24
Examination of witnesses
Geraldine McGahey and Louise Conlon.
Q13 The Chair: Good morning and welcome to this public meeting of the Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee. We are today holding the second public evidence session of our inquiry on Article 2 of the protocol to the Windsor Framework, the so-called non-diminution of rights provision.
We are joined today by senior representatives of the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland. Geraldine McGahey is the chief commissioner for the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and Louise Conlon is the chief executive of the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland. You are both very welcome indeed, and we very much look forward to hearing your evidence. We would be grateful if, the first time you speak, you would introduce yourselves briefly.
Today’s meeting is being broadcast and a verbatim transcript will be taken for subsequent publication, which will be sent to the witnesses to check for accuracy. I am now going to start the evidence session. If you want to pause for any reason at any time, just say.
Prior to Brexit, how were the RSEO provisions of the Belfast/Good Friday agreement protected? What was the Equality Commission’s role in this and how does this differ from the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission?
Geraldine McGahey: Good morning. I am the chief commissioner of the Equality Commission for Northern Ireland. It is a great honour to be here to assist you in your inquiry.
In answering your question, I would have to take you back to the Good Friday agreement and how equality of opportunity was seen as a central tenet of that agreement. Even before that, the strong equality legislation that we had in Northern Ireland helped build confidence in the participants to the Good Friday agreement as to what could be achieved with strong and robust legislation.
Prior to Brexit, the legislation in Northern Ireland really originated from ordinary legislation from Westminster. That had been indeed supplemented by EU directives that required amendments or additional legislation. In addition to that we had the Human Rights Act in 1998. In Northern Ireland we also had the Northern Ireland Act in 1998, which gave birth to the Equality Commission and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.
It is important to note that the Equality Commission was a bringing together of four predecessor bodies: the Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland, the Fair Employment Commission for Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Disability Council and the Commission for Racial Equality for Northern Ireland. All of those were merged into the remit of the Equality Commission.
How we worked at that time was to challenge discrimination. Our remit was to provide advice and education and to raise awareness, but primarily it was to challenge discrimination and seek enforcement through the legislation that was available to us. We did receive a funding resource to be able to do that.
However, it is important to note that the situation within Northern Ireland and our governmental structures make it really difficult for equality legislation to progress. It is fair to say that, in some regards, it is politicised. It is seen as a zero-sum game. There are sections within our community who really do not see the merits in having equality of opportunity or what the commission can bring to it. Some of the narrative in the media over this past number of weeks has shown that for what it is. However, equality of opportunity is central to the Good Friday agreement. The signatories to the Good Friday agreement saw that as a way of ensuring that there would be economic development and peacebuilding post the Good Friday agreement.
In terms of your question, how are we different from the Human Rights Commission? The HRC is the national independent human rights body for Northern Ireland. We are the independent body that deals specifically with equality of opportunity. The HRC’s remit is the wider human rights agenda. That is where we very much differ. I will pass over to Louise to see whether she has anything to add to that.
Louise Conlon: European law provided an important underpinning for the Northern Ireland equality legislation prior to Brexit. It did result in changes to Northern Ireland’s protections. It was a very important underpinning.
The Chair: Could you give us a couple of examples of things that the Human Rights Commission can do that you cannot?
Geraldine McGahey: In terms of our legislative framework, prior to the establishment of the dedicated mechanism, we have specific legislation that we seek to enforce and raise awareness of. The Human Rights Commission advocated and lobbied for the advancement of human rights and would assist individuals in taking cases through the courts to challenge legislation that might be a breach of human rights. There were issues prior to the withdrawal agreement and the Northern Ireland protocol/Windsor Framework in terms of the ability of both organisations to take legal action in their own names. That has since been addressed, but we dealt with two very distinct remits.
We are not connected in any way. The HRC’s remit is specifically about human rights, although it could be argued that equality rights fall within that remit. Our remit is about advancing equality of opportunity and challenging discrimination.
The Chair: Do you take cases to the courts on a regular basis?
Geraldine McGahey: We assist individuals to take cases before the courts. That could be through the county court, the employment tribunal and, on occasion, the Appeal Court in Belfast.
The Chair: Do you ask to be heard as an interested party in any of the cases that go through the senior courts?
Geraldine McGahey: Yes, but only in terms of the dedicated mechanism and the Windsor Framework.
The Chair: That may be relevant to Article 2.
Geraldine McGahey: Yes.
Q14 Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: Geraldine and Louise, you are both very welcome. I have two questions. One is part of the background. Why do you think the UK and the EU negotiated and included Article 2 of the Windsor Framework in the Windsor Framework? How does Article 2 of the Windsor Framework relate to the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, in particular in relation to the rights, safeguards and equality of opportunity provisions? That is the RSEO provisions and section of the Good Friday agreement.
Geraldine McGahey: The Good Friday agreement is really important to the people of Northern Ireland right across society. It is fair to say that, at the time of the negotiations in relation to Brexit, it was recognised that the EU was quite determined that the Belfast/Good Friday agreement would be protected in all its guises. As part of the negotiations between the UK Government and the EU to define the withdrawal agreement, and to really get things moving and get it done, as it was said, there was an agreement that the rights and protections within the Good Friday agreement would be safeguarded.
The border has nothing to do with us, but, in terms of the legislative framework that underpinned the equality of opportunity rights and the other rights within the Belfast/Good Friday agreement, there were a number of meetings between representatives of the Department for Exiting the EU, the Northern Ireland Office and both the Equality Commission and the Human Rights Commission. The UK Government wanted to be able to demonstrate very clearly its sincerity and commitment to delivering on the requirements of maintaining the Good Friday agreement.
I was not party to the initial discussions, but I was part of the delegation from the Equality Commission that met with those negotiators and legal people who tried to define what Article 2 would be. It was through those discussions that the Article 2 commitments were defined and both commissions undertook to work with the UK Government to enable them to demonstrate that they would meet their commitment.
In terms of the Annexe 1 directives, we were very keen that those directives would be protected because they underpinned most of our equality legislation in Northern Ireland, as Louise said earlier. It needs to be borne in mind that, since the devolution of equality to the Executive, we have not had any improvements in our equality protections except on foot of direct legislation from Westminster, which was actually a Private Member’s Bill, and a Private Member’s Bill within the Executive.
