16
International Relations and Defence Committee
Corrected oral evidence: The Arctic
Wednesday 21 June 2023
10.35 am
Members present: Lord Ashton of Hyde (The Chair); Lord Anderson of Swansea; Lord Boateng; Lord Campbell of Pittenweem; Baroness Coussins; Baroness Morris of Bolton; Lord Stirrup; Baroness Sugg; Lord Teverson; Lord Wood of Anfield.
Evidence Session No. 9 Heard in Public Questions 105 - 112
Witnesses
I: Dr Aki Tonami, Associate Professor, University of Tsukuba, Japan; Dr Hyoung Chul Shin, Vice President, Korea Polar Research Institute; Captain Anurag Bisen, Research Professor, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India.
Dr Aki Tonami, Dr Hyoung Chul Shin and Captain Anurag Bisen.
Q105 The Chair: Good morning or good afternoon and welcome. Thank you very much for joining us. We are very grateful to you for joining us today. This is the committee’s ninth evidence session for its inquiry on the Arctic. Today we will focus on perspectives from key non-Arctic states such as yours and the opportunities for collaboration with the UK.
This is a public session streamed live on the Parliament website. A transcript will be taken and once it is available we will send you a copy so that you can make any small corrections if you want to. I remind members that if they have any interests pertinent to the inquiry to declare them when first speaking. When you answer your first question, could you give a very brief introduction of who you are and your background? There are three countries represented here, so everyone will have a perspective on all the questions. Therefore, I will ask you to be fairly brief in your answers because we have quite a lot to get through. Thank you. Again, we are very grateful to you for being with us.
I will start with some background. Like the UK, your three countries all joined the Arctic Council as observers in 2013. As background, I wondered how the Arctic plays in the foreign policies of your three countries and what role you seek to play in the Arctic Council and the governance of the Arctic more broadly. I will start with Captain Bisen.
Captain Anurag Bisen: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here. I am a submariner. I am still serving. I am an active Indian naval officer and I have about 35 years of service. I am presently a research fellow with the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. This is an autonomous institution under the Indian Ministry of Defence. My Arctic association is that I was with the National Security Council secretariat for about eight years and there I had the privilege of working on the Arctic and drafting India’s Arctic policy. I also worked on the co-ordination of the release of the Arctic policy, which came out on 17 March last year.
You mentioned that we became an observer in 2013, along with the other four Asian observers. This is the 10th year of India being at the Council. However, our association with the Arctic goes back more than 100 years. We were one of the original high contracting parties as a dominion of the British in 1920 when the Svalbard Treaty was signed. Thereafter, we have been in the Arctic since 2007. That was when the first scientific expedition was launched. We have already launched 12 or 13 scientific expeditions in the Arctic. India is the only developing country, apart from China, that has a station at Svalbard. It is called Himadri. We are there and it is manned for 180 to 200 days a year. We have had about 200 research publications published from there.
As far as governance and international co-operation and a role in Arctic affairs are concerned, governance and international co-operation is the fifth pillar of India’s six-pillar Arctic policy. India says in that policy that she has ratified almost all international conventions that govern the Arctic. The notable objectives of this pillar are to engage in co-operation and partnerships with all stakeholders in the region, uphold the rights and freedoms contained in international law, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, actively participate in international climate change and environmental treaty frameworks relating to the Arctic, develop greater understanding of Arctic-related national and subnational legislation, and promote exchanges with Arctic nations and expert bodies on these issues.
That is my answer in a nutshell. If any clarification or amplification is required I will do that, but I will yield to the next participant on this.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That is a good introduction.
Dr Hyoung Chul Shin: I much appreciate this opportunity to speak in the session concerning an important matter: Arctic issues. I am affiliated with the Korea Polar Research Institute, the principal agency of the national polar research programme. I currently serve as the vice-president of the institute, which is ex officio the chief scientist. One thing I need to say is that my institute conducts polar research and advises and supports the Korean Government in polar affairs. I have engaged in this over many years. The views expressed today are, however, solely mine and do not represent the official positions of my workplace or the Government.
Regarding the first question, the Arctic Council observer status granted to Korea in 2013 certainly marked an important occasion for Korea’s Arctic research and other efforts, although I should mention that our Arctic interest and research began earlier. Arctic issues fall within the mandate from the foreign policy of the Republic of Korea for contribution to the global community and regional security, which are priorities. The priorities of Korea’s foreign policy are emphasised as usual, and the economic aspirations and pursuit of sustainable business opportunities are included and assume some level of priority in the Arctic elements of our foreign policy.
