19
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
Oral evidence: Undersea cables: follow-up, HC 148
Monday 18 May 2026
4.30 pm
Members present: Matt Western (The Chair); Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom; Lord Boateng; Dame Karen Bradley; Liam Byrne; Sarah Champion; Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi; Bill Esterson; Lord Godson; Lord Hutton of Furness; Lord Jack of Courance; Baroness Kidron; Mike Martin; Edward Morello; Lord Sedwill; Lord Tunnicliffe; Baroness Tyler of Enfield; Lord Watts.
Questions 1 - 20
Witnesses
I: Baroness Lloyd of Effra, Minister for Digital Economy, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; Al Carns, Minister for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence; Kevin Adams, Director of Digital Infrastructure, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology; Gary Martin, Director, National Security, Ministry of Defence.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra, Al Carns, Kevin Adams and Gary Martin.
Q1 The Chair: Today we are holding a follow-up session on undersea cables following the publication of our report last September. I am delighted to be joined by Ministers and officials from the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. I ask witnesses to introduce themselves.
Gary Martin: Hi, I am the director for operational policy in the Ministry of Defence.
Al Carns: I am the Minister for Armed Forces.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: I am Liz Lloyd, the Minister for Digital Economy.
Kevin Adams: I am the director of telecoms at DSIT.
Q2 The Chair: Thank you very much for joining us today. When we met Ministers during the inquiry, we were not accused of being alarmist but told that our concerns were perhaps misplaced about where we were in terms of defence and the relative security of subsea cables. Minister Carns, what sort of progress has been made? Has it been good progress, or glacial progress?
Al Carns: I think, first of all, we have got a line on the threat. Since we came into government, we have seen a 30% increase in Russian surface and subsurface activity in the High North. You will recall the statement from the Secretary of State a couple of months back about Russian subsurface capability, where we saw an Akula-class submarine and GUGI vessels operating around critical underwater infrastructure. It is worth noting what we mean by progress: I would argue that that operation highlighted the sophistication capability of our Armed Forces to identify, early track and then expose Russian activity, reducing the ability of denial plausibility, which was a very effective operation.
The Chair: Can I ask then, because it got good coverage—it seems like about a month ago now—what specifically MoD learned from that encounter?
Al Carns: We reaffirmed some of our capabilities and the effectiveness of our ability to track relatively sophisticated Russian capabilities. We have also learned that there is a continual attempt by the Russians to identify weakness in our infrastructure, but their ability to do that undetected is very difficult. There were 450 hours flown by our aircraft and thousands of nautical miles travelled; it was an international effort between us and some of our NATO allies to map and track those vessels and then expose them.
One of the biggest aims of the Russians is to conduct sabotage operations and then deny that they were responsible, so by having the evidential collect and understanding of exactly what they are up to and then exposing it reduces their ability to walk away and blame an anchor or some other strange incident for having an effect on our critical national infrastructure.
The Chair: Minister, can you just describe to us—because this gets coverage in the media but is often so well explained—these GUGI vessels? Are they unmanned? Where would they have originated from?
Al Carns: The Russian submarines would have originated from the High North; they would have come round the north of Norway, then into open waters. I shall not go into specific details; the Russian submarines are relatively old, but in some cases as an open source they have had their capabilities increased to do underwater research subsurface.
The Chair: So a GUGI submarine is what we would view as a traditional submarine.
Al Carns: It has been adapted to use certain capabilities.
The Chair: It is commendable that the MoD has been giving more airtime to this issue and to raising it in the public consciousness. Do you think that the public will just grow accepting to it, as more events of this nature occur—or do you plan to have a more muscular reaction to it, rather than just saying, “We see you—we know you’re there”?
Al Carns: This is part of the broader national conversation with the population to highlight and expose some of the threats that we face and acknowledge that, while we have been involved for 20 years in conflicts far away from the United Kingdom, should there be an effect on our critical national infrastructure, it will have a significant impact here and at home. That national conversation is really important—so the more of this activity that takes place, the more we need to highlight it in the right way, in the right place and at the right time to ensure that the population understands that there is an increasing threat brewing from Russia in the East.
Q3 The Chair: Thank you for that. Baroness Lloyd, we have heard a defence perspective—but, related to that, has anything changed in the subsea cable industry in how it plans for ensuring resilience in the network of cables?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: What has been progressed since we received your committee report in a couple of areas is, first, in respect of cable landing stations, which we may come on to later.
The Chair: We will.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: That is about stressing the importance of the emergency repair plans. As you pointed out, they are very much part of our subsea cable infrastructure.
The Chair: But are you seeing greater urgency from the sector, with more meetings? How do you gauge that it is taking it seriously?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: We have convened different meetings with the cable industry; it is very interested in sharing information on what we see as risks to help them to prepare. As part of the work that we also took on, following on from the last discussions, we are starting to work not just with the cable industry itself but with the other sectors that might be impacted by potential damage to cables. So the potential impacts of this in the wider economy are also being understood, perhaps in a different way than it was a few years ago.
