Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee
Oral evidence: Inquiry into the Recommendations of the Infected Blood Inquiry (Stage 1), HC 113
Tuesday 16 June 2026
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 16 June 2026.
Members present: Simon Hoare (Chair); Richard Baker; Markus Campbell-Savours; Charlotte Cane; Sam Carling; Peter Lamb; John Lamont; Richard Quigley; Luke Taylor.
Questions 56 - 102
Witness
I: Lord Norton of Louth, Chair, Statutory Inquiries Committee.
Witness: Lord Norton of Louth.
Chair: Good morning, colleagues. This is day two of the week and our second meeting of the week, so I am very grateful for everybody being here today. I am particularly grateful to Lord Norton for joining us, to help us as we embark upon our work with regard to Parliament and public inquiries. We will all remember that the infected blood inquiries report effectively said—I paraphrase—that a huge amount of work had been done and a vast number of recommendations made. Secretaries of State usually stand up in Parliament and give a statement or answer an urgent question, and the caravan moves on. Parliamentary scrutiny of the delivery of the recommendations and cross-referencing back to the inquiry chair are often probably best described as hit and miss—more miss than hit.
It looks like it will fall to this Committee of Parliament to do the umbrella overview work, and discussions are obviously ongoing with the Cabinet Office, the Leader of the House’s office and the Liaison Committee about that. Lord Norton, your Committee in the Lords did a massive amount of work so we are being rather cheeky, I am afraid—apologies for the cheekiness. Your brain is here to be picked to stop us having to reinvent the wheel, so we can pick up your key learnings and advice on how you think we might go about this. Again, we are very grateful to you for finding the time to join us. I am going to turn to Mr Lamont to open the batting.
Q56 John Lamont: Good morning, Lord Norton. The Statutory Inquiries Committee considered the format of inquiries and is in favour of a more flexible approach, including the use of non-statutory inquiries. What is your assessment of the balance of the different types of inquiries that are used?
Lord Norton of Louth: The point we were making is that there is no one-size-fits-all approach. It really depends on the nature of the problem you have identified and then how you go about it. In terms of running inquiries, we distinguished between efficiency and effectiveness. There are deficiencies in both respects, but when it comes to actually establishing an inquiry, it depends on what you are seeking to set up.
Our point was that there is no gold standard. A statutory inquiry that is judge-led is not necessarily the best way to proceed. You may require a statutory inquiry, given its powers, and a judge may be appropriate, given the nature of the exercise, but not necessarily. If it is inquisitorial rather than adversarial, the skills of a judge may not be best geared to that exercise.
Bearing in mind that a non-statutory inquiry could always be converted into a statutory one if necessary—as happened with the Horizon inquiry—there is advantage of agility. A non-statutory inquiry can be much quicker, as you do not have the rules that you have with a statutory inquiry, and the point that struck my Committee when we were taking evidence was the extent to which it could involve victims and survivors far more. When we heard from Bishop James Jones, who did the Hillsborough inquiry, he emphasised the fact that, in effect, the victims and survivors could speak directly to the chair. They were not represented by councillors, as core participants are, so they were more involved. They felt more engagement with and ownership of the process. He thought that was extremely valuable. Those are the advantages, knowing that if you do not get the co-operation and response you want, you always have the fall-back that it could be converted into a statutory inquiry.
Q57 John Lamont: Looking at recent history, what has been the split between statutory and non-statutory inquiries? Has there been any shift in recent years?
Lord Norton of Louth: The norm tends to be statutory because that tends to be seen as the gold standard. People think it needs—
Q58 John Lamont: Is that over 80%?
Lord Norton of Louth: I do not know what the percentages are, but I would not be surprised if it was, simply because of the powers that are vested in it. It is seen as somehow superior, and people think it has to be statutory because it can take evidence under oath. That is the impetus. We are trying to get away from that and say, “When you’re setting up an inquiry, you have a suite of options. You should not just go down one particular route.”
Q59 John Lamont: Is cost a factor when deciding between statutory and non-statutory inquiries?
Lord Norton of Louth: The non-statutory ones would have the value because they can be more agile and you get through them more quickly. You do not have to go through all the stages that are involved in a statutory inquiry such as evidence taking, and of course if you criticise people, you have the Maxwell rules and so on. It all adds to the cost, which as you know is one of the criticisms that is levelled at inquiries. In principle, people think they are a good thing. There are practical problems both in terms of efficiency—that is the cost and the length—and then of course effectiveness because inquiries produce outputs; they do not actually produce outcomes in terms of action being taken in the light of their recommendations.
Those are some key problems. That is what we were focused on. How do you increase both the efficiency of public inquiries, and then how do you enhance the effectiveness of inquiries once they have reported?
Q60 Chair: The infected blood inquiry recommended that PACAC consider recommending to Ministers that there be an inquiry, if there is sufficient concern to justify one. What do you think this Committee’s criteria should be when making that assessment?
Lord Norton of Louth: There are already criteria for setting up inquiries. Different criteria are given but they all relate to public concern. Tragedy, loss of life or some challenge to health that raises significant issues or generates public concern would be the basis for addressing what the problem is, but also public disquiet about that. One of the key things is coming up with recommendations that have an effect in addressing a problem, but another is establishing public trust.
