19
Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy
Oral evidence: Defending democracy
Monday 17 March 2025
4.30 pm
Members present: Matt Western (The Chair); Lord Browne of Ladyton; Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi; Bill Esterson; Baroness Fall; Sir Julian Lewis; Mike Martin; Edward Morello; Lord Sarfraz; Lord Sedwill; Derek Twigg; Baroness Tyler of Enfield; Lord Watts.
Evidence Session No. 1 Heard in Public Questions 1 - 13
Witnesses
I: Dan Jarvis MBE MP, Minister for Security, Home Office; Baroness Jones of Whitchurch, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Future Digital Economy and Online Safety, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and Department for Business and Trade; Shaun Hipgrave, Director of Protect and Prepare, Home Office; Nanyamka Brown, Deputy Director for Information Threats and Security, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
Dan Jarvis, Baroness Jones of Whitchurch, Shaun Hipgrave and Nanyamka Brown.
Q1 The Chair: We have our final session today on our Defending Democracy inquiry. Welcome to our committee. Can I invite our witnesses just to briefly introduce themselves? We will then start with questions. I would just preface this by saying that we are expecting votes in about half an hour, so brevity will be important for this entire session, if we are to get through it.
Shaun Hipgrave: I am director of Protect and Preparedness in the Homeland Security Group in the Home Office. That is the bit that deals with national security. I work to the Security Minister.
Dan Jarvis: Good afternoon, Chair. I am the Security Minister, based in the Home Office.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: Good afternoon. I am the Minister for Digital Futures and Online Safety in DSIT.
Nanyamka Brown: Good afternoon. I am the deputy director for information threats and security in DSIT.
The Chair: Thank you very much. Can I start with you, Minister Jarvis? Thank you for the correspondence that we have shared in recent months. Looking at the Defending Democracy Taskforce in the wake of the election, you inherited the work of the previous Government. In your letter, you explained that progress was being made. Can you give us some idea about what you found when you walked into the ministerial office and what changes you are implementing following the review?
Dan Jarvis: I would be happy to. It is only fair to make the point that, as the shadow Minister in opposition, I sought to work closely with the Government and with the Security Minister in the previous Parliament, because these are not matters that should be subject to political debate. These are matters that we all have an interest in, in terms of ensuring the strength of our democracy.
On a number of occasions prior to the general election, I was given briefings from the Home Office and from the Minister in order to be fully aware of the work that was due to take place during the general election. Of course, it was a working hypothesis that the election would take place later than it, in fact, did.
Coming into government, it was very important that we sought to get a refreshed mandate from the Prime Minister, and we have that. The Prime Minister is very clear about the importance that he attaches to this work. The basic pillars on which the Defending Democracy Taskforce is based have not changed. They are about ensuring the safety and security of our electoral processes. They are about ensuring that our democratic institutions are safe and secure by combating interference, including through cyberattacks or foreign interference. They are also about strengthening our democratic society, including building resilience to interference, not least in the online environment.
The Defending Democracy Taskforce continues to provide the role of being the fulcrum point across Government that brings together different government departments, operational partners, the intelligence services and the Houses of Parliament. It is the mechanism by which we ensure that we are marshalling all our resources so that they are in the right place at the right time in order to safeguard our democracy.
The final point that I would make, noting your point about brevity, is that this is not just about elections. Elections are, clearly, incredibly important moments in our democracy, but I am acutely conscious that our elected representatives are targeted and subject to harassment and intimidation every single day, whether there is an election or not. We sought to develop the work. There are a number of lines of inquiry that we have been looking at, and I can give you an assurance of the priority that we attach to that work.
The Chair: Just to build on that, as you say, elections are not everything. It is what happens between elections. We have some important elections, of course, next year for the Senedd and for Holyrood. Is there anything that you will be doing differently for that? Perhaps you could just briefly touch on what you see as the current priorities of the task force.
Dan Jarvis: There are a number of strands of work, but we are seeking to learn the lessons from previous experience in order to employ them in the local council elections that will take place in May. We have done a lot of work post July in looking at the general election and seeking to draw lessons from it.
In the main, for the general election that took place, the Electoral Commission found that polling day ran smoothly and that people were able to cast their votes securely. However, it is important to say that the election also saw completely unacceptable harassment and intimidation that was directed towards campaigners, candidates and electoral administrators. This Government are absolutely clear that that kind of activity has no place whatsoever in our democratic process, which is why we have been progressing work specifically on preventing and deterring harassment and intimidation towards anyone who participates in it.
At the same time, we should also be very clear that foreign states are working around the world to undermine democracies and to influence elections in their favour. The previous Government, to be absolutely fair to them, did a lot of work on this in the lead-up to the election that took place in July. This work included developing a cross-government response to foreign information operations of the kind that we have seen in elections in other countries.
