Revised

Members present

Lord Inglewood (Chairman)

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Lord Empey

Baroness Hamwee

Lord Henley

Lord Hussain

Baroness Jay of Paddington

Lord Jones

Lord Mackay of Drumadoon

Lord Rowlands

Baroness Wilcox

________________

Examination of Witness (via video conference)

Michèle Coninsx, President of Eurojust.

Q211 The Chairman: Good morning, Madame.

Michèle Coninsx: Good morning, Lord Chairman.

The Chairman: Good. Thank you so much for coming and giving evidence to us. Just so I am not being discourteous, your surname is pronounced Coninsx?

Michèle Coninsx: My surname is Coninsx.

The Chairman: Coninsx, yes. That is to get it on the record at our end, and I wanted to get the pronunciation correct. As I said, it is very good of you to come and talk to us. I know that you have indicated that there were three questions that were outside the proper scope of your responsibilities. We have thought about it and we have tried to contact your office to see if we could perhaps reconfigure them slightly, which would enable you to say something, if you wanted to, to us about that. When we get to those questions— 3, 4 and 7—one of the Members will be asking you a question along the lines of what we originally put. Please, if you are in any way unhappy, just say you had rather not respond. But if you were able to respond it, would be helpful to us. Before we start, I ask you first of all whether you could just say who you are and your position for the purposes of the transcript.

Michèle Coninsx: Thank you, Lord Chairman. I am very happy with this invitation to give evidence today to the Committee. My name is Michèle Coninsx, I am the national member for Belgium, and I am the President of Eurojust.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. Is there any introductory statement that you would like to make, or shall we move straight into the questioning?

Michèle Coninsx: I would just say that the matter of the European arrest warrant has been an issue at the heart of the activity of Eurojust since the outset of Eurojust, Eurojust being a European judicial co-operation unit body. A few months ago, on 10 and 11 June, we gathered in a strategic meeting all the experts of the 28 member states, representatives of the institutions and academics to make a round-up of 10 years of experience of the European arrest warrant. We also gathered the highest level of the judiciary of the 28 European Union states in a consultative forum meeting of directors of public prosecutions and prosecutor-generals. What I will share with you is based on these exchanges with more than 100 experts. In your own assessment—

The Chairman: Sorry, something very odd is happening with the link. We seem to be hearing an additional piece of evidence from somewhere else in Belgium. I do not know whether you can hear me, but I think that we are going to have to stop the call and start it all over again, but we will not start your evidence all over again, which I hope will be in order.

The Chairman: Can you hear me again?

Michèle Coninsx: I can hear you.

The Chairman: Yes. I apologise. I do not know what went wrong, but something went quite badly wrong. Shall we continue where we broke off? No point in repeating everything.

Michèle Coninsx: Fine by me.

The Chairman: One small point occurred to me while we were off air. You referred to the seminar that you held earlier in the year, which you had alluded to in your evidence. Is there going to be a publicly available report of that at some point, or was it a domestic one?

Michèle Coninsx: No, a report has been sent to the Council, which is supposed to be put on the website of the Council and on the website of Eurojust, so it is a public report.

The Chairman: Right, so in other words it is a publicly available document and we can get it and have a look at it.

Michèle Coninsx: Absolutely.

The Chairman: Good. Thank you. We will look forward to having a look at that. If I might, I will start by asking you this:it has been suggested by some of the witnesses from whom we have heard that the principle of mutual recognition, which is the basis on which EAW has been formulated, is perhaps fundamentally flawed because of a, and I quote, “gulf of difference between the standards of justice across the European Union”. Do you agree with this? Do you think there is any truth in it?

Michèle Coninsx: It is absolutely true that the European area of security, freedom and justice is an area where we are confronted with 30 different legal systems and 24 different languages. This is part of the judicial reality. We also have seen that after 10 years of practical experience at Eurojust dealing with European arrest warrants, although the issue might not always have been tackled without flaws and in a perfect way, overall it is a true success story. We see that it helps to fight effectively and efficiently organised cross-border crime. The breaches of human rights and the disproportionate execution of European arrest warrants, at least from what we see in our practical experience at Eurojust, are really limited.

The mutual recognition instrument is based on trust, but of course it cannot be based on blind trust. However, in relation to safeguards of human fundamental rights, a legal basis is foreseen in the framework decision on European arrest warrants through, for instance, Article 1(3) and Article 12 of the recital, which deals with the respect of fundamental rights through an effective protection by a competent national court. Overall, we say that it is a success story. There might be differences, but our experience does not lead to this statement so asas Eurojust representative, I am not able to confirm this statement. The European arrest warrant is a success story with some imperfections, but imperfections related to the breaches of fundamental rights and the improper, disproportionate, unbalanced execution of European arrest warrants are really limited.

The Chairman: Thank you ever so much for that helpful start to our proceedings.

Q212 Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: One of the matters that we have heard evidence about over the last few months is that the European arrest warrant is being used incorrectly in this respect: rather than it being used as an instrument of last resort, authorities are using the European arrest warrant as a first option in the proceedings they seek to take. In your experience, is such an occurrence of first-option use of the European arrest warrant founded in fact? If so, what do you consider to be the causes of it being used at this early stage?

Michèle Coninsx: Thank you very much for this question. From Eurojust casework throughout the years, differences between legal systems—namely in relation to the conditions to be met under the domestic law before an EAW can be issued—are just one among other issues that Eurojust has identified. We have identified at least 14 issues, in fact. However, from a Eurojust perspective this does not mean that the European arrest warrant is being used incorrectly or in an unbalanced way.

Moreover, the specific issue of the differences between legal systems in respect of the conditions to be met under domestic law before an EAW can be issued is by no means illustrative of Eurojust’s overall experience. To say that the European arrest warrant is being used incorrectly is an assessment that may be made on a case-by-case basis by the executing judicial authority. The assessment, for example, of whether other mutual recognition instruments are more suitable is one to be made on a case-by-case basis by the issuing judicial authorities.

The starting point is and should be the prominent role of the issuing judicial authority. Consultation procedures between issuing and executing authorities can be useful. I would like to underline in this perspective that Eurojust is playing a crucial role in supporting the national authorities in their choice and is providing them with information, for example, in relation to the national law of other member states. If we see that there are problems, they are very often related to the lack of communication between the two concerned authorities, with authorities not communicating well or having to struggle with the language issues. But the fact that there are differences in law does not seem to be relevant in this perspective.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Q213 Lord Rowlands: Some 60% of all warrants that are received in the United Kingdom come from Poland. Could you tell me what discussions you have had with the Polish authorities on the way they use the European arrest warrant?

