13
Examination of witnesses
Lauren Speranza and Franklin Miller.
Q161 The Chair: Thank you so much for joining us, Ms Speranza, and for making yourself available to speak to the committee in order to offer your perspective on the UK-US defence and security relationship. Our session will be streamed live on the Parliament website and a transcript will be taken; we will ensure that you are sent one when it is available to make small corrections, if necessary. Can I remind members that, if they have interests pertinent to their question, they should declare them when first speaking? Ms Speranza, would you like to introduce yourself briefly? Then, if we may, we will pile in with some questions.
Lauren Speranza: Terrific; I will be brief. I thank the Chair and this committee for the invitation. It is an honour to be with you all today to discuss the defence partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom. I am joining you here in my capacity as a fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, which is a non-partisan think tank in Washington DC that produces research and analysis on many of the issues we will discuss today. I most recently served in the US Government at the Pentagon, working as the policy co-ordinator for the then Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, and his immediate team. In that capacity, I played a role in helping to prepare the Secretary’s bilateral engagements with his UK counterparts, as well as NATO meetings, Ukraine Defense Contact Group meetings and other multilateral summits focused on transatlantic defence issues.
At the top, let me say that, throughout my time in government, I saw at first hand just how vital the US-UK defence partnership is in times of crisis, whether it was figuring out how best to support Ukraine against Russia’s full-scale invasion or joining forces to counter the Houthis’ attacks on our ships in the Red Sea. The UK was consistently the US’s closest partner—the first call and the one willing to brainstorm ideas, to share information and to act where necessary. I look forward to discussing in more detail the special relationship and how to preserve it for years to come.
Q162 The Chair: To the extent that you have not already answered this question, in your view, what aspects of the UK-US defence partnership have made it particularly effective compared with other bilateral defence relationships?
Lauren Speranza: I would note that the United Kingdom clearly remains the United States’ closest ally; the defence pillar of the special relationship is truly special because of its depth. As you know well, the partnership is rooted in shared history, strategic culture, common values, language and threat perceptions—in terms of how both countries see the world—as well as in a strong legacy of fighting side by side in the defence of freedom and democracy.
As I noted, in my experience, the UK is in lockstep with the US and is always consulted on a wide range of policy and intelligence matters. At any level of classification, the staffs have direct linkages and communications at a level not seen with any other country. This includes having exchange officers in each other’s defence departments, which helps to contribute to these strong interpersonal relationships. In my experience, when these countries interact, these are not stilted, formal bilateral engagements but really close, candid conversations used to solve problems and not just to talk at each other.
I know that you are all aware of the two countries’ unmatched levels of intelligence sharing, nuclear technology co-operation and deep military interoperability. It is not just through NATO; it is also through bilateral defence initiatives and things such as unique special forces co-operation, as well as other multilateral frameworks, whether it is the AUKUS agreement or the Five Eyes partnership.
Finally, I would note that, even as the special relationship changes over time, even when the US and the UK do not see eye to eye on every single policy issue and even as the US develops relationships with other geopolitically significant countries, the US and the UK still share that special bond and a commitment to tackling the future together. We saw this evidenced during President Trump’s most recent visit to the UK, where some shared priorities were outlined on, for example, defence technology, innovation and other modern challenges. That willingness to evolve and adapt together continuously, over such a long period and at such deep levels, makes the defence partnership particularly unique.
Q163 Lord Grocott: You gave me a line towards the end of your remarks about how we do not always see eye to eye. We have heard lots of evidence, including your own, on close co-operation and related matters. Can you identify areas where the US defence priorities are significantly different from those of the UK or vice versa? What are the areas where not everything is hunky-dory?
Lauren Speranza: In terms of areas where the defence partnerships align, I would note that both countries are placing a renewed emphasis on warfighting readiness and lethality. Both the 2025 UK strategic defence review and the interim national defense strategic guidance on the US side prioritise building forces that are highly trained and well equipped with modern weapons in order to strengthen deterrence and execute their respective homeland defence missions effectively; they even include things that both countries are tackling to improve for their Armed Forces, such as better barracks.