This is one of the things that comes across from those who have been involved as victims and survivors. What they are keen to ensure is that there is no repetition. The analogy I tend to draw is a bit like aircraft investigations. The purpose is not necessarily to establish culpability but to establish what the cause of the problem was, and then to have some lesson learning and put something in place to prevent a recurrence. One of the issues is about effectiveness, because we heard evidence that if some inquiry recommendations had been implemented, there may not have been some of the later tragedies we have seen, including Grenfell.
Q61 Chair: From your inquiry work, what is your assessment of how the inquiries landscape operates in the Lords? Are calls made by individual peers? Does a Committee make a recommendation? Is it the view of the House as a whole or is it just ad hoc?
Lord Norton of Louth: It would be ad hoc. That is one of the reasons we looked at setting up a dedicated Committee on inquiries, which could actually consider drawing material together, looking at what the bases are on which one might wish to recommend an inquiry. However, at the moment, in either House Members can come forward and say, “There’s public concern; let’s have an inquiry.” As you know, if there is public concern, there tends to be pressure for an inquiry and the emphasis tends to be on it being the gold standard, which is statutory.
Q62 Chair: You would think that as long as the job was done by a Committee of Parliament—this one, to be precise—with a right of audience to present argument and evidence from Members of the House or both Houses, that would do the trick.
Lord Norton of Louth: No, I think there is more to that in the basis for the role of a parliamentary Committee, because you are looking at the input side, which is establishing an inquiry. There is then the output side: an inquiry has made recommendations.
Chair: We could do the front-loaded bit as well.
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes, that is my point. It would be encompassing; it would not be confined to recommendations.
Q63 Chair: Can I just ask you for an observation or two? First, on the fitness for purpose of the Inquiries Act 2005, is there any merit you have discovered in maybe going back and having a look at it?
Lord Norton of Louth: The Lords set up a Committee back in 2014 to engage in post-legislative scrutiny of the Inquiries Act. It came with various recommendations, some of which the Government accepted, but some required legislation. It was a typical case of the Government saying, “Yes, but when parliamentary time allows,” and it never allowed.
Chair: That wonderful catch-all.
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes, exactly. There are some modifications that it looked at. On my Committee, we were more concerned with achieving actual change—in other words, what can be achieved without the need for legislation? Fundamentally, you have the powers in place, so it is about how you utilise them and then monitor and ensure that outcomes are pursued.
Q64 Chair: You may very well be familiar with the wonderful programmes, “Yes Minister” and “Yes, Prime Minister”—you may have helped on some script writing; I do not know. You remember there is usually a thing where if the Minister really wants to sort something out, the senior civil servants say, “We’ll have a royal commission.” That just became shorthand for filling the vacuum but really expecting no particular outcome.
Please tell me, is there a danger that calls for a public inquiry—be it statutory or non-statutory—become too easy a bandwagon to jump on, in a parliamentary sense, because it is almost impossible to resist? We would therefore have a Committee of Parliament, in effect, being held in public with the full light of transparency and so on, opining on what can often be very difficult and sensitive issues; things that there will obviously have been some degree of national debate on to occasion that sort of discussion taking place. Is there a danger that Parliament just says yes because saying yes is the easiest thing to do, rather than saying, “Yes, there is an issue but there are other non-inquiry routes to find a solution to it in a much quicker timeframe”?
Lord Norton of Louth: That is a fair point, because you can see there are gradations. First, there are those that could be done much more quickly without any formal inquiry. Then if you have an inquiry—picking up on what was implicit in your opening point and what you were getting at—we want to avoid it being a way of kicking the issue into the long grass, which is normally how we see a royal commission. That is the perception there.
There is also that danger with inquiries; as you know, some inquiries have gone on for a long time, which creates problems of public trust and so on. That is what we were focused on to make sure that if you have an inquiry, it is efficient in process and effective so it actually reports in good time. But a Committee could assist a Government who were looking at the criteria or guidance for undertaking inquiries, if you had a clear rubric, which I think is important because a decision not to hold an inquiry of course could be open to judicial review.
Chair: Yes, that is a very good point.
Q65 Markus Campbell-Savours: Sometimes people request that we do inquiries into things that happened a very long time ago. Was there a view that perhaps there should be some formalisation of time cut-offs for such inquiries, such as a statute of limitations-type approach?
Lord Norton of Louth: That would depend on the nature of the problem that has been identified, but that would be one of the criteria one would presumably take into account. It would not be an absolute bar, but I take your point. I am not sure if there are many calls for historic inquiries, but I would have thought there would be dangers of having a complete bar. Again, it could be a role for a Committee to devise the criteria that one would—
Markus Campbell-Savours: It is around efficiency, especially where there are not many live witnesses to events.
Lord Norton of Louth: That is one of the points one would take into account, exactly. What would be the evidence base and what would be achieved by the exercise?
Chair: Yes. The criteria would be: would any outcomes to it have a meaningful impact on policy or service being delivered to people today?
Lord Norton of Louth: Correct. It comes back to my earlier point about doing an investigation: you are examining what caused it and what could be put in place to prevent a repetition.
Q66 John Lamont: You have touched on this already but the Committee recommended, “a new committee of Parliament should scrutinise a Minister’s decision not to hold a public inquiry.” Can you give us the pros and cons of such an approach, please?
