16
Examination of witness
Ambassador John Bolton.
Q54 The Chair: Good afternoon. Ambassador Bolton, I very much welcome you to the International Relations and Defence Committee of the House of Lords. Thank you for taking the time to see us; we will be going straight into questions from various members of the committee. We have already allocated specific questions. On a personal note, you may not recall me but I certainly recall you, having served under both Prime Minister Johnson and Prime Minister May in terms of engagements during that time.
For transparency, relevant interests need to be declared at the start. I was Minister in the previous Government and my relevant interest now is that I chair an advisory board on the International Communities Organisation. May I just remind all members to declare any relevant interests when you address the committee and ask Ambassador Bolton your first question?
Welcome once again, Ambassador Bolton. This is the sixth evidence session for our inquiry looking at the role of multilateralism. Today we very much welcome your perspective on the role and future role in the multilateral system that the US, from your perspective, is and should be playing. We have been taking evidence from various people in this regard. I would also add at this juncture that we are of course particularly interested in the UK’s role in practical terms going forward, and we would welcome your own insights and perspectives.
This session is being live-streamed on our parliamentary website and a transcript of the session will be taken. Once available, a copy of the transcript will be sent and small corrections can be made if needed. I have already reminded members about declaring interests.
We are going to go straight into the questions. We have an hour or so and if there is time in your schedule, we will certainly be pleased to continue for a small period thereafter. Also, please see it as an opportunity beyond the formal questions; if there are other areas you want to provide insight on, we would certainly welcome that.
As the Chair of this committee today, in the absence of Lord Robertson—who I am sure you know—I am glad that we have been joined by other members. One member, Lord Bruce, is joining us virtually, and we welcome back physically our dear friend Lord Grocott.
The United States was responsible for building and maintaining the multilateral system post the Second World War. Ambassador Bolton, here we are in 2026. In your view, will it continue to play that role and how do you see that role developing in terms of its nuances in the years to come?
Ambassador John Bolton: Thank you again for the chance to provide the testimony before your committee. In the US—not totally but typically—we divide discussions of international organisations or the multilateral system into organisations that are part of the UN system or close to it, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which are technically part of the UN system, the multilateral development banks and the international judicial institutions, and call them multilateral organisations as opposed to alliances for collective defence such as NATO, which we do not typically call international organisations. That is not uniformly followed but it is a distinction that is important, because collective defence organisations are certainly nothing new in human history. They go back before recorded human history, I have no doubt.
It is better to treat the system of international organisations that has developed more recently on its own. In terms of the system that came after World War II, it is obviously under stress from a variety of different directions. It is certainly under stress from Donald Trump at the moment, but I will try to make this a broader picture and hopefully give you some feel for US opinion generally. Of course, I have my own opinions as well but I will try not to make that a focus.
A lot has changed in the world since the United Nations was created in 1945. The UN itself has grown dramatically. There are problems with the UN today that have been growing over the years and are more and more evident and difficult to solve. I would like to split the UN system even further, if I may. I would first like to talk very briefly about the specialised and technical agencies: the World Health Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the World Meteorological Organization and the International Maritime Organization, headquartered in London. There are dozens of these specialised agencies.
They do not tend to get as much attention as the UN itself but they do considerably important work. The International Atomic Energy Agency is quite likely the most famous of them all. These agencies have well-defined mandates, when they stick within them and do not get involved in broader political issues. They perform important, useful functions. When they get distracted by political issues or find themselves involved in such issues, sometimes that causes difficulty. The effectiveness of each agency can be judged on its own merits. Is it achieving the objectives that the founders intended and have modified over time?
To switch to what most people think of when they characterise the United Nations—the New York institutions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council in particular—many of these bodies are, frankly, broken. The Security Council was gridlocked during the Cold War; it did very little. It had some significant achievements such as Resolutions 242 and 339, on respecting the Middle East, but after the Cold War dimensions were set, by and large almost nothing productive came out of it.
In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union broke up, we thought that there might be a chance for the Council to work in a new and more effective fashion. For example, in 1990—after the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1989—the Security Council adopted Resolution 678, which authorised the use of force in aid of Kuwait as an exercise in collective self-defence. That was the first authorisation of the use of force by the Council since 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea.
There was a time in the late 1980s and early 1990s when people thought the Council could spring back into life. In the roughly 35 years since then, what we have seen is that it has gridlocked again. Although the circumstances have changed from the Cold War, we still have Russia and China on one side, generally speaking, and the UK, France and the US on the other side among the permanent members, generally speaking. Having served at the UN on behalf of the United States in 2005 and 2006, I could attest at great length how that dynamic works, which makes it very hard to accomplish much.