Al Carns: You will remember the Estonian-Finnish cable that broke—the Estlink cable. That was an example: in the international industrial engagement that took place after that, the UK led with JEF on the Nordic Warden exercise, which was to increase presence and deterrence around the Baltics and the High North and around some of those cables. From a defence perspective, working with industry and across government but also working with our allies and partners is absolutely critical to provide a comprehensive deterrence to the threat that we face.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: While there is no complacency, the repair capability and the speed of repair as well as the substitutability or rerouting is still strong, for the most part, for the cable breaks that we see. That is something that, for the UK’s resilience, is important to stress. The UK remains resilient.
The Chair: We will come on to some of those areas more specifically.
Q4 Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: It is good news that we reduce the possibility of Russian submarines doing things undetected, but if they were, say, to place a device on cables—and there are over 6,000 kilometres of cables for electricity coming into this country—what would be able to do about it?
Al Carns: First of all, we have very good capabilities that would be able to tell us whether that was the case or not. If we identified something untoward to do with the cables, we would seek to remove it, either in conjunction with industry or with other capabilities that we have?
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: Is it possible to protect 6,000 kilometres of cable?
Al Carns: You can do point defence or forward defence. Point defence would be defending every mile of that 6,000 kilometres. I think that is exceptionally difficult to do. We have to recognise that our adversaries have limited capability to be able to deliver offensive effort, so our best way to do this is by forward defence, tracking, exposing and defeating, if required, the capabilities that emanate from our adversaries in the High North.
Q5 Lord Watts: The best deterrent would be if the Russians thought that we could hit back. How well developed are our plans to actually hit their infrastructure, if they should hit ours?
Al Carns: I am not going to talk about individual operational capabilities, but I can say that the British military holds a whole suite of options and capability to deter adversaries in a whole manner of means.
Q6 Lord Hutton of Furness: You said earlier that the whole focus of your work here is on deterrence, which makes sense. Could you remind the committee whether Russian activity in this area is increasing or decreasing?
Al Carns: It is an interesting point. With the war in Ukraine, which is absorbing a huge amount of Russian capability and capacity, one area where we know they are investing is the navy in the High North and, as part of that, the Russian underwater research programme.
Lord Hutton of Furness: Is it increasing or decreasing?
Al Carns: There is increasing investment in the Russian underwater research programme.
Lord Hutton of Furness: Right, so we are not really deterring them at the moment, are we?
Al Carns: Deterrence you deliver through two means—through deterrence doctrine, punishment and denial. One is that you punish people for the activity that they have undertaken, which can be done through a whole manner of means. The second one is that you deny their capability to threaten you in the first place. I would argue that the operation that we conducted to track those submarines and expose them denied them the ability to get away with that activity without attribution.
Lord Hutton of Furness: So if this policy is working, we should see a decrease in Russian activity going forward. Is that right?
Al Carns: It depends, really. It depends on the Russian modus operandi and where they are investing their resource. Russia continues to try to find weakness or other areas in which it can impose cost on us, NATO or our alliances. We have to ensure that we can deter it and map and track it and defeat it if required, adopting that punishment or denial deterrence policy.
Lord Hutton of Furness: It is a good argument, but I am just not sure that the mapping and tracking—this argument that “We see you”—is having any appreciable impact at all on what the Russians are doing.
Al Carns: Was that a question?
Lord Hutton of Furness: It was a question, yes.
Al Carns: A whole variety of capabilities go on across government, with our allies and partners, that deal with deterrence policy in a multifaceted way, much of which cannot be discussed here.
Q7 Lord Tunnicliffe: Sorry to be blunt, but the real question that hangs in my mind—and this is an incredibly frightening area—is whether Russia has the present capability to sabotage cables, including in deep water. Do we have the capability to stop that happening physically? “Kinetically” might be the right term. Do we have that capability, and does that not inevitably escalate the possibility of wider combat?
Al Carns: When it comes to Russia’s capability to sabotage underwater sea cables—and many states have that capability—they are dragging an anchor through very sophisticated systems. Can we defeat that capability should we tip from crisis into conflict? Yes.
Lord Tunnicliffe: So your capability would involve destroying the asset that is being used?
Al Carns: I am not going to go into operational details. What I would say is that the military, across the Navy and the Air Force, have specific capabilities that can deter through punishment and denial the Russian underwater research programme.
Q8 Liam Byrne: Minister Carns, I am just going to pursue Lord Hutton’s line of questioning for a moment, and ask specifically about Atlantic Bastion. I appreciate that there are merely rumours that the defence equipment plan is going to materialise this week; it will receive three cheers from this committee if it does actually meet the light of day. When the Government responded to the committee’s report on subsea cables, there was an ambitious phrase in the response about the “rapid growth in new capabilities, including a fleet of autonomous underwater sensors” which would be “augmented by drones … and a new class of ships”. Has any of that actually happened, or is it still in the future?