Both countries are also focused on strengthening their defence industrial bases, including by refining and reforming procurement processes; pursuing stronger partnerships with industry; and investing in domestic manufacturing and production capabilities that expand capacity and increase speed of delivery for key capabilities, whether that is munitions, air and missile defence or even submarines. In both cases, this is tied to creating benefits for both the American and the British people, including job creation and economic development. Related to that, both countries have also identified the need to harness emerging technologies, to promote defence innovation and to maintain a cutting edge in terms of their capabilities for things such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and digital capabilities.
In all of those spaces, it is clear that the US and UK priorities are very aligned. It is reasonable to expect that trends in US defence policy in those areas are likely to continue in future, regardless of which political party is in power, because those issues—boosting readiness and modernisation, strengthening the defence industrial base and promoting innovation—are themes that have, in many ways, carried over from the last Administration and are being intensified and implemented in new ways under the Trump Administration.
However, as you noted, there are a few areas of divergence between the two countries. The US is, of course, reorienting to focus more acutely on defence in the western hemisphere through efforts such as the Golden Dome missile defence initiative, as well as on border security, countering illicit flows of drugs and people and even curbing foreign malign activity in Latin America. To support that, the US is looking to shift its focus away from other regions—or at least to change the scope of its activities there—including in Europe and in the Middle East.
On the other hand, the UK is doubling down on Europe, taking a NATO-first approach, prioritising European security and the Russia challenge, and doing more within NATO. It is a different priority but you could say that, in some ways, it is complementary to the US approach, with the UK helping to plug some gaps as Washington looks to do less on the European continent.
The other area of divergence I would highlight is that the UK is primarily focused on Europe but is also looking to maintain its relationships and core security interests in the Indo-Pacific. This is in slight tension with the Department of War’s approach in the United States, which has been encouraging European countries such as the UK to focus on the Euro-Atlantic pretty narrowly while the US and regional allies focus on the Indo-Pacific.
Finally, I would note that, on Ukraine, both countries share the goal of ending Russia’s war, but we have seen divergences in policy in this space over time. Toward the beginning of the conflict, the Trump Administration paused certain things such as security assistance and intelligence sharing, which was at odds with the UK’s policy and approach. Over time, though, we have seen some initiatives restart on the US side. This is an area that will require constant dialogue as US policy evolves.
We see similar divergences on, for example, the UK’s approach to Israel and the UK’s prioritisation of things such as the promotion of democratic values as a core tenet of foreign policy or the security impacts of climate change, all of which are being deprioritised for the US under the Trump Administration. That said, there can be differences on individual policy issues and still broad alignment on the overarching defence priorities.
Franklin Miller: I apologise for getting the timing wrong—it was my fault.
The Chair: Not at all. Did you hear that last question from Lord Grocott?
Franklin Miller: I did not.
The Chair: Would you like to add anything to Ms Speranza’s answer?
Franklin Miller: I heard part of her response. I believe that there is broad general alignment between the US and the UK on the defence side.
Q164 Baroness Fraser of Craigmaddie: Ms Speranza, you have outlined some areas for closer collaboration in the years ahead, irrespective of who sits in the White House. Mr Miller, given the disparity of size between the US and the UK capabilities and the potentially differing—if complementary—priorities, whether transatlantic or Europe versus Indo-Pacific, which UK capabilities do you believe are most valued by the US? How do those influence co-operation?
Franklin Miller: One must begin with the fact that the US-UK relationship is absolutely unique. There is nothing like it with regard to any of our relations with any other country because it is a full ecosystem. It involves nuclear policy and nuclear weapons; cyber; space; intelligence sharing and intelligence collection; submarines; and the embedding of personnel each with the other, including at the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence. There are unique weapons systems that we share and we have two-way technology transfer. That ecosystem is absolutely and totally unique; it is, therefore, vital to both nations.
The disparity of size does not make a great deal of difference. We were more roughly equivalent in military terms at the end of World War II. Clearly, we are not so now, but the UK contributes extraordinarily unique military, intelligence and diplomatic capabilities to the US-UK special relationship—a term that I absolutely still use and insist on using—and it will do so in future. As Ms Speranza said, there may be some differences from one presidency to another, and there is always hand-wringing when a new President takes office, but those will be overcome by the commonality of our interests over the course of time.
