23
Examination of witnesses
David Lammy and Sir Oliver Robbins.
Q1 The Chair: Welcome, Foreign Secretary. Thank you very much for coming to talk to us. You will appreciate that there is a lot in which we are interested, so we are going to try and keep our questions as crisp as we can. If you are able to do something similar, we might get through the list. Thank you. I start off with a question about the relationship between the UK and the US, which is the nub of our current inquiry. What is the UK’s strategy for dealing with the US in light of recent developments? What are your priorities for the UK-US relationship? What is your assessment of the extent to which the relationship will have changed in a way that will outlast the current Administration?
David Lammy: I think the fundamentals of our relationship with the United States are based on immense intelligence capability and shared capability in some areas under the Five Eyes system, huge military interoperability and working together. We saw that last night over the Red Sea and Yemen. We have 10,000 American troops based here in the UK. Obviously, we are key partners within NATO. The truth is, on many issues, we are aligned. But it is true that sometimes we will not entirely agree. It is also true that there may be differences between political perspectives. The truth is, whether it is Tony Blair-George Bush or indeed Starmer-Trump, it does not matter who is in the White House or No. 10, there are lots of ways in which the UK and the United States have to work together and be aligned.
Now, a good Opposition, certainly an Opposition who are hoping to form a Government in a year in which you anticipate an election, are doing everything they can to be close to those who might become the new Government. That is why I spent a lot of my period as shadow Foreign Secretary going to Washington. I am well known as one of Parliament’s Atlanticists. I have good friends, both Democrats and Republicans. It is why we were with Donald Trump back in September before his election. We spent three hours with him. I was with the Prime Minister in Trump Tower building relations. I have to say, we had an incredible team under Karen Pierce as ambassador in Washington DC; wonderful staff, doing a very good job to ensure that whoever won the election, the United Kingdom would be close. I think you saw that manifest in the meeting that Keir Starmer had in the Oval Office in those early weeks into the Trump term.
On a range of issues, whether it is security in the Middle East or the war in Ukraine, we are playing our part, and I am sure that in further questions we will go into that in detail. What we have said in relation to trade and tariffs is that we are an open economy. We continue to be an open economy and believe in open trade. We are in negotiation with the United States to get an economic agreement, and we are taking nothing off the table as we consider next steps. In fact, we are consulting with business on the effect of tariffs.
The Chair: Thank you. Just by way of follow up, the Guardian today is not terribly optimistic that we are in the front rank for a for a trade deal. What is your perspective on that?
David Lammy: I read the Guardian. It is not always right. The Chancellor of the Exchequer was in DC last week on this subject. The Business Secretary and the Prime Minister’s spokesperson on investment were also in the United States. We continue to negotiate with the United States, and we are working hard to get an economic agreement.
Q2 Baroness Crawley: It is very good to have you here, Foreign Secretary; you must appreciate having a sit down for an hour and a half without anyone asking you to go anywhere. I would like to ask you about our unique position as a bridge between the US and the EU. I am in agreement with you and the PM that the UK does not have to choose to align with one or the other, but there are pinch points. If we are negotiating with the EU, there will be areas that will make it more difficult to negotiate with the US. So how do you see the UK in the national interest managing that balancing act into the future with our trade and our diplomatic relations?
David Lammy: Let me just say that my instinct, as the Prime Minister has said, is that we should not choose and/or set this up as a binary choice. It is a mistake. In fact, when UK policy diverges in that way, it usually signals a mistake—the biggest of which in modern times was clearly the Suez crisis. Prior to that, you could argue that while the Attlee-Bevin Government were important in setting up NATO and, of course, in beginning our nuclear deterrent programme, it was a mistake to step out of the coal and steel arrangements when Europe was founding the beginning, if you like, of the European coming-together that we could have shaped had we been there in those early years. So I do not think that the binary choice is helpful. We have to navigate both.
Clearly, economically, it is self-evident that our biggest trading partner is with Europe combined. That is why I was absolutely clear that the number one thing that I set as an objective was our EU reset. Right from day one, I set about going to European capitals and engaging. We have a new relationship with Ireland. We have a new defence agreement with Germany. We will reset Lancaster House with France, and it was very important for me to get to Poland. I will be there next week as well. But it is also the case that obviously on Europe, it will culminate in our summit on 9 May with the European Union. Ursula von der Leyen will be back again for that. It is also important that we recognise that we have a very important large trading relationship with the United States. Outside the European Union, we have an opportunity to sign and forge deals. I hope we are getting close to one with India as well. That is all in the UK’s national interest.
Baroness Crawley: Perhaps I may follow up on the areas where you see the most positive future, as it were, in trading with the United States. Would it be science and technology? AI? Obviously, there is a problem and a question over security generally with the United States at the moment, but do you see it more in the science and technology sphere?
David Lammy: If you look at the world’s leading global universities, we and the United States dominate. If you look at AI, while the United States and China are leaders, we are just under that tier as third. So, yes, on tech, there is much that we can do together. Of course, as we navigate our relationship with China particularly, there are security concerns that mean that we must combine our capacity with the United States for mutual benefit. We must win the race on AI, but also on quantum in the years ahead. That is the nub of much that we are discussing with the United States at this moment.
Where we diverge, on agricultural standards and health, I see less room for agreement with the United States. But frankly, if you are in the United States and spending time on the Hill, many congressmen and women have set themselves against trade deals of that scale, and they take years, frankly, to negotiate. So, in tech, on science, there is much that we can do together.
Q3 Lord Darroch of Kew: Foreign Secretary, thank you very much for taking the time to do this. Can I ask about Russia and Ukraine? What is your current assessment of the prospects for a ceasefire and even a peace deal? The context here is that until last weekend, it felt as if President Trump was rather more critical of Ukrainian demands and requirements than he was of Putin’s position. Has there been some sort of shift since that Zelensky-Trump meeting in Rome because, since then, the President has been quite critical of Putin? Has something fundamental shifted or are we as we were?
David Lammy: There is no doubt about it: our Prime Minister, alongside Emmanuel Macron, has done a lot of heavy lifting in the coalition of the willing. We saw that in the NATO meeting of Foreign Ministers, in which Marco Rubio recommitted the United States to NATO, which was very important. We see that in the nations coming together and committing to stepping up on the security of Ukraine and, importantly, the security of Europe. We have had statements from Ursula von der Leyen about ReArm, their SAFE programme, how they are now going to procure and how they will raise their military industrial capacity—I hope working alongside the United Kingdom is an indication of that. In a sense, all that has happened because Donald Trump was pretty clear that he wanted to get a deal.