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes. There were two main reasons for having a dedicated Committee. First, it is a dedicated Committee so it would have the resources, it would build up the institutional memory, and it would undertake the type of work that we are recommending specific to the Committee. It could undertake meta-analysis and monitor recommendations on a consistent basis. The Government are already introducing a tracker of the recommendations, but it could follow up on what recommendations have been accepted by Government and then, crucially, which ones have actually been implemented.
There have been instances of, “Yes, we accept that,” and then when it has been checked, the recommendation has not been implemented. In other words, a Committee dedicated to that would not be distracted; it could monitor that. Of course, it would also have the advantage of looking at inquiries rather than an inquiry, because an inquiry is obviously limited by its terms of reference: there is just one particular problem being examined. A Committee could stand back and look at inquiries and then identify patterns or other problems with undertaking inquiries: are there any systemic problems that arise from looking at inquiry reports? A dedicated Committee would be able to do that. It would also be able to recommend to Government whether an inquiry should be undertaken and monitor what the Government are doing.
The other value that strikes me in terms of having a dedicated Committee is in terms of public trust. In other words, if you have a Committee that is to do with public inquiries, people know that is why that Committee exists. The danger of it being undertaken by any other Committee is the terms of reference. The name of the Committee will not necessarily convey to the public that this is concerned with public inquiries, that there is a body in Parliament that is alert to the problems raised by public inquiries, and that it is a body that people could make representations to about public inquiries.
Those are the key benefits. I would tend to stress the importance of ensuring recommendations are acted upon, because in our hearing from those who had been involved in inquiries, the thing that most frustrated them—you found the same—was that serious work gets done, the inquiry comes up and produces a very important report, and significant recommendations are made, but then what happens? There is the frustration of nothing happening. You have the problem of having a long and very expensive inquiry, and then there is eventually a report, but of course, once an inquiry reports, the inquiry ceases to exist, so it does not have its own means of following up—and nothing happens.
That is the challenge. The other point I was going to make is that there is a cost if you set up a new Committee. I would offset that by asking, how do you monetise the value of saving lives? If a Committee can make sure recommendations are actually acted upon that have the effect of preventing a recurrence, how do you monetise the value of that?
Q67 John Lamont: Looking at it from the start of the process, in terms of this hypothetical Committee’s power to scrutinise a Minister’s decision about whether to hold an inquiry, do you think a Minister or Government would welcome the Committee’s scrutiny and judging of the decision, or would they guard that decision-making process for the Minister or Government?
Lord Norton of Louth: It would depend on whether the Government had a degree of self-confidence. A report from our Committee recommended a debate, therefore once the Government responded to our report, a debate was triggered. We debated the report, and the Minister in response made it clear that setting up a dedicated parliamentary Committee was a matter for Parliament, but also that the Government would engage positively with such a Committee. She was quite positive in her response to it.
As you may have seen, the Government’s accepted basically all the recommendations that we came forward with as a Committee that affected them. In terms of a parliamentary Committee, they said, “That’s obviously a matter for Parliament, but we would engage positively with it.”
Q68 John Lamont: How would you assess the tools that Parliament has currently to encourage Ministers to set up inquiries?
Lord Norton of Louth: It comes back to the opening point you were making. It is up to individual Members to come forward and make suggestions. There is no formal route for doing that because as you know, it puts pressure on a Minister. Under the 2005 Act, of course, public inquiries can be triggered only by a Minister; they must make representations to Government to establish an inquiry. It would be up to individual Members to show the level of public concern that would justify an inquiry.
Q69 John Lamont: Looking at the grooming gangs inquiry that the Government have now set up, initially they said they were not going to do that. Do you think that has come about because of the pressure that MPs and peers put on the Government, or because of public opinion or the press? What was the main reason?
Lord Norton of Louth: I am not sure they are mutually exclusive. It is a combination of the Government being persuaded obviously by parliamentarians and public concern. It is usually clear when there is that degree of concern, and the Government need to take it seriously and weigh up the arguments for having a public inquiry.
Q70 Markus Campbell-Savours: The Statutory Inquiries Committee recognised that the inquiry process can be, “extremely arduous for victims, survivors and their families, who often spend many years campaigning for an inquiry.” How can we better take victims, survivors and families into account when considering whether an inquiry should be established?
Lord Norton of Louth: There is the obvious pressure from them to establish an inquiry. We were quite clear—the Government accept this—that victims and survivors should be consulted on the terms of reference before they are announced. To come back to an earlier point I made, the value of non-statutory inquiries is also important because inquiries can be valuable for victims and survivors just from the point of view of catharsis, but if it is a non-statutory one, as I said, they can feel more involved. There is a value in them actually feeling like they are round the table and they are engaging with the inquiry. At the end of the day, the key thing is to make sure that victims and survivors are core to the exercise. There should be involvement in the terms of reference, and possibly a non-statutory inquiry to enable them to be around the table.
Of course, the most fundamental point from their point of view is making sure that once the recommendations are there, they are implemented, because victims and survivors seem very keen to make sure that what they have been through is not then experienced by anybody else. We owe it to them to make sure there is something in place to make sure there is no recurrence. You see victims and survivors throughout the whole process of involvement, but then in terms of outcome, there must be some action to make sure there is no recurrence, so that there are no more victims and survivors as a result of future tragedies.
