Elizabeth Dent, Dr Hasan Alhasan and Dr David Roberts.

Q1 The Chair: Good afternoon. This is a meeting of the House of Lords International Agreements Committee. We are particularly this afternoon going to hear evidence in relation to the UK accession to the US-Bahrain Comprehensive Security, Integration and Prosperity Agreement, C-SIPA. It is two oral evidence sessions that we are going to have, so I welcome people to this session. We have witnesses for this session, two of whom are on screen and one of whom is with us live, and we welcome all three of you. I am going to ask members of the committee, as is usual, to declare interests when they first ask a question.

With that, I will start and ask for a general overview of the agreement, including the context and background to the original negotiations. Ms Dent, Dr Alhasan and Dr Roberts, can I ask you to deal with that in any order that you want?

Dr David Roberts: This is the latest agreement in a series, in many ways, that goes back a very long time. The UK has been engaged in the Gulf for many years and decades, so this is the latest component of that. On this specific agreement, I will defer to my American colleague on the evolution from the US side, but we are the latest country, or the only country after the original instigators, to look to join it. It fits nicely into the evolution of the British approach to the Gulf. It is not out of step in any way, shape or form. It is more of the same. It is trying to institutionalise our approach. I do not see our approach changing any time soon. I have not seen anything to the contrary of that. It fits quite nicely into that approach.

An interesting component of this is in the word “institutionalisation”. Some of the latest research looking at successful security agreements—I am thinking of Dr Bence Nemeth and other colleagues—focuses not just on the big and glitzy security agreements. The latest research finds that it is these mini-lateral agreements between a couple of states, where there is some meaningful progress made, that helps glue larger alliances together. Thinking of the specific elements that are quite useful, it is said that there is a defence working group that should be established. That strikes me as a specific thing that might be relevant. There are standards and guidelines and best practices. It stipulates meetings per year, so it is more on the pragmatic end of things.

Elizabeth Dent: I will provide an overview from the US perspective. It is a binding international agreement. It was signed between the United States and Bahrain in September of 2023. It was intended to grow to include countries that share this common vision based on deterrence, diplomacy, economic integration and growth, security integration and de-escalation of conflicts. A large part of this grew out of the fact that the region saw the United States in particular as disengaging. Several countries have been attempting to negotiate mutual defence treaties or other strategic agreements with the United States. This is the first one that we have really made progress on.

We believe that the US and Bahrain C-SIPA, which I am going to call it from here on out since it is such a long name, can help lead to a more prosperous, integrated, peaceful and stable Middle East, without being predicated upon a large US force presence in the region. You all have the background of the three pillars of the agreement, so I will not go too deep into that, but it is the first agreement of its kind to promote this co‑operation and blend the traditional security co-operation with areas that are likely to become the backbone of security co-operation in the field, such as technology co-operation and economic integration.

The Chair: Dr Alhasan, if I can turn to you, particularly can you tell us what you think the benefits to the existing parties of the UK’s accession to this agreement will be?

Dr Hasan Alhasan: It is a pleasure to be invited to address you today. It is important to recall that the C-SIPA represents a formalised and enhanced US commitment to the security and prosperity of Bahrain. From the US’s standpoint, it is meant to demonstrate the US’s enduring commitment to the region. The demonstration of such commitment takes on added geopolitical significance because of the Middle East’s worsening security environment, growing Chinese influence in the region, the growing risk of Iran possessing a nuclear weapon and so on.

From the Bahraini standpoint, the agreement reinforces deterrence vis‑à‑vis Iran and facilitates Bahrain’s priority access to US weapons and technology. Earlier in 2024, Bahrain became the first Gulf state to receive deliveries of the US F-16 Block 70 fighter aircrafts. That has been linked, in part, to the C-SIPA signing.

From the UK standpoint, or at least as far as the UK’s accession to this agreement and what it brings by way of benefits to the existing parties, in a sense, it provides a framework. It formalises and provides a framework for pre-existing co-operation in the defence domain between the UK, Bahrain and the US. Let us recall that Bahrain hosts the UK Maritime Component Command, UKMCC, at HMS Jufair. This is the UK’s first naval base east of Suez since British withdrawal in 1971. Bahrain also hosts the US Naval Forces Central Command, US NAVCENT, and the US Fifth Fleet.

The UK and the US are also leading members of the Bahrain-based Combined Maritime Forces. This is a coalition of 46 states that conduct counter-piracy and interdiction operations in the south-western Indian Ocean. Bahrain, the US and the UK, among others, are members of Operation Prosperity Guardian in the Red Sea and Operation Poseidon Archer against the Houthi movement in Yemen. The UK’s accession to this agreement would probably also reinforce the collective message of deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, which is a shared security threat and adversary for all three signatories of this agreement. The UK’s accession would formalise and provide a framework for much of this pre-existing defence and security co-operation.

The Chair: You are saying that there are opportunities for the UK, or indeed more generally for the world, from the UK joining the agreement to add to the overall commitment. Are there risks for the UK, in your opinion, in acceding to this agreement? I will ask Dr Roberts the same question in a moment.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: In a manner of speaking, there are always risks to any agreement, to state the obvious. The risk probably on the minds of most would be the risk of entanglement. What if the UK’s enhanced security commitment to Bahrain leads to a risk of entanglement and regional conflict? It is important to remember that this risk runs both ways. As a matter of fact, Bahrain has joined US and UK efforts to counter Houthi aggression against US and UK interests in the Red Sea, rather than the other way around. In a sense, this is a risk that all parties runs in an enhanced security commitment.

Let us keep in mind that the US, and the UK, could invoke C-SIPA to encourage Bahrain to facilitate and provide logistical support for a US or UK response to a threat emanating from Iran or its armed non-state partners in the region. It is important not to take such support in the Gulf for granted. Over the past few years, Iran-backed militias in Iraq have conducted hundreds of attacks against US bases and personnel in Iraq and Syria and yet, over the past year, multiple Gulf states have reportedly denied the US permission to use their airspaces and territories to launch strikes against Iran. There is a benefit in ensuring that the US and UK are more likely to receive logistical support from Bahrain in case they needed to respond to threats emanating from the region to their own security.

That carries with it a theoretical risk that, in the event that Bahrain was to be subjected to an attack from Iran or its armed non-state partners, the UK and US would be called upon to provide assistance. This is an expectation in any case, because of the UK’s and US’s longstanding defence and security partnerships and military presence in Bahrain. This is an expectation that would have predated C-SIPA in any case.

The Chair: We will want to ask a little bit later about the particular commitment. I was just looking to see the clause that it is in. Article 2 is mutual defence and security in the event of external aggression. We will look at that in a moment in a little bit more detail, but thank you for that. Dr Roberts, do you want to add to this? I am still looking at the opportunities and risks for the UK.

Dr David Roberts: I would emphasise again the point that this is an incremental escalation in UK involvement, not a fundamental step change. The defence co-operation agreements, so far as I know, are closed source, so I do not know the ins and outs of them. I suspect that we are already to some degree committed, involved and engaged. I do not see a huge amount within this that qualitatively changes that or makes it more risky. We will come to the wording, perhaps, a bit later on.

The Chair: You are referring to the existing agreement, which is actually not public.

Dr David Roberts: There is a variety of existing agreements. We have been operating in the region for a very long time. I am sure that there is an array of UK bilateral and multilateral agreements already within the region, and this does not seem out of step with those. That is my point.

Q2 Lord Udny-Lister: This is really a question to everybody. How does this agreement fit into the wider regional security picture? How likely is it to fulfil the aims of achieving greater regional integration and co-operation on security matters?

Dr David Roberts: I am happy to offer an initial thought, if I may. To set a little bit of context here, I do not think that our friends in the Gulf have been enormously serious about forging military commitment in the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s and 2010s. The critique I would offer is that it was not an entirely serious endeavour. There was a belief that the enormous preponderance of US military forces and bases in the region gave, de facto, a certain amount of deterrence and/or protection from threats within the region. The military endeavour went on. A lot of money was spent on it, but I am not sure whether there was an entirely coherent linking of ends, ways and means to forge efficient militaries, ultimately.

