Professor Anand Menon and Susi Dennison.

Q31 The Chair: Welcome back to the European Affairs Committee of the House of Lords and our evidence session for our report on the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine for UK-EU relations. Thank you very much indeed to our second panel of the afternoon. We have online Susi Dennison, who is senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; and, in person, Anand Menon, who is a professor at King’s College and director of UK in a Changing Europe. A very warm welcome to both of you.

I will kick off with something to get us started in a broad sense. Perhaps you could answer fairly briefly, because many of the issues will come back as the discussion develops. How do you rate the overall response of the EU and its member states to the Russian invasion of Ukraine? To what extent do you think this represents a new departure from previous EU common foreign and security policy and something that is likely to be sustained in the future?

Susi Dennison: I think there are various different elements to draw attention to in the EU response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. One of the areas that we tend to focus on is the successive rounds of sanctions packages. As of June 2023, we now have the 11th round of sanctions imposed on Russia, also targeting Belarus and Iran, in place. What is relatively exceptional about this, although not a new tool, is the speed at which that approach has been adopted and the ability to keep that process going over a sustained period of time. This was increasingly the case as well last winter on the energy side. The economic consequences of that are being felt more broadly within the EU.

The second area to note is that there has been significant economic support to the tune of, I believe, €76 billion, which is now surpassing that of the United States; €20 billion of this has been used for military support, and there are plans in place for the next financial period from 2024 to 2027 for €50 billion.

On the military dimension, there are also elements of that that are different from previous responses by the EU to conflicts in the neighbourhood. There was the agreement to launch the EU military assistance mission in autumn 2022, and the assistance measure put in place under the European peace facility. This includes, although there was some equivocation over this to get it into place, military equipment in the form of tanks and fighter jets, as well as training.

The other element, which is ongoing, is a growing effort to build defence capabilities collectively at an EU level, including, over the longer term, promoting joint research and development through the European Defence Fund.

There are two other points I would make. The first is on migration. The use of the temporary protection directive to allow Ukrainian refugees to enter the EU without a visa, and without a formal asylum request, for a limited period was an instrument that had been in place for a long time but which had not been used before this conflict. I think that has had an important dimension in the support for Ukraine as a country.

Perhaps the biggest part overall is the discussion around Ukraine’s accession to the EU. Ukraine was accepted as a candidate country in June 2022, and there has been a relatively exceptional political will at EU level, given the impasse around the broader enlargement process, which was in place ahead of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to move that forward quickly. It is expected that the December European Council will reach a decision on the opening of negotiations for that.

There are many different elements to this picture, which have various different levels of importance, but it is that longer-term perspective of accession that is perhaps most notable in the EU package.

Professor Anand Menon: If you are discussing how you would rate the EU response, first you need to step back and consider what case this is. Ukraine is a very easy case for the EU to have acted on—this direct and deliberate aggression on the borders, essentially, of some member states. The West is united. We are singing from the same hymn sheet as the United States. We are all pointing in the same direction. If the EU had not done well in this case, you would have to ask yourself: in what conceivable circumstances could the EU ever do well?

I think the EU has performed well. Given the caveat that it should have, it has performed rather well. That applies on several levels. The first relates to all the things Susi has been saying about the EU’s own institutional responses, which have been impressive and prompt.

The second, if not the more important, is the way individual member states have responded. If you think about what has happened to defence spending in member states, German defence spending went up almost 2.5% in 2022 from the year before. Finnish defence spending went up 36%. Quite often, European defence initiatives serve as a shield to hide a lack of action where it really matters in national capitals. This time, that has not been the case. You have had the tremendous shift in Swedish and Finnish defence doctrine with NATO. “So far, so good” has to be the answer, I think.

Again, in terms of context, it is worth saying that a lot of the co-ordination action has happened in fora like the G7 and the Quad, so it has not all been about the EU. However, in so far as the EU has been involved, it has passed what is a relatively simple test to date. As to whether this is a new departure, there are two things. As Susi said, enlargement is clearly something that will haunt the debates for the medium to long term now.