Michèle Coninsx: You must know that in 2009 there was afourth round of mutual evaluation, and all the member states were assessed by a group of experts on their way of executing EAWs. That report is a goldmine of information. It is not Eurojust’s role to assess to what extent one member state is issuing EAWs correctly and proportionately in a balanced way and to what extent those EAWs could be executed in the executing state. That is a matter where Eurojust has neither the competence nor the role to have any statement.

Lord Rowlands: You have an advisory role. Could you not advise the Polish authorities, for example, on the way they are handling the warrant?

Michèle Coninsx: If we are requested to play a role in the execution of a European arrest warrant, this is the kind of support we will deliver. We will ensure a translation and a communication between the two concerned states. However, it is up to the concerned judicial authorities—the concerned competent authorities—of the member states to get things right. If they need us to facilitate the communication, we are most willing to do so. If they ask us for advice, we might give it, but the final decisions, assessments and acts are made by the two concerned authorities. We cannot replace them, we can only support them. It is their call; it is their responsibility.

The Chairman: Thank you.

Q214 Lord Henley: I was just wondering whether there are any examples from Eurojust's casework where problems have arisen in relation to the United Kingdom’s execution of European arrest warrants.

Michèle Coninsx: I would refer to my previous answer. In fact, there is a report that reflects very well how the members in the European Union deal with the European arrest warrant cases. That assessment, in relation to how the UK is dealing with the European arrest warrant, should be asked by you to different member states. It is not the role or competence of Eurojust to deal with that matter. It would be utterly unprofessional for us to give any statement on this.

Q215 Baroness Hamwee: Good morning. You may well give the same response to this, but we wondered in particular about any casework regarding delays in the way the UK operates the European arrest warrant.

Michèle Coninsx: Indeed, delays in criminal proceedings, delays in the execution of mutual legal assistance requests and delays in the execution of mutual recognition instruments are the sole responsibility of the member state and it is up to the member state to deal with those delays. It is not up to Eurojust to have an assessment or a statement in relation to that.

Baroness Hamwee: Thank you.

Q216 Baroness Wilcox: Good morning, Madam President. Would it help the workings of the EAW system if some of the proposed flanking measures, such as the European supervision order and the roadmap on procedural rights measures, were implemented by all member states?

Michèle Coninsx: Thank you for this question. There is interaction between the framework decision on the European arrest warrant and other mutual legal systems and mutual recognition instruments. The choice by practitioners of the adequate instrument is not always an easy one to make, and this appears to be due to a number of factors, including lack of implementation of the instruments, lack of knowledge, and lack of tools and guidance for practitioners. While Eurojust is aware of concerns about the low level of implementation in member states of certain legal instruments, such as the framework decision on the transfer of prisoners, the framework decision on probation and an alternative sanction, the framework decision on the European supervision order, and that may have an impact on the use of the framework decision on the European arrest warrant. Not all mutual recognition instruments are true alternatives. The framework decision on the transfer of prisoners, for instance, can be an alternative—for example, there could be resocialisation arguments in a case where it concerns the execution of a sentence, but not in all the other cases. The framework decision on the European supervision order can be an alternative, too, but its scope is not suitable for serious offences. The framework decision on probation and alternative sanctions is not a real alternative either. Practitioners on top have very little experience with this instrument. If you look at the directive on the European investigation order, it is not a real alternative either, because the European arrest warrant and the European investigation order concern two different stages in criminal proceedings. One is related to the prosecution and investigation and the other is related to the stage of the interrogation. That is one point.

With particular regard to the roadmap for strengthening procedural rights, we have three directives: one on the right to interpretation and translation, one on the right of access to a lawyer and one in relation to a right to the information. All three directives can contain provisions specifically dealing with the European arrest warrant proceedings, and this significantly improves the situation of the requested person in a surrender procedure. For example, the provision of dual representation ensures that the person has access to a lawyer in the executing state and that he is informed of his right to appoint a lawyer in the issuing state. It has been underlined that the right to dual representation is not self-sufficient and that it should be coupled with flanking measures concerning legal aid and ensuring efficient co-ordination between the lawyers of the concerned countries across the European Union.

In this regard, I would like to underline that the proposal for a directive on legal aid, which was launched by the Commission in 2013, ensures that suspects have access to legal aid at the early stage of the criminal proceedings—that means provisional legal aid in the period leading up to the final decision on whether the person is entitled to legal aid. It also guarantees legal aid for people arrested under the European arrest warrant.

From a Eurojust perspective, the key tool for successful application of the framework decision on the European arrest warrant and other mutual recognition instruments is trust—mutual recognition based on mutual trust at different levels, trust between the member states. That raises a question of the need for the training of magistrates, lawyers, doctors, solicitors and legal practitioners. The need for trust between the member states raises a question on the follow-up of the implementation. Last but not least, there is the trust of the citizens in the area of freedom, justice and security, which raises the question of procedural safeguards and victims’ advice.

When you are dealing with European arrest warrants, these are very often related to cases of organised crime and terrorism cases—complex cross-border cases. There we see that, in particular because of the different legal systems, different languages, as I said, and the different legal cultures, that Eurojust can play a huge role and will continue to play a real role in having this trust enhanced between all the parties that I have just mentioned. This is the reaction we wanted to share with you.

The Chairman: One point that occurs to me is that there are a huge number of proposals you have described. Are there any that you would ascribe priority from a systemic perspective?

Michèle Coninsx: I think it is really important that the procedural rights of the accused persons are being fully respected and safeguarded. I think that all the directives I have been mentioning—right to access to a lawyer, right to information, right to translation and interpretation—are extremely valuable and essential. This should be underlined, indeed.

Q217 Lord Empey: Good morning. I would like to refer back to your written evidence of 19 September. You stated there that the issues identified in relation to the EAW scheme would be better tackled by way of soft law measures rather than by legislative changes. For all 14 issues that you highlighted, what is the likelihood that they can be dealt with in such a way by all EAW states?

