15
Examination of witnesses
Justyna Gotkowska, Ed Arnold and Kevin Craven.
Q1 The Chair: Good afternoon, and welcome to the International Agreements Committee of the House of Lords. I formally welcome to our meeting Justyna Gotkowska—my apologies; everyone pronounces my surname incorrectly, so I will get a dark mark because I did not get yours right first time round. Justyna is a deputy director of the Centre for Eastern Studies and is working with us virtually. In person, we have Ed Arnold, who is a senior adviser in defence at the D Group, and Kevin Craven, who is a chief executive officer of the ADS Group.
This is our first evidence session in our scrutiny of the UK-Poland security and defence partnership; there will be one more next week, but this is our first contribution to the work. The agreement was published by the Government on their website on 27 May this year and, today, it was formally laid before Parliament.
I will ask the opening question, which is always very broad. I will then turn to my colleagues, who will ask more focused questions and may also wish to ask supplementaries. My question is for Justyna and Ed; other questions will either be for all three of you or you will be mentioned individually. What do you consider to be the main security and defence challenges and threats faced by the UK and Poland currently? To what extent does the treaty address those challenges and threats?
Justyna Gotkowska: First, thank you very much for the invitation. I am honoured to be able to speak before you on the treaty between the UK and Poland on a security and defence partnership. With regard to your question on the security and defence challenges and threats faced by Poland and the UK, I will speak from a Polish perspective, but I am sure that this also applies to the UK to a large extent.
Poland is faced with a huge challenge coming from Russia. In practice, right now, that is narrowed down to hybrid activities that Russia has been conducting against us since 2022 and earlier, basically, with an intensification of these challenges in the past few years. It started with the preparations for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in autumn 2021. Poland has faced a huge wave of illegal migration, steered from Russia and in co-operation with Belarus. That was meant to focus Polish attention and resources on the Polish-Belarusian border and on the issue of illegal migration in order to steer the focus away from Ukraine and the Russian military build-up.
This challenge has been persistent over the past few years, and it is still there. It requires a lot of Polish attention and resources to secure the Polish-Belarusian border in order to prevent illegal migrants, not from Belarus and Russia but from the Middle East and Africa, coming to Poland and to the EU in general. Over the past few years, we have had help and been supported by the UK in dealing with this challenge.
However, this is only one element in the plethora of Russian hybrid actions against Poland and Europe—the UK included. Another is disinformation on social media, which is aimed at heating up the social mood against Ukraine for Russia and against US-European co-operation. We have dealt with intensified cyber attacks on a variety of levels, including against public institutions, government institutions, private firms and critical infrastructure. We have had physical attacks on critical infrastructure, including energy systems, water plants and other things. We have also had examples of arson, which are meant to intimidate society and to show both that it is not worth standing up to Russia and supporting Ukraine and that it is better to find some kind of negotiated peace and modus vivendi in relations with Russia.
We have also had military incidents. Recently, in September 2025, the most visible and most concerning one was the intrusion of Russian drones deep into Polish territory, which, again, sent the same message: “You are not able to defend yourself. It is better to end the war on terms that are favourable to Russia and to find a way of shaping security and defence policy relations with Russia”. Poland is afraid that these hybrid actions are possibly just preparation for conventional measures against it and against NATO’s eastern flank in which other NATO allies, due to their NATO commitments, would participate.
Russia clearly stated its goals with regard to European security in December 2021. Russia wants to subordinate Ukraine. Russia wants to have a buffer zone—a neutralised zone of privileged interest—in central and eastern Europe. Russia wants to change the European security architecture to have different relations with major European countries and it would like to push the US out of Europe. These are the clear Russian goals.
For the time being, Russia is in stage one, conducting war against Ukraine and conducting hybrid operations against Poland, the UK, Germany, France and major European countries to change the social mood with regard to support for Ukraine and to shape different relations with Russia. It wants to influence political elites and achieve its goal in a more peaceful manner without needing to resort to military means. If that does not work, after ending the war in Ukraine—if there is a favourable end from a Russian perspective—Russia would be ready after a military build-up to possibly attack NATO countries, including Poland and the Baltic states, conventionally. Through this, Russia will try to achieve its strategic goals of changing European security architecture and relations with European countries. We are seeing a phase of intense hybrid operations against Poland, but also against major European countries, the UK included. We need to prepare also for the worst—meaning the defence of NATO territory, especially on the north-eastern flank.