However, the standing of Arctic issues, as can be judged from foreign ministry documentation, is spread and not necessarily well consolidated. The best manifestation of the official government-level Arctic policy is actually in the five-year basic plan for polar activities that is based on new legislation called the Polar Activities Promotion Act. This plan is a pan-governmental plan but led by our Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries. The major objectives of this polar activity plan are investigating the less or poorly charted areas of the polar region, joining international scientific efforts, responding to climate change and environmental protection, participating in sustainable economic development, building up multi-layered co-operative channels, nurturing human resources, and designing new outreach programmes. There are corresponding strategies and projects under these different objectives.
Partnership and playing an active and leading role in Arctic affairs are equally important for us. Korea appreciates and respects the sovereignty of Arctic states as well as the role of the Arctic Council, yet values the co-operative mechanisms afforded by other international instruments and arrangements. This includes new emerging treaties such as the central arctic ocean fisheries agreement, which governs international Arctic space beyond EEZ and engages with Arctic states and non-Arctic Governments alike. I think I will pause here.
Dr Aki Tonami: Thank you for today’s invitation to talk to you. I work at the University of Tsukuba in Tokyo and I teach international relations and economics. Before coming back to Japan in 2016 I worked briefly for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and I was seconded to the embassy in The Hague. I also worked at the University of Copenhagen in Denmark. While working there, I wrote a book called Asian Foreign Policy in a Changing Arctic.
The first question is quite difficult to answer because it is all-encompassing, so I hope that my answer will be short. To answer this question, there are two things I need to contextualise: first, a very brief description of Japanese foreign policy; and, secondly, to give you a sense of Japan as a significant polar stakeholder rather than simply the Arctic.
On Japanese foreign policy, Japan basically pursues the non-military, mainly economic foreign policy of a trading nation. When it comes to international affairs, Japan tends to adopt a reactive stance. This is because Japan regards itself as a latecomer to the international system established by the western countries and it is in a politically turbulent geographical location, surrounded by great powers—US, Russia, China—and other states with complicated histories such as North Korea, Taiwan and South Korea.
On top of that, policy-making involves—like in the UK, I imagine—various agents and political actors, so some foreign policy issues have become a representation of a struggle for influence among those actors. This immobility of Japanese foreign policy can be broken depending on the level of controversy and immediacy of the issue. Whether Japan has a Prime Minister who becomes proactive on a particular issue becomes a significant factor.
With that in mind, I would also like to introduce Japan as a polar stakeholder. From a policy point of view, the polar regions for Japan long meant primarily Antarctica. Japan as a defeated power and, again, a latecomer to the international system after World War Two basically takes a liberal position in the governance of Antarctica. Japan considers having and maintaining a capability to conduct scientific research in the Antarctic via international decision-making institutions as an important status marker with great power identity. Japan would like to replicate this general success of Japan’s Antarctic policy in the Arctic using tools of science and technology diplomacy. Japan tries to do this by killing many birds with one stone and to revive its domestic economy by doing so.
In the public mind, Japan does not really give polar policy the same prioritisation as does a country such as the UK, so a lot of work is done through quiet, scientific community track 2 diplomacy, and based on institution-to-institution or people-to-people collaboration. Similar to the Korean basic plan, Japan also has a basic plan on ocean policy, which contains references to the Arctic. It says, “Currently, the situation surrounding the Arctic is uncertain as some Arctic-related activities, including the Arctic Council, have been suspended due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”. If we decode this, it basically says that there is nothing that Japan can do at this moment. I apologise for a long answer.
The Chair: Thank you very much. There is lots to follow up on and think about. For the sake of time, we will move on to Lord Stirrup.
Q106 Lord Stirrup: Thank you all for your help today. It is much appreciated. I would like to focus on the Arctic maritime routes: the Northern Sea Route, the Northwest Passage and, in due course, the transpolar route. We have heard evidence that these routes are not particularly significant today. There is not a great deal of transit shipping. In fact, there is less this year than there was in previous years. We have also heard that to an extent it is much more about destination shipping than transit shipping.
Although we are interested in your countries’ views on today, we are also extremely interested in getting some sense, if you can help us with that, of your countries’ strategic perspective over the long term as the climate continues to change and as these routes become more useful, even if still difficult. How important will they be to the economy of your country and, therefore, what strategic importance would you attach to them in overall foreign policy? Would they in the future, in your view, be of significant concern? Would they be of secondary concern or would they be peripheral? Could you give us some sense of where they are likely to lie in the future within your thinking?