The images coming out the basilica at the Pope’s funeral were indicative of this and a lot of our effort. This time last week, I was with the Ukrainians, Germans and French, ensuring that we aligned and got into the right place. That went into the American system, and that is what Steve Witkoff took to Russia. So all attempts are going into getting a ceasefire but, in the end, this is about the terms of the deal.
You still come back to—I suspect this lies behind your question—what Russia’s real intent is. The truth is that, two weeks ago, Russian ballistic missiles killed 36 and wounded 119 civilians in Sumy.[1] The violence continues. There was this gimmick of an Easter ceasefire, but this is not the appearance of a serious country that wants to engage in a ceasefire. I admire Donald Trump’s efforts to try to bring this about. He is still in it to bring about those efforts, but he has also been clear that, if this goes on, he is prepared to walk away from the current round of discussions about bringing this war to an end.
Lord Darroch of Kew: I have a very quick supplementary. You see a lot of Marco Rubio or have done in recent weeks. How much visibility do you have of the detail of the US-Russia discussions? If you get a deal along the lines that seem to have been leaked, it would involve lifting all the sanctions on Russia, which would require action from us and Europe, as well as from the United States. Do you feel that you are getting full visibility of where the US is going in these negotiations?
David Lammy: Thank you for noticing that I am spending a lot of time with Marco Rubio. They have been in office for, I think, just over 13 weeks. I have looked back over the records and I have either seen or spoken to Marco Rubio 13 times, so it has pretty much been week to week; we are either in each other’s company or speaking to each other. This week I have spoken to him twice.
So we are well sited and not just on the Foreign Ministers’ track, because the Prime Minister is speaking to the President almost as regularly as I have just indicated. Of course, Jonathan Powell, as our NSA, is also speaking to Mike Waltz, and all of us are speaking to Steve Witkoff as he shuttles around the world. So we are pretty well sighted, and you know that we have the capability to understand what others are saying about what kind of deal we might land, in lots of ways. We listen carefully to what Putin says about the kind of deal he wants and, at the moment, if you look carefully at his language, it is a maximalist offer, which is largely the same as it was at the outbreak of this war.
Q4 Lord Houghton of Richmond: Foreign Secretary, thank you for giving up your time, this afternoon. I am Nick Houghton, the ex-Chief of the Defence Staff on the committee. Can I therefore ask you a defence-related question? It is about the interplay between foreign policy priorities and the decisions on military capabilities and defence funding levels which emerge from the ongoing SDR.
It is nearly a year since the strategic defence review kicked off. It really started as an exercise in reassessing defence capability choices in the context of a more dangerous Russia and the need both to support Ukraine and re-establish credible deterrence in Europe, all within a defined financial envelope.
In the meantime, however, the global security situation has become much more febrile. Specifically, the guarantees of US security to Europe have now become much less certain, even if potentially only in a partial and not a comprehensive way. How, therefore, will foreign policy priorities now play into the defence review’s capability choices within government, because there are some very hard decisions to be made there?
David Lammy: The important thing to recognise, even before you get to the strategic defence review, is what a dire state we were in. Our armed services had been hollowed back to the smallest number since the Napoleonic war. A former Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were saying in hubris that the era of tank battles in Europe was over, there was a chronic housing problem in our Armed Forces, and a strategic plan was, in effect, absent.
What we have done is to increase money rapidly. The armed services received £2.9 billion in the Autumn Budget and £2.2 billion in the Spring Statement. That is over £5 billion in just the 10 months that we have been in office, and we have made that pledge to get to 2.5% by 2027 and to 3% in the next cycle. We have also signed a historic Trinity House agreement with Germany, which is important given their Zeitenwende and their complete turnaround of posture, by 180 degrees, to European defence.
Your question interrogates the posture of our closest ally, the United States. Strategically, its posture towards the Indo-Pacific has been self-evident at least since the Obama Administration. That, in the end, drives much of the United States’ calculus and I think that that is a reasonable calculus that Europeans have to take seriously.
When Donald Trump came into office, just four nations in Europe were meeting the 2% spend on defence in terms of their NATO obligations; today it is 24. The truth is that Presidents since Roosevelt have been saying, “You’ve got to spend more on defence, Europe”. That is now beginning to happen. The penny has landed.
As we head to the strategic defence review, the Defence Secretary, Prime Minister and I have been clear that it is NATO first. We take our global obligations seriously, of course. We have to be equipped in the right way for the 21st century. We do that alongside our European and NATO allies, and there has to be complementarity across that family of allies. But this is an era where we have to spend more, procure better against this backdrop, and be seen to meet and step up to our obligations.
You have seen that with Keir Starmer. It was encapsulated really very well after the falling out we saw between President Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office. Where did Zelensky come? What was the first phone call from the Prime Minister? Where did he come on that Saturday morning? There was a sense that the United Kingdom was back playing that important role.
Lord Houghton of Richmond: I absolutely applaud what the Government have done thus far. There is undoubtedly an uplift promised in defence funding, but we started from a remarkably low base. Out of the 2% comes a significant amount on the nuclear deterrent and a significant amount on pensions. You may be aware that you inherited our performance as the 32nd out of 32 countries in NATO in meeting our NATO military targets, so we were bottom of the league.
The indications on uplift have been made in the context of the almost certainty that Trump will come to the June summit of NATO demanding of European NATO that it takes on the burden of conventional deterrence in Europe.
I get the feeling that we are spectating a slow-moving car crash, with a Government who think they are doing enough and doing all the right things, but a significant delta between what Trump will lay not just on us but on the whole of Europe. Do you think that the Government are ready for that, or that they are comfortable with what they have achieved and promised so far?
David Lammy: I understand the inference of the question and why you ask it in the manner in which you do. But, given the engagement I have just set out with Marco Rubio, the Defence Secretary’s engagement with Pete Hegseth and the Prime Minister’s engagement with Donald Trump, we would have to be blind and deaf to what is clearly the US posture, particularly in relation to the Indo-Pacific. My sense is that that the penny has dropped in Europe.
Again, I think that at the heart of what you are saying are three potential ideas. One is burden shifting and the United States shifting the load, the second is a recalibration of burden sharing across the NATO family, and the other is burden dumping. I think that you sound as if you think that the United States is washing its hands and handing it over. What I heard from Secretary of State Rubio—I think all of us did in NATO—was something quite different. They are still committed to NATO. Let us be clear: in relation to Ukraine, Starlink, intelligence sharing and capability, and the money that was signed off under Joe Biden, which goes right into the autumn, they are all still there. But they are making demands on sharing and shifting, and they are reasonable demands that in fact, other US Presidents have all made. This President has a particular style, but Europe is paying attention.
