20
Examination of witnesses
Simon Smith, Professor David J Betz, Hanna Hopko and Nick Childs.
Q1 The Chair: Welcome to this evidence session of the International Agreements Committee on the Ukraine 100-year partnership agreement. Members will declare their interests when they speak for the first time during this session. The meeting is being broadcast live via the parliamentary website. I apologise for the slight delay, which was caused by a Division. A transcript of the meeting will be taken and published on the committee website. You will have the opportunity to make corrections when that transcript is available, where necessary.
I will kick off with the first question. How would you describe the value and the purpose of this agreement? What are the most notable aspects of it? Hanna Hopko, perhaps you could speak from your virtual position to start with and then we can move around the others.
Hanna Hopko: Thank you for having me. I am really very honoured. As a former chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I am very thankful to the UK for its steadfast support. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, you have provided us with your support.
Answering your question, the signing of the 100-year partnership agreement in January 2025 represents a historic milestone in relations between Ukraine and the UK, and affirms the latter’s role as a steadfast ally of Ukraine, solidifying bilateral strategic partnership at an unprecedented level for generations to come. This agreement builds on previous agreements including the political, free trade and strategic partnership agreement 2020 and the security co-operation agreement from last year. It is highly significant for Ukraine as it establishes a long-term legally binding framework, deepening strategic relations with the UK, and sets a clear and ambitious road map for sustained collaboration over the next century.
The partnership extends to at least 100 schools in Ukraine and launches special programmes between British and Ukrainian universities. Additionally, the agreement institutionalises regular high-level dialogues, ensuring sustained UK commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security and stability. It also establishes mechanisms for deeper defence industrial co-operation and capacity-building efforts, reinforcing Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and deter future aggressions.
It is really important. This agreement is a powerful sign that Ukraine has a strong partnership. Considering what is happening now with the US-Russian reset and Ukraine’s security contribution to Europe, it is so important.
The Chair: We may have a chance to come back to that as we go through. Thank you very much. Mr Smith, what will materially change as a result of this partnership compared to what is already happening?
Simon Smith: Just briefly to introduce myself and set out why I am here, I chair the steering committee of the Ukraine Forum at Chatham House and was British ambassador to Ukraine 10 years ago. It is from that perspective that I would like to offer two brief answers to the question.
Agreements such as this often get the “where’s the beef?” question thrown at them. It is clear that this 100-year agreement does contain a lot of aspiration: “We will set up a dialogue; we will set up a mechanism”. It contains a lot of description of areas in which Ukraine and the UK will co-operate. It is fair to throw the “where’s the beef?” question at it.
I would say, I hope rather strongly in its defence, from the perspective of a practitioner, I have certainly found this kind of treaty useful in the past in concentrating minds. I found it useful in particular with Governments where it may be difficult to mobilise action quickly because there is sometimes an institutional lack of initiative or an institutional risk aversion. To have a document signed by Heads of Government or Heads of State that says, “We have agreed to co-operate on this” is a very useful basis on which to translate aspirations into action and into real things.
We should not ignore the signals that it sends. First, it sends the signal, “This is the first product of a relatively new Government in the United Kingdom”. There were questions in Ukraine about whether the Government which came into office in July last year had to some extent taken their eyes off Ukraine or saw it as less of a priority than their predecessors. This is a good answer. It has value in that sense.
Even the preambular paragraphs—we tend to skip over those and think they are just words—are very much set in the context of adherence to something called the rules-based international system. These days it has become trendy to say, “That is old hat. No one talks about that any more. It’s on the way out”. It does not do any harm that this treaty is very firmly set in that context, highlighting the importance of alliances and effective multilateral institutions and, in a sense, providing a narrative that is opposed to the one that says, “Big countries make all the decisions and little countries will end up the losers”.
The Chair: Professor Betz, do you have anything to add to that?
Professor David J Betz: I would give an opposite view, so it is kind of an addition. The value of this agreement is nugatory or negative in strategic and military aspects.
Incidentally, by way of introduction, I am a professor of war in the modern world at the War Studies Department at King’s College London. I started off as a Soviet defence analyst at the tail end of the Cold War. I have thought about this area quite a lot over the years.
The agreement is notable chiefly for its 100-year duration and for the apparent open-ended commitment of the UK to give Ukraine £3 billion annually for military support, among other potential contributions. This represents a substantial investment of our national income with significant opportunity costs for our own military readiness that are frankly hard to justify. Pre war, UK-Ukraine trade was less than £1 billion annually. The UK has no direct national interest in Ukraine, relatively small cultural links and no significant stake in proximate issues of the war, specifically the current fighting over the sovereignty of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
Therefore, ultimately the agreement will materially amount to not very much in terms of change while at the same time costing potentially quite a lot.
The Chair: It is helpful to have a contrary view.
Nick Childs: I am the senior fellow for naval forces and maritime security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. That is my perspective on the issues at stake here.
I would reinforce the point that this is a step change in lots of ways simply because of the extended nature of the commitment. I believe it has a positive value in the sense that, through that, it adds to the signalling of intent and commitment, and therefore adds an element of increased deterrence, establishing the partnership with Ukraine as a significant pillar for that within European security.