The Chair: Thank you. You set out very clearly the threats and dangers that face us across Europe. I am going to Ed next to seek his view, but perhaps I will come back to you, as part of the question is whether you think that the treaty that has been signed will be of assistance.
Ed Arnold: I agree with Justyna; I think she has covered the hybrid threats very well. There is a growing realisation, not just in the UK and Poland, but in Europe generally, that this is effectively what we see now as business as usual. It is the penalty of having Russia as a neighbour.
The issue for the Russians is that they are so heavily conventionally committed in Ukraine and have been for a number of years. To try to achieve their objectives within Europe, they are leaning on the hybrid lever more. That is not to say that they will not potentially look towards the conventional lever. We face a very similar threat.
The language in the Northolt treaty is far stronger on describing the Russian threat and the potential solutions, not just in terms of bilateral engagement between the UK and Poland, but also, critically, in terms of support to Ukraine. The main difference in how we see the character of the threat is that Poland saw this, for geographical and historical reasons, far earlier than we did. The Komorowski doctrine from the 2010s was very much focused on territorial defence, whereas, in the same period, the UK was principally focusing on an expeditionary mindset in the military, which we are still transitioning towards more in terms of homeland defence and NATO Article 5. You see that also within the spending profiles. From 2014 until now, the UK met 2%—it was only one of three members to do so, including Greece. Now, when you look at Poland, last year when this new agreement for between 3% and 5% was made at NATO, Poland was the only ally that said, “It doesn’t really matter, because we’re already at 5%”. With the focus on territorial defence in terms of Article 3—national defence plans—and Article 5, Poland is far stronger than the UK currently.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Justyna, I am just going to come back to you. Part of the question is whether the treaty is up to the job. Is it something that Poland feels is worth while?
Justyna Gotkowska: I think so, because the treaty covers the two areas I was talking about: countering Russian and Belarussian hybrid activities against Poland, the UK and Europe and enhancing deterrence and defence capabilities. With regard to hybrid Russian activities, the provisions of the treaty say that Poland and the UK will co-operate to a large extent on countering hybrid threats. They will co-operate to a large extent on countering foreign information manipulation and interference and on countering cyber attacks.
There is a joint action plan on irregular migration. This is an important topic for Poland and the UK. We see that both countries are willing to enhance co-operation on the key areas where we see the challenges and threats coming from Russia. This is a good thing. This co-operation has existed for the past years, but the treaty regulates it or puts it in writing; it gives it a written form. I think that it is good that it was formulated in the document. On the other hand, we see provisions regarding military co-operation, especially underlining the centrality of NATO, both for Poland and for the UK, which is very important.
The Chair: Justyna, may I stop you there? I know that one of my colleagues has a question later where he is going to raise specific issues on NATO, particularly JEF. Later I will ask Lord Anderson if he might probe a little more on that with you.
Q2 Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: I am going to expand a bit on what the Chair has been asking and maybe start with Kevin Craven, as we have not heard from him yet. One of the key projects of the treaty is the manufacture and development of the next generation of missiles. We have seen through Ukraine, and indeed the Middle East, the speed with which warfare is changing. There appears to be little detail on how this will be implemented in practice. How do you foresee the collaboration happening? Are there obstacles to it? It is a big question and I will come to the other two witnesses afterwards.
Kevin Craven: It is a big question. First, for any of you who do not know, ADS is the trade association for aerospace, defence, space and security. Our relevance in this area is that a number of our members are involved in the programmes that we are talking about today. We also run trade missions in-country and support business expositions over there.
In practice, this really is the third stage of an industrial relationship that has grown over time. There are a number of elements to that industrial relationship. It is pleasing to see the deepening and increasing strength of those relationships, which will allow the right conditions for success. You have mentioned the common anti-air modular missile, but there are also the combat information systems produced by Thales UK and arrowhead frigates that Babcock is designing. MBDA, leading on complex weapons, has been a significant milestone in terms of doing that.