Q71 Markus Campbell-Savours: My question was more focused on the period that families and friends of survivors will spend campaigning for an inquiry to happen. Is there value in formalising the request process such that it can be managed in a more sympathetic way for them?
Lord Norton of Louth: Only in the sense that I mentioned of having a dedicated Committee, because then they would know there is that Committee to which they could make representations, if you like, which could then be channelled to the Minister. Otherwise, it is a case of victims and survivors working through their Member of Parliament to encourage the Government to hold an inquiry. If you wanted a dedicated route, you would have a Committee on inquiries, so people would know that a Committee exists and that they could make representations to it.
It comes back to an earlier point we were discussing in terms of having the criteria for evaluating the request for such an inquiry. Of course, the value of a Committee producing its own guidelines and advice is that people would know the criteria that were involved and how to go about it.
Q72 Markus Campbell-Savours: Under the current system, regardless of the amount of pressure that is brought to bear, if the Government refuse to hold a statutory public inquiry, there is very little anyone can do outside perhaps judicial review. Is there any answer to that problem?
Lord Norton of Louth: No, because the pressure is either from a judicial review—occasionally that has happened—or it is political pressure. It is what we were just discussing: victims and survivors make a representation to Members of Parliament to put pressure on Ministers.
Q73 Richard Baker: Do you think there should be a difference between how recommendations coming from statutory public inquiries are monitored and scrutinised compared with those coming from other routes—for example, non-statutory inquiries, prevention of future death reports or investigation bodies?
Lord Norton of Louth: I would take the view that if you had a Committee on inquiries, it would look at the recommendations of inquiries whether they were statutory or non-statutory, because it would be looking at recommendations that were designed to prevent some sort of recurrence or actions. I would regard it as being for both, because a Minister could set up a non-statutory inquiry, so then the Committee would be looking at recommendations from statutory and non-statutory inquiries.
Q74 Richard Baker: It would be possible to have a one-size-fits-all process, however the inquiry was established.
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes, because to come back to my earlier point, we do not want a one-size-fits-all process where it must be a statutory judgment inquiry and that is it, and everything is within that framework. You need more flexibility in the type of inquiry and within the structure of the inquiry. One of the points we picked up on as well was about giving guidance to a chair when an inquiry is established on the suite of options for running the inquiry, because as you know, at the moment, an inquiry is set up and the chair is basically left to reinvent the wheel in terms of how they run it.
We were very keen to build on the experience of those who have run inquiries and to establish best practice through the inquiries unit in the Cabinet Office, so that that advice is available to the chair of a new inquiry, not in a prescriptive sense of saying, “This is how to do it,” but, “These are the options,” to save reinventing the wheel. You would have that advice available to any inquiry that was established, whether statutory or non-statutory, because as I touched on, there are benefits of going down each route.
Q75 Richard Baker: On the implementation of recommendations coming from a statutory or non-statutory inquiry, what would be the elements of an effective monitoring process?
Lord Norton of Louth: You would track the recommendations made—that is fairly straightforward—and then what has actually happened to them in terms of acceptance by the Government. As I say, you would then also need some method of monitoring the implementation, because we took evidence of practice elsewhere, including in Australia, where the Government had said, “Yes, we accept that,” and then claimed it had been implemented. But when the Parliament then appointed some monitoring officers to check, they found out that absolutely nothing had happened.
You need somebody in place to do that, so it would be about not just checking what has been accepted but then monitoring the implementation. That would be of tremendous value, because of course once you start doing that, Ministers know. There is already a deterrent effect from knowing that it is being checked.
Q76 Richard Baker: We often find that when inquiries look into specific cases, there are actually common themes in terms of failures and things that need addressing. How could we ensure that implementation monitoring is not simply done in isolation for each inquiry, but there is a process whereby the common themes from recommendations across those inquiries can be identified?
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes—you have just made the case that we made for a dedicated Committee, because that is precisely the point, for the reason that you have just established. You would not be looking at the recommendations in an inquiry as discrete recommendations. You would be looking across the board at recommendations from other inquiries and seeing if there is any commonality in terms of problems arising, or any themes that need addressing as such.
You cannot get that with a particular inquiry because, as I say, it has a discrete exercise to undertake, so it does its work and it makes recommendations. If you have a Select Committee that is dedicated to inquiries, it can stand back and look at inquiries over a period of time and see any common elements or problems identified. Is there a systemic problem that needs addressing? Of course, an individual inquiry does not have the wherewithal to pursue that.
Q77 Sam Carling: I just wanted to ask a little more about the prevention of future death reports, following my colleague’s questions there. Do you have any comments on whether they are given the attention they need and deserve from Government? Are you including them in your categorisation of non-statutory inquiries?
Lord Norton of Louth: Oh, yes; we would include those. It is in the flexibility we mentioned, if necessary, to convert them to inquiries in the way that inquests have been converted as well. That is always available.
Q78 Sam Carling: Do you think they get the attention they need from Government at the moment?
Lord Norton of Louth: No, not as much as the really big issues, but that is understandable. Again, that is a case for a dedicated Committee, because that would make sure that you did not lose sight of the suite of options available for different inquiries.
