14
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
Oral evidence: Deterrence in an age of Russian aggression, HC 338
Monday 13 July 2026
4.15 pm
Members present: Matt Western (The Chair); Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom; Lord Boateng; Liam Byrne; Sarah Champion; Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi; Lord Godson; Lord Hutton of Furness; Lord Jack of Courance; Mike Martin; Lord Sedwill; Baroness Tyler of Enfield; Lord Tunnicliffe; Lord Watts, Sir Gavin Williamson.
Evidence Session No. 4 Heard in Public Questions 41 - 47
Witnesses
Tom McKane, former Director General for Strategy and for Security Policy, Ministry of Defence (MoD); Jen Easterly, former director, US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, visiting fellow, Blavatnik School of Government; Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of US Army Europe (USAREUR).
Tom McKane, Jen Easterly and Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Ben Hodges.
Q41 The Chair: Today we are holding the third session of our inquiry into deterrence in an age of Russian aggression. This time, our focus is on the UK’s role in NATO. I thank our witnesses for joining us and ask them to introduce themselves, starting with those who are in the room.
Jen Easterly: I am pleased to be here. I am currently the CEO of RSAC, which is the largest global cyber security and AI security platform. I was the director of the US cyber defence agency, CISA, and I am currently a visiting fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford.
Tom McKane: I am a former UK civil servant. I ended my career as the director-general for security policy in the Ministry of Defence. I am currently associated with the Royal United Services Institute, though I speak today in a personal capacity.
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: I am a former commander of US Army Europe. I retired eight years ago and live here in Frankfurt, Germany.
The Chair: Thank you very much for joining us. I forewarn our witnesses that, unfortunately, we are expecting three votes in the House of Lords, which could come sooner that we anticipate, so I apologise in advance. We want to try to get through this by 5 pm but, as there might be some disruption, please keep your responses reasonably brief. Thank you.
I start with you, Lieutenant General. What was your outtake of last week’s summit? Was it successful?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: There are three things to mention. The first is unity, which is always the main objective coming out of every summit. Even though my President started off by complaining about allies and even brought up the subject of Greenland again, by the time it was over, it was about where it should be, so that was a positive. The second thing was a major display of European countries investing in defence, as well as Canada. That was very positive. Thirdly, there was a positive endorsement of Ukraine by the alliance. I am very sceptical that we will get to the point where Ukraine can make its own Patriots, although I wish that were true.
The Chair: Thank you for that. Jen, what was your view on how successful last week was, and what was the main takeaway?
Jen Easterly: I would align myself with Ben on this. What I was hoping to see last week manifested today: the action taken by the UK and the EU to specifically call out Russian aggressive hybrid activity and activity that affects elections, including interference in elections in Armenia and Moldova, and the attacks against the Polish cyber electric grid, which manifested in extensive espionage. I was hoping to see some sort of statement that called out specific Russian hybrid and cyber activity in particular, but I was very pleased to see that the actions taken today include the exposure of Russian activity, specifically the sanctions against 24 individuals and entities. That is the kind of activity that NATO, the UK and our colleagues should be calling out on a more regular basis.
The Chair: Do you think NATO should have a more public conversation about its purpose and relevancy, given what you just said?
Jen Easterly: When you are talking about deterring Russian hybrid and—specifically in my field—cyber activity, the conversation needs to be much more active with respect to how you effectively deny this activity through things like resilience and by jointly hardening infrastructure. Some of that is about how we use the right regulatory regime to include some of the recent things done to hold cloud providers accountable, and how we expose, in a joint and rapid way, Russian cyber activity, as happened today. How do we impose costs? There is deterrence by denial, but there has to be a very active conversation about how we use offensive authorities and cyber power to hold Russian critical infrastructure itself at risk. Then there needs to be an important conversation about denial and deterrence by resilience. How do you preserve alliance decision-making and continued support for Ukraine by continuing to be resilient in the face of this nefarious activity?