I do not see that changing, and perhaps others will want to ask about the ongoing discussion on whether the five permanent members who created the UN and became permanent members in 1945 are the right five permanent members. Should the structure of the Security Council be changed? This is an ongoing debate that I have seen for over 40 years now. I do not think it is going to end anytime soon, but it is part of the context in which the Council operates.
I am hard-pressed to find a time when the General Assembly ever really performed well. It was one of those things you can say seemed like a good idea at the time, but its resolutions are uniformly ignored. Nobody covers them in the press in the United States any more, and it has trouble effectively working on the UN’s budget itself, as we have seen with many reform efforts that have failed. The US voted against recreating the Human Rights Council in 2006, and we have joined it and rejoined, joined and left, and joined and left again. I do not propose to spend much time on it, but I do not think it is doing all that much with respect to human rights.
These basic elements of the UN system are in real trouble. With respect to the IMF and the World Bank, there are similar debates you can have about them and the regional development banks. Are they continuing to be effective? Do we need them so much any more? The IMF was created in a world of fixed exchange rates; that disappeared in the 1970s. Should it be repurposed in some regard? These are issues that are going to be debated over time as well.
Last, I will come to the World Trade Organization. I favour the idea of the World Trade Organization; I am a free trader and have been for a long time. I do not agree with the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization. I do not think that mandatory dispute resolution by panels of arbitrators is correct. It is a derogation of certainly American sovereignty. You resolve trade disputes between nations in the traditional way. That is a real problem for the WTO and in both Republican and Democratic Administrations here.
I will just take a second on NATO. NATO has overwhelming support in the United States, on a bipartisan basis in Congress, and among the general public. That is not the position of the Trump Administration. We are seeing it unfold in front of us in Ankara as the NATO summit unfolds. Again, I will withhold any extensive comment on that; if members of the committee want to talk about it, I am happy to respond. But I want to underline that the position of the current Administration on NATO is nowhere close to a majority of opinion in Congress or among the general public.
I hope the United States maintains a strong international position in international organisations going forward, fixing them where they can be fixed, creating new ones where that might be appropriate, and in some cases leaving ones that have simply failed. Death comes to all things in the natural world; it may even come to agencies of government and international organisations. That is not a bad thing.
The Chair: Thank you, Ambassador Bolton. We will be coming on to the WTO, and I am sure we will return to NATO in a moment. I appreciate your insights as ambassador, and in your different roles. When we look at conflicts around the world today, the UN is not to be seen around the table. We have live conflicts on our continent of Europe—Ukraine, of course. We see the continuing situation not just between Israel and Palestine, but with Iran; this morning, there were developments. Are countries just doing their own thing, in the sense that there is a big power, the United States, which is then able to convene others? We have seen Middle Eastern countries, for example, come in and play the brokerage role, which traditionally we would have expected the UN to do.
Ambassador John Bolton: The trouble with the UN’s involvement—whether it is in the form of the Secretary-General, the envoys he appoints or the Security Council directly—is that to see something in the current international environment that really gives the UN a chance to play a major role, you have to find a conflict where the five permanent members do not have any real interest, or their interests do not conflict. Sitting before you today, I would be hard-pressed to come up with a case that meets those criteria. Again, this is not the Cold War, but the gridlock that enveloped the Security Council during the Cold War was not dissimilar to what we see here.
Q55 Baroness Blackstone: Ambassador Bolton, picking up what you said at the end of your initial presentation—that you hoped the USA would continue to be involved in the international world and its organisations—what do you think will actually happen? That is your hope, but do you think that the withdrawal from a number of multilateral organisations by the Trump leadership during the second Trump Administration is likely to continue? Do you think that UN Bretton Woods organisations, for example, or indeed the WTO, are going to be targeted next, not necessarily just by the Trump Administration but by any Administration that follow, so that there is a continuing withdrawal by the US from taking a front-line part in these bodies?
Ambassador John Bolton: I certainly cannot speak for the Trump Administration, but I do not sense any great enthusiasm left. The President has a short attention span and he may have already exhausted it on the UN. From the perspective of US national interest broadly, it is entirely appropriate for us to hold international organisations to the highest standards we can and to fight about budgets, what they are being spent on, whether they are being spent well, whether the organisation is effective, and frankly—before joining it or at any point—whether we continue to find it in the interest of the United States.
