Stephen Doughty and Ben Greenwood.

Q14 The Chair: Good afternoon and welcome to this evidence session of the International Agreements Committee on the UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership agreement. The meeting is being broadcast live via the parliamentary website. A transcript of the meeting will be taken and published on the committee website. You will have an opportunity, Minister, to make corrections to that transcript where necessary.

I am pleased to welcome Stephen Doughty MP, Minister of State for the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office; and Ben Greenwood, who is a deputy director in the same office. Thank you very much for sparing the time. I will go straight into the first question.

The agreement appears to be more aspirational than substantive, not least with the title. Do you feel that the agreement remains relevant and appropriate in the current context? If so, in what ways?

Stephen Doughty: Thank you for having me. I really welcome the chance to talk about the agreement. I have just returned from Ukraine; about 10 days ago I was in Kyiv. This week I have also been with Ukrainian Ministers and others discussing, for example, our economic support to Ukraine and our support for Ukraine’s resilience and governance going forward. The items identified in this agreement very much relate to the practical and pragmatic conversations that we are having with Ukrainian colleagues.

It is worth reflecting very briefly on the talks overnight. There were very welcome agreements, and obviously we congratulate President Trump and President Zelensky for the breakthrough. The Prime Minister will be convening leaders this Saturday to discuss the next steps. We want to help bring an end to the war in a just and permanent way, with security guarantees for Ukraine to enjoy its freedom and sovereignty.

Obviously, part of that just and sustainable settlement is the wide range of issues covered in this treaty, whether that is in terms of our connections, security defence capabilities, maritime co-operation, trade and migration co-operation, or justice and accountability co-operation. I very much feel that the treaty is directly relevant not only to the conversations we are having right now, and the many areas of work we are engaged in, but to sustainability going forward.

I can tell the committee that Ukraine and Ukrainians very strongly welcome this agreement and see our partnership as crucial to their sustainability and development over the decades to come. We are very much looking at putting the meat on the bones of these key points through many different pieces of work over the weeks and months to come.

The Chair: Hopefully we will be able to investigate some of the meat today. The other point is the risks to the commitments we are making in this. We will come back to some of those, but do you recognise that there are risks within this agreement, particularly given the fast-moving and developing circumstances, and the context in which this agreement is located?

Stephen Doughty: We are absolutely resolute and ironclad in our support for Ukraine. While obviously setting an agenda for 100 years is ambitious, we think it is the right ambition to have because our commitments are so deep and we are so committed.

I am always pleased to say to Ukrainians that I think they enjoy support across the political spectrum in both Houses here and across the British public. You have only to look at the unique new partnerships that have been created thanks to the commitment and support of the British public, businesses, those who have made homes here for Ukrainians fleeing the war and those considering investments in Ukraine in future. I think our commitment is matched by the British public and this place.

The Chair: But you agree that 100 years is merely an aspiration and not a practical possibility.

Stephen Doughty: No, it is an absolute commitment. We would not have signed this agreement if we were not committed to it for 100 years. I think some of our longest-term and most stable relationships are based on these types of ambitious agreements and commitments. I very much stand by what we have set out here. As I said, I think it enjoys strong support across the spectrum.

Q15 Lord Boateng: The format of this agreement is rather unusual: a short treaty then a longer political declaration. What is the reasoning and your thinking behind that? How do the two separate instruments contribute to the wider objectives of the partnership? In talking to us about that, perhaps you could tell us what in your view—you referred to unique new partnerships—are the novel elements contained in this agreement? What concrete deliverables can we expect?

Stephen Doughty: I might start with your last question first. I think there are new areas that we have begun to explore with Ukraine as a result of the situation we found ourselves in over recent years. They have identified new areas for co-operation—for example, defence technologies and new capabilities, and the co-operation between our science and energy sectors.

I visited a fascinating programme we are supporting in Ukraine when I was there 10 days ago through Innovate Ukraine. It is on the reuse of EV batteries in portable battery packs that can be manufactured and developed to meet energy needs, but also provide commercial opportunities in collaboration with a number of UK universities. There are a number of novel innovations that new connections created between British people and Ukrainians have identified. We have tried to cover all of these.

There are also areas where we have had long-term collaboration, in relation to governance, justice, anti-corruption reform and so on, and are deepening our co-operation. I met with many of the agencies responsible when I was there. So there are some areas we have worked together on already, and we are deepening and expanding them; there are other areas we have identified through the partnership going forward.