Michèle Coninsx: As noted by Eurojust, based on Eurojust casework and expertise, the European arrest warrant is a successful instrument that has brought added value in that fight against cross-border crime. On balance it has certainly improved surrender arrangements between member states. When I give presentations, I always refer back to the successful surrender of Mr Osman right after the 21 July bomb attacks in London. It took us only a few weeks to get Mr Osman, who fled from London via France to Italy and was hiding, to the United Kingdom and to get him tried and successfully convicted for 40 years for these atrocities. For exactly the same scenario, the attacks against the tube in France in the 1995 terrorist attack, it took us more than 10 years to get a terrorist, an accused person, from the United Kingdom to France. In terrorist cases, which can be considered as very serious crime cases, we have seen the absolute success of this—the speedy, efficient, effective surrender of the accused or suspected or requested persons.

But of course despite this positive assessment of the European arrest warrant overall, its functioning can still be improved by ways of soft law measures rather than by having intrinsic legal legislative change. This can include, for instance, as I have just referred to, more training for judicial authorities, prosecutors and defence lawyers in criminal justice matters, and in EU languages—as it is very often a linguistic issue—as well as proper guidelines on the different instruments, such as the handbook on how to issue European arrest warrants.

The Court of Justice of the European Union case law is of great importance for practitioners. Very often it is a yardstick and an example to be followed by practitioners. It helps them to get better acquainted with the scope and meaning of the framework decision on the European arrest warrant. Then there is also the development of a multilingual EU database of national case law covering different aspects and difficult aspects related to the European arrest warrant, such as the grounds for non-recognition, legal remedies, proportionality and fundamental rights. That could allow traditional authorities from all the member states to learn how their counterparts in other member states address certain issues and it could spread the good practices, the best practices.

From a Eurojust perspective, the member states can only benefit from these measures as they reinforce mutual understanding. Mutual understanding will lead to mutual trust and mutual trust will lead to mutual recognition done and executed in a legally binding and correct way. As I said, for some measures that require tackling at national level, such as delays in criminal proceedings, these must be addressed by the member states directly.

Lord Empey: Thank you for that. Could I just return to proportionality for a moment? Do you think that EAW legislation should be amended at European level to incorporate explicitly the concept of proportionality?

Michèle Coninsx: After having met with the highest level of the judiciary in June, and after having met with academics and experts, the final conclusion is that proportionality and other issues related to the EAW showing that it is not yet perfect should be tackled not by legislative changes but only by soft law measures. It can be the translator, the messenger of that important message that is shared by a lot of experts.

The Chairman: Arising out of that, it seems to me that the crucial aspect of soft law is whether or not it is going to be implemented in the various member states. On the basis of your past experience of where soft law ideas have been promoted, are you confident that the member states are going to do this as you would like?

Michèle Coninsx: It would be a wonderful world if the member states would follow up on the outcome of our report, but we can only signal that this is the way forward. We can only advertise that this is the best way forward for having effective, speedy and correct execution of European arrest warrants and we will continue to repeat that message. Repetition is the best way of advertising good practices. Are we sure about the successful outcome? No one can be sure, but at least we have to try to use and choose that way forward.

The Chairman: It is possibly a case of, as we say in English, the best being the enemy of the good.

Michèle Coninsx: That is nicely phrased. I could not say it better.

Lord Rowlands: You will be familiar with the phrase “soft law measures”, but I am not quite sure what they mean. Are you saying that it is arrangements and procedures rather than laws and legislation, or is a soft law measure a piece of legislation?

Michèle Coninsx: Soft law is all the examples that I have been mentioning. Very often there is a lack of training of the judiciary—that means all legal practitioners, be it lawyers, solicitors, magistrates, prosecutors and judges—on how European arrest warrants have to be issued. What about legal remedies? What about the information that should be shared? That training will lead to a better application. That is one point—training on criminal procedural law—but there is also the matter of languages. I started my statement by saying that we have 24 different languages. You cannot underestimate the need for linguistic training, so that would be one way forward. So no legislative changes, but measures that will little by little, gradually, surely but slowly, of course, lead to better execution of European arrest warrants. There is no need, after 10 years of experience, to go into hard legislative changes. A handbook on good practices and how to issue European arrest warrants might be helpful, as would be a multilingual European database with information on proportionality, as you have been referring to, and important issues such as fundamental rights and remedies. These are all certainly a way forward—a smooth way forward, a soft way forward.

Q218 The Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. We have now come to the conclusion of the points that we indicated we wanted to discuss with you, but before we finally conclude and say thank you, is there anything else you would like to say to us that we have not covered that you think is important for our deliberations, please?

Michèle Coninsx: I think that the oral evidence is confirming the written evidence. What we share with you is based on our practical experience dealing with especially Article 16 and Article 17 of the framework decision of the European arrest warrant, conflicting or competing European arrest warrants, the breach of the time limits of the European arrest warrants and helping, supporting the member states in a fast and correct execution of their European arrest warrants, especially in those cases where security is at stake—I have given you the example in relation to counterterrorism. These are matters where we have to react in a speedy and legally correct way. I have given you an example of a successful execution of a European arrest warrant and those could serve as examples for future other mutual recognition instruments. There are successes, there are some flaws, there are some imperfections, but they can be dealt with through what we call soft law measures. There is no need for immediate legislative action, because we see that the European arrest warrant is a success story.

In 2013, when I gave evidence to a Committee of the House of Lords in January in relation to the opt-out, I referred back to statistics. We have seen that the European arrest warrant is being used by the UK as a requesting country and as a requested country and I must say that the UK is making a lot of use of this mutual recognition instrument, so we see it in our practical experience that even in the UK it is considered as a success story. Of course, we need to have a critical analysis. That is something that you should do every day: “Is what I am doing sufficient? Is what I am doing correct? Is what I am doing making a difference? Is it effective?” That is what we do throughout our daily casework and in strategic meetings, such as the meeting that we had in June with the highest level of the judiciary.

The Chairman: Thank you very, very much indeed. We are all very grateful to you for the time you have given us and for the evidence and things you have told us, so thank you very much.

Michèle Coninsx: Thank you very much indeed.

Examination of Witness (via video conference)

Olivier Tell, Head of Unit, Procedural Criminal Law, Directorate-General for Justice, European Commission.

Q219 The Chairman: Monsieur Tell, it is very good of you to give us some evidence. Could you formally, please, introduce yourself, and if you want to make any kind of opening statement before we move into the questions proper, that might be the moment to do it.