In the early 1980s, the US, the United Kingdom and Singapore withdrew from UNESCO. I thought that was the right thing to do then. Britain and Singapore have gone back in; the US has gone in, come out, gone in, come out. I would not rejoin UNESCO to this day. That is my personal opinion, but it also comes from long involvement in international organisations. I do not think the subject generally is really central to the public political debate in the US at this point.
Q56 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: Good afternoon, Ambassador. What do you see as the key factors contributing to the US backlash against multilateral institutions under President Trump? Do you think this goes back a long way historically? To what extent do you consider it has justified the Administration’s scepticism? Is this going to be a permanent phenomenon in American politics?
Ambassador John Bolton: Again it is important here to distinguish between the international organisations such as the UN, IMF and WTO on the one hand versus NATO on the other. There are different subjects at stake. An issue that has led to scepticism in the United States—really going back to the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I—was the question of what some call supranationalism and others call derogation of sovereignty. The principal opposition to the League of Nations in the Senate after the Versailles negotiations concluded was the opinion of some that the treaty automatically required the United States to engage in military activity when the League’s Council had decided to do it. There were those who said they did not read the treaty that way; there were others who proposed an amendment or a reservation that would make it clear that the US did not consider itself bound by a decision by the League Council. Because of Woodrow Wilson’s unwillingness to tolerate any reservations, no solution was found and the US rejected the League.
That feeling has continued to exist in American policy ever since. When you come, not to institutions such as the United Nations itself, but let us say to the International Criminal Court, which I strongly oppose personally, the Rome Statute is a treaty that purports to give this court jurisdiction over individual American citizens without regard to the Government of the United States. For that and many other reasons, I consider it unacceptable.
I do not think the International Criminal Court is much debated in US politics either, and probably never will be. We have never joined the Law of the Sea Treaty; I do not think we ever will. This push toward supranationalism or continued minimisation of national sovereignty is not burning as brightly today as it did perhaps 25 years ago, and the push toward it has receded. The real question is, are existing international organisations doing what they should be doing? Are they effective or not? In the US it is probably fair to say there is a lot more scepticism of how effective many of these organisations are. That may have something to do with the fact that our assessed contribution in the UN is typically a little over 20%, and that still makes us the biggest contributor.
It is healthy to be sceptical and it is appropriate that we push to make organisations do what they say they are supposed to do. Let me take the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, as a good example. It is a very important organisation but it is not as effective as it could be. The question is, how can we make it stronger? That arouses a lot of debate and opposition by countries that do not want the IAEA to be more effective, such as Iran and North Korea, which withdrew from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. It is a question you have to look at for each organisation, but as a broad matter it is in American interests to be involved and have our position known. If we ultimately find ourselves unable to prevail and over a period of time, we see an organisation acting contrary to our interests, then it is equally appropriate to withdraw from it.
Q57 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: Can I just go back to your remarks earlier about the UN Security Council? Is it really fair or appropriate to judge it by the same criteria by which you are judging other UN institutions? Does the Security Council not have value in itself, simply by being a sounding board and a place where different powers—or, in the time of the Cold War, the two blocs—could come together, discuss and argue publicly? Does this not in itself have a value, or certainly some value, compared with the Security Council not existing? It was always gridlocked during the Cold War, but as you say, it might have played a role sometimes outside Cold War situations, as it did, for example, in the 1960s with the Belgian Congo and Katanga. That was outside the Cold War, and it could play a role. Even during the Cuban crisis, that was a value that the two sides argued, rather than just pursuing competition against each other outside the UN.
Ambassador John Bolton: There are certainly certain things the Security Council can do. I am not in favour of withdrawing from it or the UN as a whole. You have to keep in mind that there are some opportunities. It is just on the great questions of international affairs that it is unlikely the Council can be that effective, and there is perhaps a tendency to think that it should pronounce on everything. I do not necessarily agree with that.
Q58 Lord Grocott: Ambassador, I wonder if you can give us a couple of insights into the issue we are looking at: engagement in multilateral institutions and how that plays out in US politics. If one thinks of it in terms of a spectrum, from total isolationism at one end to total engagement at the other, are there significant differences between the two main parties, or does the position that people hold on that spectrum divide parties, as well as in their relationship to their competitors?