The fact that the United States is now more focused on China reflects our view that Xi is more likely to make a move against Taiwan in the near future—in the very near term. We view Putin as extraordinarily dangerous but not likely to move now, for a variety of political, economic and military reasons. The UK, being in Europe, has to focus more on Putin, regardless of the situation. The fact that we believe that we might have to shift some forces to the Far East, while asking the UK and other NATO nations to safeguard the North Atlantic, is a normal split of responsibilities. Again, the size does not matter at all.
Baroness Fraser of Craigmaddie: Would you point to any particular UK capabilities that are most valued by the US?
Franklin Miller: Showing the flag, as you have now with the Prince of Wales task force in the Far East. You have the Royal Navy Submarine Service, which is, unfortunately, going through some teething problems with the Astutes and getting ready to build the SSN-AUKUS, but the co-operation between the forces at all levels, in the various capability areas I mentioned, is unique and extraordinarily valuable.
I have one last point, which is on nuclear deterrence. Putin or his predecessors could have miscalculated at one point that, given an act of aggression, either the US or the UK would not respond, but he cannot ever believe that both would not respond; that is the whole concept of the second centre of decision-making. Preventing nuclear war and, therefore, preventing aggression across the board is vital, to use a sometimes-overused word.
Q165 Baroness Coussins: Mr Miller, can you expand on the question of cyber and cyberattacks, which you mentioned briefly in passing in your answer just now? What do you think might be the potential for closer collaboration between the US and the UK on cyberattacks? For example, is there scope for more international collaboration on preventing cyberattacks?
Franklin Miller: I do not know whether there is scope for more because we are doing so much together now. We are doing things together that we do not do with other allies. The answer is yes; it is important. We need to continue to do two things: blocking Russian, Chinese and other hostile attacks on our cyber networks; and having the offensive capability, if we need it, both to deter and to retaliate against those malevolent enemies.
The co-operation is extraordinary. It needs to be expanded—we in the US know that we are particularly vulnerable in terms of civilian infrastructure, which could be attacked pre-emptively in a crisis; I suspect that the UK is the same—but, again, the co-operation between our cyber capabilities and yours is dramatically high.
Baroness Coussins: Ms Speranza, you are nodding. Do you have anything to add to that answer on cyber?
Lauren Speranza: I very much foot-stomp Mr Miller’s response. There is a lot of room for collaboration between the UK and the US on this issue, particularly because of the technological advances of both forces and given the shared approach to the threats and the way in which we understand the landscape. We have seen over time that the UK is willing to be a bit more forward-leaning on this than some other countries in Europe. The US really values that; it is certainly a ramp for further co-operation in future.
Franklin Miller: Just to add to that, the UK’s cyber capabilities are, as in other areas, much more advanced than those of the rest of our NATO allies.
Q166 Baroness Blackstone: Can I turn now to NATO? I ask you in the first instance, Mr Miller: what do you think the US’s vision for NATO is in the short term, the medium term and the longer term? They may be different.
Franklin Miller: I am not in the habit of predicting, particularly with the fact that the new US national defense strategy is about to drop—although, it was about to drop in late August as well; time is passing on. What I will point to is what has, in fact, happened. There was great fear in the early spring that the US would not appoint an ambassador to NATO; the US has appointed an ambassador to NATO. There was great fear that the US would not nominate a four-star general to become the SACEUR; the US has nominated and approved a four-star general to be the head of SACEUR. We are doing things in the UK, as you well know, to give the Royal Air Force a first step towards its own unique nuclear capability. We have not withdrawn massive numbers of troops from the NATO combined command; we may withdraw some in future.
Again, everything that the United States has done to date has been supportive of NATO. This does not mean that there will not be disagreements and shifting of some resources at some point, but, by and large, if you look at the big picture, as Ms Speranza was saying, we are committed to NATO and militarily involved in NATO throughout.
Baroness Blackstone: Ms Speranza, do you share the view that we should be reasonably confident of the US’s commitment to NATO, in spite of quite a lot of comments that would suggest otherwise?