Olivier Tell: Thank you, my Lord Chairman. Indeed, my name is Olivier Tell. I am French. I have been Head of Unit, Criminal Procedural Law, in the European Commission since 2010. I am today assisted by two colleagues, Anna Hodgson on my right, and Sami Kiriakos on my left, who are responsible for the European arrest warrant in the unit. I am ready to reply to your questions, but I do not have any general statement to make at the beginning.

The Chairman: Thank you very much for that and for introducing your colleagues, who are both, needless to say, very welcome. It is then just for me to open the questioning, if I may, by asking the first question, which is that some of the witnesses we have been speaking to have suggested that the principle of mutual recognition on which the European arrest warrant relies is fundamentally flawed because, in their words, there is “a gulf of difference between the standards of justice across the European Union”. Would you agree about this, and have you any gloss you might like to put on it?

Olivier Tell: My Lord Chairman, thank you for your question. I respectfully would not agree with this statement, because the mutual recognition principle is a long-standing principle that applies in various policy areas in the EU. Indeed, in criminal matters the European arrest warrant was the first instrument that put this principle in practice. Since the Lisbon treaty, the principle of mutual recognition is now part of primary law, EU law, and binding on all member states. Basically, if I remember correctly, mutual recognition in the field of criminal law is a British idea. The very idea of mutual recognition implies precisely preserving the differences in member states’ judicial systems. It is about improving cross-border co-operation without harmonising legal systems. It implies that decisions made in other legal systems are recognised with minimum formalities and without questioning the process through which the decision was taken. Harmonising legal systems only for the sake of cross-border co-operation would be disproportionate, politically challenging and not legally possible under the current treaties, as it would offend the principle of subsidiarity, so mutual recognition seems to be the best alternative.

Importantly, nonetheless, mutual recognition requires certain consistency in the laws of justice between member states. In general, member states have high standards of justice in the EU, including the UK, with a common commitment to fundamental rights, for example, related to the application of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. On a fundamental level, the system is well founded. However, justice standards can and should be improved further, hence, for example, the procedural rights road map. A series of measures have been adapted to ensure that all member states have minimum standards for those who are suspected and accused of a criminal offence. With that I have tried to reply to this question, my Lord Chairman.

The Chairman: Thank you for that answer.

Q220 Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: Over the last few months, we have heard evidence from a number of witnesses that certain countries in the European Union are using the European arrest warrant incorrectly in this respect: rather than delaying the use of the warrant to an instrument of last resort, they are using the European arrest warrant as a first option. All Members of this Committee would be very interested to learn whether you have come across this, and if so, whether you are in a position to give us any guidance as to why it is a fact that some countries are using it as the instrument of first option.

Olivier Tell: Thank you very much for your question. In general, the Commission is of the view that the European arrest warrant system operates correctly and successfully. We used to say that the European arrest warrant is a success story. I think we have to be aware that the European arrest warrant, compared to the history of criminal procedural law in the EU, and if you refer to national criminal procedural law, is a relatively new instrument. It has only been in place for the last 11 years, and during the past 11 years we have seen that the practical operation of mutual recognition in the European arrest warrant system is very successful overall and has succeeded in helping to deliver swift and fair justice for victims. There have been many situations where the European arrest warrant was very useful for bringing criminals to trial in all the member states.

Having said that, certain problems arise, and of course we have come across them. The primary cause of these problems seems to be the lack of knowledge and experience of practitioners in the member states and sometimes the inconsistent implementation by certain member states of the EU legislation. Another reason is that authorities are not aware of less intrusive alternative measures provided in EU law, or they are not yet available in the member states due to lack of implementation in some member states, so there is much ongoing work to address this issue. During the last four years in the Commission we have worked very closely with the member states to improve the concrete functioning of the European arrest warrant and to ensure that these problems will be reduced in the future. I might come in with more detail later on the application to give you some concrete examples if you wish.

Lord Mackay of Drumadoon: That would be helpful, thank you.

Q221 Lord Henley: The Committee over the last few months has heard some criticism of how other EU states use the European arrest warrant system. I was just wondering what criticism is levelled at the United Kingdom’s use of the European arrest warrant.

Olivier Tell: This year we have organised two expert meetings with the member states on the concrete operation of the European arrest warrant. This is part of our work to improve the system, so we know what the member states think about the ways in which the European arrest warrant is working in the other member states.

As regards the UK, there are indeed some issues with the UK related in particular to keeping up with the time limits. This is set out in the latest Commission report of 2011 on the European arrest warrant. It is a well known fact that there are some delays in the UK in dealing with certain European arrest warrants. The European arrest warrant framework decision requests that European arrest warrants shall be dealt with and executed as a matter of urgency. In any case, the framework decision sets out strict time limits, and only in exceptional cases and where there is no consent by the person concerned to be surrendered, the surrender may last as long as 90 days. Every member state has a duty to ensure that their systems are able to respect these time limits, but of course we are aware that the European arrest warrant is an entirely judicial procedure. I was a judge myself in a previous life. You cannot give instructions to the judiciary, but of course it is the responsibility of the states to ensure that we keep respecting the time limits, especially because, generally, where the person is awaiting his or her surrender, very often they are in pre-trial detention and bail is not always given, so these matters should be dealt with expeditiously.

One of the most important improvements of the European arrest warrant compared with the previous extradition system is precisely that previously the average time limit to extradite someone between the member states was an average length of one year, which is a very long period of time. Now we have 16 days when the person consents to his or her surrender, and 54 days on average when the person does not consent to surrender, which is certainly an improvement from the point of view of the right of defence. Of course, in certain situations, as I said, it should be exceptional. When there are remedies that are used by the person, it is possible to go beyond the three months, but this should remain exceptional.

The Chairman: I ought to know the answer to this, but is the UK worse than many other countries in terms of the time taken?

Olivier Tell: We do not have exact data on the time taken, but I can tell you that during the latest expert meeting we had in April this year even the UK representative mentioned that they have certain problems with regard to this issue. They explained that it was linked to the systematic use of remedies or review appeals by the person whose surrender is sought.

Q222 Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: Mr Tell, could you indicate whether there are any other principal features of the way the United Kingdom operates the European arrest warrant scheme that trouble the Commission?

Olivier Tell: For us and for the other member states, as far as I know, and this is according to the expert meeting that we had with them, this is the main issue.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: Delays?

Olivier Tell: Yes, but as I said I do not have exact data on that.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: There are no other particular matters that concern the Commission at all as to the UK's use of the warrant?