Dr Aki Tonami: Thank you for the question. I would say that it is not that important for Japan as of now, but Japan, of course, would like to stay in the game should the Arctic maritime routes become economically viable in the future. To stay in the game is critical for Japan for future opportunity.
I would like to point out a new project that could be of interest of you, which is an optical submarine cable project. In April 2023, the EU began a €3.15 million project for the initial survey. This is done by a joint venture of three companies from Japan, the US and Finland, called Far North Fiber. This project aims to link submarine cables from Hokkaido, which is the northern-most prefecture of Japan, to the North American Arctic Ocean via Alaska in the USA to Finland, Norway and Ireland. It is not really a shipping route as we know of today, but it does use the route in question.
Lord Stirrup: Captain Bisen, perhaps you could help us with India’s perspective.
Captain Anurag Bisen: Yes. If you see India’s location, India is directly south of the Arctic so India really does not stand to gain as far as a shortening of time and distance is concerned from India to Europe via the Northern Sea Route or the traditional east-west route through the Suez. The major gainers from the opening of the Northern Sea Route would be north-east Asian ports such as Qingdao; north of Shanghai really: Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, Dalian, Busan and Tokyo. India does not really stand to gain from the opening of the Northern Sea Route.
In so far as China is a principal adversary of India, the opening of the Northern Sea Route would mitigate China’s so-called Malacca dilemma to a large extent. It would, therefore, need a re-evaluation of the resultant strategic maritime advantage that India holds. If you see India’s location in the Indian Ocean region, it is like a wedge that sticks out. Entire channels, sea lines of communication, pass very close to the south of India. If Chinese maritime traffic is rerouted to the Northern Sea Route, that re-evaluation would be required as to how much resultant strategic maritime advantage India holds.
Having said that, transportation and connectivity is the fourth pillar of India’s Arctic policy, and I would just like to read out one small paragraph. It says that work towards the linking of the international north-south transport corridor, with a unified deep-water system and its further extension to the Arctic, north-south connectivity may result in lowering of shipping costs and/or development of the hinterland and of indigenous communities more than the east-west connectivity. This east-west connectivity obviously refers to the Polar Silk Road, which is a component of the belt and road initiative of China.
Again, I add the caveat that the views that I am articulating here are mine alone and do not in any way represent those of the Government of India. In my understanding, the Arctic policy says that north-south connectivity benefits. North-south connectivity is referred to as the INSTC—the international north-south transport corridor. It is a 7,200-kilometre multimodal transport link from Mumbai to St Petersburg using the Caspian Sea route, and Russia, Iran and India were the founding members. I think that it was signed in 2000, and now there are 11 more nations that have joined. India is keen to develop this INSTC along with Russia and Iran. Then there is also a Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor, which links Vladivostok and Chennai. There are some commodities from the Arctic that are identified, such as the metallurgical coal, hydrocarbons and timber.
That is my answer. Basically, the NSR does not really help India so much, but we need to evaluate the effect that it has on China and the strategic advantage that India will lose as a result of the Chinese maritime traffic being diverted to the Northern Sea Route.
Lord Stirrup: That is very helpful, Captain. Thank you very much.
Dr Hyoung Chul Shin: The Northern Sea Route clearly constitutes Korean Arctic interest and it is addressed as such in the polar activity basic plan, the one that I just mentioned, the legislation-based plan. The Northern Sea Route is often promoted and publicised. We have a record of conducting trial voyages along the Northern Sea Route, but it is not an every-year event.
There are a number of small projects related to Arctic seaways, many of which are government-sourced public funds; for example, the trend in usage of Arctic sea routes, transportation route dynamics and prediction in connection with sea ice changes in the Arctic, training of icy water-ready personnel, and so on. I should add that the fibre-optic cable project is something we are aware of. To restate, the growing scale of Arctic sea route usage is monitored and is also receiving attention from the private sector.
At the same time, it is also true that the business community is much concerned with the real, actual profitability. The next move, particularly if that involves financial investment, will depend largely on the market circumstances. Providing significant and substantial subsidy to the private sector with public funds in order to stimulate the industry is not very likely at this moment. This may be possible with state-owned companies in China but it is not the case in Korea.