Q5 Lord Alderdice: Foreign Secretary, we have a world that is changing quite radically and unpredictably. One change is that even during the depths of the Cold War, diplomatic, political, professional and scientific exchanges and meetings were going on. Even our nuclear physicists from the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were meeting with each other through Pugwash, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences. All that stopped with the Russia-Ukraine war. In a context where the US Administration are now engaging directly with the Russian leadership, what channels of communication and dialogue, if any, are there between the British Government and the Russian leadership? Are there any things you can tell us about that other than that we have an ambassador in the Security Council, who obviously engages from time to time with his Russian opposite number?
David Lammy: You will be pleased to know that we also have an ambassador in Russia who is able to engage with the Russian system, and there are channels on which there is engagement. Since Liz Truss made her unsuccessful visit to Moscow, there has not been engagement at my level—that is true—and, against a backdrop of our support to Ukraine, I have not deemed that necessary. But what I have sought to do since I have come into the department is to distinguish between Ukraine policy and a broader Russia policy; therefore there is a lot of work going on in the department in relation to Russia per se. I believe I have to be clear that my assessment is that Russia poses a systemic threat to much of our national interest and much of Europe’s national interests. But if you are in the business of diplomacy, you have to be in the business of engagement on a range of issues. But one has to be clear where those are best placed, and at the moment, it is not at my level.
Lord Alderdice: Apart from at your own level, you have said that Russia is a clear and present danger. That was the case during the Cold War as well. But at that time there were meetings of scientists, academics and professional organisations, which there have not been for quite some time now. Is this a time when those kinds of things can begin to be explored or, if it is not, what might be the indications that it is time to do that kind of thing?
David Lammy: It was a cold war, but unfortunately Vladimir Putin has set himself on a path that is demonstrably a hot war in Europe, with people dying in their thousands on a weekly basis as we speak. He set himself on a path where our own people have lost their lives following the Salisbury poisoning, on our own soil, and where there are attempts—a hybrid war—at sabotage to our system on a pretty regular basis. This does not feel very cold but pretty hot, and it is against that background that one makes an assessment.
But I want to say very clearly that the contribution of Russia over centuries is immense. One can have huge respect for Russian art, literature and music—what the Russian people have produced in so many ways—and indeed for the people of Russia. It is always important to distinguish between Putin and the regime currently running Russia and the Russian people themselves. If your question goes to that, I am with you, and that is why you are absolutely right: we must distinguish a Russia policy and wider posture, and that is constantly under review in the department from Ukraine policy, notwithstanding our closeness and proximity to the Ukrainian fight.
Q6 Baroness Blackstone: I will turn to the Middle East. Given that Israel has fully blocked the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza now for over 50 days and has continued to target the civilian infrastructure, can you tell the committee what steps the UK Government is taking to prevent further humanitarian suffering being inflicted on the civilian population in Gaza?
David Lammy: Let me be crystal clear: the blockade that Israel is undertaking now of necessary aid into Gaza is horrendous. The suffering is dire, the need is huge and the loss of life extreme. We have been absolutely clear on that, and just last week, as an E3 alongside France and Germany we were very clear in our statement condemning the blockade that exists at this time and the need that we see in Gaza. I have been very clear on that, and I was clear just a few weeks ago in person to the Israeli Foreign Minister about their obligations and to Minister Ron Dermer, their Minister of Strategic Affairs. I was in Qatar and Oman at the weekend, and of course I had extensive discussions with them about the current situation. Of course, the Qataris have played an immense role in getting us to a place where we got that first ceasefire. We want to get back to a ceasefire and so there is a lot of diplomacy to get us back to that ceasefire, and of course, to deal with the issue of how you deal with Hamas. I would imagine this whole committee accepts that there are legitimate concerns for the Israelis in terms of their security going forward. It is my belief that that will not be solved militarily.
In fact, if it could be solved militarily, you might have seen that happen since 7 October. It has now gone on for some time and that has not happened. When those hostages came out, we saw those men with masks and Kalashnikovs: Hamas was still there. So how do you deal with Hamas? What I was talking to the Qataris about and what we talked to the Israelis about is that this takes an exit for the Hamas leadership that is still in place, probably to a third country. It takes a proper demilitarised position for Hamas in the system, similar to what we undertook in Northern Ireland. The arms have to be laid down, and it takes a zero-tolerance approach to the governance of Hamas. That is why I signed a memorandum of understanding just yesterday with Prime Minister Mustafa of the Palestinian Authority. We support the Palestinian Authority in its reform, because we believe that if you believe in two states, there has to be a place for the Palestinian Authority. It needs reform, but we continue to support it.
Baroness Blackstone: Thank you. I have just seen the letter you wrote yesterday to the chairman of this committee, and I think many people will welcome your outrage and feel the same level of indignation about what is happening. But I want to just quote one line back to you, if I may: “The Israeli decision to block aid, supplies and power in this way is intolerable and risks breaching International Humanitarian Law. Humanitarian aid should never be used as a political tool”. Why “risks”? It is breaking humanitarian law, surely. I think many people who read this letter and hear what you are saying would agree with it all, but they would want to know a bit more about what action you are taking, and action has to be more than criticising the Israeli Government. We have been doing that for a long time and it does not lead to any changes.
David Lammy: I have taken action. The first day I was in office I instigated a review on our arms sales to Israel and, with regret, I announced in Parliament back last September that we would not be continuing to supply arms that Israel can use in Gaza. I believed on the basis of our export licensing regime—which was revised under the last Government—that there was a clear risk of a breach of international humanitarian law. That is the criteria, and that is the criteria I used against that sober assessment that was made. At that time, during the last Government, the last time I saw that Lord Cameron was before this committee, the committee pressed him on restoring funding to UNRWA. I restored funding to UNRWA. There were concerns about just how much aid and commitment we were giving to Gaza. I increased our spend in Gaza, notwithstanding the issues about the aid actually getting in. So I have acted.