Tom McKane: I agree that unity was the theme of the outcome. It is worth quoting from the summit declaration, where the leaders reaffirmed their “ironclad commitment to our collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond”. That is all very good. I was slightly surprised that they referred to Russia as a “long-term threat … to Euro-Atlantic security and stability”. All this has to be read alongside statements and articles by senior American officials talking about NATO 3.0. A lot of people have seen the summit as being the launch of NATO 3.0, which some see as code for the Europeans taking on the role of the conventional defence of Europe.
The Chair: Thank you for that. Ben, one of the comments made at the summit was about whether the UK has a future role as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. What is your take on that?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: It is hard to imagine not having a British officer as the DSACEUR, given the importance of intelligence sharing, especially if the United States at some point relinquishes the SACEUR position, which has been discussed. Having a British officer there is an important contribution and role for the UK. It should not be measured by who has the biggest budget, or something like that; it should be a strategic role. That is appropriate.
The Chair: Tom, what is your take?
Tom McKane: I am sure that the British Government would want to continue to provide the officer who fills that role, and for some of the reasons that General Hodges referred to, I do not see any reason at the moment for them not to do so.
The Chair: To move us on, I call Lord Hutton.
Q42 Lord Hutton of Furness: This is a question primarily for General Hodges. Do you think that it is realistic to talk about a successful transition to a European-led NATO? What do you think that might look like in practice for NATO’s command and deployment divisions?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: It is almost inevitable that it is going that way, based on what this Administration and even some other Administrations do. I think that we are going to regret losing relevance and influence in Europe one day, as the Administration tries to encourage or cajole Europe and Canada to take on more of a leading role. That happening to us is not something that I fear; it is something that I would regret. The key for me will always be the collective defence, the commitment of all of us to each other and intelligence sharing—not only at Five Eyes but across the alliance. Intelligence sharing is so important for the United States. We cannot defend America from North Carolina or Texas; we have to have forward bases, friends and access. I would certainly hope that, even as the alliance becomes more European-centric and European-led, we would still have those things.
Lord Hutton of Furness: How different would a European-led NATO look? What would be the differences between the current arrangement and any future European-led NATO?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: The various headquarters would not look that different. There are European, Canadian and American officers at every one of the different headquarters at all the different levels, with European officers in command of many of these. That would not look so different. On the command systems, the United States has provided the backbone for much of the command and control digital systems that everybody uses. That does not mean that that cannot remain in place, but that would be of concern.
I would expect that the United States would continue to provide the nuclear deterrent, along with the UK and France, because it is in our interests, although a nuclear deterrent on its own would not be sufficient. The intelligence systems are a part of that. I do not think that a more European NATO will mean that there will be less US intelligence commitments or assets, because this is in our interest.
Lord Hutton of Furness: Are you saying that it would be very difficult to entirely replace US capabilities, particularly in the command and control areas?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: I would think so. Everybody has gone along with this, frankly, because of the quality of it. If, for some reason, that was no longer the case, there will be 31 other nations trying to agree on whose system will be used. That would not be a good problem to have to deal with.
Lord Hutton of Furness: That does not sound like a good problem at all.
This is a question for General Hodges and Tom: what role do you think that the UK should play as part of this transition, and how should we approach the transition at the political level? Obviously, this is going to be quite a complex and challenging task. General, could I ask you to comment first? Then we will hear from Tom.
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: Let me speak from a land-power perspective. The expectation that the US Army has always had of our British Army allies was a core headquarters, a three-star headquarters—of course, you have always provided ARRC, which is an exceptional headquarters—a war-fighting division headquarters and then to meet requirements as part of NATO’s forward presence in Estonia, Poland and such. Those are the things that I and the US Army always look for. So, when I see the size of the Army shrinking, I worry about that.
Lord Hutton of Furness: Many of us do. Tom, how do we manage the politics of this carefully?
Tom McKane: We have begun to address the question of hard capabilities, although we are only taking the first steps down a road which it is going to take some time to reach the end of. There remain, as your question implies, a number of big questions that remain unanswered concerning the overall leadership within a European NATO, if that is what we can call it. The best role that a UK Government can play is to work with the US Government—because if this is a transition, it is better to be a managed transition than a rush for the exits—and, critically, with France and Germany in the so-called E3 and, possibly, the E5, including Poland and Italy, and let us not forget Turkey. We are at the very early stages of figuring out how all this will work in practice.