We have tried on many occasions to get reform to our equality legislation, but, because of the nature of how equality has been politicised in some quarters, it becomes very difficult to get agreement right across the political spectrum. That kind of consensus is really important. I hope you can appreciate why it was important to the likes of the Equality Commission that those six directives would be there. If I was being totally honest, we wanted to get a couple of additional directives included within that.
The Chair: Could you give us some examples of what those additional directives would have been?
Geraldine McGahey: The pregnancy directive would have been one of them. We were keen that that would be included, but we did come to an agreement that the scope and nature of the six directives that were included were sufficiently broad to enable those other directives to be invoked and to be of direct effect. We stuck with the six directives because of their nature.
As part of those discussions, we were also involved in trying to define how they might work and how they might be enforced. That was where the Northern Ireland Office came up with the explainer document. We were not party to the writing of that explainer document, but we were involved in discussions leading up to it. That formed the basis of how both commissions interpreted Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. It was quite explicit in terms of the rights that it was protecting and how it might work going forward. That is where we based our definition of the scope.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: What is the “Spiro document”? “Spiro document”, you said.
Geraldine McGahey: “Explainer”, sorry.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: Oh, sorry.
The Chair: Let me just ask you a supplementary question about the explainer document. As you will know, in terms of judicial review, one of the issues that is considered is the legitimate expectations of a claimant. Has the explainer document been used to mean that people can understand better what their legitimate expectations are?
Geraldine McGahey: That was the intent of the explainer document at the outset. Following on from the Dillon judgment, the value and the merit of that explainer document needs to be reviewed. Indeed, the Northern Ireland Office has withdrawn it from its website.
The Chair: That is why I asked the question.
Geraldine McGahey: It did form a fundamental understanding for everyone at the outset. This was a novel piece of legislation. It is very complex and difficult to understand. In terms of trying to define that scope, we really had no other alternative source of information apart from the explainer document, which I would say we fairly explicitly relied on. We did take extensive legal advice—both commissions did—to try to define that scope.
Q15 Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: I have the next question as well. Moving on, therefore, to the Dillon judgment, the UK Supreme Court said in Dillon that Article 2(1) of the Windsor Framework is capable of direct effect—you already mentioned direct effect—in certain circumstances. In your view, what are those circumstances and what rights are covered in those circumstances? What is your understanding of direct effect as the judgment outlined?
Geraldine McGahey: Paragraph 118 of the Dillon judgment sets out the two types of circumstances where direct effect could come in. First of all, Article 2(1) operates in conjunction with a directly effective provision within one of the annexe directives. That was the first criterion. The second is where Article 2(1) operates in conjunction with other EU instruments. In other words, for it to be of direct effect, the right had to be very concise, explicit and defined within a way that was given in conferring rights on an individual. Once that test is there, it can be enforced within the court system.
If we look at the Dillon judgment, in paragraph 118, paragraph 119 and other paragraphs that make reference to obiter dicta, there is a degree of confusion that can arise. It is really important to recognise that Article 2(1) is not merely concerned with the non-diminution of rights but the safeguards and protections for equality of opportunity that are contained within the Good Friday chapter.
In terms of how those rights are defined, in the consideration of the Supreme Court, it was very clear that the clauses within the victims directive and the civil rights definition within the Good Friday agreement are so ambiguous that it was impossible to apply the Demirel test. The judgment did say that there would be other occasions and circumstances where direct effect could be applied.
In terms of the judgment itself, the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbitrator in relation to this, but some of the aspects of the judgment are obiter dicta. In terms of the direct effect, the Supreme Court recognised that the Annexe 1 directives, for example, were capable of direct effect. We very much welcome that part of the judgment because it really reinforced the point that we were making.
The Chair: On that very important point—forgive me for interrupting you—you have highlighted an extremely important point about the Dillon judgment. As we know, obiter dicta are not part of the rationale of the judgment. They are not binding precedents, but they may provide guidance to future courts when they consider factual issues, which one might say is not massively helpful for an organisation like yours. Can you give us an example or two of situations in which there might be direct effect, were a factual issue to arise in a case?
Geraldine McGahey: First of all, for us the uncertainty specifically arises in relation to the commentary and the statements about the fact that the right should be seen through the lens of resolving sectarian conflict. That was an important point to make because equality of opportunity was in itself forward-facing. The EU directives underpin our equality legislation to such an extent that you could say we rely upon them. To apply that in a context of the resolution of sectarian conflict becomes really confusing. We really do not know the answer to that. That is one of the examples of where the uncertainties are such that they can be addressed only by the courts.
Examples of where we might have a problem or difficulty would be in terms of new legislation that might come forward. Presently, the Northern Ireland Executive Committee has been carrying out a review of equality legislation to look how we might move forward. We have concerns that that potentially would be an opportunity for the rollback of rights.
It is really important for us that the six directives are seen to be of direct effect, are capable of being judiciable and therefore are protected moving forward. They are crucial to us. Louise, do you want to come in?
Louise Conlon: Just to add, you will be aware that we are presently engaged in a case in relation to For Women Scotland, which we anticipate might address some of these uncertainties. We are seeking leave to bring a judicial review in order to obtain an advisory declaration from the court, given the nature of the uncertainties. I do not know. Geraldine, do you want to add to that?
Geraldine McGahey: It is really important. There has been some confusion in wider society about why the Equality Commission is seeking to have a judicial declaration in terms of this particular piece of legislation or the Supreme Court judgment.
The commission is not challenging the judgment of the Supreme Court. The commission is seeking to get clarity on how that judgment sits alongside the very different equality legislation that we have in Northern Ireland and indeed how Article 2(1) impacts upon it.
Coming on from the Dillon judgment, those uncertainties around the direct effect of the Annexe 1 directives are fundamental to this. The commission is duty-bound to provide robust guidance for employers, service providers and indeed public authorities as to how the definition of sex in legislation in Northern Ireland should be interpreted. We currently have two judicial reviews against the commission, one from the side of the argument that would be very much pro-trans rights, and one from the section that would be very much women’s rights.
This whole issue is a balancing of rights. Once someone has raised a concern that Article 2 might apply, we are duty-bound under Section 78 of the Northern Ireland Act to seek to determine how it applies. That is the very reason that we are taking this legal process and asking the Northern Ireland courts to give us this kind of declaration. We believe that they have the discretion to do it, but ultimately it is up to them whether they do it. It would enable us to provide very robust guidance to society and all aspects of law in Northern Ireland that require a definition of men and women, so that there would be consistency and we can move forward in a coherent way. That is the example of where we are seeking clarity in relation to this particular aspect.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: What is your argument that trans rights are involved or relevant in the context of the resolution of sectarian conflict?
