Unrevised

Members present

Lord Soley (Chairman)

Lord Addington

Baroness Browning

Lord Hannay of Chiswick

Viscount Hanworth

Lord Hunt of Chesterton

Lord Moynihan
Baroness Neville-Jones

Lord Oxburgh

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean

Lord Tugendhat

________________

Examination of Witnesses

Professor Geoffrey Boulton, School of Geosciences, University of Edinburgh, on behalf of the Royal Society, Dr Andrew Foxall, Director, Russia Studies Centre at The Henry Jackson Society, and Tim Reilly, Arctic Advisory Group

Q158 Lord Soley: Welcome, gentlemen. We are very pleased to have you here. You know what the Committee is about. I think you had an indication of what we want to cover today. This is a particularly important area, dealing mainly with Russia. First of all, you have a declaration of interests for each Member of the Committee for you to view. This whole hearing is being webcast live. You will also get a written transcript of the notes, which you can then look through and come back to us if there are any issues you wish to raise.

The Arctic Council, which we heard a lot about during our visit to the Arctic, is clearly an evolving international organisation and quite an interesting one. What is quite difficult for us to work out is Russia’s policy towards the Arctic Council and how it makes its voice heard in that council. What do you know about that? It is the issue again of this emerging international body, Russia’s view of it and how it works within it.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: I suspect that the perspectives, the lens through which those of us here might look at this, will be rather different. The Arctic is a sphere of increasing competition, but at the same time it is an area of dialogue and collaboration. Much of the latter is of course concerned with scientific issues. It may well be that those concerned with geopolitical problems might see things rather differently from those of us who are scientists.

I will say something about the Arctic Council, which I know something about, largely because of having been involved with Arctic research institutes including Russians and Scandinavians. My perspective is that Russia wants to have a strong voice in the Council. It is very happy about and has developed ways of working with the rim nations around the Arctic rim, but is rather sensitive to the potential that the Arctic Council might expand. I think that it feels that other rim nations understand its concerns, why they are its concerns and the way it likes to work. There have been strong collaborations across the Arctic between the Russians and the Scandinavians in particular. Russia is very concerned that the Arctic Council might become a very different beast in its home terrain. That certainly feeds its way into the scientific community, in that I and some of my colleagues have noticed that over the past few years there has been a tendency for Russians to work with other Arctic rim nations whenever it can, rather than doing what it has done historically and have a much broader set of collaborations.

Lord Soley: That is very useful. Your role as a scientific adviser to the Prime Minister is very helpful. I will come back to the science questions a bit later on, but that is a useful description of how you see it.

Dr Andrew Foxall: I agree with what Professor Boulton has said. I would simply note the caveat that, broadly speaking, Russia seeks two things from the Arctic Council: first, to further its own policy interests; secondly, to achieve its national goals and interests, as broadly understood. In that sense, Russia is like every other member of the Arctic Council. It acts pragmatically, it forms temporary collaborations and undertakes co-operation with other members when it is in Russia’s interest. When it is not, it declines that opportunity to do so. For example, Canada and Russia are often seen as the two most militarised and belligerent of the Arctic states. Actually, in terms of the Arctic Council, they get on relatively well, at least in one or two respects: they agree on the sovereignty of the Northern Sea Route and the North West Passage. With Denmark and Greenland, Russia has formed a temporary alliance about resource exploitation. In a number of other respects, it fosters these alliances as a way to further its goals and interests.

Tim Reilly: I agree with all that has been said. Its real policy in the 21st century is, as a resource base, it thoroughly endorses and encourages the council. Indeed, it was the founder member of the Arctic Council through Gorbachev’s meeting in Murmansk in 1986 and later as an environmental commission in 1991. They are fully behind the mandates of the Arctic Council: no defence, strategic discussions, sustainable development and environmental protection. However, I think very much in terms of national interest, as has been mentioned, they may have hesitation about aspects of the direction of the Arctic Council, but I think that is now held equally by all powers, especially with external observers and the rise of Asia. They are probably exacerbated, in general terms, by the climate change that has made the economics viable and the northern sea route potentially possible. I think that some tension is there, but it is in favour of regulation and control of the region and the northern sea route.

In my opinion, Russia is the indispensible nation in the Arctic Council. Russia’s leadership and science, as we will discuss, are vital to the Arctic in general and to the European Arctic specifically, which may be the reason why it has such close connections with Scandinavian countries. In my opinion, it is very important to differentiate between the North American Arctic and the European Arctic, namely because the main geopolitical, strategic, economic, governance and globalisation factors in the Arctic are largely—almost unanimously—in the European Arctic, not the North American.

Q159 Lord Soley: Leaving aside science for a moment, where I think co-operation is very interesting—we will return to that—would all three of you feel that the co-operation between the nations on the Arctic Council is pretty good?

Tim Reilly: In my opinion, it is frankly amazing as an international forum in its collaboration, co-operation, and decision-making by consensus or compromise when necessary. As an international forum, it is a fantastic model for international co-operation between superpowers—former superpowers, in one case—and future superpowers in the case of Asia. As a forum, we should hope to maintain and strengthen it and in no way, shape or form, undermine it.

Lord Soley: That is very helpful. I should explain that we obviously have a particular interest in Russia because it is the largest littoral state. It is very important in terms of its relationships generally on all the issues affecting the Arctic. It is also affected at the moment by the sanctions that are being applied by the European Union and North America, which is why we are giving some extra time to this.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Before we move on, did you say that Russia was the indispensible member of the Arctic Council or an indispensible member? There is a difference.

Tim Reilly: Of course there is. I would say it is the indispensible country in the Arctic.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: All you need to do is look at a polar projection of the Arctic and you see why Russia is indispensible. The opening of the sea route will be much more powerful on the Eurasian fringe of the Arctic Ocean, with the potential economic consequences greatest here too. Many scientific issues and environmental impacts relate to the development of the Siberian and Russian land area adjacent to the Arctic Ocean and the impact that will have on the sea terrain. From both a scientific and an economic perspective, Russia matters absolutely centrally in this domain.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Could I ask a factual question, please? In the distinction you made between the North American and the European sides of the Arctic, on which side of the line is Greenland?

Tim Reilly: European.

Q160 Lord Tugendhat: How important do you feel the Arctic region is in relation to Russia’s other policy goals? I imagine it has moved up the pecking order somewhat in recent years, but is this something that is of central interest to the Kremlin or of peripheral interest?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: Let me have a first crack and then the experts can have a go. What is interesting about the Russian Arctic is that, although an enormous swathe of Russian terrain lies north of the Arctic Circle, it is not obvious to me that there is the same co-ordinated view of the Russian position in relation to the Arctic as there is in many other parts of the Russian landmass. One sees that particularly in organising scientific collaboration where you find that it is good to discuss it with senior bodies, major Russian funding agencies, with whom agreements are relatively readily made. In contrast, atthe level of local, provincial agencies,, the message of collaboration simply has not penetrated. Because of this latter, undertaking scientific work in Russia is prone to all sorts of appalling problems in different localities. If you contrast that with some of the scientific work that is going on in central Asia, it is rather different. People in localities, local provincial governors, understand what the position of the state is. Although a major Russian policy report was produced in, I think, 2008 about the Russian Arctic, it is not clear that it has led to a coherent policy towards the Arctic that has filtered down through the various agents of the state.