The other thing I would put my finger on as being a substantively new departure is the increased engagement of the Commission on matters relating to defence, particularly expenditure to do with defence, which is a wholly new departure and which has significant consequences for the European Union and, I think, for UK co-operation with the European Union down the line.

The Chair: Very good. Thank you so much. We are off to a good start there.

Q32 Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Professor Menon, you tempt one, because you say this was a very good reaction to a unique set of circumstances and that the EU functions well in this circumstance. Would you not, however, be tempted to say that, actually, it was too little too late, given that Crimea, Georgia and Moldova had steadily been ingressed into before? What do you think really triggered it to make it work this time?

Professor Anand Menon: First, I take your point absolutely. I have been on record in writing criticising the EU response to all the incidents beforehand. Up to and including 2014, the EU could legitimately have been accused of both hubris and geopolitical naivety in its dealings with Ukraine. This time, you have blatant aggression with open armed force by Russia into a country that neighbours east European countries. That is a fundamentally different issue from the ones you have mentioned—Georgia or the earlier incursion into the Crimea.

Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: So would you agree or disagree with my view that, in order to achieve success and be able to claim success for the EU, it has to regain Crimea—for Georgia and Moldova and perhaps for Ukraine—or is that something you could just roll over and have rather more limited success? What is your view on that?

Professor Anand Menon: I think the EU would claim success with far less than that, to be perfectly honest. In an ideal world, you are absolutely right. I suspect that will not be how the European Union itself defines success.

The Chair: Would Susi Dennison like to come in on that exchange first?

Susi Dennison: One point that I think contributed to the reaction, which was arguably too late, was energy dependence on Russia, which very much made Governments of many member states, but particularly Germany, feel that the action they have subsequently had to take was not an option. I think the decisions that started to be taken on decoupling from energy dependence on Russia and that have continued since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been pretty transformational for the EU’s energy mix. We are tracking the deals made with third countries by EU member states collectively, and so far we have somewhere over 120 since the beginning of the conflict.

As Anand said, there has been a process of recognition that the EU was in the wrong place before the conflict, which is an important learning for the continent.

Q33 Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: You made fascinating points a minute or two ago about enlargement. Obviously, this will be the key core issue, other than winning the war, which is the superordinate goal at the moment. Given that some member states are already looking a little reluctant and pulling back just a fraction, which I know is worrying Ukraine very much indeed, particularly on the military side, how will it be possible for the EU to keep everybody’s spirits up and the determination to succeed that Ukraine needs in both elements and, of course, in joining NATO, which is not quite the point of this discussion?

Susi Dennison: I very much agree that we are heading into a period where there are a number of risk factors to European unity on support for Ukraine, but also on enlargement more specifically. One of those is the political environment. We are heading into a very important election year in a number of EU member states, and with the European Parliament elections and the prospect of elections in the US this time next year, which could result in a change of party governing the White House. We are already seeing the potential for US support to Ukraine to be diminished, which will have a huge bearing on the willingness of many EU member states to continue this sustained action.

What will be absolutely critical—I am not predicting that this will necessarily take place in the timescale in which it is needed—is that, ahead of the December European Council decision on opening negotiations with the candidate countries, there is a need for a frank and honest conversation among EU member states about what this means in budgetary and institutional terms in the way the EU can function above 30 member states. A certain confidence that those issues are being addressed will be central to keeping the support of member states to moving forward with the process of enlargement.

Lord Lamont of Lerwick: Professor Menon, I accept that the EU has finally woken up and is finally getting its act together a bit more, but were you not being a bit kind in your reaction at the beginning? I read something the other day by a former EU Commission official now working for the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, in which he contrasted the speed of the UK’s response with that of Europe and said that if the Ukrainians were relying on the EU, the war might already be over and we would be looking at a weakened and dismembered Ukraine. Is it not the reality that the EU was very slow initially?

