8
Corrected transcript of evidence taken before
The Select Committee on the European Union
External Affairs (Sub-Committee C)
Inquiry on
Evidence Session No. 1 Heard in Public Questions 1 - 8
Baroness Billingham
Baroness Coussins
Baroness Henig
Lord Jopling
Lord Lamont of Lerwick
Earl of Sandwich
Lord Trimble
Baroness Young of Hornsey
________________
Dr Lilia Shevtsova, Senior Associate, Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program, Moscow Center, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Q1 The Chairman: Thank you very much. The picture is clear and your voice is clear. This is a formal meeting of the Select Committee. It is one of the first meetings we have in our inquiry into EU-Russia relations. It is therefore on the record. It is very appropriate that at our first evidence session we should be in touch with Moscow, even if down the line rather than in a physical presence. I will ask the first question and my colleagues will have a number of others. Do let us know if anything is unclear.
My first question is very general. How would you characterise EU-Russia relations prior to the crisis in Ukraine? Where were there shared areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great privilege and a great honour to take part in this inquiry. Regarding your question, it is such a complicated picture. In order to define the relationship between the EU and Russia before the Ukrainian crisis I would use the metaphor: this relationship before November 2013 looked like the dating of two actors who were mutually interested in each other and who had a lot of shared economic and international interests, but at the same time had different norms, principles and understandings of the policy. By the end of last year, they felt more mutual frustration, disappointment and even disgust regarding each other. This relationship had a kind of paradoxical twist about it because Europe definitely is the key partner for Russia in the economic area. Eight European countries account for more than 70% of foreign investment in Russia. On the other hand, Russia gives Europe around one-third or 25% of its gas needs. In any case, Russia needs Europe but, at the same time, Russia behaves and looks like a much more proactive neighbour forcing the EU to be complacent and acquiesce to Russia’s policy. Russia has proved tremendously successful and very able and deft in dividing Europe, in finding the Trojan horses within Europe and in pursuing bilateral relationship with European states. Do you need me to specify the exact areas of co-operation between Russia and the EU during this period?
The Chairman: We will let that come out.
Q2 Lord Jopling: Can you tell us how Russia has reacted to the signing of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine? What do you think its views are with regard to similar arrangements with Georgia and Moldova? How do you think this will develop? What will be the reaction from the Kremlin?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: Thank you for the question. Let me divide Russia into at least two parts: there is official Russia, the Kremlin position, which is currently supported by the Communist Party and forces on the left. This position is also very energetically supported by Russian nationalists and imperialists. On the other side are liberals who are a tiny minority. I belong to the liberal experts and liberal politicians. There are different views of Russia’s reaction, but Russia’s official reaction to the Association Agreements between Brussels and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia has been negative from the very beginning. In 2013, official Russia, the Kremlin, started several wars, including the August trade war with Ukraine, trying to force the former President Yanukovych to reject the Association Agreement with Brussels. Two years ago, before the country started to actively be engaged on the road to association, the Kremlin declared the formation of the so-called Customs union and then the Eurasian Union as an alternative to the European Union to counterbalance the European Union. Moscow anticipated that Ukraine and other newly independent states would join the Customs union. So it was a declaration of war and a declaration that Moscow is ready to fight for Ukraine and other states to keep them in the grey zone, or rather, in the zone of the interests of Russia. Such specific details are, for instance, Putin offering a $15 billion loan to Yanukovych before the November Vilnius summit where Yanukovych had to sign the Association Agreement. The loan was a kind of carrot that Russia was giving to Ukraine to seduce it and keep it within Russia’s limits. Russia gave $3 billion out of Putin’s pocket in one day to Ukraine to keep it from signing an agreement. Today, of course, it is much more difficult after Ukraine signed an Association Agreement in June in Brussels. It is much more difficult for Russia to keep this grab of Ukraine and other states. So different tactics will be used, not only punitive sanctions. For instance, there is the embargo on Moldovan wine, Ukrainian chocolate, milk and dairy products and wine and water from Georgia. There are other measures that will be used, some of them much more conciliatory, and much more flexible, among them tactics to co-opt or bribe part of the Ukrainian elite and to co-opt and penetrate the Ukrainian political forces. The fact that Ukraine has signed the Association Agreement does not mean that the Kremlin is ready to let it go.
