Oral evidence: British Foreign policy and the ‘Arab Spring’: Follow-up, HC 1026
Tuesday 3 March 2015
Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 3 March 2015
Members present: Sir Richard Ottaway (Chair); Mr John Baron; Sir Menzies Campbell; Ann Clwyd; Mike Gapes; Sir John Stanley
Questions 1-62
Witnesses: Tobias Ellwood MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Samantha Job, Head of North Africa Department, and Julian Reilly, Head of MENA Strategy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence.
Q1 Chair: Can I welcome members of the public to this sitting of the Foreign Affairs Committee? It is our first and only evidence session for the Committee’s short follow-on inquiry from its report on British foreign policy and the Arab Spring, which was published in 2012. It will focus on developments in the UK’s approach to major situations in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia that have taken place since 2012. It is a great pleasure to welcome the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Mr Tobias Ellwood; Samantha Job, the head of the North Africa Department; and Julian Reilly, the head of the Middle East and North Africa Strategy Department in the Foreign Office. Welcome to you all. Thank you very much for finding the time to come along this afternoon. It is much appreciated.
Minister, can I start with the Arab Partnership? Mr Reilly’s title a year or so ago would have been head of the Arab Partnership Department, rather than of the Strategy Department. Why the change? What does that mean for the programme and in real terms?
Mr Ellwood: Can I begin by saying thank you for the opportunity to speak to you? I am very much looking forward to your report and to hearing your thoughts following what I understand was a very successful visit to North Africa. It is always a pleasure to address this Committee, particularly as we have just had Foreign Office questions today. We are all warmed up.
With regard to the Arab Spring, the Foreign Office has evolved its response to the region since 2012. I think you would expect that to happen, given the events that have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa. But our aim remains a more secure and stable Middle East and North Africa region that is open and inclusive, with political systems and economies. As such, we have had to adapt our posture and funding.
As part of that, the Foreign Office’s Arab Partnership Department was renamed in February to have a broader footprint in one respect. It is now called the Middle East and North Africa Directorate Strategy Department—“MSD”. That will reflect its work on a full range of region-wide issues as we continue to ensure that our interventions are appropriate in the changing regional context.
Q2 Chair: Is it just a name change? Do you have more staff or less staff? Do you have as much funding as you used to?
Julian Reilly: Essentially, it is a name change to reflect how the department has evolved over a couple of years. It has now brought in a third pillar of activity, as comms work has come within the department. It now has a programmes team that oversees the spend of the Arab Partnership money and the conflict pool money, which will shortly be known as the conflict, stability and security fund. There is a policy team, which looks at the overriding strategic issues across the board for that. There is then a third team, which includes three additional personnel who look at how we carry out strategic communications on these broad thematic issues and our programming.
Q3 Chair: Thank you, that is clear enough. The funding for the Arab Partnership, which has now been renamed, was originally £110 million for 2011 to 2015, of which the Foreign Office was responsible for £40 million. Has all of that £40 million been disbursed?
Julian Reilly: For this year, we are on course for the full spend of all of our programme money.
Q4 Chair: Has funding been allocated for post-2015?
Mr Ellwood: I think it is going up, in fact, to £142 million for the region, with £25 million specifically for the countries that you visited.
Q5 Chair: Does that include the conflict pool?
Mr Ellwood: Yes. We have to be careful, because even that is changing its name as well, just to compound matters. It will be the conflict, stability and security fund.
Q6 Chair: Fine, so we can be reassured that the money has all been spent and that more is coming post-2015.
Mr Ellwood: Yes. As I said at the beginning, that reflects the focus and what we are required to do.
Q7 Chair: Can I move to the money that was funded under the Deauville plan, which was described by some commentators as the Arab Marshall Plan? How has that gone?
Mr Ellwood: The background to the Deauville discussions, which came on the back of a G8 meeting, was that a number of donor countries came together with funding to support those who had been caught up in the Arab Spring, in order to promote democratic values, governance and so forth. It is fair to say that some of the money has been slow in being forthcoming. The IMF has estimated that disbursements from January 2011 to June 2014 were $21 billion. It is also worth pointing out that the contributions we make to Deauville are separate from any bilateral programmes that we also operate.
Q8 Chair: There has been quite a lot of criticism of this—for example, that the Gulf states have put in substantial sums of money and got more bang for their buck. How did they manage to do that?
Mr Ellwood: Can I ask you to elaborate on that?
Chair: It is said that western funding has been limited by bureaucracy, inefficiency and confusion, while Gulf states have bought good will and influence by providing direct and substantial bilateral funds. The question really is: is the west losing its chance to be seen as a central figurehead during these important early years of transition?
Mr Ellwood: I wouldn’t say that at all. First, the Deauville funding stream is just one particular funding grouping, which came about because other countries felt the need to provide that funding, and it is being done through the EU, the IMF and so on. When it comes to influence, I would actually say that Britain is in a stronger position than it has been for many, many years, particularly in North Africa.
If we go through from the top of North Africa, in the relationship that we are now developing with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, we are seeing opportunities in other sectors beyond the perhaps more traditional energy and hydrocarbon world, but particularly to do with governance, rule of law and human rights issues, where we are running programmes and are involved in improvements to security. I would argue—I am pleased to have the opportunity to make it clear—that Britain perhaps underestimates its influence in the North African region.
Q9 Mr Baron: Minister, welcome. Can I stick with the issue of funding, but broaden it out slightly? There was a general sense, certainly following the Arab Spring, that the Foreign Office was somewhat unsighted. There was the recall of Arabists, for example—we seemed to be short in the Department—and there were other examples of that. Do you feel that you are now better sighted? What do you say to those who suggest that if we want to be better sighted, not just here but more generally, we need to invest in our foreign policy capabilities and put that investment in, in order to ensure that we reduce the scope for errors in the future?
Mr Ellwood: I hear this argument put, and it is important that Parliament does scrutinise the Foreign Office and asks these very questions, not least because of our role historically—our place, influence and connections—over a number of decades in the Middle East, and because there are huge questions and challenges facing the Middle East. What is Britain’s role in formulating a new direction of travel?
Under the last Government, the language school was closed. It has now reopened. In fact, I have benefited from a couple of lessons myself. It is pleasing that the former Foreign Secretary was able to establish and open it. It is important that we have the necessary linguists who are encouraged to take the short courses—and indeed the long course—in order to have the necessary level of Arabic to be able to make an impact.