Lord Hutton of Furness: Thank you, Tom. For all three of you, do the recent announcements made in the defence investment plan reassure you that the UK is investing enough and in the right areas to help boost NATO’s collective defence and resilience?
Tom McKane: My main concern about the defence investment plan is that it does not come with a clear statement of future force structures and, therefore, how the different capabilities that are described will fit together and how they will fit together with NATO’s plans. We must welcome the fact that we have at least some description of the Government’s capability plans, but some of the vacuum around it needs to be fleshed out.
Jen Easterly: I agree with Tom.
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: I always try to think in terms of requirements and capabilities—not so much platforms and that sort of thing. Of course, when we look at what we imagine warfare is going to be for the next 20, 30 or 40 years, air and missile defence is going to be at the top of everybody’s list to be able to protect your critical infrastructure and civilian populations, not just from drones but obviously from ballistic missiles. This is the kind of thing that is happening in Ukraine every night. That will happen in the UK or Germany if the Russians ever make the terrible decision to attack a NATO country, because they know that NATO’s deterrence and defence depends on rapid reinforcement. Everybody’s seaports and airports would get absolutely hammered and struck with cyber attacks.
The other thing is long-range precision strikes. That is what all of us are now trying to get—not better tanks, but long-range precision, where you can hit targets at 1,000, 1,500 or 2,000 kilometres for obvious reasons of achieving effect and minimising your own casualties. I did not see enough of that specifically.
I am sure that the First Sea Lord would not want me commenting on the types of ships that the Royal Navy needs, but I see the US Navy increasingly investing in unmanned maritime systems. Ukraine is achieving this in enclosed bodies of water, such as the Black Sea and Azov Sea. Whether aerial or maritime, unmanned systems are going to become increasingly important.
Lord Hutton of Furness: That is very clear. Finally, I have a quick question about Ukraine. Do you think we are doing enough to learn the lessons from Ukraine and incorporate these into our own planning for future conflict?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: Absolutely not. Everybody I talk to who deals with this is frustrated that there is still no sense of urgency and a belief that there is no way we would have to do what the Ukrainians are having to do. That is not because these people are bad or stupid; it is just that, institutionally, it usually takes a real catastrophe to force us all to get off the track that we are already on. The next war for us all will not necessarily be what Ukraine is doing right now, so you do not want to learn the wrong lessons or do away with armoured vehicles or other types of platforms. I am just saying that, given the way that information has now become the weapon, the ability to squeeze all your different sensors, shooters and decision-making into a few seconds instead of a few hours or days is the capability that we have to get—more than anything else.
Lord Hutton of Furness: Thank you, that is very clear. Tom or Jen, do you have anything final to say on that?
Jen Easterly: During my experience as director of CISA, we worked very closely with the Ukraine cyber forces and those who are responsible for critical infrastructure. We did a lot to learn from them as they were learning from us about how to defend their civilian and military infrastructure from the onslaught of Russian cyber attacks and how to continue to be able to use civilian critical infrastructure to provide for their populations. That was a very good relationship of information sharing and continuous learning that I hope will continue, although it is not clear to me that it is ongoing.
Tom McKane: One of the positive things to take from the defence investment plan was an acknowledgement that we are going to have to fight with many of the platforms that we either already have or are on contract to have. The trick will be how one makes them more effective by using the latest technology and, in that sense, learns lessons from Ukraine.
Q43 Sarah Champion: My questions are all for you, Jen, if that is okay. I have a few quick-fire ones. If Europe is expected to assume greater responsibility for NATO defence, what cyber capabilities and resilience do you think the UK should prioritise?
Jen Easterly: The good news is that the UK has been prioritising cyber capabilities and resilience. We had a very close working relationship between CISA and the National Cyber Security Centre. We shared a lot of what we were doing strategically, in particular the work around “secure by design” technology, which is holding technology vendors accountable for what they are building, including software, and, importantly, getting frontier AI labs to design and deploy these new capabilities with security as the top priority. It may sound pretty obvious but, frankly, decades of misaligned economic incentives and a lack of tech regulation or a software liability regime have led to the multibillion-dollar cyber-security aftermarket.