Lauren Speranza: I would add that the US’s approach to NATO now is certainly more transactional and perhaps a bit less reliable than it traditionally has been, as compared to the seven decades of bipartisan, ironclad commitments to the US’s leadership role in NATO prior to this point. That said, I agree with Mr Miller’s point that we have seen positive signs from the Trump Administration. Look at, for example, the summit at The Hague earlier this year, where the President rallied allies to commit to spending 5% of their GDP on defence by 2035; he characterised that as a new era of shared responsibility and strength against global threats. That is reflective of how the President views the NATO alliance: it can be a useful tool, as long as it serves US interests and ties back to America’s priorities.
I would venture to say that I hope that the Trump Administration will continue to support NATO, as long as they perceive that allies are delivering on those commitments and taking a larger role in providing for their own defence. In the longer term, it will be difficult to see how this evolves over time. We have seen that, because of the shifts in different US Administrations, some historical trust that has undergirded the alliance for so many years has been broken in some ways that likely cannot be repaired over the course of one election. In future, as NATO allies become more capable, they will have to grapple with how to anchor themselves to a United States whose commitment to NATO and to their security is somewhat uncertain at best, regardless of what Administration it will be, because it will be incredibly difficult to keep flipping back and forth.
Franklin Miller: I agree with Ms Speranza but I want to point out that this is not the first time we have had this kind of crisis. Remember Kissinger’s year of Europe in the 1970s, when he actually was not interested in Europe that year. Remember President Obama’s pivot to Asia, which, again, got people upset. These sorts of policies from the past tend to be overlooked when we focus on the present—on the here and now and the news cycle of each day. We have been through this before.
Again, as I say, unless there are massive changes—such as massive troop withdrawals or the end of extended deterrence, which is not on the cards—we will, as Ms Speranza said, absolutely have to deal with the times. There are different leaders, different Prime Ministers and different Presidents, but the common interests—supreme interests, really—run in the same vein.
Q167 Baroness Blackstone: You are both confident that Europeans do not need to believe that we are on some kind of cliff edge where we are suddenly going to lose an enormous amount of US support for NATO; you both made that point fairly clearly. Could you both—starting with Mr Miller—say what you think the US Government expect of the UK’s particular role in NATO?
Franklin Miller: The US expects the UK to be the leader among the European nations in NATO because of its experience and expertise in military affairs, as well as the fact that it has Armed Forces that span air, sea, land and space; then you add in the intelligence capabilities, such as GCHQ. The UK is the only nation with the military capability and expertise to step forward, and it has a leadership role.
Baroness Blackstone: I just wonder what the French would think of that answer. After all, in Europe, France is an equally large military power; it is similar to the UK in terms of its expenditure and its commitment to a wide-ranging area of defence expenditure. Do you think that the US Government have a more negative view of the French participation?
Franklin Miller: I love the French—they are a wonderful people—but they have a very nationalistic view of defence. On the nuclear side, the French have absolutely refused to be involved in any NATO planning for the nuclear deterrent. In my view, that is a tremendous mistake. When I was in government, I worked for more than a decade and a half to bring in the French, which they simply refused to do. There are certain things that the French do that are French-oriented. France does not really contribute as much as it could to the common defence. It all has to do with French politics—the aspiration of Macron and his predecessors for France to be the leader of Europe, which it never will be.
Lauren Speranza: I want quickly to add something on the broader question of this cliff of US capabilities in Europe. As Mr Miller pointed out earlier, we are still awaiting the release of the US’s national security strategy and the national defense strategy, which is likely to be followed by a global posture review. Of course, that will shed some more light on the US’s plans for its military footprint. It is expected that there may be a bit of withdrawal of capability from the European continent, but the US has been clear that it plans to continue extending the nuclear umbrella and is looking for additional European contributions in the conventional sense.
The risk that some US capabilities will move out of the continent is not zero, but, in terms of US expectations for the UK, I fully agree that this Administration would like to see the UK take on a stronger leadership role in NATO—not just on spending but on rallying other allies to do more on European security issues—and contribute to NATO missions. We are already seeing the UK starting to do that, whether it is on Ukraine; through taking the helm of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which it has done; or through contributions to some recent missions that NATO has stood up, such as Eastern Sentry, following some of the likely Russian incursions that we have seen, or Baltic Sentry, where the UK is already playing a key role. Those are more types of things that the United States would hope to see from the UK going forward.