Ambassador John Bolton: There is a streak of isolationism in both the Democratic and Republican parties. It manifests itself in different ways but there is no doubt that it is there, and there is a higher level of isolationism today than, let us say, 10 years ago. The other dividing principle is the difference between unilateralism and multilateralism. Both imply a presence in the world: the question is, does one typically favour one approach over another? Just speaking as someone who has often been accused of being a unilateralist, all I have to say is that in all the various roles I have had in government, I never got up in the morning and said, “Well, what unilateralist havoc can I wreak today?” The question is, what is the most effective instrument? In a given circumstance, what is the best way to advance American interest? It is like saying, do you prefer a knife to a spoon? Well, for what purpose? For eating soup a knife is not a great idea, but for cutting steak a spoon is not a great idea; that does not mean you do not use them both.
The Chair: The right tool when it comes to multilateralism is vital.
Q59 Lord Houghton of Richmond: Can you give us a feel for what drives policy towards multilateralism in America in the round? Is there any perception of US public opinion when it comes to engagement in multilateral organisations? Does Congress hold some sort of a unifying view on it, or is it very much down to the Administration of the day, given the circumstances of the moment?
Ambassador John Bolton: The latter is the case. I do not think there is a lot of discussion in United States politics about the multilateral system at the moment. That may be well or ill, but that is the reality. Certainly, in our system of separated powers, it is the executive branch that carries the most important voice in international affairs. I would say it overwhelmingly depends on who the President is and what circumstances he confronts in the world.
Lord Houghton of Richmond: Is there nothing, therefore, within Congress as a whole at the moment that acts as a challenge to where, for instance, the Trump Administration might take it?
Ambassador John Bolton: There are partisan disagreements on everything, as is fairly typical. We are in a bitterly divided, partisan environment right now and have been for some years, which is unfortunate. Typically, when Congress or one of the Houses of Congress is controlled by a party different from that holding the White House, you see the separation of powers in full view. That may occur after our November election. I will perhaps be in a better position to answer that after we see what happens in November.
Q60 Lord Darroch of Kew: Ambassador, this is a question about the UN system rather than NATO. Backing away from the international multilateral system, President Trump has withdrawn America from something like 60 organisations, mostly UN. It is being argued by some that it is opening up a big opportunity for China to adopt more of an international leadership role, particularly in relation to the Global South. Do you share that concern and assessment? If you were still in government, what would you be advising the Administration, and indeed Western allies, to do about this?
Ambassador John Bolton: Given the Administration’s pattern of withdrawal, it is hard to define what the reasons were. In some cases they withdrew from bits and pieces of organisations and bits and pieces of the secretariat. It was not entirely coherent, in my view. The issue of whether China or any other adversary of the United States gains advantage that would be harmful to the US is a factor that should be considered in the question of whether we withdraw, whatever the organisation is. That is part of an overall review where we have taken all the factors into account, even in saying that it is important to withdraw.
In some cases, that has not been carefully considered but the efforts by China to extend its influence are certainly found across the board in a wide range of things; it is hardly confined to international organisations. It is in the broader picture: in political, military and economic affairs, and in how China behaves in an international economic system that is of much greater significance than what happens in the UN. I do not think that there is a case to be made for withdrawing precipitously from the UN system. Each case is different.
I mentioned UNESCO before; that is a particular pet rock for me. The organisation lost its moorings and has never found them again. You have to look at other organisations and weigh the costs and benefits. In some cases, it may be that, even in a close case, you would decide to stay in. Jeane Kirkpatrick—one of my predecessors as UN ambassador—was once asked if we should withdraw from the United Nations as a whole. She paused for a minute and said, “No, it’s not worth the trouble”.
The Chair: Interesting. Just as a sub-question to Lord Darroch’s question, you mentioned the ICC, which the US is not a member of. We have joined, withdrawn from and joined the Human Rights Council. In my experience, the UK acted as a conduit and a connection to those institutions. Do you think that kind of relationship will continue?
Ambassador John Bolton: That will certainly depend on what the Government of the day in the UK think. As UN ambassador, I tried to have an overall rethink of all the various mandates that had been given to the United Nations by the Security Council, General Assembly and others over the years. I was there roughly 50 years after the founding of the UN. Maybe some mandates can be repealed; maybe they are not necessary any more. We did not repeal any of them. That is a very telling fact in trying to explain why the UN has so much difficulty accomplishing even what seem to be core tasks. It is distracted and its members have basically pushed it into so many different things that it has lost the ability to focus on the important ones.