So, the “secure by design” initiative that has been carried through at the NCSC and by the broader UK critical infrastructure community is important. Using purchasing power, which I know the UK is very focused on, and holding to account the cloud providers and the hyperscalers, including with the recent announcement around third-party regulation against the cloud companies, are also incredibly important.
Then there is the whole nexus between cyber security and AI. Over the past three months we have seen the release of the most powerful cyber tools to be used for the exposure, finding and fixing of cyber capabilities. The UK just released Cyber Shield, which is about how to use agents, both defensively and offensively, to reduce risk to civilian and military infrastructure. That kind of current ongoing activity is where the leading edge of how to defend infrastructure needs to be.
Sarah Champion: I am very pleased that you are so enthusiastic about the accountability measures that have been put in place, but do you think they are realistic? We have been trying to close the door on many protection measures on social media and other platforms. Why should we believe that the accountability will be in place and robust when it comes to cyber security?
Jen Easterly: From a US perspective, it has never existed. For 40 years we have allowed technology vendors to build and deploy capabilities that prioritise speed to market, features, convenience and cost over security. We have allowed that to happen. Now real actions are being taken, with legal consequences, such as the software liability regime—whether it is what is happening in the UK or in Europe, with the cyber resilience Act. If I had a magic wand and could have one thing, it would be a software liability regime to hold vendors accountable for the quality of their products, just as we hold car makers accountable for exploding airbags or planes that create crashes. There has to be a change in mindset.
The good news on these powerful cyber capabilities is that, if we can put the burden on the companies to ensure security, they can shift the advantage to defenders by creating much more secure software. That is the optimistic view, of course, but it is predicated on a lot of work to successfully hold vendors accountable.
Sarah Champion: Do you think that the UK has been front-footed enough in tackling hostile actors in this space?
Jen Easterly: In terms of the offensive cyber capabilities, I started by helping to build US Cyber Command and worked very closely with GCHQ at that time. We modelled a lot of what we were doing on its capabilities. We have now built capability and capacity that is commensurate, but it is important to continue to exercise in a very muscular way the ability to impose costs and hold adversaries accountable, and to hold both their civilian and military infrastructure at risk in the way that they hold allied nations at risk.
Sarah Champion: In your opinion, does NATO need to be clearer about what cyber activity might trigger Article 5?
Jen Easterly: There is a certain value in ambiguity, frankly, because, as soon as you are very clear with something, the line gets crossed. There is virtue in ambiguity. It is important to be much more aggressive and rapid in terms of making attributions and calling them out. Again, I wish it had happened earlier, but I was very pleased to see the statement that holds Russia accountable for going after Poland’s power grid in the dead of winter and almost taking down power for 500,000 people. That is something that needs to happen much more quickly and, frankly, it needs to have costs associated with it, whether they are costs we can see or costs that happen in sanctions, indictment, disruption, law enforcement activity or diplomatic consequences.
Q44 Lord Sedwill: My questions are primarily for General Hodges and Mr McKane, and are about the nuclear deterrent. I will come in with a few detailed points in a moment, but let us start with the overall credibility of the NATO nuclear deterrent, including the US, and then the European pillar of that deterrent in view of Russia’s repeated nuclear-related threat since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Perhaps we can start with Mr McKane.
Tom McKane: By way of prelude, it is worth reminding ourselves that the Russian Government have, in effect, lowered the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons. If you compare their 2020 statement on deterrence policy with their 2024 statement, you will see that they have changed it in a number of small ways that add significantly to the circumstances in which they would consider the use of nuclear weapons to be justified. We need to be concerned about that. We also need to be concerned about the very large number of Russian sub-strategic nuclear weapons, which completely outweighs the number that the NATO alliance can rely on. That is a weakness. General Hodges referred to the need to invest in long-range precision conventional strike. That is certainly true, but the big question is: is that enough in the current circumstances?
Lord Sedwill: I will come to General Hodges in a moment, but let us just pursue that point. You seem to be suggesting that the absence of a flexible response escalatory ladder in the modern era—horizontal as well as vertical, including cyber, for example—undermines the credibility of the NATO nuclear deterrent. That, of course, has tactical nuclear weapons in it at a point along the ladder before we get to the strategic. Would that be a fair summary?