While it reaffirms and to some extent reinforces a trajectory that we have been on for some time, I would argue it opens the aperture and is significant in that sense, not just because it is an agreement framed in language that is supportive of Ukraine but because it is more reciprocal in its language around the context of benefits to European security generally and potentially for the UK.
I absolutely take the point about the issues of what that means as regards defence commitments in the longer term. That is a significant potential drain going forward, but, in view of my comments around the reciprocity of the language and therefore what Ukraine can add to the mix going forward, there are also potentially significant benefits as regards future defence and security capabilities and industrial base issues for the UK.
The Chair: Thank you very much. I should have declared that I have no relevant interests to declare.
Q2 Lord McDonald of Salford: I too have no relevant interests to declare. My question is to the three witnesses in the room. As has been mentioned several times, this agreement has a very long duration. A hundred years is a very long time. It is being concluded at a high watermark in relations between London and Kyiv. What happens if there is a different sort of Government in Kyiv? Will this continue to be relevant?
The Chair: Lord Howell, is your question relevant to this?
Lord Howell of Guildford: Yes, it is. Following that, how many other countries in Europe, in Asia or around the world have similar agreements with Ukraine? Are we an outlier in this?
Nick Childs: As with all these agreements, while there is a sense of trying to frame them in the context of the political cycles as far as the direct signatories are concerned, they have broad aspirations. So long as the political tides are within the context of supporting the general aspirations of the agreements, they tend to be manageable over time.
Clearly, there are extremes in these cases. I am not a former diplomat who has been engaged in framing these, but presumably, like all treaties—dare I say it, we are now thinking about issues with the NATO treaty—there are adjustments and get-out clauses along the way.
The Chair: We do have a former diplomat, though.
Simon Smith: Personally, I do not know of other 100-year agreements with Ukraine. There may be some; I do not know. My memory tells me that the 100 years first emerged in 2024 in the context of a visit by a previous Prime Minister to Ukraine. I am guessing that the drafters of this agreement found it a bit difficult to duck that question and not, in a sense, continue the “100 years” into this one.
There are very similar agreements between other countries and Ukraine on security and defence co-operation. As I understand it, one of the important aspects of the British Government or British Governments entering into this kind of agreement was to take the lead in showing the kind of agreement that could be made.
The Chair: What happens if there is significant regime change?
Simon Smith: I am coming to that. I was still on the other question. The question about regime change is simple. As far as I recall, in the agreement itself, there are provisions for it being denounceable at what struck me as relatively short notice if either party does not like it any more.
Professor David J Betz: I noted the same thing. The six-month warning period of leaving the agreement without really much consultation stuck out to me. I find the agreement rather perplexing and indefensible in terms of the political developments in the world just over the last two weeks. The overall tenor of the agreement, as well as the specifics around the NATO admission commitment, puts the UK at odds with the declared strategy and intent of our main ally, the United States of America, which is not committed to those things any more.
Moreover, the level of commitment expressed is probably greater than any of our other European allies, with the possible exception of France. It is likely that the USA and Russia will normalise relations pretty quickly. That would be my assessment. It is also likely, in the course of time, that Germany, out of a need for economic survival, will follow suit. The risk, therefore, is that the UK exposes itself diplomatically, politically, strategically and militarily.
The Chair: That was the point you made at the beginning. The question was specific. Possibly Mr Smith has answered it: there is a mutual termination clause in the agreement. I did not want to cut you off while you were flying, but many of those points are ones that have already come through. We have to move on a bit.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I just want to pick up one point.
The Chair: Can we go to Baroness Verma’s question? Perhaps we can work the other questions in.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: No, I want to ask a question about what the witness said, very shortly.
The Chair: Very well, in that case we will go first of all to Lord Anderson, who signalled before you.
Lord Anderson of Swansea: We need credibly to support Ukraine, but anyone with a sense of history will surely query the 100 years. How plausible is that as a signal? It could be overtaken within the next couple of weeks. Look at the Sea of Azov, for example. If via some territorial concessions the Sea of Azov is made a Russian sea, of what relevance is the reference in it to this treaty?
The Chair: Can you declare your interest as well?
Lord Anderson of Swansea: I have no interests at all—no angle or tangle, save UK interests.
The Chair: Was that a question?
Lord Anderson of Swansea: This is my question. How credible is a 100-year treaty that could be overtaken at the first hurdle within a few weeks?
The Chair: Who wants to handle that one? I suspect we have already heard the answers.
Professor David J Betz: I find it not credible.
Simon Smith: As I said before, I suspect this is something that the drafters felt they were saddled with. Personally, I do not find it the most impressive part of the treaty. It is a little like taking a house on a 99-year lease. Goodness knows what is going to happen in that period of time. As it has in this room already, if it distracts attention from the content and purpose of the treaty, it does not seem like the best idea in the world.
The Chair: We have succeeded in getting Mr Smith and Professor Betz to agree with each other on that one, anyway.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: First of all, I must declare the following interests. I am on the advisory board of the Centre for European Reform; I am a member of the European Leadership Network; I chair an organisation called the European and International Analysts Group; and I had the chance to be the person who transmitted the Budapest memorandum to the UN archives, so I am rather familiar with that.