In terms of the structure of the agreement, each of these types of agreements is obviously unique and relates to the circumstances. I would not say it is a particularly novel structure to have a political declaration then a more detailed set of articles behind it. The detail under each of these is similar to how we have set up other MoUs, agreements and treaties.

As you know, we have a number of ongoing treaty development processes with other countries at the moment. We have a treaty with Germany, discussions with Poland and discussions on how we will upgrade the Lancaster House treaty with France. Each of them reflects the nature of that arrangement. I do not know if Ben wants to add anything on the technical side.

Ben Greenwood: It was very much a Ukrainian core ask to make it legally binding, given their previous history with agreements that were not legally binding. That was also part of the negotiation.

Q16 Lord German: I want to look at the change between the non-binding 2014 security co-operation agreement and this agreement. Clearly, as you have just explained, it is because the Ukrainians wanted it to be on a legal footing. Apart from that, what can you say about the differences between those two agreements? What is materially new that we could find as differences?

Also, I assume, because it is 100 years, that there is flexibility built into this, as things change. Is it sufficiently flexible to handle the length of time over which this agreement is intended to take place?

Stephen Doughty: On the last question, absolutely. You will note that Article 13 sets out amendments that can be made in future by mutual agreement of the parties. Obviously, each party has the ability to terminate the agreement. We obviously do not intend on doing that, but provisions are built into this, as you would expect with any agreement of this nature.

What has fundamentally changed is the context and depth of our relationship, and the ambitions for it. That is why there are some new areas identified in terms of sectors and the breadth and depth we might go to. As Ben has said, the reason for the nature of it being legally binding was a request from the Ukrainians that we were happy to engage with.

Lord German: The switch seems also to include a lot of what I might call economic and social changes in the report. Where do you think we might focus in these initial stages? You have already explained one of the focuses, but where do you see the treaty going in the next five or six months?

Stephen Doughty: If we look at our programming and FCDO support, rule of law, governance and anti-corruption measures and so on are crucial. We have important programmes, which I was just discussing with Ukrainian Ministers on Monday, that relate to support for social provision in different parts of the country. We are also looking at regional and city-based collaboration; there are huge opportunities for engagement and to build ties with nations, regions and cities across the UK.

I mentioned, crucially, the energy, climate and green transition side. Obviously Ukraine has crucial energy security needs. It was particularly inspiring to meet some of those who are working on the future of their energy in the midst of brutal attacks by Russia on their energy infrastructure. That resilience and adaptability of Ukrainians and their innovation have become apparent to us. Quite frankly, we have a lot to learn from Ukrainians. This is a mutual process, whether that is for new defence technologies or energy innovations, and it will be a mutually beneficial partnership.

The Chair: Given that this is a very broad document and that the bandwidth of both countries is limited, what are the top three things that this Government will embark on with Ukraine? How will they benefit the United Kingdom, as well as Ukraine?

Stephen Doughty: Beyond the immediate security requirements, which we have been clear about—the importance of us giving Ukraine the ability to deter and defend against future Russian aggression, as well as meeting their security needs now—they are focused on the missions that we have set out for the UK Government more broadly. They are in that growth and economic space, which will benefit trade, business-to-business links, and investment—creating a better climate in Ukraine for UK investment, joint ventures and so on. They are also in the energy and green transition space.

In terms of wider security, you will know that Article 10 talks about migration co-operation, which ties in with the Prime Minister’s ambitions. Social and cultural ties underpin all this and that relationship going forward. I have seen from meeting many organisations in the UK that new relationships and partners have sparked what I hope will be multi-decade collaborations and friendships.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Good morning, Minister. Do I have to declare an interest again?

The Chair: No.

Q17 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: It would help us a great deal if you could look at one or two of the issues that have come up since this agreement was negotiated, because this is a fast-moving situation. There have been major new developments even this week.

A question on which the committee would like to hear your view is: how does this agreement relate to the wider issues of security guarantees for Ukraine, which the Prime Minister has addressed publicly and in Parliament at various stages, in the context of either a ceasefire agreement—that may or may not transpire—or any actual settlement negotiations and agreements there may be between Russia and Ukraine? How will the security guarantees be addressed in this way and how do they relate to the Prime Minister’s references to a “US backstop” being needed for whatever European arrangements might occur?