Q3 Lord Lamont of Lerwick: I fear that my question overlaps a little with what has just been said, but I will put it and then if you have left anything out you can come back. How does Russia view EU actions in what is called the shared neighbourhood? I sometimes think we forget that it is shared. What are Russia’s anxieties regarding EU action? What are Russian strategic goals in the European neighbourhood?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: I will respond in a couple of brush strokes. At the beginning, the attitude, even Putin’s attitude in 2001 and 2002, towards Europe and European activity was rather promising. It was a warm season in the relationships between Moscow and Brussels and Moscow and European countries. There were quite a few steps that the European Union took in order to facilitate turning Russia into a market economy, getting most-favoured status, entering the WTO and resolving the crisis over the Kaliningrad region, which is surrounded by different EU states. There were quite a few promising steps. It was after 2003 and 2004—maybe after and Putin’s backlash in Munich in 2007 where he accused the West, the United States and Europe of confronting Russia and holding back Russia—that the problems started. A lot of mutual dissatisfaction emerged between the European Union and Moscow.
What the official Kremlin—but not my minority, the liberal minority—fears regarding EU activity is that the newly independent states that now constitute a buffer zone between Russia and Europe (these states include Belorussia, Ukraine and Moldova) will move toward Europe. There are other states that do not have a common border with Europe which the Kremlin does not want to have a pro-European vector. The Kremlin does not want them to move towards Europe with the possibility of becoming the EU members and letting NATO forces enter their territory. The Kremlin does not want these countries to become what, for instance, Poland became for Ukraine: a kind of icon and point of attraction, the embodiment of economic success and of a rule-of-law state. The Kremlin does not want this.
Moreover, I want to mention one very important thing. Despite all the evidence that Putin continues to be the same leader who has been running Russia for more than 15 years, he has changed the political regime. Before 2013, the Russian political regime was based on one premise: “we are with Europe”. Even if Russia imitated the values, “we are with Europe”. This was the premise: we are moving towards Europe, we want to be in Europe. So foreign policy was based on the assumption that Russia was in Europe and was integrating into Europe. Today, Putin’s doctrine of survival is based on a different principle, a different premise: “we are not Europe. We do not want to be in Europe. Russia will be containing demoralised Euro-Atlantic nations whenever and wherever it can, inside Russia and outside Russia”. The intent is not a land grab. It is not about a land grab, it is not about old imperialism; it is about crushing the idea of Maidan in Russia, Ukraine and all other newly independent states. This is how the Russian system is working today. To control Ukraine and other newly independent states is the problem of survival for the Russian system. I am not sure that Putin is the primary instrument of policy. Putin is—I am thinking about the metaphor—in a bobsled mood. He cannot jump out of the trajectory of the Russian system.
The Chairman: Thank you. I have a supplementary. You describe very well the changes taking place. Do you regard this as a change directly related to Putin or is it a change to which the Russians in general and the Russian elite would also subscribe? Is Putin here representative of the country? If he goes, would Russia continue in this respect on the same lines?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: I would say yes to both options. On the one hand, Vladimir Putin, the Russian national leader, enjoys 83% to 85% approval ratings. He is the personalisation, the embodiment, of Russian power, of the Russian system, of the Russian matrix. On the other hand, he has the support of different elite groups—not only the warmongers, the military-industrial complex, but technocrats, liberals, et cetera, people and groups who are afraid of this society, who are afraid that Russians will take to the street and create a kind of Maidan in Moscow. So there is a huge basis for Putin’s regime, his personalised power and his doctrine of making Russia tough, arrogant and aggressive, a superpower that will be bullying smaller nations. So there is the elite support.
There is support among society, too, because up to approximately 30% of the population have populist. paternalistic feelings, are dependant on the state, wish the leader to be the “State” and are still hoping that Putin will bring them well-being, normality, stability et cetera. This type of power, this type of policy, has popular support, but at the same time the question is: how numerous are people like myself? We are a tiny minority. Approximately 15% to 17% of the Russian population are in favour of Russia becoming a rule-of-law state and part of Europe, and approximately 30% of the population would say that they would support this way, this option, if it were offered to them. We are in a minority, but our minority has a very strong position in big Russian cities such as Moscow and in cities with more than 1 million people. There are more than 17 million of us, but the problem is that at the moment we have a very fragmented composition and we have been defeated.
