Foreign Affairs Committee
Oral evidence: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, HC 488
Tuesday 13 May 2025
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on Tuesday 13 May 2025.
Members present: Emily Thornberry (Chair); Alex Ballinger; Phil Brickell; Dan Carden; Blair McDougall; Abtisam Mohamed; Edward Morello.
Questions 312 - 324
Witness
I: His Excellency Rami Mortada, Ambassador, Embassy of Lebanon to the United Kingdom.
Witnesses: Rami Mortada.
Q312 Chair: We have the great privilege of having the ambassador from Lebanon in front of us. I wonder whether you could introduce yourself, please.
Rami Mortada: I am Rami Mortada, ambassador of Lebanon to the Court of St James since 2017. I am trying my best to enhance this friendship and partnership between Lebanon and the UK. I am sure that in the period ahead it will witness bright moments as Lebanon starts its recovery era, during which I am sure the UK will be by its side.
Q313 Chair: You have many friends on this Committee; I don’t think I am disclosing any secrets by admitting that. Thank you so much for coming. We are all very keen to do everything that we can to help Lebanon get back on its feet after the terrible things that you have been through, whether that was the explosion, the military, what has happened in Syria or the financial crash. There have been so many difficulties that Lebanon has faced. We are hoping that there will be a brighter future for Lebanon in the near future.
We are doing an inquiry into Israel and Palestine, but there is also reference within that to how the British can help in Lebanon as well. We are quite keen to find out what your views are. We have had meetings with various Lebanese who have been making suggestions, but we wondered whether we could talk to you as well, particularly about Lebanon and your views about the region in general.
Can I start with Lebanon? There have been certain things that the British assist Lebanon with, but is there more work that we could do to develop that or are there new things that we could do? I will give you the floor and perhaps you would be kind enough to talk us through it.
Rami Mortada: Thank you, Madam Chair. Indeed, I want to put on record our appreciation for everything that the UK has been doing for and with Lebanon for years now, particularly on the military and security track. The UK is the second-biggest donor to the Lebanese armed forces. I think that is a very valid investment.
Increasingly, the Lebanese armed forces are tasked with missions throughout the country—that includes on the southern borders, of course, as well as the eastern and northern borders—and with maintaining public law and order throughout the country. So, assisting the Lebanese armed forces, which is a national institution that enjoys wide popular approval as a very professional and democratically controlled army, is indeed a very relevant investment in the security of Lebanon and of the region.
As for Lebanon, we all know that since earlier this year we have been witnessing a very positive dynamic—of course, positive in relative terms—with the election of Joseph Aoun as President of the republic, the formation of a Government under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and the new turn that the country has taken towards addressing all the overdue and left-aside tracks such as economic reform, negotiations with the IMF, legislative reforms and, most importantly, the monetary and banking crisis. All these tracks are top priorities for the Government. From day one, under the chairmanship of the President, they have started to address these different dossiers.
Of course, one very important avenue is to address the situation in south Lebanon and fully implement the ceasefire agreement that we reached back in November, which put an end to some aspects of the Israeli attacks and aggression against Lebanon. I am saying “some aspects” because some other aspects are still ongoing since November 2024. Putting into action this ceasefire agreement, which is of course based on Security Council resolution 1701, is a top priority for the current Government.
Q314 Chair: I am sorry; may I interrupt you? If there are members of the public watching, they may not know what 1701 is. Just to assist anybody watching, would you mind giving us a couple of sentences on Security Council resolution 1701?
Rami Mortada: Security Council resolution 1701 is the resolution that ended the war back in 2006, which stipulates that Israel should respect Lebanese territorial integrity and fully withdraw to the international borders, that Lebanon would deploy the Lebanese armed forces in the area south of the Litani and that there will be no weapons in the area south of the Litani other than those of the legitimate armed forces and security services.
Chair: It included a role for the United Nations as well.
Rami Mortada: Of course, yes. It enhanced the UN peacekeeping force UNIFIL in south Lebanon. UNIFIL predates 1701, but 1701 brought in UNIFIL 2.0. It enhanced its strength and capabilities. That is Security Council resolution 1701.
Chair: Thank you. I am sorry to have interrupted you.
Rami Mortada: Today, what are we witnessing? As confirmed by the UN—this is confirmed by the guarantors of the ceasefire, the US and France—from the Lebanese side we have fully implemented our obligations. The Lebanese armed forces are deployed in the area south of the Litani. There is no Hezbollah military presence south of the Litani. Not a single bullet was shot from the Lebanese side towards the other side of the border since November 2024.