The Korean response in relation to the Northern Sea Route is more to do with Korea’s naval technology or its engineering capability that supports the Northern Sea Route in an indirect way. Korean shipbuilders have manufactured and delivered a number of ice-capable vessels to a number of customers, for example, in Russia.
The Chair: We will move on to economic activity in the Arctic with Lady Sugg.
Q107 Baroness Sugg: Some of you have mentioned this in your earlier answers, but could you give us some more information on how important Arctic resources and minerals are for each of your economies at the moment and whether you expect that to change in the future? Can you tell us if many of the companies in your countries are engaged already in economic activity in the Arctic? We will start with Japan and Dr Tonami.
Dr Aki Tonami: The development of the Arctic resources is important for Japan. Japan remains the second largest importer of Russia’s LNG after the EU, for example. The Sakhalin-2 LNG project in Russia and the Japanese companies’ stakes in the project caught media attention last year. As you probably know, Shell quit Sakhalin-2, as many western firms basically pulled out of Russia after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, but Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which are two of the major trading companies in Japan, remained. They managed to retain 22.5% combined stakes in the Sakhalin-2 project, even after the Kremlin basically ordered the establishment of a new, locally based, nationalised operation company in retaliation for western sanctions imposed on Moscow.
Somehow Japan has managed to keep importing 60% of our LNG from Sakhalin-2. According to a media report today, Mitsui said that it has no plan to exit the project at the moment. The company could easily face a dilemma as it needs to comply with the Japanese Government’s sanctions.
In addition, Mitsui has stakes in the Arctic 2 project in Russia’s Yamal peninsula as a joint venture with JOGMEC, which is a semi-government resources company. It has been reported that the production is behind schedule, which is also due to the fact that some western companies pulled out of the project.
To diversify risks, in summary, there are reports that the Japanese firms have started to look elsewhere for LNG within the Arctic, such as Alaska, along with countries such as Korea and Taiwan.
Baroness Sugg: Thank you very much. Can we hear from Dr Shin on the Korean economy and businesses?
Dr Hyoung Chul Shin: Korea and Japan share a lot in Arctic affairs, but this one, resources particularly from underground—the minerals—is probably something where we are not very similar to each other. We do not have a Mitsui-like company as Aki has described. Being keen, not wanting to miss out in the game, is a good description for our Northern Sea Route attitude, but this is not the case with resources and minerals.
The Korean economy is very much dependent on manufacture and export, so there is no question that the resources from underground and minerals are extremely important to Korea. However, there is not much expectation that Korean market demand for resources and minerals could be met from the Arctic in the near future. We have not made investment in the Yamal project and things like that. There are some endeavours of an academic nature—geological hazard studies and mineral studies in Canada and Greenland—but there are no detectable moves from the industry or the financial sector.
Baroness Sugg: Thank you very much. Finally, for India, Captain Bisen.
Captain Anurag Bisen: Russia is India’s single biggest investment destination for oil and gas projects. India’s ONGC Videsh Limited—OVL—has a 20% stake in Sakhalin-1, and Indian companies have also acquired equity in the Russian Taas-Yuryakh Neftegazodobycha and Vankor projects, which are again the largest equity investments. The Indian companies’ combined equity is 49.9% foreign investment of over $4.2 billion. There is also another consortium, Oil India Limited, Indian Oil Corporation and BPRL, which has a 29.9% stake in Taas-Yuryakh oilfield in east Siberia for about $1.12 billion.
You need to understand the context. Apart from the equity participation, you will know that India has increased its crude oil imports from Russia. It has gone from, I think, the fourth or fifth oil exporter to India to number one, and in May 42% of the oil that India imported was from Russia, averaging about 2 million barrels of oil a day. India is the third-largest energy-consuming country in the world and it is the third-largest oil importer: 83% of India’s oil is imported. It is also the fourth-largest importer of gas, after China, Japan and South Korea. India’s total import of gas is about 45%. Gas in our energy mix is only about 6% compared with a world average of about 24%. We aim to increase it to around 15% by 2030.
Just to make a short point, the Arctic can potentially address India’s energy security as well as the deficiency of rare earth minerals. Greenland alone possesses about 25% of the world’s resources. India is looking at the Arctic for sustainable resource exploitation and it has said so in its Arctic policy. It says that India’s approach to economic development of the Arctic region is guided by the UN sustainable development goals, and in accordance with these goals India supports sustainable business development in the Arctic as outlined by the Arctic Economic Council.