Al Carns: I would say two things to this. First, we are seeing a revolution in Ukraine in the use of uncrewed systems. From a maritime perspective, we have seen that in the Black Sea, and some of those lessons, while slightly different, are absolutely applicable to the High North and our territorial waters. We are pooling those lessons across and integrating it into a sensor suite and underwater systems to provide an interconnected defensive bastion. That will take time; there are 18 different programmes running at the moment, of which the first uncrewed gliders should be in by 2026. We are aiming for the first jet-powered drone by 2027 and then the uncrewed escort ships by 2029. This is a really ambitious programme, moving away from heavily crewed vessels to an uncrewed/crewed mix of vessels, which should increase our capacity and capability over time.
Liam Byrne: I am assuming, because you have been really specific about the timelines, that that is all funded.
Al Carns: That will come out in the defence investment plan, and I shall give the first cheer of your three when that comes out.
Liam Byrne: So you are giving us a kind of curtain raiser on commitments and timetables that are going to be included in the plan, and we will see the pound notes attached to that plan when it is published.
Al Carns: I have been involved in a little bit of it—not all of it—but I am pretty sure that it will come out in the defence investment plan.
Liam Byrne: The Government obviously put quite a bit of store on Atlantic Bastion as the kind of hard defence response to the issues that we highlighted, so can we be pretty satisfied this afternoon that this plan is nailed on?
Al Carns: Atlantic Bastion is absolutely moving forward full throttle. Interestingly, some of the systems and techniques that we are rolling out on Atlantic Bastion may be rolled out in other theatres first, given the precarious situation taking place elsewhere in the world.
Liam Byrne: The second line of questioning for me is whether that is enough. If you get a serious security situation in the High North or the Arctic, obviously Royal Navy capabilities, which as we know are thin, will be stretched very quickly. What kind of confidence do you have that we are actually going to be able almost to close protect some of the assets that are going to need defending if, frankly, they are diverted to even more pressing duties?
Al Carns: The United Kingdom acting on its own would be a very specific incident, and I cannot envisage one where we would. For example, the operation that I have just talked about was a multinational operation using assets from multiple countries to map and track those submarines and then expose their activity. Whether it be part of NATO or the Joint Expeditionary Force, I do not think that the Royal Navy would be acting in isolation, especially in the High North where you have three other countries that are also very interested in that water space and in protecting it and ensuring that our collective interests are secured.
Liam Byrne: Two other theatres have come to me recently. One is the work that we have to do with our partners in Ireland and the extended continental shelf. Lots of our cables that we need land on that; they do not have a lot of capability to defend them—I think that they have just given a radar contract to the French, of all people, to help them to figure out what is going on there. But there is also the biggest power plant in the world in the North Sea, which will require a very complicated set of defences. How broad does the concept of the Atlantic Bastion reach? Is it a concept that can help us to work together with our Irish allies in defending cables that actually land on the Irish continental shelf? To what extent can it help us to defend the new offshore wind infrastructure that is going to get built in the North Sea?
Al Carns: That is a really good question. There are two elements to that. First, are we supporting Ireland in the defence of its capabilities? We already are—and that is about that forward defence and making sure that any capabilities that emanate from adversaries in the North are tracked. It is in the best interests of us and Ireland to do so. Secondly, you are absolutely right when you talk about critical national infrastructure; critical underwater infrastructure is shared primarily with the Norwegians and several other partners. It is a collaborative effort between us and them to ensure that we protect them as effectively as possible. The best way in which to do that is by forward defence, not point defence, but I accept that a combination of the two is required.
Liam Byrne: How well developed is that kind of joint plan to guard those spaces with those allies?
Al Carns: That joint plan has been up and running for several years already. It is about doing it differently with different capability sets. We have been operation in the High North since the end of the Second World War. It has been an exceptionally effective operation—almost every day of every year since then we have been deployed protecting and guarding the High North. That will continue. The point here is that we will try to do it differently, taking some of the lessons from Ukraine and increasing the uncrewed systems mix with our manned platforms, as well as increasing the coverage and the sophistication of that package.
Q9 The Chair: Minister, in your response to Lord Hutton, you made some remarks about elements that you could not discuss in this public hearing. During our inquiry, we had a very productive and constructive session with the MoD, in private. Could we have a similar sort of session again?
Al Carns: Absolutely.
Q10 Mike Martin: Again, this is to Minister Carns; I apologise to the rest of you, but there are questions for you later on. I take your mind back to January, when we had UK forces helping the Americans to board a ship in the Atlantic. We declared that ship stateless, although some alleged that it was Russian-flagged. Could you walk me though the legal basis for that boarding of the ship?