In the event, there were no major information operations or cyber incidents during the general election, and the incidents that did occur were judged not to have caused a notable impact on the elections, but we are not remotely complacent about that and are working with allies internationally to make sure that we are best prepared to ensure that no foreign or malign actor is able to try to interfere with our processes.
Q2 Bill Esterson: Thank you to the panel for joining us this afternoon. Minister, we have had evidence that adversaries try to undermine public trust in the integrity of the democratic process rather than sway the overall outcome, an example of which was the Salisbury poisoning, where the Russians attempted to sow confusion in the immediate aftermath and during the investigation process. To what extent is the approach taken to undermine public trust an ongoing risk for the UK? Are you evaluating the cumulative long-term impact on trust?
Dan Jarvis: It certainly is an ongoing risk. It is probably worth reflecting, as I referred to earlier on, that the election came earlier than most people anticipated it would. In the end, most people’s assessment was that it was not going to be a close election. Had the election been likely to have been closer than proved to be the case, and had it happened at the point at which most people thought it would, it might have been a different story.
The truth of the matter is that I can tell the committee that the UK witnessed relatively low levels of attempted interference activity, which we judged to have not reached the relevant thresholds to impact or influence the outcome of elections.
The committee will also be interested to know that the FCDO monitored known Russian foreign information manipulation and interference networks as part of the collaborative HMG effort to tackle the information threats to the general election. We saw Russian-attributed networks such as Doppelganger promote pro-Russian messages with the intent to disrupt normal functions of election and voting processes. This was not judged to have caused a notable impact on the last election, but, as I say, we are not remotely complacent about the potential for it happening in the future.
Bill Esterson: Do you have a sense of the longer-term impact on trust of the kinds of activities that you have been assessing?
Dan Jarvis: All of us have an absolute responsibility to ensure that the public believe that elections are free, fair and not subject to interference by malign state actors or any other actor. That is going to have to be an ongoing process of work.
Bill Esterson: What can you tell us about how you monitor the long-term impacts of the kind of sustained interference that you have alluded to?
Dan Jarvis: Key to that is very close working relations with our allies, both the Five Eyes coalition and other partners. We co-operate very closely with our American allies. The reality is that these are challenges that western democracies are likely to have to face for the longer term, and certainly for the foreseeable future. This is not a unique challenge to the UK, which is why it is very important that we work so closely with our allies, and that is what we seek to do.
Bill Esterson: In the answer that you gave to the Chair at the start, you talked about the harassment and intimidation that some candidates, campaigners and, indeed, officials had faced. Are you able to say a little bit more about the approach that you are advocating to address this in the future?
Dan Jarvis: I wonder whether, with the committee’s permission, I might invite Mr Hipgrave to respond and talk briefly about the work that he has done on that specific point.
Shaun Hipgrave: Thank you, Minister. Many of you will know that, as we ran up to the general election last year, we were facing intolerable amounts of abuse and intimidation prior to the election being called. We were already preparing across Government on what our response would be for the general election. As we moved into the announcement of the election, we put in place, for physical protective security, a private contract to support all 4,500 candidates. That contract was able to provide protective security for event attendance for all those candidates, and was extensively used pre election.
Since the election, we have continued to maintain that capability and to provide an alternative protective security capability similar to the one that Parliament security provides for MPs. We also provide it for Ministers. This year, we have additionally ensured that we can provide that capability of protective security for metropolitan mayors, PCCs and local councillors. That same capability is working right through all the democratic systems in the UK.
Bill Esterson: Presumably, that includes what the Chair asked the Minister before about the Scottish and Welsh elections next year.
Shaun Hipgrave: The offer is for MPs and candidates in both Houses, but we work very closely with the Scottish and Welsh Governments, who are replicating some of our capabilities.
Mike Martin: Mr Morello and I were both first-time candidates in the election in 2024. We were not aware of that offer to candidates. I would be really interested whether you have any data on how many candidates were aware of that offer.
Shaun Hipgrave: We can come back to you. There is a network called the Op Bridger network, which was used back then, and the Op Ford network, which engaged with all candidates. I can talk at length on what that system of engagement was pre election, but I can come back to you on that.
The Chair: If you could write to the committee, that would be great, detailing how many candidates were aware of and took advantage of that offer.
Q3 Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: Minister Jarvis, in terms of defending democracy, it is all very well that we are talking about foreign political interference, threats to our democracy, or what is going wrong abroad, but, as we discussed last year, that was the most toxic election that I have experienced in a couple of decades of electoral contests. There was a lot of abuse and intimidation, including in my Slough constituency. What are the Government doing to tackle homegrown misinformation, disinformation and abuse?
Dan Jarvis: It is a very good challenge, not least because data from the election—
The Chair: The sitting is suspended for votes and we will return very shortly.