That state of affairs has been changing a lot in recent years, I would argue. In particular, on 14 September 2019 there was an enormous attack on Saudi Arabia’s most significant oil exporting facility, Abqaiq, and another one on Khurais. This was Iranian proxies, I think, is the conclusion. Missiles and drones struck the world’s most important refining facility with unbelievable accuracy. In the satellite photos you see pinpricks on a lot of the infrastructure. I think that that broke any illusions that leaders in the Gulf might have had that they enjoyed some kind of miraculous protection from the US or anybody else. This was one of the most important critical national infrastructure sites in the world in many ways, certainly in Saudi Arabia. American deterrence did not deter, American military might did not protect and President Trump, as was, did not really do much in reaction.

I often see Abqaiq as a pivotal moment of inflection, where there was a slightly unserious approach to defence until that moment, when I feel that the real potential of what could happen transpired. I say that because I see this agreement as more of a nuts-and-bolts institutionalising approach to meaningfully help to forge more military capability in the region and regional integration. That is where it is sitting. It is pushing nicely towards that aim.

The specific question of whether this will succeed or lead to greater military capability in the region is an imponderable. It is very difficult to do. We will come on to, I suspect, more multilateral components of this, about whether other Gulf nations might join. That gets tricky. It very much does.

The Chair: Ms Dent, do you want to add anything to what has been said on this general topic about opportunities and risks for the UK?

Elizabeth Dent: The agreement is largely complementary to a lot of the ongoing US-led efforts to integrate the regional security architecture. Bahrain has been a leader in that sector, so it made sense for the US to pursue Bahrain as the first signatory of this agreement. It is largely a formalisation of those initiatives, as my colleagues have said. It recognises Bahrain as a leader in these endeavours, while also accelerating ongoing efforts to integrate regional integrated air missile defence and maritime security to establish a common operating picture. It also helps us identify new areas of co-operation and integration in this arena. It broadens the scope of regional security to mean both economic and technological integration as well. It is a much broader spectre of regional security integration.

The Chair: I want to thank Lord Udny-Lister for his question, but take the opportunity in doing so of thanking him for his service to this committee, because this is the last formal meeting, sadly, that he will be attending. The same, I am afraid, goes for Lord Grimstone and Lord Etherton as well. I want to renew thanks to them. Maybe it will not be long before they come back. I do not understand how these things are resolved, but thank you very much indeed.

Q3 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: First, I have a declaration of interest. I was head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Middle East department in the late 1970s.

I want to turn to the aspect of this agreement being open to others to join. The meeting we are holding today obviously establishes that rather clearly, because Britain is going to join and we are being asked to assess that decision. Which countries in the region do you think might possibly be candidates for joining this process? Have any of them shown any interest in it? To what extent do some fairly well-suppressed but existing rivalries and disagreements between various Gulf countries stand in the way of joining this agreement? Could you say something on that?

Perhaps, Elizabeth Dent, when you come to comment, you could tell us something about what the new US Administration’s attitude towards this sort of agreement is likely to be. It looks like a kind of multilateral agreement, which does not inspire the new President very much, to put it politely. Will they back this? Will they back its extension to other countries?

Elizabeth Dent: I will not get ahead of any of the Government ‑to‑Government conversations, but, logically, countries that are also participating in some of the regional integration efforts make the most sense to pursue as we seek to expand this agreement, so the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and, when the time is right, Israel. I do not think that it is quite ripe yet. There is also a secondary group of countries that have interest in the region and have a stake in ensuring that the region is prosperous and stable. I am thinking about Japan, South Korea, other European countries, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. All of those countries would make sense for expansion, but it probably makes the most sense at this current time to continue pursuing more of the regional partners.

In terms of some of the GCC intra-conflict, we are facing a pretty drastically changed security environment post 7 October. I do not think that these tensions have subsided, by any means, but they are certainly more muted in the face of other issues going on. National security has broadened to be more than just defence and military co-operation, as I mentioned previously. It is in the best interests of many of the GCC states to pursue this greater economic and technological integration, because it creates a common set of standards and can help with economic development for all the countries involved.

The only spoiler would be the potential US-Saudi mutual defence treaty, which is premised on normalisation with Israel. If it were ratified by the US Senate, that would obviously be a much stronger mutual defence commitment from the United States. That could potentially deter countries from wanting to join the C-SIPA if that were to pass, because they would then realise that a much stronger US commitment would be on the table.

In terms of the new US Administration, I will not purport to know what President Trump may do with this agreement, but it is in line with his previous term in terms of pursuing transactional diplomatic initiatives that can help grow the American economy and ensure better bilateral strategic co-operation with countries with which we have shared interests. I actually think that it is in line with his worldview, despite the bilateral and multilateral nature of the agreement.

Q4 Lord Fox: How set in stone is this agreement, or is there scope to flex it if you are looking to negotiate with other people to join it? Is it what it is and it stays what it is, and you either like it or lump it if you are a potential new entrant? I should say that I have no interest to declare. Elizabeth, maybe you might have the answer to that.

Elizabeth Dent: I am not exactly sure from the Bahraini perspective, but from the US perspective it is an executive agreement, even though it is internationally binding. An executive agreement means that it was signed under the Biden Administration. The Trump Administration are at liberty to either continue to carry it out or say that they are not going to. Given that it is an executive agreement and has not been ratified by our Senate, I believe that it would be able to be amended if all parties who have signed on to the current text were to agree on amendments. My colleagues can correct me if I am wrong.

Q5 The Chair: I had not appreciated that. Assuming it is amended in that way, would the UK, if it has acceded, need to agree to that, or would it just have to be carried along in the slipstream of the change?

Elizabeth Dent: I believe that any party that had signed on to the agreement would need to agree on any language change.

Q6 Lord Grimstone of Boscobel: I should declare an interest that I am a member of the Bahrain Economic Development Board’s international advisory board. I am going to abuse my position, Chair, by asking two questions, if I may, as this is my last meeting attending the committee. The first question very much follows on what we have discussed already. There is a lot of mutual activity in regard to defending shipping lanes in the region at the moment and a lot of very strong international co‑operation. Do you think this agreement in itself strengthens or changes in any way those international agreements on keeping shipping lanes open?

Dr David Roberts: I cannot see how this would interfere with that. It strikes me as complementary in terms of the naval command in Bahrain. It is led by an American, with the Royal Navy in the deputy positions, and so therefore we are quite well placed to borrow from one to the other and have this agreement augment existing capabilities. I do not see any reason why this would be an obvious concern or duplication.

Elements of the maritime task force 154 are to do with maritime security training, so there is already plenty of training that is going on within the region. I would imagine that that might be something that the UK would like to pursue. Our fundamental approach to foreign policy and defence, of course, is enduringly multilateral. We cannot do anything unilaterally. Everything absolutely has to be multilateral with as many partners as we can, which is why, going back to my first point, this fits into the thrust of UK foreign policy so nicely. That would strike me as something that we could and should be pushing in the region to have one augment the other.

Lord Grimstone of Boscobel: My second question is that we have focused so far in this session on the defence aspects of this agreement, and indeed most of the public commentary on this agreement focuses on the defence aspects of it. This is a three-pillar agreement. In particular, there are purportedly strong commitments on investment and trade for the three countries to co-operate on. Do our witnesses have any thoughts or insights as to how useful those other pillars are?

The defence pillar is very specific. You can see how it works. It is not at all clear how the investment or trade aspects of this work. Bahrain, of course, has an existing free trade agreement with the US. We have at the moment an agreement with neither Bahrain, although that may change, nor the US. On investment, it is not easy to see why there would be trilateral investment between the three countries. I would be very interested in any comments our witnesses have on that.