Al Carns: Stateless vessels may be lawfully interdicted and subjected to the law of interdicting states. The US assessed “Bella 1” to be stateless, and the vessel was subject to US seizure warrants under counter-Iran sanctions. Military support was provided as part of our joint commitment to crack down on sanctions evasions and bolster defence and security.
Mike Martin: Have we ever done that before?
Al Carns: I will need to get back to you on the specifics. With every boarding operation with a ship—
Mike Martin: You have done a few boarding operations in your time.
Al Carns: Just a few. I would say that each one has its own legal parameters and own operational parameters and, particularly, its own policy parameters, depending on whether the ship is flagged and which nation it has come from, even down to the detail of what the crew are.
Mike Martin: Did this feel novel to you, in your experience?
Al Carns: No.
Mike Martin: Okay. In March, so shortly after that, the Government declared that they were going to be rolling out this programme to try to tackle the Russian shadow fleet. Since then, 63 sanctioned Russian vessels have transited UK territorial waters. That is one a day and, to my knowledge, we have not interdicted any of them. Is that correct?
Al Carns: We have not interdicted them, but each sanctioned vessel has its own parameters. I think that we have sanctioned more than 500 vessels—but Gary can come back to me on that—and each one will have its different legal and policy parameters, depending on where it is flagged and depending on what waters it is in.
Mike Martin: You would think, in UK territorial waters, which is obviously the most permissive for us, one of those 63 might be—
Al Carns: Trust me, I am watching this like a hawk.
Mike Martin: What is the blockage? Does it frustrate you?
Al Carns: I would not say it frustrates me, but it is primarily about making sure that the parameters are right so that actions do not have second and third-order effects, either for UK shipping or for international shipping as a whole.
Mike Martin: Can you give us detail on any of those, since you are the responsible Minister?
Al Carns: If there is a vessel that is unflagged and it fits within the parameters, we will board that vessel. The effect that we have had by making that statement is to put a Grigorovich-class frigate in the channel since April, which has had to be resupplied three times. That is quite a high-class Russian asset that is now sat having to wait in the channel, detracting its ability to engage in broader military operations. Secondly, we have also seen a rerouting of vessels, causing a huge amount of angst to the system and the Russians as a whole. If the opportunity presents itself, and the parameters are met from a legal, policy and operational perspective, we will board the vessel.
Mike Martin: Is it not about power, though? Does not this make us look powerless, if we say that we are going to get these ships if they come through our territorial waters and then we do not take any of them?
Al Carns: I can understand that, while looking at the numbers, you may immediately think, “You said you were going to do this, but you haven’t”. but I speak to the lawyers almost on any ship that comes through, and we have to weigh up the legal, policy and operational perspectives. If it meets that requirement, and particularly the first one, we will take action but, if it does not, we need to be wary of the second and third-order implications that that may set and the precedent it may set for ships around the world.
Mike Martin: Could you comment on those stories in the press that the reason why some of those ships were not taken down was because the UK did not want to pay the docking fees in the UK while they were taken alongside?
Al Carns: As far as I am concerned, that is completely incorrect.
Mike Martin: Thank you very much. A final question: are there any other legislative freedoms that you think you need? Is there any review that you are conducting at the moment? Are you looking at areas where you might need to bring legislation through to make us more able to do those types of operations?
Al Carns: We looked at expanding the interpretation of UNCLOS, and we agree that robust action is needed, but we did not believe in stretching UNCLOS provisions—that includes the piracy provisions—beyond proper limits, because of the second and third-order implications that would have for global shipping.
Mike Martin: So, for example, from the South China Sea.
The Chair: Do you think there should be a change to the ability to change flag during a transit? Currently under international law it is possible; there are different interpretations according to certain nations. Do you think, sat here today, that that would be an effective change to international maritime law?
Al Carns: If I gave you an opinion, I think it would be ill informed. I need to speak to the experts on maritime law to make sure of the second and third-order implications of changing that legislation for our own and for international shipping.
The Chair: Okay. Do you think that we will see the legislative changes that you are talking about in the defence readiness Bill?
Al Carns: We are not pushing for legislative changes at the moment, when it comes to this—we have all the freedoms we need. We just need those ships to meet the parameters and, if they do not, unfortunately we will not be able to board them without causing the second and third-order effects that I talked about.