I have now been to Israel I think three times in this last period, and there has of course been a lot of engagement with Arab partners. I support the Arab plan. We want to improve it, particularly in relation to Israel’s security and Hamas, and that was why I was in Qatar at the weekend. So there has been a lot of diplomacy, a lot of engagement and a lot of working with partners. That means also working with the United States and Steve Witkoff in particular. Let us get that ceasefire back on track. Of course, we also understand the malign behaviour that sits behind a lot of the problems in the Middle East that comes from Iran, which is another subject that we could talk about; there has been a lot of engagement too, on that file.
Baroness Blackstone: I have one very quick further question, if I may. On the subject of breaking international humanitarian law, what position is the Government currently taking on the judgments of the international courts on this matter?
David Lammy: It is a judgment for international courts, but we have been crystal clear in our own commitment to international humanitarian law and our own commitment to the architecture that was set up, much of it in the wake of the Second World War, in which so many men and women across Europe and from our own country sacrificed and gave so much—an architecture that was set up by pioneers within our own country. This used to be a cross-party position—people such as Winston Churchill did a hell of a lot to give us our current human rights architecture across Europe—so we continue to support that and to support organisations such as the ICC and the ICJ, although I recognise that that is now politically contested by some.
Q7 Lord Grocott: Welcome, Foreign Secretary. I just want to put it to you that for at least 30 years, I guess, occupants of your high office of whichever party have used pretty much the same mantra in respect of Israel, Palestine and a two-state solution. In fact, although I have not quite got the wording off by heart, it is in your most recent letter. A sustainable future is “grounded in a two-state solution that will guarantee security and stability for Israel, alongside a sovereign and stable Palestinian state”. I cannot think of a Foreign Secretary that would not have said that. But it sounds increasingly to me like motherhood and apple pie in terms of it being desirable and wonderful were it achieved, and there seems to be very little prospect of it being achieved, not least because Netanyahu has now spelled out beyond any doubt, for anyone who was in any doubt, that he has not the slightest intention of agreeing to a two-state solution. So I really want to put it to you: does this foreign policy objective, consistent over so long, any longer have any possibility of realistically being a solution?
David Lammy: Let us step back, first of all, and let me be frank about the kind of person I am. I have been in public life now for 25 years. I suppose it is possible to get to this level in public life and find yourself of a cynical disposition, but I retain the optimism that I arrived in Parliament with. It is an optimism that saw, when some said, “I’m sorry—apartheid is here to stay” and others said, “No”, how it changed. Some said, “The Cold War is here to stay”, and others fought against it; I remember when the Berlin Wall came down. So there will always be moments when we look back in history to when the impossible did not seem possible. But the whole point of diplomatic endeavour is to persevere, and you are failing every day until you succeed.
The best modern example of that here in the United Kingdom is: I remember those bombs exploding that killed so many lives because of the problems and the Troubles in Northern Ireland, but in the end, with cross-party consensus and a lot of hard work, we got there. So we can get there too on a two-state solution.
What are the ingredients and how do we get there on a two-state solution? Again, let us give the current President of the United States some credit for the Abraham accords, and let us continue to press hard to get to Saudi-Israel normalisation. On any analysis, it is hard to see how you achieve that prize of normalisation without two states. Let us focus on what we can do to give Israel the assurance that it needs in relation to Hamas, continue to bear down on Iran’s nuclear ambitions, which would be devastating for the Middle East, and continue to support those within the Occupied Territories who obviously still believe in a home of their own. I have always said the Palestinian cause is a just cause, but if you want to live alongside Israel, that means you must continue to support the Palestinian Authority. As I say, I signed a memorandum of understanding with Prime Minister Mustafa this week. All of that gives me hope.
If you do not believe in two states, then you either believe in one state—the Israelis would then have to explain how Palestinians would be able to live with equal rights, which is problematic at the moment, given the occupation—or you believe in no state. Well, I am afraid it is unacceptable for any group of people to have lived without a state for longer than I have been alive. For all of those reasons, the only option is two states. We will continue to work with partners at the moment, particularly with France as we head towards its conference in New York on two states alongside the Saudi Arabians. We will work with those two partners to ensure that we keep alive two states.
Lord Grocott: Surely a prerequisite for the two-state solution is to acknowledge that two states have got to be recognised. That brings me to that quite specific question that it is within the Labour Party’s manifesto to recognise the state of Palestine. It is something that the United Kingdom could do. It is something which 160-odd states across the world have already done. It is something which western European states, including Spain, Ireland and Norway have already done. Is that not some quite specific decision within the power of the British Government—if necessary without reference to anyone else, but obviously preferably in collusion with other people—that would make a positive step that would say to the Palestinians, “Your position is not hopeless”? As you rightly described, it has sometimes appeared a bit like that during our lifetime. When is that likely to be achieved? Of course, if we wait until Israel says, “Yes, we agree with that”, then it is simply not going to be achieved—certainly not during the course of the life of this Government.
David Lammy: I understand why you raise that, Lord Grocott, and let me be clear: no one has a veto on when the United Kingdom recognises that Palestinian state. That is the first thing. The second thing is that I recognise that there are some who see this as symbolic and that there are countries in Europe that have taken this step recently. But, on another set of questions I got from the committee, while it was a symbolic act, you have got to ask yourself: did it change much on the ground? The sad conclusion is: it did not.
We have always said that recognition is not the end in and of itself. Two states is the end in and of itself. We would prefer recognition as part of a process to those two states, so we will continue to talk to partners about that. President Macron has had a lot to say about that, most recently alongside the Saudis; of course, we are in discussion with them at this time. This is a solemn undertaking: as members of the UN Security Council, Britain has always played that role of contributing to progress on the ground. It is not just a symbolic act. That is the detail and the granularity of the diplomacy and our engagement at this point in time. But I should say to you, because this is important: settlement expansion at the moment is undermining the viability of two states, and settler violence levels are shocking. In the last year, we have had 59 illegal outposts on the West Bank. In 2024 the average was just—oh, no, there were 59 established in 2024 and the average was seven over the last 25 years. That is all undermining the prospects of two states, and it is why I announced sanctions on some of that settler behaviour a few months ago.
Q8 Lord Soames of Fletching: Foreign Secretary, I must congratulate you on retaining your optimism after all that time in Parliament. Mine gradually diminished after my first Parliament, I have to tell you.
David Lammy: You were always very nice to me when you were in the House of Commons.