I would like to pose a question to Professor Betz, who suggested that the UK, in signing this agreement, was doing so in a fashion contrary to that of its most important ally. That is a rather odd way of putting it, is it not? It might be better put to say its most important ally chose to contravene an agreement that had already been signed by the United Kingdom at the time it did so, without apparently consulting the UK or expressing any views on the subject at all, as far as I know.
Professor David J Betz: I am happy with the way you have put it, but neither of us would deny there is a gulf that exists between us and the United States on this point.
The Chair: Are you happy?
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I am perfectly happy.
The Chair: You can agree. Hanna Hopko has been sitting patiently there. Baroness Verma has a question directed towards Hanna.
Q3 Baroness Verma: I have no interests to declare. Hanna, how meaningful is this agreement for Ukraine? What are the key areas for Ukraine’s defence capabilities in particular?
Hanna Hopko: If I may, I will start by quoting a very important British public figure, Lancelot Lawton, who gave a presentation in the House of Commons in 1935 called, “The Ukrainian question and its importance to Great Britain”. You can read it; I can send you the link. He said, “The chief problem in Europe today is the Ukrainian problem. Of deep concern to this country because of its effect upon European peace and diplomacy, it is at the same time closely bound with British interests of a very vital nature”. Almost 90 years ago, a British representative, Lancelot Lawton, made this address to the British Parliament, explaining the importance of Ukraine to your security.
Today, there has been already 11 years of Russian ongoing aggression. It is not just the last three years of full-scale war; Ukraine managed to survive from the Crimean invasion in 2014 to the Kursk incursion in 2024.
Having this important agreement will also be of benefit to the UK because 30% of the weapons used by the defence forces of Ukraine are produced in Ukraine. Our capability to produce new military technologies, especially drones, is steadily increasing. For the first time, Ukraine has achieved the production of more than 1 million drones a year and is increasing the production of its own missile systems.
In 2023, when everyone expected that Ukraine would agree some concessions on the grain deal and Russia wanted to weaken the sanctions against it, we demonstrated that, without a navy, we could demilitarise the Russian naval presence in the Black Sea. Ukraine has unique practical experience.
While I have your attention, I am now showing the report that we presented to the Security and Defence Committee of the European Parliament, Countering the Authoritarian Axis: Lessons from Ukraine and Challenges for European Security. In this report, which we presented at the European Parliament, we set out how Ukraine is advancing its military technologies in fighting against not just Russia but North Korean troops. We have learned about electronic warfare. We are producing drones.
Let me also provide the argument that it is not just in the interest of Ukraine to have this bilateral agreement. Observing the threats that we are facing all together, it is fair to say that Ukraine is also a contributor to European security, not just a recipient of it. As was rightly said, Ukraine gave up the third-largest nuclear arsenal. The UK and the US were—
The Chair: We are tracking into history. Thank you very much. The point about the importance to Ukraine has been well made.
Baroness Verma: I just want to come back to Hanna with a very small supplementary, Lord Fox. It is about the comment that was made by Professor Betz. Hanna, how did you take his opening remarks? He said it is not just about defence and security; it surely should be about economics as well. I just wanted to know how you interpreted that.
The Chair: Essentially, how did you interpret the point that it should be about economy as well as defence? That is the point she would like you to answer, Ms Hopko.
Hanna Hopko: As I mentioned at the beginning, the purpose of this bilateral document lies in broadening and deepening relations across defence, security, economic resilience, technology, energy, science, culture, social development and migration policy, providing a framework for mutual support and enable closer community links.
The Chair: That really answers the question very well.
Q4 Baroness Lawlor: I have no relevant interests to declare, Lord Fox. This is for Simon Smith and Professor Betz. How does this agreement reinforce the UK’s national interests? What are the potential implications for the UK? Simon Smith, perhaps you could comment on the diplomatic and foreign political benefits from your perspective, knowing the area well, and add anything that you have to say on the economy. I have a supplementary on the economy.
Professor Betz, is it realistic for this 100-year agreement to continue to wish for the advance of Ukraine’s application to join NATO, given that not all NATO members are in favour of it?
Simon Smith: If you want to look at where the UK national interest is in this agreement, it goes much wider than a sort of area agreement. It goes much wider than the specific Ukraine context. I would argue that this is an agreement in the context of the question that we should be posing ourselves as to how we cope with a world in which Putinism remains on the march.
How do we cope in a world, as I was briefly saying before, in which the decisions are taken by large countries at the expense of smaller countries and those large countries essentially make up their own simulacrum of international law and impose it on others? What do we do in the face of uncertainty at this stage as to whether there is more affinity between Putinism and the current President of the United States than between us and the current United States Administration? That is a very big question.
Baroness Lawlor: You would say that despite the fact that both main party leaders are committed to the American alliance and nobody could be more committed, in public anyway, than the present Prime Minister.