Dr Andrew Foxall: I would add to Professor Boulton’s comments that if not, perhaps, at regional level or sub-regional level lower down in the centralised system, but certainly at the elite level as far as President Putin and President Medvedev are concerned, in terms of the practitioners of statecraft in Russia, the Arctic is of central importance. We must understand that much is at stake for Russia in the Arctic. This leads to Russia adopting quite proactive policies there. Part of this stems from a belief in the Kremlin that perhaps the chaotic state of post-Soviet transition in the 1990s led to Russia being left behind to a certain extent in the Arctic, but there is also, I think, a belief that the status quo does not benefit Russia with its newly consolidated power. That needs to be set in the broader context. In the 1990s, Russia’s policy towards the Arctic was quite haphazard. It concentrated on a number of things. It was by no means coherent. That started to change in the early 2000s. The submission to the United Nations under UNCLOS in 2001, the endorsement of an Arctic policy in 2001 and the general increase in interest lead up to 2007 and the planting of the flag on the Arctic seabed and the adoption of an Arctic policy in 2008. In a historical context, the Arctic is important and continues to be important. One must also understand that the future of Russia’s economic policy effectively rests on the exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves in the region.

Tim Reilly: I totally agree. I think it is a critical national security and policy interest. I would say it is part and parcel of trying to maintain the CIS. I do not believe that it is a question of trying to re-invent the USSR, but it is about trying to keep the CIS together and therefore it is taken as seriously as events we have seen in Ukraine and to a lesser extent in Georgia and the Caucuses some years ago in terms of sovereignty. I think that it is certainly critical.

In terms of other policy goals, virtually every other policy goal dovetails into the Arctic. If you look at resources—energy—it is the Arctic. Ninety-five per cent of the gas in the entire Arctic is in the Russian Arctic. When you say “the Russian Arctic” I would prefer to say, “the European Arctic” because the European Arctic is the Russian Arctic. That should be made clear: the enormity of 4,500 miles of coastline.

In terms of increasing international relationships with China—I think that we may come to that later in the discussion—a strategic relationship is clearly possible in the Arctic. Energy, whether evacuated into the EU or around Asia, is part of it. In terms of vital national interests, it is certainly right up there, and we should never forget that there is still a nuclear capability in terms of military assets. This is still one area of the world where the Cold War never went away. It may have waned, but that capability is still there. Incidentally, so is the US’s and I would imagine so is ours. For all those reasons, plus what Andrew touched on on the regional side, it is seen as critical. In terms of Murmansk and Archangel, and the amount of money that is there, a lot of it is in co-operation with the Scandinavian countries, such as Norway and Finland, where there is full integration at the economic level, not just at the oil and gas or political level.

Lord Soley: You said that it was more about holding the CIS together. I am puzzled because I am very well aware of the Russian concern about that in other areas, but not so much in the Arctic.

Tim Reilly: Historically, if you go back to the 19th century with Mackinder and the theory of geopolitics, which Professor Dodds can obviously wax lyrical about with his experience, there was always a suggestion that the Eurasian landmass was critical. In the 20th century, that meant that Russia had Europe on one side, America on the other and Asia to the bottom, but now, in terms of international interest, the way that the Russians see it is that geopolitically they are now exposed, in terms of the Eurasian landmass, to the north. As the ice melts, that is now a geopolitical weakness for them, and therefore something that they take very seriously.

Q161 Lord Addington: This question follows on quite nicely. Can the Arctic and international relations and co-operation in the Arctic carry on in the light of tensions in other regions? How do those tensions outside the Arctic region, most obviously in Ukraine, affect the Arctic region and co-operation and activity up there?

Tim Reilly: This is a critical question. The fact of the matter is that international relations and co-operation with Russia in relation to other nations is already under tension because of the sanctions. For good reasons or bad reasons, for purposeful reasons or unintentionally, a linkage has been made by the West in response to Ukraine by linking our response in terms of economic sanctions with another part of the world, namely the Arctic. De facto, we have done that. The short answer to your question is, yes, tensions have been created in response to the situation in Ukraine. I am not sure whether Brussels and Washington considered that the economic sanctions that were geographically contained and economic specifically targeted would get a geopolitical and strategic response from Russia because from the Russian point of view, they now see a culmination of sanctions, now including gas sanctions, which are extremely important, as opposed to oil, which is immediate revenue, of course. They see this geopolitical point about the north now being open with us putting NATO-type forces into Poland and the Baltic states and they see the attack on Gazprom as symbolic, with Gazprom essentially representing 45% of Russia’s GDP. So they see three strategic aspects of the Arctic now being attacked in one economic move by the West which, intentionally or otherwise, will, in my opinion, be responded to in a strategic and geopolitical manner, not in a tactical manner. I think that the repercussions of this were meant to be contained economically, but I believe the Russian response will be uncontained and international, geopolitical and strategic in response. I do not think that we will see anything to endorse or qualify that, or indeed to prove it, until, perhaps, the American chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2015 and next year when drilling can restart in the drilling window in the Arctic Ocean. Then I think that we will see moves that could be quite severe.

Lord Soley: Is it your judgment that the Russians would like to keep the Arctic Council out of the wider issues, even if, for the reasons you have just given, not entirely?

Tim Reilly: No. My overall point today would be that if by sanctions and military escalations we begin to look at the remilitarisation of the Arctic as opposed to the economic securitisation—oil and gas companies want security, HSE, oil spill response, criminal behaviour or whatever—

Lord Soley: President Putin mentioned on a number of occasions before the Ukrainian crisis and the sanctions an intention to expand the military presence in the Arctic.

Tim Reilly: So have the Canadians. The Americans are looking at it.

Lord Soley: I am simply saying that that was happening before. It is not new.

Tim Reilly: Of course. That was partly in response to the development of the north-west district, where a lot of the activity is, especially oil and gas and minerals, the co-operation between the region and Murmansk and Norway, and partly in response to some western pressure that we need to control regulation, sovereign rights, human rights, legal and UNCLOS enforcement and to Lloyds looking at some insurance aspects. They realised that they had to get their game together. Partly also, a third reason for that militarisation, aside from any possibly military/strategic reason, was that as the northern sea route develops, it becomes a national security aspect, rather like we have Royal Marines looking after our North Sea oil rigs and Faslane for the same reason that they are strategic vital interests to the country and therefore security needs to be maintained.