Lord Soames of Fletching: Foreign Secretary, we have asked these questions. I do not want to repeat myself endlessly, but we are now at nearly 300 illegal settlements. Every one is illegal. Every one is an obstacle to peace and an obstacle to a two-state solution or whatever way it should turn out. I just wanted to ask you, even though you have been very clear in what you have said: what further steps do you believe that the British Government can take to prevent Israel from building further settlements, which are absolutely illegal under international law? What are the implications of Israel’s settlement activities for the stability of a two-state solution? Well, I think you have dealt with that but, just on the first bit, I very much agree with Lady Blackstone that every Foreign Secretary—this is because of the way it is and has always been, as said by Lord Grocott—has always been in the same position on this. You have been robust; I am glad that our Foreign Secretary is robust. But these settlements are actually making it impossible for there ever to be a two-state solution because there is not any room for a second state.
David Lammy: I think you are right, drawing on so many years of experience in foreign policy, to place great emphasis, like Lord Grocott has, on this area of behaviour because of the rapid acceleration we have seen in this last period of time under the current Government in Israel. It is undermining the progress that was made in Oslo. It is undermining the 1967 arrangements. It is running a coach and horses over that just cause, and I emphasise this every time I engage with my counterpart in Israel. It was a subject of discussion at the G7 in Canada a few months ago. Of course, it is always a subject of discussion with the quint of Arab states, and it will be central to our discussion in New York alongside France and Saudi Arabia—no doubt about it. It is why I announced some sanctions, and of course that is kept under close review, as you would expect, because we have a solemn obligation which began with Balfour, and we are very serious about that obligation and must live up to it.
I indicated before that I am an optimist but there have been moments of tension and fear. There is no doubt about it: 7 October was a grim and horrific moment, and let us remember that there are hostages who are still not with their families at this time. But even against that backdrop, there was progress in the Middle East after terrible wars in the past. Let us seize this moment to get progress, notwithstanding how grim it is at this time.
Q9 Lord Darroch of Kew: Foreign Secretary, we will just move the focus to the east a bit from the Middle East. What is your assessment of the escalating tension between India and Pakistan in the wake of last week’s appalling and deadly attacks on tourists in Kashmir? The context here, as you know better than I do, is reports and rumours that the Indians are under pressure to contemplate some sort of military response to those attacks.
David Lammy: Let me be clear that the terrorist attack in India-administered Kashmir, in the Pahalgam area, was horrific. As you would expect, the UK condemns that terrorism and extremist behaviour. When I spoke to Foreign Minister Jaishankar a few days ago, he outlined what had happened to these tourists: stripped, shot in the head. It has of course been devastating to the public in India particularly, so we send them our deepest condolences. It was also important, of course, to speak to Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Dar.
I recognise that this is a very sensitive situation and that there are very real risks to regional and wider stability at this time. We should remember that there have been, I think, three wars between India and Pakistan since the independence of those countries. We are keeping our travel advice under constant review. We have already issued factual updates about the closure of the Wagah border, British nationals should be aware at this time of the geopolitical tensions, and I am deeply concerned about the impact that any escalation would have in the region on those living and working or travelling there.
We estimate at the moment that there are over 1 million British nationals and dependants across India and Pakistan, so of course I will be reviewing our plans with ministerial colleagues in the coming days. But I want to say that this is a very different situation to our evacuations in other crises in recent history; the challenge of a significant escalation would be of a different order. That is why, because we are talking in the end about two nuclear powers, all efforts on diplomacy are going in. It is why I spoke to my counterparts and why our NSA has spoken to his, and why we are urging de-escalation and cool and calm heads, notwithstanding the tensions at this time. Of course, I also spoke to Secretary of State Rubio about this a short while ago as well.
Q10 Baroness Fraser of Craigmaddie: Foreign Secretary, given your recent visit to Beijing, could you tell us what surprised you, or perhaps what disappointed you? What is your assessment of the UK’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China, how do you think the Chinese leadership views the UK, and what are the Government’s priorities for UK-Chinese relations?
David Lammy: Thank you for the question. Let me just give the context, because it is important. We have come out of a period of vast inconsistency, between the golden era of David Cameron drinking a beer with President Xi and the Liz Truss approach to China and the era of complete disengagement. So, when I went to Beijing I was going after six years of disengagement of activity from China. I have been really clear—I was clear in opposition and have been clear in office—that there are areas where we will co-operate with China and we must co-operate with China: things such as climate and global health—very important areas. We can trade with China as well; the United States has managed to increase its trade with China—this is prior to the tariffs—while being really tough on issues of security. So there are areas where of course we will compete and where we will challenge. When I was in China I challenged on Jimmy Lai, the situation in Hong Kong, the sanctions against British parliamentarians and human rights concerns in Xinjiang. Those are areas where we will continue to challenge China most definitely.
We are doing a complete audit of our relations with China and we have a national security review under way that we will also publish shortly. So we are clear eyed about our relationship, but it has been important that my counterpart has come from China, the Prime Minister has indicated that he will go to China, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been there, and that the Net-zero Secretary has also gone. In the end this is a global power and it is hugely important Britain has a relationship with it, is engaged with it and is able to disagree with it, sometimes pretty vociferously, but also that we are able to act in our country’s national interests.
Baroness Fraser of Craigmaddie: Thank you. You mentioned that you are undertaking an audit. This committee produced a report on China in 2021—before my time. It criticised, as you have alluded to, the then Government’s approach to China and it said that the Government needed a clear, unified strategy. So has this changed, and if so, how? As a subset of that, the report also identified a deficiency in China-related knowledge and expertise within the UK Government and the Civil Service. Has that has been addressed since 2021, or do you feel that this could still be the case?
David Lammy: The China audit will address that issue, and I have been very clear—I said this to the new Perm Sec, who is alongside me—that capability in the department is really important. That applies to our embassy in China; I have lost count of the amount of embassies I have visited since becoming Foreign Secretary, I have travelled so much over this last period, but I do not think I have found an embassy in worse condition than our embassy in China. I have also been really clear that in terms of capability—Mandarin speaking and the capability of the next generation of diplomats—in this change cycle that we are in and the 2030 ambition that the Perm Sec can say a bit more about, we have to ensure that we have that capability across the range, and Mandarin speaking is a fundamental part of that.
Baroness Fraser of Craigmaddie: Finally, because I have a bit of time, China’s belt and road initiative has become the central instrument of Beijing’s global influence strategy. As western commitments to aid decline, particularly with our own cuts to budgets and to the USAID programme, how can we ensure that China is not just stepping into the breach?
