18
Examination of witnesses
Professor Donald Abelson and Professor Monica Toft.
Q45 The Chair: Thank you both for joining us, Professor Abelson and Professor Toft, and giving us the benefit of your wisdom. Our session is streamed live on the Parliament website. A transcript will be taken and, once available, you will be sent a copy. I am sorry we are later than you expected. You will appreciate that we have even less time than we might have had. We will not ask you for lengthy opening statements, but, if you could introduce yourselves, then we will launch straight into questions.
Professor Donald Abelson: I am a political scientist at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.
Professor Monica Toft: I am Monica Duffy Toft. I am the academic dean, professor of international politics and director for the Center for Strategic Studies at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
The Chair: Thank you for joining us quite early in your day. We spoke the week before last to four former British ambassadors to the US who told us that the UK-US relationship is unique in that it is peculiarly conducted from the top, which is very different from any other relationship the UK might have with other countries. I interpreted that as meaning that personal relationships and dynamics play an important part between the US and the UK in terms of our bilateral relations. What is your view on that?
Professor Donald Abelson: President de Gaulle once remarked that any state worthy of its name has no friends, only interests, but we have seen in important bilateral relationships around the world, such as between the UK and the United States or Canada and the United States, that when the leaders have a foundation of true friendship it not only helps facilitate co-operation but, more specifically, helps manage dissent, particularly when the national politics in the respective countries could easily drive a wedge between them.
In the case of the UK and the United States, we have witnessed over several decades close relationships between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Reagan, Prime Minister Blair and Presidents Clinton and George W Bush. This is not to say that we agreed with the policy outcomes of the friendships, but at least they created access and an opportunity for the free exchange of ideas. Unfortunately, that has become more difficult in the current political climate with the change in Administration in the United States. True friendship—the ability to provide policy recommendations, to listen to criticisms and to work with others—has in my experience been very important in setting the right temperature in the room.
Professor Monica Toft: I have a bit of a preamble to my comments. First of all, thank you for the opportunity; I really am honoured to be here. I come to you as a scholar of international security. That is my area of focus, as well as US foreign and national security policy, and also civil wars. My two most recent books, both from Oxford University Press, are Dying by the Sword, which is about the militarisation of US foreign policy since 1776, and Civil Wars: A Very Short Introduction, which I just published. Both conclude with warnings about the trajectory of US politics internationally and globally.
When I speak to you today, it is with that broader history of both the internal dynamics of the United States and how it has been operating globally, and not just under President Trump. I have some serious, deep concerns as both an American citizen and a veteran, by the way, of the US Army, who fought during the Cold War. I was a Russian linguist on the front line in West Germany, which of course is now Germany. As a scholar of international politics, I find the current state of affairs deeply troubling.
We are only 58 days, as of today, into this Administration and we see the checks and balances in the United States unravelling. The Supreme Court granted sweeping licence to President Trump for any act he or it deem official, and the Republican-controlled Congress is largely rubber-stamping his agenda. In fact, he is not even going to Congress. The executive orders are the way of the day. By neglecting these oversight responsibilities, both branches are failing the system and putting American governance at great risk.
It has a big impact for the United Kingdom, which is why we are here. When we think about the special relationship and the unique way that former ambassadors and leaders have conducted relations, particularly from the top, it shows that leader‑to‑leader rapport can disproportionately affect outcomes. This means that the personal dynamic between the US President, who is currently President Trump—Professor Abelson went through the others—and the British Prime Minister is unusually important in determining the strength and relationship of that bilateral relationship. When that personal rapport is strong, co-operation flourishes, but, when it is weak, diplomatic tensions can emerge more easily than in other partnerships where bureaucratic or institutional inertia or ties provide the stability that we need in times of trouble.
Unlike European partnerships, which rely more on institutional ties—here we can think about the European Union and NATO—the UK relationship with the US can sharply fluctuate if personal chemistry between the leaders is lacking. We all know that under President Trump it is transactional, and personal relationships function as part of these transactions. What matters is whether the foreign leader or Government can offer something tangible, be it a diplomatic win for him and his team, or alignment on contentious issues. Friendships and these personal relationships are an end, rather than a stabilising force.
If the UK can be seen as instrumental—and I hate to use that terminology—in advancing this Administration’s objectives, and in particular his objectives, such as being recognised right now as a global peacemaker in Ukraine and in Gaza, or pressuring China on trade, he may prioritise the relationship. However, if Britain does not conform to his expectations it may be sidelined rather quickly.
Along those lines, given the bilateral transactional relationship, he does not respect multilateralism—we know this—or long-standing alliances for their own sake. That does not mean that he is going always to disavow them, but they are only about what they can do for him. If he perceives a leader as weak, he is more likely to dismiss them, as he did with former Chancellor Angela Merkel and former Canadian leader Justin Trudeau, whom he openly and publicly belittled.