To suggest that there is devil in the detail is right. What is interesting is that for the first time there is the concept of a shared production base, rather than a pure export from the UK to Poland. Therefore, we look at the spilt of work—where the components are produced and where the IP and technology transfers work. What does sovereign capability look like in a case where both of us would be going to market on a global stage?
One of the interesting things at the moment is that defence spending is growing globally by 7% annually and in Europe by 12%. There is a big market out there. The UK and Poland going to market together, once the national programmes are up and running, is very interesting indeed. There is a huge amount of work to build on. We would like to see a little work on the next tier down and the supply chains that will support the major primes in their programmes and this Government-to-Government framework.
Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Can I go to Justyna next? As I understand it, and as I think you were saying, Kevin, we already have structured and substantive missile development co-operation. Can you expand on what more you would like to see done through this treaty?
Justyna Gotkowska: I was trying to get more information about the provisions of this treaty and the development of the next generation of missiles, and I suppose that relates to what has been said. By that I mean the development of the air defence system NAREW, where Polish and UK firms—the British MBDA—closely co-operate. Poland co-produces the CAMM extended-range missile. As I understand it, both partners in this project have agreed to develop next-generation interceptor missiles for the short-range air defence system, the CAMM-MR. I suppose that is what was meant by jointly developing the next generation of missiles.
This common project is assessed in Poland as being quite successful. The UK and firms from the UK are perceived as very good industrial partners, willing to engage in co-production and co-development. Right now, as far as I understand, Poland has three major projects that it develops in co-operation with firms from the UK. The first is the NAREW short-range air defence system. The second is the frigate programme Miecznik, where Babcock is engaged. The third is the production of 155 mm artillery ammunition in co-operation with BAE Systems. The UK is largely perceived as a partner that is willing to engage in meaningful industrial co-operation with Poland, with benefits for arms companies in the UK.
Q3 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I would like to ask Mr Craven a supplementary question, and perhaps also the same question of Justyna Gotkowska. You mentioned the joint ventures that we are talking about entering export markets. I am sure that you are aware of, and perhaps you may have been involved in, cases where such joint ventures run up against the situation where one of the parties does not want to sell to a particular third party and the other does. Everything then gets wonderfully stuck. There have been cases in Saudia Arabia—I will not go into them all—where that has happened. What safeguards have you built into this industrial co-operation? I am not saying that they make it impossible for such a disagreement to arise, because you cannot make it impossible, but you can ensure that the parties consult at a very early stage on joint projects and, once they are into a joint project that they want to sell to country A, B or C, they then do not pull out half way through just because they have a row with that country, or whatever it is. What safeguards are there?
Kevin Craven: The short answer is that there is no detail about any safeguards that might be built in. They are actually quite difficult to build in, because of the flexible and volatile nature of geopolitical relationships and alignments in today’s world. It is really complex to do. I think that it is possible to be aligned on export opportunities, which generally require Government-to-Government arrangements, and therefore it is possible to foresee some of those obstacles fairly early in the campaigns. Escalating them to the right levels before they happen is the strong advice that I would give.
It is an increasingly competitive market globally and most of the firms that we are talking about, both Polish and UK firms, are already players in global markets. Again, they are not starting from scratch. The UK is probably peculiar in Europe, in that it is excellent at JVs. There are numerous examples, MBDA being probably the strongest example, where complex challenges have been overcome and will continue to be. In that sense, it is a useful entrée and foundation layer to an EU-UK security pact, which we all hope might take on a bit more substance going forward.
The Chair: Ed, I think that you want to add something.
Ed Arnold: It was just something worth noting on the evolution that Kevin was talking about. In 2017, that treaty set out structural, broad aspects of co-operation, but there were 23 areas for potential co-operation. That was narrowed down to focus on seven in 2023. What I think is the difference between the Northolt treaty and the other is that it looks at potential frictions to try to minimise them. You are not going to get rid of them, but you can mitigate and minimise. It talks about joint procurement, research and development, removing regulatory barriers in a UK-EU context, export controls, supply chains and enabling capacity. Quite often with an agreement such as this, it starts from a capability perspective, and you look at the blueprints and develop it in that way, and you just do not have the capacity or foresight to look at some of the issues that you raise. That is definitely a change.