The second part of the question—it may be easier for you to answer them together—is about to what extent the Government see this agreement acting as an effective deterrent against any further Russian aggression. After all, the last aggression took place out of the blue, although it was predicted by intelligence services. That cannot be excluded. Do you think that this agreement contributes to strengthening that deterrence?

Stephen Doughty: Absolutely—there is an important interaction between the two. In the conversation that is going on about the security guarantees, we have made our willingness to contribute very clear, as have France and others. The Prime Minister has outlined the number of countries that are interested and involved; we will be hosting talks on Saturday and there have been important meetings this week.

In essence, this partnership agreement provides a longer-term framework to ensure that Ukraine has long-term, sustainable, defensive capability. That is reflected in what we have set out about the wider commitments to the UN charter and the fundamental principles of international law. We have already set out in the security agreement that we would consult within 24 hours to determine the measures needed to counter or deter aggression, but there are important parts of this in relation to, for example, the capability and development of the defence industry within Ukraine and the ability to manufacture what they need, and the commitments to train, supply and work with Ukrainians to ensure that they have a key force.

I emphasise that, while we are absolutely clear about our commitments to security guarantees, which must include a US backstop as well, this is also about training, equipping and building up Ukraine’s long-term capability. That whole picture will provide the needs not only to defend against but to deter future aggression. This fundamentally comes back to the point that this is a legally binding 100-year commitment. We are putting our seal on it as this is where the UK stands in our relationship with Ukraine into the future. We cannot afford to go through another deal on which Russia or any other aggressor will choose to renege.

So we are there for them. We are there for 100 years, and we are going to put the practical commitments in place to do that. They fit together very naturally, but the immediate package of security guarantees that we are working on is a distinct piece of work. This locks into it very neatly.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: If I have understood correctly, if new elements get firmed up in the discussions that are going on in Paris and elsewhere—about peacekeeping, the possible backstop and so on—they will lead to a substantial fleshing out of what is in this treaty, as well.

Stephen Doughty: Yes—a good example is in the maritime domain. The security of the Black Sea is obviously crucial for the future of Ukraine’s sovereignty, security and prosperity. We know about the issues that have been faced with grain exports; 90% of their exports previously went through the Black Sea corridor. We are committed to establishing a maritime security partnership, developing Ukraine’s maritime forces and strengthening its alignment with NATO for deterrence. There are a number of other NATO members on the Black Sea.

We are already working through the maritime capability coalition, in the same way that we work through the drone capability coalition. Specifically, we will be providing force-generation training for their mine countermeasure task force, which will be really crucial going forward. So there are some immediate needs required. Longer term, the security and stability of the Black Sea is just one area on which we will be working very closely together.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I have a final short point. Does the Government and Prime Minister’s position remain that, to re-establish a deterrence, we will need a US backstop?

Stephen Doughty: Absolutely—he has been absolutely clear about that and it has formed an important part of the discussions that we have been having with the United States, Ukraine and European partners. It is important that we continue to work in a transatlantic way on the security challenges, not only for Ukraine, but for Europe as a whole and our commitments to NATO and the alliance. We are very clear on that in our own defence spending as we are on our commitments to Ukraine.

Q18 The Chair: You have already helpfully started to segue into my next question, which is around the maritime partnership. You raised the Black and Azov seas. There was some quite strong evidence in the Commons Defence Select Committee that that naval exercise would be a potential flashpoint between Russia and the allies, in whatever form they take. I asked about risks at the beginning; has this risk been fully grasped? It is quite clear that the sort of things you were discussing are absolutely counter to Putin’s naval ambitions in that area. What is the extent to which that commitment is needed to handle that risk?

Stephen Doughty: There are two things. Those risks existed long before this phase of the current invasion; you will know about the challenges and incidents in the Black Sea previously, so these risks have existed for a long time. It has long been an area where there have been challenges relating to the geopolitics of the countries around it. We work very closely with a number of partners around the Black Sea—with NATO members and, of course, in supporting Ukraine.

I will just bring you back to what I said previously. This is fundamentally about strengthening Ukraine’s capabilities in this area and interoperability, particularly with NATO partners, which are working to protect their maritime domains and space in the Black Sea. There will be some interoperability evaluations in 2025, and this will form a key part of that. It will be both about the military space and, crucially, about the safety and freedom of navigation for civilian shipping—in particular for Ukrainian exports of grain in the future. I do not know if Ben has anything to add on the maritime plans.