Q61 Baroness Fraser of Craigmaddie: Ambassador Bolton, you rightly say that each case is different. Which institutions, therefore, within the system, do you believe are of use to the United States? You hope that the United States can help fix those that need fixing. You have mentioned that there is a greater desire to look at budgets and value for money and making sure that public funding and institutions are doing what they are set out to do. Are there any specific areas within US policy that can be achieved only through the multilateral system? Is the US—either in the short or longer term—interested in reforming any of these?
Ambassador John Bolton: I did not bring my UN handbook with me, so I cannot go down the entire list of specialised and technical agencies. The Trump Administration withdrew from the Universal Postal Union, which I have to say I would not have done. We have our difficulties with it on what are called terminal rates—adjusting postage rates when a letter or parcel goes from one country to another—because we have so much that goes by private carrier that we tend to feel we are discriminated against by countries that have only national postal services. It has been a subject of debate for over 35 years, to my knowledge. We were never terribly happy with the result, but I would not have withdrawn from the UPU, just to give you one example.
Earlier I mentioned the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is very important in the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There are a variety of specialised and technical agencies and programmes of the UN such as UNICEF, the World Food Programme, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the World Health Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, providing protection and assistance to refugees—I am thinking of the buildings in Geneva where they are all headquartered—the International Maritime Organization in London, the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal, and the International Organization for Migration, which has become a member of the UN over time; it was not originally. There are a lot out there, which is why sweeping generalisations are a mistake. The problem with the UN today is less in the social/economic area than in the political area. It is the political bodies of the UN that are fundamentally in trouble.
Q62 Lord De Mauley: Ambassador, the subject of NATO came up in your answer to an earlier question. Could you give us your views on the likely real degree and strategic implications of US disengagement from NATO for the UK and other allies?
Ambassador John Bolton: It would be a catastrophe for the United States and all the allies. NATO is probably the world’s most successful political/military alliance in history. We have spent decades building up a capability that, even in peacetime, provides a basis for action that has never been done before. The approach of the Trump Administration is nothing but destructive.
I have a lot of things I would do to improve NATO. I am one of many Americans who served in diplomatic positions for decades and pleaded with other members of NATO to spend more on defence. Let us face it, the West as a whole made a mistake in the early 1990s—when the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the Soviet Union disintegrated—in saying we had reached the end of history, there were no threats any more and we could enjoy the peace dividend. Everybody cut their defence budgets, and it turned out to be a huge mistake.
Look at it today. None of us is spending enough on defence, and that includes the US. For years, we have failed to estimate what the demands on our arsenals might be. We can see now that they are under strain with, let us face it, what are only two medium-sized conflicts. We are not in world wars now. We have two medium-sized conflicts going on and we are straining to have the capacity to deal with both simultaneously. This is a long way from even the standard for the US in the 1990s, when our budgets were set to defend two medium-sized regional contingencies simultaneously, and those were considered war in the Middle East and war on the Korean Peninsula. We could not do that today. It is a huge mistake all the way round.
Having said that, we have always been able to work out those disagreements within NATO. When I was in college in the 1960s, I was assigned a book called The Troubled Partnership, written in the early 1960s by a then little-known Harvard professor called Henry Kissinger. We have always had troubles in NATO, and we work them out. That is the success of the alliance. The damage that has been done by any number of things that have been said is incalculable. It can all be repaired.
The most important thing for NATO—both in the US, where, as I said, support is very strong, as it is in other NATO partners—is not to assume that what we have seen in the past year and a half is going to be policy of the US for ever; it is not. If you draw over-broad conclusions from the concerns that have been raised, you are going to take mistaken decisions that could weaken the alliance further. During the Cold War, it was a core Soviet objective to split the Atlantic alliance, and one reason among many why the Soviets lost the Cold War was that they failed to do that. The last thing we should do is do it for them.
Q63 Lord Houghton of Richmond: You have been self-critical of America and the Trump Administration’s form of destructiveness towards NATO. But do you think the United Kingdom is involved in a different form of destructiveness—a weakening, at least—because of the relative sloth of our own ability to generate the amount of funding for NATO, the percentage of GDP, that NATO has demanded of it? Are we also part of a weakening?
Ambassador John Bolton: The West as a whole went into dreamworld after the collapse of the Soviet Union: globalisation would solve everything, and economics was the only issue that mattered any more. It turned out that at least we were awakened somewhat by 9/11. I have thought for some time—quite apart from Trump—that the US defence budget should approach levels we had during the Reagan Administration, which were 5% to 7% of GDP. The West as a whole ought to be at that standard; that just helps us catch up to where we should have been.