From an anecdotal perspective—I visit the Middle East about every second week and spend an awful lot of time with all our ambassadors from right across the Gulf and North Africa—I would say their Arabic is of an excellent standard. I hear these criticisms and am aware that we need to put more money in. I am absolutely with you on wanting to make sure that we elevate the bar. That is heard in the Foreign Office, but I would not diminish where we currently are. Frank Baker, for example, in Iraq, has access at a level that is as important as speaking the language itself, because of the reputation that he has been able to build up because of his work. We are returning people to posts at a later stage in their career, after they have already developed relationships at a lower level.
Q10 Mr Baron: You are absolutely right to mention the foreign language school and so forth, and that has been a welcome reopening. But this is not, I suggest, just about languages. This is about deep understanding. Languages are important, don’t get me wrong, but this is about deep understanding of what is happening in the region. There was a sense after the Arab Spring that we had to recall Arabists. We found our expertise in the area short. We are talking about a Department, the FCO, that used to be renowned for his expertise, particularly on the Middle East—stories of the camel corps, and so forth. That was sadly missing. You are right to say the language school has been opened, but there are still pressures on the FCO budget. Cuts are still being made. We hear from your previous answers to the Chairman that various initiatives have taken place, but the bottom line is that the budget is going down for the Foreign Office. How can you continue to balance that out—the cuts to the budget, and at the same time your understandable desire to be better sighted—when clearly we have been caught short in our recent past?
Mr Ellwood: It is difficult to answer without getting too political, because the period that you are referring to takes us back over the last decade. It is unfair, I don’t like it and it is not my approach simply to say, “Blame the last Government”. Decisions were taken by the last Government, and we inherited a position from which we have had to move forward on two accounts, not least because the Arab Spring took place and there was a requirement, as you say, for us to upgrade our deep understanding of what was going on. You are right that historically, we have had that.
All I can say is that the desire for us to retain our position in understanding the complexities of Arab culture, regardless of where it is, needs to continue. We have developed the ISIL taskforce, and in relation to extremism we are now at the forefront of working with key countries to tackle the extremism message. That is based on a deeper understanding of what is happening.
Q11 Mr Baron: Finally, and briefly—because I don’t think we disagree—would you agree that greater investment in the Foreign Office would improve our understanding of what is happening on the ground?
Mr Ellwood: I would absolutely agree with that. There is a fiscal environment that we have to deal with, and we will absolutely do our best as the spending review comes up to make that case. As part of our ability to project influence, and to develop and nurture the relationships we have, we need the finances in order to do that. But I am afraid the same is argued in every other sector as well. However, working in the Foreign Office, I absolutely agree with what you say.
Q12 Mr Baron: I promise this is the last question. I suggest, Minister, there is greater potential for cost savings within the FCO, in many respects, by putting in the investment. One hopes that by being better sighted you will avoid costly errors in future. They can be very costly indeed when deploying hard power.
Mr Ellwood: Yes. You are now moving on to some of the strategic thinking, which is absolutely important. I know you take a huge personal interest in that, as I do. The strategy that we have had, and that I have adopted in particular countries—to advance the British relationship and get the English language to leapfrog ahead of other foreign languages—is being pursued in Algeria, for example. There is a desire from Algeria to strengthen our relationship. We had a conference in London where we introduced to a wide variety of sectors the opportunity of doing business with Algeria. You may be aware that in Egypt, after a series of visits that I made with a smaller group, I led a delegation of 51 companies[1] to advance our relationship beyond the normal, traditional security and energy sectors that we do well in the Middle East. Those are ways in which we strengthen relationships.
From the perspective of changing these countries or getting them to adapt to higher standards of human rights, the rule of law and so forth, we are then able to have frank conversations with them, because we have developed a closer relationship in that context.
Q13 Sir John Stanley: Minister, I would be the first to say that none of us has the gift of prophecy, even in the Foreign Affairs Committee, so my question is not put to you in a critical sense, but the reality is that within the Foreign Office at ministerial and senior official level, it is clear from any number of evidence sessions before this Committee that there was no foreseeing of the Arab Spring. It would also be fair to say that once it had begun, there was very little, if any, foreseeing of the consequences that would take place in Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. I think I would add Yemen now, as well.
In the light of that, have Foreign Office Ministers initiated any constructive look at the Foreign Office to see what lessons might be learned from being pretty unsighted about the arrival of the Arab Spring and the subsequent developments? Is there a lessons-learned exercise going on that has been initiated by Ministers or that has ministerial approval?
Mr Ellwood: You ask a series of interesting and important questions on the Arab Spring itself. In the same way as with the Falkland Islands or other major events such what happened in Bosnia, if you want to predict these matters and the consequences, there is no crystal ball. The idea of having a flexible and adaptive Foreign Office and foreign policy is that it is able to move quickly in response to the new environments in which we find ourselves. That is, in my view, what the Foreign Office, along with DFID, the MOD and No. 10, has done. It is important that it is able to react in that way.
Of course, we were not able to predict the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi—that he would decide to burn himself—and that that would see Tunisia trigger people lashing out at dictatorships right across North Africa and then the Middle East, with differing levels of reaction. However, we have been able, through various programmes focused on particular countries, to leverage opportunities for Britain to assist where we believe that we are extremely strong and can offer assistance. Tunisia is a great example of where we have developed a very strong bilateral relationship. If there is a class of Arab Spring, the advance that they have had there—agreeing a constitution, having elections and so forth, and also allowing Britain to participate in their advance—has been huge.
Q14 Sir John Stanley: But wouldn’t you agree, Minister, that in the early stages of the Arab Spring, what took place—as far as I can see, it came out of the blue not only to the Foreign Office but to supposed Middle East experts around the world—was an almost tidal force of wish by people in many Arab countries to try to establish greater human rights, greater freedoms and moves towards democracy? It was not just some isolated loss of life. There was a tidal force there. Shouldn’t the Foreign Office have been asking itself, “Why didn’t we spot that it was out there?” Was the Foreign Office taking too jaundiced a view of people in the Arab world—that they might not have similar aspirations to freedom to those we have in Europe?