Q79 Sam Carling: That is really helpful. Just to give a little context—I do not expect you to comment on this detail—the concern I have in this area arises from a number of reports we have had over the years about ritual male circumcision outside medical settings, because there is no requirement at the moment for people doing that to be trained or accredited in any way. We have had a series of coroners say that we ought to regulate that better. Would you say that a Committee would be an appropriate way to follow up that pattern and press for further action from the Government?
Lord Norton of Louth: That is a good illustration of the point I was just making, because if you have the Committee with its terms of reference, it could undertake that and make sure it was not lost sight of, which is the danger you are identifying. It would be a Committee on inquiries, not just a Committee on the big inquiries that really grab attention. As I was just saying in response to Mr Baker, the value of it is in looking across the range of inquiries that have been held, but of course you then also have the longitudinal aspect, because it would build up institutional memory. It would be aware of what was going on and be able to stand back and ensure that there is some action taken.
Q80 Peter Lamb: When should scrutiny of the implementation of an inquiry’s recommendations begin and end? It feels as if there are objections almost from the start.
Lord Norton of Louth: That is a good point; there are two key aspects. We are very keen to make sure that when an inquiry is held, first, that it is efficient and effective in terms of output, and secondly that its recommendations are acted upon. As you are aware, at the moment people think inquiries are a good thing but that they go on too long and cost too much. Some go on for years and they are very expensive: according to the Institute for Government, Government public inquiries from 1990 to 2014 cost around £1.5 billion. Yes, they are desirable, but they could be more efficient. For that purpose, we were looking at how they could be undertaken in a way that does not drag on and absorb too many resources.
Among the key points we made about making inquiries more efficient was that they should have an indicative timetable. If you say to a Committee, “Report by such and such a date,” it disciplines the mind. One of the points Sir Brian Leveson made in his evidence is that when you are having an inquiry, the evidence needs to be sufficient, but it does not have to be exhaustive.
That was the way my Committee proceeded; it was a special inquiry Committee—they used to be called ad hoc inquiries—so it was set up for a set period, and we were given a date to report by. That disciplines the mind. On the presumption that you have to report by that date, you then decide what evidence should be taken within that time period. As I say, the evidence we found was sufficient; it did not have to be exhaustive. We were set up in January 2024 and were required to report by November; we published our report in September, so it was a good discipline. An indicative timetable is valuable not only for the chair of the inquiry, but for victims and survivors: they can see the end point, and they know when it is likely to report. Otherwise, if there is no end point and the inquiry is just going on and on, they have no idea.
The other aspect to efficiency—if it is an important inquiry and will go on for some time—is to publish interim reports as you go along. I know you will have looked at this, particularly with the infected blood inquiry. You could have indicative budgets as well. There are different mechanisms that one can employ to ensure that the inquiry process is efficient and that people do not lose sight of it.
Beyond that—once the inquiry has produced a report and it ceases to exist—what do you do to ensure that there is an output or outcome in terms of action on the recommendations? That is where a dedicated Committee has a key role.
Q81 Peter Lamb: When do you think Committees such as this one should start considering how recommendations are being implemented? When do you think that process of scrutiny should end?
Lord Norton of Louth: I am not sure it should end; it should begin immediately when an inquiry is reported. You should immediately track the recommendations, keep a database, and monitor what is happening to them. You may decide, “Well, nothing’s happened on this; at what point do we call Ministers?” That is the value of having a parliamentary Committee; it has the capacity to chase up what is happening with the Government, and to ask what is being done and when these particular recommendations are expected to be implemented. Obviously, that would depend on the recommendations.
Q82 Peter Lamb: Once compensation has been delivered, and in terms of ending that process, are we looking at a period of considering in the round how that worked?
Lord Norton of Louth: I do not think there is an end; it depends on the recommendations themselves and how quickly they can be implemented. I suppose that it would remain open until all the recommendations have seen some action. Again, that is the value of having a Select Committee: it builds up the institutional memory; it has a continuing database. Because for Select Committees, it is not, “That’s it, you’re finished.” You can carry on, and you can monitor any particular inquiry, although such monitoring will depend on the inquiry, the recommendations and how extensive they are, the timescale involved, and so on. This comes back to the point I was making in response to Mr Baker: we should look across a range of inquiries to see what is happening, whether there is a systemic problem in the way the Government are handling them, or a systemic problem in terms of the subject matter.
Q83 Peter Lamb: The inquiry said that in terms of any future statutory inquiry, PACAC should accept the role of reviewing the Government’s timetable for considering recommendations. Do you have any views on how the Committee could achieve that?
Lord Norton of Louth: I do not have any views beyond what I have said: that there is a danger of losing sight of the outcome, and of the public not knowing that the Committee has this role. It would be an exercise, as much as anything, in making people aware that this was a role, and that it was doable by the Committee given its other responsibilities.
Q84 Peter Lamb: The SIC report highlighted how interim reports have been used by inquiries to give chairs a chance to monitor the Government’s response. What is your view on this practice?
Lord Norton of Louth: We thought it was desirable, particularly if an inquiry is going to go on and looks as if it will be lengthy. We saw tremendous value in being able to produce interim reports for the very reason you have given: they allow for chasing up. We are very keen on interim reports, particularly for a long inquiry, so we recommend that they should be built into setting up an inquiry to indicate their value to the chair.