Geraldine McGahey: Article 2 of the Windsor Framework has six annexe directives. Whether or not they must be interpreted within the lens of conflict resolution is uncertain because there are paragraphs within the Dillon judgment that contradict each of those points. At one paragraph it is accepting that the Annexe 1 directives are of direct effect within the courts, and then in another paragraph it is saying that the bullet points need to be viewed through the lens of conflict resolution. On that argument, the lens would apply to the right to equality of opportunity.
Q16 Lord Dodds of Duncairn: Thanks for your evidence so far. Just on these EU directives in Annexe 1 and so on, whatever else is unclear, to me it seems pretty clear from the judgment that the Supreme Court did say that those would have a direct effect. You put a lot of reliance on that. I think you said at one stage that you rely on those directives. What is the situation in England, Scotland and Wales? Given the importance that you attach to them, what is the position of those rights in the rest of the United Kingdom? Are they diminished? Are they uncertain? Are they nebulous? Are we in an incredibly strong position compared to the rest of the UK? How do we sit as a result of this?
Geraldine McGahey: Leave the directives to one side. In England, Scotland and Wales, the Equality Act 2010 introduced many of the amendments to equality legislation that we have been calling for for a very long time in Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland does not have those protections. The underpinning for our legislation arises from the EU directives, which have been incorporated into the 2010 Act.
It could be argued that, prior to the 1990s, equality legislation in Northern Ireland was among the strongest right across Europe. We have not seen any progress on that since that time because of the way in which it is viewed within Northern Ireland. The EU directives provide that framework upon which our legislation has been improved. There would not have been improvements to our legislation without those EU directives. There are some examples of where legislation has been amended in accordance with that, whether that be sexual orientation, age discrimination within employment and training, and many others.
Without that continued framework to drive our legislation forward, we will be sitting without any movement and still very much behind the legislation in GB. For example, we are the only jurisdiction within these islands that does not have any protection against discrimination on the basis of your age with the exception of employment. We have been advocating for improvements to that legislation and providing the policy framework and remit for that to our colleagues in the Executive without that being addressed.
I have to acknowledge the work that was done by two of the political parties way back in 2016 to try to get that over the line. While those two political parties did agree at the time, there are so many diverse viewpoints that it ultimately fell at the last minute. Our equality protections would stagnate if did not have those directives underpinning them and driving us to keep pace with wider society.
Lord Dodds of Duncairn: As a follow-up, you have pointed to the difficulties within the Assembly and devolution. The human rights side of things is more reserved, if I could put it like that, to Westminster. From your perspective, given what you have said about what you want to see happen, should these matters be reserved rather than devolved?
Geraldine McGahey: Equality has been devolved to the Assembly.
Lord Dodds of Duncairn: Should it be?
Geraldine McGahey: That is a political decision and I do not have any view on that.
Lord Dodds of Duncairn: From what you are saying, you seem to be blaming the Assembly and devolved set-up for there being no movement on the issues where you would like to see movement.
Geraldine McGahey: I am not blaming the Assembly at all. I am saying a mere fact in terms of the way in which our Assembly works. I would love to see a consensus of political viewpoints in terms of improvement on equality of opportunity because equality of opportunity is for everyone in society. It is not for a small group.
It is really important that we are able to get to that consensus. In a democratic society, locally engaged and representative politicians need to be involved in the defining of legislation. It is important that as much legislation as possible is devolved to Northern Ireland, but I would like a greater opportunity to be able to engage and to demonstrate that it has benefits for everyone, not just one side or another.
There have been attempts over many years for some to politicise equality. As demographics in Northern Ireland change, equality legislation is as important today, in 2026, as it was in 1998. Majorities change; it ebbs and flows. One side needed protection previously; the other side may need protection moving forward. I am not about taking sides. I am talking about the fluid nature of our demographics in terms of the shift in population sizes. Everyone needs that protection.
I will give you an example of where it is really important. The Fair Employment Treatment Order monitors employment and seeks to have a representative 50:50 split in terms of our communities within designated employers. That has changed. It took quite a while, but we have now gone over 50:50 and we are seeing more from the Catholic population than from the unionist tradition. There are growing numbers who do not identify, but, going forward, there needs to be work done to protect that peace and equality of esteem. That is fundamental to how we keep Northern Ireland moving forward in a positive and constructive way, in my perspective.
The Chair: On what you have said, there seems to me to be a significant difference between what you do and what the EHRC does in Great Britain. You are able to take cases as you have described; the EHRC operates in a completely different way. For example, it can issue codes of practice, as we know, with parliamentary timetables and so on. There are going to be a lot of cases in the courts in Great Britain following the For Women Scotland judgment. That is already taking place. Does using the courts put you in a stronger position than the EHRC, on the whole?
Geraldine McGahey: Not necessarily, no. I will qualify that by saying that I personally view taking legal action as a measure of last resort. Part of our remit is about advising and promoting equality of opportunity. If we are doing our work properly, we do not need to go to court. However, you have to protect rights and you have to be prepared to enforce them when it is necessary.
We provide legal assistance to any individual who would seek to have their rights protected. We have other avenues at our disposal, not just through the courts. In many regards, we have the same powers and duties as EHRC. Our remit is very specific in terms of the protection and the promotion of equality of opportunity. EHRC has a much wider remit, and that is where the two avenues differ. We have the power to issue a code of practice as well. However, it requires Assembly approval.
In terms of the work that we do—I just want to quote this so that I get it right—our role is to give advice and guidance to individuals and employers, and EHRC does that in a way as well, although I believe that it tenders that work out in some regards. We also provide advice and guidance to service providers and public authorities, hence my reference to the guidance that we want to produce at the end of the For Women Scotland legal case that we are pursuing.
We have enforcement powers that we will use, many of which we have not used because of the limitation on resources. We use the key enforcement powers that we have, but we are currently carrying out a review to look at whether we could do more if we were to focus our attention on different issues, because our budget has been cut by some 58% over the past 10 to 15 years. We gather evidence and provide research papers to our colleagues within the Executive Office and to other government departments to try to influence policy change and make the case for improvements to legislation.
Q17 Baroness Ludford: Thank you both very much indeed. What obligation is imposed on the UK Government by Article 2 of the Windsor Framework as determined by the Supreme Court? What is the significance of this obligation for Northern Ireland and for the UK Government?