Dr David Roberts: I will offer a brief initial thought and then pass over to maybe Dr Alhasan. I have the same opinion as your good self when it comes to the other pillars that seem to be a little more aspirational, a little less clear and a little less specific. Article 4, Section 2 speaks about developing standards, guidelines and best practices, which is welcome in its specificity. As to the implementation of that, I am unsure. I am a bit more sceptical when it comes to the other pillars as to how they might meaningfully develop, but I am very happy to be corrected.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: It is important to remember that, politically speaking at least, the UK’s accession would complement probably and be perceived positively in parallel with other efforts, such as the ongoing negotiation of the UK-GCC—that is the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Bahrain as a member state—free trade agreement. In a sense, the agreement would be seen as a sign of the strengthening of the UK’s relationship with one of the GCC founding member states.

I admit that the US and Bahrain have yet to articulate very clearly how the agreement would materialise in the economic and technological domains. We have seen one announcement in December 2024, by the United States, to launch a geospatial acceleration initiative that would facilitate Bahrain’s access to US hydrographic, aeronautical and topographic geospatial foundation data. We are now seeing some US effort to give substance in the technological domain to C-SIPA.

When we remember that technology and trade are becoming increasingly securitised, it becomes not so strange, or at least we get a better understanding, perhaps, of why it might make some sense to include technology and economic co-operation in what is overwhelmingly and largely a security agreement. To give you one example, the essentially intertwined nature of geopolitics, technology and trade means that there is potentially a case to be made.

This has yet to materialise fully. We have seen, for example, that Bahrain was not included in a list of 18 predominantly western allies and partners that are exempted in the United States from restrictions applying to the sale of advanced US semiconductors or chips. This is not a blanket preference for Bahrain when it comes to sensitive areas of US technology that the US wants to protect from Chinese competition. The work that needs to be done here—and perhaps the UK could demonstrate a degree of leadership—is how this agreement could be translated into a framework for enhancing co-operation in areas of technology and exchange that have become particularly securitised and intertwined with global geopolitical competition, AI semiconductors being a prominent example.

The Chair: Do you mean in the GCC area, or are you talking more widely than that?

Dr Hasan Alhasan: It is in the sense that the agreement could provide a framework for countries such as Bahrain, and eventually the UK, to gain some priority access to areas of US technology that are under export controls and added restrictions on inward foreign investment into the United States. That is broadly reflective of the US effort to protect these sensitive areas of technology through the so-called “small yard, high fence” approach, in order to ensure that China does not gain access to these technologies. The agreement would constitute a framework for preferential treatment for partners such as Bahrain that sign on to this agreement to be able to co-operate with the US on such technologies, as an aspirational target.

Elizabeth Dent: I wanted to highlight a couple of other areas in the tech and economic spaces. For example, I mentioned earlier that a large part of this agreement was about accelerating pre-existing efforts. One of those efforts is the FAA and the Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs sitting down to discuss direct flights. Because of this agreement, the United States pushed the Federal Aviation Administration to get out to Bahrain sooner to help ensure that security measures were being matched and they could continue to pursue these direct flights.

Beyond the technological initiative that was announced in December, which is a technological initiative that is complementary to military and security pillars, there are a number of different areas where the US and Bahrain are also promoting co-operation on specific standards. Bahrain has had multiple cybersecurity attacks. The United States is working with the Bahraini Government on resiliency. Bahrain also has some very unique privacy data laws that could help attract tech investments from both the United States and the United Kingdom. There are a lot of areas where there is potential for co-operation that may not necessarily have been announced yet but that I think government officials are looking into at this time.

Q7 The Chair: Can you say a little more about these privacy laws that may be particularly attractive to tech entrepreneurs?

Elizabeth Dent: Dr Alhasan, you are probably the expert.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: I am not an expert on Bahraini data privacy laws, but, by and large, there would most certainly be a broad government and legislative appetite in Bahrain to enact the necessary reforms to ensure the flow of investment in the technological domain in Bahrain. This is a broad regional trend in the GCC. We have seen Saudi Arabia and the UAE make a lot of regulatory changes and pour a lot of investments into this domain. Bahrain is a very different regulatory environment from Saudi Arabia or the UAE, but would probably share the broad ambition of being able to attract US and other investments into the Bahraini ecosystem in that regard.

The Chair: I am hearing—I may be completely wrong—that there may be an attraction to tech entrepreneurs of a lesser degree of transparency in relation to regulatory arrangements or something like that. Am I getting that right?

Elizabeth Dent: The 2018 Personal Data Protection Law is essentially additional legal protections for individuals, companies and their data. It is a big draw for the private sector. I do not necessarily think that it is less transparent per se, but it is a draw because it is data protection that is focused on the individual.

Q8 Lord Fox: I had one question to rewind to Lord Grimstone’s first question, which was on the subject of the possible effect of this agreement on the pre-existing agreements on dealing with piracy and suchlike. I think that Dr Roberts said that he did not think that it would make much difference to that. I wanted to check with Dr Alhasan, not wishing to spread dissent between our witnesses, whether, from your perspective, there is anything that this adds to the effective policing of the area, or whether that is as good as it is going to get anyway.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: The C-SIPA agreement is probably complementary to those efforts and could be seen as an additional layer of joint effort to counter piracy. It is important to recall that Bahrain over the past year has been the only Arab or Muslim-majority state to formally support and participate in Operations Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon Archer. It has supported the Combined Maritime Forces and the expansion of the Combined Maritime Forces. It has led multiple of these task forces under CMF, including those that engage in interdiction, counter-piracy and counter‑arms trafficking efforts in the Gulf and the Red Sea, and in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea as well. I do not think that there is tension or contradiction between these pre-existing efforts and C-SIPA. If anything, C-SIPA probably reinforces those and provides yet another layer through which the US, Bahrain and eventually the UK could further co‑operate in that regard.

Elizabeth Dent: I wanted to foot-stomp Dr Alhasan’s words on that. It is very complementary to initiatives that are already ongoing in the region to secure the waterways. I think that C-SIPA helped provide Bahrain the framework and the security assurances that it probably needed to feel comfortable being the only Arab or Muslim country that was publicly affiliated with either Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Poseidon Archer.

I also want to go back to the geospatial acceleration initiative that Dr Alhasan mentioned a few minutes ago. As I mentioned, it is a technology initiative under that pillar, but it helps support the critical shipping lanes defence because it helps them share hydrographic, aeronautical and topographic datasets with the Bahrainis. It also facilitates greater access to commercial imagery and can help produce datasets where we are enhancing navigational safety for military forces and bolstering maritime security in the region. Again, all of this is complementary and it is about pursuing things that we otherwise may not have with these partners in the agreement.

Q9 Lord Marland: Thank you for letting me join you by Zoom. The agreement contains a commitment in the event of an external aggressor coming against one of the parties. It states that all parties agree to develop a response. It would be very interesting to hear an elaboration on that and what the circumstances are that might occur. You have referenced a few earlier in the meeting and I would be particularly concerned about what level of response it could be.

Dr David Roberts: When it comes to the issue of what might prompt a level of concern, we need to go back to “Yes Minister” and salami-slicing and the likes, to be honest. We have seen an awful lot of irregular tactics undertaken in the Gulf, from mines that appear on ships to missiles that get flung around. There are these irregular components. Bahrain is one of several targets of this, of course. It goes from that blurry greyness all the way up to something obvious and kinetic that is in people’s minds.

In terms of the “and therefore” and the next step, “What does this agreement mean for the UK?”, for example, I think two contrasting things. I do not know what existing defence co-operations agreement exists at the moment, and what pre-existing commitments we already have to Bahrain’s national security in the event of blah, blah, blah. That is one important caveat. I feel that, de jure, reading the text of it, it is a matter of grave concern with respect to constitutions and laws. Immediately, the most senior levels will determine defence needs. It is quite open and loose, to my interpretation. I am not a lawyer, but it strikes me as, in a de jure sense, quite open to interpretation, should we say.