Professor Anand Menon: Absolutely. The EU is many things. I do not think I ever accused it of being nimble. The fact is that the EU got to the right place eventually. In a sense, if I sounded positive, it is because my bar is generally very low for the EU when it comes to foreign and security policy matters. In that sense, for me it exceeded expectations by arriving in the right place. However, you are right: an individual state will be able to act with more agility in responding to these things than an organisation that requires consensus among 27 to be achieved before action can be taken.

Q34 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could we now look at the issue of whether it makes sense to think in terms of a strategic framework between the UK and the EU? Just to recall, I am sure you are both well aware that this was envisaged in the political declaration that was signed by the UK and the EU before Brexit took place. It was then dropped by the Johnson Government, but it is there on paper agreed by both sides. Secondly, I am sure you are aware that in the report that it produced at the end of April, this committee has recommended to the Government that they should now take this up again and proceed with it.

Operating within the framework of those two facts, first, do you think that is a good idea and, secondly, in what technical areas, such as the co-ordination of sanctions or high geopolitical strategy areas like the relationship with China or Iran as well as that with Russia? Could you perhaps say something about those two sides of things and anything else that you think ought to be included within such a structured framework, if you think that would be a step forward from where we are now?

Professor Anand Menon: Sometimes the way I think about this is to ask myself: what would have happened more effectively in UK co-operation with the EU if we had signed up to something like the security agreement that we agreed to in 2019? The answer I always come to is: not very much at all. In many ways, this relationship works pretty well in a time of crisis between the two. The advantages that you get from a formalised agreement are more regular meetings between the two sides. Institutional meetings between officials and between Ministers would be a good thing.

Above and beyond that, the real issue for me concerns the more economic sides of security. I have mentioned the European Defence Fund before. On areas like that, it is very striking that although the European Union is happy to talk about co-operation and alliance with the United Kingdom, it is adamant about excluding third countries from things like its armaments initiative and the European Defence Fund.

That is potentially damaging for the UK in the medium term should these things become serious and, indeed, for Europe as a whole, because increasingly, particularly in the case of another Trump presidency, Europeans will have to look to themselves a lot more and work together a lot more closely. In a sense, the key area where I would like to see some sort of an agreement is an area where the European Union at the moment is unlikely to agree to any such thing.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: We are doing a report on Ukraine, so your answer is very Ukraine-centric. It would not perhaps be so obvious that we would come together on, say, a relationship with China without a structured framework.

Professor Anand Menon: Again, I wonder. Our political leaders interact with their counterparts, particularly from the larger member states, in many fora where they can talk and co-ordinate on matters such as China. I am yet to be convinced that a formal security relationship with the European Union would make much of a substantive difference to our ability to co-ordinate like that. I know we disagree on this, Lord Hannay.

Susi Dennison: To build on what Anand was just saying, one reason why we have seen a number of areas of quite effective co-operation between EU member states and the UK in relation to the war in Ukraine is because of a common assessment of the geostrategic interest in doing so.

For me, one of the key arguments for a formalisation of that sort of co-operation is that there is a risk, from an EU perspective, that the incentive for that informal approach will go down over time because it risks diluting the co-operation within the EU format, which is being invested in at the moment at an EU level. It is understood as being important to the ability to manage our interdependence with other players in the current geopolitical environment.

From that point of view, some formal agreement on UK participation in some of the structures that Anand referred to would be helpful in the sense of giving the UK an enhanced third-country status, a reason for being part of that formal process, which does not dilute the formal co-operation within the EU setting.

The ideal would be to get beyond that and allow space for more upstream co-operation in some of the areas around joint defence projects in the future involving certain member states and the UK in particular. In order to build the confidence to create the space for that, there would be value in more formalised co-operation as well.

The Chair: Thank you. Baroness Blackstone on sanctions, please.

Q35 Baroness Blackstone: I want to ask about sanctions and whether you assess the co-ordination and co-operation between the EU, the UK and, indeed, other partners as being effective in relation to sanctions against both Russia and Belarus. What co-operation should this provide for in its contents?