The consequence for the UK is that it needs to maintain influence while avoiding subservience, and that fealty that he demands. It is going to have to walk a tightrope, engaging Washington to retain influence while avoiding the perception of being too deferential. We understand that Trump likes power and strength as much as he does not like weakness. It is that tightrope of not being subservient or deferential, and helping to advance an agenda.
Secondly, the UK needs to be prepared for unpredictability. Again, we are 58 days in and it is very chaotic. This Administration seem to be thriving in chaos, because it leaves everybody on the back foot. This chaos and unpredictability can disrupt long-standing diplomatic patterns, from military co‑operation to trade negotiations, and, of course, upset the multilateral context. Last week, the Financial Times said, “In just six weeks, US President Trump has turned from an unpredictable partner to an antagonist, and now to a potential adversary”. This highlights the pressure on Britain to consider alternative security and economic alliances if the US becomes even more erratic.
We know that there are broader security shifts that the UK is having to face. Germany is announcing a huge lift in its security and NATO is under strain. That friendship dimension does not guarantee strategic stability. The UK is going to have to make a hard choice. Does it double down on the US alliance and friendship, and hope to remain in Trump’s good graces, or does it begin investing even more in European-led security alternatives that would give it more autonomy in the long run? We know that the Trump Administration think in the short run; they do not think about the second, third and fourth-order effects. What I respect about Britain is that it appreciates history; it does think about the second, third and fourth-order effects of any decisions, and it is going to have to do that.
My bottom line is that friendship alone is not going to carry the UK through this period of geopolitical volatility, largely of America’s making but not solely. My sense is that we should be defining the relationship not by sentimentality but by hard, strategic calculations, and reminding ourselves that the US is doing hard strategic calculations, particularly with Trump’s vision in mind, and that Britain needs to safeguard its own strategic calculations. A paradoxical situation is that I actually think Trump would respect it if Britain was able to say, “But this is in our strategic interest. We have to go this way”.
Q46 Baroness Fraser of Craigmaddie: Professor Toft, given your point about Trump potentially going from an unreliable partner to antagonist, and with your historical perspective, how much is his “America first”, which we have seen before, actually “America alone”? What are the implications of this?
Professor Monica Toft: “America alone” and “Make America great again” are all part of this policy of privileging the United States above all else. The United States has Done that historically, but usually in tandem with its partners and allies. One of the strengths of the United States in the past against its autocratic foes was that we had allies such as the United Kingdom, Germany and France that we could rely on for leverage to make change in the international system.
My fear is that making America first will make America truly alone. When you think about US policy under the Trump Administration, I do not think the European allies can assume that the US is going to remain their primary security guarantor. They are going to have to reconsider their defence strategies without American support. Some of them are already doing that. Military conscription may be returning to some European nations. We have seen nuclear deterrence back on the table. Who is going to provide those guarantees under that nuclear shield? There are concerns that the United States may not do that. With respect to the UK, its nuclear arsenal remains heavily reliant on US missile technology and maintenance. It may turn to its European allies to help develop a fully independent deterrent.
Interestingly, if you look at the data, the US has dramatically increased European dependence on American military technology while simultaneously now signalling that it wants to rip through their support. If you look at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data, between 2019 and 2023 the US accounted for 55% of Europe’s defence imports, up from 35% five years earlier. There is going to have to be further unravelling if that is decided. This reliance creates a major vulnerability. If Trump restricts further arms exports or reduces military co‑operation, Europe’s security infrastructure could be left scrambling for alternatives.
As I said earlier, I agree with the sentiment that “America first” has, in many respects, become “America alone”. This shifts the reliability of the US as a cornerstone for global alliances and will compel partners in Europe such as the UK, but also those in Asia—we may get to Asia a bit later—to think about their long-term defence, economic and global geopolitical strategies. My fear is that the Trump Administration under their version of US national security policy see traditional alliances as ephemeral and expendable, and American commitments as conditional on whether they serve Trump’s short-term personal or political interests. As we go further down this road, I worry about the hollowing out of transnational trust and the degree to which we are going to be able to rebuild it in future.
Professor Donald Abelson: Part of the frustration, among not only European leaders but leaders in Canada and around the globe, is that they are still trying to figure out what Trump’s endgame is. If his endgame is to alienate most of America’s traditional allies, he is doing a wonderful job. If his ultimate goal is to pursue a protectionist and more isolationist policy, there are going to be serious repercussions that go along with that.
We are all familiar with the concept of hegemonic stability: that a powerful state has to be both willing and able to assume global responsibilities. During the first and second Trump Administrations, the United States has made it very clear that it is pursuing “America first”. We are going to have to wait and see what happens during the mid‑term elections in 2026 to see whether any momentum is taken away from the Republicans in the House and in the Senate. Who does Trump listen to? I hope he will listen to his base. They are already experiencing significant economic setbacks as a result of the imposition of tariffs on Canada, Mexico and other states. So much is going to depend on what Trump tries to do.