The Chair: It is lacking in specificity.

Dr David Roberts: Yes. Thank you very much. When it comes to the regional reaction, I think that there will be more of a de facto expectation of significant help. There is the idea of “Britain and the US have been our core allies for so long. We have these rafts of agreements going back a very long time. There is enormous support in the military area. You have military bases in the region. We had this new agreement just now. Of course you are going to aid in some way, shape or form”. I will offer that de jure and de facto expectation, which I think would be at play with this and other similar agreements in the region.

Elizabeth Dent: I agree that the language is quite vague, intentionally. The key word is “consult”. It is an agreement to consult at the threat of an external aggression or an external aggression. In other words, it is an agreement to meet immediately following this threat or something that occurs. That could mean anything, depending on the size and scope of what the threat or actual external aggression is.

As we all know, there are a number of tools in the toolbox that countries can utilise to help satisfy this clause. It could mean anything from a very strongly worded joint statement to even potentially non-operational or operational support for retaliation, which of course would be something that each country would have to determine on their own to satisfy this agreement. It is intentionally vague to allow for that flexibility.

The Chair: It is intentionally vague, but it talks about meeting at the most senior levels and immediately sharing available and appropriate information and intelligence, all of which sounds like, although it is perhaps lacking in specificity, quite powerful stuff. Would you agree?

Elizabeth Dent: I would agree, but, if it were at the level of something like that that would require a response, heads of state or defence Ministers would already be in discussions anyway. Given that we—the US, UK and Bahrain—are such close partners, we would likely be proactively wanting to share intelligence or information related to any sort of attack anyway. It is not really signing us up to anything that we do not already do.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: With the caveat that I am not a lawyer or an expert in law, to me the operative language here is, “Develop and implement appropriate defense and deterrent responses”, to external aggression or the threat of external aggression. The language is somewhat deliberately non-specific, not as explicit as, say, a NATO Article 5, where an attack against one is an attack against all. That leaves no room, or very little room, for interpretation. In the case of C-SIPA, it is sufficiently vague. Ultimately, a security commitment is always in the eye of the beholder.

I would second Ms Dent’s view that the commitment is somewhat superfluous, in the sense that it does not really commit the US, and arguably the UK, to something that would not have probably been done anyway. There is already a very significant degree of geostrategic alignment in the way the US, Bahrain and the UK perceive threats in the Middle East. Their threat perception is very much aligned and they have a long track record of responding and co-operating on such threats in the past.

The Chair: That is why, from this committee’s point of view, we have a bit of a challenge because we are wanting to look to see what this is adding to existing commitments. That is a little bit more difficult to identify, though we have had some important evidence already about the factual expectation that there will be.

Q10 Lord Anderson of Swansea: In commenting on the significance of the agreement, I think it was Dr Alhasan who called it a framework agreement. Indeed, he used the term “framework” on several occasions. It is a framework for existing commitments, which puts the whole agreement in some perspective. Obviously, the UK eminently qualifies because of the existing range of agreements with Bahrain, the naval agreement, history and so on. Are there any other non-regional countries that come nearly close to those links that the UK has and that have made the UK a candidate for membership?

Dr Hasan Alhasan: No, not for Bahrain. As far as Bahrain is concerned, the co‑operation with the United States and the UK, in that order, is probably the most significant set of non-regional relations on defence and security that Bahrain has, period. In a sense, the US and the UK are the most likely candidates for such a relationship with Bahrain.

You touch on a very important point, which is the idea that this is a framework. I agree with that characterisation. As you have said, I have used it multiple times. It is a framework, on the one hand, that covers, and in a sense formalises, existing defence and security co‑operation, but it is important to keep in mind some of the growth potential of that framework in two respects.

The first respect is membership. This is still a bilateral agreement. It might become a trilateral agreement once the UK accedes to it and then it could keep growing. Ms Dent has touched on some of the potential regional members. Most of these would be US, Arab and Gulf partners. There are non-regional partners that could potentially take an interest, but there are some obstacles there, and I will mention why.

India would be an interesting one. India has joined multiple mini-lateral frameworks and a co‑operation framework with Israel, the UAE and the United States. I2U2 is what it is called. India has recently joined the Combined Maritime Forces stationed in Bahrain and has been seen as a likely partner and a force multiplier that the United States could work with, alongside the Arab Gulf states, to share the collective security burden in the region. The issue on the Indian side is that India is not generally terribly excited about taking on enhanced or formalised security commitments. It has traditionally shied away from that in the Middle East. India also has a strong relationship with Iran, and so might be wary of upsetting the Iranians on that front.

The other likely or potential candidates would be the French, because the French have a military presence in the Gulf.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: Is that bilaterally or as part of the European Union?

Dr Hasan Alhasan: It is both. In terms of their presence in the UAE, that is a bilateral arrangement with the UAE to station French forces there. France is also part of multiple European coalitions of the willing. There is the EMASoH, which is a European coalition, not an EU coalition, of a few European countries that patrol the Strait of Hormuz. There is Aspides, which is another European coalition that is undertaking maritime security efforts in the Red Sea at the moment.

Again, the French have been reluctant to sign on to US-led frameworks in the past. When the Americans surged in the Strait of Hormuz, the French spearheaded EMASoH separately, and the same goes for the Red Sea. The French prefer to work with other European partners, in parallel with US and UK efforts, but independently, at least formally speaking, of US and UK efforts. While France already has a presence in the region, this willingness to operate independently would be an obstacle to France joining the agreement.

The Chair: There are a couple of other points I would like us to deal with slightly differently from the issues we have been touching on now. May I turn to Lord Hannay, please, to raise those?

Q11 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: We will take these separately because they are quite different. The first question on which it would be helpful to have some response from all of you is about the extent to which human rights problems in Bahrain and the tensions between its Sunni and Shia populations affect the security situation and the likelihood that this agreement might be rendered operative.

Dr David Roberts: I do not think that there is an obvious link between internal domestic sectarian concerns within Bahrain and that impacting upon the execution of this kind of an agreement, if that is the question. As I mentioned at the beginning, this fits into the general approach that we are taking, which is to engage extensively and consistently with our friends and partners in the Gulf. This fits into that lineage.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could I follow up that point? I am slightly puzzled by your response. If there were trouble among the Shia community in Bahrain and the Government of Bahrain suggested, alleged or claimed that it was being incited by Iran, presumably there is a link to this agreement.

Dr David Roberts: My understanding of the domestic Bahraini situation at the moment is that I do not see a chance of some kind of internal sectarian issue escalating to the point that it could impact on this or any other sort of agreement, operationally or whatever the language might be. On your angle that you raise, going back to the salami-slicing aspects I was talking about earlier, about potential Iranian inciting, it is a sensible point to raise. It is a potential concern. Of course it is, but I do not see it as being particularly likely. I do not want to pretend that I am an expert on internal machinations within Bahrain, but I do not see the situation as being that ripe for exploitation in that way.

Q12 Lord Boateng: Bahrain is a longstanding friend and ally of the United Kingdom. We have very real security, trade, industrial and commercial interests that we share in that region. Iran is not a friend of the United Kingdom and we are in competition with it. It has a track record of interfering in the internal affairs of nations. Do you still cling to the view that there is “no proof whatsoever of Iranian interference to any significant degree in Bahrain’s internal affairs”? Have you reserved the right, which indeed you have referred to on previous occasions, of John Maynard Keynes to change your mind if new evidence presents itself? New evidence surely has presented itself since you expressed that opinion.

Dr David Roberts: When was that exactly?

Lord Boateng: It was in the Guardian on 20 August 2011.

Dr David Roberts: That was a little while back.

Lord Boateng: Quite so. That is why I ask you whether, in the intervening period, anything has occurred that has caused you, Keynes-like, to change your mind.