Q168 Baroness Crawley: My question is directed to Ms Speranza but, Mr Miller, please come in if you would like to. With the new US Administration directing their priorities for defence at Chinese aggression towards Taiwan—and, as we have just discussed, pressing European allies to do more burden sharing in European defence—what expectations do you think they have for the UK in global hotspots such as the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East and Africa? How might those evolve over the longer term?
Lauren Speranza: It is possible that the answer to this may depend on whom in the US Administration you talk to—the White House might have a different view on this issue from the Pentagon, for example—but, broadly speaking, because the UK has only so many resources, forces and capabilities, the Department of War’s position has been at least encouraging the UK to focus on the European theatre then, naturally, to reduce its involvement elsewhere in the world, including in the Indo-Pacific—as you mentioned—to avoid detracting from the priority in Europe.
That said, I would venture to say that there are still places where the US would likely welcome limited contributions from the UK—in the Persian Gulf or in the Indo-Pacific through AUKUS, for instance, particularly if there is a crisis. As to how this might evolve over time, the current approach is somewhat different from what we saw from the previous US Administration, which focused on how the threats in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe were connected. They encouraged the UK and other allies to co-operate with allies in the Indo-Pacific on those shared challenges. It is possible that, in future, another Administration could seek to return to an approach that is more similar to that, or to one that distinguishes less between regions and is more focused on functional domains of competition that necessitate closer co-operation between the UK and other regions outside Europe.
All of this is to say the UK likely needs to maintain some level of flexibility to adapt to different approaches. Of course, I would argue that it is in the UK’s interest to maintain its relationships around the world and to do what it needs to do to protect its sovereign interests there, while being responsive to US signals where it makes sense. The 2025 UK strategic defence review does this well by prioritising a NATO-first, but not NATO-only, approach and emphasising readiness to return forces to Europe where necessary. It also says that the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East are secondary priorities and notes that there are ubiquitous challenges coming from China on, for example, technology competition; the UK still positions itself to tackle those issues.
The most important thing is for the UK to prioritise and stick to its course of action in line with a lot of the new strategies that have just been released.
Franklin Miller: I absolutely agree. The first thing we have to talk about is the threat. This is a unique period in our history in that we now have two principal potential enemies: we have Putin, a murderous thug and war criminal who seeks to rebuild the USSR; and, in Xi, we have a treacherous liar. Look at what he has done after the Hong Kong accords, with the artificial islands that China said it would never militarise. He is a revanchist who wants to establish a Chinese sphere of influence in the Pacific.
Putin is hampered from attacking western Europe now because of his over-engagement in Ukraine, where his economy is. The US Administration view China as the principal current threat and are, therefore, making plans to surge forces to the Pacific if they have to do so. That is where the UK comes in, in a wartime situation, to help prevent Putin attacking in conjunction with Xi. Of course, we now know that Xi and Putin are complicit in their dealings; both are engaged in grey-area operations against NATO, the United States and our Far Eastern allies.
In my judgment, it is useful, therefore, that the UK continues to show the flag and have a military capability in the Pacific and in the Middle East, as Ms Speranza said. If there is a real crisis with the potential for war, the UK forces would be best used in a joint military command and operation to safeguard the Atlantic and prevent Putin attacking NATO, but, again, these are congruent strategies.
Baroness Crawley: Mr Miller, you said that you think that the UK-US special relationship is unique and encompasses everything from nuclear and cyber to intelligence and submarines—everything. Presumably, that means that we would be the people getting the second call when it comes to any crisis developing, not just in Europe but across the globe.
Franklin Miller: That is right. I have been deeply involved in US-UK defence relations since late 1981. That co-operation is fundamental to each nation’s national security and, indeed, to global security. I absolutely agree with what you said: the UK would be the second call, or the nation to stand first and tallest, if the US were engaged on the other side of the world.