David Lammy: That is a topic of concern, and it is why I have been clear that, first, here in the United Kingdom we have not made an ideological decision to abandon our development commitments. Even after the changes that we have made, we will still be the sixth biggest development power and spender, and that is hugely important. Secondly, in the calibration that we have made—I see it a bit like an accordion—if you look over the last 50 or 60 years for the UK, if at one end of the accordion you have hard power, then you get to diplomacy and our diplomatic footprint across the world and our work in the multilateral system as well as bilaterally. Then you get to soft power, which includes, of course, development but also fantastic organisations like the British Council and the BBC World Service. Actually, that has always gone up and down across different eras. Sometimes investing in hard power saves lives. By the way, the war in Ukraine has cost the continent of Africa by some estimates £7 billion, upwards to £9 billion. So us investing in hard power at this time is important for global security and saves lives, not just in our own country.
Against that backdrop, if you abandon development entirely, then others will step into the mix. That is why it is important that we are still a force in the world on development, and we will be even after the adjustments that we have had to make.
Q11 Lord Bruce of Bennachie: Baroness Fraser slightly pre-empted my question, which is about soft power. I need to declare an interest as I have been an adviser to DIA, who deliver development programmes for both USAID and the UK Government. Soft power delivered through official development assistance, the British Council and the World Service arguably are more required at a time of convulsion, yet we are rowing back from it in spite of what you have just said, so can I ask you some specific questions about those particular agencies?
Will the Government release the British Council from its pandemic commercial loan, which is causing it real financial difficulties, and which we have actually written to you about? It is a commercial loan and it is compromising the British Council, which told us when it came here that it was 30 days from being insolvent. Will you commit more long-term support to the BBC World Service, rather than having it funded by hard-pressed licence-payers? Will you have a look at the impact of particularly next year’s cuts in ODA, not least given the amount that is being diverted for domestic refugees and asylum seekers? We are cutting aid, Foreign Secretary, more than France and more than Germany. The EU is maintaining it. Japan is increasing it. Frankly, is not the Government really weighing back? The rhetoric is great, but the actual delivery is cuts, cuts, cuts and undermining of what we used to be really, really proud world leaders in.
David Lammy: That was quite a list, so let me just have a sip of water and address that list. The first thing is that I actually increased funding to the BBC World Service. In the one-year settlement, I got it an uplift—I think it was £32 million. It has been able to increase things. I think they have just brought in BBC Burma. That is really important. I do recognise that when you have got Russia Today and others investing in soft power, the BBC World Service plays a very important role.
The second thing I did was about the British Council. It was given a loan by the last Government on commercial terms. I agreed an 18-month extension so that it could come up with a business plan and get back to paying down that loan, and we could get it into better health. I have seen incredible work from the British Council in India and Nigeria while I have been in this role. I have been a huge fan of the British Council over many, many years. My wife is an artist who has done work with the British Council in the past, so I am well aware of the contribution that it makes. That is why I got it the extension.
Now, as I said, in terms of the decisions that we have had to make in ODA spend, we will still be the sixth most important development player in the world, and we have not made an ideological decision to abandon aid entirely. That has not been our approach. It is true that when you look across Europe, whether it is the Netherlands, whether it is Germany or France, we are seeing a reduction in spend. But it is also true that there has been a need for a deeper and more meaningful conversation about western development for many, many years. I make a distinction between humanitarian aid, but we now see the UN agencies, with their UN80 programme, having to reform as a result of decisions made by USAID. All of us have been in developing countries. All of us have seen the jeeps. All of us have seen the different UN logos. Some of us have wondered why it took 19 different UN agencies in some countries, sometimes duplicating effort. I am really pleased the UN is doing that work now.
China’s belt and road is a fact. The commitment of the Gulf now to development is a fact. The commitment of India, of Brazil and of Turkey to development is a fact. So the truth is that the architecture that was set up 60 years ago has needed review for some time.[2] Our review is committed to ensuring that in Gaza, in Sudan and in Ukraine we meet our obligations. We continue to support fantastic organisations like BII, which do an incredible job. We will still be there on climate and we will still try and support the poorest and the most fragile states, which is why I made my commitment to Sudan. But the truth is that we do have to recognise that a conversation about reform is long overdue. I want to have a conference that brings together the western community on development and aid and how we spend that aid, because the time is now right for leadership, and it is also right for being sharper and smarter about the way we spend our money across the board.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie: I will just make one suggestion. Reform would be better before the cuts rather than after the cuts. The second point is: what about a cross-UK approach bringing trade, investment, diplomacy, culture, and all of these things together as a single offer? I have had ambassadors and high commissioners say, “Actually, the British offer across Africa and the Commonwealth is a bit complicated and confused”. Is that a suggestion that we could do to ensure that our visibility is not dropping below the radar, which a lot of people in Africa say it has?
David Lammy: Your instinct that reform is better before the cuts is probably fair. It is why I announced the Soft Power Council and it is why I announced the Africa approach. All of that came before the decisions that we had to make on development spend. I was suggesting that it is not just about the UK acting unilaterally; it is about a family of nations committed to development, and I think there has to be a wider conversation alongside UN agency. It is that leadership position that I hope the UK can take up in the coming months as we make decisions. But I want to be crystal clear that there is still a commitment to development. We still want to get back to more spend, by the way, when we get back to growth. I am absolutely clear that investing in hard power also saves lives and is also important to global security.
Q12 Baroness Coussins: Foreign Secretary, I am sticking with the theme of the World Service. In your recent visit to the western Balkans, you warned of, and I quote, “the long hand of Russian interference” in the region. One of the recommendations in one of this committee’s earlier reports, following an inquiry into the western Balkans, was that the Government should provide funding directly for the creation of a BBC Albanian service. That is nothing, of course, inherently to do with either Albania or Albanian, but in order to counter Russian disinformation in Kosovo, where the majority of the population are Albanian speakers. As we have seen what a success BBC Serbia has been, would you not agree now that it would be a sensible, self-interested move to create or to provide the funding for a BBC Albanian service?
Perhaps I could tack on a quick related question to that main question and ask you if you could clarify whether the future model for sustainable funding for the World Service is expected to emerge from the spending review or from the charter review, because I have heard both versions from different Ministers.
David Lammy: On the first question, thank you for raising the western Balkans, and thank you for raising Kosovo and this committee’s work in the past. I went to Kosovo when I was shadow Foreign Minister, and I was hugely proud to go. I came back from that visit concerned that the UK leadership role, begun under Tony Blair, was a little diminished following our exit from the European Union and the looking inwards that followed that decision. That is why this year the Prime Minister and I will be hosting the Berlin process, and I am really pleased that we will be leading on that once more. It is also why I was very proud to appoint one of the most senior diplomats in our system, Dame Karen Pierce, to be envoy, and she is back in the region and is already creating waves, as is needed. I am hugely concerned at the moment about Russian disinformation and influence, and very worried about what is happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. That is really very challenging and worrying indeed, and is why we have to be present.
