

Written evidence submitted by All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones (ISD0031)

The Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review - Phase One

1. Summary

The Integrated Review provides a unique opportunity to clearly articulate a cross-departmental strategy in a rapidly changing world. Creating an agile and effective strategy demands that defence, foreign policy and developmental aims and policies are properly integrated.

Over the past two decades, counterterrorism has been at the heart of UK policy. The failures of the counterterrorism approach are becoming clear: a recent [CSIS report](#) shows that the number of Salafi-Jihadist groups have nearly quadrupled since 2001; an [unprecedented number of civilians die in conflict zones today](#), with protracted instability and low-level violence [making communities and regions more insecure](#).

The nature of warfare is also changing. Responses to security challenges have emphasised small-scale kinetic operations – including [more remote, technologically driven alternatives](#) – security force assistance and partner assistance over traditional large-scale deployments. Furthermore, unconventional military commitments are quietly increasing, with a rise in ‘grey zone’ military operations that fall below the threshold of all-out war. These operations and partner assistance [undermine established curbs](#) on the use of force, marginalise Parliamentary scrutiny and cross-departmental evaluation, and contribute to the [erosion of the international rules-based order and global stability](#).

Creating an effective, future-proofed strategy requires a holistic understanding of the complex global environment, in particular of the root causes of instabilities. By drawing on cross-departmental strengths and resources, the tools available to the UK exponentially increase, opening the door to alternative responses to security challenges that address root causes over time. By including integrated measures to monitor and evaluate progress and capture best practice and lessons learnt as part of the strategy, UK policies will remain agile and adapt to a changing international landscape. Furthermore, the strong commitment to British values – democracy, rights and protections – provides us with the opportunity to strengthen our global position and influence allies to follow our example.

Drawing upon the findings of the [All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drones’ two-year expert-led Inquiry](#) and the Group’s broader work examining challenges in modern warfare, this submission underlines the necessity for the Integrated Review to be truly holistic and sufficiently broad in scope; extended in its timeframe; ensure real effectiveness; and guarantee widespread participation.

- a) **Timing:** The unprecedented impact of COVID-19 requires that the Integrated Review deadline be revised and extended. A first-class Review will require adequate time to ensure 1) the government’s capacity to input; 2) implementing of lessons learnt; 3) alignment with the spending review, and; 4) broad expert participation.

- b) **Scope:** We are at a critical juncture where the UK needs to define its role in dramatically different circumstances to those we have previously worked to. As articulated by the [House of Lords International Relations Committee](#): “in a world where influence can no longer be taken for granted and where shifts in economic and political power relationships are not working to our advantage, a more agile, active and flexible approach to foreign policy must now be developed”. This necessitates a holistic reassessment of the UK’s strategic aims and how we measure success, and a deep understanding of security challenges and the policy responses to address them. [Lessons from Operation Shader](#) and other military partnerships illustrate crucial gaps in information and policy, and ongoing flaws in how we have evaluated operational success to date. With the rise of ‘grey zones’ of military operations that fall below the threshold of all-out war, the Review will not only need to address these gaps to ensure effective policy, but address the fundamental rules by which the UK intends to work, and the global environment it wishes to see.
- c) **Effectiveness:** The Integrated Review offers a unique opportunity for Departments to engage in joined up analysis and implementation to create a more integrated, cohesive, agile and comprehensive set of foreign policy tools that effectively utilise both soft and hard power. By articulating shared outcomes, outlining roles and responsibilities for each department and clearly defining lines of oversight and assessment, the Strategy will adapt to a changing reality, ensuring it remains effective by design. In addition, The Integrated Review provides an opportunity to correct critical gaps in Parliamentary scrutiny and establish the necessary measures to ensure the effective and continuous evaluation of policy in Parliament.
- d) **Broad participation:** Considering the scale and detail of the subject matter, a successful strategy will require significant input, most significantly from Parliamentarians, committees, subject matter experts and policymakers. The inclusion of Parliament will secure wider political buy-in, whilst committees would provide a wealth of institutional knowledge, expert networks, and an understanding of contemporary and emerging issues.