I agree with Professor Toft that it is going to come with a hefty price. We also have to keep in mind that, unless President Trump is somehow able to overturn the 22nd Amendment to the US Constitution, which limits Presidents to two terms, he will be gone in a little under four years. The problem is that we still need to draw a distinction between President Trump and Trumpism, and consider the impact that this ideological and in some ways pragmatic framework has had on shaping the ideas, values and norms of millions of Americans.
Let us not lose sight of the fact that over 75 million people voted for Donald Trump in 2024. He was the first Republican President to win a majority of both the popular vote and the electoral college vote in about 30 years. We are going to have to look very closely at what happens over the next 18 to 24 months. If the tariffs begin to hurt millions and millions of Americans even more, President Trump is going to hear it loud and clear from them. There is no guarantee, but that could conceivably encourage him to pull back somewhat. But, at this point, he has made it very clear that he is going to pursue an “America first” strategy. Let us hope it is not at all costs.
Q47 Lord Houghton of Richmond: One of the challenges for the committee in pursuing an assessment of the state of and the direction of travel of the special relationship is that virtually all the witnesses are completely fascinated and distracted by the political volatility caused in the short term by Trump. Can you put your finger on those areas of strategic divergence that will outlive Trump, and those things that we ought to be careful to monitor, assess and give the right level of prominence in our review?
Professor Donald Abelson: That is a great question. Multilateral organisations are not going to disappear. International organisations are not going to disappear. The impact of civil society in western industrialised nations and in more developing countries that have acquired a stronger voice with respect to civic engagement will not disappear. Can Trump, as commander-in-chief, do a fair bit of damage? He can and already has, but that does not necessarily mean that this will be the trajectory that the United States will take over the next several decades.
We have to see American history, as the late historian Arthur Schlesinger used to say, in terms of cycles. We are going through volatility, chaos and unrest. That does not necessarily mean that 10 years down the road we will witness the same kind of dynamic. Trump is one person who wields enormous power and we have a Republican Party that is not prepared to exhibit the kind of courage that is required during important times of leadership. Yes, damage can unfold, but it can also be repaired.
You will recall, when President George W Bush stepped down from office, the amount of effort, time and energy the United States had to invest under President Obama to repair and restore relations with countries around the world. I suspect—again, depending on how much political traction Trumpism has over the next several years—that we could conceivably see a significant reversal, but, again, you have a country, as I think Professor Toft would readily admit, that is fundamentally divided between two parties that do not seem to want to give up an inch, and a President with a skin so thin that anyone who says anything that can at all be perceived as an affront to him will be part of a much-growing list of people he will set his sights on over the next three-plus years.
American history goes in cycles. I suspect that, if Trump begins to lose steam as a result of not only the tariffs but other domestic and international initiatives he is going to pursue, we could see a lot of the wind being taken out of his sails, but we can never ignore the fact that you are still dealing with a powerful country that is both politically and ideologically divided.
Professor Monica Toft: I largely agree with Professor Abelson. It is not only civil society and the citizenry responding, many of whom are saying, “Well, I wanted change, but I didn’t expect it so dramatically and to impact me”. You are seeing that with federal employees, many of whom voted for him and thought he was going to do good by them. There is civil society, the electorate, which will have a say in 20 months. That will be very interesting, but my concern is that a lot of damage can be Done in 20 months. We have already seen it in 58 days.
I teach at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and we train the next generation of diplomats. We have a master’s in international business for folks who are going into the corporate sector, who are actually in better shape than our traditional students who want to go into the State Department and foreign ministries around the world. The reason for that is that there is truly a gutting out of expertise within the different agencies in the United States. It is going to take a lot to rebuild them and to incentivise people to go back into civil service.
If the US Government can come in and disavow that commitment that people make early on in their careers, I fear that those people and the next generation are going to say, “I’m not going to bother. Why should I, if I can be dispensed with so readily?” Rebuilding those institutions is going to be quite difficult, and even more so rebuilding the faith in those institutions. I have serious concerns. The electorate will see how much damage is done across the American sector, including in red states, or states that are more ‘Trumpy’ than non‑red states.
Then, of course, we can look at the courts. Supreme Court Justice John Roberts issued a rare rebuke against Trump for saying that we should impeach, right away, a justice who disagreed with him. Of course, that requires Congress action to do, so we will see what happens with the courts. Last week, Amy Coney Barrett issued a decision with the liberal faction of the courts. They still have a lot of power and authority, and Congress is not doing its job. You want to look at the permanent damage, thinking about the perceptions, the faith in the system and what that means for people who want to continue to serve in the system.
On trades and tariffs, we are seeing a lot about computer chips in Taiwan. It has made a huge investment and is going to make a huge investment in the United States. Those are not easily turned around. Now, that might be good for the United States in the longer term, but it might rile China up a bit as Taiwan invests more in the United States. It is about looking at what can be turned around and changed, and then at what cannot be, what is slower moving and the damage that is Done to those slower-moving institutions, regulations and laws moving forward.