Professor Anand Menon: This is very much where I miss the presence of my colleague Richard Whitman, who knows a lot more about these matters than I do. We have had lots of conversations with EU and Foreign Office officials. On both sides there is a real satisfaction with how well co-operation over sanctions has worked and how well the two sides have co-ordinated together. What is interesting is that if you probe those answers and say, “Can you talk us through some of the mechanisms by which these things happen?” they will never answer. I remain at a loss as to the precise mechanisms that allow for co-ordination. All I can report is that both sides seem pretty happy with how co-ordination on sanctions has worked today, and I am hoping that Susi has something slightly more detailed to add.

Baroness Blackstone: Are they justified in being satisfied about it?

Professor Anand Menon: Yes, I think so. There was room for doubt about whether the UK and the EU could march in lockstep on sanctions regimes once the United Kingdom had left the European Union, and today they pretty much have. That is about as good as you could have expected, given Brexit.

Susi Dennison: I very much agree with that. We have seen effective co-operation between the US, the UK and the EU collectively in freezing Russia’s foreign exchange reserves. The agreed price cap in the G7 context with the EU, as well as on Russian oil exports, has been another example of effective co-operation in putting those measures in place.

I am not an expert on sanctions either, but I think there is space for more collaboration and more detailed work on the implementation. Different criteria for listings and limited scope for information sharing about the implementation at the moment mean that significant workarounds and loopholes are emerging. There would certainly be space for a working party between the treasuries in the key EU member states involved with this, alongside the UK and the EU Commission, in order to boost the effort on implementation.

Lord Lamont of Lerwick: On that very specific point, I was rather surprised that you said the price cap was working. There was a very large report in the Financial Times last week saying that it was not working, not least because a very large proportion of seaborne oil from Russia was being carried by uninsured ships and that this has obviated the price cap. In any case, the price cap looks very difficult to enforce, with the huge differential between it and the current oil price.

Susi Dennison: Yes. I apologise if I was not clear. The point I was trying to make was that it was the result of significant discussions between the different parties to put that in place. It was not a comment on the effectiveness of that, which I think comes back to the implementation point. We have seen the ability to work together on agreeing measures, but we need to see more assessment of effectiveness and what comes next when implementation is not as effective as it needs to be.

The Chair: Oil sanctions are notoriously difficult, are they not? I am thinking of the Iraq precedent, which declined very rapidly over time.

Q36 Viscount Trenchard: Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU has taken a more collective approach to increasing weapons production and defence procurement among member states. How important is it for the UK to co-operate with these initiatives? The UK has merged its sixth-generation fighter jet programme Tempest, with Japan’s F-X programme, and Italy has joined as a third industrial partner. Saudi Arabia may join, although its contribution would be financial rather than industrial, and this partnership suggests that the EU’s relevance to defence procurement may not always be as crucial as some suggest. What do you think?

Professor Anand Menon: It is not always crucial to work with the European Union. As you quite rightly say, there will be other opportunities to work with other partners. AUKUS represents another area where we will be engaging in defence procurement with non-European partners. It is a shame that the European Union has adopted such a protectionist approach to defence procurement. You can see that in the active support of ammunition production, where the UK was excluded, and particularly in the European Defence Fund. The European Defence Fund is worth putting into perspective. It is a small fund. I think it is €8 billion over a seven-year period, which pales into insignificance compared to US defence spending.

If that grows into something serious on the back of crises like this and the United Kingdom struggles to be involved, it will be problematic, for our defence industries based here and for developing the military capabilities that we can use together in future conflicts where our joint interests are engaged. I do think there is an interest for the United Kingdom, but I do not think the sticking block is on our side. I think it is on the European side, in particular this rather protectionist interpretation of the notion of strategic autonomy by some member states.

Viscount Trenchard: Susi, do you have a view?

Susi Dennison: I do not have anything to add to Anand’s comments.

The Chair: Very good. Interesting. Thank you very much.