Simon Smith: I am developing my answer a little further to say that it does us no harm to look ahead to the future and to ask, “How are we going to cope in a different situation?” At the moment, I would characterise the situation that we are in as one where there is uncertainty. I would not leap to conclusions about the question of the future of the NATO alliance.
Whether we like it or not, a very fundamental question has been put to us. How are we going to cope without the support of the United States in defending a clear security interest in Europe? Do we want Europe to be overrun by Putinism or do we want to do something about it? These are questions to which the agreement provides some answers. The answers are, “We need to do something about this, and here are examples of what we can do”.
Professor David J Betz: In my earlier remarks I made some comments on this. I will not repeat them, but I will carry on with a couple of other points.
The provision of the agreement around sanctions and the suggestion of seizing Russian financial assets strikes me as an important one that imperils Britain’s credibility as a safe financial harbour, a financial centre, a place where other countries would bank large amounts of money, a secure rules-bound environment in which to lodge and adjudicate contracts, and all of those things that are terribly important to us over a generational period.
Moreover, the agreement exemplifies a series of efforts, long preceding the outbreak of the current war, that has propelled Russia into a Eurasian compact with China, which has significant economic and military depth to it. For Britain and the West generally, it is strategically disastrous.
In summary, in national interest terms, there are no significant benefits whatsoever to Britain taking on this role. It is taking on costs that it can ill afford in support of a cause that is not obviously relevant in national interest terms while helping to propel into existence the very thing that geopolitics was invented to warn against in the first place. That is a big deal, unfortunately.
As for your follow-on question with respect to Ukraine’s membership of NATO and our deliberate and very obvious sponsoring of this, again, I find this perplexing. Ultimately, Ukraine’s membership of NATO is not possible. The British Government need to admit this. The UK’s vocal support of it at the current time is contrary to the past judgment of multiple British Governments going back over decades to the end of the Cold War. It is contrary to the current wishes of the United States, which is a factor we should take on board. It is contrary to the wishes of other members of NATO, as you mentioned, including Hungary, Slovakia and potentially others. It is obviously contrary to the demands of Russia, which, in its current position, it is well able for the foreseeable future to continue to seek to enforce.
The Chair: We have a Minister on her feet again, so I fear we are heading for votes. Lord Boateng, you had a question.
Lord Boateng: No, Professor Betz has made his clear disagreement with Simon Smith obvious in his last remark.
The Chair: If we can, then, we will go to Lord Marland.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Can I just ask one very short question of Professor Betz?
The Chair: I guess.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Are you familiar with the United Nations charter?
Professor David J Betz: Yes, I am.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Are you familiar with the fact it says that you may not use force to seize territory from your neighbour?
Professor David J Betz: Yes, of course I am.
The Chair: We have established that he knows what the charter is. Lord Marland, can we have your question, please?
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: That is fine, but—
The Chair: No, I am sorry. Can we move to Lord Marland?
Q5 Lord Marland: I have no interests to declare. Thank you very much for sparing the time. I would be interested to hear whether Professor Betz has anything to add to this. Could the current agreement be further supplemented to make it a more substantial and beneficial agreement to support Ukraine in its current position? I make particular reference, of course, to the 2024 security co-operation agreement. That is my question. I would like to hear from Nick and Simon first.
The Chair: Let us start with Nick because he has been sitting there silently.
Nick Childs: In terms of advantage for Ukraine, precisely because of the current disconnect in the US-Ukrainian relationship, there is a sense in which this agreement can fill the gaps in ambitions and capabilities in the short and the longer term.
I would like to pick up on the point about NATO, if that is all right. As Professor Betz said, in the context of the current stance of the United States Administration, absolutely, NATO membership is completely off the table. If there is ever a ceasefire or peace agreement where that is written in black and white, it clearly is. Let us not forget that it is less than a year since NATO, at its summit declaration, described membership of—
Lord Marland: Chair, this has nothing to do with the question I have just asked, with all due respect. Can we stick to that?
Nick Childs: I will pass to Mr Smith.
Simon Smith: On the question of what further ground the agreement could cover, it is a very broad agreement, as it is. It needs to be careful that it does not just add bits to the Christmas tree and prove to be too unwieldy to implement.
With that in mind, I would like to see something more concrete attached to the agreement in the field of defence industrial co-operation. My experience of industrial co-operation with Ukraine is a little old, from 10-plus years ago. When I was ambassador to Ukraine, it was not an easy country in which to put together economic and industrial co-operation. Hanna Hopko, who I knew 10 years ago as a splendid and energetic MP, would probably agree with me that the Ukrainian bureaucracy at that point and the way in which the Administration operated were at times quite difficult to penetrate and quite difficult to elicit co-operation from.
A lot has changed, but it would help to concretise this agreement if there were some specific projects or specific objectives in industrial and defence co-operation that were outlined, as well as some description as to how those mechanisms will work and how on both sides their operation might be guaranteed. A little bit more concrete showing of the way this is going to work might help the implementation of this agreement.
Lord Marland: Surely there must be a dividend from the support we are giving Ukraine.
Simon Smith: That is obviously going to be a question. I would not advocate an agreement that went into, “This is how many of your rare earth minerals you are going to hand over to us” and so on.