To set the context for what we might discuss later around the constraints, there are two that are critical. One is prioritisation within the Northolt treaty, as it expands to other areas—we have covered migration. How do you continue to develop what is a very good relationship on defence and security and insulate it from other political issues? For UK-France, migration can quite often impact work on other things.
The second is prioritisation with other countries. Both Poland and the UK have a lot of bilateral relationships; they have increased. If you talk, for example, about long-range strike capability, we are tied into a number of initiatives, with a variety of companies. How do we make sure that that produces capability?
The other aspect is delivery. This is just the treaty that has been signed. It needs a lot of political support. I note that Article 12, entry into force, says the treaty shall enter force 30 days after. It is being pushed before Parliament and since then the UK Prime Minister, Defence Secretary and Armed Forces Minister have resigned. When you are talking about delivery and momentum, and the political capital behind these relationships and prioritisation, if you were Poland and looking at that from an agreement perspective, I think that you would be fairly concerned.
The Chair: Difficult times for the industry itself, as well as in politics.
Q4 Baroness Blower: What assessment have you made of the treaty’s commitments to defence-industrial co-operation and its impact on the UK defence industry? Perhaps Mr Craven would like to start.
Kevin Craven: In this growing and evolving relationship, committing the two countries to align their defence industrial bases and export strategies is incredibly helpful. I believe that it is a very good model for other bilateral relationships that we might look at as well. It includes the ability to pursue joint procurement, to maintain those interchangeable capabilities and, as has been mentioned, to minimise the regulatory barriers to maximise the outputs and effects of these programmes.
The impact is already direct and visible. The relationships have been growing since 2017. You can see that in both the support for UK jobs and factories and the increased numbers in business traffic between the countries at key points such as exhibitions, trade missions and the like. We are already seeing that. It is useful in strengthening ties with Europe more generally. We have other bilateral treaties, such as Trinity House with Germany, and it is possible to evolve further in that type of way. This is a very good, pragmatic model with a country that is on the eastern flank and faces a direct threat. It speeds up the innovation and procurement cycles. There are things that are generally helpful for the UK industrial base as well.
Ed Arnold: In terms of UK-Poland specifically, I like the simplicity of it. It is effectively air defence and long-range strike—what NATO calls “the sword and the shield”. Why is that important? In terms of long-range strike, it is the one thing that the Russians have absolutely no answer for—for example, on the battlefield in Ukraine where their rear lines, logistics and command and control are being struck. Now we are seeing that the Ukrainians are going after other capabilities, such as oil refineries, et cetera—effectively the means of production for the Russian war machine. The Russians are really vulnerable.
We are building a variety of things. For example, the CAMM is modular, so it can be used in a variety of ways and there is a naval and land element to it. On air defence, this is one of the biggest changes for European militaries over the past, say, 30 years. Air defence was deprioritised. Where there were countries that had a prioritisation, it was generally to protect the force in the field rather than the civilian population. Therefore, on a political prioritisation, it goes really quite far up.
When you look at the UK’s other defence and security relationships, they are a bit confused and it is very difficult to progress in certain areas; there is a nuclear element to some that can complicate it. It concerns air defence and long-range strike and is not just bilateral, although some of the work will be done bilaterally. It is also in conjunction with our main European allies, particularly France and Germany, as Kevin mentioned.
Kevin Craven: I have one supplementary point. I probably should mention that an interesting aspect is that the infrastructure for these missiles will be funded by the SAFE fund that the EU produced. The command and control cabins, the launch chassis and the logistics chain that support the infrastructure to fire the missiles will be funded by SAFE. In that sense, while we are not accessing SAFE funds directly, it demonstrates that there is a clear need for the UK’s industrial capability to be accessed by Europe, in this case and in a more general case.
The Chair: Thank you very much. The next question will be asked by one of my colleagues who is online.
Q5 Baroness Lawlor: The next question concerns cyber security, cyber attacks and related information, and hybrid threats more generally. How much work are you doing? Perhaps Mr Craven and Mr Arnold might like to pick this up, because it is about how much work has been done with NATO to tackle such attacks. To what extent does the present push in the treaty for the provision of increased collaboration in cyber security capabilities and work on new and disruptive technologies reflect Poland’s desire to keep NATO close? Do you work as a collaborative project with NATO, or will this be a separate project?