Mr Ellwood: I am curious as to where you are leading with this question. Even if we had a recognition, what would you anticipate Britain doing? We could point to various unstable regimes around the world now where a nation is calling out for greater freedoms but is held back because of a very strong central Government structure. Iran could be an example. We do our best to encourage openness, improved governance and rule of law in order to provide greater standards for individuals, but to say that we should somehow be looking around and then predicting—we have to anticipate change, absolutely, but I am curious as to why you are pointing at the FCO. Your Committee studies these things and visits these places. Where was your consideration of the potential of an Arab Spring? Are we going around trying to blame—
Q15 Chair: We are quite happy to tell you what we warned about if you want us to, but we are the first to acknowledge that not even President Mubarak saw the uprising coming.
Mr Ellwood: Yes. Britain’s level of involvement and encouragement—indeed, with our international partners now, because we should not see ourselves in isolation here—in working towards extending and improving standards in any country is something that we work on. Even if we anticipate what might happen in any particular country, I am curious as to what Sir John believes Britain would endeavour to do with our allies.
Sir John Stanley: Well, Minister, I could give a lot of answers, but I think on this particular occasion it is for you to respond to questions put to you. I would be happy to carry on privately if you wish.
Q16 Mike Gapes: Can I take you back to your remarks earlier to John Baron about your visit to Egypt—the trade delegation? You said that there were 51 companies with you. Is there a public list of those 51 companies?[2]
Mr Ellwood: I don’t think that there is a public list. I am not aware that there is. We can certainly publish one, but we would just check with the companies that they are happy for that to take place.
Q17 Mike Gapes: Because there has been some speculation that the FCO is concealing the list of companies. There was a press report a few days ago claiming that. I would be interested to know if that is the case, or whether there is some reason that the names of the companies are not public.
Mr Ellwood: I think if a company from your constituency were to have participated, you would appreciate that they would probably want to be checked with before their name appeared on a FCO list. I am very happy to go through that process.
Q18 Mike Gapes: Perhaps you could send us the information.
Mr Ellwood: Yes.
Q19 Mike Gapes: Thank you. The trade delegation that you led was clearly of some significance. What do you think that it achieved?
Mr Ellwood: A number of levels: first, a bilateral relationship is developing. That is important for a number of reasons. We have a historical relationship, a security relationship and a trade relationship with Egypt. This sent a strong indication that Britain wants to support Egypt as it takes steps towards a stronger democracy. There is a commercial angle, which the private sector wants to participate in.
We were very keen to expand away, as I mentioned before, from the traditional hydrocarbon market and telecoms. We already have some very strong companies based there. I think that Vodafone is, in fact, not only the largest non-Arab company but the largest company in Egypt. The high-level reception that we received over the number of days, including a ministerial breakout, showed that they want to pursue relationships not only in those traditional sectors, but in retail, transport and infrastructure as well. I was delighted that we were able to do that. It was in the lead up to the Sharm el-Sheikh investment conference, which will be taking place on March the—
Julian Reilly: 15th.
Mr Ellwood: 15th—very soon.[3] We were getting ahead of their bigger international conference, which is taking place soon.
Q20 Mike Gapes: Clearly there has been a transition from Mubarak to Morsi to Sisi in Egypt. We, as a Government, were building ties with the Morsi Administration before he was removed. Has that caused a problem in relations with President Sisi, in the sense of being perceived to have been close to the Muslim Brotherhood and, therefore, a regime that was overthrown by popular protest and a coup?
Mr Ellwood: I can’t speak for what happened in the past. I can report that we—or, rather, the delegation that I was leading—spent more than two hours with the President. That is an indication of the desire of Egypt to do business with Britain. That is a very good position for us to be in.
Q21 Mike Gapes: So would you not agree, then, with some people who have said that the United Kingdom has been penalised by the current Egyptian Government because we are perceived to have been too close to the Muslim Brotherhood?
Mr Ellwood: I can’t relate to that. What I can relate to—there are only so many ways that I can put it, Mike—is the fact that we were hugely welcomed at all levels and that deals are being signed. I think that BP has just signed another significant deal. There are now follow-up meetings taking place, and we have had further events in the embassy here. These are all indications to say that our relationship is in a very positive place, which goes against the grain of the path you are trying to lead me down.
Mike Gapes: I am not suggesting it—it has certainly been speculated by many people, with comments made in the Egyptian media—
Mr Ellwood: Then let’s work together to defeat that speculation and say that actually, the relationship is very strong indeed.
Q22 Mike Gapes: A number of organisations, one of them being Human Rights Watch, have said that Egypt’s human rights today are in a much worse position than they were even in the Mubarak period. Human Rights Watch says that there is a crisis, which is “the most serious in the country’s modern history”. Do you agree with that?
Mr Ellwood: I think that there are absolutely some challenges that President Sisi and his Government are facing. I think that there are some destabilising factors within Egypt that they are concerned about.
Q23 Mike Gapes: Which are?
Mr Ellwood: Well, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, for example, are operating in the Sinai; they have been squeezed there and they have now pledged allegiance with Daesh—with ISIL—and they are now seen to flare up in other parts of Egypt itself. In a country that, as you have alluded to, has had a pretty bumpy last few months and years, that is a pretty nervous position that the country finds itself in, and it needs to manage that.
We are working very closely with the Egyptian Government and have frank conversations about ensuring that they identify those people who are genuinely wanting to destabilise the country and those others who want to demonstrate freely about aspects of government, and making sure that the two are not wrapped up together.
We have a lot of frank conversations about improvements to policing—we are working on that front as well—and improvements to security, so that Egypt can move forward on this. Freedom of expression is another key point, with the role of the press. I also add the independence of the judiciary, which I think has been seen in the last couple of days because of a decision to delay parliamentary elections, which we were also vocal about. We made a statement about that. We are keen for Parliament itself to be an important aspect of scrutinising domestically what is going on. They have not had a Parliament now since 2013, the upper and lower house are absent, and we are keen for those elections to take place.
Q24 Mike Gapes: Can I just take you back to this issue of human rights—did you personally raise these issues when you had your meetings in Egypt with President Sisi and others?
Mr Ellwood: I wouldn’t have necessarily raised it with the President directly, because when we met the President for my meeting, it was to do with the trade delegation. But I have raised these matters with Foreign Minister Shoukry.
Q25 Mike Gapes: When you were in Cairo?