As I mentioned in my first set of comments, this is a President—and he is not alone in this—who is not relying on Congress to make change. He is using the executive orders. But at least prior Presidents turned to Congress and said, “You agree, right?” This President just does not seem to care. He is basically threatening them all with a cudgel to say, “If you Donald’t play along, we’re going to throw tons of money and primary you”. Again, the damage there is pretty long-standing, because these people are sitting in office and they want to stay in office, even if they do not necessarily have a job to do that they want to do.
Q48 Baroness Coussins: Professor Abelson, how seriously are Canadians taking President Trump’s plans about Canada becoming the 51st state? How are ordinary Canadians responding, for example through boycotting American goods, and how is the political establishment responding to these stated plans? It may be that, although tariffs are in play, political annexation is simply a fantasy that is not going anywhere.
Could I also tack on to this question something that we have heard from previous witnesses—that, although the 51st state is an idea that is going nowhere, we should take Trump’s stated ambitions over Greenland rather more seriously? Would you agree with that? In respect of both Canada and Greenland, what do you think the implications are for UK-US relations?
Professor Donald Abelson: Canadians are certainly concerned, but not about becoming the 51st state of the United States. I have gone on record before as saying that President Trump is delusional if he thinks that that is going to happen. I have also said publicly that there are three chances of Canada joining the United States: slim, fat and none.
We are concerned, of course, about the political climate in the United States. We are beginning to question whether we are still an ally or seen as an adversary, but I am also quick to draw a distinction between Donald Trump and his Administration and the American people. Millions of Canadians have close friends and family members in the United States. Canada’s frustration, resentment and disillusionment is not directed at the American people; it is directed at the Administration.
We continue to travel to the United States, albeit probably not as much as we did before Donald Trump resumed office. We are more focused on buying Canadian goods. As our new Prime Minister Mark Carney has indicated, we are more focused on working with our allies around the globe to help buffer the effect of the Trump Administration tariffs.
We know that in Canada, for decades and decades, there has been a long-standing discussion about reducing our dependency on the United States. Former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Justin Trudeau’s father, often said, “Given the gross asymmetry and power between Canada and the United States, we are very much like a mouse living beside an elephant”. We have to take the threat seriously. Do we think that we will be annexed by the United States? Generally not, although I should indicate that 13% of Canadians appear interested in pursuing that possibility.
To your question about what ordinary Canadians and the political establishment are thinking, let me touch on those points quickly before I get to the issue of Greenland. In the last few decades, I do not think I have ever seen the Canadian people more unified in their opposition to what has happened. They are angry. They are frustrated. They are bitter.
Canada is a very proud country, as you know. We are a country of 40 million people, one-tenth the size of the American population, but our values and norms with respect to many issues vary considerably. That is not something we are prepared to relinquish, nor are we prepared to back down to a bully. We are very unified as a country. Of course, there will be ongoing discussions about the impact of the tariffs and the retaliatory tariffs that are being imposed. We do take it seriously. My advice is not to panic, but we need to monitor the situation very closely.
With respect to the political establishment, several months ago Justin Trudeau set up a Cabinet-level committee on the Canada-US relationship, which I thought was very important. For five years, I worked very closely with Prime Minister Mulroney, the 18th Prime Minister of Canada, and he would often say to me that, other than the policy file on federal-provincial relations, the most important matter that any sitting Prime Minister has to address is the state of the Canada-US relationship. Justin Trudeau, over the last several months and years, has paid far more attention to that.
The political establishment, both at the provincial and territorial level and at the federal level, has worked more closely with members on Capitol Hill. It has reached out to members of the Trump Administration and to a number of NGOs, which I believe we might talk about a little further into the discussion, to make sure that our concerns and our recommendations are heard loud and clear. We are engaging in far more advocacy. We are working with our allies. Prime Minister Carney’s trip to Europe is intended to do just that, and, of course, to appeal to institutions that are required to comment on the rule of international law.
With respect to the threats over Greenland, we know what Greenland’s response has been. This is not the first time that we have heard it. President Trump announced his intention to try to acquire Greenland during his first term, and now has returned to it in his second term. The leadership in Greenland and the leadership in Canada have taken a very similar position, in the sense that neither country is for sale and they will do whatever is necessary to protect their sovereignty.
With respect to the lessons that could be learned by the United Kingdom, it is critical to engage in a public dialogue with your citizens about the importance of separating rhetoric from reality. Professor Toft made reference to this. President Trump enjoys throwing a lot of mud at the wall, hoping that some of it will stick. It distracts people from what the important issues really are. Every day he will come up with a new set of ideas that are half-baked, but none the less capture the attention and interest of states around the world and the international public. As people who work in the educational field, we have to work with policymakers to make sure that the public are able to decipher, or at least acknowledge, the difference between political rhetoric and what is actually on the table.