Q108 Lord Boateng: Thank you very much for your evidence. Arctic states have long emphasised that the Arctic region should be an area of high co-operation and low tension. However, relations between Russia and the other Arctic states have deteriorated sharply as a result of the Ukraine war. How concerned are India, Japan and South Korea about rising tensions in the Arctic and the risk of increased militarisation in the region?
Dr Aki Tonami: If you were to ask a Japanese Government official, which I am not, they would probably say that importing geopolitical tensions into the Arctic is a bad thing and to be avoided. However, Japan is more concerned about repercussions in the Arctic for other regions rather than the actual tensions in the Arctic itself.
I remind you of Japan’s location. We have one neighbour, Russia—which many in Tokyo regard holds some of Japan in the northern territories—that is at war with Ukraine; DPRK, North Korea, regularly launching missiles into the Japanese EEZ[1]; China threatening Taiwan, which is very close, only 466 miles from Okinawa, Japan’s most southern prefecture; and China’s coercive economic behaviour, coercive naval and aviation behaviour in the South China Sea, and so on. Given this overall geographical picture around Japan, it would not be a fair reflection of people’s mindset in Tokyo to suggest that militarisation in the Arctic is a major concern. In the list of bad things that can happen to Japan that we can imagine, the Arctic is down the list.
Dr Hyoung Chul Shin: To see the Arctic as a zone of peace and co-operation and to keep it that way is the highest priority for Korea. Thus any conflicts in the region are inherently a source of concern. I must state that compared with other countries—for example, our neighbours Japan and China—the geopolitical location and bitter history of Korea render the thirst for peace as almost a built-in value and aspiration for the nation. No wonder that we are concerned about this rising tension with no easing signs shown—this Russian aggression on Ukraine.
We are not isolated from other cushioning effects around, but as I am from the science institute, we are also very much concerned with the Arctic observation gap and the resultant information gap and the deterioration of the many valuable scientific time series as co-operation with the Russian research community has become impossible.
Regarding the Russian collaboration, there is no written direction from the Government, such as restrictions on science co-operation, but we have exercised caution in line with the sanctions and have put any related monetary support or direct human exchange programmes on hold. Some of our scientists are very disappointed and in many years we hope to regain our collaboration. This is basically a scientist’s point of view.
Captain Anurag Bisen: I will partially echo the views of South Korea as well as Japan. As with South Korea, the Arctic figures way down in India’s priorities but, having said that, our Prime Minister has time and again made the statement—last year, in September 2022, when he met President Putin on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, he said that this is not a time for war. He has just embarked to the United States and in an interview with the Wall Street Journal the day before yesterday he said that India is on the side of peace. Indian Arctic policy also says that to promote security and stability in the Arctic region in accordance with international treaties and covenants, India has consistently batted for a rules-based order. That is what India’s stand is.
As far as Japan’s views, these are my personal views also. I have written about it, that because of Russia’s special military operations in Ukraine scientific collaboration in the Arctic has taken a very serious hit. That is a great setback to global climate change mitigation efforts. In fact, I am part of a back-channel effort that is going on in Geneva for a resumption of scientific exchange in the Arctic. I have written that India should use its presidency of the G20 to kick-start the scientific engagement. Six of the eight permanent Arctic Council members are represented in the G20 and 11 of the 13 observers are represented in the G20. The G20 has the credibility, the legitimacy and the heft to endeavour to restart the scientific engagement in the Arctic.
I think that the first order of the day should be to resume the scientific engagement in the Arctic because Russia cannot be ignored in the Arctic. It is more than all the other seven Arctic states put together. The climate change effects are happening in Russia and the observations and experiments are happening on Russian soil, so for the scientists it is a big setback. I think that as a world community we need to focus on the resumption of scientific exchange in the Arctic.
Q109 Lord Anderson of Swansea: Each one of your countries for good reasons is a keen China watcher. Russian-Chinese relations have oscillated over the years, but the Arctic potential seems to bring the two countries together in terms of Russian territory, Chinese investment and possibly a new power balance as Russia becomes more dependent on China. Given this new power relationship and the closer relationship between Russia and China, how does each of your countries respond to that new relationship?
Dr Hyoung Chul Shin: This is the most difficult question. Bilateral co-operation has been a firm foundation for Korea’s Arctic research endeavours. China and Russia were two of the most important collaborators in conducting research and other efforts—The Northern Sea Route and all these things. We are aware of the growing co-operation between China and Russia in the Arctic, but our understanding of the current situation and what exactly goes on behind is not quite adequate. We are simply looking at the situation closely.