Lord Marland: I was not suggesting that.
Simon Smith: I am sure you were not, but there could be something that recognises that this needs to be an enabling agreement. That is very much the spirit in which it is drafted. It says, “These things are possible. You guys on both sides have to implement it. Go out and make it work”.
Defence industrial co-operation is probably one of the most important and urgent items on which Ukraine and the UK can co-operate. I absolutely agree that it needs to be spelled out. The enterprises that go into a partnership of that sort need to have an idea that gives them confidence that it is going to be beneficial to their business.
Lord Marland: We need to embody something in this agreement that provides for that. That is your suggestion.
Simon Smith: I do not suggest that the agreement is lacking because it does not have that, but the process of dealing with an agreement such as this should be that people look at it and ask, “How does this help us set our concrete objectives, not for 100 years but for one, two or three years? What concretely can we achieve in the context of this agreement over a shorter period? How are we going to structure that? Who is going to benefit from it? How are the benefits going to be realised?”
It does not necessarily need to be in the body of the agreement, but it would help to have a concrete result that could be quickly associated with the agreement.
Professor David J Betz: It is a great question. I will be brief. First, there is a contradiction in the agreement between the intent to green the Ukrainian industrial and energy system, and the hope, on the other hand, to get defence industrial benefit out of it. Defence industry is massively energy-consumptive. I do not know how those things fit together.
To your question specifically, I consider the current agreement to be at the maximum extent of plausibility already, given that it assumes things about Russia’s demands and what the current American expectations are for a potential peace agreement. My guess is that it is going to be substantially amended in the course of time if not entirely repudiated as a condition of a peace agreement between these two countries. That would be my view.
Q6 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Would you agree that the danger is that, in descending from generalities and bringing in particulars, it will extend massively the length and scope of the agreement? There are surely some areas where there will be mutual benefit. For example, we can benefit from the drone and battle experience of the Ukrainians. It is not a one-way process.
Professor David J Betz: My wife is Ukrainian. I know the country pretty well. The very distinctive thing about Ukraine is that it is massively productive agriculturally, which we are not. That seems to me an entirely plausible advantage. It is not particularly highlighted in this agreement, but, from a forward-thinking century-long perspective, that might be very plausible.
Nick Childs: Just briefly to pick up on Lord Anderson’s point, yes, absolutely. It is implicit in the agreement and certainly in the declaration that, as I hinted at the beginning, there is an element of reciprocity around this. Yes, up to now, the emphasis has been very much on support for Ukraine, but, three years into this conflict, there is a lot that Ukraine has learned and can teach us. In some ways, we have enabled the innovation that you have talked about, including the drone warfare and that sort of thing, but we have not learned how to do it ourselves. There is an element of that going forward, which is implicit in the agreement and perhaps should be made more explicit.
It goes to Mr Smith’s point about industrial co-operation, the integration of industrial capacity and the integration of areas of industrial advantage in the defence field going forward. There is a potential contribution that Ukraine can make in a broader context, which will have an effect over time, whatever the vagaries of the moment.
The Chair: I am anxious to get to Lord Boateng’s question, which is substantially different from any other question we have had so far.
Q7 Lord Boateng: Professor Betz, you have made reference to grain exports from Ukraine. Mr Smith, you have called for concrete objectives out of this treaty. Article 3 of the treaty provides for a maritime partnership to secure safety of navigation in the Black Sea and the Azov Sea. Clearly, that is relevant to grain exports. Large sums of UK taxpayers’ money were spent on addressing this issue when Russia blocked grain exports from Ukraine. In what ways does this partnership contribute to existing maritime arrangements and what are the potential opportunities and challenges?
The Chair: Mr Childs, you gave evidence to the Defence Select Committee about the naval side. Perhaps you could pick that up and link in Putin’s ambition on naval force.
Nick Childs: A core of the partnership up to now has been in the maritime space. Post 2014 and even before the full-scale invasion, there was a lot of focus on these areas of maritime security. They are both important to Ukrainian interests and a foundation of the UK’s view of the rules-based international order, particularly issues around freedom of navigation and so on and so forth.
There is a history of incremental increases in that area. This agreement talks about expanding those further in terms of building up Ukraine’s own maritime capability and potentially, in the future, co-operative activities to reinforce freedom of navigation generally in the Black Sea—I will come to the Sea of Azov in a minute—and more broadly as a principle. It has been specifically mentioned in some ministerial answers already on this subject that reinforcing that safe navigation corridor for grain is an important element of that. There are opportunities there.
There are risks involved in that, one of which is, as has been hinted, that at the moment the Sea of Azov is—and the Russians are reasserting this—being seen as an inner sea of Russia because of the situation with the current occupation. The agreement talks about reversing that and supporting the Ukrainian maritime security strategy, which implies the reversing of those occupations of Crimea and the Sea of Azov coast as currently occupied. Clearly, that does not look feasible at the moment or at any time in the near future, given the mood music around the current negotiations. There is a potential risk that the UK will become involved in the revival of dormant but significant territorial flashpoints.