Your question about the BBC World Service is well put and well made. These have to be matters for the BBC, not for the Government. But I will write to the BBC and indicate to it that I am sympathetic to the position that this committee has put but that it must be properly a matter for the BBC. Of course, the overall settlement will be determined by the spending review but the charter review is vital and fundamental in this regard. In the end, the BBC derives much of its funding from that charter review, and that necessarily affects the BBC World Service as well. So both are pertinent to the subject at hand.
Q13 Lord Bruce of Bennachie: Just very quickly, can I ask you a question about Sudan? Obviously, you hosted the London conference, which was perhaps predictably inconclusive, given the difficulty. Do you see what the next steps could be, given that there are agencies outside that are turning it into a proxy war? What can the UK do with partners to promote the opportunity for actual internal negotiation, involving citizens and women, to try to deliver a Sudan-based solution rather than one that is being driven by external forces who have other interests than the welfare of the people of Sudan?
David Lammy: Let me say from the outset, having gone to the Adre crossing and up to the border in Chad, that the scenes that I witnessed were heartbreaking. The pain and suffering of millions of women and children should offend the entire planet. I think I was asked a question about what I had or had not expected in this role. I have been staggered by the indifference and the lack of outrage at the catastrophe that is the crisis in Sudan at this time. So, one of the reasons that I had the conference and the convening here in London was of course to achieve greater pledging and money for the people of Sudan—and we achieved that with £800 million committed, which is hugely important. I cannot say that the war will come to an end in the coming weeks. The second reason was to bring all of those who have a stake in this crisis around the table and into the room. We were able to issue a chair statement, which was a good piece of work, drafted of course by tireless officials; I must thank the whole team that worked on this in the department for their huge endeavour over many months to land this conference. Of course, it also put a spotlight back on this issue nationally and internationally, which was precisely what I wanted to do.
As you know, a few months back I put down a resolution in the United Nations. Unbelievably, Russia blocked it—Russia, which claims to stand with African nations and be this great voice for the global South, committed to even more suffering in Sudan. I hope that it will think again; there is a lot of diplomatic effort going in to try to get the Russians to think again. We will continue to work with partner countries and specifically to bolster and work with the African Union. We have to have Africa-led approaches to Africa’s conflicts, supported by the international community but alongside the African Union. All that effort will go in over the coming months.
Q14 Baroness Coussins: My question is about Colombia, so I am taking you to a different part of the world now, which generally gets much less attention than it deserves, despite the excellent work of the UK as penholder for the peace accord at the Security Council. I was very pleased to see only earlier this month in the report to the Security Council that you emphasised the UK’s full support for the UN mission of verification for the peace accord. But as you will know, this mission requires the annual renewal agreement from all members of the Security Council, or at least no one voting against. As the current mandate expires in October, it is not clear at the moment what the US’s position might be on renewal, and it would be disastrous, of course, if it decided to vote against.
So I would be very interested to know, Foreign Secretary, what your assessment is of that situation, and also your assessment of the prospects of resuming the peace talks with the ELN, which broke down in January. Can the UK use its vantage point as penholder to encourage and help achieve the resumption of these peace talks, which are obviously absolutely vital for any progress of President Petro’s “Total Peace” initiative?
David Lammy: We certainly welcome the Colombian Government’s commitment to its implementation and the 2016 peace agreement. I met with the Colombian Foreign Minister in my office a few months ago and I saw him again, I think at the G20 or it might have been in New York. I hope to get to Colombia soon. I have not discussed this issue with Secretary of State Rubio, but now that you have raised it I will, given that I speak to him on a pretty regular basis. He takes a great interest, of course, in South America, Latin America and the Caribbean. Obviously, we have discussed the very concerning situation in Haiti and the situation in Venezuela, but we have not discussed Colombia, so I am very happy to raise that with him.
Q15 Baroness Crawley: Given the extremely uncertain times we live in—I assume that we will be still talking about President Trump and not Pope Trump in a few weeks’ time—I wondered what you were doing in-house to review the way the FCDO is working and how the departments are bringing forward plans within the context of this new diplomatic world that we live in.
David Lammy: I will bring the Perm Sec in here, because I saw that David Cameron was so mean that he did not allow Philip Barton to get a word in edgeways last time, and I am determined not to follow that path. But let me set the vision and then ask the Perm Sec to talk a bit about the how, because this is really important.
I am the first Foreign Secretary since William Hague to have shadowed the role in opposition for three years, and to have been able to come to my own assessment and, obviously, to speak to lots of people about where we needed to do better. There are thematic issues that have been important for me to set in the right place in the department. So, we have to do better on growth; we have to be the international delivery arm of the Government on growth and economic diplomacy.
We have a huge role to play on migration—on returns—but alongside the Home Office, on the upstream work in countries, so I am really pleased that we have set up a joint unit working alongside the Home Office on that issue.
There is more to do on illicit finance, and we have to meet our climate commitments and continue to lead in the world. With COP coming up in Brazil you will see a lot more of that, with the UK standing alongside our Brazilian partners. So there is important thematic work that we have to do.
But I also felt when I came into the department that we were not embracing technology enough. The AI revolution is happening before our eyes. We can do much more to free up diplomats to do more: perhaps less in Whitehall and more overseas in the coming years. The department felt a bit top heavy, and I have asked the Perm Sec to look at that issue. I set up three reviews that looked at development, economic diplomacy and our relations with middle powers. We got a new Perm Sec, one of the best people in the system, who has been in Whitehall—it is always embarrassing when someone does this—working in very senior roles, but also not completely of the system in terms of not being a diplomat, and someone who could hold their own in Whitehall. There was also a sense that the Foreign Office as a big department of state had lost its ebb. So that was what I found in terms of the vision of what I wanted to achieve, and the Perm Sec is absolutely in the weeds of how we are now going to do it.
Sir Oliver Robbins: Thank you, Foreign Secretary. Given the time, I will be brief, Chair, but thank you for the opportunity. I should say, before I say anything about the department, that it is an absolute pleasure to be in it. As you have been hearing for a while now as a committee, the work of the department is extraordinary, so it is a real privilege to come and try to lead my Civil Service colleagues, who are doing extraordinary things, often in very tough places.