Q4 Baroness Billingham: How do you assess the EU’s policies, the eastern partnership and the Association Agreements in the light of recent events? Should the EU approach in the neighbourhood or, in particular, the strategic and sensitive neighbourhood, be reconsidered?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: I have to admit that this is a very complicated and difficult question for me because I have to give you my view of how the EU should behave, and it will appear arrogant for me to give any kind of evaluation of the EU. Let me answer you in the following way. We, the Russian liberal, democratic minority would anticipate help from the EU in our efforts to make Russia a rule-of-law state. Until recently, especially during the Ukrainian crisis and now as the crisis continues, we do not see a viable, coherent foreign policy agenda from Brussels. We do not see signs that Brussels has some kind of strategy that would make the European neighbourhood effective. The fact that Brussels adopted the strategy of the Eastern Partnership is proof that the European Neighbourhood policy was apparently not very successful. It is shattered today. There are bits and elements of the Neighbourhood policy—the ENP, as we call it—left, but it is hardly a vision or package of coherent policy instruments.
Regarding the Eastern Partnership, regretfully I must say that even recipients of this policy in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belorussia and Azerbaijan are sometimes in doubt and have controversial views about it. Why? First, can you imagine Belorussia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan? They are different countries. Meanwhile, we have the EU’s Eastern Partnership concept which is nearly the same for Belorussia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Meanwhile they have different agendas. The countries are different in their type of rule and their readiness to accept European norms. As far as I know, the concept for Ukraine is the model for Georgia, too, but Georgia is much readier for economic liberalisation than Ukraine, for instance. Different countries have been lumped in one basket whereas if I were a bureaucrat in the EU I would discuss a separate pattern for each country. Perhaps it was too difficult a task. I do not see much transparency while the Eastern Partnership model is being discussed, formulated and implemented. I do not see that there are independent voices that could have been useful in discussing it.
Moreover, you reminded me of the statement by the Estonian President Toomas Ilves. When he was asked what was the most useful recipe from Estonia’s path to Europe, he said that without the prospect from Brussels that Estonia would become a EU member at some point in the future, they would have never crossed the “Valley of tears”. In this situation the Eastern Partnership, and all these recipes for independence that are offered without any kind of hope. It is a very difficult process of transformation that gives no hope that at some point Ukraine will be with Europe or in some kindergarten of Europe. Of course, it constrains the efforts and energy of Europeans.
Firstly, what I would anticipate from Europe first of all—I am already switching the roles, for which I apologise—would be efforts to sort out the European crisis of identity and the European crisis of the model of integration. I would dream about a situation in which Europe will again become an icon for us, a model to pursue efforts to be like you. In fact, in Russia and some other states the European model has stopped being a pole of attraction. So, “Practise what you preach”- is my major slogan now.
Secondly, it is not just the economic instruments that are very important because everybody discusses the issue of energy diversification in Europe. It is clear that you have to diversify the energy. I, like the Russian citizen, would endorse this idea and strongly applaud the idea of diversification, which would be a blow to the Russian Gazprom. Why? Not because I am not a patriot but because I believe that in the situation where we inside Russia cannot demolish the petrostate, where Gazprom is ruling the country, having the President as its representative, I would hope that the external shock and impact, could help us to transform the Russian petrostate. So we need energy diversification and liberalisation.
Of course, we also need visa liberalisation, in order to allow Russians—not only members of the Russian political class—to travel freely to Europe. But it is not only visa liberalisation. When I see former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, who is one of the best paid Russian apparatchiks in Gazprom, I would say that all sanctions on the part of Europe regarding Russia, all attempts to preach values to us, will be now hardly be effective if you, the European Community, still have this laundry machine, this lobbyist machine that includes the highest former representatives of your political elite lobbying for the Kremlin interests.
So there are at least a few touches—brush strokes—of what we could expect, but most of all, of course, we should like to have an understanding of what the EU is: what the EU strategy regarding Russia and Eurasia is; whether you are able to have coherent policies or whether Russia can influence you through the policy of “divide and rule” and form “Trojan horses” such as Austria. Look: the EU is preparing a list of sanctions against some tiny individuals in Russia; on the other hand, Austria and Serbia are striking a deal with Gazprom regarding the South Stream pipeline. So we simply do not know where the EU stands.