Q85 Chair: This Committee can explain what its monitoring role would be; we have “public administration” in our title, and that it is a wonderful catch-all for anything public and administrative. Do you think it would be helpful if there was an expectation or requirement that the chair of an inquiry should make themselves available to this Committee to help it in its monitoring work? That would concentrate the mind of Government, it would help this Committee, and it would give confidence to those who took part in the inquiry. It would impose a new obligation on the inquiry chair, but my gut tells me they would not kick back against that.
Lord Norton of Louth: You may find that inquiry chairs are quite keen to have that opportunity once they have reported, because formally they have no status. You could work it in. One of the points we made in our report was that you could impose a duty on the chair of the inquiry to produce a lessons-learned report, which would be a condition of undertaking the role. That would go to the inquiries unit, and it could share and develop a best practice or a lessons-learned report on the legal and other challenges. You could add the provision of a working paper on the logistics as one of the requirements. Inquiry chairs would probably welcome that; it is frustrating to produce a report and have no formal standing to pursue it once the inquiry ceases to exist.
We also looked at that argument in respect of the danger of having a judge-led inquiry because judges in particular feel very constrained about taking any independent action once they have reported. Rather than being a burden, I would have thought that chairs would welcome the opportunity to chase up their reports.
Chair: That would be my assessment too.
Q86 Sam Carling: What routes do inquiry chairs and panel members have available to them at the moment if they have significant concerns about some aspect of the Government’s response to an inquiry?
Lord Norton of Louth: Formally, they have none. I know Sir Brian Langstaff took the view that, “Our terms of reference are not yet completed,” but once an inquiry is reported it ceases to exist and the chairs are left to their own devices. They are ex-chairs, so if they act that will be informally, in an individual capacity. It depends on who the chair is; serving judges go back to their responsibilities, and they feel a certain wariness in chasing up on an issue.
Q87 Sam Carling: We saw an example of that earlier this year, when two panel members from the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse wrote to the Home Secretary as private individuals. They expressed serious concerns about the response to a recommendation on the mandatory reporting of abuse. They said that the proposed duty had been watered down to the point of being ineffective and therefore, although the Government said they had implemented that duty in full, it had actually been quietly rejected. We have talked a lot about having a Committee; what routes do you think would be helpful for inquiry panel members or chairs to have available to them to be able to raise such concerns?
Lord Norton of Louth: In a way the existence of the Committee, in other words some other—
Q88 Sam Carling: Is there anything else apart from that, or is that the key lynchpin?
Lord Norton of Louth: Not formally, unless for example there was some mechanism to call the inquiry back into existence. Perhaps the way round that is to issue interim reports, so that at least the inquiry is getting something out there and getting a response. But the problem is that once it has finished its final report, the basis on which it exists as an inquiry is lost. In that case, panel members or chairs would be feeding in as individuals to a parliamentary Committee that would recognise their status as having been on the inquiry.
It comes back to the Chair’s point about making those who have chaired an inquiry available to appear before the Committee. You could extend that to other members of the inquiry, but that would depend on the nature of the inquiry and the willingness of members.
Q89 Chair: If an inquiry is chaired by a current judge, then when the inquiry concludes, the report has been published and the press conference has been given, that judge returns to life as a judge. They may be seeking a seat on the Supreme Court, an advancement on the bench or whatever, and that would require Ministry of Justice support. There is clearly merit in having a judicial brain and judicial experience to deploy at inquiries, but have you heard any evidence, or do you have any concern, that a current serving judge would feel less able to critique the Government for non-delivery, tardy delivery or incorrect delivery of recommendations because they had just gone back to the judicial bench rather than back to private life?
Lord Norton of Louth: I can see there may be that concern, but I would have thought that the bigger issue is the one you imply: that they would go back to the bench. In other words, they would be busy with their judicial role, which is going to be quite demanding. That is an issue. There is also the point that judges have particular skills. If you are setting up an inquiry that is designed not to be adversarial but to be inquisitorial on a specific issue, it may make more sense to have it chaired by somebody who is an expert in that particular area.
Q90 Chair: Would that be preferable to a dispassionate judicial mind?
Lord Norton of Louth: Exactly, yes. One of the points you also made is that it does not have to have a single chair; there can be a panel. You could look at that as an option. An expert chair would not face the same constraints as a judge and would have the knowledge to be able to follow up on the substance of what the inquiry has been reporting on.
Chair: They have knowledge and operational freedom.
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes.
Q91 Richard Quigley: The Statutory Inquiries Committee recommended a new Joint Committee to monitor and scrutinise inquiry recommendations. What were the main reasons that was considered to be the best way forward?
Lord Norton of Louth: There are two reasons, one of which we have touched upon. First, you would be drawing on the expertise and strengths of both Houses. That is always the value of a Joint Committee because it melds what each House brings to bear. On the Lord’s side, the value is that we have members who may be expert in a particular area and who understand inquiries.
If you look at the membership of the Committee I chaired, we had members who had been involved in inquiries in one capacity or another, so they understood the process. One Committee member had been in No. 10 and was responsible for helping to set up inquiries. Such knowledge can be extremely valuable, and that is the strength of a parliamentary Joint Committee.