I do not believe Russia wants NATO in there because of the effect it would have, the intellectual contradiction it would pose to the raison d’être of the Arctic Council, in that the Arctic Council is concerned with sovereign rights, and NATO is concerned with sovereignty. The whole purpose of the Arctic Council was to reduce geopolitical tensions by reducing matters to ones of science and legality and by politicians talking, but NATO is responsible for sovereignty, territory, boundaries and borders. That is the absolute opposite of what the Arctic Council is about, so I think the Russians would be very against NATO, perhaps on military grounds, but especially because of the effect it would have on the efficacy of the Arctic Council for everybody in the Arctic.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: From the perspective of scientific collaboration, matters do not seem to be quite so dramatic.

Lord Soley: Perhaps I may return to the science soon, because I have a couple of key questions.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: Going back to your question on whether events elsewhere in the Russian sphere of influence have had an impact, and looking at the pattern of collaboration over the past year or so, the impacts on scientific collaboration have been relatively slight. For example, there was a major UK-Russia bilateral meeting in Moscow last December. In the aftermath of that we were advised by the FCO to take our foot off the accelerator. Recently we have had an invitation from our Russian collaborators, including a body which now calls itself the Russian Academy of Sciences, and major funding bodies, foranother bilateral on major Arctic issues in St Petersburg in November.

So although there are some perturbations, on the whole collaboration seems to continue. My view is that we should think very carefully about how to maintain that collaboration.

Lord Soley: And would you put your foot back on the accelerator perhaps?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: Yes.

Q162 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I come back to some points which left me fairly baffled in Mr Reilly’s evidence. You take as your point of departure the imposition of sanctions but, of course, sanctions were not the point of departure. The point of departure was the seizure of the Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, all of which are in contravention of international agreements and obligations. It does rather put a different light on it. I understand that you are giving us a very helpful account of what it looks like from the Russian point of view, but that is not the only point of view. The question we are dealing with at the moment—we will come to others later—is whether one can keep the co-operation in the Arctic, as the last witness said, reasonably separate from any tensions, which could well get worse and are not terribly likely to ease any time soon; presumably, if that can be done, it is in our interest?

From what you said, I am not sure whether your answer was yes or no. When you talked about the Russians taking a strategic point of view, are you suggesting that they will retaliate against what they see as western policy over the Ukraine and Crimea by reducing or preventing co-operation in the Arctic? Or do you think that they will be inclined to foster continued co-operation in the Arctic despite the difficulties? It would be helpful if you could say which side of that you are suggesting.

Tim Reilly: I think that it would like to maintain relations in the Arctic and that perhaps all of us would like to differentiate between the illegal activities in the Ukraine and the economic sanctions in another part of the world called the Arctic. I am putting forward a view that perhaps one of the ways in which we could do that over the longer term is to consider the concept of the economic sanctions in the Arctic being considered within the Arctic Council as opposed to another international forum.

The NATO side I mentioned was that Russia sees not just the sanctions but also, contemporaneously, the movement of troops into Poland and the Baltic states, as well its feeling about an attack on Gazprom, as an attack on the entire economy of Russia and not simply on the specific gas industry. As it produces roughly 40% of GDP for the Russian Government, it is seen as a much broader thing. Russia most certainly sees that as a threat.

I agree that it would prefer NATO not to be there because, in its view, that begins escalation towards militarisation. I see that the Arctic Council would love to solve these problems, as I think we all would. My view is that the effectiveness of the Arctic Council has been amazing, including its effectiveness between the Russians and the Norwegians with the Barents Sea agreements some years ago after 40 years of conflict. It has kept to all the rules. According to UNCLOS, its application for the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf has gone through. There is every indication that Russia respects what goes on in the Arctic Council. As it does not discuss strategic matters in NATO terms but in terms of policy, science, what we need to do and legal aspects, that may be a framework within which we could look at this issue. I would try to differentiate what is happening in the Ukraine from what is happening in the Arctic.

As I have said, my general point is that the repercussions of the sanctions are broader than first considered. In essence, they were economic sanctions but, in my view, the Russians have seen them as economic and political. Therefore, their response in the Arctic will be different. Yes, they are two separate issues but the Arctic Council could be a very useful tool going forward on sanctions in the Arctic. What happens in Ukraine is a separate question which I am not qualified to answer.

Dr Andrew Foxall: Thank you. Perhaps I may go back to the original question. The impact of geopolitical tension and elsewhere will neither be straightforward nor equal across the Arctic. In many respects, the impact is to be determined by the Arctic states themselves. Some states may decide to use the region to penalise and further punish Russia. Colleagues no doubt will know that Canada boycotted the Arctic Council meeting in Moscow in April. Alternatively, others have spoken of using the Arctic as an area of co-operation to renormalize relations with Russia.

It is also worth remembering that relations in the Arctic were not really affected in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008. The Arctic provided an arena in which to renormalize relations with Russia at an international level. Whatever one thinks about the invasion and annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine since then, the opportunity exists, if the Arctic nations want to use it, to further engagement with Russia or to further isolate Russia.

Q163 Lord Addington: Would you suggest that the Arctic provides an opportunity for normalisation and a step back from this situation and the rest of Russia? Clearly, the two are connected but it is a case of how far they are connected. We might be able to have intermediaries who, even if they are involved, are not seen to be at the forefront. That might be a way to continue activity in the Arctic and possibly lead to a conduit for other sorts of information.

Tim Reilly: I have thought long and hard about this. I think that the international forum, the Arctic Council, has been successful. It was expressly set up to deconflict issues of territory and sovereignty to reduce the tensions geopolitically between what was then the two superpowers. The way that it works through a scientific and legal framework—namely, UNCLOS and the work that Professor Boulton and people like him do—is an excellent starting point perhaps. It may be technically impossible between Washington, Brussels and Moscow but it seems that among people who consider the Arctic this may be a forum that is well respected by all members and has a successful track record. Russia has never deviated from any policy, doctrine or mandate of the Arctic Council since its inception.

Lord Soley: That is a very interesting point. I want to move on to the science bit in a moment, but that is very interesting. I share the view to some considerable extent that, if you think about it, Russia also has a feeling that it lost out in the Arctic with the collapse of the Soviet Union in a whole range of ways. For Russia there is a historical feeling that perhaps is not always recognised elsewhere.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: I have become aware of deep concerns in some members of the Arctic Council about the way in which enhanced industrial and commercial exploitation of the Arctic as a consequence of sea ice retreat and warming could seriously perturb the deliberations of the Arctic Council. It has hitherto concentrated on issues of sovereignty, which you have already discussed, but also the environment, indigenous peoples and the like. Some of the conclusionsof that work have been rather profound. However, as soon as major pollution as a consequence of industrial activity impacts on the natural environment there is the potential for making what has hitherto been a relatively safe arena for discussion into a much more problematic one. For example, one thing that almost brought the Arctic Council to its knees some years ago was the issue of massive industrial pollution from some of the heavy-metal mining in the northern part of the Kola peninsula, with down-wind effects that were very dramatic indeed. None the less, these were ultimately successfully managed. There are now concerns resurfacing that precisely that sort of issue might blow up into something much more serious and much more significant, and might actually be very difficult for the Arctic Council to cope with.