Q11 Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: We are now moving on to cable repair options and risks of ship sabotage. To go to the Digital Economy Minister, you will be aware that our committee’s report recommended that the Government should acquire a sovereign capability for a cable repair ship by 2030. The Government’s response was that we would be exploring a range of options. What progress have you made on plans to develop a sovereign repair capability?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: We have taken that forward. We have issued a request for information so that we could engage with industry and the potential suppliers. We have got those responses and signed NDAs with a subset of those that can meet the capabilities that we set out. We are progressing with that so that, as you say, we have the capability for a UK-flagged capacity over the medium term.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: Specifically, are you looking to purchase a vessel or to buy theoretical repair capabilities from the two main consortiums of private fleets, or are you looking at using reservists? What is your preferred option?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: We are currently looking at all options. We are very mindful of the cost of this to the taxpayer, and we are mindful of the fact that there is good commercial provision out there at present, so we do not want to close down the options that are out there, and we do not want at this time to decide that one model is the best one that meets our needs.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: Right, okay. So we have not made sufficient progress on that—we are still at the “exploring all options” stage. Armed Forces Minister, to come to you, you will be aware that cable repair crews would be very reluctant to go into contested waters where there is a likelihood that they will come under attack. What lessons have you learned from the Iran conflict about the possibility of vessels actually refusing to sail in risky conditions?
Al Carns: When we look at this problem and ask whether we should have a sovereign vessel capable of repairing cables, on average I think we have five UK cable breaks per annum, 80% caused by shipping and 20% environmental. The UK response time is eight days, which is three times faster than the global average. But I think that here we are talking about, if one of the 64 major cables were to break and hostilities were to break out—either a crisis or a conflict—how we would work with our industry partners to escort those ships to a position to be able to fix those cables in an appropriate time. That would require a naval or collaborative effort to do so, either individually or bilaterally or as part of the coalition with NATO and JEF. It is also worth mentioning that we have HMS “Proteus” as well, which is our underwater research ship. It has certain capabilities that can enable that as well.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: The Digital Economy Minister will be aware that standard insurance specifically excludes warlike conditions. Are you exploring government-backed war risk insurance, in case vessel owners are unwilling to put to sea in a crisis?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: In looking at the capabilities and the specifications that we need, we have taken into account what we have seen in recent events in Iran. As you point out, there are issues around insurance and crew availability and crew composition, and those are all being built into the options that we are looking at right now.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: Right, so we are still exploring whether there will be government-backed war insurance schemes.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: For this capability.
Al Carns: From my perspective, in other conflicts the Royal Navy’s primary role has been in escort and protection capability of those specialist assets to repair and maintain cables. As we have said before, there are 6,000-odd miles of cables, some in our national waters and some in international waters and some in the territorial waters of other countries. It is a collaborative process.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: Armed Forces Minister, we are all aware that sabotage could be conducted in a variety of manners, whether that is when vessels are at dock in port or when they are out at sea—or through purportedly accidental civilian collisions. We have also seen that the EU has explicitly recognised sabotage to repair capabilities as a risk. What actions is the UK taking to protect repair vessels and equipment depots from sabotage?
Al Carns: From a defence perspective, should there be a requirement to fix cables because of sabotage, the Royal Navy would be called on to escort those, should the threat dictate it. The reality with a lot of those sabotage operations is that it is about plausible deniability, whether that be about dragging an anchor through the cable, to something slightly more offensive. The Royal Navy and the JEF are fully prepared to do that.
Q12 Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: There are 6,000 kilometres of electricity cables but 18,000 kilometres of communication cables, which are also at risk. But I want to ask about landing station security. In our report, we recommended that you require landing station operators to upgrade security measures and develop emergency repair plans. How have they responded, and how long are you giving them to carry this out? I do not know who should answer that.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: You could ask me if you like. We have written to all the cable landing station operators, setting out or requesting that they develop emergency repair plans, as you recommended. We have set out what, to use your phrase, “good enough” looks like—so what those components should encompass—and they have until the end of the year to come back with those plans. In addition to that, we are working with the National Cyber Security Centre and the NPSA on additional security guidance for the sector to look at exactly what they need to do and what we recommend they do on a more ongoing basis as opposed to that emergency repair plan piece of work.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: Okay, so they have got until the end of the year to come back with the plans—how long will they have to actually carry out those plans?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: The plans are in the event that an emergency repair is needed, so they would only be enacted in that case.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: I see. Okay. Are you concerned about state-sponsored terrorism using local criminal assets, as we have seen in a number of different areas in the past few years?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: When we are looking at the risk generally, we are looking at the worst reasonable cases of risk, which could be sabotage or co-ordinated sabotage or just normal wear and tear. Regardless of where the risk emanates, we are planning for those reasonable worst-case scenarios, and we are informed by all the agencies that you would expect to make that risk judgment and take that into account in the national risk assessment.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: Are you confident that local police stations, for example, are aware of the risks around the substations and landing stations and of the sensitivity of those substations?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: I do not know whether that was encompassed in the plan that we set out—we should ask Kevin.