Can I just add another question to that? Is one of those obligations on the UK Government to make it clear that the Supreme Court judgment in For Women Scotland applies in Northern Ireland?
Geraldine McGahey: If we can start, first of all, with the obligation for the UK Government, bear in mind that it was an obligation that the UK Government helped define and passed through legislation within Parliament. The obligation was, “The United Kingdom shall ensure that no diminution of rights, safeguards or equality of opportunity, as set out in that part of the 1998 agreement entitled Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity results from its withdrawal from the union, including in the area of protection against discrimination, as enshrined in the provisions of union law listed in Annexe 1 to this protocol, and shall implement this paragraph through dedicated mechanisms”, namely ourselves and the Human Rights Commission.
We need to understand that this was an obligation that was freely undertaken by the UK Government. It is enshrined in law. The obligation and its associated rights and remedies were to be recognised and available in domestic law and enforced, allowed and followed accordingly.
The significance of this is that the Supreme Court has accepted the essential nature of the obligation, and that is not in dispute from Dillon. The court affirmed that Article 2(1) is justiciable in certain circumstances, including to challenge primary legislation that is enacted after Section 7(a) of the withdrawal agreement came into effect. The significance is that Article 2, acting through Section 7(a), constrains the legislative powers of the UK Parliament, the Northern Ireland Executive and the Northern Ireland Ministers so as to render it unlawful for them to diminish the rights and safeguards guaranteed by Article 2(1) as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
You asked me specifically about For Women Scotland and whether the UK Government should make it clear that it applies in Northern Ireland. It is important to note that the Supreme Court’s judgment stated that it was an interpretation of the Equality Act 2010 and it did not look at the legislation that applies in Northern Ireland, nor did it take account of the Windsor Framework Article 2 commitments.
Those are the very questions that we are asking of the court because it is our viewpoint that the Supreme Court judgment is highly persuasive in Northern Ireland despite the fact that we operate under different legislation. As I said earlier, because it has been raised with us that there is a potential for an Article 2 implication or commitment to impact the For Women Scotland judgment in the Northern Ireland context, we are obliged to bottom that out and to address those questions.
The purpose of us doing this is to be mindful of resources, not just for us as a commission but for the courts and future service providers and employers, who ultimately will be challenged on the basis of the guidance that we provide to them. Our view is that we need to have a very clear understanding of the implications, if indeed there are any, of Article 2 because it is only the courts that can actually determine that.
The Chair: Can I interrupt you on a very important point? Article 2 refers to certain provisions of EU law. Annexe 1 refers to specific provisions of European Union law. I do not want you to take the For Women Scotland situation as an absolute. I do not ask you to give an opinion on it. Does it mean that, if the Supreme Court were to give a judgment on a certain issue, the response to that judgment might be different in Northern Ireland because of Article 2 and Annexe 1?
Geraldine McGahey: Potentially, yes. That is the very question that we are asking of the courts because we do not know the answer. If we were certain about this, we would not be taking this line. We would go ahead and issue guidance.
As I said earlier, it has been raised with the commission that there is a potential for an Article 2 implication on the Supreme Court judgment. Our role is to provide strong, robust and clear guidance for service providers, et cetera, in Northern Ireland. We do not want to leave anyone vulnerable to legal action, if we have that guidance wrong. We are obliged to make sure that it is robust within our context. I have made it clear that we are not challenging the Supreme Court judgment. We just want the court’s view to help us come up with that final decision.
The Chair: This is in your context, in Northern Ireland.
Geraldine McGahey: This is in our context, only in the Northern Ireland context. It is purely because of the potential implications of Article 2. Please bear in mind that the equality framework in Northern Ireland is different from the Equality Act 2010 in England, Wales and Scotland.
Q18 Baroness Goudie: Good morning. It is nice to see you both again. I have two questions for you on Dillon. First, in Dillon, in contrast to arguments put forward by the ECNI, the Supreme Court drew the scope of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework narrowly. How would you respond to the criticism that the ECNI has been too ambitious in its interpretation of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework?
Secondly, post Dillon, is it clear that you can rely on Article 2 of the Windsor Framework? Your website currently advises individuals to contact the ECNI if they believe that their Article 2 rights have been breached. Are you confident that in future your website will be able to offer clear advice to individuals?
Geraldine McGahey: First of all, we would respectfully reject the criticism that we have been too ambitious. As I said early on in my evidence, the Equality Commission sought legal advice and interpretation of a very complex piece of law. We used the explainer document as provided by the Northern Ireland Office to define what Article 2 was about, to seek to define the scope of the Article 2 commitment. We did that in good faith. We have always been very clear, both on our website and in our publications, that ultimately it is for the courts and tribunals to determine the scope of Article 2, but it was on our best understanding and good faith that we were defining the scope. I would categorically, respectfully, decline to accept the allegation that we have been overambitious.
Moving forward, it is really important to clarify where we sit post Dillon. We accept that the Dillon judgment made very specific judgments in relation to certain aspects of the legacy Act. There were obiter dicta in relation to the Annexe 1 directives, but it raised a number of uncertainties that, again, only the courts will be able to clarify. We have already mentioned some of the uncertainties within the Dillon judgment. Again, that is not to undermine the Supreme Court in relation to that.
The role of the Equality Commission within the Dillon case and the legacy Act was in terms of trying to clarify and support the definition and understanding of the Article 2 commitment. It was not in relation to the victims directive or the legacy Act. That is a human rights issue. It is not part of our role and would not be part of our role moving forward. We work in partnership with the Human Rights Commission, but we do not encroach on each other’s remits. We make that very clear, although we do support each other.
In the post-Dillon situation, at this moment in time we cannot offer definitive advice in terms of how the courts will deal with Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. Under legislation, we are required to give advice and promote understanding of the Windsor Framework, but the uncertainties that have arisen now demonstrate very clearly that there has to be greater understanding of the scope.
That is why we ask individuals to contact commission staff. We put that note on our website very shortly after the Dillon judgment. Everyone’s circumstances and issues are very different. To put advice at this moment in time on a website could mislead others. We would rather deal with individuals and issues on a one-by-one basis to be as clear and as practical and robust as possible.
We would hope that we will get the uncertainties generated by Dillon sorted out, if not in the For Women Scotland case then in some other judicial process moving forward. The sooner that happens, the better, because we do have that obligation to provide advice and guidance.