Ben Greenwood: No, I think you have covered it.

The Chair: I would characterise that as the difference between a general ambience of a security problem, and putting it in black and white and making commitments around particular issues. Would you accept that the difference between a generalised security issue and having a treaty or a partnership nails down the process of supporting Ukraine in this area?

Stephen Doughty: We have commitments to international maritime law, freedom of navigation and maritime security. Just down the road is the IMO and there are also wider commitments. We have always been committed to those as a maritime nation, and we continue to stand by them.

That is the wider context, but this is specifically about equipping Ukraine to protect its own assets and operations in line with international law and with its rights of freedom of navigation and freedom to export, and to be free from attack—or indeed the threat of mines. There will obviously be a substantial job there. We want to work with Ukraine closely on dealing with mines in the Black Sea and other risks to future civilian and military navigation. Ultimately, this all will come back to us enabling the functioning of the multilateral system and international rules-based order when it comes to the maritime domain, whether that is in the Black Sea or elsewhere in the world. I think it sends a very important signal more broadly and globally.

The Chair: Is the process of equipping Ukraine to achieve this within the £3 billion commitment of aid or is it extra to that?

Stephen Doughty: Some of it will be within that.

Ben Greenwood: Within is my understanding, but we will need to check.

Stephen Doughty: I will check with the defence guys and come back to you in writing. We are already engaged in some of these projects, so they are coming from existing spending.

The Chair: This opens up a wider question on the £3 billion. Is that the bottom line or is that the starting point from which additional support is then added?

Stephen Doughty: We have already committed in recent weeks, as you know, to the ERA loan of £2.26 billion from the UK. The Chancellor and the Ukrainian Finance Minister were signing that the other day. My understanding is that that is now available for Ukrainians to use. There are important conversations going on about that.

We have our £3 billion per year commitment and we have that additional £2.26 billion. We continue to look, with other European partners and globally, for additional ways that we can support Ukraine economically and with the military capability that they need.

The Chair: I think we are interested to know how that pans out.

Stephen Doughty: You want a detailed breakdown.

The Chair: How confident are you that Ukraine will become a member of NATO in the near future? Perhaps you might like to define what “near future” is. What steps will you take to overcome the barriers to this aspiration that exist currently and that may exist in future?

Stephen Doughty: We have always been clear that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO. There were commitments made at the Washington summit and we have been clear in our support for the path towards those commitments. In the intervening time, there is an absolute need for security guarantees in the way that we have described to meet the current challenge.

If we are to get to a just, lasting and sustainable peace, Ukraine will need to be able to continue to deter and defend against aggression by Russia. We continue to support its path towards NATO, and we have been very clear that Russia cannot have a voice or a veto in that decision.

The Chair: I suppose the question was not about how committed we are to it. It was: how confident are we that it will come to pass?

Stephen Doughty: You will be aware of the processes for NATO accession and the many different paths that different countries have been on to membership of NATO. We have had a number of new members join recently and each journey is its own unique path, but we continue to stand with Ukraine. We believe that there is an irreversible path to NATO membership and we will continue to work with allies in that regard.

The Chair: I am sorry to labour the point a bit, but how actively are you canvassing for that to happen? Standing with people is different to campaigning with people. You will understand that as a politician. Are we campaigning for Ukraine to join NATO or are we simply signing the nomination?

Stephen Doughty: You are aware of the process. I think the more important thing at the moment is that we are enabling the development of Ukraine’s capabilities to enable it to join NATO at a future point. That is why we are supporting Ukraine with its democratic, economic and security reforms and standards harmonisation.

I just mentioned making sure that there is interoperability and validity between the maritime operations. We are also working, for example, on NATO standards on the fighter jet coalition. We are taking practical steps now and, at the point at which Ukraine makes that decision—as I said, Russia cannot have a veto over that—we will continue to support them to do that.

Q19 Lord Howell of Guildford: People keep calling for Russia to be held fully accountable for its aggression, its disgusting slaughter of civilians and its atrocities, which I think are more or less established as war crimes. I am not sure whether the process has started, but how are we going to make all this stick? It is not as though we are going to have a conquest of Russia; it is not going to be like Nuremberg. So how will this process be turned from an aspiration into a serious reality?