From the other side, we see a continuous occupation of five hills along the border, which in reality constitutes a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel. We are witnessing continuous airstrikes. Recently, an airstrike hit an area very close to the capital in the southern part of Beirut City. There are daily overflights and daily targeting of what they claim to be operatives throughout the Lebanese territory. This is contrary to the text and the spirit of the ceasefire agreement.
In short, Lebanon implemented all its obligations as per this agreement, whereas Israel did not. This is very counterproductive for this new approach of the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. We call it a national unity Government, although it is a bit politically diluted. The profiles of the Ministers are not very much attached to political parties, but it is still a Government that represents all the Lebanese spectrum represented in Parliament. All of them, inclusively, have adopted a new strategic approach for the country, which is to get to a point where the state monopolises the use and possession of force. That is the strategic decision that has been inclusively approved in Lebanon.
What remains is how to get there. I think everyone in Lebanon recognises—the President has said it—that it needs to be an inclusive process, and it should also be an all-encompassing process. When we say “demobilisation” or “the monopoly of the use of force by the state”, we need to address the other ingredients: that is mainly occupation and an end to the conflicts. Our strategic ambition is to have a permanent security arrangement that guarantees the territorial integrity of Lebanon, the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied points within Lebanese territory, and an arrangement that guarantees the security of our citizens in south Lebanon, who have suffered a lot. All of this will be under the aegis of the Lebanese armed forces, which will be fully deployed and would be the sole fighting force responsible for maintaining peace and security in south Lebanon.
This is the strategic ambition, but Israel is pressuring this process. There is a new Government in Lebanon, which has pledged to go into this direction. But when people ask them, “What do you intend to do about the ongoing Israeli occupation?” or, “What do you intend to do about the daily targeting, daily airstrikes and daily incursions into our airspace?”, this process becomes much trickier and more difficult for the new Government in Lebanon.
You asked me what the UK could do. This is also valid in Gaza—maybe we will discuss that later—and in Syria also, where Israel is taking a very worrying posture: Israel should understand that there are consequences for its action. Here it is not about taking sides; it is about implementing the mutually agreed texts, whether that is Security Council resolution 1701 or the ceasefire agreement, which has been guaranteed by the US and France and, I know, enjoys the support of the UK. During the military operation on Lebanon, the UK played a very substantial role in calling and working for a ceasefire early on. The UK was, I think, the first nation to call for a ceasefire, back in September, a few days after the military operation escalated. So, the UK has a role to play in this, in just calling everyone to order. We are not asking the UK to take sides. It is just about abiding by the ceasefire agreement.
Of course, the ceasefire agreement came with a monitoring committee, which is chaired by a two-star American general. But the Israeli behaviour has not allowed this mechanism to start working. It came with a complaints procedure. When either party has a concern or a complaint, the ceasefire agreement stipulates that this concern is conveyed to the monitoring body, and the monitoring body will meet and ask the relevant authorities to take action. But when Israel decides to take action whenever it claims it has a concern, there is no room for this monitoring body to become operational. Last week, a new two-star American general took over. We have heard that they intend to operationalise this monitoring mechanism. We hope that they will start their work. They have started, but we have not seen any results. That is the situation.
Again, the Israeli behaviour is totally counterproductive. They are pressuring anyone in Lebanon who says, “Only by diplomacy should we liberate our lands.” They are pressuring and discrediting anyone in Lebanon who would say that the state should be the sole party in possession of or using arms. So, they are advancing aims opposite to what they claim they are advancing.
Q315 Chair: You are talking about the state being the only force that has arms. I wondered whether there was work to be done in terms of demilitarising the refugee camps north of the Litani.
Rami Mortada: This has started already. The Lebanese armed forces are doing this in a spirit of dialogue with the Palestinians. We have made it clear to all Palestinian factions, inside or outside the camps, that the Lebanese armed forces will be the sole authority carrying arms.
We had an incident where small short-range missiles were sporadically being launched by what turned out to be a Palestinian network. They were immediately arrested by the Lebanese armed forces. We made clear to everyone that we do not tolerate such behaviour because it would jeopardise security in south Lebanon. So that is a priority, starting with the refugee camps—they should all abide by this strategy that has been set by the Lebanese Government.
Q316 Chair: I wondered whether, given that the French and the Americans are dealing with assistance for Lebanon south of the Litani river and given Britain’s historic connection with the Lebanese army, one of the ways in which Britain could give assistance to the stabilisation of Lebanon might be to give assistance by helping to collect in weapons from some of the refugee camps north of the Litani river.
