefore they are subject to problems that they need not be. The only ones that need to be subject to European law are those that are trading, and that could be done. There are also other suggestions, where they both give guarantees of those coming north and those going south.
The protocol is not needed, as it says in Article 2, to protect rights. Rights are protected by those who implement them, namely the Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission, the Assembly, government, potentially the Bill of Rights et cetera.
Q81 The Chair: Let us go back to a Bill of Rights as our final subject. I am looking at the annexe to your written document, which sets out a recipe of 30 rights that might be included in a Bill of Rights. I am sure you recognise that having a Bill of Rights like that would be unusual in the context of the whole of the United Kingdom, because there is no such Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom comparable to the document you have set out.
I wanted to ask you a practical question. Which of the important rights set out in your list of 30 are not enforceable by current legal mechanisms available in Northern Ireland, even though those legal mechanisms are not in one document?
Dermot Nesbitt: I cannot answer what is not legally enforceable, again back to the legal position. This is where I say you, as a committee, should be taking a position where you say, “Here are 30 rights of the framework convention. As a Human Rights Commission, could you look at them, see which ones are particularly relevant to Northern Ireland and what you can add and make into a Bill of Rights?” It would have the expertise, knowledge, time and commitment to dissect those 30 rights, as to which would be relevant or not relevant, given Northern Ireland or the UK.
I am very conscious that they are very expansive rights. If you look at these, the last three mentioned talk about endeavouring to conclude, where necessary, bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states. That is what we have done here. Taking measures to encourage trans-frontier co-operation: we have done that. That is a right that does not need to be implemented as such.
The Chair: Exactly, that is why I am asking for your expertise. You have spent half a lifetime looking at these issues and we take what you have written very seriously indeed. I am wondering whether there are any rights in your list that stand out to you as not being enforceable under the existing, if somewhat diverse, provisions available for the enforcement of rights in Northern Ireland.
Dermot Nesbitt: There is none that stands out as not enforceable, I do not think. Having put in my mind the 30 rights, I do not think that there are any that are not enforceable, although some are not enforceable maybe because they are not needed. I gave that example of trans-frontier co-operation. That need not be a right because we have that.
Part of my problem is the North South Ministerial Council. Part of its remit was to deal with complications and difficulties, including the EU. We never dealt with that. The protocol was imposed upon us. The Northern Ireland Assembly was not consulted or asked for a view as such.
The Chair: Do you want to make any comments about the Dillon judgment? It may be that you will say, understandably, that that is an issue for the lawyers. If you had any comments about whether the Dillon judgment creates certainty or uncertainty, or maybe certain uncertainty or uncertain certainty, we would be interested in them.
Dermot Nesbitt: I view the Dillon judgment as the Supreme Court exercising its authority. The Supreme Court means the highest court in the land. It is exercising its authority. Therefore I do not see the Dillon judgment as of any great significance. I come back to the same thing I repeated: it is implementation of the Northern Ireland Act and the framework convention. I repeat that the reason I highlight the framework convention is that I go back to the Council of Europe when it was derived historically because of conflicts. It did not want conflicts among minorities to continue as they did, especially after the First World War with Germans in Poland. We know what conflict that caused.
Those are all the key things that are needed. This is a one-off judgment on Dillon. I noticed the use of words. One of the questions written to me is about sectarian conflict, and the Good Friday agreement talks about communal conflict. Sectarian conflict is a better description of the conflict we had in Northern Ireland.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: As I understand from your submission and what you have been saying, your interpretation of the Dillon judgment in relation to rights is that it dealt specifically with sectarian conflict as opposed to forward-facing rights.
Dermot Nesbitt: I could not disagree with Dillon where it said that the rights listed in the bullet points were all concerned with ending sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland. I could not disagree with that. All I would say is that those rights listed were not encapsulating all that was needed. You had to look at the whole section of that Belfast agreement to see what was needed and whether it has been properly implemented.
This goes back to the question about the Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission and whether they are doing their job. Yes, to an extent they are. To an extent, the Human Rights Commission did not fulfil its job of getting a Bill of Rights.
The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr Nesbitt. You have been a very valuable witness to the committee. I am now going to bring the public part of the meeting to a close. Can I remind you that a verbatim transcript will be sent to you for correction? Thank you on behalf of us all for your evidence.