Q37 Lord Jay of Ewelme: I want to ask about post-war reconstruction, and the ways in which the UK and the European Union, and indeed others, might co-operate on the future reconstruction of Ukraine. By “future” I mean co-operate now or co-operate later, because it is never too early to start thinking about planning for a post-war scenario. Might the UK be able to play a particular role in this?

Susi Dennison: Yes, I think it would be extremely significant for the UK to engage in discussion with the EU on this at the moment. One of the key reasons is that the financial implications of the reconstruction of Ukraine will play a major role in thinking about the budgetary issues that EU member states are concerned about in the context of enlargement. Upstream commitment from the UK to be part of that process and to be willing to talk about that at this point could be critical in that political engagement on the enlargement question.

It is also certainly true that the broader declarations of support for Ukraine, which are being developed through the G7 setting at the moment, provide a natural way for the UK to be engaged in that discussion. Yes, this is a key area where it would be very helpful to see ongoing UK-EU conversation.

Professor Anand Menon: I pretty much agree with that. The UK also has a key role to play in making sure that, depending on events in the Middle East, Ukraine does not get forgotten or relegated down our priorities, because there is a danger of that. Some member states are looking far more south than they are looking east.

Lord Jay of Ewelme: Is that just now or is that likely to continue? We always tend to get fixated by what is happening now.

Professor Anand Menon: It is impossible to say. It is at least conceivable that the conflict in the Middle East drags on, that the instability and the “tit for tat” reprisals continue well into the medium term, so it is at least a possibility. As Lord Lamont said earlier, the UK played a crucial role in whipping up support for Ukraine in the early stages of the conflict. I think the UK can do that quite easily again, but it needs to engage. One danger from an EU perspective is that if Ukraine becomes defined as an enlargement issue, it will be too easy to fall for the temptation in this country of saying, “Well, that’s their problem then”.

Lord Jay of Ewelme: Do you think there is a risk that the EU might see enlargement as, in a way, its contribution to a play for reconstruction?

Professor Anand Menon: I am quite sceptical about the prospects of enlargement anytime soon, to be perfectly honest, so no.

The Chair: We will come on to that shortly.

Q38 Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Britain is notoriously slow, apart from a very few major companies that always move. It is clear that British companies are rarer than hens’ teeth on the ground in Ukraine at the moment, whereas, last week, 40 French military companies turned up, and others are coming from other countries. What can our colleagues suggest in a way to encourage the FCDO to withdraw its hostile approach to any movement at all outside Brighton?

Professor Anand Menon: I feel uniquely unqualified to answer that question, so I am looking at Susi again.

Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: It is just that when we want companies to go, and companies want to go, the FCDO, which, after all, is a major arm of the British Government for foreign affairs, declares that nobody should move.

The Chair: That is probably a question we should take up with the FCDO Minister when he comes to give us evidence.

Q39 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Clearly, what all donors—the EU, the UK, the US and others, Japan and Canada and so on, but principally the Europeans, including the UK—will have to cope with is prevalent corruption structures in the Ukraine, which do not put the very large sums of money we are talking about to the best use. Do both of you think that is an area where it is very important that the UK should work together with the EU? Experience around the world has shown that recipient countries are past masters of playing off different donors, and it will surely be important to ensure they cannot play off European donors.

Professor Anand Menon: There is a role for us all. I would say that one of the unmitigated successes of European Union enlargement, when it is done properly and not rushed because of politics—I am caveating 2007 there—is to bring about meaningful reform in candidate states, because effective use of that carrot of membership is perhaps the most powerful incentive there is out there. The burden of that will fall on the European Union, because it does have that carrot to offer in recognition of real reforms. The danger comes when politics interferes and timetables are sped up or steps are missed because of the political imperative to let people in too quickly. That is the balancing act. It is not an easy one, but, ultimately, that will be more the EU than the UK, to be honest.

Susi Dennison: I very much agree. This is where the distinction is crucial. The next wave of enlargement is being talked about and understood at an EU level as being a geopolitical enlargement, something that is being done on a clear interest basis by the EU. As Anand said, it is crucial that it is also an enlargement in the sense of proper assessment and that time taken to ensure that the Copenhagen criteria are met in order for the candidate countries to join.