Rami Mortada: Assisting the Lebanese armed forces with resources and equipment is the right way to do it. As I said, the Lebanese army is overstretched now. It has always been deployed in south Lebanon, but it had not been able to deploy in the required strength there due to its limited resources and limited strength.
In the new era post ceasefire, they have sent enough forces to south Lebanon. There is always room to send more. They have already started the process to draft 5,000 additional soldiers to be sent to south Lebanon. Against the backdrop of the current financial crisis in Lebanon and the current shortage of equipment and resources, that draft needs to be supported. Again, that is a very relevant investment.
We hope that Lebanon’s new approach will be met from the other side with self-restraint and a positive attitude towards fully abiding by the ceasefire agreement and Security Council resolution 1701. That means full withdrawal to the international borders and cessation of the daily incursions and quasi-daily strikes throughout Lebanese territory. If these conditions are met, I think it could become a success story that ought to be replicated elsewhere in the region.
Q317 Edward Morello: Thank you, Ambassador. The Israeli invasion of south Lebanon depleted Hezbollah. Their attacks on Iran attacked the source of money for Hezbollah. I understand that the Lebanese army is now operating in south Lebanon. Have the Government seen any evidence that Iran is rearming Hezbollah? Can you speak to the Lebanese army’s ability to remain in control of southern Lebanon if Hezbollah were to be reconstituted and rearmed?
Rami Mortada: Even Hezbollah themselves have announced that they would evacuate and withdraw from south Lebanon; that is one of their public declarations. The Lebanese army has pledged that it will take full control of south Lebanon. With UNIFIL, you have a peacekeeping force. You have a monitoring body that was created to monitor and witness this process. The Lebanese army and its commander-in-chief, the President of the republic, have said that we would be ready to guarantee that, in the area south of the Litani, there would be no arms other than the weapons of the legitimate army and security services of Lebanon.
As for rearming, this is information that I do not have. We all know the situation in Syria and the complexities. We all know the dynamics in the region, which could favour some sort of different approach to things. On the area south of the Litani, we have pledged to take full control of the area. The only hindrance today to the army taking full control is the Israeli occupation of these five hills, which constitute the buffer zone. This is not passive control. We have municipal elections next week in south Lebanon, and the Israelis have made it clear that they would not allow civilians to return to their villages in order to cast their votes. That is a pretty worrying situation in terms of the intentions of the Israelis.
They are really advancing the opposite of what they claim they want to see unfold in Lebanon. They are favouring the exact opposite. Let us be frank about it: there were always two models in Lebanon. One of those says that diplomacy never helps with Israel. We remained under Israeli occupation for more than 20 years against a UN Security Council resolution. Back then, Security Council resolution 425 called on Israel to withdraw unconditionally from Lebanese territory. Had it not been for an armed resistance, they would have not withdrawn. That is one school of thought in Lebanon. There is another school of thought, which says that we have friends throughout the community of nations; we can pursue the goal of ensuring the territorial integrity of our country through diplomatic means.
What we are witnessing in Lebanon is that the second school of thought has taken over inclusively. But in order for it to be deeply rooted in the Lebanese conscience, the grievances of the other school of thought should be addressed. When you have occupation, when you have daily aggression by the Israelis, how can you advance a school of thought that says, “Let us use diplomacy as the sole means to liberate our country”?
Q318 Edward Morello: I totally take your point, Ambassador. A lot of these things are interlinked, in terms of political stability in Lebanon, the IMF releasing funds and international investors and donors looking to rebuild. They are going to want to know that Israel is not going to continue to bomb Lebanon and destroy anything you build.
The Israelis are making the complete destruction of Hezbollah the only metric of success. They want to feel confident that there is no threat of Hezbollah coming back and no threat that they are going to start displacing the Lebanese army in south Lebanon again. That is intrinsic to them. How do we get Israel to the point where they are comfortable that their security is guaranteed by Lebanon as well?
Rami Mortada: They have a trusted military force in Lebanon: the Lebanese armed forces. As witnessed by everyone, the Lebanese armed forces is a credible professional army. We have the political dimension: whether the President or the Cabinet, Lebanon has also pledged to take full responsibility of security in south Lebanon and to guarantee that the ceasefire agreement would be fully implemented.
If you go back in history, our modus operandi in Lebanon, regardless of what one hears, has always been reactive. If you go back to the genesis of Hezbollah, Hezbollah is a sub-product of years of Israeli occupation; it is not the other way around. Everyone should understand, including the Israelis, that we are not interested in starting a conflict. We want to focus on nation‑building, reconstruction and overdue reforms. We want to bring Lebanon back to its legacy of prosperity and a vibrant political and economic context, which we miss.