The Chair: I am obviously very grateful for the question from Lord Boateng. If you need time to go back to that and consider it, I would be happy to receive a written answer to that if you would be willing to do so.

Dr David Roberts: I am very happy to offer a written response as well.

Lord Boateng: It has a bearing on your response to Lord Hannay’s question, which is why I raise it. It would seem to the reasonably well‑informed observer that Iran and Iranian agents may well be stirring things up internally in the domestic affairs of Bahrain.

The Chair: I have no doubt of the relevance. I just wanted to be fair to Dr Roberts. If he wants time to consider his answer, I am happy that he is given that time.

Dr David Roberts: Thank you very much. I have a quick thought, if I may. That was, of course, alluding to the Arab spring, the Pearl Roundabout and all those concerns. Those are the immediate instigating elements that prompted that article to be written.

In the subsequent years, there has been a lot of reporting into it, the Bassiouni report being the most important one. I will be corrected by anybody, of course, but that report concluded that an awful lot of the accusations of Iranian significant interference were not as substantiated in the final analysis as was argued by the Government at the time, which led to the Pearl Roundabout and all the grimness surrounding that. That was my point there.

Iran is a malign influence in a variety of ways in the region. I do not think that there is much of an argument about that. More recently, what we have seen a lot more, as I mentioned earlier with maritime concerns, is that mines and missiles are more in evidence in terms of the tactics that Iran is using. One should not rule out the idea that Iran might attempt to leverage support that it may or may not have within Bahrain. That is a reasonable concern to fret and think about. It absolutely is.

I do not see the logic that, because something approaching a majority of Bahrain’s population are Shia, ergo they are some kind of fifth columnists, which was, especially at the beginning of the Arab spring, some kind of a concern. That is the sentiment I was trying to push back against.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: It is important to note that there is no clear connection between C-SIPA and human rights issues. There is no bearing on the issue one way or another. The second point I would make is that, since Bahrain signed the C-SIPA in 2023, there have been—I think that this is purely correlation, not causation—major moves to ensure intercommunal harmony in Bahrain.

I will mention one anecdotal and perhaps very significant example, which is the fact that, over the past year, Bahrain has seen some of the largest prisoner amnesties in its history. 1,584 prisoners were released in April, 457 in September and 896 in December of this year. These go a very long way towards ensuring intercommunal harmony and, more broadly, social peace on the island.

The third point I want to make—and this is very important—is that, if we go back to the text of the C-SIPA agreement, it specifically mentions external aggression or the threat of external aggression. A hybrid Iranian threat to Bahrain that involves perhaps a combination of sub-threshold, grey zone warfare tactics and support for terrorism is obviously conceivable. Let us remember that the UK Government have designated seven Bahrain-based groups as terrorist organisations, as have the US and a number of European countries.

Iran’s broad track record in interfering in Yemen, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and many other places around the region provides the kind of contextual background that one would need to understand the sort of behaviour that Iran routinely participates in and undertakes. The agreement’s mention of external aggression means that the parties are able to determine for themselves whether the threat from terrorism or so on that Bahrain faces, or could face down the line, is externally instigated and would therefore warrant the kind of response that the C-SIPA agreement lays out.

The Chair: And what the response should be.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: Precisely, yes.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: This is now turning to the overtly external aspect, which is Iran’s territorial claim to Bahrain, which has been asserted from the time of the Shah onwards and I believe is still the position of the Iranian Government, although others, including successive British Governments, consider it without merit. Could all three of you give us some feel for the relevance of that claim for this security agreement?

Dr David Roberts: De jure—I will be corrected—I think it was given up in 1971 and to do with the three islands off the UAE that the Iranians took when the Brits left. I think that it was around the time of that agreement, if I am remembering rightly, that Iran formally gave it up. It is still a subject of local right‑wing newspapers, as it were, ginning up these things. It is a motif, if you will, but I do not think it has any pragmatic implication today.

Dr Hasan Alhasan: Bahrain is a sovereign independent nation. It is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League and many other multilateral organisations. C-SIPA or not, one would hope that, if Iran were to attempt to reactivate its unfounded claim, which was dropped, as Dr Roberts has mentioned, on Bahrain through military aggression or the threat thereof, countries like the US, the UK and others would come to Bahrain’s aid.

It is important to keep in mind that Iran often weaponises this claim as part of its hybrid warfare against Bahrain and other GCC and Arab states. In recent times, Iran has revived this claim through newspapers and personalities and figures closely associated with the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in response to the Arab League or the GCC mentioning the disputed Emirati islands. When the Arab League or GCC lends support to the UAE’s claims on the islands, Iran will, as a matter of information warfare and disinformation, weaponise and revive its claim through informal channels in order to rattle the chains of the Arab states.

It does not go much further than that. Iran formally recognises Bahrain as a sovereign independent nation, has had diplomatic relations with Bahrain and is now also reportedly seeking to re-establish diplomatic relations with Bahrain. This is a theoretical risk. We should not take this too seriously as a real claim. It is simply part of the information warfare tactics that Iran employs every now and again.

The Chair: This is an interesting context for us, but this Committee is not going to extend to determining whether anyone else has any territorial claim to Bahrain.

This session time has come to an end. I want to thank all the members for their questions, but I particularly want to thank you, Dr Alhasan, Dr Roberts and Ms Dent all very much indeed for your very informative evidence. This session is now going to come to an end. I want to thank you all very much indeed for your evidence.

You will see the transcript of the evidence that you have given and have an opportunity to correct anything that is wrong. Subject to that, we will write our report on the basis of the evidence we have received, including from you today. Thank you all so much.

Examination of witnesses

Luke Pollard, Hamish Falconer, Thomas Allan and Kashif Chaudry.

Q13 The Chair: Welcome to you to this session of the International Agreements Committee, where we are taking evidence in relation to the recent proposed agreement for the UK to accede to the US-Bahrain security agreement. Thank you very much for being here. We have just heard evidence from some external people. You probably saw them going out and may know who they are.

We will go straight into questions. Members of the committee will ask the questions and, if they have an interest to declare, they will do so. I have no particular interest to declare for myself. I want to ask this general question, which is to ask you to identify what the UK’s main national interests are in the agreement and how accession to this agreement will advance the interests of the United Kingdom in the region.

Hamish Falconer: Thank you Chair. Thank you for the committee’s focus on C-SIPA. The UK is committed to a stable, prosperous Middle East. That affects our national interests directly in a whole range of ways, from trade to the stability of global shipping, to, of course, international peace and security as we have seen so damaged over the last 15 months by the various conflicts.

C-SIPA represents a legal codification of that commitment with Bahrain, which is a very important ally of ours, and of course with the US, with whom we have a very close relationship. In some ways, this makes public and codifies existing commitments between us and Bahrain in particular. Our arrangements with America are also covered in other agreements, of course. This is, from our perspective, an important agreement because it shows our enduring commitments in the Middle East in a legally binding form.

Luke Pollard: I would agree with what my fellow Minister has said on that point. It could have started off worse, could it not? It is worth additionally adding that, in terms of a defence relationship that we have with Bahrain, we have an established military presence in Bahrain. We have a long‑standing, very good, deep relationship with Bahrain. At the moment, we have HMS Lancaster, which is a Type 23 frigate, forward-deployed, stationed in Bahrain, and three mine hunters, Chiddingfold, Middleton and Bangor, that are based there, looking after the counter-mine operations in that joint area of operations.

If you think about where Bahrain is located and the ability for us to project naval power and have an established and well-supplied naval port facility there, it enables us to reach out to a number of the different maritime choke points in that part of the world. Our military lay down that we have in Bahrain, from a naval point of view, is already quite well established and valued. There will of course be rotations of capabilities as we renew. The strategic defence review will set out a little bit about that when that is published later on in the spring.