Kevin Craven: To be clear, it will be a separate project from NATO, and it is very significant—I will come on to that. NATO obviously regards this hybrid warfare area with very grave concern. In talking to some Ukrainian colleagues last night, we raised the question of the cognitive campaigns, such as interference in elections, propaganda, social media, et cetera, as being a major factor in downplaying Ukraine’s ability to react. It has been that type of approach, together with the more overt manifestations such as cyber attacks and industrial espionage, and it has been very significant for NATO to think about.
This treaty sets out a dedicated counterhybrid co-operation agreement and the formation of a working group specifically on cyber across both military and civilian agencies. There is the concept of a joint taskforce to counter the use of drones, which, as we all know, is something that is already happening. From an industrial point of view, we see it as extremely significant because, if you think about hybrid warfare, for the very first time this is not the military forces of a country that are under attack. It is the private companies that provide the means for warfare that are among the first targets. Depending on whether you are a very large-scale military weapons-producing company or you are a small component supplier three or four tiers down the supply chain, the level of readiness, understanding and ability to counter these threats will be very different indeed. We think that calling it out in this treaty is very important. We would like to see considerable effort devoted to it. There is not sufficient detail at the moment, but nor would you expect there to be, to be honest. It is an area to which we are going to pay close attention and hope that the Government deliver on the intent.
Baroness Lawlor: That is a very interesting answer. It reminds me of some of the problems that arose in World War II, in the bombing of industrial targets, which were very important for both Germany and the UK. This seems to me to be a much more sophisticated problem that you will have to deal with in the defence capabilities industries.
Kevin Craven: Yes, and if I may use a Ukrainian example, this morning I was talking to one of the Ukrainian trade associations who are deeply concerned about a database that exists in the UK of Ukrainian suppliers with UK subsidiaries. They believe that it has led to targeted drone attacks on some of their facilities inside Ukraine. You are talking about that level of sophistication. Something that might seem relatively simple and straightforward has become a problem, in that several Ukrainian firms have been attacked and have had to move production facilities. Those consequences of hybrid warfare are not well understood by the British public. I genuinely believe that political leadership is needed to increase the level of awareness and understanding.
The Chair: We are half way through our list of questions and I have four colleagues yet to ask some in-depth questions. I am going to continue with those but, at the end, if we have time, I know that I have supplementary questions waiting to be asked by Lords Hannay and Anderson, so we will see how we manage to motor on.
Q6 Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: At first glance, it is a bit surprising to see a treaty which basically is about defence having a commitment to deepen co-operation on energy and health security, law enforcement and countering irregular migration, but you have touched on the reasons for that. Can you try to stand back and look at it in the round? Where do these things fit in relation to what we have just been hearing about the defence industries themselves? Perhaps Ed can answer first.
Ed Arnold: It is more in the construct of how these agreements come together. Quite often, when you had past agreements, not only between the UK and other countries but within Europe, if you did not mention certain policy areas the question was, “Well, why not that policy area as an example?” As we covered in the first question, because the threats are so much more comprehensive in a variety of domains, the agreements then also need to reflect that. That is why you get a lot of additional areas. We found that, principally after the 2022 large-scale invasion of Ukraine, while that was a state-on-state conflict, it covered other issues such as energy security and food security, so we needed to look at more areas. That is why it is specifically written into the treaty but, back to my earlier point, these things all need a lot of effort and momentum.
In previous treaties in which there has been, for example, a cyber working group, et cetera, it is quite difficult to find out what they do. You might ask certain departments and say, “What about this? It was in a treaty that it is supposed to meet every six months”, and they say, “Oh, you know, when did we last meet?” The issue is that, for each line item, you must have a programme of work, but also momentum.
To return to the previous point on cyber, one of the issues has always been about European security, particularly from the American position. Madeleine Albright’s speech from a very long time ago is famously about duplication. The issue is that all the issues that are in Northolt are seen by a variety of countries. It is not just about the bilateral. It is about bringing others in and, generally speaking, sharing best practice.