Olivier Tell: For the moment this is the principal one, because, as I said, there are also all the technical issues, which are explained in detail in the annexes of the latest Commission report in 2011. I do not want to enter into the detail, but I feel that certain provisions have not been implemented. If I remember correctly, for example, in the framework decision you have a provision according to which you can refuse to surrender your own nationals if they are requested for the execution of a prison sentence, provided that you execute that sentence in the UK. I am not quite sure on that point that this provision was fully implemented.

The Chairman: Arising out of that exchange, where do you feel the UK stands compared with other member states, because obviously in some member states there are problems of one kind and in other member states they may be different? How is our operation of the EAW in general terms comparing with other member states, please?

Olivier Tell: There are issues in every member state, as you said, my Lord Chairman, which are different. As far as the UK is concerned, we mentioned several times in our report the issue of delay. We do not have the data from the UK from 2005. Every year we collect the numbers of European arrest warrants issued and executed and so on, which is important. We have improved the statistics with a revised questionnaire prepared by the Commission. For example, in the future we will be able to know for which office a European arrest warrant has been issued, which is also very important.

If I look at the statistics furnished by member states and compare the years 2005 to provisionally 2013, the latest figure that we have for the UK is from 2011. We do not have the figures for 2012 and 2013, so it would be important to get the data first of all. That would be my main concern.

The Chairman: I agree with you about that and might see what can be done.

Q223 Lord Hussain: Would it help the working of the EAW system if some of the proposed flanking measures, such as the European supervision order and the road map on procedural rights measures were implemented by all member states?

Olivier Tell: Again, very briefly, to finish on the previous question, we do not rank member states by the way they operate the European arrest warrant systems. Their institutions are very different, but in general we think, as I said previously, that the European arrest warrant system is operating well in the member states, including in the UK.

As regards flanking measures, you pointed out a very important question. Indeed, there are notably five EU legal instruments: a mutual recognition complementing the European arrest warrant, namely concerning the transfer of prisoners; probation and alternative sanctions; the European supervision orders for people who are awaiting trial; the financial penalties framework decision; and the European directive creating the European Investigation Order, which enter into application only in 2017.

I just want to mention that the framework decision, for example, on the transfer of prison sentences has only been implemented by 19 member states including the UK, but we in the Commission are pushing the member states very hard so that all of them implement it. Normally, you should not issue a European arrest warrant if you know the address of the person or for the execution of a prison sentence. You should use the framework decision on the transfer of a custodial sentence so that the sentence is executed in the habitual residence of that person in order to ensure social rehabilitation and to avoid imprisonment. If you do not know where the person is, you can issue a European arrest warrant but once the person is arrested we encourage member states to replace the European arrest warrant by issuing a certificate for the execution of the custodial sentence in the place of the habitual residence of the person. We think that in the future this will be a promising tool that could reduce very substantially the number of European arrest warrants issued for the purpose of enforcement of prison sentences.

As regards prosecution, there is a very important instrument that unfortunately has been implemented by only 12 member states, which is the European supervision order, which instead of transferring the person back to the issuing state ensures that this person remains in his own state or in the state of his habitual residence and is supervised according to certain measures, such as an obligation to present or report to the police et cetera while awaiting his or her trial. We hope that this measure will be implemented by all the member states. As you know, after 1 December this year, member states are under a stronger obligation to implement these expert pillar measures and we will scrutinise this very closely in the future.

The latest flanking measure, which is very important, is the European Investigation Order, which notably will help to avoid issuing a European arrest warrant when the sole purpose of the European arrest warrant is investigation, for example for hearing a person during an investigation. In the future, we should us the EIO and not the European arrest warrant. Today, I want to mention that the mutual legal assistance agreement between the member states allows this to be done, but unfortunately it is not used enough by some member states, which tend sometimes to issue the European arrest warrant in situations where they could use alternative and less intrusive but yet effective measures.

I do not know if you want me to mention procedural rights now, because we also have a huge agenda on procedural rights in the EU, which directly affects the functioning of the European arrest warrant. I do not know whether this was included in your question.

Lord Hussain: Yes please.

Olivier Tell: Okay. On the other side, the rights side, the Commission has done a lot to strengthen the procedural rights of persons subject to European arrest warrants, including a comprehensive Commission road map on procedural rights. Three directives have been adopted: a directive on the right to interpretation and translation; a directive on the right to information, which creates a letter of rights for a person subject to the European arrest warrant, which should be given to all these persons and that lists their rights in a language they can understand; and a directive on the right of access to a lawyer, which is also important because it provides assistance by a lawyer for persons both in the executing member states and the issuing member states.

The two first directives, interpretation and right to information, have a deadline for implementation in the past, and now they have to be applied by the member states. They directly amend the European arrest warrant, meaning that all the rights that they provide mutatis mutandis are applicable to these persons. The access to a lawyer will be applicable in 2016, and I need to insist on that. This is a very important text for the European arrest warrant precisely because of the mandatory assistance of a lawyer in both issuing and executing state.

The Commission proposed in November last year three new directives on procedural rights: one on the presumption of innocence, one on legal aid and one on the rights of children. The one that is the most important for European arrest warrant functioning is the one on the provision of legal aid, which is also applicable to European arrest warrant proceedings. It ensures that all persons subject to a European arrest warrant, be it in the issuing or in the executing member states, are granted legal aid during the proceedings. The negotiations on these three directives are ongoing. I do not think that the UK opted into the legal aid directive or the access to a lawyer directive, which we adopted, although that is still possible in the future, as you know.

Clearly, to conclude on that question, in the framework decision itself there are certain rights for individuals to counterbalance the competence of the state. If you look at Article 1(3) for example, which does not mandate the execution of the European arrest warrant when the rights of the person are clearly at stake and there have been some certain decisions related to pre-trial detention and the like, but of course it should be in exceptional circumstances. Moreover, the road map on prosecuting rights will improve the situation of persons subject to the European arrest warrant. Of course it is not in the decision itself, it is around the decision, but it does not mean that it does not improve the situation. Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you very much. I think you were going to ask a question. Would you like to ask it at this juncture?

Q224 Baroness Wilcox: I would. Thank you very much indeed.

Good morning. It has been suggested that the rights of the individual have not kept pace with the rights of the state, and I wonder to what extent the Commission's work on this procedural road map has addressed this alleged disparity.