Sitting suspended.
The Chair: We have half an hour until the next vote, so I ask all members and witnesses to keep all comments as brief as possible.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: Before we were so rudely interrupted, I asked: Minister Jarvis, in terms of defending democracy, it is all good talking about foreign powers, threats and what is going on abroad, but, as we discussed, last year was one of the most—if not the most—toxic election that I have witnessed in my 20 years in electoral politics. There was a lot of abuse and intimidation across the country, including in my Slough constituency. What exactly are the Government doing to tackle abuse, intimidation, misinformation and disinformation?
Dan Jarvis: First, let me agree with the premise of your question. The 2024 general election did take place against the backdrop of growing community tensions. There was an increasing trend emerging, with attempts being made by small groups of people to hijack legitimate protests and subvert the democratic process. I agree with your analysis. It was a very challenging election for many candidates.
Based on many conversations that I have had since the election, it was particularly challenging for women and ethnic-minority candidates. It is deeply concerning to think that, in the future, people who are highly qualified to serve in public life might be dissuaded from stepping forward to do so because of the toxic environment that we saw in some places in the general election.
A key part of our response is working very closely with local police forces through the Operation Bridger and Operation Ford networks, but it is also worth making the point that a lot of the activity that you and other colleagues will be very familiar with will have taken place online. Perhaps, with your permission, we could ask Baroness Jones to say something about online activity.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: I was literally just coming on to that, Minister Jones. Do the Government have the tools at their disposal to tackle state-sponsored disinformation campaigns online, or are we overly reliant on US platforms to do so?
Within your response, Minister Jones, could you please reassure us that the expectations of tech firms’ compliance with the Online Safety Act will not be negotiated away in the Government’s wider diplomacy with the new US Administration? The reason why I say that is because of what was reported, for example, in the Daily Telegraph back in February. They said that the Government were considering renegotiating online harm laws to avoid Trump tariffs.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: I would like to make clear that we have both legislative and non-legislative measures that we can take on misinformation, disinformation and, indeed, foreign interference. For example, if you go back to the Doppelganger incident, we work very closely with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which exposed the Social Design Agency, which was being sponsored by the Russian state. That led to an initiative by the G7 rapid response mechanism that took on that foreign interference that was occurring from the Russian state at that time.
Equally, in terms of non-legislative efforts, we work all year round. We have a department in DSIT called the national security online information team, which monitors everything that is happening online. It has a trusted flagger relationship with social media platforms, and can report incidents and trends that are happening online. Via that trusted flagger mechanism, we can get social media companies to take that down.
You then asked about the Online Safety Act, and I should say that this is a historic day, because—it has been a long time coming—from today the power to tackle illegal posts on social media platforms comes into effect. Ofcom has new powers in all of that. That is quite substantial. Under that Act, social media companies will be required to take down false communications, foreign interference offences, and other forms of illegal misinformation. That is all part of the Online Safety Act, and we are absolutely committed to following that through and making sure that the Act, in all its aspects, is implemented in full, as it will be in the coming months.
In terms of other relationships, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have made it clear that the Online Safety Act is not up for negotiation. There may well be discussions around trade deals, but, as far as we are concerned, they will not impact on the Online Safety Act, which is a piece of legislation, so you cannot negotiate it away. It is there on the statute book, and we have no intention of taking it down.
Mr Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi: Thank you for providing that reassurance. Lastly from me, Minister Jones, we have heard that deepfakes did not create major issues in this election. How concerned are you about AI-powered disinformation? Is that overhyped? Will the Online Safety Act create protections for future elections?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: Again, the Online Safety Act does cover deepfakes. Where those are identified, social media companies will be required to take them down. That is all part of the Act.
In addition to that, we are doing a huge piece of work with the Home Office to be better at identifying deepfakes. We have something called the deepfake detection challenge. We have been working with a whole range of researchers and innovators to set up new mechanisms for empowering organisations, but also citizens individually, to identify what is real and what is a deepfake. They are making huge strides now in being able to empower people to do that. At the moment, they are on the second phase of that challenge, working with the companies that have come up with the most promising prototypes for that.
The lesson that we are learning from all of this, of course, is that we always have to be one step ahead. I am sure that we will get better at identifying deepfakes, but then there will be another challenge and another challenge. It is absolutely worth saying that we are not complacent in any of this. We will have to keep modernising and reinventing to make sure that we keep our mechanisms and our protections for citizens up to date, so that we can deal with emerging technologies in whatever form they come at us.
Q4 Derek Twigg: We have very much focused on disinformation and problems around elections, but it is the ongoing disinformation and undermining of democracy between elections that we should also be talking about. I do not want to go into the details of the horrendous Southport murders, but the disinformation campaign and the way that that was handled and dealt with on social media raise some really serious concerns.