Stephen Doughty: We have been involved in a number of different processes in this regard, for example, helping Ukraine domestically with their prosecutions and in gathering evidence to document atrocities. I visited Bucha a few days ago and saw for myself some pretty horrendous evidence of the atrocities that were carried out there. We need to ensure that there are legally sound and valid processes to enable prosecutions to take place.

We have also continued to work with others in a group on the crime of aggression. This is also why we have worked within the Council of Europe on the loss and damage register, which will enable clearer cases to be made on what damage Russia has done to property and infrastructure, so that that can be properly accounted for. We have been leading with others on that process in the Council of Europe.

We have been very clear all the way along that Russia has to pay for the damage that it is done to Ukraine. That is also one of the reasons we have worked on the ERA loan issue, and why we continue to explore all lawful options to ensure that Russia does that. We are very clear that there has to be justice as part of any lasting and sustainable peace. There will be different ways that we achieve that and that is why we are invested in those different processes.

Ben Greenwood: We are also supporting the Ukrainian prosecutor-general with his domestic prosecutions for war crimes. A lot of our programme activity through our embassy in Kyiv is going in that direction—to building the Ukrainian ability to prosecute war crimes.

Lord Howell of Guildford: So Ukraine does have a war crimes process going. Is that for absent enemies or people they have captured? Who are they arraigning?

Ben Greenwood: Yes, it does. This is essentially the prosecutor-general trying Russian soldiers where they are captive. There are also trials in absentia. There is a significant domestic process in relation to prosecution for war crimes, which we are supporting.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I want to be clear about one additional point. Would anyone who is indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes in Ukraine—there are two Russians currently so indicted—be arrested if they came to this country?

Stephen Doughty: As you know, Lord Hannay, there is a process independent of Ministers for the court enforcement of ICC arrest warrants. That position relates to any arrest warrants, so our position on that is clear in relation to all the activities of the ICC. We continue to support the ICC in its important work. My understanding is that those warrants were issued in relation to issues around children, deportation and so on.

There is a series—the ICC, the group that is working on the special tribunal on aggression, and the work that we are doing to support Ukraine domestically. So there are many different ways in which we are going to hold those responsible to account. It is absolutely crucial that that that happens, having seen some horrendous stuff myself.

The Chair: It was very helpful to have confirmed that.

Q20 Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: What steps have you taken or envisaged taking to ensure that the commitment to combating foreign information manipulation and interference is implemented effectively? Secondly, how will you assess the effectiveness of that?

Stephen Doughty: There are a number of pieces of work that we are doing in this space. This is part of a wider picture of hybrid interference and threats not only to Ukraine but to Europe and globally. We are focused, particularly with Ukraine, on institutional co-operation and sharing open source intelligence in relation to information threats. We are also deepening links between some of our technical experts on this. We have a dedicated, regular dialogue to track threats and the responses to them, and we have a range of programmatic interventions in which we are engaged with Ukraine to, for example, identify harmful FIMI networks, analyse the data and then deliver interventions for the Government of Ukraine to action.

There are a range of different steps and programmes; you need capability in all areas of that mix on identifying, disrupting and then responding. We have worked very closely with Ukraine on this, and with other partners, because we know that Russia and others are using these tactics around the world. It is one of the areas of closer co-operation with the EU that we have identified from the Foreign Secretary’s meeting with the Foreign Affairs Council, along with the Indo-Pacific and the western Balkans. They are co-operational matters with Ukraine, but also in relation to hybrid threats; they will form a key part of our work, in the sharing of best practice and expertise.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: That is probably an area where we might learn quite a lot, because I am sure it is happening in this country as well. You did not answer my second answer about assessing the efficiency of these measures. Have you any thoughts on that yet?

Stephen Doughty: We measure success through different metrics. I do not know if Ben has anything more to add on that, but we look very closely at the impact that it is having on, for example, the disruption of the networks that are spreading this information. By the way, we have sanctioned a number of agencies that have been targeting not only Ukraine but more broadly.

Ben Greenwood: On the metrics and measuring success, a lot of this work is delivered through programme activity. In the programmatic process, we have systems to measure the success of our interventions, so we will be doing this through those programmatic techniques. We can again provide more information on that if you like but, in essence, it is through that programme management process.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: It would be good if you could write to us on that. The point with which I am trying to grapple is that there is a lot of stuff you can do by disruption to prevent these messages from being sent, but how do we measure the impact that it is having within the civilian population or on the armed forces and their resilience? It would be very interesting if you had anything on that.