2. Timing

The unpredicted and unprecedented impact of COVID-19 should inform a revised and extended deadline to the Integrated Review. Considering the Government’s ambition to conduct the most exhaustive review in more than a decade, and the direct impact of the ongoing global health crisis on Government-wide and Ministerial capacities, it is paramount that it is not rushed. The impact of COVID-19 on capacity was highlighted by the Prime Minister himself in a [letter](#) to the Chairs of the Defence, International Development and Foreign Affairs Committees, where he stated “we have diverted resources from across government and the Civil Service to work on COVID-19, scaling back efforts on the Integrated Review”. The lack of current capacity is particularly important considering previous criticisms of similar efforts – for example, the 2010 National Security Strategy - it “was rushed”¹ - and the 1998 Strategic Defence Review – “the money was not done at the same time” and it was not funded sufficiently by the Treasury.² It is essential that the Review is undertaken alongside the Comprehensive

¹ Lord Stirrup in Oral Evidence session to the Defence Committee, 17 March 2020 (<https://bit.ly/2x71bs3>)

² Ibid.

Spending Review, with adequate time taken to avoid past mistakes. Finally, the breadth and detail of the subject matter at hand, and the essential role that should be played by Parliamentarians, their committees, and participation of subject matter experts and policymakers, will necessitate more time.

3. Scope of the Review: Defining and measuring success in a changing world

As emphasised by Lord Ricketts' oral evidence, "this is a fundamental review because this is a change in Britain's position in the world - a more fundamental change than any time in the last fifty years." We are at a critical juncture where the UK needs to define its role in dramatically different circumstances to those we have previously worked to: we will need to work from outside the EU; our closest ally, the US, is becoming an increasingly [unpredictable partner](#)³; key multilateral institutions including the UN are under [immense strain](#); and NATO is under [greater stress](#) as a cohesive alliance than it was a decade ago.

This pivotal moment provides a good opportunity to answer fundamental questions that will inform our foreign policy baseline and underpin UK policy and strategy. What role does the UK want to play in this new global environment? What are the UK's aims for the future? How will we utilise UK strengths, capacities and resources to pursue our aims? It is also an opportunity to test our assumptions and conduct a meaningful examination of the effectiveness of current UK foreign, defence and security policy in achieving our security goals.

3.1 Crucial Lessons from Iraq and Syria: how do we measure and define success?

[Lessons from Operation Shader](#) illustrate crucial gaps in information, and flaws in how we have evaluated operational success. The UK has acknowledged only [one civilian casualty](#) out of over 1700 strikes deployed in the five-year war against Daesh in Iraq and Syria. The official UK figure has been disputed as vastly inaccurate by multiple monitoring organisations – and was even [formally disputed by the US](#). This divergence has exposed the lack of structures, processes and dedicated resources invested by the Government to understand the true impact of UK military action. The operations to retake Mosul and Raqqa were seen as successful in the short term. But at what cost to human life, and long-term stability in the region? International observers visiting in the aftermath of the operations were taken aback by the scale of the damage - reporting they had [not seen major cities so devastated by combat since the Second World War](#).

Without accurate recording of the damage wrought in pursuit of military objectives, it is impossible to meaningfully evaluate the immediate and long-term impact of military solutions to security challenges, therefore impeding effective policy making. Success is not easy to define when measured by broader criteria that take into account long-term stability and security. For this reason, the Integrated Review will need to clearly articulate cross-departmental goals for addressing global and national security threats, and mandate the means to evaluate them by cross-departmental criteria. This will ensure that defence, foreign policy and developmental goals are properly integrated, adaptable and future-proofed.

³ See: International Relations Committee, UK foreign policy in a shifting world order, pp.12-14 (<https://bit.ly/2yCkNEM>);

3.2 Looking to the future: the strategic fallout of ‘grey zones’ and strain on the international rules-based system

The Integrated Review needs to address the rules by which the UK intends to work, and the global environment it wishes to see. Military commitments are quietly increasing, with the rise of ‘grey zones’ of military operations that fall below the threshold of all-out war. In this nebulous space, the [APPG on Drones’ Inquiry](#) heard evidence on the damaging precedents set by the [US’ counter-terrorism programme](#), through targeted lethal strikes against individuals outside of armed conflict, Special Forces operations, extraordinary rendition and torture. Other challenges in this ‘grey zone’ include the impact of cyber and hybrid threats and confrontation through non-state proxies.