What I am interested in, Ministers, is whether you now have a strategy. Incidents will continue to happen, I hope not like that, but people will continue to focus on these on social media and elsewhere. We may have incidents like those we saw following Southport. What is the Government’s strategy now in dealing with and combating disinformation, and getting information out very quickly? One of the problems that we saw was the slowness of getting proper information out to the wider population.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: You are absolutely right. Southport came at us with, in a sense, very little preparation. I am pleased to say that we did, across Government, respond very quickly to that. One of the lessons that we have learned over time is the importance of government liaison. Departments are working more and more closely, and understand each other’s role much more now than perhaps they had in the past.
Of course, it was very difficult in Southport, and for very good reasons. The authorities were limited in what they could say during the incident. Nevertheless, we played our part and liaised with the major platforms.
Derek Twigg: Could I interrupt you? You said that it was very difficult because of what the Government could say during the incident. Could you expand on that a bit, please?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: The police, for example, were not able to respond to particular incidents that they were seeing, because they were still at that point of collecting evidence. They could not respond as quickly as perhaps we were able to in terms of some of the posts that were appearing, because they have to go through their due process of looking at the detail of the incidents and who was involved. They were collecting evidence, but, as we know, the incidents were rolling out much more quickly than that.
Derek Twigg: What is the strategy in the future for getting information out and dealing with incidents in a much better way than we handled things at Southport? That is what I am trying to get at.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: It goes back to the Online Safety Act, in part. It did not apply last time, so we do have that extra tool in the box. We are also able, through aspects of different government departments, including our department’s national security online information team, to work with social media companies to take posts down. That was one aspect that was working in Southport, and we would hope to use that in the future.
Dan Jarvis: Do you mind if I respond? It is a very important point. You are right. Social media is putting the established principles of how Government communicate at times of crisis under very significant strain. Counterterrorism police are looking very carefully at what more can be done in this area.
The Home Secretary, the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General have written to the Law Commission to ask it to conclude its own review into the rules around contempt of court as quickly as possible. As Ministers, we were acutely conscious that we did not want to say or do anything in the aftermath of the terrible attack in Southport that might have prejudiced ongoing legal proceedings.
Given that we now find ourselves in a situation where there is rapid online activity and ideas are being advanced, some of which are patently not correct, we do need to look at this area. That is why, as I say, the Home Secretary and others have written to the Law Commission to ask it to expedite the work that it is doing in this area.
Q5 Lord Watts: In the past, Ofcom has not reacted in the way that many of us would have wanted it to. It has been very slow and seems unaccountable. What confidence do you have, with the new role that Ofcom is going to be given, that it is able and wishes to use it to its full effect?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: It is given very specific responsibilities in the Online Safety Act. From all the engagements that we have had with it, it understands those responsibilities, and it will now have to follow that up. We will see in public the actions that it is taking to implement the Online Safety Act, so I am confident that there will be huge change in the way that social media companies respond to the challenges that Ofcom puts to them.
I have to say, as we have always said, that there is an iterative process here. The Online Safety Act is not the be-all and end-all of it. We, as a Government, and Ofcom are looking at what further steps we need to introduce, but we now have some new powers and it is only right to make sure, over the coming months, that Ofcom is implementing them in the way that the Act requires.
Lord Watts: It had powers in the past and did not use them.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: All I can say is that, from all the indications and everything that Ofcom has said to us, it is absolutely fully geared up to use the new powers that it has, and we will be able to monitor the use of those powers.
Q6 Lord Sarfraz: Minister Jarvis, how worried are you about DeepSeek-type models being released? This was a big deal. Some countries banned it altogether from citizens. Others said, “We’re not going to have any DeepSeek on government devices”. There will be hundreds of models like DeepSeek that emerge, many of which will be distributed in open source. We have no idea of knowing where they are coming from. How worried are you about this and what it means for the information that our citizens will consume?
Dan Jarvis: I worry about a lot of things. That is one. I wonder perhaps whether Baroness Jones could come in, because it relates more directly to her area.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: You are absolutely right that it is a very fast-moving area, which is exactly why we need to move further and faster to address those issues. The Government are committed to ensuring the security of UK data and that organisations and consumers can use AI data safely.
We have published the AI cybersecurity code of practice and implementation guide, which applies to developers and stakeholders. We are attempting to create a global standard. This is not just a UK issue; it is a global issue. At the end of the day, it is a personal choice as to which technology individuals use, but we want to make sure that they are armed with the tools necessary to keep them and their families safe.
There is a lot happening, with discussions on a global basis. We are monitoring what is happening. You are absolutely right that more and more large language models will be rolled out, so making sure that we deal with that on an international basis is really important.