There are a lot of lessons to be learned. Of course we are concerned, but we are not in a state of panic. Canada is pursuing the right strategy in terms of making sure its recommendations and its interests are heard loud and clear.
Lord Bruce of Bennachie: Does any of this change Canada’s attitude towards relationships with the UK and the EU? You obviously have close relationships with the UK, specifically with France, but also with other EU countries. Is it likely to lead to a significant diplomatic, trade and investment shift towards European partners as a means of protecting yourself against what America is doing?
Professor Donald Abelson: That is entirely possible. As you know, Prime Minister Carney served as the Governor of the Bank of England. He is an economist by training and has a very keen sense of European and UK affairs. I think he is going to extend himself and the country in order to establish even closer relations with the United Kingdom and throughout Europe. We understand how important it is for Canada to begin to insulate itself more effectively from American political pressure—not that we should need that to happen in order to reach out more to our European allies and of course to the United Kingdom, a long-standing friend and ally.
But if Prime Minister Carney is able to win the next federal election, and if he has the runway to work with, what you are going to witness is Canada reorienting its economic and political strategy more toward Europe and other allies, lessening its dependence on the United States and more effectively insulating itself against the vicissitudes of American politics.
Q49 Lord Grocott: This is just a very swift back reference to your remarks, Professor Abelson. There is a bit of a contrast between the Trumpian view of Europe, which is, “It’s time you all got back to being nation states and forget about this”, and his attitude to North America, which seems to be, “Well, let’s have a big, happy Greenland, Canada and United States deal”. Maybe we are not expecting to see a great deal of consistency everywhere.
My question, very simply, is this: a major aspect of British foreign policy at the moment is to pursue what is called a reset of the relationship with the European Union. It has not really been defined, but it means a closer relationship, I suppose, in terms of direction of travel. Under the present Administration, does that reset have any implications for the way that the US views Britain in this particular area?
Professor Donald Abelson: I am not sure how much of an impact it is going to have over the short term. Again, we are going to have to ascertain what the lingering effects are of Trump’s time in office. If the “America first” doctrine and policy gains the kind of traction Trump and his followers believe it might, it is a question that we are going to have to revisit.
We have seen it before. If we go back to the late 1980s and early 1990s when President George H W Bush was in power, there was a lot of discussion about America’s role as a hegemonic power. Many scholars on both sides of the Atlantic were weighing in on the concept of “beyond American hegemony”. President Bush indicated at the time that he was not necessarily looking to reset the transatlantic relationship, but he did want to have productive discussions about trying to have a more effective and perhaps just distribution with respect to the resources required to maintain the security of Europe and, indeed, the world order.
Trump’s problem is that he lacks the capacity to engage in thoughtful and productive discussions. It is less about the issue. Most Americans, and indeed most Canadians, can agree that the issues of immigration, education, healthcare, border security, foreign policy and defence policy are all important. What distracts us from focusing on and unpacking a lot of these issues is the rhetoric. It is the anger. It is the bitterness. It is the judgment that is attached to all those issues by President Trump and his Administration.
To get back to your very concise and pointed question, we are going to have to see what the lingering effect is. Has there been a lot of damage? Yes. Does it need to be repaired in due course? It will be. The issue is this: will the Trump Administration’s experiment have a lasting impact on the US-European and US-UK relationships and the world order? We are going to have to wait and see, but it does not mean that the UK should not be proactive and more advocacy oriented in making sure that its position is well represented and heard.
Professor Monica Toft: Professor Abelson, again, I agree with you quite a bit, but I would say that we had the experiment already. We tested the hypothesis in the first Trump Administration, and here we are. We have the execution of the plan, so I do not know whether we have as much time. He was airborne and now he has the runway.
I lived in the UK and taught at Oxford for five years. I love the idea of the Loyal Opposition. The problem is that that does not exist any more in the United States. They are enemies of the state now, whoever they might be, from Obama all the way through the Democratic Party, but now also the university system, which I know we may talk about in a little bit.
I am not one for setting my hair on fire. I am a very calm, calculated, strategic person, but as a student of civil wars, watching how states and autocrats—strongmen, in this case—tackle the institutions that guide how governance should be Done in normal times, I can say that they are systematically going through and doing this. I am not convinced that time is on our side. We do have the elections coming up in 2026 and I hope that could be somewhat of a corrective. Hopefully, the Supreme Court justices realise that they have a role here in checking this. Then maybe some in Congress will say, “Okay, boss, you’re going too far”.
In any event, I do not feel as if this is an experiment. They are actually implementing policies that they considered in the first Administration, then wrote about and locked down. They now understand how government works and how they can deconstruct it. They are pressing at all the different seams to see what will work. Some of it is working, unfortunately. Like I said earlier, they are catching flat-footed many who should be correcting this system. Let us hope that the states and the governors can do some work, but, as we know, we are a federal Government and there is a lot of federal aid going to those states. Even many of them are wary of challenging this President at this point.