Mr Ellwood: I didn’t meet him in Cairo, I met him on 27 January.
Q26 Mike Gapes: So when you were on your trade mission, you didn’t raise human rights issues.
Mr Ellwood: Well, I have been to Cairo five or six times now—a number of times this year. I choose when it is appropriate to raise these issues, but I can confirm that they have absolutely been raised.
Q27 Mike Gapes: But not on the visit when you were with the trade mission.
Mr Ellwood: You are keen in wanting me to have raised it—
Q28 Mike Gapes: I am just asking, when you visited Cairo with the trade mission, did you raise the human rights issues?
Mr Ellwood: I would have to check, but on immediate reflection, I would say that our focus was on the commercial aspects of that. There is a time and place—I hope you would understand—to have maximum impact, when you can raise certain specific issues. When you are trying to encourage Ministers and the President to embrace and open their arms to doing business, we have to manage when to deal with those other aspects, which I absolutely agree must be raised.
Q29 Mike Gapes: On the question of human rights violations and issues, which you have already referred, there has been violence against protesters. There have been tens of thousands of political prisoners or people arrested, although the number is unclear. I have a figure of 15,000, but I don’t know if that is correct. They are not just Islamists, and also include secular and liberal critics of the Government. There are also reports of torture and impunity. What is our Government saying about those questions?
Mr Ellwood: We have raised the numbers and the scale of people who are in pre-trial detention. Talking about the numbers, Amnesty International has estimated that up to 40,000 people have been arrested since July 2013. I hinted at this before, but this is in the context of demonstrations or opposition to political activities. We very much encourage Egypt to be confident enough to allow demonstrations to take place, and to ensure that the net of security concern is not simply thrown over everyone when it is trying to target those who are deliberately trying to cause harm to the state.
Q30 Mike Gapes: There is clearly a significant change in the position taken by the current Egyptian Government in its attitude to political Islam. President Sisi has made very strong statements on that, both privately and publicly. That also has an impact on Egypt’s foreign policy. Is it your view that the foreign policy being pursued by the current Egyptian Government—including the recent military intervention against ISIS/Daesh in Libya, and also their attitude to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Gaza—is in line with the approach that we are taking, or are there differences?
Mr Ellwood: I don’t think there is time to do a full comparison of the policy.
Mike Gapes: Well, I would be grateful if you could try. It is our job to scrutinise the British Government’s foreign policy. I am interested to know whether there are differences between the approach we take and that of the Egyptian Government.
Mr Ellwood: First, there are domestic issues, which I think we have covered, where we say that we have concerns and we are working with them.
Mike Gapes: I am talking about foreign policy.
Mr Ellwood: Moving to what is happening in Libya and indeed what is happening in the Sinai, we have concerns about the extent to which ISIL has now collaborated with Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, which in fact has changed its name in support of ISIL. That is a huge concern. This is the biggest generational fight on our hands. The world is only slowly recognising that we all need to work together on that, and the Egyptians are part of the 60-strong coalition. We are now seeing ISIL bleed into Libya, and we absolutely condemn the murders of the 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who were killed there. We need a policy on dealing with ISIL in Libya. I do not know whether we are coming on to Libya separately.
Q31 Mike Gapes: That is next, so park that one.
Can I ask you about Gaza and Hamas? The Egyptian Government is destroying hundreds of tunnels between Gaza and Sinai. In fact, the figure I have seen is 1,600 tunnels. It seems to be taking an even harder line towards Hamas than the Israelis are. There is talk now of clearances, of expulsions of large numbers of people from what is effectively a cordon sanitaire around Gaza. Do we as a Government have a view about whether we support that, or do we think it could potentially lead to an even worse humanitarian crisis within Gaza?
Mr Ellwood: I think you are roughly correct in your analysis. The bit that you have missed out is the fact that it was the tunnel systems that came up on the south side of Gaza that led not only to the movement of produce, kit and so forth, but also to weapons systems pouring into Gaza. The buffer zone that the Egyptians are now creating is an effort to try and prevent the black market weapons systems from going in. That has led to further tunnels being built. Sadly, there are further reports to say that, as I hinted in the Chamber today, they are starting to recommence. That then suggests that we are going to be revisiting the cycle of violence, unless we are able to prevent it from happening.
By clearing the northern area—the south edge of Gaza—Egypt is preventing the tunnel systems from being used. The Rafah crossing is a pedestrian crossing. A lot of people confuse it with a vehicle crossing. We absolutely want it to be used as an official link into Gaza. I hope that that will continue.
Q32 Mike Gapes: So, broadly, I would not be misinterpreting what you have said if I say that the British Government understand and are sympathetic to the position that the Egyptian authorities are taking with regard to the area on the edge of Gaza bordering Egypt.
Mr Ellwood: As I say, they have had to take extraordinary measures to deal with the situation. There was a movement of terrorists coming from Hamas into Egypt itself. Is your view—
Mike Gapes: It is not a question of my view. I am asking about the Government’s position.
Samantha Job: In addition to what the Minister has said, it should be clear to the Committee that we have raised with the Egyptians that whatever they need to do, they need to do with any eye on the human rights impact and the impact on civilian communities. It needs to be done extremely carefully if they are going to do it at all. We have said to them that we want the Rafah crossing to be open, as the Minister has said. We have put it as a sort of human rights-compliant approach to anything that they are doing in the security field, and that includes Sinai and other areas
Mr Ellwood: I should say that we watch this very carefully. Sir John is not in his place, but, as Chairman of—
Chair: CAEC: the Committees on Arms Export Controls.
Mr Ellwood: Absolutely. He will be aware of the scrutiny that we place on the equipment that is used in the Sinai, which is very much linked to the issue that Mike raised.
Q33 Mr Baron: Minister, may I move us on to Libya? Since our intervention, there has been a vicious civil war, as you know. Governments have struggled. The state of the country is perhaps epitomised by the fact that the Libyan Parliament has taken refuge on a Greek car ferry off Tobruk, as you are well aware. Apart from that, it is all going well. Can you update us on the current status of the talks between the parties in Libya? Can you give us a realistic assessment of what scope there is to find a compromise between the various polarised views, particularly given the news in only the last couple of days that Khalifa Haftar, who has been quite a divisive figure, as you will be more than aware, has now been appointed army commander in the fully recognised Government?