Sorry for this very emotional statement, but I want you to know what we in Russia feel. Strangely enough, despite the differences between liberals and other political forces, everybody is disenchanted with the EU at the moment.
The Chairman: Thank you. I think Baroness Coussins’s question has been largely answered.
Q5 Baroness Coussins: It partly follows on from what you were saying. You mentioned Gazprom. I wanted to ask you about our trade relationships and the economy more generally. How should the EU structure its economic and trade relationships with Russia and other countries in the neighbourhood? I was going to ask what the nature of the EU’s engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union should be. You have already said that you are looking for more clarity from the EU about its aims and objectives, but perhaps you could say a bit more about whether you think the two models are in competition or are potentially compatible?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: I will start with the final part of your question, regarding the EU and the Eurasian Union. I do not want to elaborate too broadly on that. There is one truth and axiom about the EU and the Eurasian Union. The Eurasian Union and its basis, the Eurasian Customs Union, formed by Russia with the participation of Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, is an alternative to the European Union. It is viewed by the Kremlin as an alternative—an antithesis—to the European Union. The Eurasian Union and the Customs Union are about the status quo—of autocracies, of economics based on fusion, on marriage, between power and property, power and economy. It is a totally different mechanism and model from the European Union. The Eurasian Union and the Customs Union are about the preservation and reproduction of authoritarian regimes and economies under state control in member countries.
I do not see any grounds for compatibility between the Eurasian Union and the European Union. I am reading a lot of articles, essays and statements, especially comment from Brussels, that make me—well, I start to shrug my shoulders at what I see and hear. I hear statements from the important European bureaucrats about the need to discuss how to bridge the European Union and the Eurasian Union. I am at a loss because even if you put aside the issue of the different standards, different models and different goals of each union, there is one technical thing, which is very important. The Eurasian Union and the Customs Union are unions of members, among which Byelorussia and Kazakhstan are not WTO members, so they do not follow WTO rules. This means that we cannot put into one basket the EU, which follows WTO rules, and non-WTO members. It is simply impossible. All rhetoric about their compatibility is mystification and a bogus argument.
Regarding the economic structure of the relationship, there are positive and negative things. The positive is the fact that Russia and European nations, despite of the fact that we follow different standards and have different views—regretfully—still have some shared economic and international interests. So both actors have a shared interest in trade. Trade is huge. I am very bad with numbers but here I have a number anyway: 60% of Russian trade goes to Europe. It is huge. The European market is the only possible huge market for Russian goods.
At the same time, we have a very particular, weird situation where Russia is a much weaker partner or actor than the European Union but allows itself to be recklessly arrogant and in breach of WTO standards. Russia still behaves as it pleases. For example, it installs higher tariffs than are allowed by WTO rules. Russia could include, for instance, a ban on livestock et cetera and EU countries timidly just watch this breach of the rules, trying not to anger or irritate the Kremlin. There are a lot of problems within the trade area as a whole, not just in terms of energy. Apparently, in order to structure effective economic co-operation, especially trade co-operation, for both sides there should be some means for the EU and WTO to force Russian traders to follow WTO rules. Forget about the exceptional status of Russia when Russia trades with Europe. That would be useful not only for Europe but for Russia and Russian markets. It would teach Russian entrepreneurs and Russian state companies to follow the rules. Regretfully, the EU allows Russia to play the ball as it wishes.
The Chairman: Thank you. I think, Baroness Henig, that a lot of the ground you were going to cover has been covered but you might wish to pursue this.