The rise of these limited and often covert operations pose serious challenges to the strength of the international rules-based system, and the vital norms which underpin global stability. The most recent example is the US’ unilateral [assassination of the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani](#) in January 2020. This strike has set the stage for new, disruptive rules of exchange whereby assassinations on the global stage are normalised and accepted. Essentially, the established protections on when, where and against whom you may use force are being undermined, if not disregarded. If this state of affairs is even tacitly accepted - what rules will be left?

It is imperative that the Integrated Review confronts fundamental questions of the red lines and parameters guiding UK action, using the Review to clearly define the legal positions and overarching values driving the UK’s international engagements.

3.3 Creating the international environment we want to see through our partnerships and leading by example

The UK’s National Security Strategy and successive doctrinal statements are all based on a presumption that ever closer collaboration with a range of military partners is increasingly likely in future operations.⁴ Whilst each partnership is different, the UK’s Rules of Engagement, and domestic and international legal restraints remain constant.

Today the UK provides a myriad of assistance to partners, [almost entirely without parliamentary oversight](#) or means of evaluation. Among the more controversial forms of assistance is that to the [Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen](#) and the [US drone programme](#). In both cases, assistance is based solely on assurances provided by the recipient government that our assistance will not be used unlawfully. However, significant allegations of disproportionate civilian casualties and violations of international law have been brought forth against both Saudi Arabia and the US⁵ – with courts explicitly finding [Saudi](#) and [US](#) strikes in Yemen unlawful.

By letting partners ‘mark their own homework’ and not requiring information to be shared on how UK assistance is used, there is not even a baseline of the information needed to understand the impact of UK assistance, a criterion which would underpin any modern evidence-based decision-making system.

⁴ UK Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015, Cm 9161, 7 December 2015, p. 29; Ministry of Defence, Future of Command and Control, JCN 2/17, 7 April 2020, p. 12 (<https://bit.ly/2NkqmKW>).

⁵ Bellingcat Yemen Project (<https://yemen.bellingcat.com/>); The Yemen Data Project (<http://www.yemendataproject.org/>); The Bureau of Investigative Journalism: Drone Warfare (<https://bit.ly/2pM7A7i>); The Editorial Board, The Secret Death Toll of America’s Drones, New York Times, 30 March 2019 (<https://nyti.ms/2TNJ4gh>)

The Integrated Review is an opportunity to identify a new means of retaking UK agency by generating the necessary information to inform policy, putting in safeguards beyond assurances, and utilising a [broader spectrum of diplomatic, developmental and economic tools](#) that can be used to influence change and remedy bad conduct.

4. Ensuring the Review is effective: Central considerations

4.1 Committed cross-departmental initiatives.

The Integrated Review provides a unique chance for Ministries to work together to provide a more integrated, cohesive, agile and comprehensive set of foreign policy tools that effectively utilise both the soft and hard power at the Government's disposal. Moreover, it provides departments with an opportunity to recommit to existing initiatives across departments, ensuring they are not lost, but rather brought together more effectively, and strengthened. Among the most significant initiatives are: the Review of the [2011 Protection of Civilians Strategy](#); producing and implementing a civilian casualty tracking policy as called for in Section 17 of the [Chilcot Recommendations](#); resourcing and implementing [Human Security](#) as a strategic, cross-cutting government priority, understood as essential to military success; the UN [Sustainable Development Goals](#); and initiatives on [Preventing Sexual Violence](#); [Freedom of Religious Belief](#), and; [Women, Peace & Security](#). Following on from the [new national approach to preventing atrocities](#), which already acknowledges many of these cross-cutting issues and emphasises the importance of joined up thinking on global challenges, the Integrated Review offers an opportunity to move beyond joined up thinking, to joined up analysis and implementation. With this holistic approach, there should be added incentives for a cross-departmental understanding of success that prioritises global peace and security, with integrated measures to monitor and evaluate progress; capture best practice and lessons learnt; and implement changes to improve policy and process.

4.2. Integrated, cross-departmental policy solutions to security threats and instability.

As an Integrated Review, this will mean that success is not just a military objective, and is not solely evaluated according to defence criteria. The Review provides a unique opportunity to mandate the design of interdepartmental responses to cross-sectional issues. This necessitates going beyond current coordination and deconfliction efforts, and ensuring that policy is made in a genuinely cross-departmental way at the strategic level. To ensure its effectiveness, the final strategy presented in the Review, should be incorporated throughout Government, outlining roles and responsibilities for each department as well as lines of oversight to monitor progress. Regardless of how efficiently each department performs their roles individually, it is vital there is universal agreement on what the ultimate outcomes are, and a net assessment of the series of methodologies used to get there.