The location there and C-SIPA itself enables us to put in the public domain some of the work that we do privately through the defence agreements that we have with Bahrain, but also that close working relationship that we have with our friends in the United States, with the location of the Fifth Fleet and additional US capabilities that we work very closely with in theatre. That means that this is not just a good thing to do; this directly supports our national security and our long-standing relationship with Bahrain and our US partners in the region.

The Chair: One thing we want to get out of this session is what it is that accession to this agreement will do over and above what we already have. We are not completely sure what we already have. You rightly talk about the long-standing relationship that there is between Bahrain and the UK. We know that, but we are not quite sure of the detail of it. We are quite interested to see what this adds to the UK’s interests in that way, so thank you both for the general answers. I do not know, Mr Allan, who, for the record I am saying is deputy director for the Gulf at the FCDO, or Mr Chaudry, head of Middle East security policy and operations director at the Ministry of Defence, whether either of you gentlemen would like to add something to what has been said by the Ministers from your departments on this general question.

Thomas Allan: I will come in on specific questions as needed. I have nothing at this point.

Kashif Chaudry: Likewise, I will come in on specific questions. All I would add is, in recognition of what the Minister said, Bahrain provides really important facilities that are used in our operational activity in the region. It is really important to capture that aspect of it as well.

Q14 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I have a declaration of interest. I was head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Middle East department rather a long time ago, in 1979. In many respects—and this is really what the Chair indicated when responding to the previous exchange—this agreement appears virtually to replicate many aspects of the UK’s existing defence co‑operation agreement with Bahrain, which was signed in 2012. Could you perhaps tell us—it would be helpful if some of the detail could come out there—what additional aspects membership of this US-Bahraini agreement offers both to us and to Bahrain? In what ways does this agreement overlap with the defence co-operation agreement, add to it or increase our commitment? That is puzzling us all a bit and it would be a great help if you could tell us, roughly and in a little bit of detail, what that is.

Hamish Falconer: With the Chair’s permission, I might say a little bit about the general framework of the agreement and then turn to my defence colleague on the detail. There are a few ways in which this agreement is novel for us. Firstly, it is obviously a trilateral agreement, but it is one that is open to other membership. It is a legally binding agreement built very much around principles of the rule of law and making explicit reference to the Abraham accords, the efforts to try to ensure that there is a more normalised Gulf.

Our joining has impact even beyond the specifics, where there are some elements which are important, but there is a wider significance in the UK entering into a legal commitment in relation to the safety and security in the Gulf. There is a wider significance in being the first additional joiner of what was a US-Bahrain agreement. It may grow beyond three or it may not, but it is envisaged as an agreement that provides some assurances about the commitments of both the UK and the US to Gulf security. In a period where the Gulf and the wider Middle East have been facing such contested conditions, we think that that has value in and of itself. There are obviously some other differences from the defence co-operation agreement as well, which I am sure Minister Pollard would like to speak to.

Luke Pollard: For me, the key part that makes this different to the defence co-operation agreements that, by necessity, are more private is that it is public. It is that we are clearly stating that we are joining an agreement with our most important security partner, the US, and a really key ally in the region. It is worth saying that, in terms of “Why Bahrain?” and “Why this treaty?”, just as much as, “Why have a treaty at all?”, there is Bahrain’s geographical location, the long-standing relationship and the naval association in particular, but also Bahrain is one of the very few nations from the region that have joined Prosperity Guardian, the support for Red Sea shipping. There are threats that Bahrain is facing. The support that the UK and US provide to Bahrain is an important part of its security framework and security architecture in the region.

There is the visibility of being able to take some of those agreements and the consultation work that we do privately and being able to say that we are putting that in the public domain, as a form of expression of our friendship, but also being able to make the case that this is a good framework agreement, where other nations may want to join and share those common values, especially when we look ahead to what the Abraham accords mean for peace and security, as well as what we mean in terms of deterrence in the region. It is that part, which might not fundamentally shift some of the provisions that may exist privately, but being able to say that publicly, reaffirm our friendship and do so alongside the US is a really important part of UK influence and support for Bahrain and for wider security in the region. It is the visibility that is as important as many of the provisions actually in the treaty, which bring over much of what is privately held between our nations as well.

Q15 Lord Fox: This follows on nicely from that actually. The agreement contains commitment for all parties to respond to threats of external aggression against one party. During the previous session, Dr Alhasan said that there is a greater likelihood that we could become entangled—that is the word that he used—in something going on in Bahrain. It would be interesting to see your assessment.

Is it more likely, as a result of us signing this, that we would become entangled—in other words, be pulled into a mutual defence—than with the current agreements that we have, which we do not really know about? Is there a greater likelihood? Publicly, we have said these things, as you have just said. Would we be expected to step in more so as a result of this agreement? Given that there is, in a sense, a slightly higher commitment to the future security of Bahrain as a result of this, what are the likely resource implications?

Luke Pollard: I might bring Kashif in on some of the detailed points in relation to security. Our long-standing association with Bahrain anyway means that, in many cases, their security, especially in the maritime domain, is also our security in the region.

The reason that ourselves and the US have such a considerable naval presence in that area is not just because of the defence of Bahrain, but because of the importance of the wider region and importance of freedom of navigation for commercial shipping, for ensuring the seas are open to maritime traffic. In that respect, if there were to be a threat to Bahrain, that threat would probably not only be limited to Bahrain.

The treaty does provide for and enable us to publicly declare a process to be able to communicate, to exchange information, to have high-level consultations in that situation. This is not a NATO Article 5-type treaty. The obligations within the treaty do not trigger an “an attack on one is an attack on all”-type provision, which we certainly do have in the NATO area of operations. It does, though, express and pull forward from the private DCA the public statements about where that works.

It is probably worth saying that there is already a high level of communication with our friends in Bahrain. It is not in the event of there being a conflict or in the build-up to a conflict that these provisions would be triggered and, therefore, we would communicate for the first time. It would continue and build a legally binding obligation for us to make sure we are consulting our Bahraini and American friends in the event of any concern and make sure we are sharing the relevant information.

That partly expresses what we would already be doing, but that visible deterrence, to show that we would be supporting our partner in the region, is a necessary part of the UK being able to exert influence in that space. Kashif might be able to add more to that.

Kashif Chaudry: It is really important that this is a binding commitment. This provides a public declaration of our support for Bahrain in a multilateral construct. One particular part of the agreement looks at external threats, any threat of external aggression to Bahrain, and the range of threats can vary considerably now and, in modern warfare, it can be anything from irregular warfare and grey threats—be it mines or cyber—all the way escalating up to a kinetic response.

The C-SIPA commits us, in a multilateral forum, to come together at the most senior level to discuss and consider what the most appropriate response will be. In terms of commitments, it is really important this looks at all the levers available. We are not just referencing a military response. We are also considering economic levers. We are also considering political levers as well. It does provide a framework to give us the means to respond to that sort of external aggression.

Lord Fox: On the resourcing part of that question, do you envisage having to increase or change the nature of the resourcing of our activity in that area?

Luke Pollard: Not on the basis of this treaty, no. With Lord Robertson’s strategic defence review still ongoing, we have made a commitment in terms of our military presence in the region, especially on naval forces, but it will not have escaped your Lordship’s attention that Type 23 frigates are now a considerable workhorse that have been around for quite some time and there will be capability cycling of our naval capabilities.

Equally, if we look at our mine-hunting capabilities, as a general approach the United Kingdom is moving from crewed systems to uncrewed systems. In due course, there may be a situation where we would seek to cycle some facilities. The whole point about this is that is making sure that our war-fighting and deterrence capabilities are up to date. That would not be in response to a treaty obligation.

Lord Fox: It does not demand a difference.

Luke Pollard: No, it does not.

Lord Fox: It is more the normal management of our presence.

Luke Pollard: Absolutely, but it also means, if there is any change, it would be in relation to making sure that we have the correct war-fighting capabilities and deterrence capabilities, rather than adjusting anything based on what would be in this treaty.