The Chair: Do you have any reservations about what I have heard referred to as provincial judicial activism? In other words, if you are in a position to and you do pursue cases before the Northern Ireland courts, it might be suggested that you were seeking to provide exceptionality from a Supreme Court judgment. Others would say that you do not need to do that because the Supreme Court judgment in For Women Scotland or Dillon is perfectly clear anyway.
Geraldine McGahey: To be honest and speaking from a personal perspective, some of the media commentary following Dillon has been quite horrendous. I have been labelled an advocate for a united Ireland. I have been called all sorts of things that are really quite horrendous, despite the fact that our Executive have an overarching strategy and commitment to ending violence against women and girls. It does make you wonder whether, if I were a man, the same things would be said about me, including about bringing me to heel.
Despite all of that, we are only doing and have only ever done our job as required under Section 78 of the Northern Ireland Act. We are there to monitor and advise and to hold the UK Government to account in terms of its commitment to Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. I have been very clear in my evidence so far. We are not in any shape or form challenging the Supreme Court judgment in For Women Scotland. Had it not been for Article 2, we would have been saying very clearly, “The judgment of the Supreme Court applies in Northern Ireland”.
In terms of Dillon, we are not challenging the judgment in relation to the Supreme Court. Rather, we are seeking some clarity in relation to some conflicting comments around the Annexe 1 directives and the fact that they are obiter. We want to make sure that the proper interpretation of those is taken forward.
The Chair: You have just made a very important statement for the purposes of this committee. Thank you for that. It is very, very clear.
Geraldine McGahey: Can I just say one more thing, Lord Carlile? We have taken the liberty to write to the Northern Ireland Office and the Secretary of State. The most expeditious way of dealing with these issues with the least amount of resources and inconvenience, not just to employers, et cetera, but to the judiciary, was to see whether the Secretary of State had considered using an eighteen-thirty-something-or-other Act whereby, under Section 4, the Government could raise the matter with the Privy Council and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to seek clarity on these issues. That would have saved a lot of inconvenience. It is my understanding that the—
The Chair: I do not think that has been done for a long time.
Geraldine McGahey: Yes, you will probably anticipate that the Secretary of State has declined to use that. That was to be expected, but we are very keen to be seen to protect valuable resources for everybody as we try to resolve these issues. We do not want to snag up the court system, hence why we are trying to get a unified and agreed position in terms of definition of sex in Northern Ireland. We just need these questions answered, and this is the quickest and the cheapest way forward for us.
Q19 Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: I have a very quick question. Earlier, you were discussing about the explainer document and the fact that the NIO removed it from the website after the Dillon judgment and it now needs to be reviewed. What progress has been made in that respect by the NIO and what representations has the Equality Commission made to that effect?
Geraldine McGahey: There has been no consultation, consideration or communication with the NIO in regard to the explainer document and how it might be defined moving forward. I have to say that the officers within the two commissions, the NIO and the Executive Office of the Assembly have very strong working relationships, so I would anticipate that there will be some discussion moving forward.
We were not advised by NIO that it was removing the explainer document. It came as a surprise when we heard it through a third party, but, quite clearly, there needs to be a revisit of that explainer document and a reconsideration of what it actually means because it in itself makes reference to the victims directive.
Q20 Lord Thomas of Gresford: We have received a criticism—I assure you it is not my view or the view of this committee, but I am putting it to you in order for you to deal with it—that the Human Rights Commission has developed an undergraduate approach to scrutinising draft Northern Ireland legislation, but the Equality Commission is a critic of Northern Ireland policy more widely. What is your comment on that?
The Chair: You do not have to deal with the first part of that.
Geraldine McGahey: I am not commenting on the Human Rights Commission because, as I said, it is a separate body. The criticism is that the Equality Commission is a critic of policy more widely.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: Yes, Northern Ireland policy more widely. Do you accept that to be the case?
Geraldine McGahey: Potentially, yes, I would accept that. We are a critic of public policy within Northern Ireland. You only have to look at our website to see the consultation responses that we have submitted to various strategies, encouraging data collection and wider consideration of Section 75 equality grounds. A number of our strategies mention the absence of precise targets or resources. Yes, I can see how people would see that we are a critic of public policy.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: Is it your view that you are stimulating the Northern Ireland Office to produce more equality-type legislation?
Geraldine McGahey: We endeavour to do that. It is through the Executive Office of the Assembly as opposed to the Northern Ireland Office because we are a devolved organisation and we report to the Assembly.
I would qualify the criticism as well by saying that it is our role to provide advice and guidance, not just to members of the public but to Government. I have personally been on the record over the last couple of years since I took up office trying to reinforce with government departments that we are not a lobby group; we are not advocating for any particular viewpoint. Our role is to challenge discrimination, promote equality of opportunity and to enforce the Section 75 duties in the Northern Ireland Act.
Our only ambition is to make life better for everyone in Northern Ireland, not to be a constant chirper in the background saying that the Government are doing everything wrong. We seek to make it better. We do not want the Section 75 duty to be merely a tick-box exercise; we want all government departments and Ministers to give real consideration to the impact of policy in terms of the inequalities in our society and the impact on good relations.
It is 26 or 27 years since the Good Friday agreement. We need to move on a little bit and gain a little more momentum. If everyone took that on board in the spirit in which we mean it, we could get better policy. I do accept that our civil servants have to work with Ministers. They have to work with the Executive. Resources are really very tight in Northern Ireland. It is just driving inequalities further and further down that road. I am not being entirely critical of the officials; I am saying that, collectively, we need to do better.
If we have an overarching strategy for the Executive as a whole, there needs to be accountability in who is taking that forward and how everyone contributes. Our very constitution within the Executive does not allow or afford for any budget to be transferred from one Minister’s department to another, despite the fact that there is commonality in terms of their ambitions to deliver on a collective strategy. Those are things outside the Windsor Framework, and they are more to do with how our Executive is structured and the constitution within which they are forced to work.
The Chair: That sounds a bit like the role of a Select Committee to me, if you will forgive me for saying so.
Q21 Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard: You are very welcome. Thanks for the presentation. Apologies, I had to pop out. I have two questions, Chair. The first is a follow-up to what Geraldine said earlier around the Executive. For any new legislation that may be brought forward by the Northern Ireland Executive, is the Dillon judgment helpful or unhelpful? You hinted that it might be confusing.