4.3. With these broad points in mind, please find a suggested sequence of questions that would aid the Review in **Annex 1** at the bottom of this document.

5. The need for broad participation

In a closed briefing to the House of Lords, Defence Spokesperson in the Lords, Baroness Goldie, outlined the need for broad and diverse expertise and information to be incorporated into the Integrated Review. In order to achieve this, all stakeholders would be welcome to input into the Review. It is important that this commitment is meaningfully upheld. The scale and detail of the subject matter at

hand mean that a vital role would be played by Parliamentarians, their committees, subject matter experts and policymakers.

5.1 The benefit of working with Parliamentary Committees

Parliament's Committees provide a wealth of institutional knowledge, have an expert network of advisors, and are informed on contemporary and emerging issues. They have institutional structures, mandates and resources at hand designed to interrogate and scrutinise issues and policies, past and present, as well as provide policy improvements and suggestions. As such, committees are uniquely placed and able to take on crucial heavy lifting, in particular concerning evaluations of the financial feasibility and technical effectiveness of policy.

Considering the broad scope of the Review, the inclusion of all relevant committees, not only as a mechanism of scrutiny, but to ensure that the review is holistic, effective, and includes all necessary elements, should be welcomed by the Government.⁶ The considerable efforts underpinning the coordination and communication of the [House of Lords European Union \(EU\) Select Committee's](#) work with its seven sub-committees could be echoed in the conduct of the Integrated Review. For example, through this multi-faceted structure, the EU Committee is able to conduct cross-cutting Inquiries that deal with different subject areas. In the course of scrutinising EU proposals, the sub-committees engage in detailed correspondence with Ministers. The [main objectives](#) are to identify issues of legal or political significance, and to ensure that the Government's position is clearly and transparently put on the record.

Lessons can also be learnt from other States' reviews. During [Canada's recent Defence Review](#), the relevant committees functioned as sparring partners and soundboards for policymakers. A continuous dialogue back and forth between policymakers and committees, whereby the former sent drafts to the latter for comment, facilitated a productive and considered policy-making process. Canada's committees provided a crucial function in evaluating the practical and financial viability of draft policies and in turn prepared detailed and actionable feedback. The Integrated Review should give serious consideration to ways to similarly integrate the UK's Select Committees into policy evaluation, feedback and oversight to support more holistic approaches to policymaking. The Defence, International Development, and Foreign Affairs Select Committees have already [shown a united front](#) in coordinating oversight and feedback on the Integrated Review. Further coordination and collaboration would encourage a shared understanding of the outcomes of the final strategy, and a net assessment of its different elements.

In addition, individual committees can act as advocates for the issues they serve to oversee. Moreover, by participating in the Integrated Review, they can provide new, innovative policy solutions that can be applied to cross-departmental policy challenges. By a) further integrating Ministries and b) sharing lessons learnt and policy options across the board, more policy solutions are made available to the

⁶These include: The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy; Defence Select Committee; International Development Committee; Foreign Affairs Committee; Joint Committee on Human Rights.

Government in response to foreign policy challenges. As seen in Afghanistan and Iraq, cross-departmental, comprehensive responses that encompassed development, governance and security took advantage of all the resources and expertise available across the FCO, DFID and MOD. During his oral evidence to the Defence Committee, Lord Stirrup highlighted the integrated response and overlap between defence and development in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the central role of the latter in building trust between the people and its leaders. Consideration of this peacebuilding approach could provide a more holistic and sustainable response that more effectively utilises the UK's significant soft power resources.

5.2. Parliament: secure buy-in through parliamentary participation and scrutiny

It is crucial that the Review is conducted well, and that it receives continued and broad Parliamentary buy-in and support, not just now, but into the future. Through open communication with Parliament, the Government should explain how the Integrated Review will be conducted, how Members can get involved, and provide adequate time for participation. Involving Parliament at large has two distinct benefits: the Government can take advantage of its great breadth of knowledge and expertise. Furthermore, by informing Parliament of the process behind the Review, and including Parliamentarians in its substantive discussion, the Government will secure buy-in and support from an early stage. Moreover, it can check policies, enabling the creation of a cohesive and actionable review.