I have served on a number of Joint Committees, mainly on draft Bills, and they tend to work well in drawing on the strengths of both Houses, so that would be an argument for a Joint Committee. It would be a dedicated Committee with its own dedicated Committee staff doing the work; whether they are special advisers or specialists in the area, they are excellent in putting the material together. There would also be continuity.
But the point I was making earlier is that a Select Committee on inquiries would be important in terms of the message it would send to the public, and in building up public trust in Parliament. I am particularly concerned about that wider issue of trust. It is a real issue, and this would be one aspect of it; it is important for victims, survivors and the public to know that there is a Committee dedicated to monitoring what is happening once the inquiry has ended. Efficiency is vital for an inquiry in undertaking its work, but for victims, survivors and people out there, it is vital to know that action is being taken to ensure that what they have been through will not happen again. That is the value of doing it; the key aspect is public trust and sending out the right signal to the public.
Q92 Richard Quigley: I do not wish to put words into your mouth, but I get a sense that when you say that sufficient evidence is sufficient, it is because you feel that perfect has become the enemy of the good.
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes.
Q93 Richard Quigley: You made a striking point that inquiries—to the Chair’s point—may start off with good intentions, but they are almost designed never to come to a conclusion because once there is a conclusion, action has to be taken. So, as you say, there is a severe lack of outcomes for victims and survivors. You have enthusiastically and energetically outlined some methods of combat, but if you had a magic wand and you could make this perfect, what would you do?
Lord Norton of Louth: When you say perfect, do you mean in terms of the actual undertaking of the inquiry?
Richard Quigley: I mean the outcome in terms of what happens after an inquiry.
Lord Norton of Louth: I would ensure that if an inquiry recommends that action be taken, “We should do A,” and the Government says yes, the Committee would check that the Government—or whichever public body is responsible—had done it, and that it was in place to prevent a recurrence. You may decide to monitor it on a continuing basis to make sure that it stays in place, but the key point is that people can see that action has been taken. The danger is that an inquiry comes up with a report and recommendations, people think it is excellent, and then nothing happens. That is worse than not setting up an inquiry in the first place because it builds up expectations and, if they are dashed, that affects public confidence.
Q94 Richard Quigley: Do you think that from the outside, people end up thinking that Parliament has no role in monitoring and scrutiny? Is that what it seems like?
Lord Norton of Louth: What awareness would the public have of what Parliament is doing to monitor the situation? People are not thinking, “Oh, it’s all right, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee of the House of Commons is investigating this. We all know that.” The challenge is that people out there do not know much about Parliament; that is the problem. That is why nomenclature—the language and titles you utilise—is very important. If you have a Committee on public inquiries, that at least sends out a signal about what it is about. Otherwise, the danger is that what the Committee is actually doing gets lost. This is not the only inquiry you are undertaking as a Committee; the pressure on Committees and for people outside to know what Committees are doing are quite a challenge. If you have a dedicated Committee and people out there know about it, that is very important. It does not solve the problem, but—related to what you say—making sure that action is taken on the recommendations reinforces public trust, because it is clear that a Committee is chasing things up and making sure that something happens.
Q95 Richard Quigley: In July of last year, the House of Lords Liaison Committee acknowledged that in the current savings context there were clear challenges to establishing the new permanent Committee you were discussing. Was that disappointing news for you?
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes, but it was not unexpected. We are aware that the House authorities will draw attention to the cost of setting up new Committees. They are expensive, so you have to make a really strong case; otherwise, I am sure we could all come up with a wish list of extra Committees we think would be valuable.
Chair: It might be cheaper to change the name of this Committee than to create a new one.
Lord Norton of Louth: If you just tacked it on to what you have at the moment, you would have a very long name. If you converted it to be a Committee on inquiries, would you have to give up all your other responsibilities? That is the challenge. We are, and were, alert to the cost of establishing a new Committee. There has to be a compelling case.
Q96 Chair: Surely the key thing is to make sure the job is done, and to communicate to those who are interested that the job is being done. We should not get tied up with badges and labels.
Lord Norton of Louth: Badges are important to people outside because they do not know parliamentary procedure. Despite the fact that it is available online, “Erskine May” is not a bestseller. Quite often, people do not understand the difference between Parliament and the Government, so there is a real challenge. Names matter; people know what a public inquiry is. Nomenclature is important, but the substance is the outline I have given of the Committee’s role, which would be dedicated to that Committee. It would be built into its institutional memory; it would have a database; it would be able to monitor and check; and it would have the authority of a parliamentary Committee to chase the Government when things are not done. Those are the arguments for it.
Coming back to your point about its justification relative to other Committees, you could argue that it would potentially have a significant practical effect in monitoring to make sure that something happens. Other Select Committees may produce valuable reports and recommendations to the Government, but it is up to the Government whether they accept those on an issue of public policy. If we put that alongside, as I say, coming up with a Committee that can ensure action is taken and recommendations are implemented, such a Committee could prevent a recurrence of a tragedy that has already happened. We have a report saying, “This is why it happened, and this is what you need in place to stop it happening again.” It comes back to your opening question, and my point: how do you monetise the value of that when you are assessing the cost of a Committee?