But as the Foreign Secretary says, you cannot expect to win if you are standing still. So what we are thinking about at the moment is, given that the department now has six clear priorities—the Foreign Secretary has just laid them out, from growth to development via security in Europe, and climate and development—we have to work out how we change the department so that by 2030, in what is likely, as we are in the middle of a spending review, to be a tough spending environment, we are able to look our colleagues in the eye and say, “We think the jobs that result from this process will be better and the effect that we can produce for the Government and their objectives will be better at the end of that process than now”.
So the five things we are focused on—I will be brief—are, first, how we prioritise as a department. I think that has come up in questioning already in this session: how we make sure that we are strategic enough to be able to focus on the things that really make a difference and really project the Government’s impact and influence in the world. There is an understandable tendency to want to have something on everything, and that may be a luxury we cannot quite afford over the coming period. We need to think very carefully about how we chase delivery through the system, making sure that when we set out our position and agree our plans with the Foreign Secretary and with senior colleagues we are following through and then adjusting: if we are not achieving the things that Ministers are asking of us, we need to make sure we know that and that we are able then to tweak the plan to get to a better result.
There is a big agenda here about openness. The Foreign Office is extremely good at picking up on what is going on in the world—that is its core business in many ways—but sometimes it does not listen quite as carefully to people here in the United Kingdom. There is an extraordinarily rich culture of learned commentary on foreign affairs, which obviously this committee benefits from, but we are also lucky enough in this country to have diaspora communities from almost every corner of the world, and we both want the Foreign Office to take advantage of that ecosystem, to make sure that we are employing every single asset the UK has openly to challenge our own policy-making and make sure it is the very best it can be.
Fourthly, we have touched on workforce: as I say, the material we have in the department is absolutely first rate, I am delighted to find, but sometimes we hold it back. This has been implied in one or two of the questions already today. We could do more to invest in the capability of our workforce, whether it be in supporting the development of genuine Chinese and Mandarin expertise or supporting that workforce in some of the most difficult workplaces in the world. There is a lot to do. The Foreign Secretary also announced in opposition a college of British diplomacy, which will be our vehicle for really concentrating on the skills, development and talent that we have in the department.
Finally, an important, if slightly dull-sounding word: efficiency. I come into the department and of course processes have multiplied, for good reasons and done by decent people. There is a job of work to be done just to streamline and to make sure, as the Foreign Secretary says, that we are taking advantage of the very best techniques and technology to give our people, who are often in tough jobs, the best tools we can.
So those are the five things we are focused on as a leadership team, with the Foreign Secretary holding us to account. We will get the spending review outcome, I hope now in a matter of weeks, and then we will know exactly what we are delivering against for the next few years.
Baroness Crawley: That is very interesting; thank you very much. I think Baroness Blackstone wants to follow up on that.
Q16 Baroness Blackstone: Very briefly, many years ago I was involved in a huge study of our overseas representation and how we made foreign policy in London and around the world, and certainly the Foreign Office was then hugely top heavy. So it is interesting that you have discovered that, or think that it still may be. I do not know whether the Permanent Secretary will agree, but the more top heavy you are, the more you deny opportunities for your very able, younger and more junior people, and it is deeply frustrating for them. So I hope you are able to address that one. But the second thing is that I have recently been overseas, and one of the criticisms that have been made of the Foreign Office in London is how immensely slow it is at making decisions, particularly about the allocation of funds for overseas development. So speed is of the essence in order to be more efficient. That is just a bit of feedback for you; you may have heard it already.
David Lammy: Thank you.
Sir Oliver Robbins: May I respond briefly to the first point there? Just to say, all the questions that the Foreign Secretary has been asked this afternoon also point to the need for good experience and judgment. So there is a careful balance to strike here, given that we operate a rotational model of getting people out overseas, about not slipping down too far at the top. But I am very alive to the risk that if you have too many senior people, the work drifts upwards, and you do not give younger diplomats and development officers the chance they need.
Q17 The Chair: Foreign Secretary, No. 10 announced earlier this month that the UK is finalising a deal with Mauritius on Chagos. Can you provide the committee with timelines for signature and when Parliament may have sight of the text of the treaty, and will it require primary legislation and/or the CRaG procedure?
David Lammy: I want to be absolutely clear that it absolutely will get the full scrutiny that you would expect it to get when those discussions come to fruition. I cannot give a timeline because these are detailed discussions, and at the heart of this, despite some of the noise that we have seen off, is UK national security. It is about securing a base on Diego Garcia for the next century, and one that keeps much of the global community safe at a time when there are immense challenges globally and specifically in the Indo-Pacific. That is a base that has that has served us so well in so many ways, and which was active in relation to the Red Sea just over this last period. So I absolutely undertake that when we get there, I will expect proper parliamentary scrutiny, debate and discussion, as you would expect.
The Chair: Thank you. Do you have time for a question from Baroness Coussins?
David Lammy: Absolutely.
Q18 Baroness Coussins: It is not in relation to Chagos but goes back to something that both of you have mentioned in different answers, which is the importance of Mandarin expertise. I just want to be sure that you are aware that, currently, the Department for Education is considering whether it should renew funding for the extraordinarily successful Mandarin Excellence Programme, whose funding expires in August this year. Clearly, you understand the importance of producing a pipeline of British nationals who are Mandarin speakers for diplomacy, for security and for business, so I hope you will make the views and the needs of the FCDO known to the DfE before it makes a decision that would be a very backward-looking one if the Mandarin Excellence Programme were to be cut.
David Lammy: Let me just say one last thing to the committee that is important and which, I hope, runs through much of my contribution and the outlook of the department. I set it out in opposition and I think it has stood the test of time. That is that the posture of the UK has to be one of progressive realism. We have to meet the world as it is, not as we would wish it to be. With the huge challenges we have with global war and the huge pressures we have with competing superpowers, that means we have to be fit for purpose for today, not for yesterday or decades ago. That is what makes Mandarin hugely important to invest in at this time. I cannot emphasise that enough, and of course I emphasise it to my colleagues. That it is why, following my visit to China, I was keen to catalyse Whitehall engaging with China. We had been absent for so many years, and actually this was not just ministerial; I think there was quite a lot of nervousness among officials: “How do we engage with China?” So the capability bit sometimes involves speaking the language, but also being empowered to engage is fundamentally important. But of course, you do it while being very clear eyed about the challenges as well.
The Chair: Foreign Secretary, thank you for giving up an hour and a half of your very busy time.
David Lammy: Thank you. I look forward to coming back.