We—by “we”, I mean all Lebanese, including the constituency of Hezbollah, because they are citizens of Lebanon like all others—everyone is fed up with wars and conflicts. We know we should focus on the internal dynamics of our country. This time there is a convergence of different elements that has produced an empowered, inclusive and credible President and Government in Lebanon. They are telling you, “We will be responsible for any breach of any of the international commitments that we make, and we have the means to do it.” I think the Israelis would be pursuing an evil aim if they were not to take this seriously.
Q319 Alex Ballinger: You will have seen the Arab proposals for peace in Gaza put forward by Egypt, Qatar and others. First, I would like your reflections on those peace proposals. To what extent do you think it is a credible plan? Is it something that could work in Gaza? Also, how much is peace in Lebanon linked to the situation in Gaza? Will progress in one or the other help the opposite country?
Rami Mortada: To start with your second question, all theatres of operations in that region are interconnected. Any positive dynamics in Lebanon will no doubt have an effect in other areas of conflict.
As for the Gaza plan, the Arabs came out with a plan that is very credible and straight to the point. It addresses, hopefully, the concerns of everyone, taking into account the fact that you cannot artificially impose governance in Gaza. You need a legitimate Palestinian partner that would be ready to ensure governance. You also cannot have, like what we have heard recently from Israel, any reoccupation of Gaza. No one will put in any money unless you have a suitable political arrangement.
Q320 Alex Ballinger: Who might that body be? What would be a credible Palestinian governance structure?
Rami Mortada: You have the Palestinian Authority. No one is saying that it has been the ideal governance, but it is at least credible and legitimate. I am referring to the Palestine Liberation Organisation. They are the custodians of Palestinian legitimacy. The PA is a sub-product of the Oslo agreement, but Palestinian legitimacy lies in the PLO, in the eyes of the Palestinian people. Even a Hamas constituent cannot overlook the legitimacy that the PLO represents.
If you want to compare or make a correlation between the situation in Lebanon and Gaza, to go back to what I was saying, you need a moderate, legitimate and inclusive national partner, which in Lebanon’s case is the President, the Government and the Lebanese armed forces, to ensure governance, address all concerns and be responsible for taking over security for the area of conflict, which is south Lebanon in our case and would be Gaza in the Palestinian case.
It does not help to overlook the Palestinian Authority or whatever structure derives from the PLO, because you need legitimacy. There is this idea about totally eradicating Hamas. Hamas is an ideology. Whether we like it or not—I personally don’t approve their ideology—it is a reality that they are representative of part of the Palestinian people, so you should offer their constituency an alternative. The alternative should be a Palestinian alternative—a legitimate Palestinian alternative, which happens to be the PLO and the Palestinian Authority.
You need to take this into account alongside several other elements, such as the humanitarian situation. The situation is dire in Gaza in terms of medical equipment and the embargo that Israel is imposing on Gaza. We also need security for all. All these elements should come together in such a plan, but the prime and most important element is who would be responsible. It should be a Palestinian legitimate governance structure, which the PLO and the Palestinian Authority represents.
In parallel, you can do capacity-building and reform of the Palestinian Authority to make it more inclusive maybe and more capable of delivering for their people. That is a parallel track. When you design a plan, you cannot overlook the need for a legitimate Palestinian partner.
Q321 Alex Ballinger: If this plan is not enacted and we see a return to large‑scale military operations in Gaza by the Israelis, what would be the consequences for the situation in Lebanon?
Rami Mortada: We are trying to now insulate our country from the repercussions coming from the region, but that is easier said than done. Don’t forget that we have 13 Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The social fabric is shared throughout the region. We all saw during the last 19 months how things spread even to the streets of London, Paris or more remote capitals. How about Lebanon? From a bird’s eye view, we are 200 miles from Gaza, with all the interconnectedness that exists in the region.
So this “forever war” strategy that the current Israeli Government is following—Israel should understand that there are consequences. This is not about taking a belligerent stance against Israel. Whoever feels friendship towards Israel should give the right advice, and the right advice is, “What you are doing currently and what you have been doing does not serve the long‑term interests of your country. It does not serve your future and the future of the region. You are slaughtering the same people that you would have to live with in the future.” So this forever war should end.
I will add one last element, which is very relevant in a UK context— recognition of a Palestinian state. If you were to ask me about timing, I would say, “If not now, then when?” A few months down the line, I think, whatever remains of this elusive goal of a two-state solution will totally vanish. So if not now, then when? We have to seize the June conference organised by France and Saudi Arabia in the UN in New York. If the UK joined, that would constitute major momentum towards putting this verbal ambition into action at last.