Q97 Richard Quigley: In the absence of a Joint Committee, is there a not-quite-perfect solution in the House of Lords? We have two Houses, and we have lots of actual capability there, but no official Committee. What role could the House of Lords play?
Lord Norton of Louth: Given our membership, we could, if necessary, have a dedicated Committee of our own. Our practice is that when we set up a Committee, the members appointed are normally members of the House who have some experience or expertise in that area, rather like the Statutory Inquiries Committee. You draw on people who have background knowledge and experience in the field because that is valuable in pursuing the matter, taking evidence and putting questions. When you are on an inquiry, the important thing is not the question; it is being able to instantly evaluate the quality of the answer. That is the value of the exercise.
We could dedicate a Committee, but the same issue comes up—whichever House is involved—of justifying the cost of setting it up. Either there is a significant opportunity cost, or something else goes; it adds to the cost at a time when both Houses are trying to make savings.
Q98 Luke Taylor: Others have proposed a national oversight mechanism. Do you have any views on that as a solution to the governance and oversight conversations we have had today?
Lord Norton of Louth: My view is that Parliament is the appropriate body. If you set up something separate, it will not have the authority of a parliamentary Committee, so what would its relationship be, not just to the Government, but to Parliament? I saw that you had that evidence, but my view is that a parliamentary Committee should have that role and be doing that oversight. If you think about it, what is the role of parliamentary Committees? You are engaging in oversight of Government.
Luke Taylor: It would be another arm’s length body to be overseen by—
Lord Norton of Louth: Yes; you can see both sides of the argument. It would be arm’s length, but that is also a problem. Parliament should have ownership of the process of checking that the Government are pursuing the recommendations of the inquiry that they are responsible for establishing.
Q99 Luke Taylor: You mentioned the role that central Government currently play in oversight. Could that be improved, and if so, how?
Lord Norton of Louth: Is oversight the right word? The inquiries unit established in the Cabinet Office is doing a reasonable job, but not everybody involved in inquiries knows of its existence. It is building up a community of practice, and that is valuable for sharing information; it is maintaining a tracker now and things such as that. It might have a monitoring role, but that is within Government; Parliament always has a role in monitoring Government. That is why I think it is key for Parliament to maintain ownership of the process, and not for the Government or Parliament to accept that it should be hived off to some other body.
Q100 Luke Taylor: The Government have introduced a dashboard of inquiry recommendations. How much of a positive step is this? How is it functioning, and again, is it the right oversight?
Lord Norton of Louth: I like to think that the Government are already acting on our recommendations because not only have they started the tracker, but I have noticed that they are using an indicative timetable and things such as that. We were very keen on having that database, and it is valuable given that we did not have it before, so I very much welcome the direction of travel. As I say, we are really keen to build up an institutional memory in the inquiries unit, to be able to share best practice and experience, and to draw in those who have been involved in inquiries, perhaps through a forum of inquiry chairs, so that anyone chairing a future inquiry has something to draw on. They will not have to reinvent the wheel, which is what has tended to happen and is, of course, highly inefficient.
Q101 Luke Taylor: In response to your report, the Government have said that they are “actively considering whether there is scope for wider reforms to the frameworks within which inquiries are set up, run and concluded.” Have you been informed of any wider reforms on these issues?
Lord Norton of Louth: Not yet; I put down a question to see where we are with that, and it is still being considered. To be fair to the Government, they keep considering it. In terms of our report, we were conscious that they were late in producing their response; I am not quite sure why, and they apologised. The good news is that they are very positive about it. I had a meeting with a Minister who was very positive about it, and the Government’s response to the report, as I say, is just a series of, “Accept, accept, accept,” on the recommendations we have made, so that is a step forward, and I am very pleased. They made the point—it was accompanied by a written ministerial statement—that they are reviewing whether there could be wider reform of the inquiry process. They are still at the stage where that is being considered and there has been nothing beyond that in terms of the substance of the reform proposals, so I shall be—
Luke Taylor: Waiting with bated breath.
Lord Norton of Louth: I will not just be waiting; I will keep asking. I will pursue it to make sure that it does not get lost. They are keen on it, so I will just keep pressing.
Chair: One hopes that you will be pushing at an open door.
Lord Norton of Louth: When I have spoken to Ministers, they have been very receptive, so I am not criticising them for their reaction. We are just waiting to see what form that review has taken and what they have come up with, and we can take it from there.
Q102 Luke Taylor: I have a question—I am surprised that Mr Baker has not grabbed it—as to how any proposed system can best take account of the role played by the devolved Executives and legislatures.
Lord Norton of Louth: We looked at the position in Scotland, which is pretty similar. I was kept informed of what was happening in Scotland and what Holyrood was doing by Lord Wallace of Tankerness—a member of our Committee—who unfortunately has since died. It would be a case of co-ordination with the devolved bodies, where there are shared concerns about a particular issue that affects different parts of the United Kingdom.
Chair: No colleague is indicating that they want to catch my eye, which is a wonderful thing to behold, and suggests that we have covered the territory that we wanted to cover. Lord Norton, we are grateful to you, first for the work that your Committee did, and secondly in the immediate for your appearance before us this morning. You have been most helpful; thank you so much.