Lord Sarfraz: Are we at all concerned about non-state actors developing LLMs? They might not have the capability right now, but might they participate within open-source projects and corrupt data?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: You are absolutely right, and we are working on this at a number of levels. There is an initiative that is happening with the central AI risk function, which is being put together with the Foreign Office. Nanyamka, do you want to add something? You know more about that.
Nanyamka Brown: The central AI risk function is an initiative that brings together policymakers and AI experts to not only identify but start to try to anticipate AI risks as they are emerging, so it is less a reactive approach. There is a model that now exists for how we respond to it, but this is about trying to anticipate what might be emerging and actively using the greatest minds to navigate potential solutions and mitigations.
Q7 Edward Morello: Mr Jarvis, why did the Government delay the introduction of the foreign influence registration scheme until the summer of 2025? Do you accept the charge that the delay means that hostile activity continues unchallenged in the meantime?
Dan Jarvis: With great respect, I do not accept the premise of your question, because we have not delayed the implementation of FIRS.
Edward Morello: It was due to come in in 2024 and is now, according to the last statement, earmarked to start in the summer of 2025, is it not?
Dan Jarvis: We have moved at pace to implement FIRS. I made a statement to the House on 4 March, in which I confirmed that we will lay the regulations for FIRS in the near future, with a view to having the scheme up and running by the summer. We have worked at pace to do this. We have more people working on the scheme than was the case previously, and we have progressed it at pace, but there has not been a delay of FIRS under this Government.
Edward Morello: Is it the case that the previous suggested launch date was inaccurate, or were you underfunded or understaffed in order to meet that?
Dan Jarvis: I am sure that you will appreciate that I cannot speak on behalf of the previous Government. On behalf of this Government, I can tell you that we have progressed FIRS at the quickest possible rate. It is the Government’s intention to implement it as quickly as possible. There is significant work under way to ensure that this happens in accordance with the timeframe that I laid out just a couple of weeks ago. It is a priority for the department, we want to get on with it, and we are progressing it as quickly as we possibly can.
Edward Morello: Are there any inherent risks due to the fact that it is not in place in the meantime? Are there threats that remain unchallenged as a result of not having that framework in place?
Dan Jarvis: That is a reasonable challenge. One of the reasons why we have progressed it at pace is that it will add very significant value. The National Security Act is a very significant and landmark piece of legislation that we have inherited. We are progressing those elements of it that were not fully introduced by the previous Government. The sooner we can get that done, the better.
Edward Morello: Can you briefly outline for the committee what the threshold is for a country being placed on the enhanced tier?
Dan Jarvis: I would love to be able to do that, but it perhaps will not come as a great surprise that I am not going to say anything further about the criteria that we will attach to FIRS. We made an announcement on 4 March with regard to Iran, but decisions on which foreign powers and the criteria that we will attach to them will be taken on a country-by-country basis, which we will base on very robust security and intelligence analysis. We will have more to say about that in the not-too-distant future, but, with great respect, there is nothing more that I can say about it today.
Edward Morello: Would you be able to tell us whether countries such as Russia or China are pursuing the same kind of activity that Iran has been pursuing in order to warrant being placed on that tier?
Dan Jarvis: That is a very clever way of seeking to get me to answer the question that I just said I was not going to answer. While I have considerable respect and admiration for the clever way in which you have done that, I am not going to play that game in the way that you might wish. We made an announcement on 4 March about Iran. Announcements about other countries will be made in the normal way to Parliament in due course.
Q8 Lord Browne of Ladyton: If I may, can I ask Ms Brown to expand upon that last intriguing contribution that she gave to the question that was initiated by the DeepSeek presence and the possibility of that proliferating? My inbox receives regular emails from a number of businesses such as ControlAI and Logically, which are focused on trying to control these risks as they develop and quite often encourage me to raise questions about the development of this technology, to try to somehow impede the problems at the beginning.
The reason that they come to me is that I have argued, on occasions, that we could learn something from arms control and the way in which that developed, particularly post the use of the only, thankfully, two nuclear weapons that have been used. The people who really understood the technology got together and worked out how there could be arms control, if leaders got to the point that they were going to try to control these weapons systems. The engineers and the scientists who were involved got together right across the whole spectrum to work out how that would be done.
I inferred, from what you said, that there is something of that going on already. Should we not encourage that? Should we not bring the developers and the people who know this technology best, both here and in other countries, to say, “If you want to control this, this is how you need to do it and this is where you need to press the levers”? Are we doing that and bringing them together to show us how to do this, rather than bringing the heads of these technologies together, as we see them collected in the United States, to do things that would not help that?
Nanyamka Brown: I just want to address one element of that question in your use of the term “control”. It is more about identifying the risks. As you have alluded to, AI technology is a fantastic innovation. There is plenty of opportunity there. It is not a matter of controlling and limiting its use. It is more about ensuring that its use is not for nefarious purposes. In answer to your question, it is not limited to specific heads of companies. It will be the range of experts that span AI development and implementation. It is broader than just the usual suspects that you have identified.