I know your Chairman is not here today, but he recently had some things in the report he did on that subject for Britain. We have always considered Britain a leader in NATO. It has always held the number two command position, or at least since 1951, as I recall. I would hope that, when dealing with some of our friends on the continent, Britain would have a leading role too and could participate, as we are doing very effectively in the AUKUS submarine programme involving the UK, Australia and the US. It is a great programme and is an excellent thing for the UK to have done. I would like to see a lot more of that, and of UK involvement in dealing with China on a global basis.
The Chair: As you say, Ambassador, our Chairman is not here, but he is quite forthright on what needs to happen in terms of funding. On your final point, the United Kingdom has also started collaborating with Italy and Japan on fighter planes, for example.
Q64 Baroness Crawley: I had better declare an interest, in that I really enjoyed Ambassador Bolton’s book, The Room Where It Happened. That is my interest out of the way.
Ambassador Bolton, President Trump’s predecessors—even the most hawkish—all worked within a network of treaties and institutions within the multilateral system. To some extent, that shaped the way the US exercises its power in the world. Do you think that, from now on, the US will pivot towards establishing new international architecture, such as the Board of Peace, to circumvent existing institutions? What do you think would be the implications of this?
Ambassador John Bolton: There are certain circumstances where we need to do it. Just to start with the Board of Peace, frankly, it is a joke and is not going to exist after the Trump Administration leave office. I do not think people should get too upset about it. Its chances of survival are about as great as the chances of making the Gaza Strip into the Riviera of the eastern Mediterranean. It is just not going to happen.
On a more serious note, in dealing with China there are a range of things we have to consider in the Indo-Pacific. It was a mistake for the Trump Administration to change the name of the Indo-Pacific Command back to the Pacific Command. “Indo-Pacific” was a decision he made in the first term, and it was the right decision. How you deal with Chinese efforts to establish hegemony along its periphery requires new institutions. A number have been mentioned, AUKUS being one.
Shinzo Abe—the now deceased Prime Minister of Japan—pushed very hard 10 years ago to expand the role of what is called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising India, Japan, Australia and the US. It has not had much favour in this Administration, but it is important. It is important to have increased trilateral military co-operation between Japan, South Korea and the US, and steps have been taken in that regard.
People may find this hard to believe, but for years there were no trilateral exercises. Now, we are going to have some. That was a barrier because of historic tensions between Korea and Japan. The leaders of both countries are now working to move past those divisions, like NATO was able to move past divisions in Europe after NATO was created.
In other words, there is a lot of architecture that is necessary to deal with the Chinese threat. I am not suggesting that there is an Asian NATO out there waiting to be developed. This is going to be very hard and laborious to do and will take a fair amount of time, but those kinds of things are up for consideration. I recall the suggestion of José María Aznar, former Prime Minister of Spain, in 2005 to make NATO a global institution and bring in countries such as Japan, Singapore, Australia and Israel. That is something NATO should think about. The threat that the West as a whole faces is not a geographic denomination; it is a global issue for all of us now.
Q65 The Chair: Ambassador, as you know, post Second World War we saw the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which then had its day. As you said, with all institutions, everything comes to an end. I have one quick question on this new security framework. We have seen Turkey, Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan come together in this rather loose construct. Do you think that that is a signal that other countries are looking at new military alliances as well?
Ambassador John Bolton: A lot of uncertainty has been caused by Trump Administration policies, and that is another manifestation of the problem here. There are changes taking place that really have nothing to do with us: for example, the decision by the United Arab Emirates to withdraw from OPEC, which I certainly did not see coming—perhaps others did. There is a lot going on in the world, and that is another reason to have a continued, very forward presence by the United States to help try to keep the system of security that we have had since World War II viable. When the US withdraws from regions of the world, the consequence will be either spreading anarchy or our adversaries moving in to fill the void.
Q66 Lord Grocott: There is a question that keeps coming up in various inquiries we have been involved in, which I am sure must be of great interest, in its own way, to a lot of people in the USA. It is a basic, very simple question. Is the second Trump Administration—in particular, the one that may or may not emerge from the November elections—an aberration in US political/international developments, or is it the shape of things to come? I am sure no one can give a definitive answer on that, but I would like to hear your thoughts.