Justyna Gotkowska: I think that this treaty is also about comprehensive security. Hence, you have national security co-operation included, countering irregular migration or how to increase resilience in energy security. I understand the majority of the other provisions of the treaty in this context. If you read Article 3 on national security co-operation, it is about countering hybrid threats and FIMI, co-ordinating on counterterrorism, but also on how to combat criminal organisations which are often used by hostile actors, Russia included. On energy security co-operation and economic co-operation, it is time to broaden the scope of the co-operation between Poland and the UK to not only strictly defence and security topics. This is the opportunity. I am looking forward to the work on implementation of these provisions in real life, beyond security and defence, which would broaden the scope of Polish-British relations.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: You do wonder how the FCDO, or whoever is leading this, manages to get the co-operation and buy-in from other departments to do quite ambitious programmes of work, but perhaps that is for another time.
Q7 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I wonder if all three of you can help us a little bit by identifying ways in which this treaty differs from, builds on or is separate from the 2017 UK-Poland Treaty on Defence and Security Co-operation and the 2023 UK-Poland 2030 Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration on Foreign Policy, Security and Defence—rather a lengthy title, much loved by diplomats. Can you say in what ways this treaty is different and what it changes? If I may, I will add a supplementary question to save time, although it is not on this particular subject. Throughout the Cold War, the British Foreign Office was very active in dealing with disinformation and attempts by the Soviet bloc, but above all by the Soviet Union, to infiltrate international organisations, cultural events and so on. To what extent do you have the impression that the present British Government and FCDO are organised to deal with that sort of thing, which I have no doubt whatsoever, from all the reporting that we see, now emanates from Russia and attempts to undermine public support, and political support in particular, for agreements like the ones that we are discussing?
Kevin Craven: Certainly, this treaty is different in that it is legally binding, which is really important, and provides an explicit commitment to assist each other in the event of an armed attack, alongside NATO’s Article 5—and very explicitly alongside that. It moves from co-operation towards genuine co-development and co-production, which, as we have mentioned, aligns industrial and export strategies. There are significant differences but, in the interest of time, I will leave it at that. It also goes broader than that into other areas, as we have discussed.
Your supplementary question is difficult to answer. They are aware and doing an enormous amount to mitigate and prevent those types of attacks. “Is it sufficient?” is probably the question that one has to ask and I simply do not know the answer. The resources that foreign state actors are dedicating to this area are significantly greater than we are putting towards defending against those activities. It is an area in which all western Governments are having to rethink their priorities.
Ed Arnold: In answer to your first question on the difference, apart from what has just been said, it is significant that this is another treaty after there was a treaty signed in 2017. That is obviously a political choice. It could have just been a supplementary or a refreshed 2023 document, in terms of the vision to 2030. There is an element within European security that, if you have a treaty-based relationship with someone independent of NATO, it is priority level. When there is a crisis, who does the UK Government pick up the phone to first? Well, it is probably going to be France, Germany and Poland—they are three states with which we have bilateral defence agreements, so there is an element of prioritisation. Obviously, the risk is that, if the delivery is not as quick as expected, or there is a problem within delivery, you are then not delivering on an additional treaty.
On the second point, I do not think that you can really make the comparison with the Cold War, because this is effectively technology-enabled disinformation. I will give a quick example. Russian intelligence agencies in the Cold War had to do manual and physical pitches, research, et cetera. Nowadays, they can just go on LinkedIn and refine a massive target list of thousands down to five to then make very structured pitches. There is a lack of capacity on the side of the Foreign Office and other departments. The sheer volume of disinformation and misinformation is very difficult to counter, but I do not think that you can quite make a comparison with how it was dealt with in the Cold War.
Justyna Gotkowska: If I may, I will answer the question of why we should sign a new treaty between Poland and the UK. The 2017 treaty was focused very much on security and defence, and it did not go beyond that. The 2023 declaration was an update of that during the PiS Government, and that was the continuity. The 2026 treaty is broader than security and defence issues only, which I think is its strength. It means co-operation between Poland and the UK going beyond the usual security and defence issues. Hence, as I said, I hope that there will be continuation and implementation of these provisions. That is one way of looking at this treaty.