Secondly, was it necessary to mention the Belfast agreement at all within the protocol discussions and negotiations? Was the Belfast agreement not strong enough to withstand any of those issues that may have come forward following Brexit?
Geraldine McGahey: I will take your last point first in terms of the Good Friday agreement. We would all recognise that the Belfast/Good Friday agreement is written in text that is not of a legal standing and would be hard to enforce. The determination to protect the Good Friday agreement came from discussions between the EU and the United Kingdom that the commission was not privy to. All we are aware from the public domain is that the Belfast/Good Friday agreement should be protected because Ireland and the UK were both co-signatories to that agreement. You could see very clearly that one of them removing itself from the European Union was going to have implications.
It is fair to recognise as well that most of the discussions and concerns around the Windsor Framework have very rightly been focused on trade issues as opposed to equality of opportunity and human rights issues. That is totally understandable, but it does not mean they cannot and should not be taken account of. That is important to say.
In terms of whether the Dillon judgment will make life more difficult for the Executive moving forward, there are uncertainties within the judgment that need to be clarified. It is an unintended consequences issue. The Dillon judgment was very specifically in relation to the legacy Act, as it was, but it has consequences for other areas. We need those to be clarified. Without that clarification, it would be very difficult for anyone to ascertain what Article 2 really means and therefore scrutinise any new legislation to ensure that it is in compliance with the Article 2 commitment.
Q22 Baroness Sanderson of Welton: Thank you both for your very clear evidence this morning. First, what discussions, if any, about the outcome in Dillon have you had with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission? Secondly, has the Supreme Court decision been discussed in the joint committee? If not, do you expect it to be on the agenda at any point?
Geraldine McGahey: The joint committee of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission is directly defined within the Northern Ireland Act. The Equality Commission is not part of that joint committee. I could not comment on whether it has been discussed or how it might appear in future agendas. We do have an aspect of collaborative working with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission. We meet on an annual basis. The three commissions are required to analyse the impact of Brexit on the divergence of rights within the island of Ireland context.
I can say categorically that the Equality Commission has had no discussions with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission in respect of Dillon and has no plans to do so in the near future, but that might be a question that you wish to raise with the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.
Lord Dodds of Duncairn: Have you had any discussions subsequent to the Dillon judgment with representatives of the European Union? They have a role in this in terms of their possible reaction to it. Have you discussed it with them or any representatives at any level?
Geraldine McGahey: No, we have had no discussions at any level at all. We have never had an opportunity to meet with a specialised committee. We have never had a reason to go to a specialised committee. We have had some informal contact with the UK-EU Joint Consultative Working Group, but I stress that it was very informal.
At my level, as chief commissioner, I met with the Secretary of State and a representative of the EU, along with other stakeholders, on only one occasion. At officer level, there may be a little more communication. The Dillon judgment has not been raised or discussed by the Equality Commission with any other body.
I will be totally blunt. Since the judgment was announced, we have had a lot of work on our plate in terms of its implications for our Order 53 statement before the court in Belfast in relation to For Women Scotland. We have been consumed by that. We have not been talking to anyone else.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Now here is someone you know very well, Baroness O’Loan.
Q23 Baroness O’Loan: Good morning, Geraldine and Louise. Thank you again for coming in and for explaining the situation so clearly to us. I would like to take you to the diminution of rights issue. Drawing on the rights that the Supreme Court concluded fell within the scope of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework, how will a diminution of rights be determined? What is the role of the dedicated mechanism, which is you and the Human Rights Commission, in determining a breach? If you could give us an example, that would be very helpful.
Geraldine McGahey: You are right that the Supreme Court in Dillon was concerned with the specific facts of that case. It left the Annexe 1 directives very much to the side in that obiter scenario.
In terms of determining whether there has been a diminution of rights, we have to look at the scope, first of all, that I referred to earlier. More importantly, we have developed a six-step test, which has been through the courts in Northern Ireland in the SPUC case. It was discussed at the Supreme Court in terms of Dillon. The six-stage test looks to establish whether there has been consideration of Article 2 in a particular case.
In other words, if you look at paragraph 128 of the Supreme Court judgment, it condensed our six stages into three stages. First, it considers whether a right or safeguard of equality of opportunity that falls within the chapter of the Good Friday agreement is engaged. There had to be that right. Once you have established that, there is what we would call the European hook. Secondly, did that right or safeguard have legal effect in Northern Ireland on 31 December 2020? In other words, did our national legislation afford that right as well? Thirdly, was there a diminution of that right as a consequence of leaving the EU?
In fairness, my view is that this is really only going to come into effect where there is a change in policy or a change in legislation. That is the only area where it will occur. Neither commission has any form of judicial determination or ability to determine it. It is only the courts and tribunals that can make that decision.
What we would do is to support an individual, if we agreed that there was the potential for a breach of rights. We could also take action in our own name and we could intervene in other cases that are ongoing, as we intervened within the legacy Act and the SPUC case; the Human Rights Commission has intervened in others.
I said earlier on that a judicial process is a failure. There needs to be advice, education and dialogue. We can save a lot of time and a lot of expense if we address how legislation and policy is amended, developed and enacted by having due consideration of the issues of Article 2 in that process.
Q24 Lord Thomas of Gresford: You referred to your role as supporting individuals and bringing actions in your own name. What other ways are available, besides individual litigation, to determine whether there has been an Article 2 breach of diminution of rights? Could a ministerial statement of compatibility with Article 2, similar to Section 19 of the Human Rights Act, offer an effective mechanism in that context?
Geraldine McGahey: As I said, you have to take into account my answer to Baroness O’Loan’s question. It follows on naturally from that. A ministerial statement of compatibility with Article 2 is beneficial—it is an added safeguard—but on its own it would not be sufficient to confirm that that was the case. It requires a lot of consideration by the Minister before he or she could make such a statement.
I would refer to our recommendations to Government in relation to the scrutiny of legislation about having explanatory notes to Bills that demonstrate how the article was considered, whether it engaged it and, if it did, what was taken into account. That would be really beneficial.
Our only way of contributing to the development of legislation is to provide submissions as legislation progresses on its journey. A little more engagement at an earlier stage would be really helpful. It is about mainstreaming the commitment of Article 2 because, while it does not apply in England, Scotland and Wales, it is there in Northern Ireland and it requires officials to have a very clear mindset and to ensure that it is taken into account at a very early stage. That would be really helpful to prevent us getting to the stage where we have a legal challenge.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: If there were a breach of Article 2, how should that be remedied?