Lord Boateng: Is it dormant? The Foreign Ministry of Russia’s spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, has said, “Any claims on these waters are a gross interference in internal affairs of our country and will be severely suppressed”. That does not imply there is going to be anything other than the immediate potential of conflict. It is not looking forward into the future.
Nick Childs: In the context of where the current focus has been as far as activity in the war is concerned, the inability to navigate there has been a fait accompli. Clearly, the ambition behind the agreement—
Lord Boateng: Is it a realistic ambition? That is what we want to know.
Nick Childs: At the moment, it looks—
Lord Boateng: Mr Childs, we get that. Is it realistic?
The Chair: We are running up against a barrier.
Lord Boateng: That is why I would like a reply. Is it realistic?
Nick Childs: It looks unrealistic at the moment. As I say, it could get the UK involved if there are joint maritime activities as part of some deterrence and reassurance presence in the region, which could potentially involve flashpoints at sea. That is an issue going forward.
Another issue going forward is that, if it is part of the UK’s ambition to contribute, with Ukraine, to delivering a more stable general maritime situation in the Black Sea, that is going to require significant resources in terms of patrolling presence and that sort of thing.
Lord Boateng: Quite so, yes. Chairman, it would be interesting to hear from Professor Betz on this because I imagine he has very firm views on it. Saved by the bell—or not, as the case may be.
The Chair: We will now put this session on pause.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
The Chair: Welcome back to this session of evidence at the International Agreements Committee, where we had to suspend for a vote. We were in the middle of talking about the naval question that was posed by Lord Boateng, and Professor David Betz was going to respond to that question.
Professor David J Betz: I will be brief. I am not a maritime expert, so take that as a warning. It is important that we are realistic about the shape of a peace agreement and act pragmatically on the basis of that realistic understanding, which is that this war is going to be determined by military reality on the land, primarily.
The provisions of the agreement for maritime partnership for securing navigation in the Black Sea and the Azov Sea are ultimately hostage to strategic fortune on the land. It is unlikely that a Ukraine-Russia peace agreement on current trajectory would allow for a significant Ukrainian—let alone British—naval presence, given the demands for demilitarisation. It is entirely possible, moreover, should the war continue, as it may well do, that Ukraine will lose the entirety of its Black Sea coast, which I would assess currently as being a highly likely Russian intention. That would be my response, essentially.
Q8 Lord Anderson of Swansea: What can Mr Childs tell us about the strength of the Ukrainian navy? The damage to the Russian fleet did not come from the Ukrainian navy. I was in Odessa a couple of years ago and all we saw was a few patrol boats and a rather rusty Soviet freighter. What is the strength of the Ukrainian navy currently?
Nick Childs: It is very diminished. It was diminished in the aftermath of the 2014 occupation of Crimea. It essentially lost 75% of its capability then. It has not operated as a conventional force and has limited strength now. You are absolutely right.
What the Ukrainians have achieved against the supposedly much stronger Black Sea fleet of Russia has been most significantly in unconventional terms, with the use of a combination of uncrewed surface vessels, long-range strikes on ships in port and that sort of thing. It is very limited at the moment.
Even before the war started, the ambitions, particularly as regards UK contributions, were in the field of producing a future naval capability that was tailored to what were then seen as Ukraine’s requirements, which were to do with patrolling and protecting its territorial waters. “Mosquito fleet” is the phrase that has often been used, so small ships and that kind of thing.
The ambition going forward, if there is any further development of that, would be to look at the lessons from the Black Sea, not just for Ukraine but more generally, about the value of unconventional capabilities particularly in a sea such as the Black Sea, and to think about any further requirements. What Ukraine has been doing up to now has been denying the sea to the other side. The issues would be around Ukraine’s ability to defend whatever territorial waters it may still have and aspire to going forward, as far as future capabilities are concerned.
The Chair: Lord McDonald, your question has more or less been asked, has it not?
Lord McDonald of Salford: I was just about to say the same, Lord Chairman. It has been asked. I cannot say it has been very well answered, but asking it again would not make much difference. I cede to the next question.
The Chair: That is very kind of you, given that we have only a few minutes to go.
Q9 Lord Howell of Guildford: My question has been largely answered by Simon Smith’s very strong line on what we are trying to do to discourage the globe generally from letting Russia get away with it. There is one particular point here about how Russia will be held accountable. People go around saying that. What is really meant by that? There is not going to be a Nuremberg. Russia is not going to be conquered. Is that just words? What does it mean, Ambassador?
Simon Smith: I am afraid this is one of those parts of the treaty where, in a sense, the need to express a position has perhaps taken over from the need to put achievable things in the agreement. This article assumes that pursuance of Russian accountability will continue following a settlement. Of course, that is not a given.
In any case, these issues can be impossible to pursue, simply. It is a very small example, but, in my personal experience, trying to extract accountability from Russia for the poisoning of a British citizen in the United Kingdom proved to be totally impossible. We are talking about a bigger picture here, but, without a Russian Administration co-operating with whatever mechanisms were envisaged for accountability, this looks like a provision that would be very difficult to fulfil.