Lord Soley: That is a useful warning. Thank you.

Q164 Lord Oxburgh: We have touched on science and its importance, and indeed the possibility of separating science and regarding it as something discrete from the other aspects of activity in the Arctic. But what I think is beyond dispute is that there is going to be more human activity in the Arctic. It is going to take place in a very large area that is rather poorly understood from a broad environmental and scientific point of view. Professor Boulton, would you like to comment on where you think the major gaps are and what you think might be done about them?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: One of the major gaps results from the demise of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet era there was a whole series of research stations stretching the whole way across the Arctic littoral of the Soviet Union, which were concerned with monitoring river flows, establishing pollution levels, establishing ocean circulation, understanding sea ice dynamics and understanding marine and terrestrial ecology. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to the demise of many of those stations. Although many are now being re-established, there is an enormous data gap. There is currently a great void in what we might have hoped to have had at hand. The time-series evidence, which is crucial in establishing the benchmark for all sorts of environmental and scientific work, is simply missing. One of the things that has been happening is that western countries have been heavily involved in trying to redevelop those capacities. For example, interestingly, one of the most effective collaborations is with the US in re-establishing a hydrometeorologically and ecologically important station in the eastern part of Siberia. Russia likes to do bilateral relationships. It is much less happy in big consortia outwith the Arctic Council.

One of the problems is recovering capacity to monitor what is happening both in the Arctic littoral and also in the shallow marine domains. They also had ice stations. There is one remaining Soviet ice station in the Russian Arctic, which is invaluable in giving surface information that we can use to understand better the imagery available from satellite observation. Although during this period satellite information was still being collected, without ground evidence and ground monitoring it is much more difficult to use. One of the large issues for the Arctic Council, which they have begun to address, is how we go about recovering capacity to understand what is happening and what might happen in the Arctic domain under circumstances where the Arctic environment is changing dramatically as a consequence of warming and sea ice retreat.

There are big scientific problems. My view—I think the Society’s view—very much is that there is a big opportunity here for us to engage in a fundamental way in an area of the earth that is changing probably more rapidly than any other and is going to suffer from very important human intervention. We will need understanding that will then help us to utilise the Artic in a “sustainable” fashion. There is a big opportunity if we can exploit it, but we have to be careful about Russian sensitivities. We should learn from those who have collaborated well with the Russians. For example, the Germans have a long history of strong collaboration. The Humboldt-Institut currently has a major collaboration in Russia that is running very well. They have a large marine geophysical and oceanographic capacity in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea and are thinking about ways in which they can engage with the Russian scientific effort that will not embarrass the Russian position, which does not like the idea of others becoming involved in the Arctic outwith the Arctic Council grouping. There are large opportunities, but some serious problems.

Q165 Lord Oxburgh: You have touched on the gaps and the science politics, if you like, but what about the scientific gaps at sea? This is an area that is very poorly known and requires oceanographic vessels and sustained international activity. Setting the politics aside, what would you like to see done there? You have to decide what you want to do scientifically, if you can, and then try to work the politics round it.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: The priority is to understand what the causes of change in the Arctic are. We have a reasonable idea, but the large question is what the consequences of change are going to be. The Arctic ocean and atmosphere systems are strongly coupled with what happens in the North Atlantic region. About 60% to 70% of the heat transport in the North Atlantic region towards the poles takes place in the ocean, whichis crucial in influencing our climate and weather. We need to understand what the consequences of Arctic change might be for circulation of the ocean in the Atlantic and climate.

What would we like to do? Well, of course, at the moment there are major oceanographic efforts. The UK is heavily involved in an effort across the North Atlantic, trying to understand the heat transports across into the Arctic ocean, the southward flux of Articwater , the ecological consequence for fisheries and the like, but actually, we need to penetrate much deeper into the ice-covered part of the Arctic Ocean and into that part of the Arctic Ocean that is now seasonally ice free. That is where arrangements with Russia become crucial. It has been extremely difficult in the past to develop oceanographic cruises in the Russian parts of the Arctic. The Swedes have recently been successful in arranging for one of their major icebreakers to have a cruise across the Russian continental shelf. It took them two years to negotiate it, but thatis better than the efforts they made 25 years ago to celebrate 100 years since Nordenskiöld first went across the Northeast Passage. The Swedish Government made overtures to the Soviet Government for about 10 years; not a single letter was answered. Things have been getting better, but there is still great sensitivity about moving into Russian-controlled waters.

Lord Oxburgh: Do you think ocean drilling is out of the question?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: No, I see no reason why it should be out of the question, but you will know very well the susceptibility of fixed platforms to moving sea ice. On the other hand, of course, we do not need to think entirely about fixed platforms anymore, because increasingly we are beginning to think that we can replace the role of many of the research vessels by remotely controlled devices. We already use those on an increasing scale in the North Atlantic; and there is no reason why we should not use them under Arctic sea ice. But again, the issue of sovereign control matters a lot. These things have to be done as part of international agreements. I think that we can do things with new technologies that do not require us to penetrate using surface vessels.

Lord Hunt of Chesterton: I would just like to comment on your comment about bilateral agreements. In 1977, I went to Russia on an Anglo-Soviet agreement. It was a bilateral agreement and very effective. That is obviously the German strength. They like bilateral agreements. That may be something we should think more about.

The other point that I was going to make is that people sometimes simply do not appreciate that there is still a great deal of excellence in Russian science. It is very important to recognise that. Our friends in the MoD are the only part of the British Government where you have a department that looks at foreign research in order to apply it, and they speak Russian there. There is very significant capability. In detecting earthquakes from satellites, for example, it is unique. Nobody else believes it is even possible.

The question is how we can improve the understanding in the UK science community of working with them. Is this something for research councils and government departments? The Anglo-Soviet environmental agreement in the 1970s was supported by the equivalent of Defra, the DoE. Government departments realised that they would benefit from this. I wonder whether you have any ideas about how we can make this collaboration broader and deeper.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: It is important to recognise that Russian science is not uniformly good and that there are areas where they would regard their science as of high quality and many of us outwith Russia might think rather differently, although of course there are some areas of truly excellent science. My first suggestion is that rather than attempting to develop large-scale, ambitious government-to-government programmes, we should be sensitive to the way Russian scientists and their funders like to work by developing relationships with specific groups. There is a great deal to be said for supporting such activities anddeveloping effective ways of working with appropriate funding. One of the problems is that there is a really serious language problem. In this country, we stopped teaching Russian in the mid-1980s. It just collapsed in two or three years. Our Russian-language capacity is now rather poor and there is certainly no uniformly high level of English capacity in Russian scientific establishments. It is a serious matter.

There is also the matter of visas. There one gets two completely opposed positions. If you ask the FCO whether there is a problem, it would say that there is some minor bureaucracy but there is no problem. If you ask many individual scientists, they say that the problems can be very severe. At the moment, it is rather anecdotal. We have tried to establish on a quantitative basis just how much the visa problem matters. Certainly many scientists who are engaged with Russia take the view that it is pretty hit and miss whether you get your visa to go in or your visa to come out. It is not entirely on our side where the problem lies; there are serious Russian problems too.