Olivier Tell: Thank you. I think I largely replied to your question just one minute ago. The rights of individuals were never neglected in the European arrest warrant system. The European Convention on Human Rights, fundamental rights and EU law and provision of the decision itself provides rights for the individual. but of course the European arrest warrant was adopted, as you know, in the aftermath of 9/11 in 2002. Clearly, since then there has been a need to improve the system as regards the enforcement of fundamental rights. This is what we did with the road map and, as I said, even if these directives are apart from the European arrest warrant, they amend it to some extent where they provide that you have the right to interpretation and the right to be assisted by a lawyer.

If you look at the framework decisions that they have now, the right to be assisted by a lawyer is very limited. It is only in the executing member states and it is according to national law. If you do not have a provision in national law according to which you should be assisted by a lawyer, this is not applicable. Now in the directive it is mandatory for the member states to ensure the right of access to a lawyer for all persons subject to a European arrest warrant.

Baroness Wilcox: Thank you for that answer, but can I press you a little further? What I am asking you about is that it has been suggested to us that the rights of the individual are not keeping pace with the rights of the state. I know that you have described to me what should happen, but I am asking you whether you have had any evidence of this. Surely you must be watching to see that there is a fair balance here.

Olivier Tell: Yes, indeed. I do not think the rights of individuals have not kept pace with the rights of the state. We are in the field of criminal law. There should be a balance. It is the essence of criminal procedural law to keep a balance between the need of the state to prosecute crimes and, of course, the need to respect different rights. I think this balance is there, and we trust the judiciary and we trust the courts to do this. There have been many decisions given by the European Court of Justice under the European arrest warrant that have tended precisely to keep this balance between those two different aspects., such as in the recent decision in Jeremy F v France on the European arrest warrant, which is precisely about the rights and the remedies.

There are of course some issues that are not in the framework decisions that relate to national law, for example as regards the remedies and the differences between the member states. There are more remedies in some member states than in other member states, but at the moment this is not addressed. Maybe in the future this could be addressed by EU legislation.

Baroness Wilcox: Thank you very much.

Q225 Lord Empey: Good morning, Mr Tell, or should I say good afternoon with you? Earlier in the inquiry, we took oral evidence from Jacqueline Minor on 16 July. She indicated at that stage that the outgoing Commission did not think it was appropriate to re-open consideration of amendments to the framework directive. Have you any evidence that you can give us to the attitude of the new Commission, if indeed it has been able to consider these matters?

Olivier Tell: As I said previously, the European arrest warrant is a rather young instrument for many practitioners, which is also one reason why there are certain difficulties in its application. Practitioners, who we have met very often over the last three years during meetings in the European judicial network, in Eurojust conferences and so on, and Eurojust agree that it is not necessary at the moment to re-open the instruments and we should continue working with such measures to improve its practical functioning. The majority of the member states do not want to re-open it either, and the Commission—as was certainly confirmed by the voice of my Commissioner, Věra Jourová, during a hearing in the Parliament—still considers that revising the framework decision would be unwise at this stage.

The issues can be addressed and are already being addressed by this flanking legislation and through training by improving the practical application and improvements achieved without re-opening the core legislation. This is the Commission’s position at the moment.

Lord Empey: That is a very clear answer, thank you very much.

The Chairman: If I may, Mr Tell, arising out of that there has been criticism levelled at this country because of the introduction of the proportionality rules in our domestic legislation. At the same time, it is clear that there is a need for some sort of proportionality principles within the workings of the European arrest warrant system, and if the Commission is not prepared to propose the introduction of such things at European level, surely member states—this one not being alone—have no other choice perhaps but to do things domestically, even if some of the other member states might be unhappy about that.

Olivier Tell: My Lord Chairman, this is a delicate issue indeed, because it depends whether you address the proportionality in the issuing member states or the proportionality in the executing member states.

As regards the proportionality in the issuing member states, even if it is not written in black and white in the framework decision, as soon as the framework decision does not oblige the member states themselves to issue a European arrest warrant, everybody agrees, and it is clearly stated in the Council handbook of 2010 that was adopted by all the member states, that there should be an assessment in the issuing member states of the proportionality of issuing those. You should not issue European arrest warrants for petty crimes, and this has been the position of the Commission for a long time. This is a serious instrument that involves costs, and even if in the European arrest warrant the threshold is only one year of imprisonment that is incurred—this is about prosecution, but the problem happens—you have to make an assessment of the interests of justice.

Most of the member states’ national transposition legislation obliges prosecutors and judges to assess whether it is in the interests of justice to issue a European arrest warrant, and there has recently been new legislation in Poland, for example, to ensure that this test is met. We have worked very hard with the member states, and we have noticed a very important reduction in the numbers of European arrest warrants issued by certain member states that have tended to issue many European arrest warrants in the past. There is a real decrease. As regards the executing member states, there is no possibility in the framework decision to make it a ground for refusal. I understand the dilemma that you raise, but since 1 December the European Court of Justice has had full jurisdiction to assess conformity in the interpretation of the European arrest warrant and the conformity of national legislation vis-à-vis the framework decision. Probably in the future we will have to say something about that.

The Chairman: Yes. If I might just speak for myself, it seems to me that it is a good thing for individual countries to give their courts a discretion about whether or not to act if there is a serious concern about the interests of justice, and I am reassured to think that it seems that the Commission shares that view. Is that right?

Olivier Tell: We share that view for the proportionality assessment in the issuing member states when you have to issue a European arrest warrant, but not at the stage of the executing member states, because in the executing member states you have a certain number of reasons for refusing to execute a European arrest warrant. We encourage dialogue between the member states, but there is no possibility normally to refuse to execute a European arrest warrant for reasons of proportionality in the framework decision. This is what the text says at the moment.

The Chairman: I understand the argument, but if there is no discretion in the issuing member state, the onus has been put on the state that is having to deal with its execution, I would have thought.

Olivier Tell: This is why we have worked very hard to ensure at the beginning that these kinds of problems should not arise in the issuing member states. I can tell you frankly what we said in the last expert meeting between the member states. We said, “If you, the executing authority, think that this is not proportionate, you should enter into contact with the issuing judge, the issuing prosecutor, and start a discussion on that and see”. Very often this is what happens and very often it leads to the withdrawal of certain European arrest warrants or the adoption of alternative measures.

The Chairman: I understand what you say and it is marvellous when it works. Perhaps we will just alter the sequence of the questions slightly. I know that Lord Rowlands is interested in these points.