Q169 Baroness Morris of Bolton: I want to come back to the Middle East, if I may. One area where we do not quite see eye to eye with the US is a possible two-state solution or recognising a Palestinian state, which we have done. King Abdullah of Jordan gave a powerful interview to the BBC just before the summit in Egypt. He said that, unless the Palestinians have a future, there will be no peace in the whole region; he also said that, as welcome as a ceasefire is, it is vital that President Trump remains engaged. Can you both quickly give your views on where we are in this divergence between the UK and the US?
Franklin Miller: I can go first but Ms Speranza will add a lot more than I will be able to add because this is not an area of my expertise at all. Clearly, the US needs to remain deeply involved in this entire process. Again, I have personal views on the Middle East and a two-state solution, but I am not really confident to say much more. I yield to Ms Speranza.
Lauren Speranza: Even if the US and the UK disagree on the particular policy approach of how to get there, both countries share a desire to end the conflict and to see peace and stability in the broader region. Of course, it is a positive development that President Trump and his team have negotiated the ceasefire, but, as we are seeing from the headlines this morning, there are many more steps that still have to be negotiated: the future governance of Gaza; Hamas’s future; and whether Hamas is willing to disarm. Those things are not all settled yet.
One way in which both countries can work together is on figuring out some sticky solutions to those issues and how to pave the path to peace in future, because we are clearly not there yet although there has been progress. There is still space for dialogue here between the United Kingdom and the United States. Even though Gaza is a very tricky issue, of course, we still see the two countries co-operating on broader issues in the Middle East—again, whether it is on co-operation in the Red Sea against the Houthis or on the broader issue of Iran. The countries still see eye to eye on a lot of other issues in the region. It is important for them to continue working together on this issue, too.
Q170 Lord Alderdice: I want to pick up the nuclear question again. I ask you both—Mr Miller in the first instance—to what extent do you think the UK’s reliance on the US for its nuclear weapons system represents a risk for the UK? In your view, does the UK need a system that is less dependent on the US for maintenance and support? If so, what options or alternatives do you think it has?
Franklin Miller: I do not mean to be flippant but where you are now means that you are going to be dependent on another country for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. You do not manufacture your own strategic ballistic missiles, so it is us or the French. I plead an interest: I was involved in crafting the sale of Trident II to the UK.
The arrangement with the US, where we have a common pool of missiles and the UK takes advantage of every test flight of a US missile to build in a long story about long-term reliability, is extraordinarily advantageous to the UK. Some will remember when Polaris was a unique system and the UK had to invest extraordinary amounts of money to keep it going. Prime Minister Thatcher decided that the UK would never be the sole operator of a strategic system. In the first instance, you are stuck with us, right?
Of course, a US Administration could turn off support for Trident. That would be a huge and fundamental break with everything about which Ms Speranza and I have been talking, in terms of joint interests in a global sense and the joint need to prevent Russia using its nuclear weapons. Again, France has not committed its nuclear forces to NATO. I do not know why it would be a more reliable supplier than the US. Our—as in “joint”— Trident II system is clearly superior to the French’s ballistic missiles.
Where I would like to see the UK doing more on its own, unilaterally, is in building on the first step of giving the RAF a tactical nuclear capability under the NATO DCA arrangements, in order to have—in the mid-term future—its own standoff nuclear capability to help deter Russian tactical nuclear use. The Russians have 2,000-odd tactical nuclear weapons. We need to have some sort of counter so that they do not think about using those weapons. We certainly do not need that much, collectively or for the UK, but it would be useful for the UK to have a sovereign capability with a standoff weapon carried by F-35s to complement the strategic capability that we jointly share.
Lauren Speranza: That was a terrific answer. I know that Mr Miller was one of the original architects of many of these developments, so I will not claim to be able to add anything to his answer.
Lord Alderdice: It was a very interesting and helpful answer.
Q171 Lord Bruce of Bennachie: Thanks for the information and views that you have given us. Apart from on nuclear weapons, we have obviously had a lot of joint procurement and development over the years. I recall that, about 30 years ago, a Bill was introduced in Congress saying that procurement should prioritise buying American. What surprised me at the time was that the biggest opposition to it in the United States came from the Pentagon, which said, “Our job is to buy the best. When it’s American, we should buy it, but, if there’s better somewhere else, we should be able to buy that, too”. Is that still the case? It can feel now as though the current attitude might prioritise America over the best.