This is a redress for years of Palestinians being deprived of statehood. It is morally the right thing to do, politically the right thing to do and legally the right thing to do. It is not about taking sides between Israel and the Palestinians. It is about setting the record straight, putting both parties on equal footing and allowing them to negotiate the details. It is not the end; recognition will not be the end. It is the start of a process, but this time it will be a credible and serious process where both sides would see they should be getting to a positive outcome. I think now is the time to opt for recognition of a Palestinian state.
Q322 Phil Brickell: I wanted to ask a question about international aid. Briefly, how important is British aid in allowing Lebanon to stabilise? How effective has that aid been in allowing your Government to achieve that policy objective?
Rami Mortada: The bulk of the aid we are getting is on the military front. That has been very much effective and useful. I have spoken to many officers of the Lebanese army and they are all very appreciative. There is a genius project that has been implemented on the eastern borders, the so-called watchtowers, which made a big difference in terms of security of the borders.
Other than the military-related ODA—we all know the whole story—we are not getting much aid. There are some programmes being funded by the UK Government, but the high-profile aid is mainly on the military front.
In the course of the economic recovery of Lebanon—as I said, this will involve bank restructuring, addressing the financial crisis and economic re-emergence—I think we will need the UK to be by our side, if not for aid then for expertise. The UK has niche expertise that we would very much need in the period ahead, in negotiating with bondholders and other aspects of the economic recovery process.
Q323 Dan Carden: It is good to see you, Ambassador. Could you give us your assessment of the role that the UK has played in the region over these last few years? Our Committee is trying to look at the role of the UK Government. What are you saying when you meet Government Ministers? What is your advice to them?
Rami Mortada: I will be frank with you, and this is an opinion shared, I think, by my fellow Arab ambassadors: there were times when we did not feel that the Middle East figured as a priority in UK international action. Of course, there were ups and downs. There was even no Middle East Minister in some previous Governments.
This has fortunately changed. We feel like there is new UK engagement in Middle Eastern affairs. Of course, Gaza contributed to that. There are other elements that have brought this renewed interest back on track. The UK is an appreciated player in the region. The UK brand is appreciated because when you say “UK” in the region, it means wisdom and it means seasoned action. It means that you do not just jump on instantaneous or momentary dossiers; instead, you look at the long term. It is a brand that has the merit to be further promoted, encouraged and used. I have always said that the UK armed forces are an important army globally but the UK soft power is no less important. The Middle East is a place where soft power is much needed and the intellectual contribution that the UK could make in the Middle East is very big.
Q324 Blair McDougall: You spoke about the Arab League endorsing the Egyptian peace plan. Can I ask for your views of Donald Trump’s plan for Gaza?
Rami Mortada: Of course, we do not agree. It is contrary to international law. Even President Trump, when he presented it, said, “I am not saying this is the only plan. I know there are other plans.” It is maybe his way of trying to shake everyone out of their comfort zone. This style of shaking everyone out of their comfort zone is not such a bad idea for the Middle East, because there is a stagnant regional order, or regional disorder, that has been prevailing for decades. So, from an intellectual standpoint, I think it is good to challenge everyone with outside-the-box ideas. Now, that is valid on the intellectual side, but to put these ideas into action would be a different story.
No, I think the future of the Palestinians remains in Palestine, and the top priority is to keep them there. I am afraid it is increasingly becoming an Israeli policy to drive them out—to bring together all the conditions that would, down the line, push them out. The problem today in Israel is that all the lunatic policies that we have always heard have become mainstream policies—that is a real challenge, and a real problem—with full impunity. So, the only way to shape their policies is to make them understand that there are consequences, and that no one is ready to continue giving them a blank cheque to do whatever they want. They have become a totally destabilising force in the region.
This is a moment to seize. There are positive dynamics coming together in the region that should be seized. Israel should not be allowed to be the spoiler of these positive dynamics—because that is their plan.
Chair: Thank you very much. I wonder whether you would be kind enough to send us a note about the five hills that you talked about, so that we can identify geographically the areas where you say the Israelis are establishing a buffer zone. You also talked about getting the economy back on its feet and you mentioned that the British might be able to provide you with advice and work with you in partnership. Again, if you could send us a few more particulars on that, we would be very interested in that, along with anything else that you want to tell us. We are always here.
Thank you so much for your time and for sharing your views with us. Unless anyone else has any other questions, I am going to call this session to an end.