It feels as though saying that we will continue to pursue accountability is fine as an aspiration, but “will be held accountable” sounds more like an attitude than an action.
Q10 Lord Boateng: Chair, is there anything from any of these witnesses, from any of you gentlemen and lady, that counters what has been said by Ms Zakharova when she describes the whole agreement as “just another PR campaign” and “worthless”? Is there anything concrete that any of the four of you can point to that counters that assertion?
The Chair: Can we start with Hanna Hopko?
Lord Boateng: Yes, that would be helpful to know because presumably she does have an example.
The Chair: Hanna, can you be brief in responding to that?
Hanna Hopko: I want to continue this topic on Russian accountability.
The Chair: I am sorry. This is a really important question, Ms Hopko. Can you address Lord Boateng’s question directly rather than referring back to Lord Howell’s? If we have time, we will come back to Lord Howell’s question.
Hanna Hopko: The question is about Ms Zakharova’s thoughts about the agreement.
The Chair: Yes, and whether it is window dressing or public relations rather than a concrete agreement.
Lord Boateng: Ms Hopko, it would be very helpful if you could assist with this from a Ukrainian perspective, appreciating entirely the organisation from which you come. Can you point to something specific that we can highlight in our report that counters what Ms Zakharova says: that this whole agreement is just another PR campaign? What would you point to?
Hanna Hopko: Ms Zakharova is afraid of UK-Ukraine strengthening bilateral relations. They are afraid of the UK’s strong position because they know that Russia poses a threat to Europe, including the UK. I would never comment on this lady. It is part of her job.
Our duty and responsibility is not to react to Ms Zakharova but to act in our common interest, in the national interest of the UK, in the interest of Ukraine and in the interest of European security. This is my comment.
The Chair: That is very helpful.
Professor David J Betz: I have nothing to say that would contradict her point of view, which is fundamentally correct.
Simon Smith: I am astonished to hear this appalling spokeswoman for the Russian Federation quoted as an authority.
Lord Boateng: She is not being quoted as an authority. I am asking you, Mr Smith, to counter her argument. I am certainly not quoting her as an authority. Please do not misrepresent my question. Professor Betz has said there is nothing to counter it. Ms Hopko has been very helpful in her assertions. I am asking you to do likewise, please, Mr Smith.
Simon Smith: I apologise if I misrepresented what you said.
Lord Boateng: Yes, please do. You totally misrepresented it.
Simon Smith: This agreement has the makings of what can be an effective posture of deterrence to the further efforts of Putin and Putin’s Administration to undermine European solidarity, unity and success. His recipe for governance is a destructive, exploitative and extractive one. This agreement enables arrangements to be put in place that defend us against that recipe for governance.
Nick Childs: I would concur with Mr Smith. As we said, to some extent the 100-year title has been a bit of a self-inflicted wound, but it does relay a sense of commitment and, as Mr Smith suggests, is a statement of intent going forward that potentially adds to the deterrence posture of the United Kingdom and, more generally, to deterrence against Russia as part of a general threat to European security.
Q11 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I just wanted to finish up, if we could, on this question of war crimes and the crime of aggression. Does the panel agree that the mistake that has been made in the agreement is to include two quite separate things? I am sure your answers about the crime of aggression are correct. There is not going to be a tribunal to try crimes of aggression.
The answer—I would like you to face this one—with respect to atrocities committed in Ukraine during the fighting is completely different. It is the subject of arrest warrants by the International Criminal Court. Ms Zakharova will not be travelling to this country. If she lands in Heathrow, she will be arrested immediately. That is what the Government said they would do in another context.
The muddling of the two things is not—perhaps you will comment on this—terribly helpful. The International Criminal Court issue will not go away, and it is not ours to give away. It is the International Criminal Court’s to give away, if it wishes to.
Simon Smith: I find that a very helpful distinction, Lord Hannay. That is a very good clarification. The point I was trying to make was that, yes, there is action that we can continue to take, that Ukraine can continue to take and that we can take with Ukraine together, but it may not be action that produces a result in terms of accountability being achieved. What it can do is, exactly as Lord Hannay has described, have some effect in applying some degree of accountability and applying consequences for crimes or atrocities that have been committed.
Baroness Lawlor: Just to get clear your position, Mr Smith, in answer to Lord Boateng’s question, I took it to be that, without any concretisation—that was one of the words you used—in this 100-year agreement, there is nothing one could put one’s finger on. We need to put something into it. You described it as an enabling treaty, so there is nothing concrete here. Is what you have just mentioned outside the terms of this?
Simon Smith: No. In my view, it enables an effective posture of deterrence.
The Chair: Lord Anderson, your question takes us into a different area that we have to discuss.
Q12 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Article 7 and Pillar 7 contain commitments about combating “foreign information manipulation and interference”. I would value the views of the panel on the extent to which these provisions can be implemented effectively and the best way of measuring their effectiveness.
Professor David J Betz: Reporters Without Borders, among other institutions, has recently warned of shrinking press freedom in Ukraine, including threats against journalists, censorship and other forms of media control. An American social media influencer died rather suspiciously in Ukrainian custody.