Q226 Lord Rowlands: I might ask the question, because everyone knows already that the United Kingdom Government have enacted a proportionality bar, a requirement for a decision to charge to be made and a further bar to address specific concerns about the European arrest warrant as it affects the United Kingdom. May I ask whether the Commission is content that the legal remit that we have introduced is consistent with European legislation?

Olivier Tell: The UK has opted back into the European arrest warrant and into two important measures, Eurojust and so forth, and we are very pleased that it has. This means that the national legislation needs to accord with the framework decision. The Commission will scrutinise the existing legislation, and we will see whether it is fully compliant or not with the European arrest warrant framework decision. I cannot tell you more than that at the moment.

Lord Rowlands: Out of interest, did the United Kingdom government Ministers, for example, have any discussions prior to enacting the law? Did they discuss their thoughts about changing the law with the Commission?

Olivier Tell: We are in permanent contact with the UK experts in the Ministry of Justice. As I said, we organised a meeting on 1 April. They were there. We had informal contacts and they mentioned their wish to change their legislation, certainly at expert level.

Lord Rowlands: And at that level, the Commission did not feel that it offended European legislation?

Olivier Tell: As I told you, we will scrutinise this legislation. We are not fully aware of the content of this legislation. It needs to be assessed and to be scrutinised in light of the text and in light of public consideration before I can make any official statement on its conformity or non-conformity to the framework decision.

Lord Rowlands: What timescale is this consideration going to have? When are you likely to at least have an opinion on the matter?

Olivier Tell: I am afraid that I cannot tell you now. On 1 December we started the process of scrutinising all the implementation by the member states of the expert pillar acquis measures, including the European arrest warrant but not only the European arrest warrant. This process has started and will be ongoing over the next few months, so I cannot tell you exactly when this will be done. As I said, I can tell you that this process has started but not only for the European arrest warrant; it has also started for all the framework decisions adopted prior to Lisbon, because the 1 December cut-off date has passed and now we have to do some things. The Commission published a list of all these measures in May. We entered into negotiations in the Council for opting back in, which lasted many months and resulted in a very good result, and on 1 December all the Acts were published in the official journal, with the listing of measures to which the UK will opt back into. Now, we will turn this into a more general exercise with all the member states to ensure first the proper transposition and then conformity of the legislation in the future.

You have to be aware that we are talking here about conformity or non-conformity, but there are many framework decisions that have not been transposed by member states. The European arrest warrant is the only framework decision that has been transposed by all the member states. We are very busy at the moment ensuring the proper transposition by all the member states of all these instruments, including those that are as important as the European arrest warrant, such as the instrument on the transfer of prisoners. This is our first priority.

Regarding the correct implementation of the framework decision European arrest warrant, we work closely with the member states. We favour dialogue with the member states. There was a meeting with the member states on 20 November where certain important issues were addressed. There will be another meeting in the first semester of 2015 with the member states in which the UK will participate, and we will address these issues.

The Chairman: Mr Tell, presumably we cannot opt back into something if we are not in conformity with it. Is that not correct?

Olivier Tell: I am not sure I am the right person to reply to this legal question, because it is rather a more legal question.

The Chairman: That is fair enough.

Olivier Tell: I am not working in the legal service of the Commission, but my first feeling is that this is not the issue; all the member states have transposed the European arrest warrant, but the transposition is patchy. In all the member states there are different levels of transposition. We have already published three reports on that and if you look at all the annexes of the report 2005, 2007 and 2011 you see that they relate to this patchy transposition, but this does not prevent the European arrest warrant from operating satisfactorily at the moment. The UK has opted back in. We will monitor compliance in the future, not only for the UK but for all the member states. I do not think this is an impediment to opting back in. This is my personal view. As regards extradition, the UK is no different from the other member states.

Q227 Lord Jones: My Lord Chairman, Mr Tell, good morning. What appetite do the Commission and the Council have for enacting the recommendations contained in the report on revising the European arrest warrant for which Baroness Ludford was the rapporteur? What is the state of opinion? Have you any plans for moving forward?

Olivier Tell: Thank you. To answer your question, I do not know if Baroness Ludford is there among you, but I know her very well. We worked together on different files because she was rapporteur on the access to a lawyer directive, for example, so please send her my best appreciation.

Lord Jones: Baroness Ludford is sitting here listening to proceedings.

Olivier Tell: Thank you. After the resolution of Parliament on the recommendations contained in the report on revising the European arrest warrant for which Baroness Ludford was the rapporteur, the Commission has officially replied to that report and praising it. It was a very moderate and balanced report, especially on the question of proportionality, which was addressed only in the issuing state. We felt that, all in all, the recommendations of the report were very good and very interesting. Nonetheless, as regards the issue of reopening the European arrest warrant, as I said previously, the Commission said that for the time being, instead of revising the European arrest warrant, we would prefer to improve its practical functioning by training, by flanking measures, by best practices et cetera. We will not, at the moment, give legislative follow-up to that report, but we are trying to enforce these measures through means other than EU legislation.

Lord Jones: Thank you, Mr Tell.

The Chairman: Lady Jay, I think you just want to clarify something.

Q228 Baroness Jay of Paddington: We were interested, Mr Tell, when you spoke earlier about the lack of any need to reform the legislative framework for the EAW. We have obviously had a very large number of proposals from Eurojust of things they would like to see changed or action on, and I wondered if you thought there were any things, particularly around the proportionality question, that would be susceptible to proper European legal change and that would avoid some of the confusions that you have described about the different applications in different member states.

Olivier Tell: Thank you for your question. As regards the proportionality between member states we have certain recommendations, which are soft law in the handbook. We have devoted almost a full meeting with the member states to the issue of proportionality in the issuing member state in April this year. We will continue doing that. The Commission now, after Lisbon, is taking over the handbook. We will revise the handbook on the practical application of the European arrest warrant, and of course particular emphasis will be put on the issue of proportionality. This has given results. As I told you, Poland has changed its legislation. This is a result of the bilateral talks that we had with Polish authorities, and, I know, of the bilateral talks between member states, including the UK, and the European authorities. This is the way we want to continue. We want to work with the member states to improve the operation, showing best practices and making legal information more accessible—for example, in the e-Justice portal—but we will not, in the short term, revise it.