Kevin Adams: I do not think, from memory, we asked them specifically to engage with local law enforcement—but the picture is probably mixed. We can have high confidence in some areas but not necessarily everywhere; there is not a consistent standard and awareness in local enforcement. That is one of the reasons, as the Minister said, why we are working closely with the NPSA and NCSC to issue comprehensive guidance to all cable landing station operators by the end of this year, which will include those sorts of things.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: Thank you, that is helpful. At the other end, some of the connectors of electricity or communication cables are in other countries, in Europe. Are you having conversations with European counterparts about how they could protect their landing stations?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: We have a number of discussions with counterparts, including the EU Commission on its EU cables plan—and, as was referenced before, with Ireland in particular. The Prime Minister met the Taoiseach this year and last year raised the importance of working together on Ireland-UK cables, and we will be running some scenarios later this year with Ireland. We also have a NATO infrastructure group—I forget its name—so we co-ordinate with NATO colleagues as well as with North Sea partners, including Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and Denmark. We have signed a joint declaration on co-operation regarding protection of infrastructure in the North Sea. So there are lots of contacts with counterparts on the whole of undersea infrastructure and telecoms.
Al Carns: We have been working with the Cabinet Office and others to work out by the end of the year what our war books look like for homeland defence. The point that you raise is an absolutely sensible one, of where local authorities that may have critical national infrastructure within their patch need to be very clear about what their vulnerabilities are, and make sure that they are on the register. That is something that will be taken in within that documentation so that each local authority knows exactly what it must keep an eye on and protect, should there be an escalation or increase towards crisis or conflict.
Q13 Lord Jack of Courance: That probably more or less covers my question, but have there been any hostile threats towards landing stations?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: Not that I am aware of.
Lord Jack of Courance: No plots foiled?
Kevin Adams: No, I do not have any specific threat information to share on cable landing stations, but we are aware of their potential vulnerability—hence the work that we have already described.
Q14 Lord Godson: I have a quick question for the Armed Forces Minister on your very comprehensive account of the arm that we put round the Irish Republic; I think that is the word you used. I would like to ask about two aspects. To some degree it has been touched on already, but I would just like a little more detail on threats from the Russians and Chinese to our interests in the Republic of Ireland specifically. Secondly, where would the Irish Republic be without the assistance that you have described, which we give them? Thirdly, as per the debate going on in the Republic or Ireland and in the EU, in security circles, should the Republic of Ireland as a neutral country in NATO terms be doing more?
Al Carns: I do not want to talk for the Republic of Ireland, but I can say, because of its geographic location, almost connected to the British isle—and indeed there is Northern Ireland—we have a huge amount of interoperability when it comes to security and defence policy. At recent meetings, it has been a topic of discussion, and we accept that vulnerabilities in the Republic of Ireland can have a second or third-order effect for the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
Gary Martin: I think this just reinforces the need to work with allies and partners. The Ministers have both referred to work within NATO and the EU, and the way in which the cables work is that they are all connected on a global basis. We all need to work together with those vulnerabilities, and we need to really focus on our intelligence capability to get the information, which means that we can share effectively with partners and take action where required, including with industry and tipping people off to threats as and when they arise.
Lord Godson: I was not so much thinking of you speaking for the Republic of Ireland, Minister, but just asking for your perspective on greater burden-sharing on its part, bearing in mind the dependence that you have described.
Al Carns: I think there is a requirement for a bilateral relationship that divides responsibility, but there is also an acceptance that these multifaceted problems that we face, whether they be from Russia or elsewhere, if they affect the Republic of Ireland, affect us, and if they affect us they affect the Republic of Ireland—and the same for the rest of Europe and our NATO and JEF partners.
Lord Godson: I have a final question for both of you—just on a little more detail on the impediments to the acquisition of an indigenously based national repair capability for undersea cables. We have heard a lot about co-operation and so on, but what more might or could or ought to be done in that regard for us to step up to the plate indigenously, as it were, in our industrial capabilities?
Al Carns: Between the US, France, the UK and Italy there are 10 flagged vehicles that have the capability to repair cables. I shall leave the national solution to Baroness Lloyd.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: We are making progress on this question of the medium-term access to UK capability and UK-flagged vessels through this process of engagement with the industry and setting out the specifications. I am happy to come back to you in the latter half of this year with an update on where we have got to. There are many ways of getting there. You recommended ownership; there may be other commercial arrangements that could secure what we need as the UK that are not that exact model—but we have not ruled anything out at this stage.
Lord Godson: I was not recommending it, I was merely curious about it as one of the possible options.
Q15 Lord Boateng: The Government committed to preparing for the “high impact, low likelihood” disruption scenarios and updating the national risk assessment accordingly. When will these updates be published, given that apparently the Cabinet Office has transitioned into what is described as a dynamic assessment process?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: We have updated the private risk assessment scenario to take account of this in a way not limited to transatlantic connections but also covering the possibility of co-ordinated sabotage. That is in the national security risk assessment, our private assessment of the worst risks facing the UK. The publication of that will be in the national risk register later on in the year.
Lord Boateng: So it is coming.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: I believe that a public version is coming.