5.3 The opportunity to correct critical gaps in Parliamentary oversight

In its inquiry on [Parliament's role in the deployment of force](#), the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee outlined the importance of Parliamentary scrutiny of decisions concerning military action. The report states:

'It is clear to us that strong scrutiny of Government leads to better decisions. This applies as much to the decisions and policies on military action, as it does to any other area of Government policy and decision-making.'

A key finding of the report, however, was a warning that Britain's growing military capabilities and commitments are outpacing the existing procedures for parliamentary scrutiny and oversight, highlighting the need for a strengthened Parliament to meaningfully uphold its obligations⁷:

'...The post-2003 convention of prior consultation with the House of Commons [before deployment of force] developed as a mechanism to ensure that decisions on military action were democratically authorised and accountable...The increasing frequency and importance of sub-conflict confrontations highlighted throughout the evidence poses new challenges both for the Government and Parliament. While we accept that much of this would not, and should not, be covered by the existing convention on prior parliamentary approval, we do not accept the view of the Minister for the Armed Forces that these are not issues for Parliament. On the contrary, it is imperative that the House of Commons considers how it can effectively fulfil its duty to hold the Government to account in relation to foreign policy and defence issues.'

⁷See also: House of Lords debate on 'Drones: International Law', 16 January 2020 (<https://bit.ly/2VfUjki>); House of Lords debate 'Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament', 9 September 2019 (<https://bit.ly/2UUYTFC>)

In response to this need to adapt to the 'increasing frequency and importance of 'sub-conflict confrontations', the Committee recommended that MPs have access to all but the most sensitive information regarding the possible use of military force, to ensure effective scrutiny of Government decision-making and policy. Considering the need for quick decision-making, the Committee urged both the Government and Members of the House to develop new mechanisms for communicating and sharing the necessary information, and provide space to debate and agree the parameters for military action that would be supported by Parliament before any emergency arose.

The Integrated Review provides an opportunity to not just articulate the UK's policy aims and underpinning strategy - but also to establish the necessary measures to ensure their effective and continuous evaluation in Parliament. This would instate a feedback loop which would not only serve to improve policy, evolve benchmarks of success, and highlight any emerging risks; but also ensure political buy-in and support of government action.

5.4 The vital role of broad civil society and expert participation

The Government should take advantage of the exhaustive community of civil society practitioners and experts⁸ available to the UK. Considering the ambitious scale of the Review and the multiple facets involved in a truly integrated approach, it is essential that experts across relevant subjects are consulted and their input evaluated and incorporated at an early stage, before the analysis is set in stone. The importance of diverse sources of information and expertise has already been welcomed by the FCO during a [debate on the protection of civilians in conflict in June 2019](#). The importance of independent and external sources of information were highlighted by members, and the important role that social media and civil society sources could play in this area was emphasised by then [Minister for Asia and the Pacific, Mark Field MP](#).

5.5 The importance of engaging with the public

It is essential that the Integrated Review is conducted with sufficient consultation and communication with the public in order to create buy-in for the vision and policies it will set out. As [outlined by the United Nations Association](#), over time, public disengagement can become a security risk by leading to polarisation, disaffection and apathy. Looking ahead, the marginalisation of parliamentary participation on the use of force and the growing civil-military gap may affect public perception of military operations and ultimately, personnel. Whereas public support for the individuals serving remains high in the UK, that of military operations has [declined over the past decades](#). As the civil-military gap increases, whereby the public have little knowledge of the activities of the Armed Forces, [some have predicted](#) that public support for military personnel will also decline should the military increasingly engage in remote, coalition and clandestine actions.

Conversely, an [informed and engaged public is a security asset](#) that can support resilience at the community level and actively participate in decisions on the UK's future security. The Integrated Review needs to incorporate meaningful efforts to engage the public in discussing what "Global Britain" means - as a national narrative, and in conjunction with cross-departmental security policy and practical aims. The [Lords International Relations Committee](#) further stresses that:

⁸E.g.: Aid; humanitarian; human rights; civilian protection; women, peace and security; development; country/region specific; counterterrorism; security; cyber; non-state actors; interstate competition; climate change and environmental experts

“it is critical to ensure the public understands and is supportive of the UK’s foreign policy objectives, necessitating the development of a strong foreign policy narrative, coordinated by the National Security Council...strong and fully informed discussion with the public on the demands and parameters of UK foreign policy are essential”.