Q6 Baroness Henig: I want to switch more explicitly to foreign policy thinking in the Kremlin. What is your assessment of the goals and driving forces of Putin’s foreign policy? To what extent do you think it is driven by domestic considerations and to what extent by strategic and economic objectives? As for Putin’s objectives in Europe, you mentioned the ambition to divide and rule but are there other issues that are equally important?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: This is my favourite topic but I am not so sure that I can give a clear answer to your questions, especially regarding the implication of Russian foreign policy. I definitely support part of your question strongly. Foreign policy in Russia is, and has been for a long time but now very strongly, the servant of a domestic agenda—point blank. That is why all these Western attempts to make a “de-linkage” do not work. For instance, during the reset, Obama has been trying to base US policy on the principle of the de-linkage which is, “Let us sort out international issues with Russia, while forgetting about its domestic developments”. It is not only the United States. A lot of other western European countries followed the de-linkage principle, and they have been shocked and baffled at what happened during the last six months. Yes to your question: foreign policy is the servant, instrument and means of a domestic agenda. What is the Kremlin domestic agenda? To survive through to 2018—that will be the election year when the current presidential term is over—and indefinitely, and keep stability and status in Russia. It is their interest, paradoxically, when we talk about the domestic situation in Russia, to keep the status quo of the country. Putin and the elite do not want any kind of change. They forgot the words “modernisation” and “reform”. They do not need them. They do not want any change or opening of the window which could create some disturbance, ruin the balance of powers or open the door to some unwanted feelings on the part of society. It could bring the mighty down, for God’s sake. That is why they need a stable system and regime. What about the outside? Here is our paradox. This is the status quo of a country that has become revisionist when it looks outside. In order to keep the boiling kettle closed, foreign policy has become the most dominant actor. The Kremlin is playing across the global spectrum in terms of Soviet space, in Europe, across the globe, for instance, in Venezuela, and with international authoritarians such as China. It has played pretty successfully for a weak country with weak resources, for a country in decay. We have to think, regretfully for me as a liberal, that the Russian system is in decay. It is an obsolete, outdated, outmoded and ossified system based on subjugation of the individual in society to the leader and elite. This system, however, has a huge field for manoeuvre. It can manoeuvre, first, using the energy stick and embargo which it will use this winter. I hope the UK has its own resources but other countries could be threatened. Secondly, the regime and system can use the co-option and penetration mechanism. I mean penetration into European structures. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe and of the OSCE, which is turned into a kind of theatre by the Russian political delegation. It is co-opting business in Europe and outside, though mostly in Europe. It is co-opting media people, experts and former politicians. At some point, I have looked at the boards of key Russian state companies and saw major politicians on them, including Brits. That is a kind of legitimisation of their activities. Finally, Russia has invented—Putin’s Russia, not my Russia—an absolutely, fantastically deft, skilful and amazingly effective instrument. Guess what it is: the information war that is pretty successful with “Russia Today”. Every time I come to London and switch on the TV I see CNN first and then “Russia Today” pops out, bringing its own narrative of how Russia feels and whatever. Russia still has a huge field for manoeuvre, having built a powerful machine which works to pursue the Kremlin’s interests. This is the success of Russian foreign policy. I am sorry, maybe I forgot some element of your question.
Q7 Lord Trimble: Turning to look at the way in which Europe conducted diplomacy with Russia, do you think that the European Union’s institutional structures are adequate to facilitate a strategic dialogue? Is the European Union actually coherent in its approach? As you mentioned, are there ways that certain individual member states conduct their own bilateral relationships which somewhat undermines that coherence?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: I have to admit that I am at a loss because I have to evaluate the European political and administrative structure. I do not know how to respond to your question. What we have seen so far is the possibility, along with pretty effective efforts on Russia’s part, of pursuing bilateral relations with two tiers of European states. The first tier includes Germany, of course, because Germany is number one. It also includes France and the United Kingdom. The second tier would be, say, the Mediterranean countries. The third tier is made up of the Trojan horses. The Trojan horses are the weaker states that can easily be subjugated and harassed. They include Hungary and Serbia. Just last week, Serbia signed a gas deal with Russia. Bulgaria was forced to sign a deal with Russia on the basis of non-European rules.
From my Russian perspective, I do not know how to restructure the European mechanisms in order to pursue a unity of effort and coherence in European policy. That is why, as I understand it, the best European minds are deliberating on how coherence and a common vision should be achieved. From my Russian perspective, I do not know how to solve this issue, but the result I see is that, regrettably, there may be a structural deficiency. Perhaps it is a bureaucratic deficiency. Maybe there is a reluctance on the part of the key players on the European scene to have a united policy. We are not seeing an effort to form a united policy and thus we are the victims of the EU not having a strategic vision and a united policy.
At the same time, I have to praise at least one part of the European structure—diplomacy. I understand that European diplomacy has to be an instrument of the EU, so when the EU has no strategy or coherent vision, diplomats and ambassadors here in Moscow have to fight for an understanding on how to proceed. So far, we have had the best and most brilliant representatives of European diplomacy here in Moscow. They are doing what they can within the circumstances of European paralysis.