Mr Ellwood: This is, I fear, the area of concern in the part of the world that I look after, which the international community perhaps needs to devote more time to. I am pleased that Bernardino León and Jonathan Powell have done an awful lot of work to bring the parties together. After 40 years of misrule, the country was pleased with the departure of Gaddafi. Britain played a role in preventing the bloodbath that would have taken place in Benghazi. It is very sad to now see the lid lifted on a complex tribal system, and those tribes and communities are not able to find agreement as to how their country should move forward. We should bear in mind that it is a very rich and prosperous country. Indeed, 5% of our own oil needs still come from Libya.
You rightly point out that we almost have this dual system of two Parliaments. It is actually more complicated than that, because some of the tribal structures are simply backing one side or another depending on which way the wind is blowing. The entire construct of Libya itself, put together by the Italians, based on three regimes, has never had the space, if you like, or the ability to develop a proper infrastructure and a national and, indeed, a local level of governance. The question that needs to be posed is how we can work both from the top down and from the bottom up. There are more than 20 cities which are relatively peaceful now, where there is, in fact, little fighting and no militias, as such. How can they be allowed to flourish and develop? The problem, unfortunately, is the people of Libya themselves.
I served as a soldier in Bosnia, a country with three warring factions. I arrived at a point, after a number of years, when I asked why they were all agreeing to a peace accord, when not one of them could claim to have been the victor. The reason was that war weariness had set in. It is something that we do need these people to recognise. Unfortunately there are influences from outside Libya which are causing concern and now, to complete this point, the ingredients are perfect, with poverty growing, with lack of governance and lack of representation, for ISIL to come in Libya and establish itself, as we have seen in Sirte, in Derna and in parts of Tripoli.
Q34 Mr Baron: I will come back to that point in a minute, Minister, but can you tell me very briefly what point have things got to? The UN Special Envoy has made the point that peacekeepers will be needed in Libya. What is your view on that, and has the UK made any commitments to that peacekeeping force, or any commitments generally to the idea?
Mr Ellwood: Lots of ideas have been discussed. I am pleased to say that talks are about to resume with all parties. There was a problem with members of the National Assembly and then the original National Congress refusing to participate if another group was there. As things stand, I understand that all parties have been invited and have agreed to attend talks in Morocco. This is, I think, the first time that we are going to get everybody round that table, so that is very positive. I do not know whether the arrival of ISIL has been the wake-up call to many, whether they are moderates or more Islamic groups, to ask, do we really want to end up in complete civil war.
Q35 Mr Baron: You will be well aware that I raised, both at FCO Questions today and with you in Committee now, the need for greater investment to try to better understand events on the ground. There has been criticism levelled against the Government that we simply did not have the knowledge, we were poorly sighted, as to the consequences of simply removing Gaddafi. One example is that we supported the moderates in the Parliament when it had long become evident that actually, they may have described themselves as moderates, but most would ally themselves with one extremist faction or another. I come back to the general theme, which a number of Committee members have raised, of a lack of understanding—which some of us will put down, at least in part, to a lack of investment—of the consequences of intervention. How do you respond to that criticism, given events in Libya at the moment?
Mr Ellwood: It is twofold. However well intentioned we are, however well we understand the complexities of a country such as Libya, if the people themselves do not want to embrace peace, if they choose deliberately to want to expand their own areas of influence, there is little that Britain can do on its own, or that the international community can do, unless you envisage some sort of full-scale intervention, and we know that there is absolutely no appetite whatever for that.
Q36 Mr Baron: Minister, may I turn that back on you slightly and push back? Some of us argued against intervening at all in Libya, because we simply did not know what the consequences of our actions would be. Let me give you another example of where we seemed to be short of knowledge on the ground: we engaged with the GNC long after it was very apparent that it was in the hands of extremists, thereby giving credibility to extremist groups and factions in the country. That is relevant to what we are discussing, because it is this very make-up that we are having to deal with in trying to forge some sort of solution to a very chaotic situation. I come back to that criticism: why did we engage with the GNC for so long when it was quite clear that it was in the hands of extremists?
Mr Ellwood: There is a series of questions there. The first one goes back to the whole question of Benghazi. Are we a nation that stands by when we see a massacre about to take place? I visited Rwanda a number of times—I don’t know whether you have done so yourself—and the international community is now kicking itself for not having intervened when it should have done and when it saw the signs. The issue was debated in the UN, and clever wording was used to justify not moving in.
As I say, we are all looking at this with hindsight, and it is now mapped out in a chronological list of events. But you ask yourself, going back to that point, if we had not decided to go in, and we had stood by, what would the international community feel? What would we as a nation feel had we not stood up? There are few countries that can step forward, as we saw in the debate we had on Syria in terms of challenging somebody who chooses to use chemical weapons in part of the world. We had that debate, it went the way it did and you participated in it; all I am saying is that the people who can stand up and be counted, and who can say what they see in intervening in a domestic matter such as this, are few and far between.
Even though further events have led to where we are today, we cannot put the blame on our intervention to remove a dictator, who, on completing the Benghazi massacre and realising he could get away with it—in the same way we saw with the Anfal massacre and Saddam Hussein—would then have continued to punish people. Indeed, in Syria, Assad got away with using chemical weapons, and he continues to use that today. So I think the decision back then was absolutely right, but I absolutely agree that today we are not in a good place with Libya.
Q37 Mr Baron: Can I bring us back to Libya, if I may? You make a fair point, and these decisions are finely balanced. You say, what would have been the alternative? Benghazi airspace could have been controlled by others. We have seen the UAE intervene in Libya through air strikes with the support of Egypt. Other regional players could have exercised control over Benghazi. Then, you have to point out—this is not with the benefit of hindsight, and a large number of Members in the House predicted this at the time—that the number of casualties thrown up by the civil war is now greater than the entire population of Benghazi. One accepts that this is a question of finely balanced decisions, but it comes back to the central point about expertise and knowledge on the ground.
If I may, I want to move us on. Another repercussion of our intervention is that the country now has large ungoverned spaces, which has allowed terrorists to move in—ISIL being one example, but there are others, as the Minister will be well aware. That is causing a huge problem with regard to migration or potential migration from Libya. Given the vacuum that exists, what is your assessment of the possibility that we could still see massive migration out of Libya? What assessment has been undertaken of the precautions Britain could take? What danger does this present—I mean “danger” in the mildest form—to Britain’s interests?