Digital communications tools have intensified public pressure on governments, increased the number of actors engaged in policy debates, and resulted in a much wider audience for policy making. In an era where it is not clear how, and when the UK is at war - or even engaged militarily through its partnerships - the articulation of defined parameters of engagement and a clear cross-departmental agenda will help promote shared understanding, legitimacy and support of UK international engagement.

23 April 2020

Annex 1: Recommended sequence of questions for the Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review

Defining the UK’s integrated goals

- What is the UK trying to do in the world?
- What is the foreign policy aim and intention?
- How do we measure success?
- What are the UK’s interests?
- What will the UK dedicate efforts and resources to do?
- What are the principles the UK will abide by, and why?

How does the UK intend to achieve its goals?

- What is needed to achieve its goals?
- With whom will it carry out its activities?
- What policies and laws underpin this strategy, or need to be put in place?
- What is the UK’s policy and legal position on the use of force?
- What are the red lines in place for working with partners?
- How does the UK intend to influence a partner’s conduct in the case their actions go against UK interests? Is there a means to remedy the behaviour, or exit the partnership?

What are the current barriers to achieving UK interests?

- Political and diplomatic issues
 - Undermining of international rules-based order by both State and non-State actors
 - Unreliable and fluid alliances
 - Limitations of the international system for holding State and non-State actors to account for violations of international law and atrocities.
- Risks and threats
 - Creation of a risk matrix, correlating the likelihood of the risk, and impact it would have if materialised.

- Has the threat landscape changed?
- What are the new and emerging threats?
- What are global sources of insecurity that require transnational action? E.g. climate change, poverty and inequality, corruption.
- What is needed to be agile, adaptable, responsive to changing realities?

How is government capability currently applied?

- What existing initiatives do we have?
- Are hard power or soft power approaches prioritised?
- What range of tools and resources are available to the UK?
- What is the timeframe of each initiative?
- How are we carrying out our aims? Alone and in alliances?
- How are we measuring whether aims are reached?
- What strategy have we been working to?
- What was the political intention set, and what were the aims in pursuit of this?
- What capabilities have been prioritised, and why? (e.g. defence, diplomacy, development, aid etc.)
- Are all departments equally involved and equally resourced?
- Any aspects of capability which are not being applied? Why?
- What kind of global reputation and reach do we have currently? What needs to be improved?

Unpacking of the status quo:

- Examining the evolution of warfare to this point
- What kind of conflicts are we fighting?
- Which of these conflicts do we define as an armed conflict, or all-out war?
- How are we defining success? What is the government's intention, and how has this evolved?
- Can the UK accurately determine the impact of any military actions on the ground - both regarding combatants and the impact on civilians
- Can the UK conduct aerial warfare to its high standard without deploying forces on the ground to provide key intelligence? This is especially acute in urban environments where the intelligence gathered from the air is limited.
- What assumptions are we working to?
- When collaborating with partners, what are the military, societal or political ramifications of any civilian harm that has been caused, and to what degree is the UK contributing to these? How do these ramifications affect the achievement of the UK's broader foreign policy, developmental and security objectives?
- Can the UK accurately assess how its support to partners (whether through sales and maintenance of British weapons and equipment, sharing of assets and intelligence, embedding of personnel, and use of UK territory) is being used?
- How have we had to adapt our strategy since the last review? Is there a system for this, a process in place, ability to allocate resources and adapt?
- How have current military engagements and the strategy behind them been communicated? To: Parliament; the public; the armed forces; our allies; in multilateral organisations.

Evaluate the efficacy of current approaches and strategy. Is the status quo working?

- What is working?
- Do any approaches have an impact on how likely a threat is to emerge? How is this calculated?
- What is not working?
- Can the UK conduct aerial warfare to its high standard without deploying forces on the ground to provide key intelligence?
- How are we measuring success? What have we achieved?
- Do UK current partner operations support long-term British strategy and aims across Government Departments?
- What gaps in information and policy do we have?
- How do we capture lessons? Are these shared adequately, across theatres of operation, and embedded into future planning?
- How do we evaluate?
- Who is involved?
- Is there sufficient joint-up working?
- What existing initiatives are there to future-proof our current working?
- Are we agile, resilient and adaptable enough to react to changes?
- What assumptions have been proved wrong?
- Are our alliances working for UK and global interests? What needs to change?