Ambassador John Bolton: Trump is an aberration. We will see what happens in November, and then in 2028. There is no way of predicting who his successor will be, but there will be a backlash against the Trump Administration, for a lot of reasons. This is a subject for a long political discussion. It is a mistake to think—certainly in the national security space—that Trump has a philosophy; he does not. He does not have a grand strategy; he does not even do policy the way most people normally think of that term. Since there is no philosophy or strategy, there is no real legacy for somebody to pick up and run with. It is one reason why his coalition is fragmenting, even now. There will be a new alignment and an intense debate in 2028 about a whole range of issues.
It goes to the point I alluded to earlier. In looking for future policies in the UK or elsewhere in Europe, it is a mistake to project Trump straightforward and for ever as that is what the United States is going to do. Chancellor Merz of Germany at one point said that Germany needed to be independent of the United States. Well, good luck with that; that makes both Germany and the United States weaker. What we need to do is just grit our teeth and try to get through the next two and a half years with a minimum of damage, and then—specifically with respect to NATO—try to fix the damage that has been done.
Q67 Lord Bruce of Bennachie: Thank you, Ambassador, for your insights; it is very interesting indeed. You have said on a number of occasions that America should make its decisions on its relationship with international multilateral organisations on the basis of the American national interest, which is perfectly reasonable, but America is a very big power. When those decisions appear to other countries to be against their national interest—to the extent that they start to think they have to find other ways of doing things, and other partners—how do you think the United States will react if it sees different alliances or arrangements happening, partly because of the actions of the United States?
I take your point about the Trump Administration, but our own evidence suggests there is an element of detachment in the United States that cuts a lot longer than just the current Administration. From the UK’s point of view, given that we have relied very heavily on the United States and we have now left the EU—although we are trying to reconnect in some ways—what is the right role for the UK to maintain the right relationship with the United States, while also building relationships elsewhere? Does the dynamic not require both those things to happen?
Ambassador John Bolton: In terms of the UK’s relationship with the United States, it is so deep—for so many reasons that have nothing to do with whoever is the leader of the US or the UK at any given time—that in many cases, it drives us pretty much to the same outcome. If you believe that alliances that are working benefit all the partners, then when there are disagreements within an alliance or even among informal groupings—coalitions of the willing—you try to accommodate the differences in order to continue to pursue the objectives you have agreed on. It is not just a question of, every day, “Okay, let’s have a new calculation of what America’s national interest is”. Part of the problem with Trump is that every day is a new day and he says, “Well, what have you done for me lately?” That is not conducive to any human institutions that are intended to last for a long time.
In the shifting circumstances we are facing, I certainly hope that, whatever else the UK does, it is not making the mistake that some have made of saying, “If we don’t like the United States so well, maybe China’s our alternative”. Good luck with that, really. In the press of daily events, it is difficult to think about what happens after Trump, but that is what is necessary. How do you get through this period with the minimum amount of damage, so that, once we are past it, we can really focus on what we are concerned about? Trump’s lack of strategy, forethought and follow-through means that on any given day, what you think is the main problem with Trump may turn out to be irrelevant the day after.
Q68 Lord De Mauley: Ambassador, please forgive me for asking what is a rather parochial and probably naive question, but what do you think a country such as the United Kingdom should do to influence developments—whether or not through the institutions we have been discussing today—in the direction of a more peaceful world?
The Chair: That is a very pertinent question that caused a degree of amusement among the committee about our importance in the role as well.
Ambassador John Bolton: From the US perspective, one reason why the relationship between the US and the UK is so important is that the UK has many connections, because of history and geography, that are better than the United States has. It has been almost the unfailing practice in every international-related job I have had in the US Government that when we are thinking of what we are going to do, probably the first person you talk to, if not one of the first, is your counterpart in the United Kingdom. That is invaluable to the United States, and I hope it helps the UK too. I would certainly encourage you to continue that.
History has given us a lot of different partners around the world, and I have always tried to take advantage of that. It is not unhelpful to have Australia where it is. It is not unhelpful that the Five Eyes countries share intelligence the way they do. I would take advantage of all these things. They have been of advantage to the US and hopefully to the others involved in it.
Just to come back to AUKUS, the UK ought to have a larger role in the Pacific; it would be important for the US and others. Japan, for example, and other countries would welcome a larger UK role. People say we are all pressed for budgets and so on, but there is no higher budget priority than national security. If you cannot defend your national security the rest of it is irrelevant, in my view.