Lord Browne of Ladyton: I am sorry. I do not want to take this too long, but are we bringing these people together to work together and advise us? Physically, are we bringing them together?
Nanyamka Brown: I would not be able to answer, I am afraid, as to whether they have been physically brought together, et cetera, but, yes, a broader suite of people than central government and the heads of tech companies are being brought together to examine this issue, to identify risks and to consider potential mitigations.
Q9 Baroness Fall: Is the national security strategy going to focus on foreign interference and resilience? Will it dock with the work you have already done for the Defending Democracy Taskforce? That is a question to Minister Jarvis, please.
Dan Jarvis: As you will be aware, the Prime Minister has given a commitment that the national security strategy will be published in advance of the NATO summit that is taking place in June. The strategy will bring together work that is currently being led through the Ministry of Defence and the strategic defence review with other strands of activity that we are looking at from a departmental perspective, working very closely with Cabinet Office colleagues and partners across Government. The national security strategy will be a drawing together of all those different strands of work in order to ensure that we have a coherent response to the very significant and varied threats that the country faces.
Baroness Fall: Will that include the China audit as well? Will that come under the same umbrella or come before?
Dan Jarvis: The strategy itself will reflect the wide spectrum of threats that we face. In truth, the world feels like a very difficult and dangerous place at the moment. On the specific point about the audit, that is a piece of work being led by the Foreign Office. That is ongoing. With great respect, I would not be able to comment on the precise sequencing of that with regard to the national security strategy. I would be very happy to take advice and come back to you.
I can give you an assurance that the strategy will be a drawing together of bits of work that are taking place across Government, so we have in one place a holistic and coherent strategy, and we are marshalling our resources in the most appropriate and effective way to ensure that we can keep the public safe.
Baroness Fall: It would be interesting to hear about the timing, Minister. When Vice‑President JD Vance was speaking in Munich recently, among the many points he made, he told off the Romanians for cancelling their election based on the fact they were concerned about election interference. He said, “You can’t have a very resilient democracy, if that’s the case”. Did he have a point, Minister, or not?
Dan Jarvis: With great respect, you are providing me with an opportunity to comment on remarks that have been made by the Vice‑President of the United States. I am not going to do that, but let me explain why I am not.
You will understand that we are at an incredibly important moment in terms of work that the Prime Minister is leading with partners and neighbours across Europe, as part of a coalition of the willing, working very closely with NATO and with our US allies. It is incredibly important that we support that process and ensure that it has the very best chance of succeeding.
My own view is that, as Ministers, we should not seek to give a running commentary on that process because it is not helpful. The stakes are incredibly high not just for Ukraine but for European and our own national security. We have to ensure that we do not become commentators, but that we focus on the work to ensure that we can achieve a lasting sustainable peace for Ukraine. Responding to every headline or every utterance is not especially helpful in that regard.
Baroness Fall: Understood. As a final question from me, you mentioned early on in the session that it was not just the integrity of the poll that you were concerned about but the time in between. I was interested whether you had any concerns about—
The Chair: The session must be suspended. We are expecting a single vote. We will return in approximately 15 minutes.
Sitting suspended.
Q10 Baroness Fall: Minister, my question was about the new Chinese embassy, which is quite large. Some are concerned that it will advance their capabilities of interference when it is up and running. What are your thoughts?
Dan Jarvis: A final decision on China’s planning application for a new embassy has not yet been made. The Deputy Prime Minister, in her capacity as the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, and in her independent quasi-judicial role, will make the final decision in due course.
Because there is a legal process that is ongoing, there is not much more I can say, but I can say that the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary wrote a letter to the planning inspector on 14 January. As part of the process of sending that letter, the Home Office has considered the breadth of national security issues in relation to this particular planning application.
Sir Julian Lewis: I want to follow up on that. I know you do not want to make any controversial political statements, but I hope it is hardly controversial to suggest that China is ruled by a totalitarian communist regime that broke all its assurances of democracy in Hong Kong and even now is squaring up for a possible conflict with Taiwan.
During the last Government, it was no exaggeration to say there was a tension between those, such as Prime Minister Cameron and Chancellor Osborne, who wanted a golden economic relationship with China, and those who were more concerned about the security aspects arising out of the nature of the regime. Would it be true to say that that tension persists now?
Are you aware of the letter that was sent in January to the Planning Inspectorate by two senior Conservative MPs and four Labour MPs—one of the Conservative MPs was your immediate predecessor, Tom Tugendhat—listing all the security objections to having the largest embassy in Europe as the Chinese embassy in that prestigious location? Can you honestly say to us that there is not a continuing clash between security considerations pulling one way and the grasping naivety of economic greed pulling the other?