Here, Ukraine is already showing a lot of political will, but I believe that this is one way in which, despite this being an EU conversation, the UK as a donor will also have a voice. It is crucial that in the early stages of reconstruction we do not see scandals emerging about corruption in the way the funds are used. That is extremely important for the long-term, sustained commitment of partner countries through what will be a very long process of reconstruction.

Q40 Baroness Ludford: In answer to Lord Trenchard’s question about the weapons production defence industry, Professor Menon, you referred to the concept of EU strategic autonomy. Could I pursue your understanding of that concept? From our earlier panel, apparently it has somewhat evolved into the notion of European or EU sovereignty—apparently the trendy term now. Whatever we call it, how has it evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and what are its implications for future UK-EU relations? Shall I start with Professor Menon?

The Chair: He is good on trendy EU terms, I think.

Professor Anand Menon: There are those that talk about EU sovereignty. There are others who talk of EU preference, and it has evolved in rather a closed way. I read with interest the recent Spanish Government non-paper on open strategic autonomy, which was an interesting document but also had about it a plaintive tone of: this is how we could have done it had we not gone down the other road. There was a sense in that Spanish paper that member states that favoured a more open vision of European strategic autonomy feel that they have lost that particular struggle.

European strategic autonomy, particularly in the economic field, is a very inward, slightly mercantilist construct aimed at prioritising European industries over all others. That is potentially damaging, both for them and for us, given that, ultimately, our security interests are shared and down the line it is hard to see major international crises where we do not have to work together. Splitting off the economic side of security in this way is not the most effective way of getting effective security outcomes.

Susi Dennison: Yes. There are two ways for me in which the war in Ukraine has exposed issues with the idea of strategic autonomy within the EU. The first is the idea that strategic autonomy is about being autonomous from other actors, particularly the US, about the ability to choose our own strategy. We have seen that, although Europeans have certainly stepped up to this war within our own neighbourhood, that has also underlined the extent to which the transatlantic relationship remains crucial to the defence of Europe, so it is problematic.

We have also seen in multilateral efforts led by western powers to call Russia to account for what it is doing in Ukraine a great deal more fragmentation in the world today, and many other powers that are not thinking of strategic autonomy. As the ECFR we have been talking about more strategic interdependence and acceptance that they depend on other players in different ways, and that they will assess each geopolitical event case by case and not in a bipolar vision of the world, which that strategic autonomy in some ways harks back to.

To echo Anand’s point, we have seen in communications from the EU on the economic security strategy this spring and in communications on critical minerals and resources a sense that, as Europeans, we also have to recognise that we operate in this world too, so we need a more sophisticated understanding, which will never be autarky in an economic sense but is the ability to manage our relationships in a more sophisticated way in that environment. For me, the strategic autonomy discussion has moved on a bit with the war in Ukraine.

Professor Anand Menon: It does strike me that the conceptual challenge for the UK and the EU, post Brexit, is that of being economic competitors and firm political allies. That is quite a hard balancing act to carry out, and it is early days.

The Chair: Absolutely. Baroness Ludford, did you want to follow up on that or should we move to our final questions?

Baroness Ludford: No, I am happy with the interesting answers. I have a third phrase of strategic interdependence, for which I am grateful.

Q41 Baroness Scott of Needham Market: You have both referred, with different degrees of enthusiasm, to the re-emergence of enlargement as a question. I would like to start with Susi and then come to you, Anand, and reflect on how realistic it is that both the accession states and the EU will be able to do what they need to do to make this a reality and, in doing that reflection, to think about how it might impact on the UK or what position the UK ought to take.

Susi Dennison: It is quite likely that at the end of this year we will see an opening of negotiations with Ukraine in particular. There is real political will to start that process. The big shift that we have seen this year is the French position on that front in being open to moving that process forward, which, as we all know, is a significant weight in the EU context.