In that context, how does the UK—when it is asking the British people to put a lot more money into defence than they have been used to—prioritise what it can confidently invest jointly with the United States? To what extent should it recalibrate what it does and build with, perhaps, more trustworthy and reliable partners? There is a worry that America might disengage abruptly and unpredictably from things to which we have committed.
As an adjunct to that, although you have explained it, we are being asked to take—quite justifiably—much more responsibility for the defence of Europe. We all accept that that is a reasonable proposition, but we are also being asked to be part of the defence in the Indo-Pacific. Again, whether we have the resources to do both is a matter for judgment. Before we start committing to major investments in defence, we need some clarity on what the American position is and whether we can trust it. How do you suggest we go about getting that?
Franklin Miller: Obviously, you need to buy the best; there are areas of joint co-operation, where it is not US or UK, but you need to buy the best. I absolutely believe that that is right. I do not need to tell you that national politics sometimes intrude into rational defence decision-making, but, by and large, you have to buy the best. I would also say that the British public—and, indeed, the US public—are being asked to spend more on defence, but, to quote your colleague and my friend, Lord Robertson, “You may not be interested in war but war may be interested in you”.
The threats that are being posed by Putin and Xi are unprecedented in the post-Cold War era. We need to be able to deter. We need to be able to prevent a situation such as 1936-39, where Hitler was allowed to go through a variety of small steps and aggressions and believed that he could take on all of Europe, until he got to a point where he did not think that the West would respond but the West responded. We need to prevent those kinds of misjudgements in the first place.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie: Ms Speranza, I take that point, but some people have felt in the last six months that America’s commitment to supporting that prevention has not been wholehearted or full-throated. I do not know whether you would accept that.
Lauren Speranza: That is a fair concern. In terms of the points you have made, of course, there are certain vulnerabilities associated with US platforms because, as you noted, the Pentagon and other parts of the US Government have to clear things such as upgrades and software changes; the US has to be invested in the programme being joint, to your point. We have seen that the Administration have some control over those issues. It is fair for the UK to have those concerns; that is why we have seen in the strategic defence review, and as part of the UK’s new defence industrial strategy, a push to develop sovereign capabilities in the UK more.
The war in Ukraine has highlighted some weaknesses in the UK’s capacity to produce munitions at scale, for example. That has led to a reliance on imports from other countries, including the US, which may already have overstretched capacity. It is not just about national interests at that point; it is about the alliance and its ability to produce enough weapons for the collective good. The UK investing more in its own always-on supply chain, to bolster domestic capacity and collective capacity for the alliance, is a smart decision. You see the US doing that as well, whether it is looking to create more domestic supply chains to reduce reliance on strategic competitors or on things such as raw materials from China or elsewhere. Both countries are thinking about this challenge in a similar way, in that it is better for us to have resilient, distributed supply chains that can be mutually reinforcing, but, at the end of the day, there is some element of national interest underpinning this.
In terms of thinking about where to collaborate and invest jointly in future, there are certain capabilities where the US is the core provider and Europe cannot easily replace those capabilities overnight. Here I am thinking about things such as strategic command and control; long-range precision strike; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities; and even things such as strategic mobility assets—sea lift and air lift. Those places will necessitate closer co-operation between the UK, the US and Europe going forward because we cannot just replicate those in Europe overnight. I hope that we will continue to see joint investment in those areas.
Franklin Miller: I completely agree with everything that Ms Speranza said. Not to be cheeky, I would ask you: who would you find in Europe more reliable than the United States?
The Chair: Thank you both very much indeed. I know that Lord Robertson and Lord Houghton would want you to know that they would have been with us but they are at Lord Guthrie’s memorial service today.
Franklin Miller: If it were not for Charles’s service today, I would have it as a black mark against both of my friends.
The Chair: Very good—thank you. A transcript of our session today will be shown to you for small corrections, if you feel that they are appropriate. Thank you very much indeed. I declare the session closed.
Franklin Miller: Thank you. I apologise for my timing being a bit off.
The Chair: Do not worry at all.