Mr Ellwood: You raise some pertinent points. For different reasons, they were not discussed to the extent that perhaps they should have been in the past. Getting the countries around Libya to be better aware of the situation in Libya has been a challenge. That is only now being addressed. The migration of those who are fleeing what is turning out to be a chaotic situation is, of course, a concern for Europe, not least because those who are genuinely fleeing are fleeing because of persecution, because they want to move away from war and because of extremist groups. Ansar al-Sharia is the other terrorist group based in the country. They are making their way across into Europe and expanding their extremist influence in that sense. Italy has started to ask these questions, and I think that they are talking about a naval force looking at this. These are questions that the international community is looking at.
Samantha Job: On a point of fact, the migration up until this point is not Libyan nationals; it is people coming from sub-Saharan Africa being trafficked. It is a very nasty trade, but we hope that some of the solutions belong upstream in the countries of origin. They are not, for the most part, Libyans.
Q38 Mr Baron: I take that point, but the bottom line is that this is taking place as a result of the chaos—the vacuum and large ungoverned spaces—in Libya at the moment. There has certainly been a pick-up in migration from North Africa since we intervened in Libya. I do not think that anybody can deny that.
Samantha Job: I would say “through” North Africa.
Mr Baron: Well, through North Africa, but Libya has certainly been a conduit.
I have a final question, Minister. I come back to the lack of expertise or knowledge of the implications of what is happening on the ground. Can I press you on migration? Has the FCO undertaken any assessment of the impact of this conflict continuing? What happens if we have a failed state in Libya? What happens if the whole thing just implodes? What assessment, if any, have we undertaken of whether UK interests will become threatened, and the effect of migration, in that eventuality? Are we at least thinking about precautionary steps?
Mr Ellwood: If I may contest this, you have repeated the line that we do not know what is going on so many times that you almost have me believing it, so I am going to challenge you.
Q39 Mr Baron: No, I am not saying that, Minister. I think that we have got better at it, but there is no doubt that we have made a series of errors in our lack of understanding about the implications of intervention. I have the cited clear examples of us believing that the moderates would not side with the extremists, engaging with the GNC for too long and giving extremists credibility. Those are concrete examples.
We now have large ungoverned spaces. We are playing a bit of catch-up here; I do not think that anyone would really deny that. But what assessment have we now made of the potential impact of migration should the situation continue as it is, given the evidence on the ground that it will be very difficult to bring the polarised parties together?
Mr Ellwood: The reason I challenged you is the line that we are somehow participating in this or have an interest in this on our own, bilaterally. That is not the case. The UN is the vehicle that collectively needs to respond. To suggest somehow that Britain is not doing its part—
Mr Baron: No, I’m not saying that.
Mr Ellwood: Well, if I may finish, there is an insinuation here that we do not know what we are doing, we do not have the expertise, we are slightly out of touch and we are talking to all the wrong people.
Mr Baron: No, don’t put words in my mouth, Minister.
Mr Ellwood: If I may finish—
Q40 Mr Baron: I am not suggesting that for one moment. I am saying, broadly speaking, that we have been poorly sighted, that we did not foresee these implications and that we have to raise our game. I sense that you are doing that and trying to do that, to be fair. One is not suggesting that we are completely flying blind here, but history would suggest that we have been poorly sighted. I am simply asking: if the situation continues as it is and there is no real indication that it is improving markedly, are we at least thinking about contingency plans should the worst come to the worst and we see a hitherto unseen scale of migration?
Chair: Before you answer, Minister, I think you have made your point, Mr Baron. We all get it. We will allow the Minister to respond and then move on.
Mr Ellwood: I would make the case that there are countries we have a close historical relationship with. Libya is not one of them. It was never part of the Commonwealth. It was never one involved from the colony perspective. We had some training in the ’50s when we assisted with the formation of armed forces after the Second World War, but our bilateral links are not, perhaps, the same as other countries, particularly Italy. However, it is us, through Jonathan Powell, the Prime Minister’s special envoy, who have done more than many other countries in order to understand and speak with and encourage the various factions that we have spoken about, from the Zintanis and Misratans to General Haftar and the GNC, to bring them round the table. As I have said, we have been successful in doing so working with Bernardino Leόn. I am passionate about this. Britain is doing more than its bit working through international partners, not least the EU.
However, the questions that you raise about where things go from here—which I think are more pertinent than asking, in hindsight, did we do this, that or the other—with the refugee situation, the movement of people, as Samantha says, coming from the Sahel and indeed the extremism punching into Europe and questions to do with the naval taskforce, are absolutely pertinent questions which we must now address.
Q41 Chair: Thank you, Minister. I personally will just add to that from a slightly different angle that, after the intervention, there was an election, a Government was formed and then it fell apart, so the causal link was interrupted by a bout of democracy in the middle of it.
May I now move on to Tunisia? We had a successful visit to Tunisia the other day and we have a decent team there, working hard doing what is expected of them. None the less, we got the impression that other embassies have a slightly higher profile than we have. Is this a deliberate strategy on our part to be operating below the radar, or is it a lack of resources or is there some other explanation?
Mr Ellwood: Again, I do not quite register that. Forgive me; my visit to—
Chair: It is not meant to be a criticism, necessarily. Someone said to us that the more effective people are the people who keep a lower profile.
Mr Ellwood: The countries that are in my area of concern are the positive news stories, if you like, compared with Libya, and so on. Tunisia is very much one of those countries. We have worked extremely hard to advance the bilateral relationship in order to provide opportunities for commercial development to take place. Tourism is extremely strong. I think we have almost 500,000 visitors every single year. We have had a fleet of Ministers from various Departments go through, which is always good; it should not just be the Foreign Minister. Sadly, my visit in January was postponed because they had not yet formed a Government so there was nobody for me to see, which was unfortunate. In comparison with what the embassy is actually doing, I believe we are a visible partner. Perhaps, I would concur, there is clearly more that we could do. From a Facebook perspective, our number of followers has quadrupled over the last 18 months—twice as many as the French have. If that is a yardstick, I think that is a very helpful one.
Q42 Chair: On this business of our strategy, is it to keep a low profile?