The second one has been mentioned. In recent years we have faced the signing of bilateral treaties between the biggest, E3 countries: France, Germany and the UK. In this more uncertain international environment, with NATO in transformation, these bilateral treaties give additional assurances, especially from the Polish perspective, even if they are put in the NATO framework and in the Article 5 framework. The UK recently signed agreements with France and Germany. Poland signed a treaty with France last year, the Nancy treaty, and one with the UK this year. This month, a defence agreement focused on defence and security issues with Germany has been signed. From a Polish perspective, the signing of these treaties gives more assurances that the party will react if the situation will not allow NATO, for example, to react jointly.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Does the particular treaty that we are looking at now enjoy the full support of all parties in the Polish Parliament and the president?
Justyna Gotkowska: The UK has been the preferred ally for the current Opposition, and the PiS Government signed the 2017 treaty on defence and security co-operation and the 2023 joint declaration on strategic partnership. I think that the current Opposition support the Polish-UK treaty and its ratification in Parliament. But we have cohabitation between the current Government and the president, who comes from the opposition party, strong polarisation and incoming parliamentary elections. Many differences are being played out, and the president has expressed his dissatisfaction with how the Government have co-operated with the Chancellery of the President on how this treaty has been presented to the head of state. He has expressed his concern publicly. But I am of the opinion that ratification, both in Parliament and by the president, will be concluded because the UK is an important partner from the Polish perspective. There is continuous co-operation on security and defence issues, regardless of which party is in government.
Q8 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Lord Hannay has already asked about the added value of the treaty. Justyna, you have conceded that it is a bit Christmas tree-like, in that it gives such a wide definition to security. My question is about the Joint Expeditionary Force, founded in 2012, with the UK as its head. It included Finland and Sweden almost from the start, which were not then NATO members, so Ukraine might possibly join. Why is Poland reluctant to join the JEF?
Justyna Gotkowska: I have heard two explanations over the years for why Poland is not part of the JEF, the Joint Expeditionary Force. One explanation is that the UK does not want us in, and the second is that Poland has been reluctant to join. Overall, whatever the explanation is, JEF is a specific format of co-operation focused especially on the maritime area, where the UK is the framework nation co-operating with smaller countries. Poland is a larger country in central Europe and somehow does not fit, either politically or militarily—but especially politically—in the format. That is a political perspective.
From a military perspective, JEF is focused very much on the maritime domain, on both the Baltic Sea and the north Atlantic. Poland is very much focused on the land domain, for obvious reasons, and hence prefers to shape maritime co-operation that is largely focused on the Baltic Sea. Our preferred format is the Commander Task Force Baltic, where we co-operate with Germany and Sweden. These common structures are co-ordinating allied efforts in the Baltic Sea, such as the Baltic Sentry. This is currently our preferred format of co-operation in the maritime domain. JEF has different political and military goals, working from the UK perspective and that of the Nordic countries engaged in this format.
Lord Anderson of Swansea: I ask Ed: what are the prospects of JEF changing—expanding—in the near future?
Ed Arnold: It could expand. JEF was conceived in 2012. It is part of NATO framework agreements agreed at the Wales summit in 2014 and has always had a very operational defence dimension. In 2022, the first leaders’ meeting was held virtually the day after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it started to develop a political dimension. That political dimension has stalled for a variety of reasons. There is now a view that, if JEF is going to develop, it will possibly be not in the political dimension but back to a military framework very much focused on the north.
The issue specifically around Poland is that JEF is there to cohere regionally like-minded allies. Now that the UK has command of the Arctic and the High North in terms of NATO through Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, and there is a rotating command through Germany and Poland in Brunssum, which basically covers the eastern flank and is predominantly in the land environment, you have to ask the question: where would the value add be for Poland? Justyna just mentioned the maritime capability co-operation led by Germany in the Baltic, and now Baltic Sentry in terms of the NATO mission, so you are seeing a slight delineation. I am not entirely sure that it is a good fit militarily or politically at the moment, but that can change.