Q8 Earl of Sandwich: Dr Shevtsova, you have touched on the next question, but perhaps I may reshape our query about the business model in Russia. We have already heard from you that it is very personalised and politicised. What advice can you give to us as a Committee about understanding the business model in Russia?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: To put it in a very crude form, first, Russia is being ruled by the people who own Russia. Secondly, Russia has the typical characteristics of a huge petrostate. The rent-seeking elite controls the power resources that have been personalised by Putin and his very tightly knit team, while at the same time each controls the economy through its monopoly. That is typical of a petrostate, but Russia is a unique one because it is a nuclear petrostate. Russia is a nuclear petrostate that is a member of the Council of Europe and of the UN Security Council. We must relate that to the business model—a kind of merger between power and property and between power and the economy. Of course there is strong monopolisation, along with the lack of competition and a lack of transparency. We do not know what is happening or who owns what. It brings raiders and rent-seeking together in an attempt to legitimise rent-seeking through joint ventures with the West. Regrettably, I was very naive 10 years ago because I was welcoming western businesses that came to operate in Russia. I thought: the more western businesses here, the better. When I looked at western businesses operating in Russia, I thought that they had to give Russian business—the Russian political elite—an example of how to pursue a framework for the rule of law, how to pursue the principle of transparency, how to pursue the demonopolisation process, and so on. But I could see the absolute opposite happening. I saw that western business was amazingly ready to accept the Russian rules of the game in which you have to rub political shoulders and massage political emissaries and rulers, the regional elite and the Kremlin elite. You are then left in peace—although not always.
Regrettably, western business has accepted the Russian model of doing business. An example of that would be, for instance, those trials involving Siemens from Germany and Daimler-Benz that we all remember. These companies admitted that they gave huge bribes to Russian officials in the Government and elsewhere. They were made to pay fines according to the American legal process. If those two companies were caught, can you imagine how other companies are operating? I want to remind the Committee of the pretty pathetic example of BP. Even “accepting” the Russian rules of the game as dictated by the Kremlin—they are the same in other authoritarian countries; I am not sure whether they might be different in China, but they might be—western business is still not safe. That is why BP lost its contracts for Sakhalin and Kovykta. But the fact is that BP came back, while ExxonMobil has already done so. It means that apparently they have political room so they can be sure that there is a kind of safety-net. But having a political safety-net does not mean that they are playing according to the western model of doing business.
The Chairman: Thank you. I think we are now getting close to the end. You said earlier that foreign policy in Russia is the servant of the domestic agenda. Do you agree that from the point of view of Russia, economic relations are the servant of strategic interests?
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: Yes, absolutely. Everything connected to Russia’s economy, even the non military/industrial sectors such as oil—Gazprom—are strategic assets and strategic weapons. Commodity policy is one of the most important elements of Russian foreign policy. It means that Gazprom is much more important than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Minister for Foreign Trade. We do not have a Minister for Foreign Trade, but we do still have a Minister of Foreign Affairs. It means that, on the one hand, I would not call on you to come to the conclusion to stop all economic relations with Russia and thus isolate her. Russia due to its policy would be an isolated, reckless state that is fearful and apprehensive of its future. Personalised rulership would definitely become much more threatening. At the same time, the West has, first, to build its foreign policy on the premise that after Putin declared his doctrine of containment of the West, Russia is not a partner and all conversation about partnership is more about acquiescence to the Kremlin’s wishes. Secondly, all economic, energy, cultural and information ties—to use the popular term, “public diplomacy”—are the means by which the interests of the state are pursued, but not the interests of Russia. So my call to you would be to see the divergence. You must divide the state and the nation, and the state and society. But I understand that it is very difficult to formulate and build a relationship with a society that is currently in a state of what could probably be called paralysis.
The Chairman: Dr Shevtsova, you have been very eloquent indeed. You have given the Committee not just factual responses to the questions, but you have also managed to demonstrate the intellectual, cultural and emotional underpinning to what you have said. This has been a very successful evidence session and I can see my colleagues nodding in agreement. Thank you very much indeed.
Dr Lilia Shevtsova: Thank you. Perhaps I may add one brief comment. I am an associate of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House. It is the best European think-tank and I am very proud to be a part of it. Thank you for your patience.