Tom McKane: I think that is a fair summary, and there are two aspects to this. One is the relatively small size of the US inventory of sub-strategic weapons in Europe. Secondly, against the backdrop of some of the strains that have appeared in the transatlantic relationship, there is the absence of any sovereign capability on the European part in that space. The French have air-delivered nuclear weapons, but they regard that as strategic. Although the UK Government have said that we will join the NATO dual-capable aircraft mission, it would be entirely wrong to imagine that that increased our sovereign capability, given that the weapons are US-controlled.
Lord Sedwill: Thank you. We might come back in a moment to the question of the European pillar of the nuclear deterrent were, for example, the Americans not engaged. I will come back to that point, if I may. General Hodges, is there anything you wish to add to Mr McKane’s points? It is very good to see you as well.
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: A nuclear deterrent does not have to be nuclear. In other words, if the Russians believe that we have the capability, even using non-nuclear weapons, to eliminate Kaliningrad, their submarine bases up on the Kola Peninsula or other targets such as that, that is a nuclear deterrent. You do not have to match the Russians, as you know, warhead for warhead. Because France has somewhere between 500 and 600 warheads and the UK has somewhere in that general territory, we do not need the 5,000 or 6,000 to match what Russia has. How we look at the nuclear deterrent should reflect that. Deterrence is all about capability and demonstrating the will to use the capability. They have to believe that we would actually do this so that they do not.
Russia has been threatening the use of nuclear weapons for a long time, ever since it was first proposed that we give a Stinger air defence system to Ukraine. Then, people thought, “Oh my God, they might escalate”. The Russians can see how effective their threats are and how we stop, when, in fact, there is almost zero chance they would use any nuclear weapons in and around Ukraine, because there is no benefit for them to do that. President Xi has told them not to. Prime Minister Modi has told them not to do it. There is no benefit for Russia to use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. The real benefit for them comes from just the threat of it, and they see how we, frankly, overreact to it.
Lord Sedwill: Thank you. That self-deterrence point is a is a whole different topic that it is just worth registering. We probably do not have time to pursue it in detail, but it is a point very well made.
I come the question of UK and French nuclear collaboration and the 2025 Northwood declaration. Perhaps starting with Tom, how meaningful is that in strategic versus symbolic terms, recognising these are somewhat blurred? Strategic communications is a big part of deterrence. It is not just about nuclear capability, as General Hodges has suggested. Where do you see that in terms of progress since that declaration?
Tom McKane: I do think it is significant. Clearly, the UK and French Governments, ever since the mid-1990s, said that they would regard anything that was a threat to the vital national interests of one as threatening the vital national interests of the other. Of course, the in the Northwood declaration, they went a step further and said that—and I am not quoting here—they could not envisage a threat to the vital national interests of anywhere in Europe as not affecting them and that it would require them to respond.
The question as to whether their capability is sufficient to deter Russia, as General Hodges has said, is very much about the mind inside the Kremlin and what they think. But we have to remember that successive UK Governments, ever since the 1960s, have believed that their own strategic deterrent and sovereign capability, would be sufficient in extremis to deter Russia. So, one has to assume that the same applies today. The UK and the French do not rely, unlike the Americans, on a counterforce doctrine. When you put their forces together, they could represent a threat that the Kremlin would have to take extremely seriously. The question is how far the French and British Governments are going to co-ordinate the way that their deterrent forces operate. Clearly, two boats—or perhaps three or four—at sea at the same time represents a much bigger deterrent force than a single boat. The British and French Governments have been extremely tight-lipped about progress that has been made over the last year. I personally believe that it would send a good deterrent message if our Government said more about how the decision to join the DCA mission and how the decision to deepen collaboration with the French added to our deterrent messaging.
Lord Sedwill: Thank you; I agree with that. Your point about the Kremlin’s attitude to this was well made by Lord Robertson just recently, when he commented about how many times he had been in the Kremlin and the extent to which the nuclear deterrent was something that was on the mind of President Putin. That it is just worth registering that. That was really helpful. Thank you. General Hodges.