Lord Boateng: Reference has been made, and it was helpful of you to make it, Minister Carns, to the national conversation. This committee has heard a great deal about that, but there seems very little evidence that it is actually taking place. Can you look at the specific issue of crisis response and emergency data priorities? Maybe I should declare an interest here as a senior non-executive director of an international bank based in the City of London. How have you engaged the financial sector and its trade bodies around crisis and resilience planning?
Al Carns: I am happy to lead off. There has actually been a great deal of reporting about the threats that we face, and the increasing threats. The trouble is, in some parts of the country, that it is quite difficult to comprehend what that really means for our constituents, so we have been talking about how we can change the narrative and help it land more effectively. That is where you have seen the change to the military intelligence service, as our Defence Intelligence organisation starts to power up.
The second one is: how do these threats resonate? For example, the Jaguar Land Rover cyber attack, wherever that came from, is half of the two-child benefit cap for a year. We are under more than £15 billion-worth of cyber attacks every year. What does that mean to your individuals on the street? We need to work really hard to help these land and accept that—probably for the first time in British history—we have a great divergence between defence and our population, more so than ever before. You are more likely to know a veteran than someone serving, so we have got quite a long way to go to bridge that gap and land the messages. I would not say it is similar, but it pulls some parallels to the way that Finland, Sweden and Norway, and indeed other eastern European countries which feel the threat slightly closer to home, have landed that message. If we can do that properly, then we will be off on the right footing.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: As part of this risk assessment that I mentioned, we have subsequently looked very carefully at what that scenario means for cable access and the implications of that for other critical national sectors. One of the first ones we have been working on is finance, with the Treasury and banks. The technical assessment of what this scenario would mean is now being cascaded into discussions with the lead department—the Treasury—and the finance sector so that they can prepare, as they would do for any reasonable scenario, what this would mean for them and can start to build that into their resilience plans. That is happening.
Lord Boateng: Thank you for that, but I wonder if I could push a little on the point that you made, Minister Carns, about engaging ordinary people in this conversation. I attended a really impressive Army Expo event at Redford Barracks in Edinburgh last year. Have you got any plans to expand that sort of event all around the country? It is a very dramatic representation of the scale of the threat, our response to it and what service in the military might mean in terms of a response to the threat that is out there. It goes directly to the way that your constituents relate to issues, because it dramatises them.
Al Carns: I agree. We have Armed Forces Day coming up, which is an example of how we connect the British population back with the military and help them understand the pivotal role that it plays. This is specifically around the geopolitical situation—the threats, and how those threats that emanate perhaps from elsewhere resonate or have an impact in the United Kingdom. How we articulate that to the nation is what I mean by the national conversation. Part of that is—I have already mentioned it—the Cabinet Office moving towards these war books by the end of the year, to actually make sure that, across government but also right down into our local authorities, people understand their role in a time of crisis.
Lord Boateng: Now YouTube, Instagram and TikTok are the ways in which large sections of the population, particularly the youth population, who need to be woken up to the dangers and the importance of service in the military, access information. First, what are you doing about that? Secondly—this is a specific one for you, Minister Lloyd—in terms of prioritising critical data in a major crisis, how will YouTube and Instagram appear in relation to government systems of communications? How will you make sure that the key messages get out there?
Al Carns: Interestingly, Minister Lloyd and I were talking about this just before we came in. How people digest their information in this day and age has changed very much from when I was young, and we have got to adapt on all those channels to land our message effectively. I think the Ministry of Defence does quite a good job. We need to broaden it out across all different media forms to ensure we land the messages at the right place, at the right time and to the right people.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: On the big picture, when the UK faces a crisis—for example, when COBRA is set up—the importance of communication is always a standing agenda item, how you communicate and the importance of that. That is one thing. Specifically in terms of disruption to cables, data prioritisation and what happens in those scenarios, that is exactly why we are running tabletop exercises where we are thinking through how this would happen and we are engaging with industry to put things into practice. The operators have the powers to direct and manage their data, and what they need from us in an emergency is that good contact and communication so that we can work together to prioritise that. I have referenced the legislative review that we are undertaking currently. We are looking at whether there are new powers that may be needed as part of that legislative review.
Q16 Lord Sedwill: Can I just bring you back to the first part of Lord Boateng’s question on “high impact, low likelihood” scenarios? You touched on this in response to Tan Dhesi’s questioning earlier, but you really talked about doctrine rather than capacity and capability. The doctrine of Atlantic Bastion is that the Royal Navy will be largely in the High North blocking. You talked about NATO and the JEF potentially supporting in dealing with an attack on undersea cables. But if there were a concerted attack on undersea cables—you mentioned escorting—do we really have the capacity and capability to do both of those things at the same time when, as we know, it took herculean efforts to get one Type 45 into the eastern Mediterranean recently?