Dan Jarvis: I know you will understand that, because there is a process under way, I have to be incredibly careful not to seek to interfere with that. Ultimately, a decision will be taken by the Deputy Prime Minister in the way that I have just described. Colleagues from both Houses and elsewhere are, of course, fully entitled to express their opinion and their view about it.
In terms of your wider point, it is reasonable to say that, whoever would be in government, there are a number of countries around the world that present a dynamic tension, in that, on the one hand, from an economic growth point of view, we need to have a trading relationship with those countries while at the same time using all measures at our disposal to guard against the potential risk and threat from those countries. It is the job of Government—it can involve some quite difficult decisions—to manage that dynamic tension and take decisions that are in the national interest and allow us to fulfil the desire to grow our economy while at the same time safeguarding our citizens.
I can give you and the committee an assurance that these are matters that we take incredibly seriously. They are discussed among Ministers, not least at the National Security Council, but also in other forums. We take our responsibilities as a Government very seriously. In the end, national security is the first responsibility of Government. We will always do the right thing to keep the public safe. At the same time, of course, we have to make sure we can generate economic growth, because it is through economic growth that we have the resources to invest in our public services and do the things that we have been elected to do. We will manage that dynamic tension to the best of our ability.
The Chair: Minister, just picking up on that, to what extent has the task force brought together the strategies of resilience and addressing foreign interference? How does that differ from what, say, the Cabinet Office would be doing?
Dan Jarvis: It is very important that I convey the impression to you that the task force is the fulcrum point for activity across Government. The JESP—the joint election security and preparedness unit—which is formed from civil servants from the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, fulfils a very important function in terms of looking at these particular issues.
The task force, which I chair, is rooted right across Government and has all the right Ministers and operational partners to provide a fulcrum point for the Government’s response. It is a responsibility we take very seriously. We have invested a lot of time and effort, since the election, in making sure that we apply the right resources. We take the threats that we face as a country incredibly seriously. We are making sure that we are best prepared to guard against them.
Q11 Baroness Tyler of Enfield: I would just like to probe a little more in the whole area of cybersecurity resilience and our response. I am sure we all know that there are rising cybersecurity challenges, not least potential Russian retaliation if we commit peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. What steps are being taken to boost UK cyber resilience in both the short and medium term? Also, would you mind just explaining your ministerial responsibilities here? From looking in your witness bios, you both seem to have some responsibilities in this area, unless I have misread it. I do not know who wants to go first.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: I am responsible for a lot of the digital side of it. My colleague Minister Feryal Clark deals with AI and some of the cyber side of that. As the Lords Minister, it seems like I cover everything.
I deal with some of the online implications. As I was saying earlier, we have the AI security committee, which looks at the broader issues of AI and how we make sure, exactly as Minister Jarvis was saying, that we keep the country safe while making the best use of AI as we go forward. We also have the cybersecurity code of practice. We are working with other government departments to make sure that is a robust code of practice.
As we were both saying earlier, a lot of this is enhanced by our connections internationally. You cannot do very much of this alone. We are very busy building resilient relationships on an international basis with countries of like mind. The more we do that, the more we will be genuinely resilient as we go forward.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield: Before I ask Minister Jarvis whether he wants to come in, on that international point, are you concerned that US Cyber Command has reportedly paused its operations against Russia? Does this have wider security implications for us?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: We are in favour of strong relationships with all our allies, including the US. We want to share information and build resilience with all our allies. The more we can share intelligence with trusted partners, the better. That has to be our strategy going forward.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield: Yes, I am sure that is right, but the issue was more about what our response has been to the fact that the US seemed to have paused its operations against Russia. Minister Jarvis, are you able to respond on that point?
Dan Jarvis: Can I come to your first point in terms of ministerial responsibilities? From a Home Office perspective, we own the threat pillar, but matters relating to cyber need to be wired right across Government.
To the specific point you made around resilience, that is a Cabinet Office lead, but these are matters that we work on very closely together as a Government. NCSC, the National Cyber Security Centre, is represented on the task force. It does incredibly important work in terms of combating the threat that we face, including specific measures to support parliamentarians.
I am acutely conscious that this committee has previously been very critical of the leadership of the Home Office specifically with regard to ransomware. I hope the committee will have noted that, a couple of months ago, we launched some world-leading ransomware proposals that we are currently consulting on. These are very much matters within the domain of the task force, but on which we work across Government.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield: Do you have anything to add on that Russian point?
Dan Jarvis: I do not have anything to add.
Q12 Lord Sedwill: Can we move from defence to deterrence? Do we have the capabilities, and are we using them effectively enough, to disrupt our adversaries who seek to attack our electoral processes and democratic system, whether those are the National Cyber Force’s capabilities or other measures such as sanctions? Do we have the capabilities we need? Are we using them sufficiently to deter that threat?