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: Sir?
Lord Sedwill: Is there anything you wanted to what Mr McKane said? I have a couple of other questions, and I can move on to those, but I just wanted to check if there was anything you wanted to add on the Anglo-French question?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: Nothing else from me, sir.
The Chair: I am just conscious of time, so if you could perhaps wrap these into one, that would be helpful.
Q45 Lord Sedwill: A final question to all three of you. If one thinks of the panoply of deterrence, as General Hodges said earlier, one does not necessarily need nukes to deter nukes. There are other elements to this. That includes cyber and so on. How well postured is NATO Europe now were the United States not to be engaged, either through choice or necessity in a potential confrontation with Russia? Perhaps General Hodges could start.
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: This would be where the political will really comes to the fore. If there is not a strong US, UK or French push to say we have to respond even if it was unilaterally, but for the alliance, there will be quite a few countries that would be much less perhaps forceful in doing something like that, unless there was such an obvious threat that everybody agreed they had to deal with. That would require some real leadership. That is another good reason to have a British DSACEUR.
Lord Sedwill: Thank you. Perhaps we will hear from Jen Easterly next, and then we will let Tom have the final word.
Jen Easterly: Integrated deterrence strategy that I mentioned at the outset is about deterrence by denial; exposing activity; imposing costs, whether that is through sanctions or indictments; diplomatic consequences or offensive cyber operations. The last is about resilience and persisting together as a collaborative, non-fractured community. The US does not necessarily most importantly come into play on the military side. As General Hodges mentioned earlier, Five Eyes and intelligence sharing is absolutely critical to the continued understanding of attribution and being able to call out and declare that activity in a way that has resonance for the declaratory policy. With respect to the military piece, it is about imposing costs. Do I think that NATO nations, specifically the UK, can effectively impose costs without the US military involved? Yes, but the US military Cyber Command now plays a very important role, which would have to be accounted for as we move forward on cost imposition and deterrence by punishment.
Tom McKane: There are two aspects to this. One is capabilities. As Europeans, we are still desperately short of certain capabilities, notably those strategic enabling capabilities that we rely on the US for at the moment. There is a big question as to whether we are moving quickly enough to build up capability; that would be a big question about the defence investment plan in this country, but there are also questions in a number of other European states, notably those to the south and the west.
The second issue is one of cohesion. Without US leadership, would the Europeans be able to decide collectively to act effectively in their own self-defence? The biggest risk in that situation is a fait accompli operation where the Russians seize a small part of Baltic territory and then sit on it waiting for the European NATO states to try to dislodge them.
Lord Sedwill: Thank you. We could certainly pursue that point but, with that, I will close, Chair. Thank you very much to all of you.
The Chair: General Hodges, could you give us a few more minutes of your precious time? Would that be possible?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: Sir, I think your time is much more precious than mine. I just got a 15-minute reprieve from my next appointment, so I can.
The Chair: That is very generous; thank you.
Q46 Lord Watts: Can I ask you about the credibility of NATO’s deterrence? Is it dependent on all NATO countries making their increased contribution? What does Russia think of the fact that NATO members are backloading a lot of that increased spending? Do you think we are doing all we can on procurement to get value for money, co-operation between NATO members and a strategy for identifying what NATO needs to provide and how best to divide it?
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: First of all, as you know, the most important aspect of deterrence is the readiness of the forces that you have: the Air Force, Navy, land forces, everything. Whatever state of modernisation they are in—we are all constantly going through some degree of modernisation and reorganisation—are they fully manned, are they trained to carry out their tasks and do they have adequate ammunition, fuel and repair parts? That is absolutely the most important thing about deterrence. Even though many nations are playing catch-up on modernisation, focusing on the level of readiness of what is there would be at the front of my mind, and not everybody is where they need to be yet.