Q21 The Chair: This is a difficult question to answer, but you seem to be talking about defensive rather than offensive information. Can you assure us that you are doing both, rather than simply finding ways to disrupt disinformation coming this way? What are we doing to promote our arguments in the opposite direction?

Stephen Doughty: We are working with Ukraine to strengthen our ability to defend against these types of attacks and activities, and they are, quite rightly, trying to make sure that the facts about different issues and about the reality of the situation on the ground are out there—on the atrocities and some of the disinformation that goes on around them. We have a deep partnership with them; there are a lot of conversations at the expert-to-expert and official-to-official level. We are aware that this is a globally contested information environment, but we are very focused on degrading the networks that are spreading this information, as well as on identifying the particular narratives or pieces of information that are being pumped out there by adversaries. Of course, it is not just Russia doing this, globally.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: It would be very helpful if we could have a written reply, as you offered, on how this work is being undertaken. I raised this in February 2022, and have not had much information about it since then.

Stephen Doughty: The Foreign Affairs Committee in the other place is looking at wider issues with foreign information manipulation at the moment. Perhaps the committee might find it useful if we share some of the evidence that we have submitted on that.

The Chair: If you can root it to the context of this partnership, it would be helpful.

Stephen Doughty: Yes, I would be happy to do that and come back to you.

Q22 The Chair: During an earlier part of this session, you raised the Government’s missions, so perhaps we can investigate a couple of those and how this might reflect on them. The first is growth. There is a finite pool of capital to invest. To some extent, if we are encouraging investment in Ukraine, we are perhaps deferring investment that might come to this country. How do you square that particular zero-sum game? How, in real terms, will this feed into the Government’s mission on growth?

Stephen Doughty: Fundamentally, developing and deepening our business and commercial opportunities—as I said, this is a two-way process—will be mutually beneficial for us and Ukraine. Whether that is in advanced defence technologies or green tech, I am very clear that there are going to be opportunities both ways. That is why we are so heavily invested in this.

In terms of practical steps, we co-hosted the Ukraine Recovery Conference back in the previous Administration in 2023. There have been different examples of that since, but that raised over $60 billion. We are doing a lot of work on war risk insurance and work with the EBRD to underpin potential investments. That will again be mutually beneficial to UK and Ukrainian companies. I will be meeting with insurers very shortly to discuss some of the ways in which we can expand that work.

We currently have £500 million via UKEF backing for reconstruction, energy and defence projects. British International Investment is also operating. Of course, all these have mutual benefits for future collaborations in both directions. I am very clear that there are growth benefits both for the UK and Ukraine in these partnerships. Having met with some of the Ministers responsible in Ukraine, I can say that they are absolutely looking forward to strengthening their co-operation with UK companies and businesses and matching our skills and expertise together. In areas such as digitalisation, tech, green energy and defence technologies, there is a really exciting potential set of partnerships with the UK.

The Chair: I know that Baroness Lawlor wants to come in, but I will just follow up slightly. I think you would accept that, apart from for the very large companies, quite a degree of hand-holding would be needed to take steps like this. In a sense, the Government simply saying it and having a few conferences is the issue; what practical, supportive steps will you put in place?

Stephen Doughty: We have appointed a new trade envoy, Alex Sobel MP, from the other place. He will be working very closely with DBT and other colleagues on this. I absolutely accept that investing in riskier and more challenging environments will require advice and B2B connections. There are also crucial issues with insurance, which is exactly why we are working on that.

By the way, I should point out that a significant part of our programme will be based on supporting SMEs and trying to create SME-SME links between our two countries. I do not know whether Ben has anything further to add on that point.

Ben Greenwood: Through the partnership, we are looking in the long term to improve the long-term business environment in Ukraine—strengthening the rule of law and improving the regulatory framework to make it easier for our companies and other companies to operate.

The Chair: That is very important.

Q23 Baroness Lawlor: I am very sorry for being late; I had a 12 pm appointment I could not change.

We are talking about a very risky country. It has been devastated—to put it mildly—and growth opportunities at the moment look pretty poor. If I am an investor, how can I be sure there will be any guarantee that my investment will pay dividends in the foreseeable future? What guarantee is there for the UK taxpayer that the commitment made by our Government will bring any return to the UK? What is the outlay you expect to put in as part of the UK Government?