Lord Soley: Before I move on to Lord Moynihan, when we were on the Norwegian Island of Svalbard, where we also have the science research station at Ny-Ålesund, we were told that the Russians were planning to open a science base on the island. Can you see any advantages or possibilities of co-operating with that base through Ny-Ålesund?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: I think the plan is that the Russian base will be at Barentsburg, which is a desperately dilapidated coal-mining station that has not mined any coal for probably a couple of decades.

Lord Soley: I think it does mine some, but it is very minor.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: Well, the belief in the Norwegian community is that they import coal to Barentsburg in order to show that they are exporting it, but never mind. I think it is unfortunate in a sense that they are planning to place this at Barentsburg rather than at Ny-Ålesund. It would have been wholly better had it been there. On the other hand, if a well-found station is created there and brings good Russian scientists to Spitsbergen, there is every reason why we should attempt to work with them at Barentsburg, because that physical proximity matters a lot.

Q166 Lord Moynihan: The planting of the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole has been interpreted in three ways in evidence given to us. The first is as a purely symbolic act, the second is as a critical scientific and in the end fraught but successful expedition to meet UNCLOS criteria for the territorial claims of Russia—incidentally led by one of the world’s leading scientific explorers in pursuit of that goal—and thirdly as both. I would be grateful for your views on that. At the same time, if you give any credence whatever to the UNCLOS element to that expedition, what do you see as the legal ambitions and expectations of Russia regarding the Arctic seabed beyond its exclusive economic zone?

Dr Andrew Foxall: I understand the Russian act of planting its flag in both ways. It was in one respect little more than a sideshow to a serious scientific endeavour that was, as I am sure colleagues know, to collect the data that were missing from its 2001 submission. It also had symbolic resonance domestically. This came little more than a few months after Putin’s speech at the 2007 Munich security conference, which was understood as an aggressive speech, when he laid into the United States and accused it of trying to establish a unipolar world system and so on. That domestic narrative falls apart in a number of respects. Let us not forget that this was not the demonstration of Russian strength, nationalist fervour and endeavour that it was portrayed to be. It was not simply the Russian state, it was the Russian state with a number of international partners. The Swedes and the Australians were there and provided much needed technical support in search and rescue and so on and helped to finance the initiative.

With regard to Russia’s territorial ambitions in the Arctic, I echo what the Chairman said earlier. During the Soviet period, the Soviet Union controlled approximately one-third of the Arctic Ocean. Russia believes that during the 1990s in a sense the West was devious and took some of what Russia believes to be its territorial waters away from it, and it now seeks to reclaim them. Its 2001 application to UNCLOS is part of that. Earlier this year, UNCLOS recognised part of the Sea of Okhotsk near Japan to be Russian territory so that Russia now controls the whole of Sea of Okhotsk. Exactly what will happen on the decision on the 2001 application remains to be seen, but I imagine that if it does not go in Russia’s favour, Russia will simply provide further science that would lead to a revision of the decision such that it may well then go in its favour.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Can I ask a question about this flag business? You said that the Swedes and other Nordic nations were on the same expedition and were there when the flag went in. Did their flags go in as well?

Dr Andrew Foxall: They did not, but it is worth noting that other Arctic states have planted flags previous to that. Canada, for example, planted a flag in 2005, I believe, and there was not the same overreaction to that.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: It would be interesting to know about those other precedents, please, if you have information on that, because this is obviously quite a symbolic issue.

Tim Reilly: At the time, I wrote a letter to the Times. I was at the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge at the time and I wrote this letter saying that we had to be very clear that Russia putting a flag on the Arctic Ocean was about as significant as the United States putting a flag on the moon. It was absolutely fine: they had worked hard and provided the science and the personnel. In this case, as Dr Foxall said, it was partially financed by the West and there were a lot of scientific personnel on board. Artur Chilingarov himself was very surprised. In that sense, the politicians—in this case, President Putin, as Dr Foxall said—took full advantage of this coup, but Artur Chilingarov has said that he was totally surprised and he was actually the father of Arctic ice stations in the 1950s and 1960s. He is a very serious oceanographer and Arctic specialist. In terms of UNCLOS, yes, they are applying to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, but so are Canada and other countries, all pushing out towards to the North Pole. In one sense, it is significant politically to be there, but in terms of economics and resources there are no known hydrocarbon resources that far out into the Arctic Ocean.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: So your view is that the Russians are not any more territorially ambitious than anybody else.

Tim Reilly: They are no more so than anybody else; there are other people applying to the CLCS right now within the Arctic Council who are making similar appeals. None the less, it would give them sovereign rights. Again, it is very important to differentiate between sovereignty, which they would not have, and sovereign rights, which they would have. But, of course, sovereign rights would still be subject to freedom of the seas, innocent passage and all the other aspects of international maritime law. In some ways, it is symbolic for all nations within the Arctic Council to push as far out as the North Pole. However, with change in weather and ice melt, and the NSR perhaps in the end being overtaken by a route right over the Arctic, that may change in terms of politics, but it is far too early to see that.

Lord Soley: It is an important area, but if it is any comfort to you, Mr Reilly, we British politicians at least have learnt the dangers of planting flags on things, although we did do Rockall a few years ago. Dr Foxall, did you want to come back on this before we move on?

Dr Andrew Foxall: I did, just very briefly. If one were to understand the act of Russia planting its flag as the high point of what at the time was being called a ‘new Cold War’, as part of that wider timeline of aggressive events and actions by Russia, it would also be true to say that, since 2007, things have actually gone in a remarkably peaceful direction in the Arctic—the Ilulissat Declaration; the maritime delimitation treaty with Norway; and the 2011 signing of the first legally binding treaty. If that were the high point of the confrontation, then we are at least over it now.

Lord Soley: It is difficult to get the balance right on how to react to these things at times.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: Just to interject a little historical perspective. It is easy to underestimate just how much Russia associates itself with the Arctic. It has historically felt quite free to express its views trenchantly. Of course, in this regard, it has done much of the important geological work, both on the continental shelf in establishing its extent and up to the pole. I have no doubt whatever that Russia intends to make a sea bed claim up to the pole, as will other nations. So I do not think that we should overegg this one. As you have said, we have done a bit of flag-planting ourselves.

Lord Soley: We covered the world in them at one stage.

Q167 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: I wonder whether you could tell us what you think Russia’s intentions are towards the mineral resources, both onshore and offshore—and I am not talking just about oil and gas—in the Arctic, and when and where further developments are likely to take place. Perhaps you could comment in that context also on how capable the Russians are of developing mineral resources in the Arctic without foreign collaboration and investment or whether they need western, Chinese and perhaps even Vietnamese association with these mineral ventures in order for them to be viable.