Dan Jarvis: That is a good and big question, which is probably deserving of a session all of its own. The work that I mentioned earlier on, which is complementary to the work of the strategic defence review, is the work that will come together as part of the national security strategy. We are absolutely considering those matters in the round and ensuring that we have the right capabilities that are appropriately resourced.
It is important to be honest with the committee about the level of risk and the level of threat we face as a country. The world is a more dangerous place than at any point I can remember. It would be naive of anyone to assume that this was not challenging, given the full-spectrum capability of the threat we face.
As a still relatively new Government, we are looking very carefully and closely at the nature of the threat and ensuring that we have appropriate resource attached to the capabilities that we need to address it. It is through the work that we are doing and the production of the national security strategy that we will have the policy foundation to underpin that activity.
Lord Sedwill: You are right: it is a big question. Say, for example, we have had a cyberattack or some other form of attack to disrupt our electoral process or confidence in democracy. Would the task force have within its remit the ability not simply to say, “We have had this particular kind of attack; we need a cyber response to that”, but to deploy some other kind of response, whether it is sanctions or some other measure, in order that we are not simply combating this in the area that our adversaries have chosen? Is that within your remit?
Dan Jarvis: Yes. That is a very good point. I am confident that we have got the structures absolutely right. These gatherings are incredibly well attended by Ministers, senior civil servants and operational partners. They provide a very constructive forum to bring decision-makers together to look at the challenges that we face and take decisions about how we marshal our resources to best address them. The Prime Minister has been very clear about the concern that we as a Government feel with regard to these matters.
There is nothing more important than ensuring that our democracy is not interfered with, that our democratic process is allowed to operate free from interference and that our democratically elected representatives can do their business unaffected by harassment and intimidation. That is not the way things are at the moment, and all those who have been involved in recent elections will know that.
It is our remit, as a task force, to ensure that we address the threats that we face, and there are a number of metrics and measures that I personally will attach to that. When we go into the next general election—I am incredibly mindful that there are local elections and other elections before that—that election should be a smoother process than was the case previously.
Lord Sedwill: You have talked about the efforts that were made to disrupt the last election, although fortunately they were not successful. Have we been able to take any punitive actions against adversaries, whether false flag adversaries, private institutions under state control or state institutions, without breaching security?
Dan Jarvis: You will perhaps forgive me if I want to consider that more comprehensively than I am able to do in this moment and come back to you with a considered response.
Lord Sedwill: Of course.
Derek Twigg: Could I just follow on from that? I will put it as simply as I can. Now you have been in the job for a number of months, do you think we are too timid in our retaliation against our adversaries in terms of what they are doing to us? Are we too timid in responding and taking retaliatory action against them? Could we do more?
Dan Jarvis: It is an entirely fair challenge. I would say no. We take these threats incredibly seriously. We are well organised. We have the work strands in place that we need to make sure that we have the policy foundation and the resources in place to address the threats that we face. I am very clear, the Home Secretary is very clear and other Ministers are very clear that this is a very significant challenge that requires a strong and robust response, and certainly not a timid one.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch: Could I just add to that? As I said earlier, when the issue of Russian attempted interference in the election in terms of online messaging occurred, with the Social Design Agency and RT trying to use bots to change the election, we acted very quickly. The FCDO was very much involved in that. We had a G7 response to it. Again this comes back to co-ordinating not just the government response, but the response with fellow countries with which we are aligned. We have the mechanisms in place and we are watching what is occurring very carefully.
Q13 The Chair: Can I put this to you, Minister? A moment ago, you mentioned that we are possibly facing the greatest threats online and through other forms of challenge. Has the time come for Government to be more transparent in how it deals with this and how it relates the threats that we face to the public?
Dan Jarvis: It is an interesting point. For any Government there is always something of a dynamic tension, to use that expression again, between the importance of matters relating to national security, which clearly need to be very closely safeguarded, and the need to be clear with the public about what you are seeking to do.
In all honesty, in my experience of being in government to date, we have pretty much got that balance right. There was a very interesting point made earlier on about the terrible Southport incident. That is a matter that we have and continue to consider very carefully, which is why the Home Secretary and others have raised these matters with the Law Commission. Particularly in terms of online space, there are threats emerging that can present a very significant challenge very quickly.
We always need to look very carefully and closely at these things, and I think we do. To date, we have probably struck the right balance between being transparent wherever we can while at the same time clearly needing to safeguard confidential information.
The Chair: You will be unsurprised to hear that we had further questions for you. If we wrote to you, as a committee, we would really appreciate your responses to that, should you be so willing. I am very conscious of time, given that we have had such a punctuated session. We are just over time now. Can I thank the four of you for your forbearance through this mixed session? Thank you in anticipation of your responses to our written questions as well.