Q69 Baroness Prashar: Ambassador Bolton, if the USA moves away from being the steward of the multilateral system, what would it look like? Is there any potential for like-minded powers to come together to reinforce the multilateral system in the way suggested by Prime Minister Carney at Davos?
Ambassador John Bolton: Again, because I believe Trump is aberrational, I do not really foresee a future where the US walks away from its role. It will differ depending on who is President and what the party is. I have followed Prime Minister Carney’s remarks at Davos and some other things he has said, and I do not think there is much prospect for success in this coalition of middle-sized powers that he talks about. I do not think that is a likely road ahead, because the biggest element in common that middle-sized powers have is that they are middle sized—and that does not get you very far.
The Chair: That sense resonates with us. Some of us have great reservations about the term “middle-sized power”. If you demean yourself, others will see you in a very different light.
Q70 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: Ambassador, may I go back to your comments about the WTO? You said you are a free trader, and I assume that you believe in rules-based trade. You said you have problems with the dispute resolution mechanism—I do not know if that is just about China—but do you think it is possible to make changes to the WTO in a way that would be helpful and satisfactory for America, so that it can play a full role again, or do you think it is a lost cause?
Ambassador John Bolton: If you went back to the approach of GATT, which allowed nations to resolve their trade disputes in their own ways—that is imperfect but any mechanism is going to be imperfect. The problem with mandatory arbitration is that it is creating a supranational institution, and I just simply do not accept that. The problem with China is endemic, and without getting into a discussion of Trump’s Liberation Day tariffs, he declared trade war on the rest of the world when what he should have done was to have gotten our friends and allies together and said what we all believe to be the case: that the biggest problem in international trade today is China, and that if we got together and put pressure on China, we would be more likely, at least, to solve the problem than not. We have gone in the opposite direction, which is very unfortunate.
Q71 Lord Darroch of Kew: Ambassador, this is an existential question, I am afraid. You have been very eloquent about the gridlock in the international system, at the political level in particular. On this side of the Atlantic there is a lot of talk about not just the deadlock but the collapse of the international rules-based order—the institutions, rules and processes that built up after World War II, pretty much all under American leadership. Are you an optimist about the future of the international order, or do you think it is possible or even likely—as some people on this side of the Atlantic think—that we are heading for what they call a G2 world, which is basically America and China calling all the shots?
Ambassador John Bolton: I do not think that is the way it is going to work out, and I never believed there was a rules-based international order. If there was, nobody gave the memo to Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un and various leaders in Iran. They do not play by the rules—they do not care about the rules. Maybe Donald Trump does not care about the rules either. The order that was created after 1945 ultimately rests on international power, and the power that has kept international affairs relatively stable has been a function of American power and its alliances. As I said earlier, when the US begins to withdraw, you get more anarchy. It does not have anything to do with rules; it has to do with the distribution of power.
Trump said again this morning in Ankara that we do not really worry that much about the war in Ukraine because there is an ocean between us. It does not work like that any more. Oceans are highways not just barriers these days, and the fact is that we benefit from the order we helped create. There is a lot of dissatisfaction in the United States among people who do not think our partners bear their fair share. There is a lot to be said for that, but the problem in the US is that our political leaders ever since the end of the Cold War have not made the case effectively that we are not doing this all around the world as an act of charity; we are doing it because it is in our interests to do it. We benefit from the stability that our forward American presence provides, and that our alliances emphasise. A lot of other people benefit from it too, and some do not pay their fair share of the burden, but that does not mean we should give it up, because it hurts us to do it. Actually, if Americans had a better sense of how much we benefit from the order we have helped create, there would be a lot more support for it and a lot less attraction to somebody like Trump.
The Chair: Thank you, Ambassador Bolton; we are more or less bang on time. Thank you for being direct and candid; the insights you have provided have been extremely valuable. Are there any final thoughts or insights you would like to share with the committee?
Ambassador John Bolton: This would be a purely personal view, of course, but with respect to what is going to happen to the US role in the world, I would just advise, “Never bet against the United States. Better days are coming”.
The Chair: We all live by that hope as well. We extend our best wishes, 250 years on, although those 250 years perhaps have a slightly different perspective from the UK. Happy Independence Day, and long do we look to strengthening the UK-US alliance.
Ambassador Bolton, on behalf of all the committee, thank you so much for your time; it was extremely valuable. In that regard, we will be sending you a transcript of today’s proceedings. If there are any minor corrections, et cetera, that you feel are necessary, please come back to the committee. Thank you very much and we hope to see you again soon; all the best. The formal session is closed.