Geraldine McGahey: At the present time, up until this point, the courts in Belfast, both the High Court and the Appeal Court, have disapplied a particular piece of legislation that is in breach of the Article 2 commitment. It is fair to say that Dillon did not address that issue. In the absence of any further judicial commentary or statement in regard to that, it is still disapplying the legislation. If we look at the Windsor Framework—
Lord Thomas of Gresford: That is a European remedy, is it not? It was introduced by the lower courts.
Geraldine McGahey: How a breach would be remedied is within Article 13 of the Windsor Framework, but it is for the courts to determine how that remedy would be delivered and what that remedy would consist of. Our only role is to ensure that a breach is identified and that the appropriate action is taken. We do not define what the appropriate action should be. Presently, it is seen as disapplication of the offending legislation, if I can use that phrase.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: We were told last week that there is a route via the EU-UK Joint Committee, and beyond that arbitration, with points of law being decided by the European Court.
Geraldine McGahey: That is absolutely right, yes.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: How do you see that as a route and would you have any part to play in it?
Geraldine McGahey: We do have a part to play in that process. We have a right to raise issues with the specialised committee where there is a disagreement between us as the monitor and enforcer of the Article 2 commitment and the UK Government. If we have explored avenues and we cannot get agreement, we can raise the issue with the specialised committee and say, “Here is a problem. It is hindering the meaningful application of the Article 2 commitment”, and then it can ultimately progress to international arbitration between the EU and the UK, if there is continued disagreement.
The Chair: Has that route been followed as yet?
Geraldine McGahey: Not as yet, no. We have never had any occasion to bring any matter to the specialised committee. Moving forward, I know that our colleagues in the Human Rights Commission are still very much considering their position in relation to the Dillon judgment and aspects of civil rights. Who is to say where that might go in the future? It is there as an opportunity to resolve issues that we are unable to resolve with the UK Government directly.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: To make it absolutely clear, you have standing to do that.
Geraldine McGahey: We have standing to do that within the withdrawal agreement, yes.
The Chair: It would be a slow process, presumably.
Geraldine McGahey: It would I imagine be a slow process because we have been advocating and trying to ensure that there are more formal processes in terms of how we might engage with the joint working group and others. That has been a little slow to get off the ground. I would imagine that making a representation to the specialised committee would also be slow.
The Chair: I have a connected question that goes back to something you said about five minutes ago. As you are aware, with any Bill that comes before this Parliament in which we are sitting, a certificate is provided by the relevant Secretary of State that the Bill is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Is it your view that, where Bills affect Northern Ireland, it might be useful for a similar certificate to be provided on the face of a Bill near the title to say something similar in relation to human rights in Northern Ireland?
Geraldine McGahey: It is another safeguard, but on its own it would not be a determination as to whether it is in compliance with Article 2. It is an additional safeguard. The explanatory notes of a Bill will help as well. It is not just a case of saying that it is in compliance with Article 2. I would prefer to see whether it is affected or impacted by Article 2 and what has been considered to be able to make that determination that it is in compliance with Article 2. A bold statement on its own is insufficient.
The Chair: Ms Conlon, please feel free to intervene if you would like to. Have there been situations in which you have been consulted in relation to parliamentary Bills as to their compatibility with either the ECHR or Northern Ireland human rights law?
Geraldine McGahey: Yes, there have been occasions where we have contributed, shared our views and made representations in relation to Bills as they progress through the House.
The Chair: What sort of Bills do you mean? Could you give examples?
Geraldine McGahey: There was one in relation to artificial intelligence data protection issues. We raised that. There are some concerns as to how aspects of that might work in reality. In particular, one of our concerns was around how artificial intelligence and remote analysis might take account of the special needs of an individual. We have had case law through in Northern Ireland in relation to the definition of autism. We have taken quite successful cases against BT and others in relation to asserting those rights for people with special educational needs in recruitment processes. That would be one example of where we have taken that action.
Q25 Baroness O’Loan: We are coming to an end now, but I want to go back to the dedicated mechanism and its operation. Have you ever been asked to operate in that context? That is my primary question, but I will also ask how you would assess the effectiveness of the existing Windsor Framework structures for formalised engagement between the Northern Ireland Executive and the dedicated mechanism. That is the first part of the question. It is about the Northern Ireland Executive and the dedicated mechanism.
Lord Carlile has already taken us down the path, to a degree, of engagement between Westminster and/or Whitehall and the dedicated mechanism. I do not know whether your engagements on Bills have been in the context of the dedicated mechanism or simply consultation. Could it all be improved in future and, if so, how?
Geraldine McGahey: The short answer is yes—it definitely could be improved. I have to reinforce the fact that there are good relationships at officer level both in Westminster and at the TEO back in Belfast. That engagement is working well.
In terms of how we work at a more senior level, I have personally had the opportunity to address a TEO committee about the Windsor Framework and how the dedicated mechanism would work. I have never had the opportunity to speak to a Minister regarding that. That might come in due course.
On how the whole process might work better or recommendations for improvement, you need to take into account the review that was undertaken by Lord Murphy. It made some very valuable contributions and in many ways echoed the stance of the commission. We really need to see early consideration of draft legislation and draft Bills. I cannot recall an occasion where the commission or the dedicated mechanism was asked for its views; rather, we have made submissions to consultations. I think that is a fair comment.
Louise Conlon: Yes, in Westminster. We have given our views in the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Geraldine McGahey: We have offered those views as opposed to being asked for them.
Louise Conlon: We have been asked for our views by the Executive.
Geraldine McGahey: Yes, but not in Westminster. There is a difference in how the two operate. It is because of the closer relationship with the Executive as opposed to with Whitehall.
There really needs to be strong training and guidance. After Lord Murphy’s recommendations were published, there was a reissue of guidance here in Westminster. Some really good training has been taking place at officer level within the Executive back home.
Parliamentary scrutiny is really important. That ties in with that certificate of compatibility issue. Members in both Houses really need to scrutinise the legislation that is coming forward to look at that Article 2 commitment. You are the people who have the power to raise those issues. We implore others to do that. That parliamentary scrutiny at a really early stage can save an awful lot of time in the legal process further down the road.