Another aspect of this deterrence—I am glad that Jen mentioned it earlier—is the grey-zone operations where Russia is using hybrid tactics and constantly pushing the boundaries of what we are willing to tolerate, whether we are talking about drones, sabotage, assassination or shadow fleet vessels moving through the Baltic Sea, the channel and the Black Sea. Then, of course, there is disinformation. Until we figure out how to inflict consequences on the Russians for those things that are not easily attributable but we know who is behind them, they will continue to escalate this, because it is designed to scare us into stopping to support Ukraine. We will get into the scenario that Tom just mentioned of some sort of limited incursion into, say, Latvia or Estonia. Deterrence is not only about equipment; it is about political will and the readiness of our forces.
Tom McKane: I absolutely agree with the general that we must not end up terrifying ourselves over this situation, and we should focus on readiness. NATO has been conducting exercises in the Baltic states in order to both demonstrate its determination to defend them and to learn lessons about operating in that environment.
On your second point about value for money, there is a very big question about whether we achieve that. Clearly, there are many projects one could point to where that is definitely not the case. My main concern is that, while I recognise and understand the reasons why our Government talk constantly about spending defence money on British companies, we also have to try to find a way to maximise the impact of spend across the European NATO allies, which means finding ways to get better bang for our buck by combining procurements and so on. There were signs in Istanbul that some projects were being announced that would answer that point, but we are still a long way from reaching best practice.
Jen Easterly: The only thing I will add is that when it comes to cyber defence and offensive capabilities, it is critical to recognise that, while we have five domains of warfare, with air, land, sea, space and cyber, we really have a sixth domain, which is the private sector. It is very much affected by defensive operations, whether below or above the threshold of activity, and specific kinetic attacks against civilian or military infrastructure, because there is a civilian-enabling component even to military infrastructure. Also, when you look at the cost imposition of things like offensive cyber operations, there is a real impact on private sector businesses, which have to be taken into account.
Q47 Lord Godson: General Hodges, I think I must declare an interest, having been your guest in Ukraine a decade ago; I thank you for your hospitality back then. You were one of the first people to be miles ahead of the curve on the whole subject of a Schengen zone, as I think you called it, for resupply of allies on the front line, like Ukraine and other nations—not least NATO countries such as Poland—so I would be grateful for your latest assessment of the progress that has been made on a Schengen zone within NATO for that reinforcement of allies in eastern Europe.
Lieutenant General (Ret'd) Ben Hodges: Thank you, sir, for reminding me of your visit with us to Ukraine when we had just delivered the Q-36 radar to the Ukrainians, before we were even providing lethal capabilities to them. I was amazed because the radar was even better than I realised: they were so good at using it and getting the most out of it.
The idea of a military Schengen started because I was trying to impress on leaders how important it was that NATO forces could move as fast as or faster than Russian forces across Europe during peacetime conditions when we were trying to deter Russia from making a terrible mistake. They needed to see that we could assemble in Lithuania, Estonia or somewhere in Poland, for example, to tell them, “We see what you are doing. Don’t make a terrible mistake”. I discovered that crossing borders, infrastructure and rail capacity were all lacking, as was an understanding of why it mattered. I was talking to the wrong people. I kept talking to Ministry of Defence people in all these countries, and they have nothing to do with their borders, just like in the US. I should have been talking to the Interior Minister and others.
I thought I would be cool, as an American, demonstrating how well I know Europe by using the Schengen zone as the comparison. I said, “We need a military Schengen, where you can move across borders without a problem”. You could see that people were like, “Oh, that makes sense”, until one of the senior EU commissioners said, “Please stop saying Schengen, because half of Europe hates it and the other half wishes they were in it”. The next day, the Dutch Minister of Defence said, “We need a military Schengen zone”, so I was happy that I did not have to say it any more.
We are way further down the road—pardon the pun—than we were when you and I first talked about it. The regional approach that the Netherlands, Germany and Poland have taken together was good for creating that mobility corridor. That was a good step towards achieving it, rather than trying to get the whole thing all at once. But it has to be practised, because so many civilian agencies are involved—civilian contractors, boats, trains, ferries, you name it. It needs to be part of all the exercises. Of course, the British Army practises this quite a bit, but it requires constant effort.
The Chair: Thank you. That concludes out first witness panel session. I thank our guests for joining us today, and I thank General Hodges for accommodating us by extending his time with us.