Mr Ellwood: No, it is not. The size of the embassy since the revolution has doubled, so the objective is not to keep a low profile. It is to work in suitable areas where we can advance the bilateral relationship. As I say, that is why the embassy has expanded and why so many Ministers have visited the country.
Chair: And I know that has been welcomed. It is one of the success stories. It would be ironic if the smallest country there turned out to be the pioneer or template for everyone else to follow.
Mr Ellwood: May I just add on the finances: the bilateral UKTI reports that business wins for UK companies in Tunisia increased from 14 million in 2013-14 to 55 million in the last financial year? That is very good news.
Q43 Chair: Tunisia has not been without the operations of militant Islam, as I call it. To what extent do you feel that Tunisia has been an incubator of foreign fighters? It has been reported that not tens, not hundreds, but thousands of them have gone off to fight in Syria and Iraq. Do you share that analysis, and do we have a strategy to help the Tunisians counter this?
Mr Ellwood: This is a curiosity. You are absolutely right that the number of foreign fighters who have gone from Tunisia is in the region of 3,500, as I understand it. A huge number are moving across. Yet despite that, we have seen a very secular Government being established; we have seen a constitution which, so far, honours religious freedom in a way that we would love to see other countries in the Arab Spring grouping copy; yet there is still the irony that so many from Tunisia choose to go and fight. One school of thought is that, simply because they cannot join a group—because Tunisia itself has been good in being able to clamp down on extremism—they are departing. But the numbers are enormous. It could be frustration at the original socio-economic conditions, or maybe the repression of religion under previous regimes, that has led to individuals going there and then attracting more.
I am sorry, I cannot give you a fully qualified answer. I know that there is now work being done with online companies and so on to get messaging across, particularly to the youngsters. They have a high exposure to social media: 4 million Tunisians, out of a population of 11 million, are on Facebook. Maybe that is the reason. We know that Daesh/ISIL uses online communication to do a lot of recruitment. If 4 million out of your 11 million population are on Facebook, that could be one of the answers. Samantha, I don’t know whether you want to offer some thoughts.
Samantha Job: To answer your question about how seriously that issue is taken, it is taken extremely seriously by the Tunisian Government and by us. We have a conversation with them about how we might be able to help in an appropriate way.
Q44 Chair: Minister, you mentioned British tourists a moment ago. To what extent do you feel that tourists are safe in visiting Tunisia—could they be targets for returning jihadists?
Mr Ellwood: Sorry, I was not expecting that question. Could you explain the last bit again?
Chair: We have talked about tourism. There are a lot of British tourists there; it seems that the figures had gone down, but they are beginning to creep back up again. It is not really travel advice that I am after, but is there a threat to them from jihadists returning from Syria and Iraq? We did pick up that this was a possible threat to British visitors to Tunisia. Do you think there is anything in that?
Mr Ellwood: I had a very helpful bilateral forum in November with my counterpart. We discussed a range of issues, including the importance of British tourism to Tunisia. On the issue of jihadists coming back, we had a separate discussion about protecting Britons who choose to holiday in Tunisia. Just as Sharm el-Sheikh, on the base of the Sinai, has a protective series of layers because it knows that tourism is very important—you can fly straight in, and that buffers it from the rest of the peninsula—in the same way, we are working closely with the Tunisians to make sure that the areas that Britons go to have the necessary security measures in place in order to make sure that any Britons travelling there are kept safe.
Q45 Chair: Thank you. I am pleased to hear it.
Countries such as Tunisia that have come out of the mire and into a period of stability, like Morocco, are keen to be closer to the EU, for obvious commercial reasons. To what extent are we helping them with that? Are we able to assist Tunisia in getting better access to the EU markets?
Samantha Job: The short answer is yes. Both from an EU perspective and for Tunisia, we would like to get Tunisia to a point where it is able to sign the next level of agreements with the EU. There are some domestic Tunisian parliamentary hurdles that it needs to get over, but we are supporting that with as much support through the EU channels as we can, including talking to the Tunisians about what they need to do to access them.
Chair: As you are well aware, the Parliament has only just been formed, so I would strike while the iron is hot.
Samantha Job: Quite.
Q46 Ann Clwyd: May I go back to migration and Libya for a moment? Do you still feel that the UK can justify its support for a reduction in humanitarian assistance for migrants whose lives are at risk daily in crossing the Mediterranean?
Mr Ellwood: I do not recognise that statement; I do not know whether two issues are conflated there. If I might look at that, I will be happy to do so. I do not quite recognise that. Are you saying that the amount of funding—it could very well be that it is tied in with DFID funding—has been reduced?
Q47 Ann Clwyd: Triton, which was launched by the EU border agency in November, was the successor operation to what was going on in the Mediterranean.
Mr Ellwood: Ah, this is not a British initiative; this is an EU initiative to monitor—
Q48 Ann Clwyd: Yes, but we contribute to it, don’t we?
Mr Ellwood: In the sense that we are a member of the EU, yes.
Q49 Ann Clwyd: But I understand that we contribute less than we did to the previous operation.
Mr Ellwood: Alright, I see where you are going with this—the fact that it has been cut means that Britain has, in essence, cut its small share. What was actually happening was that because this system was in place, it was actually encouraging people to make the trip across. So more people were, in fact, sadly dying because these boats were not adequate in any way to make the journey. Not only that, but the actual captain of the boat would jump off and leave the boat stranded, hoping that the international community would rescue them.
So the decision was taken by the EU, I understand, to remove that. But, in an emergency, Italy has stepped up to say that it is ready to respond to any genuine emergency that takes place, as it would do, because these are its waters. But we were in fact fuelling the number of ships. My colleague James Brokenshire gave a statement on this when the decision was actually made, which I would recommend the Committee looks at.
Q50 Ann Clwyd: It is not going to stop people who want to get away from their country for whatever reason. They are going to continue doing that, aren’t they?
Mr Ellwood: This was a trade that was developed. Rickety boats, which would never be able to make the journey across the Mediterranean, were being used by people, knowing that the EU had a programme of picking these boats up. So the system was lending itself—if I remember rightly, I think you asked the very question when the statement was made. Now, because it has been a number of months since that statement was made, maybe we can check where things are and whether the number of boats has dropped or is increasing. That would give an indication as to whether the policy change has been successful. Would that be okay?
Ann Clwyd: Yes, thank you very much for that, because it appears to me that the numbers of deaths are increasing, and the fact that we now give reduced aid to the whole operation does not seem to be good practice.