Q50 Baroness Blackstone: I wonder whether Professor Toft could tell the committee about how she sees American policy towards China developing, and what the expectations of the Trump Administration might be of the UK in respect to this development of policy in China.
Professor Monica Toft: Under Trump, US policy toward China will remain confrontational in rhetoric but, as with his other policies, transactional in practice. We know that his brand relies on tough talk against Beijing, but what we may see—and I have written a piece in Foreign Affairs that was recently published about spheres of influence—is a pattern of public hostility followed by backdoor deal-making.
Trump likes strongmen. We see this. He likes autocrats. I think he will continue to press China on trade, intellectual property and military influence in the Indo-Pacific, where we have allies, but his personal admiration—we do not want to disregard this—for authoritarian leadership suggests that he may be willing to strike deals with President Xi Jinping that fundamentally alter US commitments to our allies in the region.
Tough rhetoric is going to continue, but I think there are going to be strategic concessions. He may seek economic wins that allow China to expand its influence in exchange for trade concessions. My biggest fear—and I think everybody’s biggest fear—is that he views Taiwan as a bargaining chip. His past behaviour suggests that he could negotiate away long-standing commitments in exchange for short-term economic or political gains. Given his willingness to cede ground, literally and figuratively, to Russia in Ukraine, it is plausible that he could pursue similar deals in China.
The key implication here is for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. We know it is critical for the US. Trump has been working with Taiwan to develop that. They power American industry and military technology, which means there may be significant resistance from fellow US policymakers. That is a good thing. In his Administration, we know there are China hawks. The question is whether they speak up and challenge him. That is the question mark. Will Congress challenge this? The question is then whether China will be seen by the Trump Administration as a lever against US allies, pressuring them into making military and economic concessions and doing a “wink wink, nod nod”—you make a deal favourable to China in exchange for better policies with the United States.
What might the US ask of the UK? If the US cosies up a little more with China in the background, it could be stronger UK alignment with US trade policy on China. If China remains in the bad basket, it could be adopting tougher economic restrictions on China, maybe blocking or seeking to block Chinese investment in key UK industries, or aligning our tariffs and trade barriers against Beijing. It might ask for diplomatic support for US-Taiwanese policy. It may be about publicly backing the American military presence in the Indo-Pacific, which would draw the UK further in, or aligning on condemning Chinese aggression toward Taiwan and expanding defence co‑operation.
On security restrictions, we have already seen alignment on Chinese technology, and then there is the seeking of even closer military and intelligence commitments. We know that the UK and the US are very close on intelligence sharing, but even more so through the Five Eyes alliance. It may request a stronger UK naval presence in the South China Sea, but that is a high-risk manoeuvre that Britain may be reluctant to commit to, especially since Europe is still burning. The war in Ukraine does not seem to be ending.
The UK faces a strategic dilemma in that difficult balancing act, because, if it relies too heavily on the US and is not sure of what the US position is, it faces fallout. It can face political fallout, but also economic fallout. We know that China remains a key trading partner for the UK. Pushing back against the US risks diplomatic fallout. The Taiwan question, of course, is the most volatile one. We do not know where that is going to land with this Administration. You need to think about whether Trump will trade away Taiwan or aspects of Taiwan for short-term gains. If that happens, the UK will find itself in a geopolitical crisis and it will be forced to choose between staying aligned with US policy or taking a stand in defence of democratic allies. We are back to the unpredictability and uncertainty.
When I look at the evidence, President Trump does like backdoor deals. What kinds of conversation is he actually having with President Xi and his Foreign and Trade Ministers in the background? I am not privy to those conversations. Maybe some in your Government are more assured, but, given the uncertainty that we are facing, I would not take it for granted that things are going to stay the same. Hostile rhetoric may not mean a continuation of existing policy.
Professor Donald Abelson: All I would add—Professor Toft summarised the issue very well—is that Trump is looking for a big international win. He considers himself to be one of the world’s greatest negotiators. He is looking for a big win in the Middle East. He is looking for a big win in Asia. He is thinking about his legacy. He is thinking about areas in which he will be able to distinguish himself on the world stage.
I agree that on the one hand he appears to be tough with respect to China, but you know that he is having long conversations with the Chinese leadership that will help soften the blow. Taiwan is going to remain a critical issue, with America’s security guarantee. I would really focus on the narrative that Trump continues to weave around China, Russia and Taiwan.
It will also be very important to look at the people who are closely advising him in the White House to get any signal about the direction that the Administration are going to move in. We know that during the first Administration there was considerable conflict between the intelligence community and the Trump Administration. We know that there are many in the military—I am sure Professor Toft can talk about this at length—who have deep concerns about the President’s attitude and approach to many strategic and defence issues. This is a volatile issue that the UK and others are going to have to follow very closely, because it can erupt in a relatively short period.