Dr Andrew Foxall: I will start by making the broad point that Russia does a good enough job of telling us itself what it seeks to do in the Arctic. We could simply refer to a number of, if not several, Russian policy documents that stress the importance of the exploitation of resources—not simply hydrocarbons but also mineral resources—in terms of strengthening Russia’s position and its influence in international affairs and on the international stage. As I noted earlier, Russia’s future economic model is in a sense based on what it can get out of the Arctic resource-wise at whatever cost is economically viable. In a number of respects, because of the Soviet Union’s experience in the region, as Professor Boulton alluded to earlier, Russia starts in a position of strength, certainly where hydrocarbon resources are concerned. I see no reason why that would not change in the future.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Why it would change?

Dr Andrew Foxall: Yes, why it would change.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: There is a great diversity of potential for mineral resources, not restricted to continental shelves but also in the deep ocean. Many countries are seriously making or preparing to make investment in the technologies required to mine minerals in the deep ocean, particularly along mid-ocean ridges, where valuable minerals occur in concentrations that are far higher than found on land. The Russian difficulty at the moment is partially one of investment and partially one of technology. Inevitably, many of the large-scale marine devices and ship-borne devices required to undertake not only deep-ocean mining but other aspects of mining on the shelf are likely to come from Asia. There are certain sensitivities that I am aware of, particularly about Chinese involvement in the Arctic, which I think the Russians would not necessarily welcome—although I believe that they have recently struck up an important agreement with South Korea to provide them with marine capacity that they currently do not have.

Q168 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: The next point that we wanted to raise was that which you just raised, about the greater involvement not only of China and Korea but of Japan and Singapore. How are the Russians reacting to that? Are they holding out the hand? I want to come back to the differentiation over what is science and what is not, but, on this, are they embracing these new partners?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: I look to my colleagues on my left first.

Tim Reilly: Within the Arctic Council, once again, it was recognised that, in terms of the massive infrastructure requirement within the Arctic in order to exploit the economic opportunities and to provide a livelihood for indigenous peoples and the rest of it, there had to be sustainable finance coming from somewhere. The other aspect of it, as Professor Boulton has alluded to as well, are some of the climate and weather effects that are going on in the Arctic. The Arctic is at the epicentre of these changes. The effect on climate is felt now not only within the Arctic but without the Arctic. Countries like China are saying, “This is actually affecting currents, tides and solidity of water in our waters, or will do. Therefore, we have a right to be there”. So there is some justification in this. External countries are saying that, because the Arctic is the epicentre of climate change on the earth, they have a right to be involved in the solution to it and in the endeavour to find out in terms of hard science. The second part of this is the way in which this is looked at by the Arctic Council—Russia does not disagree with it. It is pretty implicit to observers now, including the United Kingdom, that if you want to join the party, you must share the burden and ask what you bring to the party. One of the smartest things, and it is why I think that Asia will have a place here and possibly with Russia because of the circumstance of sanctions, is that the Chinese have produced a manual for the northern sea route, with navigation, communication, and depth of ports, water and all the rest of it. It is a small move—it will cost them a couple of million dollars to do—but it is a very clever move. It is saying, “We are arriving in the Arctic and we are immediately contributing to the new global trade route for the future and, in the mean time, something that may well be used for evacuation of oil and gas via LNG from places like the Kara Sea out to the Asian market”. So burden-sharing, infrastructure and the fact that Arctic conditions are changing and now affecting outside the Arctic as well as inside are all reasons that, sooner or later, the Arctic Council—including Russia; I do not think that there is any contradiction here—will see the inevitability of it. I think that each individual state within the Arctic Council favours it more or less. For instance, Greenland finds it quite attractive; I would not say that Iceland is being seduced, but it is being courted heavily. Both Greenland and Iceland are like China; countries like America will take a different view. Russia has always had difficult Sino-Russian relations, but, on the other hand, understands now, especially given the sanctions, that the opportunity is there.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: So the Russians are more embracing than not?

Tim Reilly: I would have said so, yes.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: I think that Russia likes a cosy Arctic Council setting and is rather wary of external interests.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: Another major player.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: A point that I think the Chairman made relates to this: what are the legitimate reasons for non-Arctic states taking an interest in the Arctic? Climate change is the obvious one, but something that exercises a proportion of Russian scientists, although by no means all, is what they call the potential for a methane catastrophe. There are two potential sources for this. One is the permafrost on land. Russian scientists, who have been looking at permafrost for the best part of 200 years, reported about 15 years ago seeing for the first time in temporary winter lake ice little bubbles containing methane, suggesting that sodden or frozen vegetation in the permafrost was being released from it and methane was being exhaled. Of course there is a much larger issue there, as the solid methane—the frozen methane, if you like—that is contained under many continental shelves along the Arctic rim could well be released if the Arctic were to warm to a particular level.The impact of this would be substantial as methane isa greenhouse gas about 1,000 times more effective in warming the atmosphere than CO2.. This has become a rather political battle in Russia in that, for reasons that I do not understand, there have been reports in parts of Russian science, often from very senior people, saying, “Look, we must put this issue to one side. It is an apocalyptic issue that really is not very likely”. You have as much chance of guessing why they should take that view as I do.

Dr Andrew Foxall: I agree with what Professor Boulton said—not about the methane catastrophe because that is something that I know very little about, but about his first point. Russia, like Canada, opposed the expansion of the Arctic Council on the basis that Russia has long argued that the Arctic is of regional rather than international concern. It has opposed the expansion quite consistently over a number of years, not least because it was worried about the commitments and rights that future members, participants and observers. would necessarily have. Perhaps one of the reasons why Russia has allowed the expansion to take place recently is that, whatever one thinks in the West, Russia is wary of the growth of China and its emergence as a superpower, and allowing China into the institutions and architecture, in effect, of the Arctic Council means that China acknowledges the council’s legitimacy, so that if China ever wanted to make any claims in the Arctic it would have to do so through the Arctic Council itself.

Lord Soley: That is a useful reminder that international relationships change from time to time.

Lord Hunt of Chesterton: Can I just make a point about those two interventions? The first is that there was a significant meeting at the Royal Society in September, where it was quite remarkable that the United States scientists who had been quite sceptical about the connections between change in the Arctic and climate variations further south over Europe, Asia and America have switched their position and now see that this warming of the Arctic leads to these very large gyrations of the jet stream that form large circles of blocking or permanent events. This question of climate over the Arctic and further south is now much more validated scientifically. That is just to make your point—there is a political ramification.

The other point is that when the Arctic climate assessment was produced—I was there when it was presented in Reykjavik in 2004 or 2005—there was great reluctance then to make any comments about the permafrost, the methane and so on. In particular there was an American scientist who was very opposed to that discussion. Now, though, that is very much more on the table, although again there are arguments about who is doing it and how it is being done. However, it has still not actually been incorporated into the climate models. That is a historical political point. Currently there is a great move for all the international climate bodies to begin to recognise this. The political ramifications of that, as you commented, are quite large, and we can have not really seen the consequences.

Lord Soley: Professor Boulton, do you wish to respond to that?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: No, the point was well made.