Mr Ellwood: As I say, the aid bit is slightly tenuous, because it is an EU decision and they have decided to cut that. Our aid that we give to the EU programmes is exactly the same. But, if I may, I offer to find out where things are since the statement was made a couple of months ago, and we can see how the policy is working.
Q51 Mr Baron: A few years ago—I think it was in 2011—we were told that the FCO was operating a values-led approach to the Arab Spring states. Is that still a key element of our foreign policy?
Mr Ellwood: I was not a Minister in 2011.
Chair: Mr Reilly, you don’t seem to run fast enough.
Julian Reilly: On the UK’s values-based approach, we will continue to be clear and consistent about the principles that inform our policies, which include universal freedoms, values and human rights. That certainly informs the way that we carry out not only the policies but the programming that we have been putting through the Arab partnership and the conflict pool over the past years. How do we do that? Of course we have diplomatic tools, programme tools and others, such as communications, to implement this, as well as continuing politically to engage on the basis of our values. In short, yes.
Q52 Mr Baron: I think I am right in saying that people can no longer protest in Tahrir Square, that there have been mass arrests and human rights violations, and so forth. How do you reconcile what you have just said with the facts on the ground and our support, for example, of somebody like President Sisi?
Mr Ellwood: There is an end-state that we want to get to, and there will be a frustration if we are not at that end-state. We are not at that end-state, as you rightly imply through your illustration of Tahrir Square. That does not mean to say that we have stopped or should somehow curtail or put up the shutters on a country like Egypt because they have not reached that end-state just yet. We work effectively behind the scenes and have robust conversations to take them to a better place. The strategy is to move them away from where they were in the past. On longevity, we are about to celebrate 800 years since Magna Carta. If someone 800 years ago were to ask why we have not done x, y and z, they would be frustrated at the pace of change. Clearly, for a variety of reasons, we expect change to happen a little bit faster than in our own experience, but I hear what you say. We need to encourage things to happen at a manageable pace.
Q53 Mr Baron: So what you are saying, in effect, is that what is most important is the sense of direction, rather than whether we have reached the endgame, which is perfectly reasonable.
Mr Ellwood: That is fair, but through strategy is how anybody is best placed to exert influence over the very people that you want to change. Iran is the best example of whether you open an embassy and have frank dialogue, which is our intention, or whether you shout from afar, “Iran, you are doing this, that and the other, particularly on human rights.” I think Iran hangs or executes the most people, with the possible exception of North Korea.
Q54 Mr Baron: What is the strategy for influencing those very countries?
Mr Ellwood: Dialogue, basically.
Q55 Mike Gapes: May I take you to the question of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK? A year ago, the Government established an internal Government review under Sir John Jenkins, the former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, which was supposed to look at the “impact and influence on UK national interests, at home and abroad,” as well as the wider influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on UK society. How is that inquiry going? Are we likely to see a report published before the general election?
Mr Ellwood: I am grateful for that question. It was important for us to have a comprehensive understanding of what is happening in the Middle East. The Prime Minister is committed to making the findings public in due course—those famous words.
Q56 Mike Gapes: It has taken a long time, hasn’t it? This isn’t another Chilcot, is it?
Mr Ellwood: It needs to be done correctly. The work involves a number of Government Departments to consider all the findings, which is what is happening at the moment. It is also complex. There is a domestic angle to it. There is an international aspect to it, with ramifications. I hope that you would agree that it is right that we consider these issues carefully.
Q57 Mike Gapes: It was suggested that the decision to establish this review of the Muslim Brotherhood was a direct result of pressure from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and possibly Egypt. It was, in a sense, seen as a way to send a signal that we were looking at the issue. How would you respond to that accusation?
Mr Ellwood: I do not agree with that. It goes back to the point that John was making. If you want the Foreign Office, No. 10, the Cabinet Office, MOD and DFID to have a better understanding of what was happening in the dramatic events that we now label the Arab Spring, it is important that we take stock, do our homework and learn. It is right that such studies are done.
Q58 Mike Gapes: The FCO has an oversight role on the steering group of the review. In that role, do you expect the review report to be published before 7 May?
Mr Ellwood: It is not my responsibility to publish the report, so I can only give you what I understand to be the case, which is that it will be published in due course.
Q59 Mike Gapes: Not during purdah presumably, so we have three weeks.
Mr Ellwood: You can ask the question in so many clever ways. We can do it 14 times if you want and I am afraid that the answer will probably be the same.
Q60 Chair: It is above your pay grade.
Mr Ellwood: That is the other phrase that, of course, is in the lexicon of the civil service.
Q61 Chair: That completes our questioning. Is there anything that you want to say, by way of conclusion, about the region?
Mr Ellwood: On a personal note—it fits into some of John’s comments and your impressions as well—sometimes Parliament is not, perhaps, aware of the extent to which we can influence things and participate because of our heritage, history, connections and long-term understanding of what is happening in the Middle East and North Africa. Despite some huge challenges that are taking place, there are many good news stories, from a commercial perspective, right across the board, where Britain is in a much stronger place.
I go to these countries and we can affect opinion and exert influence. I do not want that to fade or be diminished in any way, so the requests that you have made and the questions that you posed on how we can keep pushing the envelope and ensuring that we do not lose capability and understanding are well understood. I understand that and I will do my best to make the case in the spending review that the funding for the Foreign Office to project its understanding and work with our partners is in Britain’s interest, and there is an international benefit.
Q62 Chair: Thank you. We set out our views quite clearly in our report last week on finance and performances that the Foreign Office, frankly, is at a crossroads. It either has to narrow its aspirations or be better resourced.
I thank you all very much indeed. You have stayed nearly half an hour longer than was scheduled so we are grateful for that. This is quite possibly the last time that you will appear before us in this Parliament, so I thank you for your work since you have been in the Foreign Office.
Mr Ellwood: Thank you, much appreciated.
Oral evidence: British Foreign policy and the ‘Arab Spring’: Follow-up, HC 1026 21
[1] See clarification by the Minister in his letter of 11 March 2015 to the Committee Chair.
[2] See clarification by the Minister in his letter of 11 March 2015 to the Committee Chair.
[3] See clarification by the Minister in his letter of 11 March 2015 to the Committee Chair.