Our collaboration with those two countries is mostly bilateral so far and never trilateral. At international meetings and fora related to the Arctic where both countries participate, we are keeping an eye on the agenda and all the discussions.
Honestly, if Korea shares the abovementioned concerns there have been no particular actions undertaken in this regard. This is probably because there has been very little room for proactive actions that Korea could initiate to generate major effects.
Captain Anurag Bisen: I beg a little bit of time in answering this question. The Arctic presents India with a very complex set of opportunities as well as challenges. I am saying so because two of India’s closest strategic partners are Arctic nations—Russia and the United States—as is India’s principal adversary, China. All three of them are locked in a strategic contest. It is a complex situation for India.
India officially has not articulated a statement of position on China’s growing closeness to Russia, but again in my opinion the growing isolation of Russia, recent sanctions and denial of technology, especially in hydrocarbon exploration and extraction, are increasingly driving China into the lap of the dragon. India is faced with a choice whether to cast its lot with the A7—that is the eight Arctic Council countries minus Russia, which will all eventually be members of NATO—or with Russia. Now, ceding any space or going on the other side to China would be of detriment to India. That is a primary concern, so I think that India will have to play a balancing game there.
It is also of concern because when Xi Jinping visited Russia they jointly announced greater collaborations in the Arctic, including increasing collaboration in Yamal. LNG was mentioned and Arctic LNG 2 was also mentioned. The trade between Russia and the share of rouble and yuan mutual commission transactions has now risen to 65% and continues to grow. The bilateral trade has grown by 30% in 2022, setting a new record of $185 billion and aiming to surpass $200 billion in 2023. This is a real cause of concern.
What also needs to be borne in mind is that it is not a concern for India alone. It needs to be borne in mind that the Arctic Ocean represents the shortest missile flight trajectory as well as submarine passage between China and Europe and North America. Greater Sino-Russian collaboration in the north would also divert US energies to the region. It would dilute the United States’ focus on the Indo-Pacific and allow China greater manoeuvring space in the region. I think that should also be a cause for concern for India because it would give greater freedom for China to operate in the Indian Ocean region.
Therefore, the growing homogeny between Russia and China, especially in the Arctic, if unchecked, would be detrimental not only to India but to the West. It must be, therefore, a collective endeavour to prevent such an outcome and the West, in my opinion, needs to play a long waiting game vis-à-vis China, which represents a growing and formidable threat to the rules-based order and the Bretton Woods institutions.
Dr Aki Tonami: This question really hinges on who you are talking about. If you are talking about the scientific community or polar research, the majority of Japan’s scientific research programme on the Arctic has been based on co-operation with and collection of data from Russia. Covid-19 and the subsequent halt of diplomatic relations with Russia forced scientists to alter their research plans completely.
At the same time, it seems that while China maintains relations with Russia, there is no active research co-operation between China and Japan. That puts Japanese scientists in a bit of a tricky situation. However, I have heard from Japanese scientists that they have observed that there is a growing distrust of Chinese research facilities in the Nordic countries. Researchers in one particular Nordic country have approached Japanese and South Korean counterparts to see whether they could use their research facilities in collaboration with China, probably trying to mitigate the risk of dealing solely with Chinese scientists.
At the personal level, Japanese scientists have collaborated extensively with Russian and Chinese scientists, not just in the Arctic but in the Antarctic. There has been a long history and it has a personal attachment.
If you talk to those who are more concerned with or focused on the geopolitical situation, then the story is a bit different. The Russia-China relationship is watched very carefully, in much the same way as observers are carefully watching the Russia-China relationship in the wake of the war in Ukraine.
Q110 The Chair: In particular, do you see the relationship as dangerous for the future of the Arctic Council?
Dr Aki Tonami: Dangerous in what sense, if I may ask?
The Chair: Precipitating a change in the status of the Arctic Council, a different form of governance.
Dr Aki Tonami: At the moment Asian observers, including Japan, I think are at a loss as to what to do next. Basically, everything around the Arctic Council has stopped. It could be dangerous if China and Russia dramatically disturb or try to influence the decision-making mechanism of the Arctic Council, but for the time being I do not see it happening, given the structure and the way the soft laws surrounding the Arctic Council are designed.
Lord Anderson of Swansea: Do you see a danger of an alternative to the Arctic Council developing, led by Russia and China?