As regards Eurojust’s concerns—I have the list in front of me—most if not all of them have already been addressed with the member states during these expert meetings. Insufficient information or abuse of or access to information asked by certain member states from other member states is an issue that we cannot address with legislation. A certain number of issues on Eurojust’s list could be addressed in the legislation, but imagine if we tried to enact new legislation. It would take one to two years for the Commission to adopt it. It might take two years for the member states to negotiate and adopt it, should they agree and should they adopt it. If they then put three years of deadlines for implementation in the directive, it would be five to seven years before the legislation was available for the practitioners. We would clearly prefer to work with the member states to improve the situation for practitioners on the ground.

I can also tell you that most member states apply a proportionality test in practice before issuing a European arrest warrant. We know that because we have these discussions with the member states, and sometimes certain member states even go so far as to issue a European arrest warrant only for very serious crime, which is not in conformity with the framework decision. There is, of course, a range of practices, but this issue of proportionality is being addressed at the moment.

Baroness Jay of Paddington: Thank you. I understand your concerns about the length of time to legislate, but you are confident that you can do the soft-power approach in a shorter time, are you?

Olivier Tell: Yes, we are confident. It has already produced real results. We have noticed a significant decrease in European arrest warrants issued in certain member states. I do not want to name them; you can imagine which member states I am talking about. This will continue. This is a result of all the underground work we are doing with the member states.

As I said previously, you have two reasons for issuing a European arrest warrant: prosecution and enforcement of a prison sentence. As regards the enforcement of a prison sentence, the framework decision on the transfer of prison sentences will be adopted by all the member states. Our position in the Commission is that only in exceptional circumstances should European arrest warrants be executed for the enforcement of prison sentences. Again, that is why it is so important to get the data and that is why we are insisting that the member states provide them, because if we want to monitor the application of the European arrest warrant correctly we need the statistics from the member states, especially as we now have a new questionnaire and the data that are required from the member states are much more comprehensive than previously.

Lord Rowlands: Very briefly, the figures show that a very large proportion of the warrants received by the United Kingdom are breaches of probation orders.

Olivier Tell: Yes, indeed. This is a situation that we have discussed with the member state concerned. This is also why it would have been important for the UK to opt back into the framework decision on probation, because instead of using the European arrest warrant you would have been able to use the framework decision on probation and supervise the obligation of the persons in the UK. Of course, this has certain costs—although these people are habitual residents in the UK—such as reimbursement of the victim, obligation to pay alimony for children and so on, failure of which might be a crime in other member states. Indeed, this is the situation with regard to one particular member state, as far as I have heard. Again, as we have said in the Commission, a solution to that would be the application of the framework decision on mutual recognition of probation measures. It would mean that the issuing member state would not issue a European arrest warrant only because a person has fled and is in the UK, and even if the European arrest warrant is issued, once the person is arrested this measure would immediately switch to a simple execution of the probation measure in the UK.

Of course, I am aware that this has a cost for the executing state, which has to supervise the probation measure, but this is a principle of mutual recognition: all member states that are party to the framework decision will have to supervise the probation measures issued by the other member states. On that measure, we have organised three expert meetings of the member states. We are at the moment assessing the difficulties of implementation of this framework decision on probation and we hope that in the future it could certainly work better.

There is also an issue about difference in legislation. In certain member states, probation measures are very often given by courts as an alternative to prison sentences. I am aware that this is not necessarily the case in all member states, including in the UK, even though you have the community service order. You do not have exactly the same system as France, Poland or Germany as regards probation. We also want to work with the member states so that they get used to the differences between the national legal systems.

Q229 Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: Mr Tell, we have already discussed certain aspects of the United Kingdom’s recent opt back into the European arrest warrant, but I just want to ask you about the relationship of that with our non-participation in certain measures adopted with regard to the rights of individuals in criminal proceedings. That is to say the Stockholm Programme, the road map in 2009, and a year ago of course the December 2013 proposed package by the Commission: the presumption of innocence, the procedural safeguards for child suspects and a directive on access to provisional legal aid. Are those matters of concern to the Commission? Which matters particularly concern the Commission? What are the implications of our non-participation now that we have opted back in?

Olivier Tell: Thank you for your question. This is indeed an important question. Of course, the Commission would have preferred the UK to opt into those measures and the UK has still the possibility to do so. It is not for ever. I see a possibility to opt in, for example in the access to a lawyer directive, with which you are probably already compliant. It is 20 years since the right of access to a lawyer was granted in the UK. It is not an innovation for the UK. What is especially important, also, in these directives, as I have mentioned previously, is that they give new rights to a person subject to a European arrest warrant as regards assistance by a lawyer. That, for us, is very important. Indeed, it will be appreciated also by the other member states that all EU instruments on procedural rights would be applied in the UK. That would be a positive step for the application of mutual recognition instruments, including the European arrest warrant.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: Do any of these measures that we have not chosen to opt back into yet concern you particularly?

Olivier Tell: No. It is difficult for me to rank them in matter of priority. They are all important. Clearly, technically speaking, from a strictly legal point of view on the European arrest warrant’s functioning, as I mentioned, the access to a lawyer directive is important because it provides access to a lawyer for those persons, and the legal aid directive also. The rights that are directly linked to the European arrest warrant, which is the subject of the hearing today, are access to a lawyer and legal aid, but they are all important for the Commission. The children’s rights are important and of course the presumption of innocence has a very important symbolic and practical importance for the Commission, not only vis-à-vis the situation in the UK, which is not at stake, I think, but also because we want a minimum standard across all the EU member states. This is also important for UK citizens when they travel abroad, or for UK legal practitioners when they are intervening in cross-border cases; they could rely on those measures.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood: Thank you very much.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Mr Tell. It is very good. We have come to, I think, the conclusion of the points that we indicated we wished to raise with you. Unless anybody else has a point they would like to put to you, could I just ask you whether you feel you would like to tell us that we have not specifically come forward with?

Olivier Tell: My Lord Chairman, thank you very much. No, I was very pleased to speak with you and to answer as far as I could. I did my best to answer your questions. Thank you very much. I remain at your disposal, as does my team, should you have further questions or further requests.

The Chairman: That is very generous. Thank you very much. You have given us a lot of material. Some of it was, if I can put it this way, rather dense, so I think there is every likelihood we may want to follow up some of the points you have raised with a letter or something. If we could do that, that would be very good. Thank you and your team for the help you have given us.

Olivier Tell: Thank you very much. Goodbye.