Ukraine and Britain have long-standing co-operation on strategic communications, which are specifically invoked in the agreement, including the provision of education and training to a very large extent. The British military has been highly involved in the CIPsO—the Ukrainian Centre for Information and Psychological Operations—for a very long time. Therefore, the provisions of the agreement are in line with existing co-operation patterns between the two countries, specifically on the matter of information management and strategic communications.
However, there is a specific paragraph that I thought to be curious. Paragraph 5 of Pillar 7 says, “Enable effective disruptive actions to respond to FIMI, including through information sharing, including on individuals and organisations that undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine”.
What does this mean? To whom are they referring when they speak of individuals and organisations? Does it entitle authorities to act against people in the UK who might be seen to undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine? That simply should not be permitted, and I would query that language personally.
The Chair: That is helpful.
Simon Smith: This is not one of the more momentous or portentous portions of the agreement. It simply reflects an agreement between the two parties that the manipulation of information is a potential obstacle and risk to co-operation and a potential risk to achieving results for the benefit of populations in Europe more broadly. But I am not an expert on this issue, and I have nothing concrete to suggest here.
Nick Childs: This is not really my area of expertise.
The Chair: Ms Hopko, if you could give us a quick answer from your point of view, that would be great. Then we can get to the last question.
Hanna Hopko: Since 2022 four UK-Ukraine strategic communications dialogue sessions have taken place between the Ukrainian Government’s strategic communication representatives and the relevant FCDO and the Cabinet Office teams. This has allowed the countries to launch a number of important joint projects, including addressing the challenges related to the Russian aggression against Ukraine and outreach to the regions of the so-called global South.
Bearing in mind that countering foreign information manipulation and interference is an important part of the UK-Ukraine 100-year partnership declaration, Ukraine is determined to continue bilateral effective co-operation on this matter. From the beginning of the Russian invasion in 2014, Russia was saying, in the Russian language, “Nas tam nyet”—“We are not here”. They were blaming this on separatists, saying that Russians were not invading Ukraine.
Even now, we have seen many cases of Russia manipulating and spreading disinformation about Ukraine, including our reforms, and discrediting all of our achievements. We are moving towards EU membership. We have achieved a lot, especially in anti-corruption and freedom of speech.
This is what Russians always blame because a successful Ukraine is a nightmare for Putin. A successful Ukraine is a nightmare for this regime. They are afraid of the reforms that Ukraine has delivered because they do not want to have similar reforms in their society. This is why we have learned a lot, as I mentioned.
I recently returned from Taiwan, where I participated in the Halifax International Security Forum in Taipei. They are learning from Ukraine how to counter Russian disinformation because China is using a similar playbook. This is how we can contribute: by explaining how Russians are brainwashing European society and preparing the ground for further invasions. This is a very serious issue, and we have to consider how to invest more resources in not allowing Russian strategic and foreign information manipulation and interference.
The Chair: Thank you. That is very helpful. We can move on to the last question, which is something I never thought we would get to. Again, please keep your answers quite short.
Q13 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: This is a double question. It basically brings our discussion up to date because it looks at the picture at which we are now looking some time after the signing of the agreement we are considering as a committee. First, how does this agreement relate to the wider issue of security guarantees for Ukraine in the context of any ceasefire agreements or arrangements between Russia and Ukraine or any settlement between those two parties?
Secondly, to what extent will this agreement and its existence, as ratified, act as an effective deterrent to any further Russian aggression against Ukraine, whatever the outcome of the present talks?
Nick Childs: It relates to this in a number of ways, one of which is in terms of security guarantees and assurance in its commitments to maintain, increase and improve, through co-operative agreement, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and its defence capabilities. In the maritime space, it is potentially very significant in relation to maritime security in the territorial seas and Black Sea navigation generally. While it presents opportunities, there are also risks, not least in terms of the level of UK commitment potentially in this area.
Simon Smith: Very briefly, you have put it absolutely correctly that a security guarantee has to be based on a strong deterrence. The agreement itself is not a deterrent, but, in my view, it enables a lot of actions and a lot of co-operation. Taken together, that could provide an effective deterrent in the future that in turn would underpin a security guarantee. It is a reflection of the fact that the Government think that is possible, that it is worth making the effort to pull that together, and that it is something we should do.
Professor David J Betz: In short, predictably, I disagree. It does not represent anything to Russia that it will regard as truly deterring in the future.
The Chair: Hanna Hopko, you have the final word in today’s session.
Hanna Hopko: Some 64% of Ukrainians believe that Ukraine should not accept any negotiations without real security guarantees. Of course, the path to Ukraine’s full membership of NATO—
The Chair: I am afraid we cannot hear you with the bell going. We are going to have to draw a close to this session. I would like to thank all four of you for bearing with us in very difficult circumstances. Thank you for your evidence.
Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could we ask Ms Hopko to put in writing what she would have given us?
The Chair: Yes, could you put in writing what you were going to say? Thanks for your contributions. If there is anything you would like to add that we did not get around to, please do put it in writing to the secretariat. A transcript of this will be circulated in due course. Thanks again.