Al Carns: As a contributing partner to NATO and the JEF, absolutely. Within NATO, there is a fleet of vessels that sits within the UK but also across those 32 nations, many of which operate in the High North, whether they be the Norwegians, the Germans, et cetera. We then have to lay that against our adversary’s very specific, sophisticated capabilities to attack our undersea cables. Then you are into a force ratio match. I would argue that, as part of NATO or indeed the JEF, the force ratio match is way in our advantage.
Lord Sedwill: I agree, but how operational is it?
Al Carns: I would argue that, if required, it is exceptionally operational. Let us talk about the Russian underwater research programme. Let us say, on the last issue that we identified at the start of the conversation, that we had three submarines. We have the combined American, UK, Norwegian and German submarine fleet to deal with that. Then on top of that you have the combined frigate fleets, and on top of that the P-8s. I would argue that, given their ability—apart from on some capabilities—it would be very difficult to shake that tail off. It would need to be a concerted, multifaceted effort and a much broader conflict for them to be able to absorb the totality of NATO’s resources and divert it away from the High North for them to be able to find a vulnerability. But it is not lost on me, as mentioned earlier, that they are trying to find the gap. We have got to do our best to either block them in a gap, or track them and defeat them should they threaten or indeed impact or trigger Article 5.
Lord Sedwill: Okay, we do not have time to pursue this further, but thank you.
Q17 Sarah Champion: I am very glad that the risks the undersea cables present are being addressed, and seemingly addressed well. In your response to our report, you said that there was an “Undersea Infrastructure Security Oversight Board” to improve on governance. Baroness Lloyd, following on your answer to Lord Boateng, is it up and running? What does it do? Basically, what difference has it made so far?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: It is up and running. It meets quarterly. It brings together all those departments that have an interest in undersea infrastructure. It is the forum that has been used to look at some of these scenarios and learn, so that we can test subsequently with industry what conversations we need to have with them to increase their resilience. It is bringing together the right people and it is meeting regularly. It has the ability to escalate issues and blockages to Ministers if needed. It is not a crisis management forum; it is an ongoing policy and discussion forum.
Sarah Champion: Is that an internal group? Is it just departments? Who chairs it? Are you bringing in industry as well?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: That body is chaired by the director of state threats and cyber. It is supported by the National Security Secretariat. There is parallel engagement with industry, but outside of that.
Lord Boateng: Why is it outside of that? Surely it would be a help to have them around the table.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: There are some discussions which it is very useful to have just among government departments. Similar discussions are had with industry.
Q18 Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom: Minister Carns, in response to my question about whether it is possible to defend the cables, you answered in terms of point defence and forward defence. Once Russian ships are sitting on top of our cables, is forward defence not out the window?
Al Carns: Yes, as long as those vessels sat on top of your cables are being observed 24/7. If we have a Russian underwater research vessel over the top of our cables or anyone else’s, and if we have 24/7 coverage and the ability to affect that and identify what activity is taking place, then we can defeat it when we want to.
Q19 Baroness Tyler of Enfield: Could I pick up on what Baroness Lloyd was saying about the oversight board meeting quarterly? I just wondered: does anything from those board meetings go into the public domain? If the answer is no, how is that information shared around government departments and other agencies that are involved in this sphere?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: The oversight board is really for policy development. That will be shared through a two-way conversation for departments attending. The results of that, which are what needs to be shared with the industry, are done through the department—through the subsea cables industry body—which, again, is a two-way conversation. That is how it happens. I think you may be hearing from representatives of the cables industry, so you can test with them how effective this communication channel is.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield: But nothing goes public.
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: I will make some things public. I am giving a speech next week on cables and there are forums such as this, but we do not publish the minutes, for example.
Q20 The Chair: Baroness Lloyd, I was particularly keen to understand better the point raised about the financial sector, with the City and financial services obviously being so important to the UK economy. Have you engaged with, say, TheCityUK on its resilience planning?
Baroness Lloyd of Effra: I might ask Kevin, because he has led a lot of the work with the industry engagement, but that all grew from the importance of engaging with many more sectors about the implications of denial of access to subsea cable information flows. We have taken that but, on precise banks or other areas, I think Kevin knows.
Kevin Adams: I will just add a little bit more. The finance sector is one of the sectors that we think potentially would be impacted, so that is one of the sectors that we have prioritised engagement with. To give an example, the Treasury runs, I think, a quarterly senior forum with the finance sector, which includes the organisation that you mentioned and many of the big banks. At a recent one of those—I do not know if it was the very last one—there was a deep dive on subsea cable resilience, where we engaged alongside our Treasury colleagues with the sector on the risks they face on some of those impacts, and a discussion about how that sector can build into its own contingency planning more resilience plans. I believe that work is being prepared for this year—it may even be published—where the finance sector will be setting out its own plans. We have prioritised engagement with that sector.
The Chair: Okay. I thank our witnesses for this first panel’s session. We will now briefly suspend to change panel. Order, order.