The Chair: We have had that question

Baroness Lawlor: Oh, I am sorry.

Stephen Doughty: I would like to re-emphasise what Ben said. We are really focused on the issues around the rule of law and governance within Ukraine and other measures to strengthen the business environment to make it an attractive prospect for people to invest in. Obviously, the questions around insurance are also really important.

UKEF is backing projects and I think there is huge potential for investment in Ukraine. Yes, there is absolutely devastating damage in parts of the country, particularly around the front lines. There is also damage to infrastructure, particularly in the energy sector. But Ukrainians are incredibly adaptable and resilient. The Ukrainian economy continues to function; there is incredible work going on.

I am very optimistic that a peaceful, just and sustainable Ukraine of the future that has those security guarantees and reforms institutionally, as it goes on a Euro-Atlantic path, will become an increasingly good prospect for UK businesses, joint ventures and investments in each other’s economies.

Baroness Lawlor: Would you put a timeline on when investments will start paying back?

Stephen Doughty: I cannot put a timeline on any individual investment for obvious reasons. We are going to continue to implement our political co-operation, free trade and strategic partnership agreements and modernise those. We are trying to widen market access more broadly, as you will see in the detail under pillar 4. We are also working with Ukraine on its financial centre. We are working with the City-Ukraine hub, which is between the City of London and Ukraine, as well. It has been a testament to UK business and institutions that have wanted to step up in different ways to support creating these links to the future. This is not just about what the Government do; it is also about what our businesses, financial services and legal services do. There are really exciting partnerships being built.

The Chair: You mentioned immigration and how this partnership can help support that. Can you explain how and where you see the benefits? What will Ukraine bring to that particular challenge?

Stephen Doughty: Article 10 very much sets out the agenda we have with a number of countries around Europe and what the Home Secretary has set out about whole-route co-operation, particularly when dealing with people smugglers, traffickers and others. We will work with them on how to combat those networks, including when they are linked to serious and organised crimes, and on how to protect victims of trafficking.

Those networks and dynamics are unique to each country and region we are working with. Therefore, they sometimes require bespoke approaches, but they have the same core principles—we want to get after the gangs and criminals involved in this. We want to protect the victims, particularly those who are being trafficked, and ensure that our law enforcement agencies are speaking to each other in ways that enable us to work together to tackle it.

In that regard, I point the committee to the new sanctions regime we are launching on illicit migration and our ability to take very robust action against those responsible for facilitating those networks.

Ben Greenwood: I will add that, as you will see in the body of the text, we will be having a new dialogue with Ukraine that covers some of the issues the Minister has been setting out. There is a new channel for discussion of these issues under the partnership.

The Chair: I do not suppose many of us saw Ukraine as a viable route for immigration, so it is surprising to hear you use that as an example.

Stephen Doughty: It is important that we look at this. We want to make sure that our action on migration and tackling illicit migration is across Europe and global, and that we are working with partners around the world. Therefore, we want to make sure that new routes do not open in the future either. It is also about building Ukraine’s structures and systems in co-operation with us to tackle organised groups that decide to use those routes in the future.

Q24 The Chair: Thank you. I know we are reaching the end, but is there anything that you wished we had asked you that we did not get to?

Stephen Doughty: No, but I genuinely welcome the committee’s interest in the agreement. As I said, it is one that enjoys broad support in both Houses and with the public. It is certainly hugely welcomed by the Ukrainians, as a symbol not only of what we are doing now but that this is not a relationship that will suddenly disappear when we hopefully get to a more peaceful, just and secure Ukraine in the future. This is something that has been forged in a pretty unique partnership. We have rediscovered links and connections.

I think of the connections between my own part of the world and Ukraine. It was a Welshman who helped to found the city of Donetsk, and Welsh engineering and technology that went over to the Donbass. My own city was twinned with Luhansk. We have rediscovered many of those links; British people have discovered many of those links.

I think there are huge amounts of commonalities between Ukrainians and British people in our courage, stoicism and commitment—even in the most difficult of circumstances—and that is what binds us together. I think it will form an incredible foundation for economic, energy and security partnerships in the years to come.

The Chair: Thank you very much for that. On that uplifting note, thank you, Minister and deputy director, for your time.