Q51 Lord Darroch of Kew: I have a quick follow-up on what has just been said on Taiwan. John Bolton was Donald Trump’s third national security adviser out of maybe five in his first term. He wrote a book about it, in which he reports himself as trying to persuade the then President to take an interest in Taiwan and to care about Taiwan’s future. He basically says that he completely failed, and that Trump seemed utterly indifferent to Taiwan’s fate.
Alongside that, you have military experts who for some time have been saying that China is developing at least the military option of a Taiwan invasion—the capability to do it, even if it is not anywhere near taking a decision on whether to do it or not. I noticed in the newspapers the other day a photograph of a Chinese military exercise of landing vessels launching a military assault on a beach somewhere in China. These things are not released by the Chinese for no reason at all.
Where do you think this Administration really are on Taiwan? Are they genuinely indifferent to Taiwan’s fate, in which case the Chinese are bound to notice it, or has the President changed his views a bit on the strategic importance of Taiwan, maybe because of its semiconductor business? Where are they on this now? It always seems to me that Trump is basically concerned with China as an economic challenge. In the spheres of influence theory, it can do what it wants in the South China Sea, but it is the economic challenge from China that worries him.
Professor Monica Toft: The very simple answer is that we do not know. There are such contradictions. For example, there is a big investment now for the Taiwanese Semiconductor Manufacturing Company into the United States. You could make the argument that this is bolstering the relationship with Taiwan, that Trump and his Administration value Taiwan, that they want it to invest in the United States and that if something happens to Taiwan there is that investment in the US. On the other hand, Trump has declared that he would like to get rid of the CHIPS and Science Act, which is all about redeveloping the manufacturing of chips in the United States.
There are contradictions. I am not sure they are fully thinking through this piece of it, so I go back to the idea that it could be the case that President Trump thinks it is an advantage to support Taiwan over the short term, because it will get him that win. Professor Abelson is exactly right; this is a guy who does like a deal. He wants to win, and he wants a big win. Then perhaps he will wake up and realise that Taiwan is valuable and that we need to defend it. He would be supported in the US Government in doing that. The China hawks are very strong. They believe in that alliance. They believe in the commitment to that alliance.
However, if he and President Xi are making backdoor deals, and President Trump finesses or finagles a way for the United States to still get some guarantees that it will have access to those chips, as it is building chip capacity in the United States, I can envision President Trump selling Taiwan away, unfortunately. Given that, by the nature of the Trump Administration, he has his loyalists—these people are very loyal to his decisions—and a Congress that does not seem to be fighting back, he might get away with it. It is very uncertain where that Taiwan piece sits.
President Xi, right now, is going to be rubbing his hands together, because under President Trump we have basically given Russian President Vladimir Putin a victory in a war that he was probably going to lose or definitely was not going to win. We all understand that. I do not think that President Xi will have to go to war. We all understand—as you do in the United Kingdom—that it is very costly to attack island nations. President Xi understands that, but he may not need to. He might just do it through these negotiations and these deals. By the way, Taiwan might feel as if it has to accept this. It will have to become a buffer, or a neutrally aligned country in some ways, to both if a deal is struck.
Professor Donald Abelson: We have seen a scenario like this play out before, when President Clinton was in office and we witnessed what took place in Tiananmen Square. There was a debate between advancing economic interests and protecting human rights interests. We know how that panned out. This is not to draw a parallel between what could happen to Taiwan and what took place in China, but there is a dynamic of competing interests.
Once again, Monica has summarised the issue very well. John Bolton’s remarks are appropriate. There is an observation that Bolton has made many times before of Donald Trump: he seems to listen to the last person in the room. That is not how you want to engage in rational decision-making, but the reality is that how we were trained to think as rational scholars, economists, political scientists and strategists, does not apply to Trump in many ways. He is a very different President with a very different personality and very different attributes. That is what makes it more difficult to try to predict the next move, other than to know that, whatever he is going to do, it is in some way going to advance his legacy, his personal interests or those of his political base.
Q52 Lord Alderdice: Professor Abelson, earlier on Professor Toft mentioned the cuts to academia. You have also written a lot about think tanks. I wonder whether I can link those two together and ask what impact you expect the cuts to academia to have for US-UK research partnerships. Is there any scope for US and UK think tanks to meaningfully co‑operate to support the US-UK relationship?
Professor Donald Abelson: With respect to how cuts in federal grants to academic institutions could affect the study of the US and the UK among other areas and partnerships, it could be very significant. If the resources are not available, it is very difficult to hire people; it is very difficult to engage in even short-term research projects that will produce the kinds of policy insights that many stakeholders can benefit from. My colleagues in the United States are experiencing this, as are my colleagues in Canada. Academic institutions are moving in the same direction.