Dr Aki Tonami: The Arctic Circle Forum in Iceland was initiated based on co-operation between Iceland and China, especially after their deepening relationship post the financial crisis in 2008. It is also my observation that because the Arctic is so centred around Arctic coastal states and the geographical proximity is of utmost relevance, it is difficult to imagine that China would be the main stakeholder in initiating and moderating an alternative Arctic forum. It really depends on how much Russia will use or rely on China in trying to initiate such a discussion.
The Chair: Do not feel you need to, but would either of the other two witnesses like to add anything to that?
Dr Hyoung Chul Shin: I think that it is an interesting idea for the two of them to develop some alternative mechanisms or arrangements, but honestly, the probability is not very high. I could sense some level of solidarity between these two nations. Not just in the Arctic but in the Antarctic, for example, they support each other. When most countries criticise Russia, China tends to be a friend to Russia. As Aki mentioned, I think that there is still not much room for China to lead something big in the Arctic Circle. There will be some new developments but not to the extent of developing an alternative mechanism. That is what I think.
Captain Anurag Bisen: Very briefly, I would say, again in my opinion, in its present state the Arctic Council is broken and I think it is broken for ever. I say this for several reasons.
Even at the height of the Cold War, co-operation continued in the Arctic, but since 2014 it has been going in reverse and from bad to worse. After Russia’s special military operations in Ukraine and in March when they announced suspension, it has not been the same story. I do not think that the Arctic Council will operate in the way it operated earlier. Again, that is my opinion.
China and Russia are also probably moving, they are waiting and watching. On 11 May when Norway took over the chair of the Arctic Council it was an online meeting and it went without any event, but in my estimation Russia will probably invite India—I do not know how India will act or react—and China and some other countries, maybe Kazakhstan, to have some kind of a structure, not really in parallel because it was brought out that the Arctic Council will not be replicated in any manner. I do not see Russia on one side in the Arctic Council working with the other seven countries, which are all part of NATO.
Russia also amended its own Arctic policy I think in February—they released it last year up to 2035—in which it dropped references to Arctic Council co-operation and it increased references to bilateral co-operation and to working within its own national interests in a bilateral format. I think that Russia will not really be engaged with the Arctic Council to the extent that it was engaged earlier.
The Chair: Thank you very much. That is very interesting.
Q111 Baroness Coussins: As you know, like your three countries, the UK is an Arctic observer state. At the end of our inquiry, we will be looking to identify recommendations that we can make to the UK Government. It would be interesting and helpful to know whether each of you has any thoughts or recommendations on how the UK can work more effectively with your respective countries and more broadly with other Arctic observer states. If there is anything that you would like to put to us on that question, on better collaboration or, indeed, other recommendations that you would like to put to our committee, they would be very helpful to hear.
Captain Anurag Bisen: I have three specific recommendations for the UK and India to collaborate more closely in a bilateral or multilateral format.
The first is that India and the UK could sign a memorandum of understanding on polar scientific co-operation. The United Kingdom already has an MoU with our Ministry of Earth Sciences, which is the nodal ministry in India for scientific activities in the Arctic. It has an MoU with the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK on co-operation in earth sciences, which was signed on 1 March 2013. It was then extended for another five years and I think that it expired in March 2023. We could sign an MoU on polar co-operation because India is active in Antarctica as well as in the Arctic. Of course, then we have the Himalayas, where we carry out extensive research. It is considered as a third pole. It has the largest resource of fresh water outside the two poles. We could collaborate on scientific co-operation in the Arctic.
The other recommendation is that the UK could work with India as part of the G20 to restart, as I mentioned earlier, scientific co-operation in the Arctic because it would be a delivery of a global good and it has global repercussions. I think that scientific co-operation must be started and the United Kingdom could work with India.
The third recommendation is that the United Kingdom and India should work—and I have written that India should work with other nation observer states as well—to have a more inclusive and equitable Arctic Council. You are aware that in the Arctic Council observers do not have a say to the extent that they should have. Many times your research priorities may not coincide with those of an Arctic Council member state, yet you have to propose your research proposal to an Arctic Council member state and your contribution cannot be more than 50%. There are restrictions. This time—this flux state in the Arctic Council—could be used by the observer states to have a more equitable and inclusive Arctic Council and to have a greater say in that Council.