A big issue for us in relation to the dedicated mechanism is the transposition requirements that might arise on the Annexe 1 directives. At the moment, there are two issues before the Equality Commission: the equality standards directive—there are two parts to that—and the pay transparency directive. We have advised the Executive and the NIO that we believe they need to be transposed. The previous Government had confirmed that the equality standards directive needed to be transposed.
We have been working tirelessly with our colleagues in TEO and NIO on the pay transparency directive. Up to the present time, we believed that pay transparency and gender pay reporting, which does not happen in Northern Ireland but happens in England, Scotland and Wales, would be addressed by the “good jobs” Bill. Some of the recommendations within that did not go quite far enough to meet the requirements of the pay transparency directive, but it was a step in the right direction. It does not look like that might progress in its current form. We do not know how that is going to move forward. I would say that it should have been transposed by 26 June, so we are already behind the ball.
In terms of the equality standards directive, they would directly, in some regards, impact on the Equality Commission, but a pragmatic approach needs to be taken to it. It is not a case of saying, “Here is a new directive. Transpose it in its entirety”. We have taken some time to look in detail at the structure, remit and vires of the Equality Commission as it currently stands and how that sits along the equality standards. It was designed to bring equality bodies in the rest of Europe up to a level playing field. There are many regards in which we do not need to change, but there are also some really fundamental aspects where we do.
We have also been monitoring, through our colleagues in Equinet, how other member states are moving forward with transposing these directives. Equinet is a network of equality bodies right across the European Union. Through Equinet, we have been monitoring how member states have been progressing in terms of transposing the new directives. It is very much a mixed bag. I do not believe and the commission does not believe that we should be advocating that the Executive need to transpose these directives in a timely manner by the end of June when others are taking their time. It is about getting it right and working with the Executive to determine the best way in which the requirements can be incorporated, but it is our view that the requirements must be incorporated.
The Chair: Are you a member participant of Equinet?
Geraldine McGahey: Yes, we are.
The Chair: Is the Equality and Human Rights Commission a participant partner in Equinet or not?
Geraldine McGahey: We are not a participant partner because of Brexit, but we are still engaged with it. We are included in its information and its networks, although we do not have the same voting rights. It is the same with the EHRC. We have a close relationship with the EHRC in terms of how we all collectively work together with Equinet to enable an understanding of what is happening in Europe, how directives are being viewed by the European Union and whether there is likely to be much progression in the EU in terms of looking at any one of those six directives.
We have learned that member states in the EU are keen to stabilise themselves in terms of equality, hence our very pragmatic approach in relation to the equality directives. Let us take our time and get it right, but ultimately we have to be on a journey with an end goal.
Q26 Baroness O’Loan: I have one very quick question, if I may. I am thinking about the identification of a diminution of rights by the dedicated mechanism. Do you and the Human Rights Commission produce joint responses or do you simply both produce your own responses? I am just thinking of the sensitivity of some of the rights that might be identified.
Geraldine McGahey: We have an agreed way of working together because we have the same goal and, in many regards, we have commonality in our purpose, but we also have very distinct differences in our raison d’être. We have a memorandum of understanding with the Human Rights Commission in terms of how we work collectively. That could be in terms of the research work and evaluation work that we do. We split that and cover it between us. That is for everyone’s benefit.
When it comes to dealing with cases and potential breaches, we tend to stay within our own remits because that is where the expertise is. The Illegal Migration Act and the legacy Act were primarily with the Human Rights Commission. It is the same with For Women Scotland and the request for a judicial declaration. That came from the Equality Commission. We have two very different approaches, but we work together in terms of understanding where each other is going and that mutual support. Does that help?
Baroness O’Loan: The dedicated mechanism, in fact, is the situation in which you use your areas of expertise, skills and everything else to respond. It is not a joint operation in any way at all.
Geraldine McGahey: We have been producing joint annual reports. When you look at Section 78 of the Northern Ireland Act, it gives the powers to both commissions separately, but under the final aspect—I think it is 78(e)—we can work collaboratively together. It is about trying to maximise the impact of our resources, support each other and contribute our expertise to where the other is standing. Where we have to differ, we will differ.
Q27 Baroness Goudie: You raised a point about the gender pay gap, the transparency gap, and bullying and sexual violence in the workplace. There are a number of people in this House who, when we worked on the Bill, mentioned that Northern Ireland was not covered on these issues. As you know, we also care about it around this table. If there is any support we could give informally, or formally, if it had to be formal, would you come back to us through the Chair? It is a really important issue. You have been behind for too long.
Geraldine McGahey: We have been behind on a whole range of fronts for too long, but I very much welcome your ask for a communication from us. In fairness, a lot of work has been done on a “good jobs” Bill for Northern Ireland. There are some issues outstanding with it, and our business sector has some concerns about it. The Employment Act (Northern Ireland) 2016 had a clause within it that allowed for gender pay reporting, but it was never enacted. If we are serious about having equal opportunity and an equal society, that needs to be addressed.
The Chair: Let us not get into the weeds of that.
Baroness Goudie: It is really important because it is the United Kingdom at the end of the day.
Q28 Lord Thomas of Gresford: Do you have notice of and the opportunity to make representations about secondary legislation and regulations, which must be very much a part of your brief?
Geraldine McGahey: We do. It is not just primary legislation; it is also secondary legislation. Indeed, we contribute to policies of Government, not legislation, as well.
Lord Thomas of Gresford: Do you have notice of it?
Geraldine McGahey: Not so much from Westminster, no, but we would through the Executive, yes. We have very close relationships in that regard. With Westminster, unless the secondary legislation had a direct impact on Northern Ireland, we would not be engaged with it.
The Chair: Lady Ritchie, did you have a last question?
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick: No, I perfectly understand. I have known Geraldine for a long time, long before she was ever in the Equality Commission.
Geraldine McGahey: Yes, since I was a little girl. I have to say as well that Baroness O’Loan was my lecturer at the University of Ulster.
The Chair: No wonder you are such a splendid witness.
Geraldine McGahey: I do not know about that.
The Chair: Thank you very much indeed. The evidence that you have provided has been, for me, extremely valuable and a very important part of our inquiry. Thank you for taking the trouble to come to London to give the evidence in person. We take a lot of evidence online, but having important witnesses in person is a self-evident advantage in my view.
We are coming now to the end of the public session. I am going to draw the panel to a close by reminding you that a verbatim transcript of your evidence will be provided to you for correction. My Lords, the public element of this meeting is now closed.