Q16 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Part of the problem of Article 5 is where to draw the line, given the multiplicity of threats that are possible—cyber, space, even things like underwater cables and so on. Do you expect similar problems to arise with this agreement? How would you define the appropriate trigger points?

Hamish Falconer: Your Lordship, and Lord Hannay, I too was in the diplomatic service, so congratulations on your service before me. The way in which the treaty is framed is that it demands high-level consultations in the event of external aggression, as you say. Determining what is external aggression in this day and age is particularly complex, given the hybrid nature of threats that we face. Even in the short period we have been the Government, there have been a whole range of events across the globe that are difficult to attribute and determine, and it is particularly difficult to do so publicly.

The way in which this obligation is framed is not as specific as Article 5 and so it allows for quite a lot of flexibility in response, which I think, from Bahrain’s perspective, is welcome. Given the complexities of their region, having it framed in this way allows for that flexibility.

Q17 The Chair: It might be said by some that, because of that lack of direct specificity, not saying directly what the consequence is going to be, it is not much of a deterrent. What would you say to that?

Hamish Falconer: It is a discussion that so many of you will be familiar with about ambiguity and deterrents. We are signalling legally, publicly and clearly our commitment to Bahrain’s security. We are not doing that in the same framework as Article 5, but we are seeking to be clear about our commitment to Bahrain and how seriously we would take any external aggression towards her.

Q18 Lord Udny-Lister: My question is probably directed to Mr Falconer. The agreement is intended for other people to join. Are you talking to anybody else about joining it and, if you were, what would be the criteria?

Hamish Falconer: The criteria are open. We have told our allies that this is what we are doing and we would welcome others expressing an interest. We would not see this as a failure, if it were to remain only at three. We and the US are both close security partners with Bahrain, and it is welcome to Bahrain that we have made these commitments.

One could envisage a broader agreement with more partners as part of a greater normalisation of the security architecture in the Middle East. As I know you are very familiar with, there is a recognition that the Middle East has been such a volatile place and that, unlike in other regions—most obviously Europe—there are fewer frameworks in place that govern its security. Should this arrangement expand to include others, either in the region or beyond, it could make that wider contribution to regional security, but we would by no means see it as a failure if it remained in the structure that it is in.

Thomas Allan: The treaty explicitly says that accession of other countries have to be by agreement of all members of the treaty. That is one point. Secondly, any other members joining would have to abide by the principles of co-operation set out in Article 1 of the treaty, which is important.

Q19 Lord Boateng: Thank you all for your evidence. Bahrain is a long-standing friend and ally of the United Kingdom and, we believe, a force for good. We have talked about the security architecture of the Middle East in terms of this agreement, but, of course, for this particular region, freedom of navigation is not only of interest to ourselves and the Middle East; it is also of real interest to Africa.

We know that Bahrain recognises that interest. They held in the beginning of 2024 the ring for talks between the warring factions in Sudan and played a constructive role in seeking to bring people together there. The UK has expressed very real concerns and interest in peace in Sudan. Mr Chaudry, you know Africa very well from your sterling service in Pretoria, covering the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. What talks, if any, have you had with Bahrain about the situation in Sudan? How, generally, do you see our engagement with Bahrain as a force for good, economically and politically, in the whole of the region, not just the Middle East but also Africa?

This is a separate but related issue, because it has a direct bearing on the agreement. We have had evidence only today that it is possible, by executive diktat, for the United States to seek to amend the agreement. Can you confirm whether any amendments to the agreement, were they to occur, would be subject to the entry into force provisions in Article 7 of the agreement and, therefore, subject to CRaG and the scrutiny of Parliament and this committee?

Hamish Falconer: Lord Boateng, I might turn to my colleague on that more detailed second question. I must confess that I am not the Minister for Sudan, but I am the Minister for North Africa and, of course, the wider region. I have spoken to Bahrain about events in Sudan, where they are, as you say, very concerned. There is a concern for Bahrain and many in the Gulf that the Red Sea at both ends, both clearly in relation to the Houthi threat but also the instability in Sudan, is becoming a wider, suppurating problem, both for global shipping and for the countries on either side of it.

This is very much in our minds. It is very much in my mind. I was at the United Nations on Monday, focused most particularly on the Yemen situation, with the Yemeni Prime Minister. There was a recognition across the whole Gulf that, while the Red Sea remains as chaotic as it is at the moment, while there are such acute threats to global shipping, the Gulf’s economic and political security is imperilled.

They do share our orientation in relation to the issues in Sudan and they are, as you say, a force for good in trying to work with us and others, such as the Americans, to try to see if a more peaceful situation on the Red Sea, both in Yemen and Sudan, can be achieved. On the question of detail, I might turn to Mr Allan.

Thomas Allan: On the point of amendments, we are not intending to amend the treaty. We have not amended the treaty and are not requesting any amendments to the treaty in our intention to join. Any amendments would have to be made by mutual written consent of all parties. If any amendments were put forward, they would be subject to scrutiny in accordance with the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, hence the 21-day sitting period for Parliament as well.

The Chair: That is useful confirmation. Thank you very much for that.

Q20 Lord Anderson of Swansea: To go back to the question of additional membership, I note that Mr Falconer said that not to expand should not be construed as a failure of the agreement, but central to any expansion is the view of the United States. The UK was a very obvious candidate from the start, because of the breadth of our links, historical, naval and so on, with Bahrain.

I understand it is early days in the US Administration, but analysts are very ready to point out what has been said in the past by incoming members of the Administration. Are there any indications of whether the US is, in principle, in favour of further expansion and, if so, in which direction?

Hamish Falconer: I would not want to speak for the incoming Administration, Lord Anderson, and, as everyone will appreciate, they are still forming their Administration. They will no doubt express more detailed views about the Middle East in due course.

I would assume that this Administration will remain very interested in the Abraham accords in the way that they were during the last Trump Administration and, indeed, in the way that the Biden Administration has been.

Lord Anderson of Swansea: That would be Saudi Arabia, most of all.

Hamish Falconer: There are currently three Abraham accords countries in the Middle East. I would imagine that the incoming Administration would be interested in there being others. I know the campaign has made some comments to that effect, but I would not want to be drawn too deeply into second-guessing what they might think once they have made their full set of appointments.

Q21 The Chair: Can I just ask a question about amendment? It may be that Mr Allan wants to say something about this. In the last session, it was suggested to us that the status of this agreement, so far as the US is concerned, may be what was described as an executive agreement, which would allow the new Administration in the US to do something with it, to make amendments to it, without going perhaps through the whole process.[1] I just wonder if that is something that you have any insight into. What would you do, for example, in relation to the CRaG arrangements if that were to be the case?

Thomas Allan: In terms of the amendments, it is not our understanding that any party could unilaterally make amendments. The treaty is quite explicit, under Article 6, on that point, “This agreement may be amended through mutual written agreement of the parties”.

The Chair: This is to do with US constitutional law, not the terms of the treaty. Maybe you might study that, if you can, after this session and just let us know what you think. I was a little surprised by what we were told, but that does not mean it is not right.

Hamish Falconer: We would be happy to write to confirm our understanding of the position.

The Chair: Thank you very much indeed, Minister.

Q22 Lord Fox: I had a supplementary. If, as we are all being told, we are moving into a transactional relationship with the United States, it would seem to me that this should be in the credit, rather than the debit, column of our relationship with the US, in that it is not something we are getting; it is something we are giving. It seems to me that, when you are having these conversations, it is important to make it clear that this is not us getting something from them.

It is us joining something with them and getting a tick in the credit box, rather than another tick in the debit box. I wondered if you can take that on board but also confirm that that is how you see it and that is how you or the FCDO will be portraying it as we have conversations with the Americans.

Hamish Falconer: We have such a deep and broad relationship with the United States and, in this area in particular, Minister Pollard has referred to some of the shared commitments on Operation Prosperity Guardian. There is bipartisan support in the United States for close co-operation on security and political channels in relation to the stability of the Red Sea in particular, but also the defence of the Gulf.