Dr Aki Tonami: I read that the new framework of the UK on the Arctic emphasises the UK’s scientific, diplomatic and military strengths. Given Japan’s non-military, mainly economic, foreign policy as a trading nation, it would be a bit tricky for at least the Japanese scientific community to work on areas where military and science intersect.
I refer you to the essay I wrote for Chatham House in 2021. In it I wrote that it is naturally attractive to look at Arctic security from the perspective of wider geopolitics. A practical vision for Arctic security should be one that prioritises the machinery of collaboration. For example, for Japan and its scientists, the fact that the majority of scientific collaboration with Russia came to a halt since the 2014 Crimean crisis was more relevant than, let us say, China’s ambition in the Arctic. It was also highly controversial when the United States under President Trump failed to maintain solidarity with other Arctic states and the international community by withdrawing from the Paris climate agreement. As you saw from our Prime Minister Kishida’s efforts during the recent G7 meeting, Japan has become even more keenly aware of the importance and value of collaboration.
I would suggest that one area for realistic multilateral scientific co-operation with Japan for the UK is perhaps within the field of humanities and social sciences; for example, a joint project on promoting and protecting indigenous languages or analysing social media posts from indigenous communities in Russia. I understand that this is not as headline-grabbing as, let us say, joint military patrols in the Arctic Ocean, but these working-level projects capture the reality of Arctic security. Because the Arctic is no longer a hinterland disconnected from any human activities or civilisation, to make this complex web of interaction work, we need more co-operation rather than contestation. That co-operation begins with small foundational steps rather than talk of a grand geopolitical strategy.
Dr Hyoung Chul Shin: First, 2013 was the year that Asian states were granted observer status to the Arctic Council and I recall that was when the UK first produced its Arctic policy. I recall it was Adapting to Change. Ten years later, you produced another one—I think it was this year—which was Looking North. I did not do a comparative analysis, but I saw these two things and ours as strikingly similar, except the military strengths mentioned in the UK’s Arctic plan. As a country outside the Arctic Circle, we have a number of things that we can share and help each other with.
Perhaps because I am from a science institution I can say that I take a view that high-quality scientific research, especially in a time of climate crisis, research that can meet the societal needs, is currency and maybe ammunition for those states outside the Arctic Circle. We have to make use of this.
Secondly, co-operation and collaboration are the keys. Partnership is not just a value but is at the same time a strategy itself. The collaborations are not just between Arctic states and observer countries but among all those involved who are willing and able.
At this point I can add my personal observation. I have not seen too many UK figures in Arctic governance-related dialogue at international fora. Here is one thing. Last week we hosted the second conference of the parties for the central arctic ocean fisheries agreement. It was hosted at my institute. I noted that we had two UK officials from Defra as observers, which means there was a deliberate application that was accepted. To me it was a pleasant surprise and I found it encouraging. Not just scientists, but many different walks of life can come from the UK in Arctic-related dialogue in the fora. It will be good and I look forward to more opportunities to converse with UK colleagues and to work with them.
The Chair: Lord Stirrup would like to follow up on that.
Q112 Lord Stirrup: I have a very brief question for Dr Tonami. When we were talking about maritime routes earlier and what implication that might have for future policy, you said that Japan’s approach was to stay in the game, which sounds perfectly sensible, of course. I wonder whether you could give us some sense of what that might mean in terms of Japanese policy. Clearly, part of it will be watching very closely how things develop, but Dr Shin, for example, was talking about the implications for Korean shipbuilding companies. Can you give us any practical examples of what staying in the game might mean for Japan?
Dr Aki Tonami: The difference between Korea and Japan is that our shipbuilding industry is basically taken over by Korean or Chinese rivals, so we do not have too much interest in shipbuilding necessarily. We have considered it crucial to have an Arctic capability research vessel as a symbol of our research capability. The Japanese Government managed to pass a budget and project proposal to start building a new ice capability research vessel, which will be run by the National Maritime Research Institute. That is considered a big, tangible result of all stakeholders to try to stay in the game. It is not necessarily linked to shipping but when it was lobbied to obtain the budget, the aspect of shipping was always referred to.
The Chair: Thank you very much for your time. It has been very useful and we have certainly got the message, I think, that more communication, particularly on the scientific front, is not only desirable but probably essential when we are dealing with the climate crisis that we are. I suppose in a very small way this is an example of communication and co-operation, so thank you very much for your time. Just to remind you again, we will send you a transcript that you can review. Thank you again very much for all your time and all your wise advice.
[1] Exclusive economic zone