Q169 Baroness Browning: We have heard about the military build-up in the districts in Russia that border the Arctic, and we have heard again this afternoon about Russia’s awareness of its exposure to the Asian land mass to one side of it, but with regard to the response that it had from Canada this year in response to its proposal to form an Arctic military command by 2017, should the West or NATO be worried? How are you interpreting the escalation, which seems to be quite rapid, in this area?

Dr Andrew Foxall: To put this into its broader historical context, the post-Cold War period as a whole has seen quite a marked demilitarisation of the Arctic itself, but it is true to say that over recent years, as your question suggests, Russia has undertaken a remilitarisation of it. That has been particularly pronounced since 2008 and the military reforms undertaken by the then Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. The Russo-Georgian war was a success as far as Russia was concerned but revealed issues with Russia’s military that since then it has sought to address, and that has involved a modernisation of its military not seen in the West for over a decade. Russia’s plans in the Arctic together with its plans, its build-up and its military manoeuvres, elsewhere should rightly be alarming the West, but I would caveat that by saying that, as Professor Boulton alluded to earlier, given Russia’s size in the Arctic, the size of its coastline in the Arctic and its number of large Arctic settlements, Russia has legitimate reasons for undertaking the securitisation of the region. However, I would distinguish between the securitisation and the militarisation of the region.

Tim Reilly: It is quite instructive to note that the incumbent Minister of Defence, Sergei Shoigu, was previously the Minister of Emergency Situations in the Arctic. Under him, and along with Putin, way before Ukraine, Russia had already decided that it would need a military capability. For clarity, it is important to point out here that for all militaries and navies in the Arctic, the fundamental problem is that there is no private security. They do not have the logistical support, the training and all the rest of it, so the only people who can provide security to some extent—ring-fencing health and safety issues, oil-spill response or emergency evacuation—are military people. We are all the same; the Canadians set up a formation like this in their Arctic with a specialist brigade, port facilities, ships and all the rest of it. Again, it is important to be careful in distinguishing between intent and capability here. Certainly there are now two brigades 10 kilometres from the Russian border, there is an airborne division in the air, there is a special forces—Spetznaz—brigade, they have changed the military command and put it into St Petersburg, and they have made it into brigades as opposed to mechanised, difficult-to-manoeuvre divisions, so they have clearly looked at the military. They recently did an exercise right up in the Baltics near Poland, which included the Barents Sea and air aspects over the Kara Sea, where they were looking at a supposed incursion by terrorists into Belarus and the regaining of that. It was obviously about something more than that, and we recognise that. But it is important to differentiate between militarisation and the securitisation for the reasons that I mentioned earlier: that this is now a vital interest and a resource base. The north-west part of Russia and its border with the Baltic states, but especially the Scandinavian Arctic rim countries—Sweden, Finland and Norway—have to be looked at in terms of national security, including the industry there. Shoigu came from the emergency ministries where he was looking at these exact issues. Incidentally, at the very time when the flag was planted, he was talking about what sort of people should be put there to help people evacuate in the event of a potential oil spill. There is certainly something for NATO to consider, but it takes more time to understand whether there is intent because there is capability—whether this is remilitarisation for geopolitical reasons or whether this is a hybrid of commercial securitisation with military. Officially, Russia has said that in all cases the American, Canadian, Norwegian and Russian troops are all dual-task—they are for civilian tasks as well as purely military. I think the answer is that it is too early to say, but the capability is most certainly there, which will have budget implications for NATO.

Q170 Viscount Hanworth: As regards an alternative point of view, might we consider the incursions of Russia into Crimea and Ukraine simply as precursors to further territorial adventures or even incursions? I am thinking of a threat to the Baltic states, which all incorporate substantial Russian minorities.

Tim Reilly: In a way, that is what I am saying. They have the capability, but is that their intention? Was this a rehearsal for the Baltics or not? Certainly, with Finland they have replaced some of the missiles and are telling the Finns that, if they are thinking about joining NATO, they will put nuclear tips on that. That has come out and the Finns have reported it, and that is close to their border as regards some of their missile launches from trucks.

Viscount Hanworth: What I am very aware of is that we seem to want to avoid consideration of these rather extreme and unsettling scenarios. However, we saw it happening in Georgia and we could depict what happened in Crimea as simply another instance of an ongoing policy of aggrandisement.

Tim Reilly: The depressing point along that line is that if you look at the White Sea Canal, which goes from St Petersburg into the Gulf of Finland and cost the lives of 25,000 Gulag prisoners to build under Stalin, that is now a pathway right into the Gulf of Finland from out of the White Sea. There is a railway system there and at one of the cities there is a major depot, with oil and gas interests. It would give Russia the capability—they are enhancing the infrastructure—to adopt an alternative route down through the White Sea, along the White Sea Canal and out into the Gulf of Finland, where they have Latvia and Lithuania to the left and Finland to the right, which would make most people feel quite uncomfortable.

Viscount Hanworth: I am mindful of the fact that the Crimean adventure has been hugely popular in Russia and one can envisage a scenario in which Putin is subject to some kind of duress and wishes to boost his popularity by further incursions of that nature.

Tim Reilly: I wrote a paper that I think was distributed to the Committee in which I said that the problem Putin may face now is that on the one side most certainly there is evidence of factions within his Government, which he has to balance in the Arctic against international partners with economic interests. At the same time he has to factor in the geopolitical and economic ambitions of Russia in the Arctic, so he has four factors all moving independently. It could go any way, frankly.

Lord Soley: Nationalism is a difficult card when you play it. Before I bring in Lord Hannay and Lady Symons, I think that Dr Foxall wanted to come in.

Dr Andrew Foxall: I did, on a number of things and I shall try to be brief. President Putin in a sense was always a wartime leader. Let us not forget that he came to power on the launching of the second Chechen war, which led to similar approval ratings that he gained when he was Prime Minister after the invasion of Georgia and which are now 86% after the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. I do not think that his designs on eastern Europe go much further than Crimea and what we might call “New Russia”, or “Novorossiya”. However, that is not, of course, to say that, if we were having this conversation in Warsaw, Tallinn or Riga, we would not be rightly worried about Russia’s geopolitical designs on the Baltic. If I might bring this back to the Arctic zone and the initial point, yes, Russia’s annexation of Crimea has in a sense drawn attention to its military activities in the Arctic, but its militarisation of the Arctic predates Ukraine and Crimea. Last summer—the summer of 2013—Russia re-established a permanent military presence in the Arctic, for example. I would also note, although it is often overlooked, that whatever one thinks about the Kremlin’s sensitivities, from its point of view it believes that Russia is being encircled by NATO in the Arctic. Russia is the only Arctic littoral state that is not a member of NATO. When Russia talks about its militarisation of the Arctic, it does so—numerous practitioners of statecraft in Russia have argued this—as a way of rebalancing the military situation in the region vis-à-vis NATO. Russia does not see the other littoral states as individual states; it sees them as members of NATO.