The 2030 horizon, which is being talked about, is quite an important one, because it is seen as a compromise between the geopolitical enlargement and the merit-based enlargement, which this also has to be. It is something to work towards. It is a date that will give a certain hope and confidence to the candidate countries that this is a serious process but, at the same time, that it is realistic in all there is to be worked through.

Coming back to my earlier answer, the political climate at the moment in the EU is more open to this than may be the case with the developments we are likely to see next year. That will also focus minds ahead of the December European Council on the need to take this step at this point.

Professor Anand Menon: First, Baroness Scott, thank you for saying “accession states”, because it is worth remembering that there is a queue. The western Balkans are crucial, and the EU has to perform a delicate balancing act. There is a political reason for focusing on Ukraine, but doing so at the expense of the other states is bad politics, so that is worth bearing in mind.

To be honest, the UK role in this, which you asked about, will be very limited. This is about the European Union. One of the paradoxes of this is that the conditions that make Ukrainian accession a political priority is the war with Russia. It is only when the war with Russia is over that accession becomes a serious possibility. Once the war with Russia is over, it will be less of a political priority.

So there is a paradox sitting at the heart of this, and whatever the intentions and rather sophisticated lexicon the EU invents about membership perspectives—the number of euphemisms we hear multiplies all the time—there are some incredibly hard political trade-offs down this road. I am very cynical as to whether Ukraine will be a member in the next 10 to 20 years, to be perfectly honest, because the war will be behind us by definition when there is a serious debate about Ukrainian accession, and at that point political priorities will shift.

I am old enough to remember that rather farcical Dutch referendum on the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with Ukraine, which was relatively trivial and led to massive blowback in Holland. National politics will be crucial. I am pretty sure that some member states, whether they like it or not, will end up having referendums on this.

A crucial variable in all this is growth. Like us, the EU is desperate to find a way of achieving growth, and it is not obvious how it does and whether it has stagnant economies in that context. A prospect in which the majority of member states become net contributors will be politically unsellable to national populations. I applaud the sentiment behind the European Union’s promises, except that there is a real danger of raising hope.

We have seen in the case of Turkey what happens if you do a “Grand Old Duke of York” with an aspirant member state, if you are marching up and down the hill. There is a danger at the moment that that will be the fate that befalls Ukraine, although cynically, unlike Turkey, Ukraine has no option but to look towards the European Union.

Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne: Do you not foresee, however, that in line with the way in which Romania was brought in that the acquis communautaire will be altered to fit getting Ukraine in, then even further altered to consider Moldova’s entry? It is so important. This is a European Union member state. It is not Turkey, which is twice the size of any vote that Germany could possibly muscle up and is therefore an impossible candidate. It is not the west Balkans, with horrific backgrounds there. Ukraine is European, is next door and must come in, but you can do that if you shift around the acquis.

Professor Anand Menon: I think in a sense it is almost the opposite. The lesson of Romania and Bulgaria has been very salutary for the European Union, which has told member states, “You don’t rush this process”, because one of the curiosities of the European Union is that the moment of maximum leverage is before a state joins. Once that state is joined, its ability to do anything about how it conducts its internal affairs is distinctly limited.

I suppose the other historical example is Cyprus, but there the Greeks had a very significant potential veto over the whole eastern enlargement. Even if, say, a Poland tries to play that trick, it is hard to imagine a decision as big as that eastern enlargement that could be held up by a threat of veto, so I wonder. Moldova is too small to matter. The EU could let Moldova in tomorrow. It is a small state. Ukraine is a large, poor, very corrupt country. It is a whole different kettle of fish to some of the smaller states that are already in the accession queue.

Susi Dennison: I very much agree with that. I do not think we should underestimate the level of vulnerability that the EU as a project feels politically at the moment, which is why the clear merit-based approach and recognition of the criteria will be so crucial to keeping the 27 current member states on board around this.

The Chair: Very good. Thank you very much indeed, Anand and Susi, for a fascinating series of answers, full of insights and things for us to think about as we complete our report.