There is considerable shared interest between the UK and the United States, particularly in relation to the destabilising threat that Iran can pose to the region. I do not wish to put words into their mouth. They will put them there themselves, once they are fully appointed, but I would imagine that this would be an area where any incoming Administration would be glad to see this level and depth of co-operation with the UK.

Lord Fox: All I was saying was it would be useful to make sure that they notice it.

The Chair: You are being given negotiating advice by Lord Fox. Whether you take it is a matter for you and other members of the Government.

Q23 Lord German: Most of this agreement and the discussions so far that we have had have focused upon defence and security. That has been the main focus. I want to just quickly turn to the areas of the economic and trade dimensions of this, which are quite broad. They are not exceptionally well developed into detail.

At the same time, of course, there is a negotiation going on with the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to get a free trade agreement with them. How does this, in relation to the economic and trade dimensions, fit with what you are trying to achieve in the free trade agreement with the GCC, especially as most of the wording here looks towards extending this partnership, rather than necessarily looking at a new partnership?

I would like to know where the balance is lying. The economic and trade dimensions will be much stronger in the GCC free trade agreement, if we get that negotiation going forward. Will these be left in the way that they are in order to make sure that there is room for that free trade agreement to continue?

Hamish Falconer: It is a very good question. The way I would characterise my discussions with the Bahrani authorities on those questions is that it is a real priority, both for us and the GCC, to conclude the free trade agreement. It is a real priority and the overarching framework for our free trade with the Gulf, which we hope to see concluded shortly.

This is complementary, but we would see the FTA as the overall structure, as would the Bahrainis. There is a lot that we do directly with the Bahrainis, as indeed we do with many other GCC members. Nothing in this treaty impugns upon the GCC FTA negotiation, which we would see as being the big, overarching agreement, but which does not prejudice agreements with individual GCC members to try to further deepen our economic or investment opportunities between the two.

Lord German: Presumably, that is why the wording here on these issues is very broad. No one could possibly disagree with what is in this. There is not anything extremely controversial. Can we take it, therefore, that the headings are relevant to the free trade agreement you are trying to negotiate with the GCC, but the content really will appear in that agreement, rather than in this agreement?

Hamish Falconer: I am afraid I can confirm the FTA is a very much more detailed negotiation, with multiple different chapters, and there will be considerably more detail in the FTA in relation to these questions than there is in C-SIPA.

Lord German: One would obviously ask how it is going.

Hamish Falconer: It is going very well. We still have some progress to make, but we hope to conclude it soon. I am sure, if the committee is interested, Minister Alexander, the Business and Trade Minister, would be very happy to provide an update.

The Chair: He has seen us already, generally in relation to the negotiations that he is involved in, but he touched on GCC.

Lord German: This committee likes the word “soon” when we are told that things are going to happen politically, so we will wait on your definition of “soon”.

Q24 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Following up on that, we have been told, when we have been briefed about the GCC FTA, that the Department for Business and Trade does not consider taking up any issues relating to sanctions against Russia under that agreement. Are there issues with Bahrain about the evasion of sanctions against Russia? There certainly have been with the Emirates, because we and the Americans have sanctioned companies based there for evasion.

Hamish Falconer: We are not aware of any issues with Russia sanctions compliance with Bahrain. It has not been part of my discussions with them.

Thomas Allan: Can I just make a supplementary point on the relationship between the FTA and the C-SIPA treaty? Article 5 in the treaty explicitly states that the aim is to reinforce other agreements and arrangements between the parties and that the agreements should be implemented in a manner consistent with those agreements. We see them as entirely complementary.

The Chair: I have noted that. Thank you very much. There are two other questions we raised in the last session, which we would like to put to you. I am going to ask Lord Hannay if he would raise both those questions, which really came from him. He can ask them best.

Q25 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: They are probably better taken separately. The first one relates to human rights in Bahrain, over which, over the years, there have been certain concerns expressed and there have been some bad incidents back in 2011 or so. To what extent do the tensions within Bahraini society between the Sunni and Shia populations affect the security agreement that we are now entering into?

To what extent have we, in the negotiations with Bahrain to join this, raised these human rights issues and put to them that a really strong human rights performance by their Government is rather an important part of their security situation?

Hamish Falconer: We have a close and long-standing relationship with Bahrain, including a dialogue on human rights. I would note that there has been quite considerable improvement in the human rights situation in Bahrain, which is welcome and is a subject of discussion between our two countries, whether in generality, about the nature of the laws, or in relation to specific cases. We do discuss these issues. We continue to have a fruitful dialogue on them and we really welcome the progress that has been made, some of which was described in the previous session.

The crux of this agreement revolves around threats of external aggression. It is focused more on external questions than it is internal questions. I would probably characterise our human rights dialogue as being part of our bilateral engagement with Bahrain, more than it is a part of our trilateral engagement, but it is fertile and ongoing. The progress in Bahrain is deeply welcome.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: The second question perhaps relates a little to the last one, because there has, over the years, been a certain amount of evidence that Iran has been involved in the tensions between the Shia and the Sunni populations in Bahrain. Could you tell us what the Government’s analysis or assessment of the Iranian territorial claim to Bahrain is? Is it still in existence? There seems to be some evidence that it is. Some members of the regime in Tehran do talk about it. The idea that the renunciation might have been definitive is not entirely solid. That territorial claim is very long-standing and successive British Governments have always dismissed it as being without merit, as of course has the Government of Bahrain. Could you give us your take on that?

Hamish Falconer: In relation to the first question, Lord Hannay, I took it to be a question about what our response would be to Iranian hybrid efforts.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Let us start with your analysis of the status of that territorial claim.

Hamish Falconer: In relation to the territorial claim, you captured the British and Bahraini position. I am not totally clear whether Tehran has renounced it.

Thomas Allan: Our understanding is the Iranian claim on Bahrain has been given up.

Hamish Falconer: We think the claim has been renounced. I do not know whether or not they have said anything about it publicly, but our position has not changed in relation to that.

Q26 Lord Boateng: What we do know, Chair, is that the Ayatollahs in 1980 made it clear that they did not accept the agreement of recognition that had occurred under the Shah. Subsequently, Ayatollah Rohani and a number of others have indicated that they do not accept the dispensation on the part of what they would see as the ruling minority in Bahrain. Upon what basis have we come to the view that Iran has given up all efforts to subvert and to interfere in the internal affairs of Bahrain?

Hamish Falconer: Lord Boateng, just to be clear, I am not saying that we think Iran has given up all efforts. Clearly, as I said earlier to Lord Udny-Lister, the questions of hybrid warfare are difficult to determine and this agreement is an indication of our commitment to protecting Bahrain from external aggression in whatever form it might come.

In response to Lord Hannay’s specific question about the territorial claims—on which, I must confess, I am not aware of the latest pronouncement from Tehran—I can confirm British policy remains as it was. We do not recognise their claims, and I am sure the Bahrani position remains the same.

Lord Boateng: Perhaps Mr Allan could send us a memorandum of some sort to indicate the basis upon which we have come to the view that the sovereignty claim is no longer a realistic one. That would be hugely helpful.

Thomas Allan: Yes, of course. I will do.

Lord Boateng: Thank you very much, Minister, and thank you, Mr Allan, for your clarification.

The Chair: Thank you for that. We have covered all the topics that we wanted to. We are really grateful to all four of you for the evidence that you have given to us. Thank you very much indeed. We wish you very well. We will be considering some of these issues again, as we have touched on the GCC and the free trade agreement arrangements. Thank you very much in the meantime for that and to all your officials for their assistance, which I know is very important too. Thank you.

[1] Here, the Chair is referring to the domestic ratification processes in the US, as outlined by Elizabeth Dent in Q5. An Executive Agreement allows the President to enter into legally binding international commitments without Senate approval.