The catalyst for change would be a demonstrable change of opinion from the US within NATO and people looking at a potential plan B. JEF is a very good option because it has intelligence, operations, logistics, plans and, vitally, communications. Not many sub-NATO formats have that. But it would have to be a very political decision of the UK to expand JEF to try to encapsulate and keep NATO functioning, or, in a regional area, as close to functioning as it currently does. Again, you would have to look at that in terms of the US change of position.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That was challenging throughout and made us all very thoughtful. Our last question is going to be asked by Lord McDonald. I appreciate that we have now hit the magic time of one hour. May I just check that all three of our contributors are able to stay a little longer? Thank you very much indeed; I am very grateful.
Q9 Lord McDonald of Salford: My question is at least brief. We have heard that this is quite a multifaceted agreement—a Christmas tree has been mentioned. My question to all three panellists is: do you foresee any challenges for either the UK or Poland in implementing aspects of the treaty?
Kevin Craven: I am happy to go first, and my answer might be equally brief. I think that one of the challenges, which has already been mentioned, is the UK’s credibility as a customer in this process. I did not really want to mention the defence investment plan, but inevitably the delays are sending a mixed signal to our allies just as we are committing to joint programmes. Slightly less controversially, perhaps, are the benefits of this treaty. If we are using the Christmas tree analogy, I might say that the twinkles in the Christmas tree might be the SMEs in the supply chain that would help our major primes—BAE, Thales UK and MBDA—in building these industrial relationships in Poland that are long-lasting and multidecade.
Ed Arnold: Credibility is critical—that is covered. Prioritisation is a point that I have made previously, not just in terms of the bilateral, but everything else that is going on in Europe, bearing in mind that that is very much a changing position. I think also of governance, for this particularly. The UK-Poland relationship generally meets through the two-plus-two format, which is Defence Secretaries and Foreign Secretaries. That is pretty good. There has to be a judgment call. If you look at all the areas that it now covers, you could potentially have 12 Ministers and, just diaries permitting, that would not help. On governance, you have to have it at the very top. From the UK position, that needs to be the Prime Minister to drive this in terms of the prioritisation. You probably need it jointly led by the Defence Secretary and the Foreign Secretary, but with the Home Secretary joining as and when. I think also, if you were going to have, say, a three-plus-three meeting, where you can clear diaries and get the discussions going, that is where you would see that prioritisation and that strategic view from a UK and Poland perspective realised. This cannot just be bilaterally between the Defence Secretaries, the Foreign Secretaries and better department-to-department working; it has to be elevated.
Justyna Gotkowska: I am not sure that I agree with the metaphor of a Christmas tree. I see this treaty as building on the core of co-operation that focused for years on security and defence. That has been updated through this treaty and expanded a little on the issues concerning national security co-operation on hybrid, which, on the other hand, have been a field for joint projects, especially in eastern Europe. I know what Polish-British co-operation looked like in the past. We have had projects of co-operation on how to counter FIMI and hybrid threats in countries such as Ukraine and Moldova. These were very successful.
This treaty expands the areas of co-operation, which also reflects how Poland has changed and how Polish-British relations have changed in the past year. Poland is not only a one-dimensional co-operation partner regarding security and defence, but it wants to broaden this co-operation to larger areas such as the economy, health and energy. Hence, for me, that is the challenge: how to implement that.
On security and defence, I think that we are looking with concern at what is happening in the UK with regard to defence investment in the British Armed Forces, and to what extent the UK will be able to meet its commitments within NATO. This is very important for us in the situation where the US is coming up with the concept of NATO 3.0 and the Europeanisation of the alliance, where in order to keep and maintain deterrence, the European allies need to do much more to meet their commitments, and quickly. For me and, I think, from a Polish perspective, the battle over financing of the British Armed Forces is a question mark.
The Chair: Thank you very much indeed for your contributions today. This is our first session on scrutinising the treaty itself. Thank you for giving us a very detailed background about the real threats, every single day, every single second, against the UK, Europe and Poland because of the instability that we face and the threats from Russia. Thank you too, for the reality of the people who have to deliver what really happens, and that is producing the support for those who are going to take part in the JEF and those producing the matériel and the weaponry that can keep us safe. What has come down through your very practical contributions is that the treaty has legality. It is up to Governments to make sure that there is—and I wrote it down—a programme of work and momentum, and it is our job to make sure that Governments, whatever their composition may be, do just that. Thank you very much indeed.