Q171 Lord Hannay of Chiswick: Unless I have got this completely wrong, Russia has been “encircled” by NATO in the Arctic sine 1948. It is not something new. It has existed as long as NATO has existed. However, I have a question I want to probe a little more. I am puzzled by the fact that apparently the Russian perception of the activity of this group of western nations is that it always involves NATO. However, if my understanding is correct, NATO as an organisation has gone out of its way not to have a presence in the Arctic, not to have a strategy, military or otherwise, in the Arctic and not to ask for membership of the Arctic Council or observer status, so surely this is a matter concerning not NATO but certain member states of NATO which are clearly littoral states and clearly have the Article 5 guarantee of their territorial sovereignty and so on. It is therefore not true to say that NATO is confronting the Russians in the Arctic, is it?

Lord Soley: Before you respond to that, can I check whether Professor Boulton has a plane to catch?

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: Not yet.

Tim Reilly: You are technically correct, Lord Hannay. I think that the West went to great lengths to emphasise that the force that has been suggested—I think it is a brigade size force—was not NATO but comprised members and individuals put together. I think that it was sending a signal to the Russians that this was not NATO moving in. The point that I was trying to make—Dr Foxall will speak for himself—is that that is exactly where we want it to be. We do not want it to escalate any further than this. The emergence of NATO would happen if things were to go wrong, but I think that the talk about escalation, capability, intent and the rest of it is dangerous from a statecraft point of view. What we all need in the Arctic from an economic, environmental and indigenous people’s point of view is stability and predictability, and this is counter to that, so putting limited forces and air force into the Baltic states and Poland recently, not under the banner of NATO but none the less western countries, was probably inevitable. However, I repeat what I have said before: there may be another alternative forum wherein this can be discussed and the geopolitical tension eased in order that it does not become a case of NATO moving into the north-western sector.

Q172 Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: I am very interested in the points that Lord Hannay and Viscount Hanworth have raised. Earlier in the discussion, I thought you were critical of the sanctions spilling over into the Arctic in a way that was dragging in the whole of the Russian economy and the other points that you raised. It was as though there was a view, particularly from Professor Reilly, that science should stand outside these political developments. I do not know whether that is what you were implying, but that is how your argument came over to me: namely, that somehow science could be isolated from politics, from international relations, from a country breaking the rule of law, from human rights abuses and from everything else that we deplore, and that where sanctions are taken, very often economically and where they are taken in sport, the implication seemed to be that somehow science stands outside that. It was an argument that I could not quite follow, but I thought that was where it was going.

Tim Reilly: I can clarify. What I am trying to portray, and I hope the value of what I am saying, is that, having talked to Russians about what I have said over the past few weeks, their view was, “Yes, you’re on the money. That is how Russia will react to this”.

From my point of view as regards the science and some of the repercussions of the sanctions, for instance, on the oil and gas companies, the amount of money that the oil and gas companies put into science, R&D and technology is in the hundreds of millions of dollars. If they are no longer operating in the Arctic, shareholders and stakeholders will question the various boards of these big oil companies. They will ask, “What are you doing spending money with no return?”.

Secondly, what concerned me about the sanctions, and the limitation and the scalability of them, is that paradoxically in the Arctic the oil and gas industry is one of the only industries that has sufficient capital, skills and infrastructure in place to enable environmental protection and sustainable development to proceed and to monitor business. It is a paradox, but it is they who will build the bridges, the tunnels, the airports, the hotels, the communications and the navigation systems for their own purposes, but it is on that that environmental protection and good science can take place with data to support how we are going to move forward.

There is another aspect of the sanctions that has an effect on the Arctic Council, if the Arctic Council is to be affected by the sanctions, with Russia being the biggest player. One question being asked by the Arctic Council internally is the purpose of science. Traditionally, it was to support environmental protection measures and to look at an orthology of fish and to understand their breeding patterns and all the rest of it, so that it could put barriers up and so on, as it did in Sakhalin, where the direction and the routing of the pipeline was changed at a cost of many billions of dollars. That was the purpose.

One question which the Arctic Council is asking now through the Arctic Economic Council, the new body, is what the purpose of science is. Is it moving further away? I think Professor Boulton alluded to this as well. There are concerns that the purpose of science will not be directed exclusively any more towards environmental protection but will look towards sustainable development. If it is proved that science can prove the validity of sustainable development in the Arctic, business would have a green light to operate. That business would be energy. Why is it energy? It is because the Arctic Council has publicly stated that the Arctic Economic Council’s primary endeavours economically will be hydrocarbon exploitation.

If the sanctions per se have a negative effect on the Arctic Council and Russia’s position in it, science in the way that I have outlined will raise these sorts of issues. The science could either be sidetracked or undervalued, because if the likes of Shell, BP and Exxon go, who else will supply the money for the research in order that environmental protection can be understood and that we can sustainably develop the Arctic in the form of western business, capitalist business?

Lord Soley: Dr Foxall, do you want to add anything?

Dr Andrew Foxall: I would add an isolated footnote. Over recent years the Russian state has been cracking down on NGOs and other organisations that co-operate with the West. Only last week, the Russian state took the deplorable decision to end the long-standing Future Leadership Exchange Programme, a multilateral initiative with the US and other members of the CIS. As part of that broader crackdown, I would say that that does not bode well for future scientific operation.

Professor Geoffrey Boulton: I would answer Baroness Symons’s question in a rather different way. Historically, science has been able to maintain dialogue, notwithstanding a reprisal and counterreprisal when states find it impossible to talk to each other. Let us not forget that at the height of the Napoleonic wars, Michael Faraday went with Humphry Davyto Paris when Davy picked up a medal from the French academy and had a passport from Napoleon to permit him to do so.

Last year, the Royal Society, together with US colleagues, developed a programme to work on a volcano, Mount Paektu in North Koreawhichhas, in the past, been immensely destructive in North Korea, and is showing signs of renewed activity We had a joint scientific enterprise, which was just about the only real collaboration that has happened between North Korea and western states. It is not the same thing as BP and Shell getting involved, but it is possible to maintain dialogue and contact. Indeed, during the height of the Cold War there were analogous scientific contacts. So one should not dismiss that. It has important significance.

Lord Soley: I think the fact that this session has gone on for 25 minutes more than it was timed for is an indication of how important it has been. As I have said, it is desperately important for everyone that we understand Russia’s perspective of the Arctic. I always see Russia as a rather tragic country in the 20th century with two world wars, millions dead and injured, a revolution that goes wrong, a tyrant, famine, deportations and the collapse of an empire. We always have to see Russia through that pretty bad history. Having said that, it is crucial that that we understand where they are on these issues and do it through that prism. Whether that justifies what is happening in Ukraine or elsewhere, understanding that is critical and you have been very helpful in your answers today. Should you wish to put in any more details, either on the science side or anything else that has been said that you feel has been left out, please do so. If you have any specific recommendations, please send them through. You will get a copy of the transcript, which you can read through. Having said that, I thank you and would like to make sure that Professor Boulton gets his plane back to Edinburgh.