However, there is a silver lining. There are many very prominent think tanks in the UK and in the United States that have a common interest in pursuing more research on the US-UK relationship. Inside the Washington beltway alone, you have the Atlantic Council, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Washington office of RAND, which is headquartered in Santa Monica, California. These are prominent, world-class institutes that have had the United Kingdom and the United States as a thematic or regional focus. Many years ago, the American Enterprise Institute, which is now located right down the street from Brookings and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, spearheaded the transatlantic initiative. It gained some steam for a brief period and then seemed to lose energy.
There is a real opportunity for scholars, policy practitioners and policymakers to get together, whether it is in the context of think tank collaboration or the work that think tanks can do with universities, to highlight the challenges, but also the opportunities. You are absolutely right; I have spent the past 30 years of my life studying think tanks on both sides of the Atlantic. That kind of measured, practical and thoughtful analysis is required now, probably more than at other times I can think of.
It is not just about the supply of information; it is about the demand for information and expertise. Donald Trump has indicated over the last several years that his primary goal in Washington was to drain the swamp. Well, guess who is in the swamp? It is universities, think tanks, government relations firms, NGOs and civil society actors, whose job is to provide information and expertise. Unless those organisations somehow benefit the ideological and political positions that Trump is willing to embrace, they are often ignored.
There are fundamental challenges to academic institutions. There are fundamental challenges to other repositories of policy expertise. I believe there is ample opportunity for collaboration between UK think tanks, Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York to really highlight the significance of what we are experiencing today and how we need to prepare for it.
Lord Alderdice: Professor Toft, can I give you a brief last word on these issues?
Professor Monica Toft: Sure. It is lovely to see you, Lord Alderdice; I have not seen you since our Oxford days.
Lord Alderdice: Indeed, it is lovely to see you.
Professor Monica Toft: I can give you it at first hand. I had a Minerva grant with the University of Oxford. This allowed me to deepen my relationship with my colleagues after I joined the Fletcher School. That grant was cancelled, and then two weeks later they cancelled the entire Minerva initiative. I do not know whether you know about the Department of Defense Minerva initiative, but it is really about studying national security policy and foreign policy, not only for the United States but globally. Many important studies came out of that initiative, and it has been cancelled wholesale.
I had a colleague who had a $2.3 million grant to study water conflict and co‑operation around the world. She is probably one of the world’s most renowned water experts. That has killed that study and really harmed her career.
USIP, the United States Institute of Peace, has brought peace negotiations and settlements around the world. The very first external grant I ever received as a lowly graduate student at the University of Chicago was from the United States Institute of Peace. I am not sure I would be speaking with you today had I not received that grant, because it was external validation that I was doing good research that needed to be funded. USIP was just raided. The president was removed and they dismissed most of the board and inserted Trump supporters on it.
We can talk about Woodrow Wilson and the Fulbright. I know the folks who run Fulbright, and they are concerned that the Fulbright programme is going to be substantially cut back, if not cut out. We know how important the Fulbright foundation is, not only for research but for America’s soft power in introducing American ideas, culture and its next generation to the world.
There has been a profound impact. When we think about our think tanks, foundations and universities, yes, much of this comes from federal funding. Even if a think tank says, “Okay, I need to deepen my relationship with Chatham House”, or what have you, we may not have the funding to do that. We can do it over Zoom—I am greeting you from Oman—but those face-to-face engagements are really important.
I worry about the next generation. Students who applied to graduate school are getting letters and are being told, “We’re stalling or stopping admission because we’re not sure we have the funding for you”. It is profound. It is going to mean cuts in research assistant positions, fewer postdoctoral fellowships, which is how people build their careers, and fewer transatlantic and global collaborations. Think tanks may be able to bridge some of these gaps, but I am afraid the long-term damage could be severe, because you need money to do good research.
We saw that reflected with the sanctioning of Russia. The Fletcher School had a relationship with MGIMO[1], which is the university that trains most of the students who go into its foreign ministries. We have not been able to engage with it in any public, open way, which is harmful, because we want to retain those ties to have better diplomatic relations and track two diplomacy down the road.
Private Donaldors could step forward, but I can tell you from talking to foundations over the past couple of weeks trying to re-secure funding that everybody is calling them. The demand on their funds right now is so high that they cannot fully answer the call. Let us hope that this unravels, but, as Professor Abelson said, we know from this Administration that there are only certain kinds of questions, think tanks or ideas that they are going to be willing to fund. It is not impossible, but we are not going to have that free-flowing debate as readily as we may have just six months ago.
Professor Donald Abelson: I agree with Professor Toft. There is also another scenario where the Government can step in and establish public policy institutes that operate at arm’s length. We have had that in Canada and it has appeared elsewhere. I agree with her comments and concerns about government funding and philanthropic funding, but there is also an opportunity for Governments to recognise the important intersection between the policy-making world and the academic community, and to help establish institutes to do important research that could, I hope, cover or address some of the important issues that she has identified.
The Chair: I thank you both very much indeed. We will send you a copy of the transcript of our session.
